The slides are about the terrorism and counter terrorism strategy of 21st century.

1. Group Members-
Kazi Majharul Alam (1501085)
Kazi Mashrur Jaman (1501041)
Md.Abdullah Bin Halim (1501048)

2. Questions
 1. How do you evaluate the logic of suicide terrorism?
Discuss the linkage between religion and terrorism.
Do you find any relevance of Islamic terrorism with
the fifth wave of terrorism? Substantiate your answer
with appropriate examples.
 2. Compare and contrast the counter-terrorism
strategy of UN, EU and USA. Do you see any
qualitative difference in the US National Counter-
terrorism Strategy in between and after the 9/11 terror
attack? Write your answer with relevant examples.

3. Terrorism
 Most researchers tend to believe that an objective and
internationally accepted definition of terrorism can never
be agreed upon; after all, they say, ‘‘one man’s terrorist is
another man’s freedom fighter’’.
 The question of who is a terrorist, according to this school
of thought, depends entirely on the subjective outlook of
the definer.
 Ref-Ganor, B., 2002. Defining terrorism: Is one man's terrorist another
man's freedom fighter?. Police Practice and Research, 3(4), pp.287-304.

4. Terrorism
 The definition proposed here states that terrorism is
the intentional use of, or threat to use, violence against
civilians or against civilian targets, in order to attain
political aims
The essence of the activity
 The aim of the activity is always political
The targets of terrorism are civilians.
Ref- Ganor, B., 2002. Defining terrorism: Is one man's
terrorist another man's freedom fighter?. Police
Practice and Research, 3(4), pp.287-304.

5. Suicide terrorism
 “Suicide terrorism” is the most aggressive form of
terrorism, pursuing coercion even at the expense of
angering not only the target community but neutral
audiences as well. What distinguishes a suicide terrorist is
that the attacker does not expect to survive the mission and
often employs a method of attack (such as a car bomb,
suicide vest, or ramming an airplane into a building) that
requires his or her death in order to succeed. In essence,
suicide terrorists kill others at the same time that they kill
themselves.
Ref- Ref-Pape, R.A., 2006. Dying to win: The strategic logic of
suicide terrorism. Random House Incorporated

6. Evaluating the logic of suicide terrorism
 The idea that choosing terrorism might be rational has,
for the most part, been limited to rational choice theory
models that suggest terrorism yields unique
sociopolitical gains.
 Political scientist Robert Pape has argued, for example,
that the seemingly irrational phenomenon of suicide
terrorism can be understood as logical if it is accepted
that the irrationality of the individual act (suicide) is
superceded by the group’s reasonable expectation that its
strategy (coercing political concessions via a reign of
terror) will yield results.
Ref-McBride, M.K., 2011. The logic of terrorism: Existential anxiety, the search for meaning,
and terrorist ideologies. Terrorism and political violence, 23(4), pp.560-581.

7. Evaluating the logic of suicide terrorism
 Suicide terrorism is a response by weaker actors against
foreign occupation by democratic states. Democracies are
the most likely targets of suicide terrorism, he claims,
because their “publics have low thresholds of cost tolerance
and high ability to affect state policy.
 Democracies are the most likely targets of suicide
terrorism, he claims, because their “publics have low
thresholds of cost tolerance and high ability to affect state
policy”.
Ref-Pape, R.A., 2006. Dying to win: The strategic logic of
suicide terrorism. Random House Incorporated.

8. Evaluating the logic of suicide terrorism
 Three interrelated conclusions have drawn in the book of
‘Dying to win’
 1) suicide terrorism is a “response to foreign occupation”.
 2) suicide terrorism has increased markedly during this
period because groups have learned that terrorism “works”
to repel foreign occupiers .
 3) to mitigate the terrorism threat, the United States
should eliminate the conditions that gave rise to it in the
first place, namely foreign occupations.
Ref-Pape, R.A., 2006. Dying to win: The strategic logic of
suicide terrorism. Random House Incorporated.

9. Evaluating the logic of suicide terrorism
 To demonstrate that terrorist groups are generally
motivated by a desire to repel occupation, Pape shows
that, of the 315 separate attacks, 301 of them were
perpetrated as part of a “large, coherent political or
military campaign” against a foreign occupier
Ref-Pape, R.A., 2006. Dying to win: The strategic logic of
suicide terrorism. Random House Incorporated.

10. Linkage between Religion and
Terrorism
 Religious ideas and institutions are particularly powerful
constructs in the struggle to lessen existential anxiety.
Becker argues, for example, that religion is the best
construct for ameliorating existential anxiety because it
‘‘solves the problem of death.
 A variety of psychological needs and write, ‘‘No other
repositories of cultural meaning have historically offered so
much in response to the human need to develop a secure
identity. Consequently, religion often is at the core of
individual and group identity.
Ref-McBride, M.K., 2011. The logic of terrorism: Existential anxiety, the search
for meaning, and terrorist ideologies. Terrorism and political
violence, 23(4), pp.560-581

11. Linkage between Religion and
Terrorism
 To be clear, this model does not suggest that religion is the primary
catalyst for terrorist ideologies or violence. Psychologists have noted
that ‘‘there is no special relation between religion and violence’’.
 In a 2001 study on the relationship between terrorism and religion,
political scientist Mark Juergensmeyer found that though religion
served an ideological and organizational role in facilitating terrorism, it
was not a principal motivator.
Ref-McBride, M.K., 2011. The logic of terrorism: Existential anxiety, the
search for meaning, and terrorist ideologies. Terrorism and political
violence, 23(4), pp.560-581

12. Linkage between Religion and
Terrorism
 A recent psychological research on the function of
religion has shown that religion alleviates stress in the
face of adverse situations. One study found that, when
exposed to terrorism (i.e., when existential anxiety was
heightened), participants characterized as religious
and ultra-religious experienced less ‘‘psychological
distress’’ than participants described as traditional or
secular.
Ref-McBride, M.K., 2011. The logic of terrorism: Existential anxiety, the search
for meaning, and terrorist ideologies. Terrorism and political
violence, 23(4), pp.560-581

13. Linkage between Religion and
Terrorism
 As a result, terrorist recruits are offered a two-for-one
deal in which the terrorist ideology combines the
meaning-giving value of organizational identification
with the meaning-giving capacity of religion.

14. Linkage between Religion and
Terrorism
 Religion has been used as a tools of terrorism on the fourth wave
of terrorism . For example,
IS’s formidable means of communication has been quite open
about its belief that they are waging the final struggle under a
leader who fits precisely the Prophet’s description of the final
Mahdi, in whose veins flows the blood of the Family of the
Prophet.
 Abu Turab Al Mugaddasi: ‘‘If Allah wills, we will kill those who
worship stones in Mecca and destroy the Kaaba. People go to
Mecca to touch the stones, not for Allah.
 Ref-Kaplan, J. and Costa, C.P., 2015. The Islamic State and the
new tribalism. Terrorism and Political Violence, 27(5), pp.926-
969.

15. Islamic Terrorism
Islamic terrorism is defined as any terrorist act, set of
acts or campaign committed by groups or individuals
who profess Islamic or Islamist motivations or
goals. Islamic terrorists justify their violent tactics
through the interpretation
of Quran and Hadith according to their own goals and
intentions.The idea of Islamic supremacy is
encapsulated in the formula, “Islam is exalted and
nothing is exalted above it”.

16. Fifth wave of terrorism: Terrorist Semi
State Wave (2000-present)
 Henry Kissinger identifies fifth wave of terrorism as “state
within a state.”
 Researcher defines TSSs as rebel groups that
a) control portions of a weak state’s territory, maintaining
governance there;
b) but still launch terrorist attacks against third party
victim states (TPVS). Hence, the TSS does not just launch
attacks against the weak state whose territory it partially
controls (a phenomenon which is not new as it is typical of
most civil wars).
Ref- Honig, O. and Yahel, I., 2017. A Fifth Wave of Terrorism?
The Emergence of Terrorist Semi-States. Terrorism and
Political Violence

17. Terrorist Semi State Wave
 Tactics-mixed conventional and guerilla fighting,
shooting raids, suicide bombings.
 Formative Events- The American Invasion of Iraq, the
Arab Spring, Israel’s Pull-out from Lebanon.
 Financial source- Self-funding through taxes and
extraction of natural resources, State sponsorshi
Ref-Honig, O. and Yahel, I., 2017. A Fifth Wave of
Terrorism? The Emergence of Terrorist Semi-
States. Terrorism and Political Violence

18. Relevance of Islamic terrorism with
the fifth wave of terrorism
 In the early stages of the Arab Spring, that the Islamic
political parties would be able to seize control over some
countries in a democratic way, the secular Arab
regime/elements were able to prevent the realization of
this ambition.
 The Muslim Brotherhood President, Mohamed Morsi, was
ousted just 14 months after he became the first
democratically elected head of state in Egyptian history.
Ref-Honig, O. and Yahel, I., 2017. A Fifth Wave of Terrorism? The
Emergence of Terrorist Semi-States. Terrorism and Political Violence, pp.1-
19

19. Relevance of Islamic terrorism with
the fifth wave of terrorism
 Second, the growing Shia-Sunni division. Khomeini
focused on whether the state was ruled by a cleric
(wilayat al-Faqih).
 The 2003 war generated intense competition between
Sunnis and Shias over who would rule, a competition
which made many Shias in the region identify
themselves based on sectarian lines.

20. Relevance of Islamic terrorism with
the fifth wave of terrorism
 This competition resulted in sectarian violence
such as the bombing of the Shia Askari shrine in 2006, and
the 2008 street fights in Beirut following the quarrel
between Hezbollah and the Sunni Prime Minister of
Lebanon Siniora.
 This incidents have triggered hostile relation between shia
and sunni.
 It has been observed that religion is one of the major tool
to initiate fifth wave of terrorism.
Honig, O. and Yahel, I., 2017. A Fifth Wave of Terrorism? The Emergence of
Terrorist Semi-States. Terrorism and Political Violence, pp.1-19

21. Differences between fourth wave and
fifth wave
 According to O. HONIG AND I. YAHEL there are eight
dissimilarities between fourth wave and fifth wave .
Those are given below-
 A religious self-identity or merely the attempt to
exploit symbols for mobilization.
The extent of the group members’ religiosity and the
consequent strategic flexibility/pragmatism.
The geographical spread of the TSS phenomenon

22. Differences between fourth wave and
fifth wave
 Tactics
 The devoted defense of and attachment to a certain
territory (A “Homeland”).
 The extent of self-funding and independence from
sponsoring states.
 The size of the group’s fighting force and its implication for
its foreign/military policy
 The identity of targets and what it means about the nature
of the TSSs’ motivation .
Ref- Honig, O. and Yahel, I., 2017. A Fifth Wave of Terrorism?
The Emergence of Terrorist Semi-States. Terrorism and
Political Violence

23. Question-2
 Compare and contrast the counter-terrorism strategy
of UN, EU and USA. Do you see any qualitative
difference in the US National Counter-terrorism
Strategy in between and after the 9/11 terror attack?
Write your answer with relevant examples.

24. What is counter terrorism?
 Any kind of steps govt. took against the terrorism is
called the counter terrorism.
 After 9/11 attack it started broadly
 Elements: Fight root causes, Divert terrorist from
violence, incident management, using force etc.
 UN, US & EU took strategy against counter terrorism

25. Introducing UN strategy
 five-year proggramme for the period 2016-2020 was presented in
December 2015 to provide strategic focus on counter terrorism
 12 key areas marked for the full implementation of the Strategy at the
global, regional and national levels
 several international and regional forums, such as the Global
Counterterrorism Forum, working to assist in the implementation of
the Strategy
 The United Nations Counter-Terrorism Centre has an annual budget of
only $20 million to spend on capacity-building projects for all Member
States
Ref: UN global counter terrorism strategy, report of the secretary

26. Introducing UN strategy
 The United Nations General Assembly adopted the Global Counter-
Terrorism Strategy on 8 September 2006.(resolution 60/288)
 Every 2 years they reviewed it
 38 members in task force
 Worked Under the Secretary-General for dept. of Political Affairs
 The United Nations has been affected, with field
missions and country teams in Africa, Asia and the Middle East
attacked.
 “All of united nations” approaches
 A total of 745 participants from 125 Member States, 23 international
and
regional organizations and 26 United Nations, entities, as well as 67
civil society
organizations and private companies, participated in Geneva
conference in 2016
Ref: UN global counter terrorism strategy, report of the secretary

27. Ref: https://www.un.org/counterterrorism/ctitf/en/un-global-counter-terrorism-
strategy

28. Address the conditions conducive
to the spread of terrorism
 Conflict prevention, negotiation, mediation, conciliation, judicial
settlement, rule of law, peacekeeping and peace building- these areas
are marked for the reducing conflict
 Involvement of civil society is necessary to create the space in which
dialogue and alternatives to violent extremism can be promoted.
 Plan of action was taken where women and young people are included
in decision making process according to Security council resolution
2250
 110 projects under pillar 1.
Ref: UN global counter terrorism strategy, report of the secretary
general,2016, Page: 11-12

29. Measures to prevent and combat
terrorism
 Members states should help each other by sharing information, other
resources under the framework of the United Nations foreign terrorist
fighters capacity-building implementation plan.
 The International Criminal Police Organization (INTERPOL) has
assisted in these efforts by developing and strengthening essential
tools and resources.
 cooperation with the private sector through public-private partnerships
with financial institutions will be essential to make the success of these
objectives
 Decrease the affect of mass destruction UN the International
Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism.
 57 projects under pillar I
Ref: UN global counter terrorism strategy, report of the secretary
general,2016, Page: 12-14

30. Building State capacity and strengthening
the role of the United Nations
 The United Nations Counter-Terrorism Centre and other
parts of the United Nations system will continue to provide
capacity-building assistance to Member States and regional
organizations to advance the implementation of all four
pillars of the Strategy in a balanced manner.
 the United Nations Counter - Terrorism Centre will
support the development of regional counter-terrorism
strategies in other regions
 IMF, WB, International criminal police organization help
all the states to combat money laundering and financing of
terrorism
 108 projects under Pillar III
Ref: UN global counter terrorism strategy, report of the secretary

31. Ensuring Human rights and the rule of
law
 States must ensure to combat terrorism comply with their
obligations under international law, in particular human rights
law, refugee law and international humanitarian law.
 For ensuring the human rights of the victims and their families
UN takes the full responsibility
 UN expressed deepest sympathy and respect for the staffs whose
are serving for bringing peace against terrorism
 20 projects under Pillar IV
Ref: UN global counter terrorism strategy, report of the secretary
general,2016, Page: 14

32. US counter terrorism Strategy
 The Sept. 11, 2001, terrorist attacks made counterterrorism a
pillar of domestic and foreign policy in the U.S. and
beyond.
 Declared “war on terror” strategy
 Main goals: Protect the homeland, Diminish the power of
Al-Qa‘ida in South Asia, Arabian peninsula, south Africa
and many others
Ref: National strategy for counter terrorism, The white house, 2011, Page:

33. US strategy
Core Principles
 Adhering to U S Core Values
 Building Security Partnerships
 Applying CT Tools and Capabilities
Appropriately
 Building a Culture of Resilience
Ref: National strategy for counter terrorism, The white house, 2011, Page: 10

34. Adhering to US Core Values
 Respect for Human Rights
 Encouraging Responsive Governance
 Respect for Privacy Rights, Civil Liberties, and Civil
Rights
 Balancing Security and Transparency
 Upholding the Rule of Law
Ref: National strategy for counter terrorism, The white house,
2011, Page: 11-12

35. Building Security
Partnerships
Applying CT Tools and
Capabilities Appropriately
 Accepting Varying Degrees of
Partnership
 Leveraging Multilateral
Institutions
Ref: National strategy for
counter terrorism, The white
house, 2011, Page: 12-13
 Pursuing a “Whole-of-
Government” Effort
 Balancing Near- and Long-
Term CT Considerations
Ref: National strategy for
counter terrorism, The white
house, 2011, Page: 13

36. Building a Culture of Resilience
 Building Essential Components of Resilience
US Overarching goal
 Protect the American People, Homeland, and American Interests
 Disrupt, Degrade, Dismantle, and Defeat al-Qa‘ida and Its Affiliates
and Adherents
 Prevent Terrorist Development, Acquisition, and Use of Weapons of
Mass Destruction
 Degrade Links between al-Qa‘ida and its Affiliates and Adherents
Ref: National strategy for counter terrorism, The white house, 2011, Page:
14-16

37. EU counter terrorism strategy
 In 2005, the Council adopted the EU counter-terrorism strategy to fight
terrorism globally and make Europe safer.
 EU fully support the US’s counter terrorism strategy “War o terror” and
worked under it.
 TREVI (Terrorisme, Radicalisme, Extrémisme et Violence
Internationale), created in 1976
 The Strategy explains how Member States of the European Union have
to: prevent new recruits to terrorism, protect possible goals, pursue the
aim of obstructing terrorists' capacity to plan and organize a threat
 EU strategy require to work at national, European & International level
to reduce the threat from terrorism
Ref: COOLSAET, R., EU counterterrorism strategy: value added or chimera?

38. EU Strategy
The strategy focuses on four pillars:
 prevent
 protect
 pursue
 respond
Across these pillars, the strategy recognizes the
importance of cooperation with third countries and
international institutions.

39. Prevent
 Prevent’ stands for the radicalization process by tackling the root
causes which can lead to radicalization and recruitment.
 The Council adopted an EU strategy for combating radicalization and
recruitment to terrorism in 2008.
 Develop common approach to stop and tackle the problem behavior
 Develop a media and communication strategy to explain better EU
policies Develop good governance, democracy, education
Ref: http://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/policies/fight-
against-terrorism/eu-strategy/

40. Protect
 Protect’ aims at sheltering citizens and infrastructure from
new attacks.
 This includes securing external borders, improving
transport security, protecting strategic targets and reducing
the vulnerability of critical infrastructure.

41. Pursue
 ‘Pursue’ relates to the efforts to chase and investigate terrorists
and their networks across our borders.
 The EU is working to hinder terrorists' capacity to plan and
organize, and to bring these terrorists to justice.
 To achieve the goals, the EU has focused on:
 strengthening national capabilities
 Improving cooperation and information exchange between
police and judicial authorities
 Tackling terrorist financing
 Depriving terrorists of their means of support and
communication
Ref: The European counter terrorism strategy, Council of the EU,
2005

42. Respond
 ‘Respond’ puts into practice the 2004 Solidarity clause by enhancing
consequence management mechanisms and capabilities to be used in case of
an attack in one of the member-states.
 This is done by improving capabilities to deal with the aftermath, the
coordination of the response, and victims' needs.
 Priorities in this area include:
 Developing EU crisis coordination arrangements
 Revising the civil protection mechanism
 Developing risk assessment tools
 Sharing best practices on assistance to victims of terrorism

43. Contrast
 UN, US and EU all are mainly fight against the
terrorism.
 UN and EU support the national strategy of USA’s
“War on terror”.
 All the countries are ready to help each other with the
possible assistances.
 EU’s prevent strategy directly similar to the war on
terror strategy of US .

44. Compare
 As the common view of all are against the terrorism
there is not so much comparison.
 US strategy mainly focused on the decrease of Al-
Qa‘ida’s activities
 UN and EU strategies are almost similar.

45. US National Counter-terrorism Strategy before 9/11
terror attack
 Before 2001, the United States was not prepared to
wage such a decades-long struggle.
 American power was mainly directed at deterring
aggression from nation-states.
 The United States treated terrorism largely as a law-
enforcement concern, not a matter of war and peace.

46. US National Counter-terrorism Strategy
before 9/11 terror attack
 But 9/11 marked an inflection point in our history, and
Americans came to view radical Islamist terrorism as
an existential threat to our values and way of life.

47. US National counter terrorism
strategy
 After the 9/11 attack US national counter terrorism strategy
has changed drastically.
 Bush Administration declared war on terror as a response
to the 9/11 attack.
 In response to the attacks of September 2001, the United
States embarked on a national effort against al-Qa‘ida, the
transnational terrorist organization responsible for
planning and conducting the attacks.
Ref: National strategy for counter terrorism, The white
house, 2011, Page: 14-16

48. Counter terrorism strategy of Obama
Administration
1. Separating the enemy from the populace to provides support and
sustenance.
This entails three basic missions:
a. Denial of enemy sanctuary
b. Elimination of enemy freedom of movement
c. Denial of enemy resources and support;
2. Identification and neutralization of the enemy;
3. Creation of a secure environment—progressing from local to regional to
global
4. Ongoing and effective neutralization of enemy propaganda and information
operations through the planning and execution
5. Interagency efforts to build effective and responsible civil governance
mechanisms to eliminate the causes of terrorism and insurgency.
Ref: Hoffman, B., 2010, A counter terrorism strategy for the Obama

49. Some approaches taken by us national
counter terrorism strategy as a response of
9/11 attack
 THWART ATTACKS AND PROTECT OUR
COMMUNITIES.
 STOP RECRUITMENT AND RADICALIZATION AT
HOME.
 KEEP TERRORISTS OUT OF AMERICA
 TAKE THE FIGHT TO THE ENEMY
 COMBAT TERRORIST TRAVEL AND CUT OFF
FINANCIAL RESOURCES
 DENY JIHADISTS ACCESS TO WEAPONS OF MASS
DESTRUCTION
 BLOCK TERRORISTS FROM RETURNING TO THE
BATTLEFIELD

50. Some approaches taken by us national
counter terrorism strategy as a response of
9/11 attack
 Establish multiple layers of security screening for
people and objects entering the country
 Undermine terrorists’ recruitment capability.
 Encourage these same communities to disavow and
expose terrorists who may be in their midst.
Ref- Adams, N., Nordhaus, T. and Shellenberger, M., 2011.
Counterterrorism since 9/11: evaluating the efficacy of
controversial tactics.