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By: Valerie Kong
28 February 2013
The role of drones in the War on Terror: How targeted killings are shaping
American foreign policy
In the debate surrounding the use of armed drones, the tool has become a symptom of a wider
issue with the U.S. government’s indefinite War on Terror.
Since the first known drone strike in 2004, an estimated 3,700 people have been killed in the
United States’ effort to track down and kill suspected terrorists and stop impending threats to the
country. Proponents of drones point to its unmanned capabilities and precision in eliminating
targets as an effective weapon for fighting terrorists. For some observers, the implications of
drone warfare reflect more problems with the very policies that have put it in place.
As drone strikes show no sign of slowing down, concerns about the administration’s use of this
weapon stem from uncertainties about its ethical and legal basis in American and international
law. But whether or not it achieves what it’s supposed to do may not matter if drones don’t have
a part in accomplishing the bigger goals of counterterrorism.
“Right now it’s justified, and legally justified,” says Joshua Foust, a fellow at the American
Security Project and contributor to The Atlantic.
Foust says under the Authorization for Use of Military Force (AUMF), the president has a
mandate to go after suspected terrorists to prevent any current or future attacks against the
United States.
The Department of Justice recently released a white paper explaining the government’s legal
framework for drone strikes on Americans, pointing to the president’s constitutional duty and
authority through the AUMF to protect the country.
“The bigger issue isn’t that the drones are out there doing stuff, it`s that the president has a
certain authority to kill people based on a secretive process. That’s really problematic,” says
Foust.
Winslow Wheeler, director of the Straus Military Reform Project at the Center for Defense
Information, says he doesn’t see this as a sufficient argument to deprive citizens of due process
and override their right to a fair trial in court.
“It’s inconvenient to the government to have to go out and arrest them, and bring them back here
and try them, but that’s what our constitution requires,” Wheeler says.

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The paper says that a balance between the person’s interests in living must be weighed against
the interest of the United States to prevent the death of other Americans from a terrorist attack or
threat.
While the paper addressed the case of Al-Qaeda suspects and U.S. citizens Anwar al-Awlaki and
Samir Khan, the government suggests that its rationale also holds up as self-defence under
international law.
The United States says it’s in state of armed conflict with al-Qaeda and any associated
organizations, nations or people, so using drones to go after them is legal since the country is at
war.
While state actors are covered under Article 51 of the UN Charter, terrorist groups don’t fall
under this category, and this is where some say the basis for drone strikes also comes up short.
“If you want to do that, you have to go the whole way, and accept that if these people are
combatants, then they must be treated as combatants in every respect,” says Paul Robinson, a
professor in the Graduate School of Public and International Affairs at the University of Ottawa.
“In my point of view, it’s inconsistent to try and justify what you’re doing using the war model
in one respect, but then discard the war model in another respect,” Robinson says, “One is a
combatant, or one is not a combatant.”
Drone strikes have been carried out in countries where the United States has declared war, like
Iraq and Afghanistan, but also in Yemen, Somalia and Pakistan.
The Pentagon and Joint Special Operations Command (JSOC) operate the targeted killings
program for theatres of war, while the CIA commands the second program as covert operations
in these other conflict zones.
The idea of irregular conflicts or irregular war, where the U.S. is fighting individuals and not
states, is the wrong way of looking at it, says Foust.
“Irregular warfare is the norm, and the way that we do warfare now with armies and set battles is
a fairly recent invention,” Foust says.
But the ability of drones to fly into remote locations and use lethal force does change how wars
are conducted, and Foust says this makes it a politically attractive policy.
“In Pakistan, we can’t for political reasons really use anything else. We can’t send in the FBI, we
can’t send in the air force, and the last time we sent in the SEALs, it created 11 months of
disruptions and violence in Afghanistan,” says Foust. “So all of these other ways of going after
these people pose huge, huge risks in a way that despite all these social and political issues with
drones, we just have to.”

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Estimates from the London-based Bureau of Investigative Journalism peg the number of
confirmed drone strikes in Pakistan, Yemen, and Somalia at just over 400, while the New
America Foundation estimates that 420 strikes have been carried out in Pakistan and Yemen
alone.
Both organizations cite a large increase in the use of drones, from an average of 50 strikes
carried out by the Bush administration to now over 300 under President Obama.
As drone warfare continues to be used in fighting terrorist groups abroad, mounting public
concern and media attention have questioned the number of civilian deaths and accountability for
the program.
“It depends on what your objectives are, it depends on the risks you’re willing to incur, and it
depends on the values you prioritize,” says Micah Zenko, a fellow with the Council on Foreign
Relations. “The costs are immeasurable, and the benefits are immeasurable, so it’s ultimately a
judgment.”
Robinson says while drone strikes have been able to eliminate a number of suspected terrorists,
the positive benefits beyond that are highly debatable.
“In some ways you might say no, because that’s several hundred people who were prepared to
fight that are not prepared to fight anymore,” says Robinson. “But then there are other negative
impacts due to the collateral damage, which may cause political difficulties, and which then
leads to further anti-American emotions.”
Calls for greater transparency and oversight over the program have been made in the media, and
politicians in U.S. have suggested the idea of a drone court to review decisions of targeted
killings by the executive branch.
With the secrecy of these covert programs and lack of clear data, the effectiveness of targeted
killings depends on its purpose in in a wider strategy, says Zenko.
“You would first have to articulate what your counterterrorism objectives are and then think
about your courses of action and what tools you apply,” says Zenko. “The AUMF isn’t an
objective; it’s a law by Congress.”
The United States carried out its first drone strike in Somalia in 2007, but the U.S. has been
operating in Pakistan and Yemen since 2004 and 2002.
Foust says that drones has played different roles in these countries, where in Yemen it has helped
the Yemeni army move in to seize ground and gain political control of the region, while in
Pakistan there have been varying results.
“Assuming there is a policy, we can’t measure it actually having an effect, and it’s here where
we’re wondering if we’re better off.”

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The White House announced it will reveal more information about the process for targeted
killings over the next several months, and ensure that proper checks and balances that are in
place.
“As a tool we can’t say that it’s definitely a disastrous failure, but we don’t have any good
evidence to suggest it has very positive results either,” says Robinson, “And I think that is a very
good argument against it, because there are costs, and there are known costs, and to involve
yourself in these known costs when the benefits are uncertain strikes me as unwise.”