A Review Of Pannenberg S Unity And Attributes Of The Divine Essence

COLUMBIA EVANGELICAL SEMINARY
Longview, WA
A Review of Unity and Attributes of the Divine Essence:
Wolfhart Pannenberg’s Systematic Theology Volume I.
Wolfhart Pannenberg’s Systematic Theology Volumes I, II, III
TH734 Term Paper
By
John Lawless, Student # JL-D-518
Longview, WA, U.S.A.
April 6, 2016
Professor: Mark Richardson, D.Min.

1
INTRODUCTION
Wolfhart Pannenberg (1929-2014) was a German theologian who, starting in
1991 through 1998, released a three volume set entitled Systematic Theology.1
As a
prelude to the release of the three volume set, he released an introductory publication
Introduction to Systematic Theology.2
E Frank Tupper believes, “The work of Wolfhart
Pannenberg constitutes one of the most significant theological developments in the
history of modern theology.”3
Pannenberg placed a substantial emphasis on the use of reason and the study of
history as part of his methodology. Stanley Grenz states, “Pannenberg has repeatedly
been described as a rationalist. Several conservative critics have found aspects of his
rationalistic approach problematic for the relation between faith and reason.” Grenz
continues, “Pannenberg has failed to see the human problem of spiritual blindness goes
deeper than merely a lack of historic evidence.”4
Pannenberg believed the understanding sought by contemporary Christians
necessitated a joining of the two horizons of history and reason. Jim Halsey expresses
this view referring to Pannenberg’s position, “Thus the text is only understood when
1
Wolfhart Pannenberg, Systematic Theology, (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans,
1991–1998).
2
Wolfhart Pannenberg, Introduction to Systematic Theology, (Grand Rapids,
MI: Eerdmans, 1991).
3
E. Frank Tupper, “The Christology of Wolfhart Pannenberg,” Review and
Expositor 71, no. 1 (1974): p. 57.
4
Stanley Grenz, The Theology of Wolfhart Pannenberg, Carl E. Braatan and
Philip Clayton eds. (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 1988), p. 23.

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the whole of the history which forms the continuity between past and present is
grasped.”5
Daniel Clendenein remarks concerning the reasoning aspect of Pannenberg’s
methodology, “In the words of the contemporary German theologian Wolfhart
Pannenberg: ‘Every theological statement must prove itself on the field of reason and
can no longer be argued on the basis of unquestioned presuppositions of faith.’”6
Pannenberg’s Systematic Theology Volume One presents Pannenberg’s
discussion of God’s essence and attributes. His arguments and methodology concerning
God’s essence attributes and the difference between them are worth the attention of the
twenty-first century Christian. Therefore, this author has chosen to review the Unity
and Attributes of the Divine Essence, as found in Pannenberg’s Systematic Theology
Volume One Chapter Six.
THE MAJESTY OF GOD
Beginning the discussion of the Majesty of God Pannenberg announces, “Any
intelligent attempt to talk about God—talk that is critically aware of its conditions and
limitations—must begin and end with confession of the inconceivable majesty of God
which transcends all our concepts.”7
Even though God is incomprehensible in both his
transcendence and immanence the discussion of God is a subject embraceable by
mankind. What mankind knows about God is a result of general and special revelation.
5
Jim S. Halsey, “History, Language, and Hermeneutic: The Synthesis of
Wolfhart Pannenberg,” Westminster Theological Journal 41, no. 2 (1978): p. 283.
6
Daniel Clendenin, “What the Orthodox Believe,” Christian History Magazine-
Issue 54: Eastern Orthodoxy (Carol Stream, IL: Christianity Today, 1997), np.
7
Pannenberg, Systematic Theology Volume 1, p. 337.

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Pannenberg held in high regard the writings of Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel. In
Pannenberg’s words,
But I also had to teach courses concerned with the Lutheran Reformation and,
especially, with the history of modern Protestant theology. It was in this connection
that I came to appreciate the importance of Hegel’s thought in the development of
modern theology, but mainly as a challenge to theology. I never became a Hegelian,
but I decided that theology has to be developed on at least the same level of
sophistication as Hegel’s philosophy and for that reason I studied his writings
carefully and repeatedly.8
Pannenberg goes to Hegel for his first supporting source, “To the abstract thesis that we
can know nothing of God Hegel rightly replied that it robs the thought of God of any
definite content (PhB, 59, 40–41; ET Lectures, I, 86–87) and expresses a position
which in fact makes the finite Ego absolute (pp. 137ff.; ET I, 297).”9
Pannenberg follows up with Immanuel Kant as a second source, “With
increasing insight into the dimensions of the theme the very plurality and variety of
what we have to consider leads to an ever deeper recognition of the inconceivable
sublimity of the divine essence.”10
Despite the great respect Pannenberg has for the
majesty of God, he still agrees with the need to pursue a discussion of the majesty of
God. There was a sense within Pannenberg of an existing tension between the greatness
8
Wolfhart Pannenberg. The Theology of Wolfhart Pannenberg, Carl E. Braatan
and Philip Clayton eds. (Minneapolis, MN: Augsburg Publishing House, 1988), p. 17.
9
Pannenberg, Systematic Theology Volume 1, p. 337, cites Georg Wilhelm
Friedrich Hegel, Lectures on the History of Philosophy Volume 1. Translated by E. S.
Haldane. Vol. 1. 3 vols. The English and Foreign Philosophical Library. (London:
Kegan Paul, Trench, Trübner & Co., 1892), pp. 86, 87, 297.
10
Pannenberg, Systematic Theology Volume 1, p. 337 cites Immanuel Kant,
Kant’s Kritik of Judgment. Translated by J. H. Bernard. (London; New York:
Macmillan and Co., 1892), p. 94.

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of God and the need to raise and further a discussion of God.
Pannenberg sees a source of God’s majesty as infinity, “Much work has been
done on the concept in the history of thinking about the knowledge of God. But the
results have not been wholly satisfactory because we can conceive of the Infinite but
not comprehend it as such.”11
The finding of this infinite God requires one to search out
God with all one’s heart. If mankind chooses to take on this search he will find him,
“But from there you will seek the LORD your God, and you will find him if you search
after him with all your heart and with all your soul” (Deuteronomy 4: 29).12
Pannenberg
also points the searcher to Jeremiah and Matthew in his defense of the need to search
for God with all one’s heart (Jeremiah 29:13-14; Matthew 7: 7).
Pannenberg considered this a worthwhile journey and yet did not preclude from
critically reflecting on this concept of the incomprehensiveness of God, “There must
still be a criticism of the anthropomorphism of religious ideas of God. Logical
conditions must be formulated for the concept of the one God as the source of the world
as a whole.”13
Pannenberg considers this journey must go through the Son, “To know
the incomprehensible God, therefore, we must hold fast to the Son. This is the point of
Luther’s distinction between deus revelatus and deus absconditus.”14
Pannenberg
11
Pannenberg, Systematic Theology Volume 1, pp. 338–339.
12
Unless otherwise indicated, all Scripture is from the English Standard
Version Bible (Crossway Bibles, Copyright © 2001, 2007, 2008).
13
14
Ibid., cites E. Jüngel, “Quae supra nos, nihil ad nos,” in Entsprechungen.
Theologische Erörterungen (Munich, 1980), pp. 229ff.

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continues, “The many-faceted concept of the deus absconditus (cf. Isa. 45:15) embraces
the hiddenness of God from sinners, whether in salvation or in judgment, the
unsearchability of his counsel, and the incomprehensibility of his essence.”15
Pannenberg sees the revelation of the Son as the incomprehensiveness of God
revealed. The eventual consummation of the revelation of the Son, according to
Pannenberg, completed in the eschaton. Pannenberg gave the supporting statement,
“Only at the end of history will the God who is hidden in his overruling of history and
in individual destinies finally be universally known to be the same as the God who is
revealed in Jesus Christ.”16
Even though God is conceivable but not comprehensible,
there is hope in knowledge through the revelation of the Son.
Pannenberg considers another aspect of the incomprehensiveness of God exists
in the Trinity, “It has supposed that the existence and essence of the one God are
accessible to rational knowledge through the works of creation, but that we may know
the trinitarian distinctions only by special revelation. Along these lines statements about
the mystery of the Trinity have been put after those about the one God and his
attributes.”17
Pannenberg remarks, “In contrast, the Trinity is absolutely as well as
relatively beyond the reach of natural knowledge.”18
Pannenberg defends, “It was more
difficult, however, to view the trinity of Father, Son, and Spirit as an expression of one
15
Ibid., pp. 340–341.
16
Ibid.
17
Ibid., p. 342.
18
Ibid.

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and the same divine essence. Once the dogma was established at Nicea and
Constantinople in the 4th century, the central problem of the doctrine of the Trinity was
not the trinity but the unity of the trinitarian God.”19
As the early church struggled with the trinitarian unity, it became evident;
similar difficulty also existed with the idea of the divine essence of God and his
attributes. Pannenberg once again returns to an early church father reference, “Gregory
of Nazianzus stressed the incomprehensibility of the divine essence, and Gregory of
Nyssa based this on his doctrine of the infinity of God.”20
Pannenberg continues with a
reference to Gregory of Nyssa, “If God is infinite, he said, it follows that we cannot
ultimately define his essence, for it is indescribable (adiexitēton).”21
Todd S. Labute summarizes, “For Pannenberg, then, ‘even the question of
God’s reality, of his existence in view of his debatability in the world as atheistic
criticism in particular articulates it, can find a final answer only in the event of
eschatological world renewal if God is viewed as love and therefore as the true
Infinite.’”22
19
Ibid., p. 343.
20
Ibid., cites Gregory Nazianzen, “Select Orations of Saint Gregory
Nazianzen,” in S. Cyril of Jerusalem, S. Gregory Nazianzen, ed. Philip Schaff and
Henry Wace, trans. Charles Gordon Browne and James Edward Swallow, vol. 7, A
Select Library of the Nicene and Post-Nicene Fathers of the Christian Church, Second
Series (New York: Christian Literature Company, 1894), p. 292.
21
Ibid., cites Gregory Nazianzen, p. 292.
22
Todd S. Labute, “The Ontological Motif of Anticipation in the Theology of
Wolfhart Pannenberg,” Journal of the Evangelical Theological Society 37, no. 2
(1994): p. 282.

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Unlike Gregory of Nyssa, John of Damascus thought the incomprehensiveness
of God went beyond the infinity of God. Pannenberg includes this in his reflections,
“We have, then, adequately demonstrated that there is a God and that His essence is
incomprehensible.”23
Pannenberg brings his discussion of God’s majesty to a close with a discussion
of Thomas Aquinas and his view of God’s incomprehensiveness. Aquinas postulates,
“To know the essence of a thing we must say what it is, not what it is not.”24
Pannenberg summarizes, “This is the material core of Aquinas’s doctrine that only by
analogy can we attribute positive descriptions of God to the divine essence.”25
Pannenberg’s complaint was the idea of people trying to define God by what God is
not, apophatic. He felt if one is to satisfy one’s search for the incomprehensible God it
must include the positive aspects of who God is, kataphatic. Pannenberg dictates, “To
know the essence of a thing we must say what it is, not what it is not.”26
Pannenberg
determined despite some of the apophatic methodology used by Aquinas his First
Cause viewpoint allowed him to speak of God from a kataphatic methodology.
23
Pannenberg, Systematic Theology Volume 1, p. 343 cites John Damascene,
“An Exact Exposition of the Orthodox Faith,” in St. Hilary of Poitiers, John of
Damascus, ed. Philip Schaff and Henry Wace, trans. S. D. F. Salmond, vol. 9b, Nicene
and Post-Nicene Fathers of the Christian Church, Second Series (New York: Christian
Literature Company, 1899), p. 4.
24
Ibid., p. 344.
25
Ibid., p. 345, cites Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologica, trans. Fathers of the
English Dominican Province (London: Burns Oates & Washbourne, n.d.), ST 1.13.5.
26
Ibid.

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Pannenberg further appreciated what William of Occam stated, “If we are to
have a knowledge of God it must be from not only general but also distinctive terms.” 27
Occam saw God and his creation being infinitely distinctive. Pannenberg summarizes
his discussion of the majesty of God, “God’s incomprehensibility has to do with his
infinity and with the infinite unity of his essence.”28
THE DISTINCTIONS BETWEEN GOD’S ESSENCE AND EXISTENCE
As a connection between God’s majesty and a further examination of God’s
essence and existence Pannenberg confirms, “The conceptuality of such a description
demands closer examination already, as do also the presupposed distinctions between
existence and essence (or substance) and between essence and attributes.”29
Pannenberg opens this section, “The thesis that God’s essence is
incomprehensible did not stop the fathers from maintaining that we may know God’s
existence.”30
As has already been determined, God is infinite and, therefore,
incomprehensible. Since mankind is a finite creation of God, how can mankind even
conceive of an infinite God? Pannenberg first presents a viewpoint of John of
Damascus, “Thus John of Damascus argued that knowledge of the existence of God is
implanted in us by nature even though it has been obscured by sin to the point of denial
27
William of Occam, Scriptum in Librum Primum Sententiarum (Ordinatio 1),
prol. q. 2, Opera, I (St. Bonaventure, NY, 1967), pp. 117.14ff.
28
29
Ibid., p. 347.
30
Ibid., p. 348.

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of God.”31
Referred to as the ontological evidence for God. The idea that mankind a
finite creation can even conceive of an infinite God is because God has placed that
concept in his mind. Pannenberg also presents support from Gregory of Nyssa
concerning the knowledge of God from ontological resources.32
Pannenberg
summarizes this position, “In spite of the incomprehensibility, then, there go hand in
hand with the knowledge of God’s existence certain insights, albeit negative, regarding
his deity.”33
Pannenberg sets off to define just what this concept of knowing God exists but
not be able to comprehend God’s infinity or essence. He begins with Aquinas’ position
there must be a first cause for all that exists. Aquinas used regression methodology and
determined God must be the first cause of everything that exists. Aquinas then inferred
from the first cause position the simplicity of God, then his perfection, goodness,
infinity, eternity, and unity.34
Pannenberg indicated, later scholars found this harder to
accept in its entirety. Pannenberg related Occam had a mixed acceptance of Aquinas’
31
Ibid., cites John Damascene. “An Exact Exposition of the Orthodox Faith.” In
St. Hilary of Poitiers, John of Damascus, edited by Philip Schaff and Henry Wace,
translated by S. D. F. Salmond. Vol. 9. A Select Library of the Nicene and Post-Nicene
Fathers of the Christian Church, Second Series. New York: Christian Literature
Company, 1899, p. 2.
32
Gregory of Nyssa. “The Great Catechism.” In Gregory of Nyssa: Dogmatic
Treatises, Etc., edited by Philip Schaff and Henry Wace, translated by William Moore.
Vol. 5. A Select Library of the Nicene and Post-Nicene Fathers of the Christian Church,
Second Series. New York: Christian Literature Company, 1893, p. 477.
33
34
Thomas Aquinas. Summa Theologica. Translated by Fathers of the English
Dominican Province. London: Burns Oates & Washbourne, n.d., p. 1.3ff.

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position, “Occam agreed that God’s independence and goodness follow directly from
his existence as a first cause, but not his unity, infinity, or omnipotence.”35
Pannenberg
being the historian states, “Based on simplicity, the fact that essence and existence are
the same in God also lost its central importance for the doctrine of God.”36
Pannenberg felt there was a large separation between knowing there is a God
and knowing what or who of God. Pannenberg does agree the Protestant theologians of
earlier times saw it more clearly, “The older Protestant theologians saw clearly,
however, that those who assert the existence of God must have some idea of his
essence, no matter how vague or general.”37
Pannenberg points out there is a certain
knowledge of God already. Accepting Aquinas’ position on the first cause, mankind
knows God to be the Creator of all things. The apophatic aspect of this viewpoint has a
drawback, not much else revealed concerning God, particularly the in-depth
information provided by a biblical concept of God.
There is a point about God; he depends on no one for his existence. If God
depends on no one, then he is infinite. Duns Scotus saw this as a major point, “Duns
Scotus emphasized again that infinity is not just one divine attribute among others but
has basic significance for the whole concept of God.”38
35
Pannenberg, Systematic Theology Volume 1, p. 349, cites Occam, Scriptum,
prol. q. 2, Opera, IV, p. 357.9.
36
Ibid.
37
Ibid., p. 350.
38
Ibid.

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Pannenberg now examines the philosophy of Rene Descartes concerning the
infinity of God. Descartes saw the first intuition of God supplanted in mankind by God
is the basis for all other knowledge. Descartes also felt all that mankind can imagine
within a finite context is limited by the infinite. Pannenberg summarizes, “Though he
only hints at this decisive thesis, it is the basis of his view that the idea of the infinite
comprises that of perfection because it obviously contains more reality than all that is
thought to be limited by it.”39
John of Damascus derived God’s infinity from his
perfection; while Descartes reverses that, “Descartes reversed the argument on the basis
of his idea that our views of finite objects are formed by limitation of the infinite. In
this way he succeeded in equating the idea of the infinite as such with the traditional
concept of God.”40
Pannenberg continues with other sources equating the idea of God’s existence,
and essence contained together. Occam among many did not agree with the idea of
deriving God’s infinity from God being the first cause. It was because of Descartes’
work reviving the ontological evidence for God was successful. Pannenberg
documents, “The absolute superiority of the divine being and the idea of God as a
necessary being also seemed to him to be posited herewith, so that he was able to revive
the ontological argument by deriving the thesis of God’s existence from the concept of
his essence.”41
39
Ibid., p. 351.
40
Ibid.
41
Ibid., p. 352.

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The idea of infinity is a confusing concept for mankind and yet it does not hold
man back from searching out God. The revelation of the Son, as Pannenberg sees it, is
the revelation that God’s essence is love.
Pannenberg details, “The Son also reveals the existence of the Father, and by
the sending of the Son the Father reveals his essence, his eternal love (John 3:16).”42
From much earlier in Pannenberg’s career, “According to this, God himself is fully and
completely present in Jesus; Jesus Christ is not a mere man, but a divine person.”43
In
support of Pannenberg’s position, Michael F. Bird states, “As long as the Son shares the
same essence and substance as the Father and eternally co-exists with the Father, he can
only be regarded as being one with the Father in an ontological sense.”44
Pannenberg
concludes this section with a parting comment about the one essence of God and the
three personalities, “But in the Father, Son, and Spirit the divine essence has the
specific form of its existence—not merely the forms but the form, since the three
persons constitute a single constellation.”45
GOD’S ESSENCE AND ATTRIBUTES AND THE LINK BETWEEN
THEM IN ACTION
42
Ibid., p. 358.
43
Donald Macleod, “The Christology of Wolfhart Pannenberg,” Themelios:
Volume 25, No. 2, February 2000 (2000): p. 34, cites W. Pannenberg, Jesus—God and
Man (London: SCM Press, 1968). Translated from the German Grundzüge der
Christologie (Gutersloher, 1964), p. 121.
44
Michael F. Bird and Robert Shillaker, “Subordination in the Trinity and
Gender Roles: A Response to Recent Discussions,” Trinity Journal 29, no. 2 (2008): p.
270.
45

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Pannenberg continues his discussion on God’s essence, “The question of the
essence thus becomes that of the attributes that characterize God’s working.”46
Pannenberg switches from a strict form of reasoning to a subjective viewpoint.
Pannenberg believes since there is not a list of God’s attributes contained in the
Scriptures, mankind knows of God’s attributes through the experiences of God’s
manifestations. Pannenberg reflects on this principle, “Thus many qualities of God are
manifested in his works.”47
If God is a single essence how does one relate the numerous
attributes to the singular essence?
Pannenberg speaks to the idea we cannot know essence because it is unseen. We
can only know essence by the actions of the attributes of the substance. The problem
arises when one tries to refer to God as a thing. Finitude places a heavy burden on
mankind when one attempts to understand the infinite essence which manifests itself in
a plurality of attributes. Pannenberg believes, “The divine essence is not a thing that is
simply something in distinction from all else. Finitude is essential to the definition of a
thing. But God is infinite. Nevertheless, when ascribing attributes to God, we do in fact
speak of him as an object that we distinguish from others by its attributes.”48
One solution to the singular essence manifested by plural attributes is Aquinas,
“Thus Aquinas says that the perfections preexist in God in unity and simplicity but are
46
Ibid., p. 360.
47
Ibid.
48
Ibid.

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divided and multiple in creatures.”49
Pannenberg does not agree with this position. He
uses a comment by Barth to support his position, “Thus ‘the idea of the divine
simplicity was necessarily exalted to the all-controlling principle, the idol, which
devouring everything concrete, stands behind all these formulas.’”50
Pannenberg further
states:
If we try to trace back the multiplicity of the qualities that are attributed to God, in
distinction from the unity of his essence, to the multiplicity of his outward relations,
and in this way to rescue the unity of the divine essence, there follows not only an
abstract and empty notion of the essence but even more fatefully a fundamental
contradiction in the idea of God that has destructive consequences for the whole
concept of God.51
D. F. Strauss supports Pannenberg’s position, “This inner contradiction is that God is
not to be really distinguished from his attributes but is to be distinguished from the
functions that form the stuff of his attributes as something that stands behind them.”52
Pannenberg sees this as the beginning of the projection thesis. The attributes of the
divine are not attributes at all but rather are merely projections from the finite creations
of God.
Pannenberg refers to a short book published in 1898. The book supports his idea
49
Ibid., p. 362, cites Thomas Aquinas. Summa Theologica. Translated by
Fathers of the English Dominican Province. London: Burns Oates & Washbourne, n.d.,
p. 1.13.4.
50
Ibid., cites Karl Barth, Church Dogmatics (G. W. Bromiley and T. F.
Torrance eds. Peabody, MA: Hendrickson Publishers, 2010), p. II/1 329.
51
Pannenberg, Systematic Theology Volume 1, pp. 362–363.
52
Ibid., p. 363, cites D. F. Strauss, Die Christliche Glaubenslehre, I (Tubingen,
1840), pp. 542–43.

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of God’s attributes are nothing more than the manifestation of God’s essence by way of
the actions of the divine essence. Pannenberg believes the concept of divine action is at
the heart of the contributions of modern theology toward the understanding of the
divine attributes. Herman Cremer authored the above mentioned book, Die Christliche
Lehre von den Eigenschaften Gottes (The Christian Doctrine of the Properties of God).
Cremer states, “We know God only through his action for us and to us.”53
Cremer
continues, “Since we have to regard action as purposeful activity, it gives evidence of
qualities of will and ability which are also qualities of essence. The God who acts, who
sets and achieves goals, can no more be without qualities than his action can.”54
Pannenberg continues his defense of actions and attributes, “It is still true,
however, that the choice of a goal stands related to the one who chooses and who acts
accordingly, so that the one who makes the choice is essentially characterized by the
selection and fulfilment of the goal, displaying essential qualities by action.”55
Pannenberg further supports attributes and actions, “In the case of personal action the
essence of the subject may be seen in the choice and achievement of the goal so that the
kind of action characterizes the one who acts.”56
If one wants to know what God’s
attributes are, according to Pannenberg, one should examine God’s actions. Cremer
53
Ibid., 368, cites Hermann Cremer, Die Christliche Lehre von den
Eigenschaften Gottes, (Charleston, SC: BiblioLife Publishers, LLC, 2009 [1897]), p. 9.
54
Ibid., cites Cremer, pp. 16-17.
55
Ibid.
56
Ibid., p. 369, cites Cremer, pp. 18-19.

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sees something similar according to Pannenberg, “Cremer sees a basis for the belief
that in his conduct with us God makes known his essence so that the qualities of his
loving action are in fact qualities of his essence.”57
Pannenberg uses the actions reveal attributes position to move to the idea the
love of the Father must, therefore, reveal God’s essence is love. Pannenberg believes an
essence should permeate all the attributes; therefore, Pannenberg concludes, “If God’s
love is the epitome of his essence, it follows that all his qualities are manifest in the
revelation of his love, for he is wholly present for us in this love, and he keeps nothing
back.”58
It appears Pannenberg has stated with no reservations, “God’s essence is love.”
God loves us but also chastens who he loves (Hebrew 12:6).
Barth disagreed with the position of Cremer, “Barth, then, made the tension
between freedom and love the basic concept in his doctrine of the divine essence and
attributes, not the thought of love alone.”59
For love to be true, it must be freely given
and freely received. Pannenberg concludes in this section on essence versus actions of
attributes, “The idea of a God who acts purposefully presupposes that God has intellect
and will and that he works out ideas of his intellect in relation to the goals of his action
as in the case of human persons.”60
GOD’S SPIRITUALITY, KNOWLEDGE, AND WILL
57
Ibid.
58
Ibid.
59
Ibid., pp. 369–370, cites Barth, II/1 pp. 282-283.
60
Ibid., p. 370.

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A given position among most conservative theologians is the idea if God does
exist he is a personal God. Many times a person in a twenty-first century church will
hear the admonition, come to a personal relationship with Jesus Christ. With mankind
being a finite creation and God being infinite how can one have a relationship with
God? John, the apostle, declares, “God is a spirit” (John 4:24). How can mankind, who
is not only finite but substance, have a relationship with a spirit?
Abraham Calovius, also Abraham Calov, was a Lutheran theologian and was
one of the champions of Lutheran orthodoxy in the seventeenth century. Pannenberg
cites Calov to begin his discussion concerning God as a spirit:
Certainly God as a rational being far transcends the limitations of our human
existence, but as in the usual Protestant description, he is to be understood as an
infinite spiritual essence in the general sense (conceptus communis) of spiritual
essence, sharing in this regard with other spiritual creatures, but distinct from them
in virtue of being infinite.61
Theologians such as Spinoza, Hume, Fichte, and Feuerbach did not feel
comfortable relating to God’s attributes that seemed to be overly anthropomorphic. To
refer to God as possessing being is precarious because God is not a being. As Aquinas
points out, “God does not belong to a genus.”62
Origen supported indirectly this idea
God is not a being, “Having refuted, then, as well as we could, every notion which
might suggest that we were to think of God as in any degree corporeal, we go on to say
that, according to strict truth, God is incomprehensible and incapable of being
61
Pannenberg, Systematic Theology, Volume 1, p. 370, cites A. Calov, Systema
locorum theologicorum, II (Wittenberg, 1655), pp. 176ff.
62
Aquinas Summa Theologica 1.3.5; and Summa Contra Gentiles 1.25: “God
does not belong to a genus.”

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measured.”63
When one attempts to understand what it means to speak of God as spirit one
encounters the absence of anything in mankind’s created reality to use as a comparison.
The Greeks used two words to refer to this spirit concept, pneuma, and nous.
Pannenberg determined, “Certainly Paul (1 Cor. 2:11; 2 Cor. 3:17) and especially John
(4:24) bear witness that God is pneuma, but this idea did not as yet bear any relation to
the concept of God as nous which was common in Middle Platonism and which Philo
had adopted.”64
Tertullian among other early Christian authors saw the pneuma as a
fine mist no one could see.65
Origen objected to this because this would tie God down
to a place; God is a spirit and therefore not tied down.66
God consists of no extension,
no parts, and no forms. Pannenberg accepts this position, “This is how we must
understand the Johannine statement that God is pneuma.”67
There were others who saw God as pure reason or intelligence; illustrating the
idea of nous. Others saw God as the idea of self-consciousness of man. One
methodology was to take the Hebrew word ruah and connect it to the idea of
63
Origen, “De Principiis,” in Fathers of the Third Century: Tertullian, Part
Fourth; Minucius Felix; Commodian; Origen, Parts First and Second, ed. Alexander
Roberts, James Donaldson, and A. Cleveland Coxe, trans. Frederick Crombie, vol. 4,
The Ante-Nicene Fathers (Buffalo, NY: Christian Literature Company, 1885), p. 243.
64
Pannenberg, Systematic Theology, Volume 1, p. 371.
65
Tertullian Ad prax. 7; other writers cf. on A. von Harnack, History of Dogma,
7 vols. in 4 (New York, 1961), Volume II, p. 255.
66
Origen, pp. 1.13-4, 6.
67

19
consciousness. Pannenberg detailed, “Crellius, Calov’s opponent, had better exegesis
on his side in this regard. The Hebrew term for spirit ruaḥ does not mean reason or
consciousness. Rational thinking and judgment are located in the ‘heart.’”68
In the third century with the influx of Platonism, there was a movement from
pneuma to nous. The movement caused a more anthropomorphic view of God. John
Duns Scotus Erigena was aware of the dangers of an overly anthropomorphic view of
God which arise when mankind describes the divine essence as nous.69
With the effect
of Aristotelian metaphysics, it enabled for the first time to think of God as pure reason
and increased the anthropomorphic view of God; therefore, opening Christianity up to
criticism.
Spinoza had a problem with connecting God’s intellect with God’s will.70
Spinoza believed a person has a will because they are lacking something and seeks to
fill that need. If God is perfect, then he has no needs and therefore, has no will. Spinoza
felt if God did have a will then it was much different than mankind.
The work of theologians such as Hume, Kant, and Hegel have helped in moving
the idea of God as the pure reason rather than self-consciousness. Finally, Fichte
68
Pannenberg, Systematic Theology, Volume 1, p. 373, cites H. W. Wolff,
Anthropology of the Old Testament (Philadelphia, 1974), pp. 40ff., 47ff.
69
Ibid., p. 375, cites Wolfhart Pannenberg, “Die Gottesidee des hohen
Mittelalters,” in Der Gottesgedanke im Abendland, ed. A. Schaefer (Stuttgart, 1964),
pp. 21ff., esp. 25ff. on William of Auvergne De universo 1.1.27, Opera Omnia
(Orleans, 1674), I, pp. 623b–624a.
70
Baruch Spinoza, Ethica Ordine Geometrico demonstrata (1677), I, prop. 17
corr. 2 and Scholium. On Spinoza’s relation to Maimonides in this rejection of a
distinction between intellect and will in God cf. L. Strauss, Die Religionskritik Spinozas
als Grundlage seiner Bibelkritik (1930, repr. Darmstadt, 1981), pp. 134–35.

20
determined, as part of his criticism of a personal God, to assign God to self-
consciousness would place a finite limitation on God making him like mankind.71
Pannenberg makes a conclusion worth noting, “It is obvious that here again we
transcend the conditions of any idea of knowledge that is possible for us when we try to
conceive the thought of divine knowledge.”72
Pannenberg has covered the spirituality and the will of God. The knowledge of
God, according to Pannenberg, spoken of as metaphorically is no different than
speaking to God as the Rock. How does one describe the idea of having all possible
knowledge? Pannenberg defines it as, “When we speak of God’s knowledge we mean
that nothing in all his creation escapes him.”73
Pannenberg continues:
The inescapability of the presence of God finds classical expression in Ps. 139:
“Thou knowest when I sit down and when I rise up” (v. 2). Those who would flee
from the presence of God have nowhere to hide. The creature of God has no real
reason to flee from him (vv. 13–16). His presence, his knowledge of their needs
(Matt. 6:32), and his remembrance of them (Ps. 98:3; Luke 1:54; cf. 1:72) are the
comfort of the righteous (KJV).74
Whether one is rising or falling God’s presence is ever there. God’s presence then
follows the omniscient of the divine essence. An accurate conclusion by Pannenberg,
“Our experience of awareness and knowledge, then, can give us only a feeble hint of
71
Pannenberg, Systematic Theology, Volume 1, p. 376 cites J. G. Fichte, Über
den Grund unseres Glaubens an eine göttliche Weltregierung (1798, ) quoted from H.
Lindau, Die Schriften zu J. G. Fichtes Atheismus-Streit (1912), pp. 16–17.
72
Ibid., p. 378.
73
Ibid., pp. 379–380.
74
Ibid., 379.

21
what is meant when we speak of God’s knowledge.”75
THE CONCEPT OF DIVINE ACTION AND THE STRUCTURE OF THE
DOCTRINE OF THE DIVINE ATTRIBUTES
Pannenberg moves back to the idea of actions, not to illustrate anything of the
essence but rather the persons of the Trinity. If there is an action, then there must be a
person performing the action. One of the concepts Pannenberg relies on is perichoresis.
Perichoresis is the idea the Trinity is so close that when one executes an action, it is as
if all three are involved. The idea of an action and an actor brings to the front the focus
of a goal. To apply a goal to God would make God finite. Mankind initiates actions and
sets goals to fulfill a need; God has no needs. To state God has a need would be to state
God depends on someone outside himself. God is complete in himself; therefore, God
depends on no one for God is the first cause.
Certain passages (Romans 8:28) give the idea God has made decisions of how
the world should act. If this is true does this not rob mankind of their individuality?
This brings out a major premise for Pannenberg:
Primitive Christianity, too, recognized that the divine plan of salvation, the divine
mystery, which was the theme of God’s economy (oikonomia), his control over the
course of history, would be universally known only with the fulfilment which had
begun in the history of Jesus Christ but will not be completed until the awaited
eschatological event of consummation.76
Pannenberg puts a major part of his theology into the idea of the consummation of time.
Labute confirms, “In a careful investigation of Pannenberg’s theological program the
75
Ibid., p. 380.
76
Ibid., p. 387.

22
central motif of anticipation emerges as the foundation on which his entire system is
built.”77
Pannenberg now uses the teleology of an action to discuss the attributes of the
divine essence.
By examining the statements of Isaiah, Solomon, and Paul one can see there is a
structure that exists. Pannenberg believes:
The psalmist extols the God who has so skillfully prepared all things (Ps. 139:14)
and founded the order that the stars do not break (148:6). In this order God’s wisdom
is declared (104:24). Hence the Wisdom of Solomon (13:5) and Paul in Romans
(1:20) can state that God is known from the works of creation even though in fact
people do not give him the honor that is his due.78
Pannenberg sees this as the beginning of finding an answer to the idea of the structure
of action as it relates to God. Pannenberg states, “The three persons of Father, Son, and
Spirit are primarily the subject of the divine action. By their cooperation the action
takes form as that of the one God. This must be the starting point of a Christian answer
to the totalitarian implications of a single divine subject acting without restriction.”79
Pannenberg sees the world as the dominion of the Father, which the Son and the
Spirit carry out the Father’s actions. These actions while being ascribed to the three, are
also ascribed to the divine essence. Once again one can see Pannenberg’s emphasis on
the perichoresis of the action. The three are so close that when one carries out an action,
it appears to come from the divine essence. The action illustrated here is not an
example of trinitarian differentiation but rather expresses their living fellowship toward
77
Labute, p. 274.
78
Pannenberg, Systematic Theology, Volume 1, pp. 386–387.
79
Ibid., p. 388.

23
the world, according to Pannenberg.80
What about the difficulty of applying goals to God’s actions. Pannenberg sees
this not a problem since the object of God’s actions is God himself. Pannenberg defines
God’s goals as two-fold. The first is creation itself. God’s first goal is the creation of all
things which is distinct from God, and its eventual consummation with the Creator. The
second goal of God is the revelation of himself to mankind as the Creator of the world.
Understanding, by knowing the effects of an action mankind can come to understand
who God is and what his attributes are. Action and the connectivity of the knowledge of
God go back to a previous concept of Pannenberg, the only way to know the attributes
of the divine essence are through man’s experience with God’s attributes in action.
Pannenberg now begins a discussion of the attributes themselves and how
various theologians have divided them. Pannenberg begins, “By the common action of
Father, Son, and Spirit the future of God breaks into the present of creatures, into the
world of creation, and on the basis of this divine action the attributes are predicated not
merely of the trinitarian persons but also of the divine essence that is common to them
all.”81
What does it mean to predicate the attributes to God? Pannenberg sees the
attributes divided into two categories, those based on God’s actions and those that
answer questions about God. Attributes such as omnipresent, omniscient, infinity, and
omnipotent are there to assist mankind in understanding God in the midst of his actions.
80
Ibid., p. 389.
81
Ibid., p. 391.

24
While attributes such as gracious, merciful, long-suffering, and great kindness are there
to explain who God is. Not all theologians agree with this distribution.
Cremer divided the attributes differently. Pannenberg details Cremer’s position,
“Along these lines Hermann Cremer in Christliche Lehre, pp. 34ff., 77ff., distinguished
between the qualities of holiness, righteousness, goodness, wisdom, and mercy, which
are disclosed in revelation, and those of omnipotence, omnipresence, omniscience,
immutability, and eternity, which are presupposed and contained in the very concept of
God.”82
Cremer’s statement illustrates a concept that theologians have argued for
centuries, “How does one structure the principals for attribute distribution?” For
instance, Schleiermacher’s division was possible only because he related the attributes
not to the being of God but only to his causality in the different spheres of his activity.83
Cremer differed, “Cremer posited a linguistic distinction between the concept of the
subject which we presuppose in the act of ascribing qualities and the predicates which
are actually ascribed. But even regarding this distinction he still maintained that we
know all God’s qualities from his revelatory acts.”84
Pannenberg concludes this section, “The fact that this trinitarian God is the one
true God finds expression in statements about the attributes of his being.”85
It seems
logical to support Pannenberg’s idea of two categories of attributes, presupposed
82
Ibid., p. 392 cites Cremer, pp. 34ff, 77ff.
83
Ibid., 393.
84
Ibid.
85
Ibid.

25
attributes, and those witnessed as a result of God’s actions.
THE INFINITY OF GOD: HIS HOLINESS, ETERNITY, OMNI-
POTENCE AND OMNIPRESENCE
Pannenberg lays out his goal for this section, “God’s infinity needs the
statement of his holiness for its elucidation, while eternity, omnipotence, and
omnipresence may be viewed as concrete manifestations of his infinity from the
standpoints of time, power, and space.”86
As Pannenberg begins this section the
question asked, “With Pannenberg’s clear belief God’s essence is love, how will he
view God’s attribute of holiness?”
In preparatory, Pannenberg redefines infinity:
Strictly, the infinite is not that which is without end but that which stands opposed to
the finite, to what is defined by something else. This qualitative definition is
different from the quantitative mathematical definition, though it underlies it, for
freedom from limitation is a consequence of negation of the finite, and this freedom
can have the form of unlimited progress in a finite series.87
Pannenberg is proposing a definition of infinity different than normally thought of as
without end. Pannenberg’s definition of infinity, the negate of the finite, he derives
from Schleiermacher and Hegel.88
This definition then applied to holiness as being
without limit. Pannenberg asserts, “In this regard the concept of the Infinite links up
especially with that of the holiness of God, for the basic meaning of holiness is
86
Ibid., p. 397.
87
Ibid.
88
Ibid., footnote 126, cites Schleiermacher, Christian Faith, I, §56.2; and
Hegel, Science of Logic, I, § 1, ch. 2 c.

26
separateness from everything profane.”89
To Pannenberg, the definition of holiness is
the total separation from profane without limit. He sees it as a two-way separation.
Pannenberg believes in not just the separation of a holy God from everything profane;
but, the separation of everything profane from a holy God. Pannenberg to support his
position refers to Gerhard von Rad:
As von Rad has stressed, the point of the cultic separation of what is holy, of what is
dedicated to God or related to him, and especially of the deity and the places and
times of his presence, is not just to protect the holy against defilement by contact
with the profane, but above all to protect the world of the profane from the threat of
the holy. For contact with the holy brings death (Exod. 19:12).90
Following in Pannenberg’s consummation of history methodology he sees the holiness
of God visible in the final judgment of man.
Pannenberg uses Isaiah’s experience before the Holy One of Israel, as an
illustration, to show how no one who is profane can stand before a holy God, “This is
why Isaiah, when at his call he had a vision of the holy God, reacted at first with terror:
‘Woe is me! For I am lost; for I am a man of unclean lips, and I dwell in the midst of a
people of unclean lips; for my eyes have seen the King, the Lord of hosts [Yahweh
Zebaoth]’ (Isa. 6:5).”91
The separation of God and the profane is for the protection of
both. The holiness of God, as Pannenberg sees it, is not only destructive to the profane;
but, is also the only source of salvation for the profane. The holiness of God seeks to
include the profane in the sphere of God’s holiness. With salvation comes separation.
89
Ibid., pp. 397–398.
90
Ibid., p. 398, cites Gerhard von Rad, Old Testament Theology, Volume 1,
(New York, NY: Harper and Row Publishers, 1957), p. 204.
91
Ibid.

27
God calls on man, “Be Holy for I am holy” (Leviticus 19:2). Also Pannenberg states,
“It thus follows that the people now stand under the protection of the terrible divine
holiness that is a threat to all outside (Exod. 15:11; cf. Isa. 10:16).”92
As these points have contributed to Pannenberg’s view of the holiness attribute,
there exists no mention of holiness as essence similar to Pannenberg’s treatment of
God’s attribute of love. It would appear, without stating it, Pannenberg sees God’s love
to hold a more controlling influence than God’s holiness. Pannenberg does see the role
of God’s holiness at the consummation of history. Pannenberg summarizes his position,
“Thus the holiness of God both opposes the profane world and embraces it, bringing it
into fellowship with the holy God.”93
Pannenberg moves on to a discussion of God’s eternity. The previous discussion
saw Pannenberg use a definition for infinity as without limitation. Pannenberg
presented the idea of eternity as without end from various sources. Pannenberg is not
supportive of this definition, “This does not mean that we are to think of eternity in the
OT only as a process, as unlimited time. On the contrary, the Psalms that we have
quoted are telling us that God is always unchangeably himself (Psalms 90:2).”94
Relating to God’s eternity and the relationship to time Pannenberg proposes, “In
the same way all time is before the eyes of God as a whole.”95
He further continues this
92
Ibid.
93
Ibid., p. 399.
94
Ibid., p. 401.
95
Ibid.

28
line of thought, “The thousand years of the psalm are not meant to be a literal span of
time or to be a starting point for calculations. They are simply meant to show that any
span of time is simply like yesterday in the sight of God (Psalms 90:4).”96
It is not that
God looks to the future or that God remembers the past. It is as if all moments of time
are in God’s present.
Pannenberg sees similar comments concerning heaven as the place of God.
Pannenberg details, “If it was thus natural to see heaven as the place where decisions
are made about earthly events, and where, resolve and execution being the same thing
for God, the future, and especially the future event of salvation, is already there for him,
then heaven expresses the thought that all times are present for the eternity of God.”97
Pannenberg believes all time is always before God’s eyes. He continues to
support his position, “But this idea (God looking forward) makes God into a finite
being if it implies that like ourselves God at every moment of his life looks ahead to a
future that is distinct from the present and sees the past fading away from him.”98
Pannenberg continues, “If God is, then his whole life and all things created by him must
be present to him at one and the same time.”99
Pannenberg now seeks to understand what it means to say God is both
omnipresent and omnipotent. He once again returns to his definition of the infinite,
96
Ibid., p. 402.
97
Ibid.
98
Ibid., p. 405.
99
Ibid.

29
“Infinity means without limitations.” As part of Pannenberg’s discussion of eternity, he
developed the idea that all points of time and all objects created are always before God.
Pannenberg declares, “The past remains present to the eternal God and the future is
already present to him. His eternity thus implies his omnipresence.”100
Barth was not in agreement. Barth did not agree with the grouping of
omnipresence with eternity. Barth grouped omnipresence with God’s love and not with
God’s eternity.101
Pannenberg remarked concerning Barth’s position:
Though Barth’s claim that the thought of omnipresence belongs primarily to the side
of the love of God and that of eternity to the side of the freedom of God (pp. 464–
65) is the expression of a much too artificial division of the divine qualities into two
poles that are in tension with one another, we must agree with Barth that the
omnipotence of God stands opposed to a concept of God which thinks of him as only
transcendent in his relation to the world.102
If God is present before all things then so is his power. Pannenberg uses this position to
discuss the unlimited power God has over all things. God has this power because he is
the Creator. Without God being Creator he would not have this unlimited power.
Pannenberg declares, “As all things are present to God in his eternity, and he is present
to them, so he has power over all things.”103
Pannenberg continues, “More detailed
discussion of the omnipotence of God demonstrates that it can be thought of only as the
power of divine love and not as the assertion of a particular authority against all
100
Ibid., p. 410.
101
Barth, II/1 pp. 464ff.
102
Pannenberg, Systematic Theology, Volume 1, p. 412, cites Barth, II/1 pp.
464-465.
103
Ibid., p. 415.

30
opposition.”104
THE LOVE OF GOD
Of all the sections of this discussion, Pannenberg’s efforts in this section are the
most extensive. Pannenberg has stated on numerous occasions his belief God’s essence
is love. Pannenberg uses the phrase God is love fifteen times within this discussion on
the divine essence (pp. 397-474). Pannenberg asserts, referring to John’s belief that
God is love (1 John 4:8, 16), “Prenter clearly saw that the Johannine saying is not
describing a quality of God but his essence or nature as love.”105
Pannenberg divides his discussion into three parts, Love and Trinity; Attributes
of the Divine Love; and the Unity of God. Pannenberg begins, “The coming forth of the
Son from the Father is the basic fulfillment of divine love.”106
He further associates the
relationship between the three personalities of the Trinity as an example of divine love.
He sees the Father is the father because of his relationship with the Son. Even though
there are other creations that the Scriptures calls sons, they do not hold the same
relationship as the Son holds to the Father. Pannenberg further stipulates the Father is
not the father except for his relationship with the Son. Pannenberg summarizes, “Thus
their existence as persons is coincident with the divine love, which is simply the
concrete life of the divine Spirit, just as conversely the one reality of God as Spirit
exists only in the mutual relations of the trinitarian persons and precisely for that reason
104
Ibid., p. 422.
105
Ibid., 424, cites R. Prenter, “Der Gott, der Liebe ist. Das Verhältnis der
Gotteslehre zur Christologie,” TLZ 96 (1971): p. 403.
106
Ibid., p. 429.

31
is defined as love.”107
Pannenberg sees this as one way the Trinity differentiates from the creation.
Mankind does not have their identity because of an association with one and only one
person. Pannenberg further believes:
The personal distinctions among Father, Son, and Spirit cannot be derived from an
abstract concept of love. We may know them only in the historical revelation of God
in Jesus Christ. But on this basis they and their unity in the divine essence make
sense as the concrete reality of the divine love which pulses through all things and
which consummates the monarchy of the Father through the Son in the Holy
Spirit.108
Once again Pannenberg restates his belief in the divine love as God’s essence,
“God’s essence as they are disclosed in his revelatory action may be understood
through and through as the attributes of his love.”109
Pannenberg sees the various other
attributes of God such as holiness, eternity, omnipresence, omnipotence, grace, and
mercy does not take mankind past the idea of God’s love but only describes different
aspects of God’s love. Pannenberg defends his position, “God’s merciful turning to the
needy, the suffering, and the helpless must thus be seen as a specific expression of his
goodness and its practice, not as a different quality.”110
Pannenberg believes the
message of Jesus was not the covenantal faithfulness of God, but rather the goodness of
God which finds its origin in the divine love of God. Pannenberg even saw God’s
107
Ibid., p. 431.
108
Ibid., p. 432.
109
Ibid.
110
Ibid., p. 433.

32
righteousness as a result of God’s divine love.
The onset of the Gnostics and Marcion brought a difficulty in trying to relate a
union between God’s righteousness and God’s mercy. Pannenberg explains, “Christian
theology, then, was always at pains to prove that God’s righteousness is in harmony
with his mercy. Thus, Aquinas taught that the existence of all things may be traced back
to God’s goodness while his righteousness finds expression in their order and
proportionality.”111
The idea of a penal righteousness made it difficult to associate the
idea of God’s love with God’s righteousness. Pannenberg believes once someone looks
at Paul of the NT one discovers God’s righteousness was about the salvation of man not
the retribution for man’s sins.
Cremer saw God’s righteousness as more of a judicial viewpoint. Cremer
thought God first judged the man and then saved the man.112
Barth thought God’s
righteousness was an example of God’s acceptance of man by God’s mercy.113
Pannenberg further believed, “There is no other reason for turning to the poor and
needy of the world other than through God’s love for the world.”114
Pannenberg believes the force holding the Trinity together as seen in the Unity
of God is in God’s divine love. Pannenberg returns to an earlier discussion, “It is the
question whether we can think of statements about God’s love in conjunction with his
111
Ibid, p. 435, cites Aquinas, p. 1.21.4.
112
Ibid., cites Cremer, Christliche Lehre, p. 56.
113
Ibid., cites Barth, II/1, p. 383.
114
Ibid.

33
infinity, holiness, eternity, omnipresence, and omnipotence. Stated thus, it is the
question of the unity of God in the multiplicity of his attributes, and especially of the
relation of the divine love to the attributes. . .”115
Is unity an attribute in and unto itself? Pannenberg along with Schleiermacher
and Aquinas agreed that unity is not an attribute.116
Logically one cannot speak of unity
unless one can also point to the one being one of many. This process would lead to God
declared not to be one. Scriptures tell us, “Hear, O Israel: The LORD our God, the LORD
is one” (Deuteronomy 6:4). Pannenberg determines since God is incomparable to
anything else God must not only be declared one but also absolute. Pannenberg
summarizes and declares, “There is thus a connection between the oneness of the God
of Israel and his love, namely, through the claim to sole deity which is grounded in his
love, and to recognition of this claim by those to whom he reveals himself (cf. Matt.
6:33; Luke 12:31; also Matt. 6:24; Luke 16:13).”117
Pannenberg concludes this discussion of God’s love:
Similarly, the relativity of the concept of essence and the differences between
essence and attributes, essence and manifestation, and essence and existence, have
their concrete truth in the trinitarian dynamic of the divine love. Love is the essence
that is what it is only in its manifestation, in the forms of its existence, namely, in the
Father, Son, and Spirit, presenting and manifesting itself wholly and utterly in the
attributes of its manifestation.118
115
Ibid., 443.
116
Ibid., cites Schleiermacher Christian Faith, I, § 56.2; also compare
Pannenberg, Basic Questions, II, 119ff., pp. 126–27; Aquinas used a similar argument
in ST 1.11.3.
117
Ibid., pp. 444–445.
118
Ibid., p. 447.

34
Pannenberg among many theologians cannot be understood unless one is aware of his
total commitment to the idea the essence of God is love.
CONCLUSION
Rudolf Bultmann believed, “There can be no exegesis without
presupposition.”119
Pannenberg saw it much different, “Every theological statement
must prove itself on the field of reason and can no longer be argued on the basis of
unquestioned presuppositions of faith.”120
Pannenberg in a section of Volume 1 apart
from this section asks the question, “Whether rational religion alone is adequate for our
salvation or whether we must accept in addition a supernatural revelation?”121
Pannenberg placed a tremendous emphasis on the use of reason to determine his
theological positions. Carl E. Braaten is speaking to Pannenberg’s methodology states,
“The commitment of faith, however existentially meaningful, cannot be used as an
argument for the validity and truth of a position.”122
This paper has been a review of Pannenberg’s Unity and Attributes of the Divine
Essence as found in Pannenberg’s Systematic Theology Volume 1, pp. 337-488. There
119
Rudolf Bultmann, Existent and Faith Shorter Writings of Rudolf Bultmann,
(New York, NY: Living Age Books, 1960), pp. 289ff.
120
Daniel Clendenin, “What the Orthodox Believe,” Christian History
Magazine-Issue 54: Eastern Orthodoxy (Carol Stream, IL: Christianity Today, 1997),
np.
121
122
Carl Braaten, “The Place of Christianity among the World Religions:
Wolfhart Pannenberg’s Theology of Religion and the History of Religions”, The
Theology of Wolfhart Pannenberg, Carl E. Braaten and Philip Clayton eds.
(Minneapolis, MN: Augsburg Publishing House, 1988), p. 294.

35
are certain conclusions that are visible following this review. First, if Pannenberg could
not develop a concept of reason alone he found it difficult to support that position.
Pannenberg agreed the elements of God were conceivable but incomprehensible.
Despite this position he still thought it was an admirable pursuit to investigate and talk
about God.
The following comment by Pannenberg speaks to his perceptive concerning
truth, “Every assertion has an anticipatory structure. For its truth claim can be called
into doubt and discussed, implying whatever truth it claims is not yet definitive or
indubitably settled.”123
Pannenberg saw no absolute when it came to truth. It doesn’t
matter what his position was it was always in the process of change. It is for statements
such as this that caused certain scholars to label him with the title, process
philosopher.124
A serious failing of Pannenberg’s theology was his unwillingness to
consider almost any resource of American scholarship, placing him within the camp of
such men as Moltmann, von Rad, and Barth.
As pointed out earlier Pannenberg stated God’s essence is love. When one looks
at the twenty-first century society and the issues involved with an over-emphasis on
God’s love, part of the blame goes to Pannenberg’s doorstep. Pannenberg saw love as
not only God’s essence but the source for all God’s other attributes. It appears
Pannenberg sees no use for God’s holiness until the consummation of history. He even
considers God’s righteousness derived from love. American theologians such as
123
Pannenberg, Metaphysics and the Idea of God, p. 94.
124
Stanley J. Grenz, “Eschatological Theology: Contours of a Post-Modern
Theology of Hope,” Review and Expositor 97 (2000): p. 348.

36
Armstrong, Culver, and Mohler would have significant points of disagreement with this
position. This author sees a problem with this position. This position disconnects the
believer from the responsibility to live a holy life. This position can contribute to the
position of the twenty-first century church that love produces acceptance.
Pannenberg’s methodology for the injection of reason into his defense is
masterful. He did a great job of trying to explain the Trinity, God’s essence of Spirit,
and finally the unity and attributes of the divine essence.

37
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Aquinas, Thomas. Summa Theologica. Translated by Fathers of the English Dominican
Province. London: Burns Oates & Washbourne, n.d.
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