Framework For A Socio-Economic Plan

MW Kellogg Limited Note For File CONFIDENTIAL
Project Engineering Management Note A. Briggs Page 1 of 13
Framework for a Socio-Economic Plan
Nigeria LNG SevenPlus Project
1. Introduction
The bid requirement for the Nigeria LNG SevenPlus project stipulates, amongst
other requirements, the submission of a socio-economic plan. The socio-
economic plan is to address how the bidder proposes to handle the principle of
respect and safeguard of people in general, while providing opportunities for
their social improvements and maximising benefits to the local community.
The plan is also required to encompass how the bidder plans to engage and
work with subcontractors and vendors, whilst interfacing with local
communities, the local government, the state government and other
authorities, to arrange socio-economic aspects in accordance with local
customs, and to include proposals for community projects.
2. Background Information
Inclusion of a socio-economic plan as a bid requirement was probably informed
by the state of the political economy in contemporary Nigeria, with the
underdevelopment of the Niger Delta as the focus of national and international
attention. The situation may have forced the regulator of the Nigerian oil and
gas sector, the Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation (NNPC) to create a
Nigerian Content Division (NCD) in 2006, with a mandate to transform the oil
and gas industry into the economic engine for job creation and national growth
by developing in-country and indigenous capabilities. In pursuit of this
mandate the NCD promulgated a 22-point directive with specific targets to the
oil and gas companies, with a view to maximising Nigerian Content in projects.
NLNG took a cue from this, and in addition has requested for a socio-economic
plan to be included in the bid for its LNG SevenPlus Project. Devising a socio-
economic plan will necessitate taking an incursion into history, political
economy and development of Nigeria’s Niger Delta, and Bonny to form the
basis for and to guide policy formulation.
3. The History and Political Economy of Bonny
Bonny, the location of the Nigeria LNG Complex is a major export point for
Nigerian oil and gas. It is an island situated in the Niger Delta on the Bight of
Biafra. In the 18th
and 19th
centuries Bonny was the centre of a powerful
trading state, and in the 19th
century it became the leading site for slave
exportation in West Africa. From 1885 to 1894 it was the administrative
centre of the British Oil Rivers Protectorate. Bonny declined in the 20th
century but revived after 1961, when its port was modernised as the export
point for petroleum.1
Present day Bonny is not an average Niger Delta town,
as it appears to be relatively more prosperous and is home to billions of dollars
worth of oil and gas infrastructure. However, it is enmeshed in the political
economy of the region. But the socio-economic climate of the Niger Delta is a
potent mix of poverty, crime and corruption. This is fuelling a militant threat

to stability of the oil and gas business. The root causes of this insurgency are
violence, underdevelopment, environmental damage and lack of credible state
and local government institutions.2
The militants have fought with
government forces, sabotaged oil and gas installations, taken foreign workers
hostage and carried out lethal bombings; demanding political and economic
concessions from the central government. In turn, the central government
seemed to have realised that any attempt at a military solution would be
disastrous for residents and risky for the industry; facilities are particularly
vulnerable to raids by well-armed militants with intimate knowledge of the
terrain. Thus government has tactfully delegated its developmental role to oil
and gas companies, imploring these to spend ever larger amounts on socio-
economic plans and community projects, and have tacitly admitted that their
own development strategies have failed.
The basis of this proposed socio-economic plan is the key hypothesis that
previous development interventions in the Niger Delta have been unsuccessful,
and that only transparent and participatory development schemes can foster
hope and accountability in Niger Delta communities.2
Among specific
recommendations to all stakeholders in a bid to redress the situation, oil and
gas companies are now implored, by international observers (e.g. the
International Crisis Group), to imbibe the following guidelines:
• Improve measures to ensure transparency of contracts and other
community payments, including for surveillance, development projects and
compensation for land use and pollution, while honouring company
commitments and making payments by bank transfer not in cash to
intended recipients; conclude agreements wherever possible that provide
for individuals and local communities to be compensated for land use and
pollution; and seek independent mediation or arbitration when agreements
are in dispute.
• Prioritise long-term ability to operate in Nigeria over short-term production
goals and seek community assent before proceeding with production-
related projects.
• Develop partnerships with non-governmental, community-based bodies
with demonstrated ability to provide skills training and capacity building for
development projects, including women’s and religious groups that have
played significant roles in mediating among various ethnic groups and
actors in the past decade.
These and similar guidelines have been advised by the outcome of numerous
social studies of the Niger Delta. The problems of the Niger Delta have been
well-documented; it is irrelevant to enumerate them here. But excerpts from
notable commentators are reproduced below, to give a flavour of the current
situation.
❛After 50 years, the oil companies are still searching for a way to operate
successfully with communities.❜

Anthony Goldman, Risk Consultant, London
❛The companies didn’t consult with villagers. They basically handed out cash
to chiefs. It wasn’t effective at all.❜
Michael Watts, Director, African Studies Program, UC, Berkley
❛No one can deny the sheer technological achievement of building an
infrastructure to extract oil from a water-logged equatorial forest. Intense
swampy heat, nearly impenetrable mangrove thickets, swarming insects, and
torrential downpours bedevil operations to this day. But mastering the
physical environment has proved almost simple compared with dealing with a
social and cultural landscape.❜
National Geographic, February, 2007.
❛For years, the holding pattern worked, at least according to its perverse logic.
Conflict simmered through the Delta, but it followed a template that was easy
to understand: suffering, frustration, protest, organised uprising, violent
crackdown, memorandum of understanding, token development project,
discreet cash handout, return to suffering. Year after year, the same tired set
pieces were acted out, with only the cast of characters changing, a sort of
rotating repertory of protests and pipelines and white men arriving in
helicopters.❜
John Ghazvinian, The Curse of Oil, The Virginia Quarterly Review, 2007
❛Underdevelopment begat anger and resentment, leading to violence, which in
turn deters economic activity, reducing opportunities for non-oil growth,
worsening unemployment and poverty and creates a stream of disaffected
youths prone to manipulation into violence for political ends.❜
World Bank and UK Department for International Development, 2005.
But stakeholders are still in search of that elusive and much talked about
panacea – the Social License to Operate, that will make it possible for oil and
gas companies to work in peace.3
A watershed may have been reached,
alongside good intentions and innovative approaches to community and media
relations, it is felt that things may have gone too far, too deep, in a way that
no amount of good will can turn around. Therefore a paradigm change is
required. This informs the need to embark on a socio-economic programme
that would impact positively on the community without the rancour of the
past. While keeping in view the key lessons learned from past operations for
sustainable delivery of economic and social infrastructure, and services to rural
communities.4
These key lessons are enumerated below.
i) Political commitment to improving the lives of rural communities is a
necessary but not sufficient condition for operations to be effective and
on a scale to make a significant impact.

ii) A pragmatic approach, as opposed to a traditional project approach, is
needed to scale up activities.
iii) Governments can afford to improve the lives of the urban poor by
providing basic services, provided appropriate and affordable standards
for infrastructure are developed and adopted.
iv) The poor are willing to pay for infrastructure investments and services
that are reliable, affordable and respond to their needs, and must be
enabled to contribute towards improvements to take joint ownership of
interventions with local governments.
v) Project designs must be simple.
vi) Capacity building activities are essential for both communities and local
governments.
vii) Meaningful community participation empowers people to make informed
contributions to decision-making.
viii) City-wide infrastructure networks will require improvements to ensure
the flow of services to upgrading sites.
ix) Improving the physical environment in poor communities provides a
sound foundation for additional actions and programmes to deal with
other social services and economic problems facing a community.
x) Upgrading projects are less likely to succeed if implemented by a single
central government, or state government agency because when success
depends on the implementation and coordination of one agency, it is
more likely to fail. Experience highlights that implementation should be
led by local governments and linked to other stakeholders such as NGOs,
private service providers, communities and other service agencies.
xi) Ownership by communities is critical and best ensured through
community involvement and fostered through strong partnerships
between local governments and communities.
xii) Appropriate standards and continuous monitoring are critical for success.
xiii) Need to ensure effective implementation arrangements that minimise
potential interference and overcome bureaucratic delays over contract
award and payment authorisation.
xiv) Need to develop appropriate design standards for infrastructure that are
workable, sustainable and replicable to enable scaling-up and
mainstreaming of interventions in poor urban communities to become an
integral part of a local government’s development programme.
xv) Assessing which service options local governments can realistically offer
the recurrent costs and human resources needed to make them viable in
the long term.
xvi) Intervention experts need to re-think the purpose of technical standards;
and if they do not lead to effective, manageable infrastructure, then they
should be changed.

4. Socio-economic Outlook
The urbanisation issues in Bonny conform to the general outlook in a typical
Nigerian settlement, albeit in a smaller scale indicative of its modest
population. Bonny is characterised by rapid urbanisation, increasing poverty
and social unrest. It has a distinguishable and typical ‘enclave economy’ as a
result of the secluded camps of the oil and gas industry. Like any major urban
centre in Nigeria it is growing at a rate between 7 – 10 % per annum. Urban
poverty may have increased from 17% in 1980 to 58% in 1996; and projected
to about 68% in 2005. A good proportion of the labour force involved in the
energy business in Bonny is non-indigenous, leading to resentment.
Unemployment, under employment, violence and crime rates are moderate
though, but there is increasing insecurity due to external influences. At the
same time, the relative contribution of its economy to Nigeria’s GDP is high,
compared to its rural economy. 4
There are infrastructure deficiencies, especially in the low-income
neighbourhoods (those outside the energy company enclaves), due to
inadequate investment in new facilities and negligible maintenance of existing
facilities. This exacerbates poverty due to a lack of access to basic municipal
services. Negligible periodic and routine maintenance of existing infrastructure
has rendered the town ill-equipped to provide for the basic needs of a majority
of its present much less its projected population. There is breakdown of
infrastructure and service delivery. This is largely due to inadequate
budgetary allocations for maintenance, inefficient operations and maintenance
through the public sector, and the fact that maintenance is the first local
government budget item to be deleted when revenues do not match budget
forecast, because fixed expenses such as salaries and wages get priority.
Typically, decisions on new capital investments in Nigeria are not subject to
the systematic application of screening criteria, such as cost-effectiveness,
financial, economic and social returns on investment, affordability and actual
demand. There exists therefore, no technical mechanism to guide
prioritisation.
Inadequate fiscal decentralisation leads to an unacceptable level of
dependency on Federal resource flows to maintain and increase recurrent and
capital expenditures. The high dependency puts most local governments at
risk from reduced resources when Federal finances are impacted adversely by
external economic and political factors, especially the price of oil.
Unpredictability of Federal resources makes financial planning difficult, while
dependency engenders local government inefficiency and lack of management
effort.
There is inadequate access by local governments to financing for infrastructure
investments. Local governments are not credit-worthy, and for purposes of
security, reliable financial mechanisms have to be able to plan and undertake
capital investments. Local governments are dependent on Federal transfers to
finance development. Their internally generated revenues are inadequate to
finance the recurrent expenditures needed to maintain existing assets.
Local governments do not have the technical, managerial or financial resources
to plan and manage growth in their areas, and urban information systems are
poor. There is a general lack of trained and experienced personnel and the

large number of local governments in Nigeria has meant that the few trained
professional staff are spread thinly across many states and local governments.
The government’s strategy – as outlined in FGN’s National Urban Development
Policy of 1997 – aims to improve the living standards of the Nigerian people,
by facilitating adequate, efficient and functional service delivery. This is to be
achieved by providing infrastructure developed to design standards that make
urban facilities and amenities more affordable, through investments in a
package of basic services to upgrade poor urban settlements.
5. Devising The Social License to Operate
Against this background a community-based urban development framework is
envisaged, the key proponents of which are:4
• Establish partnerships between communities and their local governments so
that subproject proposals are developed jointly by them.
• Demonstrate viable approaches to infrastructure development and service
delivery that enable local governments to move away from a culture of total
financial dependency for infrastructure development and even recurrent
expenditures for infrastructure operation and maintenance.
This approach was advocated by the International Development Association
(IDA). The IDA is a World Bank institution specialising in giving financial and
technical assistance to developing countries around the world. The IDA has
over 30 years experience in social development, and has been facilitating
partnerships between poor urban communities, local governments and state
governments, for decision-making related to on-site public expenditures on
settlements, thereby fostering good governance.
The IDA promotes demand-led and participatory planning techniques for public
expenditures on infrastructure within budget constraints, especially in poor
urban neighbourhoods, ensuring better utilisation of resources. It assists in
developing long-term, realistic and workable financial strategies for scaling-up
upgrading interventions in cities in the future, and helps to draw lessons for
urban policy work in Nigeria. It has embarked on knowledge transfer to
support the development of a web facility to promote learning, knowledge-
sharing and transparency.
Selection of intervention options will be modelled on and aligned with the
World Bank Group and UK Department for International Development (DFID)
strategy for Nigeria.5
The development framework contained therein is based
on and guided by the National Economic Empowerment and Development
Strategy (NEEDS) and the State Economic Empowerment and Development
Strategy (SEEDS). The key thrusts of these strategies are:
• Empowering people and improving social service delivery.
• Growing the private sector and focussing on non-oil growth.
• Changing the way government works and improving governance.
The NEEDS and SEEDS strategies provide frameworks for positive change and
focus on macro-economic reform and economic growth as the fundamental
building blocks for poverty reduction. The strategies champion a social charter

for the people, growing the private sector and reforming the way government
works. Below are excerpts from the Country Partnership Strategy (CPS)
Results Framework:
I. IMPROVED SERVICE DELIVERY FOR HUMAN DEVELOPMENT. NEEDS Pillar: Empowering People
Longer term goals
MDGs and NEEDS
Obstacles, Issues,
Challenges
CPS Period Outcomes Interventions*
I. Reduced
Maternal & Child
Mortality rates
• Child mortality
under 5 reduced by
two thirds
• Maternal mortality
rate reduced by
75%
II. Combat
HIV/AIDS, Malaria
& Other Diseases
• Change at risk
behaviour
• HIV/AIDS
prevalence rate
reduced by 25%
• Wild polio virus
interrupted
• Malaria prevalence
reduced
III. Improved
Educational
Outcomes
• All children
complete a course
of primary
education of
adequate quality
and relevance
• Basic education
completion rates
increased
• Improved quality
and equity of
service delivery
IV. Improved
Access to Safe
Drinking Water
• Significant
improvement of
living conditions in
Sustainable improvements in access and quality of basic services in health, HIV/AIDS,
education, water and sanitation
Health
• High child and maternal
mortality rates
• Poor and inefficient
funding in public and non-
state sectors resulting in
collapse of basic health
care services
HIV/AIDS
• Weak coordination,
strategic planning and
information systems
• Limited access to
prevention services and
care, support & treatment
• Discrimination,
stigmatisation and denial
Education
• Lack of access to
education
• Inequality of service
provision in education
• Weak institutional
capacity in education
sector
• Inadequate quality of
post-basic education
Water and Sanitation
• Limited access to safe
water in rural and urban
areas
1. Health:
• OPV immunisation coverage
of 80% under 5 population
in 2007, 80% in 2009
• Utilisation of EOC in states
• Use of ITNs and appropriate
ant-malaria treatment
• Strengthened capacity at
federal & state level in
policy, planning, regulation,
coordination, resource
mobilisation, monitoring
and evaluation
2. HIV/AIDS:
• NACA and SACAs
strengthened to implement
‘Three Ones’. Monitoring
and evaluation system
implemented by 2007
• Increased access to
prevention, VCT, care and
support services
• Implemented Family Life
and HIV/AIDS curriculum in
50% of schools by 2007
3. Education:
• Nationwide M&E system in
place to evaluate quality of
education sector
• Post-basic education reform
strategy piloted, and
lessons drawn for scaling up
• 10% increase in girls’
primary and secondary
enrolment
• States to have an approved
EFA plan under
implementation
4. Improved Water &
Sanitation services as
measured by:
• Reliable piped water to
more than 5 million people
• Support immunisation
campaigns as necessary.
• Campaign for a clean
environment to eradicate to
control the malaria vector.
• Support the on-going
• Support the on-going
• Concerted monitoring and
evaluation efforts.
• Central water treatment
plant; supply whole island
with ring mains in phases.
• Central sewage treatment
plant, developed in phases to

urban areas
• Rural communities
access to safe
water 70%
Community Participation
• Decaying community-
based social infrastructure
and service provision
• Lack of social contract and
demand for enhanced
service delivery
State service delivery
• HD challenges, as above
• Systemic failure in state
and local government
service delivery –
undermined by lack of
social contract
• Weak coordination among
tiers of government
• Lack of government
provision of social nets
in targeted cities
• 500 rural schools provided
with water supply and
sanitation facilities
5. Improved access to MDG-
related HD infrastructure and
services, as measured by:
• 2000 communities and
volume of resources for
basic services managed at
community level
• 2000 of community
implemented social service
plans (e.g. schools
rehabilitated, PHC clinics
rehabilitated and
operational)
1. Increased access to
preventive and curative
services provided by public
and private agents measured
by:
• Full immunisation coverage
• Utilisation of EOC is at least
25% of estimated need
• 20& of pregnant women &
children under 5 sleeping
under ITNs by 2008
• 80% of health facilities have
staff trained in the use of
ACT by 2008
improved (buildings, certified
teachers, textbooks)
education services measured
by:
• Increased basic education
enrolment and completion
rates by at least 10%
• Improved quality of
education, at the end of
primary and junior
secondary cycles
• 75% of schools with
community/parents
participation in
management
3. Conditional cash transfer
program piloted in states
accommodate community.
• Isolated water treatment
plant for each primary and
secondary school.
• Refuse collection, treatment
and disposal for whole island
community.
• Enhanced and modern fire
fighting capability and
organisation.
• Establish a coast-guard or
life-guard station.
• Finance, organisation and
training to personnel in
support of existing
programme(s).
• Rehabilitate selected schools
buildings, supply equipment
and enhance teachers’
welfare.
II. IMPROVED ENVIRONMENT AND SERVICES FOR NON-OIL GROWTH. NEEDS Pillar: Promoting Private Enter.
Longer term goals
MDGs and NEEDS
Obstacles, Issues,
Challenges
CPS Period Outcomes Interventions*
Support sustainable growth in the non-oil sector through improved productive
infrastructure, improved regulatory business environment and increased productivity in
agricultural sector, enhancing competitiveness

I. Reduction in
income poverty
through shared
sustainable
economic growth:
• Reduction in
poverty incidence
by 5% per annum
• Growth in
manufacturing
sector of 7% per
annum
• Growth in
agricultural sector
of 7% per annum
• Increased
foreign/domestic
investments
• Inflation rate target
of 9%
• Stable and
competitive
exchange rate
Infrastructure
• Low level of power
generation capacity and
unreliable delivery of
electricity
• Underdeveloped domestic
gas market
• Poor roads and limited
access to markets
• Limited ports capacity
reliable, affordable
commercial energy as
measured by:
• Actual power generation
increased to 5000MW by
2008
• Reduced power outages
• Increased penetration of
gas in domestic markets for
power and industry
improved/sustainable
transport systems to facilitate
trade, flow of goods, access to
markets:
• 1500km of highways under
performance based
management, etc.
• Concession of 16 port
terminals
• Concession of at least two
rail operations
• Limited ability to
communicate and to
access information
increases operational
costs for business
improved communications –
rural & urban:
• Increased tele-density to
6%, and increased
percentage of population
covered by mobile footprint
to 70% from 45%

Legal and Regulatory
• Ineffective and obstructive
institutions & regulatory
framework (e.g. policy
instability, irregular
application of procedures,
etc.)
• Limited access to efficient
financial services (e.g.
poor regulatory/policy
framework, lack of
information and
inappropriate financial
product)
• Uncertain policy
environment (exchange
rate volatility, policy
regulatory regimes)
4. Improved Legal and
Regulatory Environment:
• Reduced index of cost of
doing business
• Common external tariff
implemented
• Customs reform
implemented
• National tax policy reform
implemented
• Increase in the number of
effective land registries
across the country
• Increase in ADR
mechanisms used to resolve
commercial disputes
• Increased access to
financial services: 30%
increased PS credit and
savings rate of 18%
• Improved legal and
institutional framework for
financial intermediation in
place (e.g. credit bureaus
and pledge registry)
• Private sector exploration
investments in mining
sector
Non-oil producer and
enterprise productivity,
profitability
• Poor rural infrastructure
(roads, power, water) and
limited access to markets
• Agricultural sector
vulnerable and
productivity below real
potential
• Unfavourable business
climate
• Lack of access to efficient
financial services
5. Enhance productivity in
non-oil sector (esp. agric-
related), through CDD
generated infrastructure, and
use of new technologies in
targeted communities:
• 70% of small community
irrigation systems
operational
• 70% of farm to market
roads expanded
• Producers report
improvements in agric-
related services
• Small scale artisanal mining
operators benefiting
financing and business
development assistance
Policy analysis, private –
public dialogue
• Weak public consensus on
the links between
economic management
and non-oil sector growth
6. Informed public debate on
the links between Nigeria’s
economic management and
growth of the non-oil sector
• Policy and financing
decisions influenced by
agric sector policy analysis
and dialogue
• Public/private policy
analysis, research and
advocacy developed and
used in public debate
• Range of communications
media, formal and informal,
being used to influence
public policy

State service delivery and
business environment
• Poor rural infrastructure
(roads, power, water) and
limited access to markets
• Agricultural sector
vulnerable and
productivity below real
potential
• Unfavourable business
climate
• Lack of access to efficient
financial services
1. Improved investment
climate indicators and
productivity through:
• Access to productive
infrastructure e.g. power,
roads, irrigation, etc.
• Improved business
environment (e.g. tax
administration, CDR, land
registry, etc.)
• Access to improved
agricultural technology and
farm inputs (seeds,
fertilizers, machinery)
• Improved access to financial
services
*Intervention options are to be discussed with all stakeholders; some suggestions given here.
The principal idea is to leverage the joint World Bank Group – DFID Country
Partnership Strategy for Nigeria (Report FY 06-09) in a ‘niche’ – Bonny; which
is distinct, being a relatively isolated island, with both political and traditional
administrations. Traditional administration is by the Bonny Council of Chiefs
headed by the King. Political administration is by Bonny Local Government,
which has an elected chairman and 14 councillors. Community development
administration is effected through the Bonny Kingdom Development
Committee (BKDC). This strategy eliminates starting a new programme from
scratch, while gaining international acceptability. It takes as its starting point,
the vision of wealth creation, value re-orientation and establishment of a social
charter for human development and empowerment as outlined in Nigeria’s
home-grown poverty reduction strategy – NEEDS.
It is essential that every aspect of the CPS and each intervention internalise an
understanding of the political economy and works to unblock the three
underlying constraints – mismanagement of oil revenues, weak formal
accountability and transparency, and poor non-oil growth. A key objective of
the CPS is to support reform efforts and ensure that they are sustainable over
the medium term. Empowerment, growth and good governance have broad
support among the Nigerian population. However, powerful interest groups
will lose economically and politically and will be resistant to change. But the
programme may be grounded if some early tangible results (quick wins)
especially in the area of infrastructure provision are identified and pursued.
Another prerequisite is to ensure that the strong partnership between
government agencies, World Bank and DFID is fostered and extended to the
local community and civil society thereby creating space for voices supportive
of moving a community forward in a way that benefits all its members.
The associated risks are:
• There is a possibility that the scope for socio-economic progress in the
Bonny community is overestimated and thus an underestimation of the
political economy challenges. The degree of institutional deterioration, the
entrenchment of corrupt practices, the lack of accountability and

transparency are probably greater than can be imagined.
• Lack of supportive will by the government agencies, as the bureaucrats may
feel some erosion of their rent seeking tendencies, making them resistant
to change.
• The existing myopia of central government and the international aid
agencies to realise that they lack the tools to manage the risks of the CPS
implementation programmes, as most of them routinely operate outside the
intervention zones thereby stretching their supply lines and resources.
Assistance should be sought from other nimble and willing non-
governmental organisations or agencies while an external coordinator (a
major resident operator) should give oversight functions and keep any
programmes on track.
The outlined aspects needed for the Social License to Operate are envisaged to
be effected through a suitable non-profit non-governmental organisation
(NGO). Such NGO should be locally based, with or without an international
affiliation. TSKJ acts as the fosterer, and be the link between the NGO, the
World Bank and DFID on whose framework the plan is based. The NGO will be
responsible for delivering the services, through the local government and any
other identified stakeholders. A brief of the scope of envisaged works
(coverage and details of selected intervention projects and programmes) is to
be jointly prepared upon conclusion of initial TSKJ sponsored contacts with all
the stakeholders. This scope will then be tendered amongst identified NGOs
such as: the Niger Delta Fund Initiative (NDFI) which is set out to bring
international and national focus to governance issues related to rights to land
and resource royalties and rents; the National Primary Health Care
Development Agency (NPHCDA); and Pro-Natura International Nigeria (based
in Port Harcourt) which has established itself as the primary exponent of the
‘bottom up’ participatory development process. Use of an external agency
frees up substantial TSKJ resources, and enhances the credibility of TSKJ as
supporter of local empowerment initiatives.
The schedule for implementing the above is as follows:
February and March 2007:
1. Identify and make contacts with NGOs and approach DFID for assistance
and support. Reputable NGOs will be invited to give information on their
ability and coverage in the Niger Delta, and an assessment made as to their
suitability in delivering the envisaged services.
2. Make contact with Bonny Local Government and the Bonny Council of
Chiefs, introducing the concepts to them, obtaining their views, while
soliciting their initial buy-in. Information on working modalities, existing
programmes, organisational structure, basis for cooperation and guidelines
on identification of mutually acceptable projects and programmes are to be
obtained.
3. Reach some basic agreement (statement of intent or memorandum of
understanding) with an NGO on scope of intervention, coordination roles,
etc.

April 2007:
1. Prepare a comprehensive socio-economic plan based on outcome of
discussions and studies as above, and in combination with findings from the
in-country survey include as a chapter in the Nigerian Content Plan of bid.
5. Conclusion
Implementation of the aforementioned framework will culminate in the
presentation of a credible socio-economic plan that will guarantee the Social
License to Operate for TSKJ on the LNG SevenPlus project. The plan ensures
that there is no social exclusion and that all development stakeholders in
Bonny are consulted; organisation and implementation being undertaken by a
credible non-profit making body (the NGO), fostered by a responsible operator
(TSKJ), and with international backing and further credibility by the World
Bank and the reputable DFID. The framework of this plan embraces the
paradigm change, drawing from past lessons learned, and is guided by
specialist development and socio economic studies. It will institute a technical
mechanism to guide prioritisation of new capital investments. An alternative
strategy to maintain a security force for protection on Bonny will be more
expensive while perpetuating capital flight; it would be an attempt at futility,
offensive to Nigerians as it further alienates the sponsoring energy company
and will not meet with government’s approval.
References.
1. Columbia Encyclopaedia, 6th
Edition, 2006, Columbia University Press.
2. International Crisis Group: Africa Report No. 115, 3 August 2006; The Swamps
of Insurgency – Nigeria’s Delta Unrest.
3. John Ghazvinian, The Curse of Oil, The Virginia Quarterly Review, Winter 2007.
4. Federal Ministry of Works and Housing, Urban and Regional Planning Division:
Nigeria – Community based Urban Planning.
5. Report No. 32412-NG, World Bank and Department for International
Development (DFID) UK, Country Strategy for Nigeria 2005 – 2009, June
2005.

Framework For A Socio-Economic Plan

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