Presentation for the Roundtable on Governance in Afghanistan's Extractive Sector, Social Accountability for Violence Prevention and Peacebuilding, By Sadaf Lakhani

1. Preventing Violence, Building Peace
In the Extractive Sector in Afghanistan
By Sadaf Lakhani
Roundtable on Governance in Afghanistan’s Extractive Sector
November 28, 2012, United States Institute of Peace
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2. 1. Transitions to durable peace are daunting
In countries with high-value natural resources - including timber, oil, gas and mineral
- the stakes are high and peacebuilding can be especially challenging.
2. Resource-rich post-conflict countries face particular opportunities and
challenges
Advantage =natural resources can yield revenues for alleviating poverty, compensating
those effected by conflict- creating jobs, creating critical revenues and rebuilding
the country and the economy. BUT a number of actors have interests in the
outcomes of the reorganization of the state and management of state resources.
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3. 3. Evidence shows this opportunity is often poorly used, challenges dominate
Resource-rich countries do not have a better record in sustaining peace. In fact, resourcerelated conflicts are more likely to experience relapse.
4. The exploitation of natural resources and related environmental stresses can be
implicated in all phases of the conflict cycle
-contributing to the outbreak
-perpetuation and escalation of violence
-undermining prospects for peace agreements .
Substantial research and guidance on this issue by development agencies: UN Environment
Programme, ELI, World Bank, UK ODI
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4. Learning from other contexts
Lots of ‘bad-case’ examples
 Bougainville Discontent with Rio Tinto Panguna mine turned violent. Environmental damage and lack of benefits for local
people escalated hostility between the people of Bougainville and the Government of Papua New Guinea. Result= loss of
15,000-20,000 lives, destruction of state infrastructure, closure of the mine which had contributed 20% of GDP, Decade long
civil war, and the creation of an autonomous region in PNG.
 Sudan and South Sudan: conflict over oil results in continued instability, linked to localized ethnic tensions.
 Nigeria: Oil extraction in Niger Delta fueling community grievances over benefits and environ. damage, emergence of armed
groups NPVDF, MEND and others. Significant costs to government and damage to mining companies’ assets.
 Libya: Rebel militias likely to continue capturing more oil fields and pipelines for financing.
 DRC: Likely more than 50% of rare-mineral mines controlled by rebels.
 Indonesia, mismanagement of natural gas, laid on top of issues of identity, made for a decades long civil war in Aceh. In
West Papua mining continues to be a source of contention and localized conflict, with links to the ongoing succession
movement.
 Balochistan, Pakistan, where controversy over benefits and corruption is laid upon existing discontent towards the state,
and horizontal inequalities has prevented the start of mining operations and fuels the separatist agenda.
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5. Conflict context- Afghanistan
Afghanistan has already experienced significant linkage between conflict and mineral
mining, e.g. financing of anti-Taliban United Islamic Front in the 1990s from emerald
mining.
 Much of Mineral wealth not controlled by the state
 Informal mining conducted by communities for income and fuel

2005, 80% of mines controlled by armed illegal actors (MoMP data)
 Complex set of conflict dynamics
 Afghanistan also suffers from land tenure disputes, underpinned by long-term, structural
issues
 Challenges to the central state is not a new phenomenon. Afghanistan statebuilding has
historically been difficult
 History of inter-ethnic tensions and domination by elite group
 Criminal networks that often overlap/links to corrupt power brokers and the state
 Legacy of decades of conflict with both regional and international dimensions
Also
 Weakly organized civil society beyond traditional structures
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6. Preventing conflict:
Why social accountability is key
• Perceptions of injustice in benefits sharing a key driver of conflict in
extractives.
• Negative Social and particularly environmental impacts from extractives can
become triggers for escalating violent conflict.
• Weak formal accountability structures require supplementing to be able to
voice citizens interests and concerns. Strong social accountability mechanisms
should be invested in, situated within broad governance reform.
• These will help to ensure perceptions of equitable distribution of benefits
(often simply due to transparency) and effective management of grievances
related to extraction.
• Build legitimacy of central Afghan state, take power away from armed non-
state actors who challenge the state.
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7. Valuable foundations laid by Ministry Mines and
Petroleum
What the MoMP has done so far towards social accountability are all very important foundational
steps:
Evolving website which has a clear information – in particular a social development section with a
social policy
Developed and are implementing with the technical assistance of the WB a resettlement action
plan, based on WB OP. on involuntary resettlement, targeting the 10 villages, with a generous
compensation package that also provides lessons, as a pilot, for what could be done elsewhere
Started publication of all contracts and ancillary documents, following Karzai’s decree no. 45 is a
fantastic achievement already
 Initiated the establishment of the GRM for the RAP, that would help mitigate grievances before
they become acute & violent
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8. Local communities attend ribbon-cutting ceremony at Qara Zaghan Gold Mine,
Baghlan Province
© by the Endowment of the United States Institute of Peace. All rights reserved.

9. Recommendations for MoMP
1. Monitor extraction activities and local areas to ensure contract and regulation
compliance and to see what kinds of impacts-negative and beneficial. Involve impacted
communities as this already helps diffuse tensions.
2. Develop and finance local plans for mitigating negative impacts and capitalizing
on extractives for economy and human development for communities. Baseline data
like that provided by IWA for Qara Zaghan and Hajigak will help ( above)
3. Engagement action plan that is developed in consultation with communities and their
representatives: this should the elements that we have discussed: information feedback
systems, consultation structures, a GRM mechanism that can address broader concerns
with the mines.
4. Support capacity development -Capacity development plan for the Ministryidentifying key skills, as well as resources that are needed to implement the above plans,
and what already exists. Same for communities and organizational structures, support
them to play their role in social accountability.
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10. Guidance points
Civil Society Engagement
Some words of caution /guidance; The how of what is done is as if not more important that the how.
Engagement with communities can take many forms, its not easy to do, in that its hard to get right in a
way that create a meaningful relationship with government and between different groups in society:
 Structures and spaces for engagement: Often, governments or donors may set up structures that
compete with existing ways in which people associate and collaborate with each other, or with the
state. Capitalize on existing mechanisms – such as Shuras, instead of creating new ones, but being
cognizant of what their short falls might be. Allow people several options for how to engage- formal
consultations, open sessions, community liaison officers,etc.
 Who is the ministry going to engage with?: communities impacted by the mining go beyond
those who have been resettled. Also, a closer examination of the civil society sector would be able to
inform you of what kinds of representative organizational forms exist, and who they exclude. NGOs
may be very knowledgeable about technical issues but may require assistance and encouragement
from the ministry to ensure that they represent communities.
 Often if people are ‘participated’: unwillingly or in forms that they don’t feel are relevant to their
interests, they can actually feel disempowered or manipulated. Resentment arises from meaningless
or tokenistic participation, or for corrupt or questionable ends and elite capture of the participatory
process.
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11. Guidance points 2
 Active information and feedback mechanisms: Providing information should be
part of a communications strategy that complements the action-plan and the structure
established.
 Going beyond providing information: The other side of that also, is that people feel
that they are being told, but not being listened to. Provision of information is simply
one part of a process of active and constructive engagement.
 Matching supply with demand: Resentments can also arise if communities feel that
they are being listened to, but nothing is being done. Need to be able to match demands
and promises with capacity, and to manage unrealistic expectations.
 Be fair: be cautious about overly generous compensation packages, for example, which
if you are not able to offer in subsequent resettlements, can create perceptions of
injustice between communities.
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12. Guidance points 3
 Be transparent: this is a learning process, and there will inevitably be changes along
the way- be transparent about those changes and clear about the reasons for them.
Major decisions or changes may also necessitate special consultative sessions.
 Research from the WB and elsewhere shows that capacity of government
institutions is a key factor in ensuring real engagement with communities in in
achieving the desired results. Mapping and strengthening existing skill-sets and
resources for engagement is important.
 Capacity of organized civil society or communities is also key: if they have no
time, poorly informed or little understanding of the information that is being given and
few incentives, the quality of the MOMP participation or engagement with
communities is severely impacted. Civil society in Afghanistan is weak beyond
traditional structures. Strengthening capacity and addressing illiberal elements is
something that will take many years.
© by the Endowment of the United States Institute of Peace. All rights reserved.