Challenges for Japan

1. Last Week: Japan-East Asia Security
Relations
• Structure: From bipolarity to unipolarity . . Bipolar structure
(and legacy of colonialism) prevented security links in Cold
War, now emergence of multilateral institutions, and perhaps
multipolarity . . but Japan remains bilateral;
• Agency: Yoshida school politicians, bureaucrats, LDP, brief
reign of DPJ politicians, different party, same results?
• Norms: Cold War: anti-militarism, bilateralism. Post- Cold
War: slow erosion of anti-militarism, development of
internationalism – ultimate salience of bilateralism.

2. Unit 10
Challenges
for Japan
Pinnacles Dispute, DPRK and Futenma base

3. Aim
To apply the concepts and theoretical approach
introduced to the primary international
challenges faced by Japan.

4. Objectives
(1) To identify the relative importance of
structure, agency and norms in explaining
the primary contemporary challenges faced
by Japan;
(2) To demonstrate how structure, agency, and
norms can be used to help explain and
understand the nature and dynamics of these
challenges;
(3) To assess the gravity of these challenges and
their inter-related nature.

5. Introduction
• Why these challenges?
• Political, security and economic reasons;
• Apply the Structure, Agency and Norms
approach we have used so far;

6. The Pinnacle Islands Dispute

9. Pinnacle Islands Dispute: Background
• Use as navigation aid prior to 1895 Sino-Japanese War
(map wars);
• Occupied and incorporated 1895 by Japan – timing
problematic, also Treaty of Shimonoseki (Art. 2b);
• San Francisco Peace Treaty Japan gets residual
sovereignty?
• 1968 Survey finds possible oil  Taiwan and China
make claims, US declares neutrality;
• 1978 Shelved . . Deng Xiaoping:
“It does not matter if this question is shelved for some time,
say ten years. Our generation is not wise enough to find common
language on this question. Our next generation will certainly be wiser.
They will certainly find a solution acceptable to all”

10. The Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands Dispute:
Post Cold War Period
• Early-mid 1990s, China began to reassert its
claim, but cautiously, Japan prioritised good
relations; (e.g. 1996 Lighthouse recognition)
• Late 1990s/early 2000s China pushes harder,
Japan giving ground (e.g. Prior Notification
System)
• Koizumi Administration: Policy U-turn (e.g.
leasing islands, recognising lighthouse)
• 2004 Protesters Arrest and 2010 Collision
Incident;
• Ongoing landings, fly-overs and posturing 2012-

12. The Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands Dispute
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=lgVEu2hQ-BY

13. S.A.N. and the Senkaku/Diaoyu
Islands Dispute
• Structure: Weak China delayed, increasingly stronger
China makes increasingly stronger claims/actions . . US
and Japan vs China?
• Agency: Right-wing politicians and groups pushed a
hardline on the dispute (and raised awareness) . .
Koizumi administration took hardline;
• Norms: 1990s Asianism, Anti-militarism, Economism . .
Leave the dispute alone, no need to antagonise China .
. Today, nationalist norms, strong Japan or weak Japan?
• Proactive/Reactive?
• Challenge: To maintain peaceful relations with China
and maintain control over the islands . . .

14. The Futenma Base Issue
• IMAGE OF BASE

15. The Futenma Base Issue: Background
• US occupation until 1972, still site of most US
troops;
• Pros and Cons . . Ecomonic Benefits vs.
Pollution, environment, crime, etc..
• 1995: 12-year old girl raped  85,000 people
protested;
• 1996 Agreement to scale back . . Included
Futenma, Marine airfield in Ginowan City.

16. Futenma Base Issue
• A Marine Base in urban area with V-runway,
helicopters, planes (in use since 1945);
• 2004 Helicopter crash at Okinawa International
University .. More anti-base protests;
• 2006 Roadmap of Realignment . . Moving
Futenma to Henoko;
• DPJ Pledge to lessen burden on Okinawa . . move
Futenma out of Okinawa, renegotiate the deal
with the US;
• Secretary of Defence Robert Gates visits in 2009;
• Failure to find alternative site, Hatoyama reneges
on promise and resigns;

17. The Futenma Base Issue

18. Futenma Base Issue: S.A.N.
• Structure: Relevance of the US-Japan Alliance in
the post-Cold War era – Alliance against whom?
DRPK and China? (2010 Senkaku incident);
• Agency: MOFA, MOD, LDP, Media: pro-alliance;
do not question Okinawa bases. DPJ “equal”
relationship, control back from bureaucracy . .
Anti-base protesters and Okinawa itself; LDP;
• Norms: Bilateralism – Hatoyama’s failure
suggests questioning the status quo is dangerous.
Anti-militarism and Economism;
• Challenge: To maintain strong bilateral alliance
while maintaining support for alliance
domestically (and in Okinawa).

19. DPRK and Normalisation
In 2006, 2009, 2013 North Korea
announced successful nuclear
weapons tests
The trajectory of the 2006
Taepodong Missile Launch

20. DPRK and Normalisation: Background
• Legacy of Colonialism and Cold War Bipolarity
prevented normalization;
• Refusal to pay compensation, instead
“economic cooperation”, 1960 Security Treaty
included Korean Peninsula;
• Cold War Talks scuppered by events: KAL 858,
Rangoon terrorist bombings, alleged
abductions, Fujisanmaru detention;

21. DPRK and Normalisation
• End of Cold  Talks restart. Various issues prevent
normalisation;
• MOFA “renkei” policy: Japan-DPRK relations
determined by ROK-DRPK and USA-DRPK relations;
• 1994 Nuclear crisis, Agreed Framework
• 1997/8: Talks begin . . Taepodong-1 launch, abductions
denied.
• Sunshine policy vs. Axis of Evil
• 2002 Koizumi surprise visit to Pyongyang, admission of
abductions
• From 2002 on, abductions domestic key issue, public
opinion, media, strongly anti-DPRK

22. Dear Leaders

23. DRPK and Normalisation:
Recent Events
• 2006 Missile and Nuclear Tests, UN resolution,
tough bilateral sanctions;
• Domestic and International structural
obstacles to normalisation: Missile and
Abductions, 2008 New hard-line ROK
administration, Bush/Obama positions
fluctuated;
• 2009 Taepodong-2 Missile and Nuclear Tests;
• Cheonan sinking, Yeonpyeong Island shelling;
• 2012-13 Satellite/Missile Launch, Nuclear test.

24. S.A.N. and DRPK Normalisation Issue
• Structure: Cold War bipolarity, DPRK “hermit
state”. Post-Cold War remains opposed to ROK
and US, Japan’s key regional allies (renkei policy;
• Agency: Many agents. Cold War period: left-wing
parties, LDP factions, MOFA, etc.. Post-Cold War:
abduction groups, media, LDP/DPJ, other market
actors (military industry in US and Japan etc.);
• Norms: Various norms such as Asianism,
Economism, Developmentalism, etc . . . But all
trumped by Bilateralism.

25. Conclusion: Inter-related Challenges
• Same key factors in each dispute:
– Structure: Cold War bipolarity, Post-Cold War: Security
Treaty, US Alliance, Bipolarity
– Agency: Maintain Alliance remains priority
– Norms: Bilateralism trumps all others
• Inter-related nature of challenges: Inflation of DPRK
risk/threat, Change of security focus from North (USSR)
to Southwest (China), Futenma Base – Perceived need
to keep US in Okinawa (2010 collision incident great
timing!)
• Island dispute, DPRK, Futenma . . Also related to
broader issue of “normalisation” or “remilitarisation”;
• Challenges: How to address? DPJ policy initially more
balanced? DPJ policy failure – can Abe’s LDP succeed?