LETTERS TO STAFF COLLEGE QUETTA-1990-2008

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Letters to Staff College Quetta and What is Wrong with
Pakistan
Army
Agha Humayun Amin
ISBN-13: 978-1499790535
ISBN-10: 1499790538

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What is wrong with Pakistan Army
This is an internal assessment of Pakistan Army‟s
promotion system , training system and general
environment.

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British Colonial
legacy
Any discussion or analysis of the performance of
Pakistani or Indian Armies based on the assumption that
these armies came into existence in August 1947 is
meaningless and incomplete.
The organisational tactical and social development of
both the armies had a 190 year old connection with
British rule in India and influenced their conduct in 1948
1965 1971 wars and even today in many aspects.We will
therefore first of all analyse the conduct of Pakistan Army

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in 1965 with particular reference to the influence of the
"British military Legacy".
An attempt was made by sycophants in the period
1958-69 to prove that the Pakistan Army was largely the
creation of Ayub Khan!There are two types of men in
history;ie those who follow the status quo and those who
are originators or executors of dynamic ideas which
change the course of history ! Both Indian and Pakistan
Armies were dominated by men of the former category.In
India primacy of civilian leadership did not allow the
growth of dynamism in the army while in Pakistan
concentration on improving personal fortunes and in
perpetuating military dictatorship ,kept the military
usurpers attention fixed on non military things!In other
words no major change or reform was undertaken in both
the armies as far as doctrine staff procedures and military

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organisation were concerned .The armies which fought the
1965 war were led by men who were the products of the
British Colonial heritage. We will examine the influence of
British military colonial legacy on Pakistan Army's conduct
in 1965 war in the following paragraphs.
British Indian Military Tradition:-Britains power was
never based on its army but on its naval power and
superior diplomacy which enabled it to defeat its various
European mainland rivals by coalition warfare.Thus after
Marlborough British Army's role in land warfare on
European mainland decreased and during the Napoleonic
wars Britain's main contribution consisted in naval warfare
or in providing finances for sustaining the various
coalitions against France than in actual war against
France.Thus Napoleon was destroyed in Russia and in the
campaigns of 1813 and 1814 in which the British Army had
no role.Even Waterloo was a coalition affair in which the

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Prussians played as major a role as the British.In short the
foundation of British supremacy or British power was not
military excellence but other factors like naval
power,super.ior diplomacy and an overall superior political
system.In this sense the British legacy which the

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Indo Pak armies inherited was certainly not the finest in
the world.But the difference did not end here.The British
Indian Army which was the father of the post 1947 Indo
Pak Armies was an even more outdated organisation than
the regular British Army.This was so because the regular
British Army was designed to fight Britain's European
enemies and thus got more attention in terms of finances
equipment and was more vigorously reformed by a
concerned parliament.The British Indian Army which was
primarily an internal security army was far more backward
than the regular British Army because it was not designed
to face any European foe till 1914 except the Russians
whose military potential or effectiveness was regarded as
far more inferior than Britains West European rivals like
Germany and France and which in any case performed very
poorly in the Crimean War of 1854-56 and was later
defeated by an Asiatic power in the Russo Japanese War.In
terms of equipment the Indian Army as we have already

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seen was deliberately kept one generation behind the
regular British Army whether it was infantry weapons or
artillery (which was taboo for Indians except few mountain
batteries in which Indians could serve as common
soldiers).The Indian Army was trained as late as 1900 to
fight primarily as battalions or brigades against frontier
tribesmen. We have already discussed that the First World
War forced the British to slightly modernise the Indian
Army and the massive Indian contribution to the British
war effort forced the British to grant the Indians the
privilege of Regular commission in the army.The Indians
selected for officer rank were from the most loyal classes
with proven record of loyalty to the British Empire.Even
Indianisation (introduction of Indian Army Officers) was
resisted by the British Indian Army officers and as late as
1939 twenty years after Indianisation had started there
were just 333 regular Indian officers in the Indian Army as
against 3,031 British officers6
.We have already seen that

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after 1918 it was felt that the Indian Army would not be
required to fight in a European war and this led to massive
reduction in the size and resource allocation of the Indian
Army.Thus the Indian Army was so outdated in 1938 that
General Auchinleck observed in 1938 that in terms of
modernisation and equipment it was behind even the Iraqi
Egyptian and Afghan Armies '!There was another serious
misconception in many minds and has been carried
forward till today that the Indian Army was the finest army
in the world and played a major part in many British
victories.There is no doubt that the Indian Army played a
significant role in British Empires wars.However it must be
remembered,as we have just discussed, that Britains wars
right from the time of Marlborough were coalition wars and
British Army's role in these successively became lesser
and lesserin this context the Indian Army's share in the
relatively limited contribution made by the British Army in
both the world wars was even more limited.In any case

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the Indian Army was Indian only as far as the rank and
file was concerned and its principal strength was its British
officer cadre.Even beyond battalion level each Indian
Brigade was stiffened by one pure British battalion and the
Indian Army always functioned as part of a larger team
and mostly in circumstances where the British enjoyed a
comfortable numerical material and logistic superiority
over their adversaries.The Indian Army at its best was
used only as a defensive force in France in 1914.The British
final success in both world wars had a deeper connection
with US aid and Russian blood than with the Indian
Army.In any case the principal force multiplier of the
Indian Army was the British officer and the vast resources
of the British Empire rather than the Chakwal Jhelum men
who were merely cannonfodder.In this regard there was
absolutely no comparison between the quality of
performance of the pre 1947 Indian Army and the post
1947 Indo Pak armies.In Pakistan specially it was

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mistakenly assumed that the British Indian Army did well
because their soldiers i.e. the Punjabi Muslims were more
martial than the Hindus !These naïve commentators failed
to see the essential fact i.e. that it was the British officer
who was able to organise and lead Indians of all
nationalities and religions equally well in battle .The
cardinal factor in the whole equation was not the martial
race,as has been mistakenly asserted by many Pakistani
officers, but the white officer who inspired the espirit de
corps and the relatively superior organisation skill that
created the Indian Army.
Legacy of inter arm compartmentation and rivalry:-
One of the most negative legacies which inhibited the
performance of both the armies in 1965 and even in 1971
was a purely British inculcated and British inherited legacy
of inter arm and even inter regimental rivalry within the
same arm.While German successes in the WW II had a

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deep link with emphasis on fighting as a division with
intimate coopertion between all arms,many British
military failures had a deep link with inter arm rivalry
which severely retarded their ability to fight as combined
arms teams.Thus at Gazala in 1942 the 2nd
Highland
Infantry was overrun by German tanks "whilst a superior
British tank force looked on"8
Lack of leadership tradition:--We have briefly
discussed the fact that the West European way of warfare
was imported by many Asian and East European countries
like Russia.There was a major difference between the other
countries who imported the European way of warfare and
the British Indian Army.While the entire officer corps in
the Ottoman ,Russian,Japanese,Egyptian and Chinese
Armies consisted of their

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own people,there was no leadership tradition in the
British Indian Army as far as Indians were concerned.The
English East India Company was very careful in not allowing
native Indians from becoming officers in their native
Presidency Armies and did not allow even Anglo-Indians to
become officers after 1805 barring few exceptions like
Colonel Skinner etc.The objective of the company was
simple i.e. not letting a leadership tradition grow in the
natives and also not to let the natives master the European
methods of warfare.The US War of Independence convinced
the British Government that it was dangerous to let any
colonial subjects from mastering the art of warfare by
getting the officers commission.This policy played rich
dividends when the native soldiers of the Bengal Army
failed to handle units larger than platoons and companies
and were easily defeated by the British despite their
relative numerical superiority at least in the initial stages of
the rebellion.The Sepoy Rebellion reinforced the British

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determination not to allow Indian to become commissioned
officers and till 1919 there were no Indian officers in the
Indian Army.This meant that there was no leadership
tradition in the Indians who became officers.The Indians
selected to become officers from 1917 onwards were
from classes with proven loyalty and men meant to
be groomed for lower level command ranks
only.After the formation of Indian Military Academy
a large proportion of cadets were from the ranks
which never attracted the best available young men
in India9
.Many of these were sons of rankers or VCOs
who had spent their whole lives in serving the
juniormost British officers and had inherited from
their family a narrow approach of a life spent in
playing sycophant par excellence with the juniormost
British officer who was senior to the seniormost
Indian VCO in rank and authority.In future analysis this
will be referred to as the Ranker/VCO approach which was

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found in plenty in the 1965 Indo Pak Armies!Colmar Von der
Goltz spoke of the "aristocracy of education" which
constituted the corps of German officersIn India bulk of the
real aristocracy had been eliminated when the British
emerged victorious.The new aristocracy which they
created was an aristocracy of toadies The German
aristocracy which constituted the bulk of the German officer
corps was basically an impoverished aristocracy„butrich in
tradition of contributed many generations of officers to the
Prussian/German Army.In Indo Pak armies bulk of the men
who reached the officer rank were neither an aristocracy of
education nor possessed a long tradition of leadership by
virtue of having ancestors in the officer ranks!The
Germans on the contrary did not encourage NCO to
become officers and Von Seeckt the founder of the
Reichswehr which was the iron frame of the Wehrmacht
deliberately increased educational qualifications to
discourage ex NCOs from getting officer rank.Thus in 1928

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just 117 out of 4000 officers were ex NCOs In the Indian
and Pakistani Armies a much larger proportion of rankers
or rankers sons were in the officer rank. Contemporary
evidence suggests that the British preferred these over
directly commissioned Indian officers with good college or
university education since the ex rankers or rankers sons
who were educated at the military schools of Ajmer
Jullundhur and Serai Alamgir (schools for rankers sons
education) were more pliable and easier to handle material
!
It is not difficult to understand that the small
number of Indians who joined the army as
commissioned officers were viewed as a necessary
evil arising as a result of a civilian governments policy
to accept Indians in the commissioned ranks.These
men were not held in much high esteem by their
British superiors and viewed the army as just one

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career where they could improve their personal lot
and as an avenue of social advancement.What
leadership tradition could be expected from such
mercenaries.The real hero of the British Indian Army
was the British officer who was from the first thirty
cadets in the Sandhurst entrance examination, and
was fighting for his King Emperor!His Indian
counterpart was just a mercenary for whom serving
the British was just a job!
Conservative Military Doctrine:--The British Army being
an extremely snobbish and class conscious army was the
bastion of conservatism.There was no threat to Britain in
the period till 1933 and military reform or radical change
was never serious agenda in the British Army.Thus the
British Army that fought the WW Two was an out of
date machine which performed extremely poorly in
France and North Africa till overwhelming material

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superiority,thanks to US aid finally enabled it to turn
the tables at Alamein.Thus progressive and dynamic
military thinkers like Fuller were sidelined from the
British Army before the war in an atmosphere where
Polo and social contacts were more important than
strict professionalism.Thus the British approach
towards warfare was extremely conservative and
outdated .If this was the case in the regular British Army
which was supposed to defend Britain in a war against
European adversaries it is not difficult to imagine the
rudimentary and primitive approach that dominated the
British Indian Army which was designed to imperial
policing jobs in countries like Iraq and Persia after the end
of First World War.
Lack of Permanent General Staff-The British Army
lacked a permanent General Staff unlike the German
Army.This was a serious drawback and played a major role

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in relatively poor performance of the British Army in the
two world wars.Organisationally the British Army was not
as efficient in carrying out

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military operations as the German Army.Cardwell the
revolutionary British Secretary of State and the father of
reform in the British Army was in favour of having a
permanent General Staff like the German Army but was
frustrated in his attempts to do so by the conservative
elements in the British Army led by Duke of Cambridge"
.Just because the British did not have a permanent General
Staff,the post 1947 officers of both the Indian and Pakistani
Armies saw no need to have one.Thus Staff work and
procedures stayed as poor and rudimentary in both the
armies as in the pre 1947 Indian Army or the British
Army.There was an ocean of qualitative difference in
between the British and German Staff institutions of
instruction.The British Staff College at Cambrai in words of
Montgomery's biographer Nigel Hamilton was an institution
preoccupied with "hunting and socialising"12
.The same was
the case with US institutions like Fort Leavenworth where
in words of General Bradley to rose to great heights in the

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US Army the system of education was
"predictable....unrealistic and did not encourage
unconventional tactics" 13
In addition while the German
General Staff course lasted for three years that at Staff
College Quetta lasted for two years and was later reduced
to six months from 1940.Most of the senior officers who
held important command and staff assignments in the
1965 war were graduates of this six months crash course
in which entry was by nomination.ln 1965 as we shall
discuss many opportunities were primarily lost because of
poor staff work.in words of a British Army officer ; "The
British Army lacked an institution which deliberately
cultivated and carefully fostered a self-conscious
intellectual existence like the German general Staff.For the
German Army this institution became the focus for
professional debate and a vehicle for operational
innovation.The officer corps to which it gave rise received
a thorough grounding in military history and an induction

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into the critical methods of historical study.These
formidable intellectual foundations conferred on the minds
of staff trained German officers a powerful and sensitive
analytic approach to the problems of managing
violence"I4
General Von Mellenthin who served as a general
staff officer in North Africa noted a major different in the
quality of thinking of the British about their staff officers
and the measure of trust that was placed in British Army in
the staff officers; "The officers of the German General Staff
were not mere clerks or mouthpieces of their commanders
(as was the case with British and their corrupted off shoot
i.e. the Sub Continental Indian and Pakistani Armies) ,but
were trained to accept responsibility for grave decisions
and were respected accordingly.In contrast the British
fighting commanders tend look down on the staff,and the
British show a curious reluctance to appoint capable staff
officers to operational commands15
.

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Orders Oriented British Legacy:-Another legacy common
to both the Indo Pak armies was an orders oriented
approach.This was the opposite of the German approach
of Auftragtstaktik under which commanders at all levels
were trained to function without waiting for orders in case a
tactical or operational situation warranted it and valuable
tactical or operational opportunities were being lost in case
one waited for orders from higher headquarters.The famous
British staff officer Dorman Smith observed that ; "
Essentially in a professional army the commander is left to
carry out an order without wet nursing.In the British
system,on the contrary a subordinate will do nothing until
he will have the next above breathing down his neck.The
result is that everyone is doing the proper job of of the
next below instead of his own battle job.This is the main
cause of stagnation in the British tactical mind" 16
. The
Indo Pak armies suffered from another subtle drawback in
this case.On one hand the British were conservative in

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attitude towards orders and secondly Indians till the
second world war were mostly very junior officers barring
few exceptions who commanded companies or battalions or
one who commanded a brigade.The Indian was fighting the
White Man's war and took no interest in exercising his
initiative always pursuing a safe course of waiting for
orders.The same bunch of people who fought the second
world war constituted the Indian and Pakistani armies who
fought the 1965 war from Lieutenant Colonel onwards.These
men as subalterns and captains or majors were not trained to
take mission oriented decisions,nor were they motivated to
risk their career by exercising any initiative since they were
fighting the white man's warlA large number of them like
Musa Tikka etc were ex rankers who were even more
limited and conservative in their typical "ranker
approach".Thus when these men became brigadiers and
major generals they expected the same from their juniorsJt
was the case of a habit getting instilled and internalised

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as an essential part of ones personality.Thus many
opportunities were lost since all commanders from
squadron/company till divisional level preferred to wait for
orders rather than do anything on their own initiative.Gul
Hassan's memoirs is full of examples of approach of
senior Pakistani officers using the weight of their rank and
intimidating their juniors by use of court of inquiries and
warnings!Anyone who is keen to know about the
"Conspiracy against originality boldness and initiative"
should read Gut" memoirs which though otherwise not

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wholly accurate provide an excellent
image of the attitudes of senior officers of
that time as regards cultivation or rather
discouragement of initiative!
The British system of selection of
Indians as army officers did not
encourage initiative or mission oriented
decision making .The Indian was
grudgingly allowed commissioned rank
as Indian Army had played a crucial role
in First World War.

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But this Indian was not supposed to go
beyond a company or a squadron
commander.
Second World War hastened British
Empires demise and both Indian and
Pakistan Army were hastily created in
1947 with Indians as divisional and
army commanders.
Many of the Indian officers had actually
been good batmen of British officers.
So that leadership trait was missing.
I explored this sensitive theme in my
article Tejh Singh of Meerut at the

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height of Musharraf usurpers power and
did not please the military usurper .
Tejh Singh of Meerut
In 1807 one Khushaal Singh , son of a poor
Brahman shopkeeper of Gaur Class came
from Sardhana Pargana of district Meerut,
then a part of Honourable English East India
Company's territory to Lahore. Khushaal
enrolled as a soldier in Ranjit Singh's army
and ultimately rose to the rank of a
Jemadar. The Hindustani Brahman became
close to Ranjit Singh and also brought his
nephew Tejh Ram from Meerut to Lahore in

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1812. They both became Sikhs, soon, the
uncle in 1812 and the nephew in 1816. By
1830s Tejh Singh was one of the senior Sikh
Chiefs in the inner circle of Ranjit Singh
having served in many key posts at
Peshawar, Kashmir etc.
Like many leaders of past and present Ranjit
Singh feared a military coup and this made
him have Hindustani Hindus like Tejh Singh
in his army's highest ranks. It is an
interesting fact of history that one of the
greatest leaders of Punjab did not favour
having a Punjabi chief in his highest army
ranks for fear of a military coup.

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No surprise since it is another fact of history
that all four army chiefs of Pakistan Army
hailing from Punjab were selected by Sindhi
or Pathan heads or political heads of state
i.e. Tikka, Zia and Karamat by two Sindhi
prime ministers i.e. Z.A. Bhutto and Benazir,
while Asif Nawaz was selected by a Pathan
president.
Yet when war finally came in 1845-46 Tejh
Singh betrayed the Khalsa at the battles of
Feroz Shah and Moodke refusing to attack a
far weaker British force which also housed
the then Governor General of India . This if
done would have been a fatal blow to the
British. Mallesson the famous author of the

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book "Decisive Battles of India" has singled
out Feroz Shah and Moodke as a decisive
battle in which Tejhh Singh's treachery was
more fatal than that of Mir Jafar at Plassey.
Tejh Singh was well rewarded for his
services by the English East India Company
and his family's name was on the top in the
famous book Punjab Chiefs published in
1909.
The tradition of divide and rule, selecting
key persons from political or ethnic
minorities is ancient. The Mughals soon
discarded their key Uzbek and Turk nobles
soon after Humayun's demise in Akbar's
reign and imported the Persian nobles with

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the hope that being from the Fiqh-I-Jafariya
they would be a sectarian minority and thus
a political guarantee against a coup by a
Sunni Turani military commander. The folly
was proved once the Persian Zulfiqar Khan
allied with the Marathas against the Mughals
and in the Battle of Karnal once the Persian
Nawab of Oudh betrayed the Mughals
leading to the sack of Delhi.
Liaquat Ali Khan selected a junior and
military record-wise incompetent officer
Ayub Khan simply because Liaqat was
involved in a political battle and did not
want a Punjabi army chief. Pakistan payed
the price in 1958. Ayub selected Yahya with

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the premise that Yahya belonged to the
Qizilbash minority and Pakistan paid the
price in 1971. Bhutto selected Zia because
he thought that Zia was meek and docile
and Pakistan is paying the price till to date.
Nawaz selected Musharraf with the premise
that Musharraf being from a minority would
be less dangerous than the Pathan Ali Quli
and Pakistan paid the price in Kargil and
Nawaz on 12th October. There is a Mianwali
saying " Siana Kaaan , Gooo tay Digdaa" .
(meaning a clever crow in his
overconfidence noose dives into cow shits
heap and dies).

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Divide and rule is a dangerous policy. Back
in 1980s the military intelligence pundits
acted as the midwife of ethnic parties in
Sindh in the hope that it would counter the
PPP. Thus a Pandora's Box was opened and
the military intelligence Don Quixotes have
so far failed to control the genie they
unleashed in Sindh in 1985-86. These ethnic
parties may even outlast Pakistan the way
geopolitical events are moving.
The Afghan Mujahideen and their successors
Taliban again represent an interesting lesson
in the limitations of policy of divide and rule.
Just to preserve a military regime facing a
political challenge in 1980s and 1990s these

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groups specially the Taliban became an
embarrassment for Pakistan and Pakistan
paid the price of 10 Billion loss to economy
in 2001.
Presently the policy of dividing and
destroying two of this country's largest
parties the PPP and the PML is again
dangerous. Whatever is left to present the
military rulers any credible defiance is being
bull dozed just in the interest of one man
rule. Thus the PML Q and the PPP Patriots.
How long would this policy of divide and rule
go on. This is a phenomenal self-deception.
How long would we be again and again

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betrayed by Zulfiqar Khans or Tejh Singhs
whatever their ethnicity sect or religion.
Castration of rights joined by Pakistan
Army officers as inherited from British
Indian Army Act
An army officer till 1951 could not be retired
summarily.However after the so called Pindi
Conspiracy affair Pakistan Armys chief Ayub
Khan , Pakistani Secretary of Defence
Iskandar Mirza advised Pakistani premier to
amend rules of service regarding retirement
of an officer.
From now on an army officer could be
retired or dismissed by the government as
easily as a sweaper !

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This is the simple summing up of why a
Pakistan Army officer is programmed to be
docile.
Any officer of any rank could be retired
without any reason and this officer could not
go to a civil court while in uniform against
this decision.
An officer was as good or as bad as a
personal slave of the Pakistani state.Job
security being Nil !
Even the Pakistani politicians failed to give
the army personnel the basic constitutional
right to appeal enjoyed in India. Thus while
ZA Bhutto did allow this initially in

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constitution in 1973 , he immediately took it
back once the Attock Conspiracy took place.
In 1958 when martial law was
clamped,Pakistans military dictator Ayub
Khan also castrated Pakistans civil servants.
Arbitrary interference of an
overpowerful executive and no job
security.This is Pakistans issue of
governance !
Ayubian System and complete
destruction of talent in Pakistan Army
In the Ayubian system when officers with
ranker background or those who lacked

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independent judgements were preferred for
higher ranks! The class conscious British
who were extremely snobbish in selection of
regular officers for the British Army very
cleverly kept a 50% quota for Indian Army
rankers (24 on internal merit and 6 on
nomination) in each intake ( 30 out of 60
cadets) of the Indian Military Academy Dera
Dun. The ulterior motive was to ensure that
relatively more pliable , politically inert, and
orders oriented material entered the Indian
officer corps. In India the ranker breed did
not do as well as Pakistan because their first
Indian C-in-C Cariappa was from the 1919
commissioned Indian course. On theother

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hand in Pakistan the civilian leadership in its
zeal to have a non-Punjabi C-in-C at a time
when the Punjabi-Hindustani conflict was at
its peak selected Ayub who was a 1927
commissioned officer. This led to the exit of
many Sandhurst/Daly College commissioned
Muslim officers who were senior to Ayub.
The leftover of Sandhurst commissioned
officers were eliminated by Ayub through
forced retirement or by promotion of Musa
to C-in-C‟s appointment in 1958. Thus the
Pakistan Army lost the services of many
more experienced officers simply because
they were sidelined through political
supersession or were retired. The gap

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between the two Indo Pak armies in quality
of experience may be gauged from the fact
that the first Indian C-in-C was eight years
senior to Ayub in service and the course
mate of Musa, the second Muslim C-in-C of
the Pakistan Army i.e Manekshaw became
the Indian C-in-C eleven years after Musa!
This may have worked positively for the
Pakistan Army had Musa been a man with
an independent outlook! Musa on the other
hand as Gul Hassan‟s memoirs revealed
lacked independent judgement dynamism or
talent! The Pakistan army during the period
1951-71 became a highly orders oriented
machine! Smart on the drill square,

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tactically sound but strategically barren and
lacking in operational vision! One whose first
Pakistani C-in-C was more interested in
political intrigue and industrial ventures than
in the basics of higher military organisation
or operational strategy!
Modern warfare on the other hand
demanded mission-oriented approach, which
was sadly lacking in both the Indo Pak
armies! This was thanks to the British
inherited orders oriented approach which in
words of General Mellenthin of the
Wehrmacht, reduced British officers to the

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status of clerks and mouthpieces of their
commanders! The British with all the
resources of the British Empire and thanks
to US aid in both world wars managed to
survive despite phenomenal military
incompetence.
Thus Alanbrooke the British Chief lamented
during WW Two once he said “It is
lamentable, how poor we are in army and
corps commanders; we ought to remove
several , but heaven knows where we shall
find anything much better...the flower of our
manhood was wiped out some twenty years
ago and it is just some of those that we lost

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then that we require now” (Refers-Page-
239- The Turn of the Tide-Arthur Bryant -
Collins Saint James Place-London-April
1957). But this incompetence was no longer
affordable in the resource starved Pakistan
Army of 1971! The Indian problem was less
serious since many of their drawbacks were
overcome by the fact that they were
numerically superior, and possessed larger
material resources. This was applicable
relatively less in 1965 and convincingly
more in 1971! Secondly the Indians had
lesser number of ranker officers in their
higher ranks and had benefited from the
experience of a larger number of service

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chiefs with more experience in terms of
length of service as well as war record than
Pakistan Army, whose first chief was famous
for tactical timidity in Burma, while the
second chief was a non entity, whose only
quality was humility, albeit, commensurate
with his actual potential (!) and political
reliability!
Some readers may find the approach biased.
Nevertheless it is based on lessons of
military history. Leadership is a situational
process. The finest leadership seen in an
institutionalised form was developed in the

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German Army. The German officer corps
was dominated by two classes of men. One,
scions from aristocratic families of Prussia or
the impoverished nobility weak in land
holding but bearers of a long tradition in
officer rank. Men with the title/prefix Von.
Second were men of learning who made
their way upwards in the officer corps
through sheer merit and on total intellectual
grounds. Like Moltke Gneisenau and
Scharnhorst (of humble origins but educated
under a noble‟s patronage who saw great
talent in him). Take Moltke the Elder, the
writer of a large number of military history
works and a profound thinker. He cannot be

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compared with Niazi Tikka or Musa, all of
whom entered the army on the ranker quota
and the last were not famous for any
qualities of higher military leadership apart
from eminence in conducting ruthless
counter insurgency operations in Baluchistan
or East Pakistan! Men who had not written
even a single article or composition on any
military subject, with any trace of depth of
intellect! When I was commissioned in the
army in March 1983 we had two officers in
11 Cavalry who specialised in narrating
anecdotes of General Tikka Khan‟s
utterances of Solomon‟s wisdom on various
occasions while he was the chief! Take Ayub

49
49
Khan. Guilty of tactical timidity in Burma!
No comparison with Thimaya the only Indian
to command an infantry brigade in actual
action in WW Two or Rajendarsinhji the first
Indian to get a DSO! Those who did have
the talent of higher command or grasp of
strategy like Yaqub were sidelined! Those
who did have a record of accomplished
generalship as divisional commanders like
Abrar or Sarfaraz or brigade commanders
like Qayyum Sher were not promoted!
The reviewer‟s observation about gallantry
awards may be compared with Tajammul‟s

50
50
observation about the round about manner
in which gallantry awards were awarded in
1965, e.g Aziz Bhatti‟s case who as per
Tajammul died on the home bank of BRB
(by fluke) but was awarded a Nishan e
Haidar on the basis of the citation (which
was rewritten three times) written by his
Commanding Officer Colonel Ibrahim
Qureshi (a man the readers may or may not
know of considerable literary merit).
(Refers-Page-74-The Story of My Struggle-
Major General Tajammul Hussain Malik-Jang
Publishers- Lahore -1991) . In any case Hilal
I Jurrat was awarded even to Niazi again
and to General Rahim (accused of fleeing in

51
51
a unsoldierly manner later), Ansari, Sharif
(God knows why) during the period when
the army was engaged in minor operations
against the so-called Mukti Bahini
insurgents from March to December 1971
(Page -126-Ibid). Tajammul a Punjabi
Muslim from Chakwal forthrightly admitted
that these above-mentioned awards were
given to these gentlemen for killing their
own countrymen! (Ibid).
The problem of the Pakistan Army was not
lack of talent but of operating in an
environment, which I have always referred

52
52
to in a self-coined phrase as “ conspiracy
against originality and boldness”, something
which I at least witnessed in my 13 years
service from 1981 to 1994. Why this
conspiracy against talent? We enter the
political realm once again!
The German Kaisers had nothing to fear
from a Moltke or Blucher but military or
civilian usurpers of Pakistan had a lot to fear
from a more talented general! Thus the
necessity for (another self-coined phrase)
“Goof Selection Syndrome”, a process
initiated by Liaquat the first prime minister
under able advice of Iskandar Mirza and

53
53
perfected by Ayub and Bhutto. “Select a
man from an ethnic or sectarian minority or
at least a politically docile man or one who
is mediocre or at least perceived/assessed
as such”. Thus in the Ayubian era officers
with ranker background, were not preferred
on merit, but on the basis of lack of talent
and thus lack of ambition in being politically
docile, or being from ethnic and sectarian
minorities as was the case with Musa and
Yahya. The German Army which we were
discussing as late as 1930‟s the German
army was a “Von” dominated army. As a
matter of fact most of the German generals
who opposed Hitler‟s rule and many of his

54
54
unsound strategic decisions were men like
Fritsch Manstein etc, all of them with an
aristocratic background. In India
unfortunately the British with an ulterior
motive had encouraged men from the ranks
to be officers with the thinking that these
would be more reliable. There never was
any 50 % quota for rankers in Sandhurst!
Why the British were so generous with the
despised Indians! Even the Punjabi
dominated army which was so much
criticised by the British press for atrocities in
East Pakistan was a British creation whose
origins dated back to the period 1883-1911!

55
55
The army did have potential Moltke‟s
Mansteins and some Grey Wolf‟s but the
vast bulk of these, perhaps with the
exception of men like Eftikhar Khan were
sidelined! Even Eftikhar, thanks to his
unorthodox personal life, was a sidelined
man, once the war broke out, and it was
Pakistan Army‟s good luck that this great
leader of men, our finest commander
commanded the 23 Division! I remember a
session with General Attiq ur Rahman whenI
presented him with a book that I had
written on Clausewitz‟s military thoughts

56
56
.The book was dedicated to Eftikhar Khan.
Attiq was horror struck and remembered
Eftikhar as a horrible man , as Attiq saw him
in the light of Attiq‟s strict standards of
morality as Eftikhar‟s Directing Staff in Staff
College Quetta. I dismissed General
Attique‟s objections since I viewed Eftikhar
as all the officers and men of my unit 11
Cavalry saw him in Chamb in 1971. Moving
towards the sound of guns, racing ahead of
the leading tank ! Goading cursing and
prodding with his stick irresolute lower
commanders ahead ! Our problem has been
failure to identify and groom talent! A
natural result in a country where the Prime

57
57
Minister or the President wants to have the
most pathetic man in the highest ranks, just
because he feels safer with them!
The fact that Niazi became a three star
general proves that incompetent men can
reach relatively high ranks in an army. Who
can say that Niazi was different from the
bulk of other generals of the Pakistan Army
in 1971!
An army in which between 1955 and
November 1971, in about 17 years 40
Generals had been retired, of whom only

58
58
four had reached their superannuating age.
(Refers- Page-258 & 259- Pakistan‟s Crisis
in Leadership-Major General Fazal Muqeem
Khan (Retired)-National Book Foundation-
Ferozsons-Rawalpindi-1973).
An army in which in the words of a major
general who served in the same period,
anyone “in the higher ranks who showed
some independence of outlook were
invariably removed from service” or one in
which “Some officers were placed in
positions that they did not deserve or had
no training for”! (Ibid). An army where
“gradually the officer corps, intensely proud

59
59
of its professionalism was eroded at its apex
into third class politicians and
administrators”. An army in which security
of commission and constitutional safeguards
against arbitrary dismissal thanks to laws
amended from early 1950s were so lacking
that “some left in sheer disgust in this
atmosphere of insecurity and lack of the
right of criticism, the two most important
privileges of an armed force officer”.

66
66
Javed assans India Study in Profile

176
176
A CONSPIRACY AGAINST
ORIGINALITY AND BOLDNESS-THE
ABOVE ANALYSIS APPLIED TO
ASSESSMENT AND TRAINING OF
MILITARY LEADERS
What was wrong with Assessment
of Officers and Military Training-
Pakistan Army and What continues
to be wrong till to date as research
indicates

178
178
Selection and Assessment of
Commanders in Pakistan Army-
Pakistan Army Journal-Citadel-
Command and Staff College
These articles published in military
journals of Pakistan Army
endeavour to subject the highly
defective system of assessment of
officers to criticism despite strict
censorship.

179
179
One must add that some discussion
became possible in the army only
after 1988 when General M.A Baig
took over .
In the Zia era , with intellectual
honesty buried and hypocrisy and
sycophancy being hallmark of the
army for 12 long years (1976-88)
this was impossible.
After 1998 once Brigadier Riaz took
over as DG ISPR the situation
improved.

180
180
Three editors of Pakistan Army
Journal were outstanding , all in
succession , i.e Colonel I.D Hassan
(a chronic bachelor and very
cereberal and well read) ,
Lieutenant Colonel Syed Ishfaq
Naqvi (outstanding) and Lieutenant
Colonel Syed Jawaid Ahmad (soft
spoken but bold as far as publishing
articles and extremely
knowledgeable).
In the command and staff college
there was Lieutenant Colonel Ashraf
Saleem (later lieutenant general) ,

181
181
Lieutenant Colonel Tariq Khan (now
lieutenant general) and Lieutenant
Colonel Ahsan Mahmood (now
major general) , all three were well
read and had a high intellectual
calibre particularly Tariq Khan.
After these three the pedants came
and pedants and the conformists off
course are in preponderance !
I would say the assessments that I
made in faulty and fallacious
assessment of military commanders
continue !

182
182
If Tariq Khan became a three star it
was a triumph of destiny over a
thoroughly rotten system !
WHEN ORDERS SHOULD BE OBEYED
AND WHEN DISOBEYED OR
MODIFIED AS SEEN IN MILITARY
HISTORY-MARCH 1991

184
184
http://www.scribd.com/doc/27648037/
Orders-and-Obedience
On the first page a question is raised " if
selection and assessment system in
an army is realistic" .
There was a big question mark in
1991 when I wrote this , it
remained when I retired in
December 1993 because the army
then was run on whims and likes
and dislikes and no one bothered

185
185
how good an officer was in real
command and intellectual ability ! I
fear that the large gaps and
question marks remain to date ? The
very Kargil operation proves that an
overambitious man with myopic
strategic vision like Musharraf can
rise to the highest ranks
,shamelessly abandons bodies of
soldiers and then proclaim Kargil as
his greatest success ! One could see
an ambitious man in him in 1993 ,
who was obsessed with self
projection ! I had asked Lieuenant
Colonel Ashraf (then CO 46 Field

186
186
and my platoon commander in PMA ,
also GSO 1 , 14 Division what he
thought of Musharraf his brother
gunner officer .Ashraf an
outstandingly honest and straight
man hailing from Kalar Saidan near
Pindi stated " what can you make of
a man who uses generator of his
locating unit for his house "

188
188
No one in kargil had the courage to
point out that the operation was a
wild gamble ! Brigadier Simon
confided that that General Tauqir
Zia was against it but then Tauqir
Zia never gave his dissent ?
PROBLEM WITH MILITARY
TRAINING , MILITARY EXERCISES
AND ASSESSMENT OF OFFICERS

190
190
A real soldier in the peacteime
environment of jee hazoori and yes man
ship hardly has any chance of being
promoted ! True in 1992 when I wrote
this and true today ! Can Pakistan afford
this ?

192
192
PROBABLY IN OUR SCENARIO A
QUALITY TERMED AS LOYALTY ,
WHICH IN REALITY IS DOCILITY
AND OVERCONFORMITY IS HIGHLY
VALUED !AND LOYALTY OF A
PERSONAL NATURE IS SHEER
INTELLECTUAL DISHONESTY !

194
194
WHY ASSESSMENT OF OFFICERS
QUALITIES IS OF CARDINAL
IMPORTANCE

215
215
Historical Proof of the argument
presented above
War Performance had nothing to do
with promotion to higher ranks in
Pakistan Army

216
216
Altaf Gauhar Ayub‟s close confidant
inadvertently proves this fact once he
quite uncharitably, and for reasons,
other than dispassionate objective
historical considerations, described
Yahya as one " selected…in preference
to some other generals, because Yahya,
who had come to hit the bottle hard,
had no time for politics and was
considered a harmless and loyal
person".
Major General Abrar, who had proved
himself as the finest military
commander, at the divisional level, at

217
217
least by sub continental standards, was
sidelined and ultimately retired in the
same rank!
Lieutenant Colonel Nisar of 25 Cavalry
who had saved Pakistan‟s territorial
integrity from being seriously
compromised at a strategic level at
Gadgor on the 8th of September 1965
was sidelined.
Lieutenant Colonel Nisar of 25 Cavalry
who had saved Pakistan‟s territorial
integrity from being seriously
compromised at a strategic level at

218
218
Gadgor on the 8th of September 1965
was sidelined. This may be gauged from
the fact that at the time of outbreak of
the 1971 War Nisar although promoted
to brigadier rank, was only commanding
the Armoured corps recruit training
centre, a poor appointment for a man
who had distinguished himself as a tank
regiment commander in stopping the
main Indian attack. A man whose unit‟s
performance was described by the
enemy opposing him as one "which was
certainly creditable because it alone
stood between the 1st Indian Armoured
Division and its objective"23 was

219
219
considered by the Pakistani General
Headquarters pedantic officers as fit
only to command a recruit training
centre while one who was instrumental
in failure of the main Pakistani
intelligence failure as DMI was promoted
to Major General rank and trusted later
with the command of Pakistan‟s 1 Corps
with disastorous results !

222
222
Brigadier Qayyum Sher who had
distinguished himself as a brigade
commander in 10 Division area in

223
223
Lahore was also not promoted! Qayyum
Sher was one of the few brigade
commanders of the army who had led
from the front.
Major General Shaukat Riza who rarely
praised anyone had the following to say
about Sher‟s conduct while leading the
Pakistan army‟s most important infantry
brigade counter attack on Lahore Front
as a result of which the Indian 15
Division despite considerable numerical
superiority was completely thrown off
balance. Shaukat stated that "Brigadier
Qayyum Sher, in his command jeep,

224
224
moved from unit to unit and then
personally led the advance, star plate
and pennant visible. This was something
no troops worth their salt could ignore".
But the Army‟s Selection Boards ignored
Qayyum Sher once his turn for
promotion came! Qayyum Sher did well
in war and was awarded the Pakistani
D.S.O i.e. the HJ!
But war performance or even
performance in peacetime training
manoeuvres was, and still is, no criteria

225
225
for promotion in the Pakistan Army!
Qayyum retired as a brigadier,
remembered by those who fought under
him as a brave and resolute
commander, who was not given an
opportunity to rise to a higher rank,
which Qayyum had deserved, more than
any brigadier of the Pakistan Army did.
Brigadier Nisar of 25 Cavalry who was
praised by Indian historians as
outstanding in delaying battle in
Shakargarh as commander of changez
Force was also sidelined because he was
not close to Tikka Khan and company

226
226
and did not possess Zias mastery of art
of sycophancy and appeasement of
seniors !
It was typical of Pakistan Army that
Brigadier Rahimuddin who did not join
his brigade in Chamb on pretext of
martial law duty was promoted to
general rank while Nisar who fought
both the 1965 and 1971 wars
exceedingly well sidelined !
In 1965 Nisar by his singular action at
Gadgor had literally saved Pakistan ! But
promotion in Pakistan Army had nothing

227
227
to do with war performance or real
soldiering ! Pathetic !
Interestingly Brigadier Irshaad heading
the military intelligence in 1965 and
guilty of Pakistan Armys greatest
intelligence failure of 1965 i.e
disregarding a genuine report that
Indian Armoured division was in kashmir
, dismissing it as a deception plan , was
promoted to two and three star after the
war .He played hell with Pakistans 1
Corps in 1971 War !

228
228
Major General Sarfaraz whose conduct
as GOC was outstanding in 1965 War
was not promoted because his ability
was regarded as a threat by Ayub Khan
!

229
229
Brigadier Tajammul Hussain Malik was

230
230
praised as an outstanding commander
by a person no less than the Indian
opponent of his Major General lachman
Singh .
A special commission was appointed by
Indian Army to study Tajammuls
brigade actions !
The tragedy is that all starting from
Liaquat Ali Khan sidelined officers with
outstanding war performance ! The first
being the elevation of Ayub Khan to
army chief with a proven record of
tactical timidity in Burma !

231
231
Ayub Khan ,Tikka Khan and Bhutto
sidelined the best officers of 1971 !
Tajammul was sidelined because he was
not a pathetic sycophant with no war
record like Zia ul Haq ! This is a man
whose war performance was so
outstanding that the Indians appointed a
high level commission to study his epic
brigade battle at Hilli where he literally
repelled a division plus! His direct Indian
opponent Major General Lachman Singh
praised him as an outstanding and very
brave man in his book Indian sword
penetrates East Pakistan ! But the

232
232
Pakistani selection boards criterion for
promotion was certainly not war
performance !
Major General Abdul Ali Malik noted by
Major General Fazal i Muqeem for
launcjing the most ill planned and failed
counter attacks of 1971 War in
Shakargarh Bulge was promoted to
three star rank after the war !
General K.M Arif who had no war record
in 1971 and no command experience
beyond a brigade command for few

233
233
months was promoted to two three and
four star rank !
Brigadier Ameer Hamza who conducted
a brilliant brigade offensive battle at
Sulaimanke was similarly sidelined as a
Lieutenant General whereas many
others who had no war record in 1971
war as brigade commanders became
corps commanders !
Major General Tajammul Hussain Malik
in an interview with this scribe in
September 2001 summed up these
promotions in the following words:--

234
234
The peculiarity about these promotions
was that except for Jahanzeb Arbab,
who had been superseded earlier
because of having been found guilty of
embezzlement of huge amount of
money while in East Pakistan by a Court
of Inquiry, headed by Major General M H
Ansari but continued to remain in an
officiating Command of a Division with
the rank of a Brigadier for nearly two
years upto as late as February 1976
when he was promoted to the rank of a
Major General, all others were those
who were on staff in GHQ.

235
235
Major General Iqbal was doing as Chief
of General Staff, Major General Sawar
Khan was Adjutant General, Major
General Chishti was Military Secretary
and Major General Ghulam Hassan was
Director General Military Training.
The Division Commanders that is to say
myself, Major General Akhtar Abdur
Rehman, Major General Fazal e Raziq,
Major General Mateen, Major General Ch
Abdur Rehman, Major General Jamal
Said Mian, Major General Amir Hamza
(DG Civil Armed Forces), Major General

236
236
Wajahat Hussain (Commadant Staff
College) were all superseded.”
General Zia ul Haq had seen my conduct
during the Division Commanders
conferences expressing my view very
candidly. He, therefore, thought that he
would not be able to control me. He
selected a team of „yes men‟ who were
more docile and prepared to accept his
command without any hesitation.”
Even the normal and highly defective
ACR system in the army was
disregarded in promotions.

237
237
Thus while Major General Tajammul had
been graded as “OUTSTANDING”, as a
Brigadier, in his last Annual Confidential
Report and again as a Division
Commander was graded “Above
Average” by the then Corps Commander
Lieutenant General Aftab Ahmad Khan,
his contemporaries Lieutenant General
Faiz Ali Chisti and Late General Akhtar
Abdur Rehman were adjudged on the
lower side of the “Average” grade were
promoted to three star rank .Chishti in
1976 and Akhtar Abdul Rahman in
1977-78.

238
238
Tajammul Hussain thus well summed up
Pakistan Armys tradition of promotions
when he stated:--
“In our Army, Field Marshal Ayub Khan
since he became Commander-in-Chief in
1951, made sure that only those people
were promoted to higher ranks, who
proved their personal loyalty to him
rather than loyalty to the state.
He did so because he had the ambitions
of becoming the Head of State from the
very beginning. As I said before, he had
a contempt for the politicians and with

239
239
the passage of time he went on getting
extension of his tenure till he finally took
over in Oct 1958.
From amongst the senior officers
anyone who expressed his opinion
against the Army indulging in politics
was immediately retired. Some of the
very capable generals who had passed
out from Sandhurst were superseded
when General Musa was appointed
Commander-in-Chief. Now that he is
dead, it is not proper for me to pass any
remarks against him but I have no
hesitation in saying that he was a typical

240
240
Gorkha Soldier, who had learnt to obey
the command of their superiors whether
right or wrong. The junior officers
following examples of the seniors, had
also learnt that perhaps sycophancy,
rather than professional capabilities,
was the only criteria for attaining the
higher command.
Exceptions are always there, but as a
general practice many good officers who
would have become very good Generals
could not go beyond the rank of
Lieutenant Colonel because they were
intellectually and professionally far

241
241
superior to their seniors and always
expressed their views without any
hesitation whenever and wherever
required.
Commanders who attain the higher
ranks through following the path of
sycophancy soon crumble in the face of
danger and cannot stand the test of
battle fatigue. That has been an
inherent weakness in our Army, which
perhaps continues till today.
I had not intimately known General Zia
before he became the Chief of the Army

242
242
Staff but from his conduct during the
Divisional Commanders Conferences, he
appeared to me an incompetent and low
grade officer.
In one of the Division Commanders
promotion conferences, I even saw him
sleeping with his mouth open.
He surpassed all limits of sycophancy
when meeting the Prime Minister
Zulfikar Ali Bhutto. While in uniform, he
used to bow when shaking hands with
Zulfikar Ali Bhutto.

243
243
I remember my old Brigade
Commander, Brigadier Hayat, with
whom I served as his Brigade Major,
once told me that he had written in

244
244
Major Zia ul Haq‟s ACR when he served
under his command, “Not fit to go
beyond the rank of a Major”. It is an
irony of fate that a person of such a
calibre had ruled Pakistan for a long
period of eleven years till he was finally
killed in an air crash.”

245
245
There is no second opinion possible
about how Pakistan Army suffered
because of military rule.Thus Major
General Fazal Muqeem Khan in an
officially sponsored book admitted this

246
246
cardinal fact when he wrote :--
"We had been declining according to the
degree of our involvement in making
and unmaking of regimes. Gradually the
officer corps, intensely proud of its
professionalism was eroded at its apex
into third class politicians and
administrators. Due to the absence of a
properly constituted political
government, the selection and
promotion of officers to the higher rank
depended on one man’s will. Gradually,
the welfare of institutions was sacrificed
to the welfare of personalities. To take

247
247
the example of the army, the higher
command had been slowly weakened by
retiring experienced officers at a
disturbingly fine rate. Between 1955 and
November 1971, in about 17 years 40
Generals had been retired, of whom only
four had reached their superannuating
age. Similar was the case with other
senior ranks. Those in the higher ranks
who showed some independence of
outlook were invariably removed from
service. Some left in sheer disgust in
this atmosphere of insecurity and lack of
the right of criticism, the two most
important privileges of an Armed Forces

248
248
officer. The extraordinary wastage of
senior officers particularly of the army
denied the services, of the experience
and training vital to their efficiency and
welfare. Some officers were placed in
positions that they did not deserve or
had no training for"
The tradition continued till to
date.Lieutenant General Mahmood and
Usmani with all their drawbacks was far
superior to Generals Aziz Yusuf and
Ahsan Saleem Hayat promoted to four
star rank but sidelined because feared

249
249
as more resolute and thus dangerous !
It would be actually comical to match
these two groups at all ! Usmani was so
upright that he risked his career twice
as a brigadier and major general when
he took a righteous stand with his direct
superiors Malik Saleem Khan
in Karachi and Mumtaz Gul
at Peshawar !
It is no secret that had Yusuf or Ahsan
Saleem Hayat been commander 10
Corps in place of Mahmud on 12 October
1999 , Musharrafs coup would have
failed ! Perhaps that was the key

250
250
selection criterion for both ! Lack of
resolution ! But that‟s what Pakistan is
all about !
A Conspiracy against originality and
boldness ! An undoubted failure !

251
251
Pakistan has no short of talent and
military genius but our military system
is a conspiracy against talent originality
and boldness.Below is an article of this
scribe published in Daily Nation

252
252
summarising whats wrong with Pakistan
Army published :---

LETTERS TO STAFF COLLEGE QUETTA-1990-2008

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LETTERS TO STAFF COLLEGE QUETTA-1990-2008