How the British neglect their military heroes and their graves

2
ISBN-13: 978-1985772182
ISBN-10: 1985772183

5
This is a brief account of how callously the British treat their
military graves.
The Battle of Chillianwallah fought on 13 January 1849 was
the bloodiest single battle that the British ever fought in
entire India ,Nepal, Burma,Afghanistan,China or Iran in their
entire history.

7
British graves at Chillianwallah are in a bad shape .No
caretaker takes care of the main moument constructed
originally in 1873.
The battlefield has a special significance for me as my
paternal grandfathers great grandfather and grandfather
served in Sikh Artillery while my maternal grandfathers great
grandfather and cousins were serving in the English East
India Comapnys cavalry units that took part in this unit.
Also appended in this brief book is my account of the battle
with hand drawn maps.
The idea and the message is to save the graves at
Chillianwallah particularly those of HM 24 Foot a brave unit ,

8
that may totally disappear in the next ten years or so, in
case serious efforts are not made to conserve and preserve
these graves.

20
The author at Chillianwallah in February 2018.

62
WHILE VISA OFFERS OR VISA AGENTS MAKE A HEFTY
10,000 POUNDS STERLING PER VISA GRANTING VISAS
TO IMMIGRANTS FROM THIRD WORLD COUNTRIES
WHO WILL ONE DAY PRODUCE TERRORISTS WHO
WILL PLAY HELL WITH BRITAIN THE POOR SOLDIERS
WHO LAID THEIR LIVES FOR BRITAIN HAVE BEEN
FORGOTTEN.THE POWDER OF THEIR BONES SOLD TO
JAPANESE CHEMICAL DEALERS AND THEIR MARBLE
TOMBSTONES USED AS FLOORS OF LATRINES AND
ROOMS !
CHILLIANWALLAH MONUMENT IN POOR CONDITIONED AND
UNMAINTAINED WITH THE GRAVES BEING CONTINUOUSLY
DAMAGED AND PILFERED

63
ALL BATTLE MAPS ARE CONCEIVED AND DRAWN BY MYSELF
BASED ON EXHAUSTIVE BATTLE RESEARCH .
CHILLIANWALA
The forgotten British reverse in India and published in
Defence Journal Karachi August 2000 issue
A battle in which more Britishers died in one day than in a
any other battle fought in India Afghanistan Nepal or Iran.

64
A battle in which the British lost more officers on one day
than all officers of Pakistan or Indian Army killed in 1965
war.
Originally written by me after 1 years research .Initially
submitted to Journal of Military History USA but not
published because of Anglo Saxon biases.
Maj (Retd) AGHA HUMAYUN AMIN
The list of military disasters which the British suffered in
India is long, but most of these were rationalised by British
military historians by highlighting situational factors which
made British defeat certain and inevitable and was in many
cases due to circumstances involving overwhelming
numerical inferiority, excessive battle exhaustion, adverse
weather and terrain etc. The Battle of Chillianwala fought on
13 January 1849 is, however, one odd exception and stands
out as a battle in which the British failed to defeat their
opponents despite having the advantages of weight of
numbers, ideal weather and terrain, superior logistics etc. In
Afghanistan the British disaster was explainable since the
British force which was destroyed while retreating from Kabul
to Jalalabad was a vastly over numbered exhausted and
logistically very weak force of some 700 Europeans and
4,500 Native troops which was destroyed by a vastly superior
Afghan force in adverse mountain terrain and very cold
weather. At Bhurtpore the British failure to capture the mud
fortress was ascribed by a British military historian to lack of
adequate artillery.1 At Chillianwala a British Army which had
a high European troop component large number Sepoy
(regiments), sufficient artillery, two heavy cavalry brigades
to ensure that no one could surprise the British army,
excellent logistics, little campaign exhaustion having fought
no major battle since assumption of hostilities, winter

65
weather negating the possibility of heatstroke and cholera
the worst killers of white soldiers in India,failed to defeat the
Sikhs. Chillianwala thus stands out as a battle which changed
Indian perceptions about British military effectiveness and
had a direct link with the “Great Sepoy Rebellion” or “The
Indian War of Independence” of 1857.
A succession of British military victories since 1757 barring
few exceptions like Battle of Pollilore (September 10 1780),
Siege of Bhurtpore (1804-1805), Monsoon’s Retreat (1804),
Kabul Brigade’s Retreat (January 1842) which were
dismissed as exceptions (to the general rule of “European
Superiority) by virtue of exceptional numerical or other odds;
it was assumed that no Native army of India, Nepal or
Afghanistan could stand a determined bayonet charge by the
Red Coats. A feeling of superiority was produced
accompanied by the natural attitude of over confidence and

66
rashness, and most British commanders felt that simply a
direct march to the sound of guns and a simple frontal
assault using “Cold Steel” was enough to disperse any native
army however tough or well trained. The uses of manoeuvre
or taking into account the “Independent Will of the Enemy”
and the fact that a British army could ever be surprised was
dismissed as impossible. Thus once the British suffered a
rude reverse accompanied by heavy casualties despite
having all the advantages; public opinion in Britain was
shocked. The British Commander in Chief General Gough was
replaced by Charles Napier. Subsequently when the Sikhs
were defeated at Battle of Gujerat (21 February 1849) British
military historians rationalised their defeat at Chillianwala by
laying the blame on “Bad Terrain” “Lack of Artillery”
“Cowardice of the Native Troops” etc. Chillianwala was
forgotten and Gough again became a hero. The damage done
at Chillianwala to the prestige of British arms was enormous
and played a major role in changing Indian attitudes about
the British, leading directly to the “Great Sepoy Rebellion” in
which the British almost lost their Indian Empire and the
English East India Company whose private Bengal Army had
fought Chillianwala lost India to the British Crown!
BACKGROUND
The Sikh religion was founded by Baba Guru Nanak (1469-
1539) whose prime aim was to increase communal harmony
between the Muslims and the Hindus. Initially the Sikhs were
very peaceful and preached pacifism. Their followers were
confined to the north West Indian region of Punjab (in
modern India and Pakistan) and were mostly peasants from
the sturdy “Jat” caste. In the period 1606-1675 the Sikhs
came into conflict with the Mughal Emperors and became a
very militant political group; primarily because of religious

67
persecution by the Mughal Emperors. The Gurus persecuted
were:--
1. The Fifth Guru - Guru Arjan Dev because of the fine on
him by Jahangir as he sheltered his fleeing rival (Dara?) at
Amritsar. He was asked to convert to Islam at Lahore (there
still is a gurdwara at Lahore Fort where he was jailed and
eventually died), refusing which Maulavi prescribed the
punishment "to show the hell right here on earth as depicted
in Quran" so for the first three days he was not given any
water (month of June in Lahore) as well as his body was
wrapped in the cow hide. Then 4th day the hot sand was
poured on his body., fifth day he was made so sit on the
"Tava" or "hot plate", sixth day hot sand was poured on his
body while sitting on the hot plate and on the seventh day
his body was thrown into the river Ravi., on the orders of
Jahangir.
2. The sixth Guru Guru Hargobind was jailed at the fort of
Gwalior for 10 years.
3. The seventh Guru Guru Har Rai was hunted by Mughals all
over Punjab.
4. The ninth Guru Guru Tegh Bahadur was martyred at
Chandani Chowk Qotwali (delhi in front of the Lal Kila) on the
orders of Aurungzeb, he went to Delhi to plead with the
emperor to stop converting the Kashmiri Brahmins to Islam.
5. Tenth Guru was attacked by Aurungzeb at Anandpur, his 5
year old and 7 years old sons were killed (for not converting
to islam) at Sarhind along with his mother, his 15 year old
and 17 years old sons attained martyrdom fighting at
Chamkaur, He himself was murdered by Mughals at Nanded

68
(close to Bombay) but was able to appoint the Guru Granth
Sahib as the eternal Guru.
6. The sikhs who look to the book Sri Guru Granth Sahib as
their eternal guru had to face many more persecutions. Baba
Banda Bahadur along with 760 Sikhs were martyred at Delhi
for not converting to Islam by the successor of Aurungzeb.
My Thanks to Sandeep Bajwa for this correction !
As a consequence of this repressive policy the peaceful Sikhs
became fiery rebels and were persecuted by the Mughals in
the period 1675-1748.Their places of worship were
desecrated and demolished, whole male population were
massacred and they were denied the right to carry arms. The
Sikhs resorted to Guerrilla warfare and succeeded in
surviving Mughal oppression despite being a minority
community (just around 8 % of the population of Punjab2.
The Sikhs compensated in quality for their lack of numbers
and by 1757 emerged as a strong political community who
harassed all invaders who passed through Punjab. By 1799
the Sikhs occupied Lahore the capital of Punjab under the
leadership of a brilliant military commander Ranjit Singh
(1780-1839) who united the loose knit Sikh confederacy of
various local chiefs and conquered whole of Punjab and large
parts of the Indo-Afghan frontier till the Khyber Pass,
Kashmir and parts of Ladakh (Tibet) creating a strong and
stable state by 1818 and consolidating and enlarging its
frontiers to their maximum extent by 1833. It was Ranjit
Singh who expelled the Afghans permanently out of
Northwest frontier territory of India which the Afghans had
occupied since 1739 by completing his conquest and
annexation of Peshawar on 6 May 1834.3 From Indo-Pak
history point of view this was a unique achievement since
Peshawar area was re-occupied by a non-Muslim army for

69
the first time since 1001 A.D4. Thus Ranjit’s re-occupation of
Peshawar was reversal of 833 years of history of foreign
(both ethnic as well as religious subjugation)! This disproves
Indira Gandhi’s claim of having reversed 1000 years of
history in 1971 once Pakistan lost the 1971 war. As a matter
of fact Indira’s claim is ridiculous since the Low Caste Hindu
Marathas occupied Delhi as early as 1758, more than 200
years before 1971!
Ranjit Singh was fully aware that survival lied in following
European military methods and organisation introduced in
India by the French and British since the Seven Years War.
He induced many European soldiers of fortune who had
reached India following the Napoleonic wars to join the Sikh
Army. Thus two Europeans i.e Allard (French) and Ventura
(Italian) who had served in Napoleon’s army till Waterloo
were the pioneers among the total of some 36 Europeans
and 3 Americans who joined Ranjit’s army between 1822 and
18395. The Europeans in the employment of Ranjit included
some 12 Frenchmen, 7 Anglo Indians, 4 Italians, 3 Britishers,
3 Germans, 2 Greeks, 2 Spanish, 1 Russian, 1 Scotch and 1
Prussian.This varied composition meant that fresh diverse
and varied influences from Europe incorporating the lessons
of Napoleonic wars were directly transmitted to Ranjit’s
army. Ranjit appreciated that confrontation with the English
East India Company, which became Ranjit’s southern
neighbour following the 2nd Maratha War (1803-5) would be
costly and impractical. Therefore, Ranjit followed a policy of
neutrality during the period 1809-1839.
It may be noted that Ranjit initially employed Hindustanis
(mostly Hindu Rajputs and Brahmans from Gangetic plain
east of Ambala in such large numbers that up to 1813 the
majority of Ranjit’s regular troops were Hindustani
mercenaries from the east of Jamna and south of Ambala

70
region6. From 1813 onwards this trend was reversed and
Ranjit switched to a largely Punjabi Jat Sikh regular army. In
addition Ranjit also employed some Punjabi Muslims in the
infantry and a much larger number of Punjabi Muslims in the
artillery. As per one estimate there were 41 high ranking
Muslim officers in the Khalsa Sikh army out of which two
were generals, one i.e Ilahi Baksh from the artillery7. Ranjit’s
policy in this regard was to ensure Sikh preponderance in the
army, while ensuring that there were Hindu and Muslim
officers and soldiers in the army to act as a counter weight
and source of information against any possible Sikh led
conspiracy against Ranjit’s rule. Ranjit’s brilliant albeit
Machiavellian ethnic/religious diversity policy paid rich
dividends since Ranjit survived at least two serious Sikh
coups masterminded by the Sindhianwala family.
Ranjit Singh died on June 27 1839. The legacy that he left
was a very strong army and extremely imbecile and debauch
successors. The Sikhs were a minority and Ranjit’s policy of
Divide and Rule involved employment of a large cross section
of Sikhs, Hindus and Muslims in various ranks and
appointments. Thus the Sikh state required a man of genius
to run it smoothly since most of the nobles had no direct
loyalty to the Sikh state by virtue of belonging to other
religions. Ranjit had many sons but Kharak Singh the only
one who was considered legitimate and who thus succeeded
him was a very weak and incompetent ruler. was deposed
within four months and succeeded by his son Naunehal Singh
who was very competent man but met with a premature
death, being crushed under a falling arch soon after
assuming power. He was succeeded by one of Ranjit’s
illegitimate sons who was despised by the army and nobles
and was soon removed from power. Rani Jindan one of the
many wives of Ranjit and a former dancing girl now usurped
power, ruling in the name of Duleep Singh her five year old

71
son from an unknown father, but supposedly affiliated to
Ranjit Jindan nominated her paramour a Hindu Brahman Lal
Singh as the Vizier (Prime Minister) and another Hindu
Brahman Tej Singh as Commander-in-Chief. The trio of the
Rani and her two confidants were afraid of the power of the
Sikh Army and in order to destroy it planned the First Sikh
War (1845-46).The Sikh Army was incited and launched
across Sutlej River (the Anglo Sikh) boundary to invade
English East India Company’s territory with the ulterior aim
of destroying the Sikh Army, while negotiating a peace with
the British and continuing to stay in power after the Sikh
Army had been destroyed. Thus at the Battle of Feroz Shahr
(22 December 1845) the British Army was at the mercy of
the Sikhs8. As a result of treachery and poor leadership the
Sikh Army was thus decisively defeated at the Battle of
Sobraon (10 February 1845) and the Sikh State came under
the domination of the English East India Company. Punjab
was now placed under a council of Regency composed of
various Sikh Nobles and led by the British Resident Henry
Lawrence who was ruling on behalf of the infant Daleep
Singh.The Sikh Army was not disbanded but a British force
was stationed at Lahore, an annual tribute levied on the Sikh
state and British officers posted in various districts to
supervise revenue collection and administration9.
THE SECOND SIKH WAR 1848-49
The Sikh Army had been humiliated but not destroyed in the
First Sikh War.The Sikh soldier felt that he had not been
defeated militarily but merely betrayed by his leaders who
wanted the destruction of the Sikh Army and acted
treacherously. The Muslims who were the vast majority
welcomed the British victory since under the old Sikh state
the Muslims were second class citizens and many of their

72
places of worship were used as Gunpowder magazines and
Stables10.
Dewan Mul Raj’s Rebellion at Multan
In April 1848 Diwan Mul Raj the Sikh Governor of the
southern Punjab province of Multan who was a Hindu,
rebelled against the British Regent and all the Sikh troops at
Multan joined him. The British organised three columns to
march towards Multan; one under General Sher Singh (3,382
cavalry and 909 infantry), one under Lieutenant Edwardes
(4,033 cavalry and 7,718 infantry), the column of the
neighbouring British vassal Muslim state of Bahawalpur under
Lieutenant Lake (1,900 cavalry and 5,700 infantry). In
addition a British Division under General Whish (8,089 men,
32 siege guns, 12 horse artillery guns) was also sent to co-
operate with Sher Singh and assist him in capturing
Multan.General Whish’s Division joined Sher Singh and the
other three columns under joint command of General
Cortlandt of the Sikh Army (an Anglo Indian soldier of
watching Multan in August 1848 and formal siege operations
were commenced against the fort city of Multan.The
besiegers numbering nearly 32,000 against Mulraj holding
Multan with 12,000 men 54 guns and 12 mortars11. On 14th
September Sher Singh with all his Sikh troops went over to
the rebel side. General Whish was forced to raise the siege
and to withdraw few miles south of Multan and entrench
himself awaiting reinforcements, waiting to be reinforced by
another Division of the English East India Company’s Bombay
Army marching from Sindh to reinforce Whish.
Mulraj did not trust Sher Singh and would not let him enter
the fort! Both the leaders met outside the fort in a temple
and Sher Singh agreed to move north and join his father
Chattar Singh the Governor of Hazara province who had

73
already rebelled on 20 August 184812. Mul Raj as a goodwill
gesture decided to advance money to Sher Singh to pay his
troops. Another possible reason why Sher Singh decided to
move north was the fact that Multan was a 98 % Muslim
majority area and the main Sikh population centres and the
major Sikh troop concentrations were in areas north of
Lahore.Thus on 9th October 1848 Sher Singh started
marching northwards along the left bank of Chenab
River.Initially he moved to within 25 miles of Lahore but
finally decided to take a position north of river Chenab and
wait till the major Sikh Army formations north of Lahore
joined him,finally launching an advance on Lahore.Meanwhile
Sardar Chattar Singh rebelled (he shot Canard an American
who refused to join him)13 along with his Sikh troops in
November 1848 and marched towards the strategic Attock
Fort on the river Indus.The Sikh troops holding Attock fort
and those at Peshawar also joined him thus the British lost
almost the whole of area north of river Chenab in addition to
the Multan fort.Thus a local rebellion was transformed into a
Sikh national rising.The major advantage which the British
possessed however was the fact that 90 % of the population
which was Muslim was with the British.Chattar Singh also
lured Dost Mohammad Khan the ruler of Afghanistan to join
him promising him cession of all old Afghan territory taken
by Ranjit Singh west of river Indus.Dost Mohammad was not
sincere about helping his old enemies and his prime interest
was regaining Peshawar.Therefore he helped the Sikhs in a
very lukewarm manner sending a mere 5,000 troops14.
Assembly of Gough’s Army of the Punjab and invasion of
Punjab
The government of the English East India company had
meanwhile issued orders for the assembly of an army to
invade Punjab and crush the Sikh rising under the leadership

74
of the overall Commander in Chief India and also of the East
India Company’s Bengal Army,General Sir Hugh Gough (C in
C since 11 August 1843).It may be noted that General Gough
a veteran of Napoleonic wars had already successfully
commanded the Bengal Army in the First Sikh War.The Army
of the Punjab started assembling at the frontier town of
Ferozepur from mid October.The total strength of this army
was about 16,000 troops.Gough wanted to start the advance
as early as possible but was delayed due to procrastination
on part of Lord Dalhousie the Governor General of India.15
Nevertheless Gough managed to send a cavalry brigade (H.M
3rd Dragoons, H.M 14th Light Dragoons, 8th Bengal Native
Cavalry, 12th Bengal Irregular Cavalry) reinforced by one
Royal Army and one Bengal Native Army infantry regiment
under Brigadier General Cureton a very brave and capable
cavalry officer to observe area north of Lahore along the line
of river Chenab .This brigade crossed river Ravi on 2nd
November and took an obseravtion position at Qila Deedar
Singh (see map) ,over 50 miles Northwest of Lahore and 8
miles short of the Sikh advance position at Ramnagar;
waiting to be reinforced by another infantry brigade. Soon
another brigade ie Eckford’s brigade (two native infantry
regiments) also joined Cureton.The aim of pushing Brigadier
General Cureton’s Detatchment north of Ravi river was to act
as a bait to entice Sher Singh to march south of Chenab river
with his main body and to attack Cureton.
The situation in November 1848 was that Sher Singh had
assembled a sizeable Sikh force north of Chenab river while a
smaller force was guarding Ramnagar ford staying south of
the river. Sher Singh’s father was assembling another Sikh
force in Peshawar area, but very slowly and negotiating with

75
the Afghans to reinforce the Sikhs.Gough wanted to destroy
Sher Singh’s force before Chattar Singh could join him and
make the Sikh position stronger. Chenab was however a
complete water obstacle even in winters and not easy to ford
except after careful reconnaissance. On 6th November Gough
reached Ferozepur to take personal charge of the ongoing
preparations for the invasion of Punjab.On hearing news
about the fall of Peshawar Gough became deeply concerned
about the necessity to advance immediately and defeat Sher
Singh before he could be reinforced by Sikh troops
concentrating at Peshawar.Thus on 8th November he ordered
Brigadier Colin Campbell (later to be famous as Lord Clyde)
with an infantry brigade at Lahore to march Northwest wards
and reinforce Curetons force and to also assume the
command of the whole force.Campbell marched from Lahore
on 10th November with two native infantry regiments.On 13
November th Gough reached Lahore and on 15th November
authorised Brigadier Campbell to attack the advance Sikh
position at Ramnagar ;in case of a favourable opportunity.On
16th November Gough started his advance with the main
body of the Army of the Punjab from Lahore towards
Campbells position south of Ramnagar.On 17th November
Gough learnt that another Sikh force of troops who had also
rebelled at Bannu west of river Indus had also joined Sher
Singh’s main body north of Chenab.On 18th November
Gough received intelligence that Sher Singh had withdrawn
bulk of the troops of his advance position at Ramnagar north
of Chenab,leaving some outposts south of the river.On 21st
November Gough joined Campbell with the main body at
Campbells camp 8 miles south of Ramnagar.The whole of
Gough’s army was now concentrated opposite Ramnagar
except his two heavy artillery batteries.It may be noted that
the highest authority in East India Company’s government in
India was the Governor General;the 37 year old Lord
Dalhousie.Dalhousie had issued clear orders to Gough that no

76
operations north of river Chenab were to be undertaken till
Multan was captured and the heavy siege train from Multan
joined Gough16.
Sardar Sher Singh Attariwalla ambushes Gough at
Ramnaggar
Dalhousie explicitly forbade Gough from any operation north
of Chenab River. However this did not restrain him from
attacking the reportedly small Sikh Detatchment at
Ramnagar on the south bank of Chenab.Gough who was an
impetuous Irishman was panting for action and decided to
clear the Sikh outpost at Ramnagar on 22nd November.In
reality unknown to the British the Sikh Detatchment south of
Chenab was covered by two batteries of heavy guns on the
north bank of the river and one battery deployed on an island
dividing Chenab into two channels at Ramnagar.The British
on the other hand could not effectively reply with counter
bombardment since their two heavy batteries had still not
joined them.(The heavy guns joined the main body on 30th
November).In brief the British charged the Sikh infantry
without adequate reconaissance,their cavalry got stuck into
the sandy river bank and the net result of the action at
Ramnagar on 22nd November was 12 officers and 84 men 52
of whom were killed including Brigadier General Cureton and

77
Lieutenant Colonel Havelock commanding officer and the rest
wounded.What had appeared at first sight a Sikh infantry
Detatchment was covered by heavy artillery which was out of
range of the British guns,covered in addition by Sikh cavalry
which was hiding behind the sand bars.14th Light Dragoon
saw a body of Sikh infantry at a distance in hasty retreat
towards the north bank of Chenab. At this juncture Gough
took the command of cavalry in his own hands and ordered
14th Light Dragoons and 5th Native light Cavalry to charge
and intercept the Sikhs.In reality this was an ambush into
which 14th light Dragoons had been unwittingly lured.
Cureton watching from a distance had gallopped towards
14th light Dragoons in order to restrain them when he was
struck by two matchlock balls, one going through the head
.Cureton was an ex cavalry trooper who had served the
entire Peninsular War in 14th Light Dragoons and risen to
become an officer.Brigadier Colin Campbell who was present
attributed this blunder to Gough’s interference in handling
cavalry,not allowing Cureton to proceed according to his
independent judgement17. The action at Ramnagar
illustrated Sher Singh at his best and Gough at his worst. By
a brilliant combination of artillery infantry and cavalry the
Sikh imposed such a punishment at Ramnagar, that at least
for the next seven days Gough lost his offensive spirit.
The Cannonade of Sadullapur
Following the costly success at Ramnagar Gough became
cautious, at least for some time, and decided to wait for his
heavy artillery batteries, which joined him on 30th
November.Now he decided to turn the flank of the Sikhs by
sending a force up stream and crossing the Chenab at a ford
reported 8 miles north of Ramnagar.For this purpose Major
General Thackwell who had replaced Cureton as cavalry
division commander was tasked. Thackwell was given some

78
7000 men (1 British cavalry regiment, 4 Native cavalry
regiments, 2 British infantry regiments and 5 native infantry
regiments) supported by 32 guns (30 field and two heavy).
The mission given to Thackwell was to “cross at any ford that
he might choose “...with the specific instructions that he
must do so while ensuring that “ unless he could be sure of
bringing his troops full and fresh upon the enemy’s flank
opposite Ramnagar by 1 P.M the latest on the 1st of
December, he should take a second day to complete the
movement”18. Due to confusion in initial battle procedures
instead of achieving surprise Thackwells force reached the
reported ford at Runneeke at 11 o clock in the morning
instead of an hour before first light as planned.The force
discovered that there was no ford and the river bed was even
wider than that at Ramnagar which was a proper ford.Three
hours were wasted looking for another ford and this led the
outflanking force a further 12 miles up stream and 20 miles
from Ramnagar where they finally found some boats and
crossed Chenab on the night of 01/02 December 1848.The
whole force completed the crossing by two o clock on the
afternoon of 2nd December,and found no Sikhs in front They
advanced ten miles along the northern bank towards
Ramnagar and halted at a village called Daurawalla.
Thackwell also sent Gough a detailed despatch about his
operations north of Chenab. Meanwhile Sher Singh came to
know about Thackwells force around mid day on 2nd
December.The British army at this moment was divided and
could have been destroyed by Sher Singh in detail, if Sher
Singh could concentrate bulk of his force against
Thackwell.However Sher Singh took half measures, although
initially he had resolved to march with his whole force and
crush Thackwell, on second thoughts he adopted a
compromise plan, under which he left a small infantry force
with few guns opposite Ramnagar to deceive Gough into
thinking that the main Sikh body was still opposite him,and

79
marched to attackThackwell with a smaller force around 8 or
9 thousand.In the meantime Thackwell received Gough’s
orders on the night of 2nd December to advance towards
Ramnagar and attack Sher Singh, while Gough attacked him
frontally19. Acting on Gough’s orders Thackwell commenced
his advance early on the morning of 3rd December.However
as soon as few hours had passed Thackwell received another
despatch to halt and wait to be reinforced by another infantry
brigade which was crossing Chenab river via another ford
which had been discovered six miles north of Ramnagar20.
Thackwell halted and while he was waiting for Godby’s
Brigade was fired upon by Sher Singhs artillery. The result
was the artillery duel of Sadullapur in which both the armies
exchanged artillery fire without coming into contact from 11
A.M to 4 P.M and after which Sher Singh withdrew
northeastwards. The British losses did not exceed 73. The
aim of Sher Singhs march towards Thackwell seems to have
been to impose delay on him for few hours, while Sher
Singh’s main body withdrew north towards Rasul into a very
strong defensive position. In the meanwhile Gough was doing
nothing on 3rd December except engaging what he thought
were Sher Singh’s positions across Chenab with his artillery.
Had Gough showed some audacity on 3rd December the
British could have easily crossed the Chenab.Probably the
rubbing received on 22nd November certainly had succeeded
in at least momentarily dampening Gough’s offensive spirit,
apart from Dalhousie’s instructions. Thus in words of J.W
Fortescue the pro establishment historian of the British Army,
“But the main fault lay with Gough himself, for he had been
completely outwitted by Sher Singh”21. While Gough made
no attempt to cross the Chenab at Ramnagar on 3rd
December, all that the British artillery was pounding with full
force was “half empty trenches and six guns” in words of
Fortescue22. Godby’s brigade which was supposed to have
joined Thackwell on the 3rd only partially joined him on the

80
morning of 4th December. This delay occurred because this
newly discovered ford was not a ford in reality and Goodbye
had to use boats to cross it. After the battle of Saddulapur
Gough blamed Thackwell for not attacking Sher Singh on 3rd
December without waiting for Godby’s brigade and disowned
the orders sent to Thackwell to stop on 3rd December 23!
Fortescue however excused Gough for all that had happened
on 3rd December consoling the readers with the statement,
“such miscarriages as these are the common places of
war...his good faith cannot be called in question and as his
staff kept no copies of the orders sent to Thackwell, Gough
did not know what he had or had not bidden him to do” 24!
But this is not all Fortescue went further and still extolled
Gough’s conduct saying, “However, the passage of the
Chenab had been won at a trifling cost, and that was after
all, the main point”25. Fortescue even wants the readers to
believe that there was a ford which Gough’s staff had
discovered but, the whole situation changed because of an
ecological change ie “it is certain that the ford had been
carefully examined.......There is however,nothing more
treacherous than a glacier fed river; and it is likely that the
fords were never the same for twenty four hours
together”26!
THE BATTLE OF CHILLIANWALA
Initial Situation
Thackwell resumed his advance on 4th December with
cavalry and saw no Sikhs in front. Gough also sent cavalry in
the at 8 A.M on 4th December. Gough sent a long despatch
to Dalhousie melodramatically describing the passage of
Chenab; “ It has pleased Almighty God to vouschafe to the
British arms the most successful issue to the extensive

81
combinations rendered necessary for the purpose of effecting
the passage of the Chenab, the defeat and dispersion of the
Sikh force under the insurgent rajah Sher Singh.... 27”
Gough wanted Dalhousie to fire a royal salute for the
passage of Chenab but Dalhousie refused since he did not
agree with Gough that the passage of Chenab was a great
victory28. On 6th December Gough ordered Thackwell to
form a standing camp at a place called Helan. On 18th
December Gough crossed the Chenab across a bridge of
boats laid at Ramnagar and joined Thackwell at Helan. Soon
it became clear through reports that the main Sikh Army had
not been dispersed but firmly entrenched at Rasul on the
bank of river Jhelum. Meanwhile Gough since he had already
exceeded his instructions did not attempt any major
movement towards Sher Singh’s position at Rasul. The
country between Helan and Rasul was a sandy waterless
plain interspersed by patches of thick jungle.
Meanwhile a column of the Bombay Army had finally
reinforced General Whish at Multan on 22nd December taking
his force up to 15,000 regular troops apart from some
20,000 irregulars. Multan’s siege was resumed and the fort
was assaulted beginning from 27th December.The city and
suburbs were captured by 1st January and the Citadel
captured by 22nd January.The British losses were 210 killed
and 910 wounded 29.
Gough received news about arrival of Bombay column at
Multan and the city’s capture on 6th January. On 7th January
Dalhousie who was now at Lahore wrote to Gough that now
that Multan had been captured, he would be rejoiced to hear
of a similar blow being struck at the Sikhs upon the
Jhelum30. Dalhousie’s despatches to Gough were however
non-committal; thus he urged him to fight...”. If sure of a big
success at small cost “.... “If he should deem himself strong

82
enough,”31 27 Dalhousies vaguely worded despatch was
enough for Gough to once again start the job begun at
Ramnagar on 22nd November.Gough was under pressure to
attack, but no explicit orders were given to him by Dalhousie.
Finally the news of the fall of the strategic fortress of Attock
on river Indus received on 10th January acted as a catalyst.
Fall of Attock meant that all Sikh troops investing Attock and
the Afghans could now easily reinforce Sher Singh at
Rasul.Major Mackeson the political officer at Gough’s camp
also urged Gough to attack following the news of fall of
Attock.32
Gough’s advance to Chillianwalla
Finally on 11th Gough resolved to attack Sher Singh.His plan
of attack was to advance to Dinga and from their march
straight to Rasul and turn the Sikh left. Despite having ample
cavalry British intelligence about the Sikh position was
sketchy. As per Gough’s intelligence estimate the Sikh
position extended from Rasul situated on a line of ridges
parallel to river Jhelum to the vicinity of Mung a village 5
miles south west of Rasul and again very close to river
Jhelum.Rasul was situated on a dominating height but
immediately south of it was a plain intersected by dry
channels and a belt of trees and thorny scrub. The Sikhs had
entrenched the whole position but there was a wide gap
between their left at Rasul and their centre and right, which
extended till Mung.
Gough had calculated that after leaving troops to guard his
baggage, he could muster 12,000 men and 66 guns to attack
the Sikh position at Rasul. The information which he had
about the Sikh position was vague i.e. that it extended from
the village of Rasul on the left till Lakhni Wala 6 miles to the
south and facing east in a concave line with the broad fast

83
flowing Jhelum river to the rear. Fortescue who exaggerated
the odds as a matter of habit placed the Sikh strength at
30,00033. Malleson who was dismissed by Fortescue as
“pseudo historical” “inaccurate” “slovenly” and
“untrustworthy”34 estimated the Sikh strength at
Chillianwala to be in the neighbourhood of 23,00035. British
historians do not agree on what was General Gough’s exact
plan for 13th January. Gough and Innes who wrote their
book primarily to defend Gough stated that it was Gough’s
intention to march from Dinga to Chillianwala,drive in the
Sikh outposts and launch the attack on the main Sikh
position on 14th January after detailed reconnaissance was
carried out on the 13th January.36 Fortescue states that on
the evening of 12th January Gough summoned his generals
and gave them orders for the fateful morrow 37. However
Fortescue does not elaborate at all i.e. what were those
orders for the fateful morrow!
--------------------------------------------------------------------
--- --------------

84
PADDY GOUGHS FIRST PLAN
MARCH TO THE RIGHT AND ROLL UP THE SIKHS LEFT FLANK
BIBLIOGRAPHY TO THIS SECTION AND FOOTNOTES
1 Page-324-The Decisive Battles of India- G.B Malleson -
Oxford-1883.
2 Pages-97 7 373- The Military System of the Sikhs-Fauja
Singh Bajwa-Deep Publications-New Delhi- 1964.
3 Page-543-Cambridge History of India-Volume Five-British
India-H.H Dodwell-S.Chand and Company.New Delhi,1987.
4 Page-105-The Chronology of India-C.Mabel Duff-Archibald
Constable & Company,White Hall Gardens-1989.
5 Page-61-"A History of the Reigning Family of Lahore-
Calcutta, 1847 and Pages-XXXVI & XXXVII., The
Punjab- Lieutenant Colonel Steinbach-Calcutta-1846.

85
6 Page-26- The Sikhs and the Afghans- Shahamat Ali-
London- 1847-Reprint - Patiala, 1970.
7 Page-36- The Real Ranjit Singh- Waheed-ud-Din, Fakir-
Karachi- 1965 and Page- Pages 235 & 236- The Sikhs
and the Sikh Wars- General Sir Charles Gough and
Arthur.D.Innes-London-1897 .
8 Pages-308 & 309- History of the Sikhs- Joseph Davies
Cunningham, (Edited by H.L.O Garrett)- Oxford- 1918- And
also see Page-366-Malleson-Op Cit.
9 Pages-59 & 60- History of the Sikhs,Volume Two-
Khushwant Singh-Oxford University Press-Delhi-1991.
10 Pages-347 to 360-Lahore-Past and Present-M.Baqar-
Punjabi Adabi Academy- Lahore-1984.
11 Page-639-A Comprehensive History of India-Volume
Three-Henry Beveridge-London-1862.
12 Page-326-Parliamentary Papers-1849-London .
13 Pages- 302 & 313-Ibid.The American was buried at
the Christian cemetery at Haripur later by the British. An
Indian historian Dr J.M Walia in a book published in 1992
asserted that Canora was pro Muslim and anti Sikh and
incited the Muslims to rebel against the Sikhs (See Page-171-
A History of the Punjab-J.M Walia-Kalyani Publishers-New
Delhi-1992. It was a sad end for Canard who had done so
much to train the Sikh artillery. Very few Americans know
that Americans also contributed in the development of Sikh
artillery.
14 Pages-643 & 645-Beveridge-Op Cit.

86
15 Page-431-A History of the British Army, Volume Twelve-
J.W Fortescue-Macmillan and Company- London- 1927. The
reader may note that the main infantry weapon of the British
and Indian army at this time was the Brown Bess Musket of
Napoleonic war vintage. This musket had a maximum range
of 300 yards and an effective range of 100 yards beyond
which the weapon was effective but inaccurate. The British
field artillery's effective range was 800 yards for roundshot
and shell and 300 yards for grape shot. The Sikhs used
muskets and artillery very similar to the British ones. Field
artillery was heavy e.g a British 12 Pounder weighed 6500
pounds. Refers Page-67-Gough and Innes- Op Cit.
16 Page-115-The Punjab in Peace and War-S.S Thorburn-
London-1904.
17 Pages-184 & 187- Life of Colin Campbell,Lord
Clyde,Volume One - General Lawrence Shadwell-Edinburgh-
1881-
18 Pages-437 7 438-Fortescue Op Cit ,Page-117- Thorburn-
Op Cit and Pages 209 to 211-Gough & Innes- Op Cit.
19 Page-406-Malleson-Op Cit.
20 Page-439-Fortescue-Op Cit.
21 Page-440-Ibid.
22 Ibid.
23 Pages - 440 & 441-Ibid.
24 Page-442-Ibid.

87
25 Ibid.
27 Page-410-Footnote Number *-Malleson-Op Cit.
29 Page-645-Beveridge-Op Cit.
31 Page-412-Malleson- Op Cit.
32 Pages-448 & 449-Fortescue-Op Cit.
33 Page-449-Ibid.
34 Footnote Number 1-Page-469-Ibid.
36 Page-218-Gough and Innes-Op Cit.

88
On 12th January Gough advanced 11 miles north to Dinga
and encamped there. On 13th January he left two regiments
of Native infantry ,two of Irregular cavalry and 2 guns to
escort and protect his baggage train which was to follow him
and began his advance at about 7 A.M towards
Rasul.Goughs’ army covered a front of a mile and half while
in marching order . All the brigades marched in column with
one cavalry brigade on each flank and the European
regiments leading the advance of each brigade. The heavy
guns were in the centre and the other horse and field
batteries in the gaps between the four infantry brigades.
After marching for five miles he halted at a place from where
a track branched to the village of Chillianwala which was
westwards off the road from Dinga to Rasul.Gough’s intention
was to carry out a reconnaissance. Engineers were sent
forward with cavalry to check whether the road was
practicable for the heavy guns or not. Once this was
confirmed, the march was resumed. Soon however some
Sikh Army deserters who were mostly Muslim arrived and
informed the British through the political agent Major
Mackeson that the Sikhs were occupying the villages of
Mujianwala and Chillianwala on the left of the British in

89
strength. It was probably at this juncture that Gough
changed his earlier plan of advancing till Rasul and then
taking the Sikh position by rolling up their left flank
downwards. Gough ordered some heavy guns and infantry to
dislodge the reported strong Sikh screen position at
Chillianwala.This was successfully done since the Sikhs did
not offered only token resistance instead of exploiting the
dominating position of the mound over which Chillianwala
was located and quickly withdrew into the thick jungle west
of Chillianwala.Gough now personally rode to the village of
Chillianwala while the British troops who had cleared
Chillianwala were deployed 500 yards west of Chillianwala
facing west ,to carry out personal reconnaissance and assess
the situation himself.There was a thick jungle in front but
Gough observed the Sikh positions parts of which were
visible to understand that the Sikhs had swung their right
and centre forward leaving their entrenchment and were now
deployed some 4000 yards west of Chillianwala with the
jungle in between masking their front and Chillianwala.In
response to the discovery of the Sikh positions so close to
Chilllianwala,Gough extended his brigades into deployed
formation .By the time Gough completed his reconnaissance
it was two o clock in the afternoon and Gough decided to
attack the Sikh position on the next day.Because of the
proximity of the Sikh Army it was now no longer possible to
stick to the old plan of marching to Rasul since this would
have exposed the left and rear of the British Army to a Sikh
attack from a position which they could barely observe from
Chillianwala.Gough now decided to bivouac on the open
ground west of Chillianwala and to launch his main attack on
14th January.While the British were making preparations to
bivouac some Sikh artillery guns opened fire on the British ,
from the positions hidden by the jungle.The artillery fire was
inaccurate and did little damage.Gough however ordered the
heavy guns to return fire on the Sikh positions which could

90
not be located.Once this was done , some thirty Sikh guns
from different points in the jungle in front opened fire.Gough
suddenly realised that he was too close to the Sikh positions
and Sher Singh had full intention of fighting on 13th January
38.
BIBLIOGRAPHY TO THIS SECTION AND FOOTNOTES:--
38 From desriptions given by Fortescue Op Cit from Pages-
449 to 451 ,Gough and Innes, Op Cit from Pages 216 to 220
and Malleson, Op Cit from Pages- 414 to 416
Sikh Dispositions and Plan of Battle
It is necessary to examine the Sikh plan in order to
understand the developments till 2 P.M on 13th January.The
Sikh position at Rasul was not an ideal one in terms of
cohesiveness or frontage. With 23,000 men they were
occupying a concave shape position extending over six miles
with large gaps in between there left and their centre and

91
right. The entrenched Sikh position extended with the left
resting on Rasul and the right on Lakhni wala. All the six
miles of this concave position were not held by the Sikhs and
there were gaps in between, the most marked one between
the Sikh centre and left. The Bannu garrison was deployed at
Lakhni wala, approximately a regiment of cavalry and four
infantry battalions, with eleven guns.
A mile to the north were Lal Singh’s two regiments of cavalry
and ten infantry battalions and 17 guns deployed around
Chak Fateh Shah, a further one mile north there was Sher
Singh at Laliani with one regiment of cavalry, nine infantry
battalions and some irregulars placed at 4,000 horse and 20
guns. The position from north of Laliani till Rasul was held by
irregular levies. 39 There is no independent and reliable Sikh
account of the battle, therefore we have relied on the above
mentioned description based on Fortescue’s narrative which
is true as far as general depolyment is concerned but highly
exaggerated as far as the numbers are concerned, since
Fortescue suffered from the usual Victorian malady of
magnifying the odds. Fortescue40 placed the total number of
Sikhs at Chillianwala at 30,000. A line of small ridges with
thick vegetation in shape of trees and thorny bushes and
scrub covered the entire Sikh front with small gaps right from
Lakhni wala to Rasul.Rasul itself was located on a very
dominating ridge. The ridge on which the Sikh position was
based sloped gently towards the eastern plain from which
Gough’s army was expected to attack, but had abrupt slopes
towards its northern side which lay south of river
Jhelum.From Lakhniwala till Lulianee this ridge followed a
roughly north south alignment, but beyond Lulianee it
changed direction to an east west alignment, also gradually
increasing in height till Rasul which was the highest point
being roughly 90 feet higher than the adjacent plain to the
south of Rasul.Durand who participated in the battle

92
described the Sikh initial defensive position as, “ It was
evident that the enemy occupied a position too extended for
his numbers”.41 Sher Singh’s original intention seems to
have been to force the British to attack a well entrenched
position under conditions of extremely limited fields of fire
and observation due to the thick jungle in front,which
ensured that British artillery could not effectively pound and
soften up the Sikhs before the main infantry attack.Another
important strong point of his position was the fact that the
left flank was protected by river Jhelum while the right flank
was refused by virtue of being inclined backwards towards
Mung.It appears that Sher Singh decided on 12th January to
slightly change his plan when he received news of Goughs
advance Sher Singh now decided to bring his right and centre
forward,ahead of the entrenchment’s and give battle to the
British under more disadvantageous circumstances , rather
than passively waiting for them , while they marched without
being opposed till Rasul and from there roll up the whole Sikh
position ,by attacking in oblique order.It appears that
keeping in view the line of British advance Sher Singh
decided to swing his right and centre forward and force the
British to attack through thick jungle country rather than
allowing them to skirt round the jungle and threaten him
from his right flank . Whatever the actual case this decision
of Sher Singh stands out as the most brilliant tactical
decision of the entire Second Sikh War.
40 Ibid.
41 Page-415-Quoted by Malleson-Op Cit.

93
British Dispositions and Plan of Battle
The British possessed superiority in artillery42 in terms of
calibre of guns. Most of the 60 pieces of Sher Singh were of
small calibre, while Gough had 12 heavy guns and howitzers
(8 eighteen pounders and 4 eight inch howitzers) ,17 nine
pounders, 25 six pounders , and a number of horse artillery
guns,66 in all.The British artillery was organised into two
heavy batteries of four 18 pounders and ,two 8 inch howitzer
each,three field batteries,and six horse artillery batteries,66
guns in all.The overall artillery commander was Brigadier
Tennant and under him Brigadier Brooke commanded the
Horse artillery brigade while Brigadier Huthwaite commanded
the Foot Artillery. Once Gough ordered general deployment
for battle at about two-o clock the artillery was deployed as
following. The heavy gun batteries i.e two batteries of four
18 Pounders each and two batteries of two 8 inch howitzers
each, under Majors Shakespeare and Ludlow with Major

94
Horsford as the overall Heavy artillery commander, thus a
total of 20 heavy guns, were all deployed in the centre of the
British line. Three Troops of Horse Artillery (Colonel Brind) of
six 6 Pounder guns each and two field batteries (Lieutenants
Walker and Robertson) of 9 pounders under Major Mowatt
were attached to the left attacking division i.e Campbells.
The left attacking division i.e Major General Sir Gilberts was
supported by three troops of Horse Artillery (Colonel Grant)
and one Field Battery of 9 Pounders under Major Dawes.
The British army was as earlier stated, divided into two
infantry divisions i.e Brigadier General Colin Campbell
commanding the 3rd Division or simply the left division (and
Major General Sir Walter Gilbert commanding the 2nd
Infantry Division or left division. Both the infantry divisions
were supported by one cavalry brigade each on the outer
flanks i.e 1st Cavalry Brigade (HM 3rd Light Dragoons, 5th
and 8th Bengal Native Light Cavalry) of Brigadier White on
the left flank and 2nd Cavalry Brigade (HM 9 Lancers, HM 14
LD, 1st and 6th Bengal Native Light Cavalry) of Brigadier
Pope on the right flank. Campbell’s division consisted of
Brigadier Pennycuick’s Brigade (HM 24 Foot, 25 and 45
Bengal Native Infantry) and Brigadier Hoggan’s Brigade (HM
61 Foot, 36th and 46th Bengal Native Infantry). Major
General Gilbert’s division consisted of Brigadier Mountain’s
Brigade (HM 29 Foot, 30th and 56th Bengal Native Infantry)
and Brigadier Godby’s Brigade (East India Company’s 2nd
Bengal European Infantry Regiment, 31st and 70th Bengal
Native Infantry). Brigadier Penny’s Brigade originally under
Brigadier General Campbell was the army reserve with two
infantry battalions i.e 15th and 69th Bengal Native Infantry.
The 20th Bengal Native Infantry alongwith 3rd and 9th
Bengal Native Irregular Cavalry alongwith three field guns
was designated as baggage guard, with Brigadier Hearsay as
baggage guard commander43.

95
We have earlier discussed that Gough ordered his army to
form up for battle at 2 o’clock. By 3 o’clock Gough’s army
was formed up to attack. Four infantry brigades each
comprising two native and one British infantry battalion
commenced their advance towards the Sikh position east of
the thick jungle around three o’ clock. The jungle consisted of
trees interspersed with thick undergrowth and extremely
thorny trees and bushes sometimes referred to as “Musket”
in the Punjabi Shikari (Hunting) terminology. The closest
European equivalent to this term is brushwood.
Malleson states that Gough was a “thorough believer in the
bayonet and looking upon guns as instruments which it was
perhaps necessary to use but which interfered with real
fighting, he, wild with excitement ordered his infantry to
advance and charge the enemy’s batteries”. The reader may
note that the Sikh position was at least 1760 yards from the
British army and there was dense forest in between!44
42 Page-127-Thorburn-Op Cit-.Later at the Battle of Gujerat
in February 1849 the British were far
more superior in artillery and this enabled them to
overwhelmingly defeat the Sikhs with casualties
which were far less than those suffered at Chillianwala.
43 Details of dispositions are based on Pages 206 to 217-
Gough & Innes-Op Cit and Pages-449 to

96
454-Fortescue-Op Cit.Details about “Baggage Guard Units”
are taken from Lieut F.G Cardew’s book.See
Page-232- Sketch of the Services of the Bengal Native Army
to the year 1895 –Lieut F.G
Cardew-Office of the Superintendent of Government Printing-
Calcutta- 1903.

97
Brigadier Pennycuicks Attack
We will now proceed brigadewise and briefly discuss the
battle. Firstly we will deal with Brigadier General Campbell’s
Division. Campbell was a Royal British Army officer born in
1792. He had seen action under Wellington in the Peninsular
War and in 1849 had some 42 years of service behind him.
Son of a Glasgow carpenter Campbell was helped getting into
the class-conscious British army through the help of a rich
relative. Campbell became, as was the norm at that time a
colonel after some 30 years service. He was described by
many contemporaries as “extremely brave” and “thorough”
but “utterly devoid of dash” and “too cautious” and “ too
selfish for any place”45 as is mostly the case with men with
humble origins who progress upwards slowly mastering all
the red tapism and bureaucratic obstacles in armies!
Campbell like Gough was a firm believer in the power of the
bayonet! Campbell’s prime responsibility was to command
and co-ordinate the function of both his brigades. However
keeping in view the adverse terrain he decided to accompany
his left brigade i.e Hoggan’s brigade in the attack while
ordering Pennycuick the right brigade commander to lead the
attack on his own. . Gough and Innes well summed up
Campbell’s decision as following, “ He abrogated the duties of
a divisional commander to discharge with splendid success
those of a brigadier”!46 However before the attack
commenced Campbell rode to Pennycuicks brigade and after
briefing Pennycuick about the attack rode on to HM 24th
Foot, the British unit of Pennycuicks brigade and gave them
the following orders, “ There must be no firing, the work has
to be done with the bayonet” 47. HM 24th Foot 1000
bayonets strong had newly arrived in India.48 The unit was
thus highly enthusiastic but highly inexperienced in the
British Indian way of warfare! By some oversight or due to

98
an out of proportion sense of excitement, once HM 24th Foot
commenced its advance, it did so without loading its
muskets!49 through some confusion the artillery designated
to provide fire support to Pennycuick trotted to the left50.
Pennycuick advanced rapidly towards the Sikh position, HM
24th Foot doing so more rapidly, full of enthusiasm to
bayonet the accursed natives, that thin red line tipped with
steel, as the British infantry at that time was known! The
Sikh artillery whose overall commander was Illahi Baksh a
Punjabi Muslim functioned admirably and as soon as 24 Foot
came within round shot range of 800 yards, it was effectively
engaged by Sikh artillery, and men starting falling. At 100
yards the Sikh infantry engaged the unit with musket fire,
but the unit advanced stoically without firing back, their
muskets unloaded, determined to do the work with the
bayonet as ordered by Campbell. 24th Foot was the first to
emerge in open ground west of the jungle outstripping both
the native units of Pennycuick’s brigade i.e the 25 and 45 NI
on the right and left flanks respectively. To add further bad
luck to 24th Foot’s fate right across its axis of advance was a
large water pond between the Sikh position and the British
unit. 24th Foot thus had to break formation to cross the pond
bypassing it from left and right while some braver souls
attempted to wade through it. At this moment the Sikh
artillery played havoc with 24th Foot causing inflicting great
slaughter.
THE BATTLE SCENE FROM THE MOUND IN THE REAR

99
24th Foot did reach the Sikh guns but the punishment
inflicted was too severe. As close quarter fighting started
24th Foot soon lost many officers including its commanding
officer. The unit had not loaded its muskets and had
advanced too fast thus reaching the Sikh position
unsupported by both native units. Beveridge states that the
unit advanced at a double time pace because of a
misunderstanding on part of two officers leading the brigade
, however this view is not substantiated by either Fortescue
or Gough and Innes .The native units advancing more
carefully, while preserving their energy for the final assault
under the more experienced British officers of the East India
Company’s private army did finally attack the Sikh position, a
few minutes after 24th Foot’s attack, suffering many
casualties in the process but by this time HM 24th Foot was
close to the breaking point The Sikhs counterattacked and
the 24th Foot broke up and withdrew in disorder back into
the jungle towards Chillianwalla. The native units also
withdrew. Pennycuick, his son Lieutenant Pennycuick and his
brigade major all died in the bloody engagement. In all
Penycuicks brigade lost some 376 men killed (244 from HM
24 Foot and, 112 from 25 NI, and 20 from 45 NI) and about

100
417 wounded (266 from HM 24 Foot, 92 from 25 NI and 59
from 45 NI). The brigade fought well but failed because of
sheer tactical ineptitude of HM 24 Foot in advancing too
rapidly and because of its blind obedience to Campbell’s
instructions regarding use of bayonets apart from lack of
artillery support. Pennycuick’s brigade’s remnants arrived in
driblets back to their start line east of the jungle.51

101
Brigadier Hoggan’s attack
Campbell’s left brigade whom Campbell accompanied fared
better. It was well supported by artillery and HM 61 Foot was
a better-led and trained unit. The native units on the flanks
of HM 61 Foot knew their job and their pace of advance in
any case depended on the European unit in the middle .The
reader may note that the British always cleverly placed the
European unit in the middle so that the thankless and dirty
job of looking after the flanks where most of the Enfilading
fire came was assigned to the native units! Soon after
commencing advance Hoggan’s brigade lost touch with
Pennycuick’s brigade because of the jungle. Once it crossed
the jungle it arrived right in front of a gap in the Sikh line 53
in between the Sikh left flank of their (Sikhs) right division
and the right flank of the Sikh centre. Fortescue denies this
and states that once Hoggan’s brigade appeared out of the
jungle there were Sikh troops in front of it.54 However
Fortescue does admit that Hoggan’s brigade was able to
advance thanks to massive concentration of some 29 British
artillery pieces i.e Mowatt’s battery on Hoggans right and
Colonel Brind’s three horse-artillery batteries (troops) on the
left55. These British guns as per Fortescue were able to
silence an excellently sited Sikh heavy battery which
otherwise was ideally placed to enfilade the advance of the
entire brigade . In any case whether there was a gap in front
of Hoggan’s brigade as Malleson asserts or not as Fortescue
would like us to believe Hoggan’s brigade successfully
advanced onwards and after doing its job in the front
wheeled northwards towards Pennycuick’s supposed position
, while the cavalry brigade along with Colonel Brind’s horse
artillery troops ably performed the task of flank protection
and defeated a Sikh attempt to attack Hoggan’s brigade’s
flank from the south by well directed artillery fire and a sharp

102
cavalry charge. However in the process one squadron of HM
3rd Lancers lost contact with the brigade while pursuing the
Sikh cavalry.
HM 3RD LIGHT DRAGOONS FOUGHT WELL EXCEPT ITS ONE
SQUADRON LOSING ITS WAY DELAYING THE WHOLE
CAVALRY BRIGADE RESULTANTLY
This squadron was in turn counterattacked by Sikh cavalry
and in the process lost 23 men killed . This squadron only re
joined its parent unit at the end of the days fighting and thus
was a major reason why Brigadier White was unable to utilise
his brigade more effectively to attack the Sikhs from the left
.Hoggan’s brigade now advanced northwards wheeling right
and took in the flank the Sikh troops which had defeated
Pennycuicks brigade . The Sikhs were outflanked and fought
well but Hoggan’s brigade evicted them from their position
and continued its advance northwards rolling up the Sikhs
flank from the south. Hoggan’s brigade continued its advance
till it finally met Major General Gilbert’s left brigade. The
reader may note that Hoggan’s brigade was sucessful in
joining up with Mountain’s brigade i.e Sir Walter Gilberts left

103
brigade because Mountain’s brigade attacked the Sikhs facing
Hoggan’s brigade from their unguarded north rear.52
45 Page-334-The Great Mutiny India 1857-Christopher
Hibbert-Penguin Books-London-1983.
46 Page-221-Gough & Innes-Op Cit.
47 Page-452-Fortescue-Op Cit and Page-130-Thorburn-Op
Cit. Fortescue finds nothing unusual in this order and merely
states that Campbell said "that there must be no firing but
that the bayonet must do the work".
48 Page-217-Gough & Innes-Op Cit.

104
49 Page-130-Thorburn- Op Cit.
50 Pages-220 & 221-Gough & Innes-Op Cit.
51 Pages-223 and 224-Ibid. For Beveridge's claim of HM 24
Foot advancing double time see Page-650-Beveridge-Op Cit.
Fortescue merely states that HM 24 Foot "pushed on rapidly"
being a battalion which was "very strong" and composed of
"young soldiers" (Refers, Fortescue, Op Cit, 452). Gough and
Innes does not say that HM 24 Foot advanced rapidly but
state that Brigadier Pennycuick advanced rapidly , implying
that the error of advancing too fast was committed at
brigade level and by Brigadier Pennycuick ( Refers Page-222-
Gough and Innes- Op Cit). Malleson states that Pennycuick's
brigade suffered because it had to charge 300 yards of
distance in open space in face of Sikh troops whose front had
been strengthened by many guns and that the men were
exhausted before reaching the guns and thus " broke from
the charging pace at the moment that it was most important
to have continued it" (Refers Page-418-Malleson , Op Cit).
However Malleson states that the brigade did capture the
guns but was forced to withdraw soon afterwards due to a
Sikh counterattack.
52 Illahi Baksh the commander of Sikh artillery defected to
the British lines on 19th of January six days after
Chillianwalla Ilahi Baksh's departure left the Sikh artillery
leaderless and played an important role in poor efficiency of
Sikh artillery at the Battle of Gujrat where the Sikhs were
decisively defeated. Ilahi Baksh gave the British valuable
information about the Sikh army and about Sikh fears about
British artillery which Ilahi Baksh felt was poorly utilised at
Chillianwalla. Refers Pages-235 & 236-Gough and
Innes- Op Cit . The reader may note that many wholly

105
Punjabi Muslim batteries of the Sikh army were inducted later
in the British artillery e.g, the Hafiz Baksh's (four guns ) and
Fazal Ali's troops (two guns) of Horse Artillery of the Khalsa
of the old Sikh Durbar, which was re-designated as No.2
Battery raised at Bannu on 18 May 1849 by Lieutenant H.
Hammond an officer from the (Hindustani manned) Bengal
Artillery , in accordance with Lord Dalhousie's brilliant policy
of rehabilitating all Punjabi soldiers of the Khalsa whether
Sikh or Muslim .Similarly the No . 3 Battery raised at Dera
Ghazi Khan by Lieutenant Mc Neill of the Bengal Artillery was
also largely composed of ex Punjabi Muslim and some Sikh
Horse artillery men from the old Khalsa Sikh artillery. Refers
Pages 8
--------------------------------
ALL BATTLE MAPS ARE CONCEIVED AND DRAWN BY MYSELF
BASED ON EXHAUSTIVE BATTLE RESEARCH AND NOT LIKE
MAPS DITTO COPIED FROM US ARMY FIELD MANUALS INTO
PAKISTANI PUBLICATIONS
52 Illahi Baksh the commander of Sikh artillery defected to
the British lines on 19th of January six days after
Chillianwalla Ilahi Baksh's departure left the Sikh artillery
leaderless and played an important role in poor efficiency of
Sikh artillery at the Battle of Gujrat where the Sikhs were
decisively defeated. Ilahi Baksh gave the British valuable
information about the Sikh army and about Sikh fears about
British artillery which Ilahi Baksh felt was poorly utilised at
Chillianwalla. Refers Pages-235 & 236-Gough and
Innes- Op Cit . The reader may note that many wholly
Punjabi Muslim batteries of the Sikh army were inducted later
in the British artillery e.g, the Hafiz Baksh's (four guns ) and
Fazal Ali's troops (two guns) of Horse Artillery of the Khalsa

106
of the old Sikh Durbar, which was re-designated as No.2
Battery raised at Bannu on 18 May 1849 by Lieutenant H.
Hammond an officer from the (Hindustani manned) Bengal
Artillery , in accordance with Lord Dalhousie's brilliant policy
of rehabilitating all Punjabi soldiers of the Khalsa whether
Sikh or Muslim .Similarly the No . 3 Battery raised at Dera
Ghazi Khan by Lieutenant Mc Neill of the Bengal Artillery was
also largely composed of ex Punjabi Muslim and some Sikh
Horse artillery men from the old Khalsa Sikh artillery. Refers
Pages 8
& 9- The History of the Indian Mountain Artillery-
Brigadier General C.A.L Graham-Aldershot, Gale &
Polden- 1957. Thus the Pakistani artillery which traces its
origins to these batteries carries the fine Khalsa traditions
which were brought to Punjab by French and American
artillery instructors. The reader may note that Ranjit Singh's
army had following artillery instructors from europe and
America:- (1) Court -France, (2) Garhee -American, (3)
Canora, (killed at Haripur by Sher Singh Attariwalla's father
Chutter Singh Attariwalla) -American. Refers, Major G Smyth
(Editor) Op Ci, xxxvi & xxxvii. The reader may note that
as per one estimate the Khalsa in 1845 had 276 pieces of
ordnance out of which 163 were from Horse Artillery i.e fully
mobile. Refers-Page-xxxvi- Colonel Smyth-Op Cit.

108
Conduct of Pope’s Cavalry Brigade leading to diasaster on the
right flank
We have earlier stated that Brigadier Pope’s cavalry brigade
was tasked to protect the right flank of the army of Punjab.
Pope’s cavalry brigade consisted of HM 14th Light Dragoons ,
HM 9th Lancers, 1st Bengal Native Light Cavalry (1 LC) , and
6th LC . The European cavalry regiment average strength
was approximately 400 Sabres and Native Cavalry Regiment
strength was approximately 300 sabres.58 Brigadier Pope
was from 6th LC and had more than forty years service. He
was a brave and dashing officer in his earlier years but was
not really physically or mentally fit to command a cavalry
brigade in action.59 The 6th Bengal Native Light Cavalry the
readers may note was one of the most illustrious units of the

109
native cavalry. One of its most illustrious feats was a daring
charge at the battle of Sitabldi in the Third Maratha War
where it dispersed a Maratha force of about 18,000 men
including 3,000 Arab mercenaries.60 This battle was unique
in the sense that there were no British units present and the
battle was an all Indian show barring the British officers of
the native units.
HM 9TH ROYAL LANCERS WHICH ALSO SHAMELESSLY
BOLTED AWAY FROM THE BATTLEFIELD FOLLOWING HM 14
LIGHT DRAGOONS SHAMELESS FLIGHT
Pope notwithstanding his dash as a young officer , was an
invalid in 1849 , and one who could hardly sit on horseback
61. As soon as the British advance commenced Pope with the
cavalry brigade on the right flank also advanced.
Immediately a body of Sikh cavalry emerging from the high

110
ground around Rasul , made a threatening demonstration
towards Popes right rear flank. Pope detached a wing (half
regiment) each of HM 9th Lancers and 1st and 6th LC under
the overall command of Colonel Lane to observe them and to
act as a flank protection screen. Lane deployed his force a
little northwards and thus lost visual contact with the
remaining British army ,because of the intervening strips of
jungle . Pope continued his advance westwards with the
remaining brigade, some nine cavalry squadrons, i.e HM 14th
Light Dragoons (HM 14 LD) and wing each of 1st and 6th LC
and HM 9th Lancers. Soon another body of Sikh cavalry
appeared in front of Pope’s axis of advance . The Bengal
Horse artillery the best branch of the British immediately
deployed into action to engage these Sikhs. However Pope ,
without thinking of anything decided to charge the Sikhs ,
also masking the British artillery’s fire in line formation . The
result was a weak charge without any depth or artillery
support , delivered in words of Gough and Innes without
speed or momentum.62 The Sikh horsemen led by Jawahir
Singh Nalwa63 the bold and dashing son of Sardar Hari Singh
Nalwa now realising that poor execution and bad terrain had
brought Pope’s apology of a cavalry charge to an absolute
halt64 now counter charged. Jawahir Singh with his band of
horsemen emerged, once again, through the wild Doab
jungle, and charged Popes force, in the process of which
some Sikh horsemen physically attacked Brigadier Pope,
cutting him across the head with his Tulwar, and wounding
him 65. At this critical stage of the battle Pope’s brigade
which had already halted and was waiting for orders, now
became leaderless. An event then occurred which the British
historians right from 1849 onwards find hard to explain or
account for. HM 14th Light Dragoon turned about and bolted!
The native cavalry also panicked and followed HM 14th Light
Dragoon rearwards, galloping through at top speed through
their own horse artillery batteries backwards! Fortescue

111
states that HM 14th Light Dragoon bolted because Pope gave
them a word of command of “Threes Right” which they heard
as something like “Threes about” 66 and that’s why the unit
bolted! There is no doubt that had a native cavalry unit done
so Fortescue’s verdict may have been much more harsh!
Jawahir Singh Nalwa pursued Pope’s cavalry brigade with
great elan, cutting down many British Horse artillerymen
including Major Christie, one of the battery commanders ,
destroying six guns and carrying four guns intact apart from
two ammunition wagons and fifty three horses as war
trophies!67 Pope’s cavalry brigade from this moment
onwards ceased to be a fighting formation! It was rallied with
great difficulty by Gough’s staff and the regimental Chaplain
of HM 14 LD, with his pistol! It was said that Gough
recommended the Chaplain to be promoted to the rank of
Brevet Bishop ,on the battlefield!68
The flight of Pope’s brigade resulted in a serious operational
imbalance in the British position . Their right rear flank was
now vulnerable to counter attack . Sher Singh Attariwalla
immediately ordered a counter attack and Sikh infantry and
cavalry west of Rasul immediately advanced down from the
heights through the open gap encircling Gilbert’s division
from the rear! It was Pope’s good luck that he died soon
afterwards from wounds suffered in the battle.
NOW THE BRITISH LIES WHICH CONTINUE TILL TO THIS
DATE WITHOUT SHAME ! A WEBSITE CALLED BRISH
BATTLES ,LINK GIVEN BELOW HAS THE FOLLOWING LIES TO
NARRATE ABOUT THE CAVALRY BRIGADES FLIGHT:--
Pope led his brigade at the trot through the broken scrub
without the precaution of skirmishers in advance. At the sight
of a body of Sikh cavalry, the BLC squadrons in the centre of
the line halted, forcing the British regiments on the flanks to

112
stop in conformity. The Sikhs charged the BLC squadrons
which turned about and made off. The two British regiments
did the same, all attempts by the officers to halt their
soldiers being to no avail.
The precipitous withdrawal of the cavalry regiments left the
brigade horse artillery battery unprotected and in the
confusion of limbering up, the battery was overrun by the
Sikh cavalry who captured two guns. Eventually two other
guns came into action and were sufficient to drive the Sikh
cavalry back.
http://www.britishbattles.com/second-sikh-
war/chillianwallah.ht m
58 Page-132-Thorburn - Op Cit.
59 Pages-216 & 217-Gough & Innes-Op Cit.
61 Page-33- The Maratha and the Pindari War- Lieutenant
Colonel R.G Burton- Compiled for the General Staff-India -
Government Monotype Press- Simla- 1910.
62 Page-134-Thorburn-Op Cit.

113
63 Page-229-Gough and Innes-Op Cit.
64 W.L Conran and H.D Craik, "The Punjab Chiefs", "Volume
Two", (Civil and Military Gazette Press, Lahore, 1910), 81
65 64 Fortescue, Op Cit, 456.
66 65 Malleson, Op Cit, 420 & 421.
67 Fortescue, Op Cit, 456.
68 Ibid.
NOTE ON SUICIDE OF LIEUTENANT COLONEL KING
COMMANDING OFFICER OF 14 LIGHT DRAGOONS IN 1850
HM 14 LIGHT DRAGOONS IS NOW KNOWN AS 14/20 Hussars
.General Sir Charles Napier Commander in Chief unwittingly
commended HM 14 Light Dragoons on parade during a visit
at which the regimental trumpeteer said " our commanding
officer Lieutenant Colonel King is a coward" .Lieutenant
Colonel King was severely overwhelmed and committed
suicide.
Meanwhile lies continue to this day when thev website British
Battles says that Colonel King told Brigadier Pope to attack
the Sikhs whereas the actual position was that poor old man
Brigadier Pope (of the indomitable 6th Light Cavalry -all
Ranghars or Aghas) was already mortally wounded with a
sikh sword striking his head and died the same night.Now
there is a reason here.The class conscious British despised
Brigadier Pope because he was from the native cavalry of the
English East India Company's Bengal Army.

114
SARDAR SHER SINGH THE REAL SIKH HERO OF
CHILLIANWALLAH

115
Major General Sir Walter Raleigh Gilbert’s attack
Major General Walter Gilbert commanding the right division
consisting of Brigadier White and Mountain’s Brigades was a
far more experienced man than Campbell or Gough.He had
seen action in the First Sikh War and was not only an
extremely brave leader of men but also a relatively more
sensible man as compared to Gough and Colin Campbell.
Walter functioned as an effective divisional commander and
coordinated the advance of both his brigade’s well. Brigadier
Mountain’s Brigade on the left encountered stiff Sikh
resistance . The 56th NI its right flanking unit ran into an
excellently sited Sikh position and was counterattacked by an
overwhelming number of Sikhs. The unit fought well but was
repulsed after losing in the process 8 officers and 322 men
killed and wounded56. The other two units i.e HM 29th Foot

116
and the 30 NI were however more successful and captured
the Sikh positions opposite Lulianee spiking a large number
of Sikh artillery guns and rendering them ineffective. As a
result of success of HM 29 Foot and 30 NI 56 NI was rallied
and joined the brigade . It may be noted that Mountain’s
brigade attacked the Sikhs facing Hoggan’s brigade
advancing from the south and thus enabled Hoggan’s brigade
to defeat those Sikhs57. Gilbert’s right brigade i.e Brigade
Godby’s brigade performed relatively better than Mountain’s
brigade . The brigade ably supported by artillery sucessfully
cleared all Sikh positions in its front and drove the Sikhs
close to the river Jhelum opposite the village of Tupai. Godby
then halted his brigade in order to reorganise before the final
attack driving into the Sikh’s once he was suddenly attacked
by the Sikhs in force from his rear. How this happened will be
discussed in the following paragraphs.
54 Page-453-Fortescue- Op Cit.
55 Ibid.
56 Details of fighting of Hoggan's brigade are based on
Gough and Innes account-Page-224-Gough & Innes-Op
Cit.. Details about Brigadier White's Cavalry brigade's
operations are again based on account of Gough and Innes.
Refers-Page-228-Gough and Innes- Op Cit.

118
GILBERT AND HOGGANS BREAKOUT TO THE REAR
Gilbert’s Counteractions and final British withdrawal
We had already left Gilbert discussing Major General Gilberts
action when Gilberts brigades suddenly found themselves
under attack from their rear. Brigadier Godby whose brigade
bore the brunt of the Sikh counter attack from the rear
reacted in a most resolute manner to the sudden Sikh threat
from his rear! The day was however saved by brilliant
handling of artillery by Major Dawes of No 17 Field Battery.
Dawes immediately moved his battery to the right flank and
brought such an effective fire on the Sikhs attacking Godby’s
brigade that the Sikh counter attack was broken up. Almost
at the same time Godby gave an order of “Right about face”
to his brigade and attacked towards the rear scattering the
Sikhs attacking his rear.69

119
Mountain’s brigade whose rear was also threatened, although
relatively far less than Godby’s also counterattacked
rearwards and dispersed the Sikhs threatening his rear . By
this time the reader may note Hoggan’s brigade had also
joined Mountain.70
At this stage of battle Brigadier Penny’s reserve brigade
which had been ordered by Gough to take Pennycuick’s
position after Pennycuicks brigades repulse had entered the
jungle, lost its way and moved north-westwards instead of
south westwards now suddenly emerged out of the jungle in
front of Gilbert’s division, now breaking out eastwards and ,
also played a marginal role in reducing the Sikh threat to the
rear of Gilbert’s division 71.
69 Ibid and also, Lieut Gen S.L Menezes, "Fidelity and
Honour", (Viking , Penguin, India, 1983), 73
70 Gough and Innes , Op Cit, 231 & 232.
71 Ibid , 232.

120
CLICK TO ENLARGE
ENTIRELY CONCEIVED AND HAND DRAWN IN FREE HAND BY
A.H AMIN IN FEBRUARY 1999
By now darkness was approaching and Colonel Lane, all
throughout unaware of what was happening emerged from
the jungle and attacked the retreating Sikhs, who had
attacked Gilbert’s rear from his position in the right rear.72
Gough now decided to withdraw what remained of his
demoralised army to Chillianwalla. All the wounded that could
be found were carried back to Chillianwalla in the darkness
73. The British had failed to dislodge the Sikhs , the only
adversary in India Afghanistan Nepal and Iran which checked

121
a British army with more than three British infantry
regiments and above 10,000 men in open country, without
the safety of any fortress walls like Seringapatam Bhurtpore
or Delhi or any mountain fastness like Nepal Afghanistan or
the Trans Indus Frontier regions! It was a unique honour
never broken by any other British adversary from 1757 till
1947!
72 Ibid.
73 Ibid, 233.
ANALYSIS
British Casualties
The casualties that the British suffered were relatively much
larger in proportion as compared to any battle that they
fought later or earlier at least as far as unit averages were
concerned. There are many aspects of this issue. Firstly
native casualties Vis a Vis British unit casualties proved that
the natives fought as well as the British despite no national
motivation to do so. Secondly most British casualties
especially those of HM 24th Foot occurred not because of
greater valour but simple tactical ineptitude. Thirdly the
casualties suffered were much higher at least in proportion to
casualties suffered by the Indian Army in any subsequent
war including the two world wars or even the 1965 and 1971
wars as far as the two Indo Pak armies are concerned. The
total British casualties were 2,357 , sub divided as 602 killed
(including 22 British officers) , 1,651 wounded and 104
missing (which in reality were killed) . The vast bulk of

122
cavalry casualties was borne by Brigadier White’s brigade,
which performed its task in an
admirable manner, losing 31 killed and 35 wounded while
Pope’s brigade which performed disastrously suffered 15
killed and 30 wounded . Out of these , HM 14 LD the real
culprits losing only 2 killed and 14 wounded ! The field
artillery lost 22 men killed and 16 wounded out of which
Christie’s field battery on the right bore the brunt of the
artillery losses , due to the , Sikh counter attack and could
not bolt away being deployed lost heavily losing 12 men
killed and 5 wounded including the battery commander Major
Christie who died because of mortal wounds . Gough and
Innes put the total casualties at 2338 subdivided as 599
killed , 98 missing (in all probability killed) , and 1641
wounded .However Lieut F.G Cardew is widely regarded as a
more reliable authority having had direct access to all Bengal
Army records and having been officially tasked to write the
short history of the Bengal Army after all the three
presidency armies were merged into one Indian Army in
1895. J.W Fortescue avoids the details of casualties merely
stating that they were over 2300.74 Infantry unit casualties
are given in detail in the following tables.The tables are self
explanatory and the reader may form his own conclusions.
The number of Europeans in killed is reduced to a mere 48 as
compared to 179 Natives once 24 Foot and 25 NI are
excluded from the total. The Europeans fought well, they
were well fed as compared to natives, much more well paid,
performed no guard duties and were fighting for their own
country. The native , most of whom were Hindustani Hindus
recruited at that time from areas east and south of Ambala
who was a mere mercenary fought well ! But after 1857 were
branded as no good!

123
It should also be remembered that one brigade of native
infantry ie Brigadier Penny’s brigade was only marginally
employed in the battle since it was the reserve brigade. If
casualties of this brigade are excluded, following is the Native
versus European comparison of casualties : -
To recapitulate three different stories ie that if 25 NI and HM
24 Foot are included the European casualties %age wise are
higher only because Pennycuicks Brigade merely blundered
and was unnecessarily sacrificed, secondly if Pennycuicks two
units are excluded the native percentage of casualties is
higher and lastly if Penny’s Brigade is also excluded Native
%age of casualties is even higher :-
* Increased due to addition of 5 British Officers of Native
Regiments.
THE BATTLE OF CHILLIANWALA AS A TEST CASE OF COMBAT
PERFORMANCE OF EUROPEAN AND NATIVE TROOPS
Immediately from 1857 onwards the British officers
particularly those of the Royal Army and some officers of the
Company’s private army started vigorous propaganda
campaign against the native troops from south of Ambala
areas. They floated a theory that the races south of Ambala
in general and East of Jumna in particular were non martial
and had performed poorly in the Sikh Wars.I have selected
battle of Chillianwalla fought in the second Sikh War which
was the last major battle fought by the Bengal Army against
the Khalsa Sikh Army on 13 January 1849. The battle was
unique in the following ways :—— (1) The Punjabi but Sikh
Khalsa Army was without any doubt the toughest opponent
of the British in entire west Asia. Their battle performance

124
was superior to any other Army which the British
encountered in entire India Nepal Burma Afghanistan or Iran.
(2) The battle was fought in a plain territory unlike the
Gurkha War or the Afghan Wars where the Gurkhas or
Afghans made good use of very adverse terrain. The Sikh
position was based on a ridge which was an insignificant
feature as compared to Afghanistan or Nepal’s terrain.(3)
The British Army at Chillianwala was logistically absolutely
sound being well supplied unlike the First Afghan War where
the British were more than 1500 miles from their supply base
and on quarter rations.The battle was fought in a mild Punjab
winter unlike adverse snowfall and below freezing
temperature during the British retreat from Kabul. (4) The
battle was unique in the sense that a British army with more
than 12,000 troops suffered a reverse which was unique as
the only instance of the type in the entire military history of
the British Army in India Pakistan Afghanistan, Iran and
Nepal ! Bhurtpur and Delhi were different since in both these
places the defenders were behind the security of artificial
man made fortifications. The battle saw a renowned Royal
Army regiment of Cavalry ie HM 14th Light Dragoons running
away from the battlefield in utter panic. Their glorious flight
was only checked after they were profanely abused by their
Chaplain at pistol point!
The casualties suffered by the native troops in this battle do
not reflect any sort of demoralisation or battle weariness as
alleged by British writers from 1857 onwards. No native
regiment broke up and fled the battlefield like HM 14th Light
Dragoons ! We will let the figures speak for themselves and
allow the reader to form his own conclusions .
COMPARISON OF CASUALTIES AT CHILLIANWALLA WITH
1965 AND 1971 WARS

125
The following table illustrates some casualties suffered by
various unit/formations of the Pakistan and Indian Army in
1965 and 1971 wars.The reader may also note that while
Chillianwalla was a battle that lasted for about six hours at
the most both 1965 and 1971 wars lasted for more than 10
days and were fought with far more lethal weapons than
those held by Gough’s or Sher Singh Attariwalla’s army at
Chillianwalla:—
THE BRITISH INDIAN MILITARY LEGACY
Failure to utilise artillery properly , reliance on frontal attacks
, blind obedience to orders and lack of professional attitude
as exhibited at Chillianwalla were inherited by both Pakistan
and Indian armies right through 1965 1971 and even as late
as 1992 as proved by Brigadier Anwari-Major General Abbasi
joint attack at Siachen in 1992 . The Battle of Barapind in
1971 is yet another example of the Gough legacy of military
incompetence at corps brigade and division level. In short the
state of affairs at Chillianwalla was inherited by us right till
today i.e extremely brave young officers , dedicated and self
less troops but highly incompetent commanders from unit
onwards!
Postscript
The British buried their dead at Chillianwalla but soon after
Gough’s army marched from Chillianwala, most of the British
dead were torn out of their shallow graves by hyenas jackals
and village curs77. Later the British reburied their dead and
made a beautiful cemetery that exists to date a, although
poorly maintained. The locals of Chillianwalla called the place
“Katalgarh” or “House of Slaughter” in memory of the bloody

126
battle78. Very close to the obelisk created in the memory of
the battle was the village of “Mong” which as per one
archaeologist was built on the ancient city of Nikaea built by
Alexander in commemoration of his victory over Raja Porus
in the battle of Hydaspus fought almost on the same location
as Chillianwalla.79
Sher Singh Attariwalla was a brilliant military commander .
But he was fighting against the ruthless tide of history .
Today few know about him outside the Sikh community , but
there is no doubt that he was a great military commander of
the sub continent ! Gough finally defeated the Sikh Army at
Gujerat on 21 February 1849 , where he simply allowed his
artillery to do the job. Sher Singh was outgunned and forced
to fight in more open country because of starvation and
blockade. He died in exile at Benares in 1858 . Sardar
Jowahir Singh Nalwa another hero of the battle joined the 1st
Sikh Cavalry in 1857 against the same Hindustani Hindu and
Muslim sepoys who had fought against him under Gough at
Chillianwalla and Gujerat! He distinguished himself as a
Risaldar of 1st Sikh Cavalry in 1857 and later became an
honorary magistrate at Gujranwalla finally dying in 1877.
Most of the native infantry cavalry and artillery units that had
served the British so devotedly at Chillianwalla rebelled in
1857 or were disbanded . Only 31 NI and 70 NI survived the
rebellion ! The 1st Light Cavalry , a fine unit of Ranghars and
Hindustani Pathan Muslims of Rohtak and Rohailkhand and
some Hindustani Rajput Hindus rebelled at Mhow , rode all
the way to Delhi and later at Lucknow and finally was
dispersed and destroyed in the Himalayan rainforest of
Terai!One of its native officers Risaldar Ghous Khan ( a
Hindustani Pathan from,Rohtak district , which was
transferred to loyal Punjab in 1857 as a punishment for
rebellion) was the sepoy cavalry commander at the siege of
Delhi and played a prominent role in raiding British convoys

127
on the Karnal-Delhi road The 46 NI was destroyed at the
battle of Trimmu Ghat in Gurdaspur on the Ravi river . It was
marching from Sialkot to Delhi and was intercepted by
Brigadier General Nicholson’s movable column.The 56 NI was
one of the units that rebelled at Cawnpore in 1857 .The 20
NI rebelled at Meerut in May 1857 and marched to Delhi. The
25 NI a brave unit was luckier . It was disbanded at Benares
in 1857 .The 36 NI and 6th Light Cavalry were part of the
Jullundhur brigade in 1857 .Both rebelled and marched all
the way from Jullundhur to Delhi in 1857 and fought against
the British till their final destruction in the Nepalese Jungle of
Terai where Lord Clyde (Brigadier Campbell of Chillianwalla)
drove it in December 1858.30 NI rebelled at Naeerabad in
Rajputana in 1857 and marched to Delhi.69 NI was
destroyed at Multan in 1857 once it rebelled .The 45 NI
located at ferozpur in 1857 rebelled and marched all the way
to Delhi.The 3rd Irregular Cavalry rebelled at Saugor in 1857
while 31 NI also stationed at Saugor fought against it to
protect the British officers and non combatants.9th Irregular
Cavalry unlucky in being stationed at Hoshiarpur in loyal
Punjab and was also disbanded . 5th and 8th Light Cavalry
which had provided the nucleus to raise most Punjab Cavalry
units were disbanded at Peshawar and Lahore respectively in
1857. It was at this juncture that one of the authors
ancestors ,then in 8th Light Cavalry , joined the Punjab Police
through the good offices of a British officer .
Many British units that fought shoulder to shoulder with the
native units at Chillianwalla were employed against the same
units in 1857! HM 24 Foot , which was stationed at
Rawalpindi in 1857 , was used to disarm 28th NI at
Rawalpindi and to fight the 14th NI at Jhelum.The 61st Foot
and the 2nd European and HM 9th Lancers marched to Delhi
in 1857 and played a leading role in the assault on the city in
September 1857. HM 14th Light Dragoons participated in the

128
central India campaign in 1857 , which was a very minor
affair in terms of battle casualties .Brigadier Penny was killed
in a sepoy ambush in Rohailkhand in 1858 . Colin Campbell
later fought the Crimean War and returned to India in 1857
as C in C Bengal Army (Overall C in C India) and was given
the title of Lord Clyde . His overcautious conduct as a military
commander in 1857-58 was much criticised.
The British forgot the brave conduct of the Hindustani Sepoys
at Chilllianwalla once these sepoys rebelled against them in
1857 and from 1857 onwards started calling them non
martial races ! As if HM 14 Light Dragoon was from a martial
race!What matters in the final analysis is how well a unit
fought , not the army or race or religion to which it belonged
! It’s the spirit of man that matters in the final reckoning!
------------------------------------------------------------------ -
------------------
CHILLIANWALLAH
by GEORGE MEREDITH
Chillanwallah, Chillanwallah!
Where our brothers fought and bled,
O thy name is natural music
And a dirge above the dead!
Though we have not been defeated,
Though we can't be overcome,
Still, whene'er thou art repeated,
I would fain that grief were dumb.
Chillianwallah, Chillianwallah!
'Tis a name so sad and strange,
Like a breeze through midnight harpstrings

129
Ringing many a mournful change;
But the wildness and the sorrow
Have a meaning of their own -
Oh, whereof no glad to-morrow
Can relieve the dismal tone!
'Tis a village dark and low,
By the bloody Jhelum river
Bridged by the foreboding foe;
And across the wintry water
He is ready to retreat,
When the carnage and the slaughter
Shall have paid for his defeat.
'Tis a wild and dreary plain,
Strewn with plots of thickest jungle,
Matted with the gory stain.
There the murder-mouthed artillery,
In the deadly ambuscade,
Wrought the thunder of its treachery
On the skeleton brigade.
When the night set in with rain,
Came the savage plundering devils
To their work among the slain;
And the wounded and the dying
In cold blood did share the doom
Of their comrades round them lying,
Stiff in the dead skyless gloom.
Thou wilt be a doleful chord,

130
And a mystic note of mourning
That will need no chiming word;
And that heart will leap with anguish
Who may understand thee best;
But the hopes of all will languish
Till thy memory is at rest.
74 Fortescue, Op Cit, 457.
75 The total is based on Lieut F.G Cardew's figures (Page-
234) Also see Gough and Innes, Op Cit, 224
to 234. The details of unit and arm casualties are based on
Gough and Innes. Also Fortescue, Op Cit,
457 & 458.
76 Based on Goughs and Innes and Fortescue’s
acounts.Gough and Innes-Op Cit-Pages 223 to 224- and
Fortescue-Op Cit-Pages-451 to 461.
77 Based on various books i.e those of Grand Slam 1965 on
Lieutenant Colonel Mukhtar Ahmad Gillani (Retired),
"Pakistan Bharat Jang 1965", (Harley Street ,Rawalpindi,July
1998,10. General Harbaksh Singh, "War Despatches",
(Lancer , Delhi, 1992) .Candeth "The Western Front", ( Allied
Publishers, Bombay, 1984).
78 Page-137-Thorburn-Op Cit.

131
79 Page-23-District Gazetteer of Gujrat-Government Printing
Office-Lahore-1921.
80 Pages-27,28 & 151-The Land of Five Rivers- David
Ross-Lahore 1882.

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