1. M113 FAMILY OF VEHICLE HISTORY
• The A2 version was designed to maintain pace with the M60 tank
– be a common vehicle chassis for many functions
– provide basic tracked mobility/transportation
• The A3 incorporates improvements in mobility, survivability,
reliability, and capability to fight w/ Bradley/Abrams team
– be a common vehicle chassis for many functions
– provide basic tracked mobility/transportation
• A3 modifications began in 1986
– Many changes since then
– Many configurations out in the field
• M113s provide mortars, medical evacuation, command and
control (2), cargo, target designation, training, smoke (2),
and infantry transportation.
THE M113 IS THE MOTHER OF ALL LEGACY SYSTEMS.
(It deserves the mother of all recapitalization programs.)

2. THINGS AN A3 HAS THAT AN A2 DOESN’T
• 63 more horsepower, new engine, and 3X the acceleration
• Passive night vision (AN/VVS-2) and water ration heater
• New (supportable) auxiliary power unit, personnel heater,
and variable speed fan drive
• Upgraded final drives
• New transmission (eliminates pivot steer, transfer gear
case, and old transmission)
• Spall liners and external fuel cells
• Armor mounting provisions and simplified driver controls
• More than 150 reliability improvements
• Upgraded electrical system and two additional batteries
• Better cold start in winter, and better cooling in summer
The hull doesn’t rust or wear out. The vehicle is
as modern as the material inside.

3. FLEET STATUS
• The M113 Family of Vehicle Overhaul/Conversion Program
was cancelled in the FY03 PBS:
– WTCV,A (Carrier Mods) funding diverted to T-150 track production
– HASC language required a report on Army plans to maintain the 16,000
vehicle fleet through the year 2029
– Failing that, HASC diverts all funding to upgrades, and identifies the
Containment Corp as the recipients
• FY04 POM build assumes M113 upgrade cancelled.
• Army plans for continued use of the vehicle through 2029.
• No overhaul or ‘recapitalization’ program (current or planned) for
the fleet (except the addition of T-150 track).
• Army Combat Vehicle Evaluation (CVE) teams inspecting the fleet
have identified thousands of vehicles that require overhaul (non-
deployable) … A3 and A2, in every component, including CAC.

4. READINESS IMPACTS
• Status of the M113 Fleet of Vehicles after FY02:
– Counter-attack & Containment force not fully modernized
– Only 6200 of 16,061 (38.6%) upgraded & able to keep up with
Bradley/M1 - despite clear “Lesson Learned” ( Desert Storm)
– Readiness rates already below 90% (deployability threshhold)
– Thousands inspected and require overhaul
• Logistics complicated by:
– Mixed fleets (A2 & A3, plus various configurations of each)
– Lack of an overhaul program since FY94
– Parts that rarely break … will. NMCM/S will go up fast.
– There is no vendor for A2 transmissions, pivot steers, heaters,
auxiliary power units, fan housings, transfer gear cases, etc.
• Training impacts because:
– Driver controls completely different
– Capability differences will have to be considered in OP plans

5. ARMY RATIONALE
• “Leadership will take appropriate risks …”
– M113s will not meet 90%readiness required to deploy.
– If deployed, A2s (& some A3s) will hamper operations.
– More than 75%of the M113 fleet uses the active infra-red
system for night vision (endangering the crew).
– Commanders/staffs ride in M577s…even in BFVS units.
• “The M113 is a threat to the IAV …”
– It is fully deployable on the C-130 ... with full loads,
armor, crew, and 7000 additional pounds of cargo.
– It meets every IAV requirement.
• “Industrial base/economic production issues are
not decision variables …”

6. THE INDUSTRIAL BASE ARGUMENT
• The upgrade to A3 is accomplished in a sole-source Partnership
with Anniston Army Depot.
– 41% savings to the “all Depot” estimate
– Perfect record for deliveries of over 2100 vehicles
– ISO quality/best commercial practices
– Model of acquisition reform and materiel management
• With the M113 program “kill”, the Partnership goes away. So does
OEM engineering for the Army’s largest tracked fleet (by 2X).
• Intuitively, work must re-start… and it will cost much more.
• Partnership conversions are more cost effective than overhauls.
– No reliance on Government furnished material
– Capability added, not just maintenance labor hours
– Many A2 parts becoming unsupportable
• The loss of parts vendors w/o some sort of program will be a
stampede, led by the transmission manufacturer.
NOTHING ON THE HORIZON WILL REPLACE THE M113

7. THE ECONOMIC PRODUCTION
ARGUMENT
• THE PARTNERSHIP IS PERFECTLY SIZED FOR 1.5
VEHICLE PER DAY PRODUCTION (SINGLE SHIFT)
– CAPABLE OF PRODUCING 4/DAY WITHIN 6 MONTHS
– ARMY PROCUREMENTS ARE 1.0/DAY
– COST IS XX% HIGHER THAN IT NEEDS TO BE
• ARMY AWARDED 6 CONSECUTIVE ANNUAL
PROCUREMENTS FOR 10,000 VEHICLE REQUIREMENT
– 15% SAVINGS MINIMUM AVAILABLE WITH MULTI-YEAR
– MORE IF ARMY EMPLOYS ‘LONG SUPPLY’ VEHICLES
• VEHICLES PERFECTLY SUITED FOR ADAPTATION TO
EVOLVING HOMELAND DEFENSE REQUIREMENTS
– UNLIMITED FLEXIBILITY - ALREADY WIDESPREAD
– LOW COST - OWNED BY ARNG

8. BOTTOM LINE(S)
• Risk the Army accepts in M113 cancellation are
not fully understood … even by the Army
– Three former VCSA report the M113 status was never
presented to them
• System is not categorized as a ‘major’ system
• No effective proponent in a system build on proponency
– “Current” data on M113 is dated 1984
– PM shop assigned to office w/28 other support systems
• Impact reports of M113 cancellation smothered
by “transformation” (and IAV)
• Eliminating ‘economic production’ & ‘industrial
base’ as decision variables is highly suspect
• Dropping readiness as a decision variable is
negligent.