The Brandt Doctrine of the Two States in Germany and the Erfurt Meeting March 19, 1970

The Brandt Doctrine of The Two States in
Germany
and
The Erfurt Meeting
March 19, 1970
_____________________________________
A Case Study in The Failure of West German Federal Chancellor Willy Brandt’s
Ostpolitik
________________________________________
A Report By Michael E. Dobe
Prepared For The History Research Seminar, St. Anselm College
Submitted April 25, 1987

From Adenauer to Brandt:
The Significance of Brandt’s Election as Federal Chancellor
On October 21, 1969, the West German Lower House of parliament elected the first Social
Democratic Federal Chancellor in Post-WWII German history. Coming to this post with extensive
experience in German foreign policy, and especially in the realm of German relations with the East, Willy
Brandt was perhaps the most ideally suited West German politician- -indeed, it could be asserted, the best
equipped Western politician- -to embark upon a new Ostpolitik. Having served as Mayor of Berlin during
the 1961 Berlin Crisis, and then as Vice Chancellor and Foreign Minister under a coalition between German
Socialists and Christian Democrats (referred to as the Grand Coalition), Brandt had first hand experience of
the difficulties, even intractabilities, of Western relations with nations of the Soviet Bloc. It is because of
this that Brandt should himself have realized the futility of any attempt to further détente between East and
West Germany, and it is despite this that Brandt's new Ostpolitik failed to effect significant changes in East-
West German relations during the year 1970.
That Brandt could become Chancellor with the backing of a coalition consisting of Christian
Democrats and Free Democrats, that constituted a parliamentary plurality of only three votes, hardly
signified an overwhelming popular mandate for change in Bonn's Ostpolitik. But during the first year of
the Brandt government, the Western and Eastern worlds looked on as efforts were made to further West
German détente with Poland, the Soviet Union and East Germany (officially called the German Democratic
Republic, GDR). So significant was Brandt’s Eastern initiative that Time magazine chose Brandt as "Man
of the Year" in January 1971. Time's editor, in citing reasons for Brandt’s selection, hailed Brandt as the
first West German politician to fully accept the consequences of World War Two.1
Brandt was certainly the first West German politician to recognize the permanence of territorial
alterations, which had resulted from the devastation of WWII. He also went far rhetorically toward
abandoning the traditional West German hope of destroying, or even minimally democratizing, the
Communist governments that had been erected in Eastern Europe by the Soviet Union after WWII. Brandt
viewed such irrevocable results of WWII as the wages of Hitlerite Germany's sins, and he was therefore

compelled by the very force of his own logic to abandon such prognostications of the inevitable roll back of
Communism in the East as had been proffered by previous West German governments. Thus Brandt was
viewed by many in the West as a realist. It is the goal of this paper to demonstrate that, contrary to this
perception, Brandt was actually quite naïve.
Putting a thaw on the Cold War posed significant difficulties for both East and West, especially if
that thaw was to come in East-West German relations. In pursuing "little steps" toward a "regulated
juxtaposition" with East Germany, Brandt's Ostpolitik involved not only the interests of the two Germanies,
but also the interests of the two power blocks to which they belonged.2
Historically, the most difficult
aspect of post-WWII Ostpolitik had been West German relations with East Germany. It is upon this
particular aspect of Brandt's Eastern initiative during the year 1970, a year which was to be highly overrated
as "The German Year," that this report will focus.
Brandt inherited, as West German Federal Chancellor, a rough schema for his Ostpolitik. It was
upon the policies of Adenauer, Erhardt and Keisinger which Brandt built. Since Brandt shared with these
three the ultimate goal of the reunification and the preservation of the German nation, it was asserted after
Chancellor Brandt's election that his Ostpolitik was more a change in style than in substance.3
This would
prove to be a correct assessment. Post-World War Two West German Ostpolitik began with the policy of
the reconstituted West German government's first Federal Chancellor, Konrad Adenauer, a pragmatic but
conservative Christian Democratic politician. With regard to the East German question, Chancellor
Adenauer adhered to roughly the same ideological stance as U. S. Secretary of State John Foster Dulles, a
fellow anti-Communist fighter.4
As will be shown, Brandt’s Ostpolitik was certainly no radical departure
from that of Chancellor Adenauer.
With the goal of "liberating the Soviet zone" and asserting Western ideas of democracy in Eastern
Germany, Adenauer's policy toward the other Germany was strict non-recognition of its socialist régime,
which the West generally asserted was "neither German, nor democratic, nor a republic." Further,
Adenauer held that only the West German government could speak for the German people on the
international scene.5
To enforce this policy, Adenauer threatened to sever relations with any nation which
recognized the legitimacy of the East German government. This sanction was embodied in the Hallstein

Doctrine, a West German policy directive issued in 1955, which would ire East German politicians for
many years. Walter Ulbricht, the chief party man of the ruling East German Socialist Unity Party at the
time of Brandt’s election as Federal Chancellor, was perhaps chief among those ired.
Although one notes that at the time of Brandt’s election as West German Federal Chancellor, the
policy of Chancellor Adenauer had already undergone minor revisions by Chancellors Erhardt and
Kiessinger, it must be remembered that these were Christian Democratic politicians. Brandt was the
representative of a party coalition with a more liberal angle on foreign policy. Chancellor Adenauer and
his Christian Democratic successors all insisted upon strict non-recognition of the East German régime and
linked any talk of all-European security measures to progress toward German national reunification. For
several years as West German Foreign Minister, Brandt had sought to create a legal fiction by arguing from
the position that there were two states in Germany, but only one German nation. This was essence of "The
Brandt Doctrine of the Two States in Germany." This doctrine, along with the fact that Brandt had
consistently supported an all-European security conference without preconditions, certainly worried the
Christian Democratic opposition.6
Even though it has been argued quite successfully that Brandt's policy was the natural outgrowth of
Adenauer's, given the post-WWII reality of two firmly entrenched power blocs, Brandt struck some in the
West as willing to grant unilateral concessions at the expense of NATO and the West.7
This was to be the
case, as it will be shown. The West German opposition parties, as well as many in the NATO countries
and in the United States, feared Brandt would sell West Germany down the river in its negotiations with the
East, especially with East Germany. To an extent, they were correct in this assessment.
As did many of the more conservative Republicans in the USA, the Christian Social Union's party
chief, Franz Joseph Strauß, argued during the 1969 federal elections that Brandt's Ostpolitik would lead to a
betrayal of the NATO alliance.8
The leaders of the two superpowers were, on the other hand, more
optimistic over the prospects for Brandt's new Ostpolitik. Publicly, at least, President Nixon expressed
support for the new Brandt government and its Ostpolitik.9
Also, the Soviet régime, as well as the those of
East Germany and all of the other Warsaw Pact nations, hoped it would now face a less intransigent
negotiating partner.

It is a commonplace to state that the Soviet Union had always asserted great influence upon the
political moves made by the East German government, but at this point Moscow and Washington were in
the process of warming up to each other. Sino-American Talks were to resume in January of 1970, and
this, in combination with the Ussuri Border War of 1969 (between the USSR and China), convinced the
Soviets that détente with West Germany would be an excellent means of securing its western flank.10*
In
1969-70, it is highly probable that the impetus for negotiations between the two Germanies came from the
Soviets, not simply from Brandt's coalition government.11
This must not be taken to mean that the Soviets
hoped for German reunification, for this was (and continues to be) decidedly not in their best interests.
Besides the fact that Moscow regards Eastern Germany as a military outpost and a trading partner which it
can not afford to lose, a resurgent German nation- -whether anti- or pro-Communist- -would threaten the
Soviet Union on its western flank, as does China on its eastern flank.
To assert that the Soviet Union moved East Germany toward negotiations with West Germany
during the late 1960s, or at least gave the go ahead for negotiations, is not to say that the USSR exerted
complete and total control over East Germany's policy towards the West. Ulbricht proved to be a much
more obstinate negotiating partner in his dealings with the West German government than one would
believe the Soviets would have liked. There is even evidence that the Warsaw Pact nations pressured
Ulbricht to open up negotiations with the West Germans against his better judgement.12
As it held dearly to
the rhetoric of the early Cold War period of the 1940s, 50s and 60s, during "The German Year" East
Germany showed itself to be the most obstinate of the Communist states in its dealings with the détente-
minded West.
Facing off against Brandt, Ulbricht proved himself capable of driving a very hard bargain. In an
article entitled "Twenty fruitful years of building socialism," which appeared in the October 1969 issue of
World Marxist Review, Ulbricht showed himself to be one who clung to the hard line Cold War Communist
stance. Ulbricht, as had the pre-détente Soviet propagandists, vehemently and repeatedly leveled the
accusation that the West German government was one of the chief Capitalist-Imperialist offenders. To
Ulbricht, West Germany was still dominated by revanchist Christian Democrats in collusion with monopoly
capital, and thus it had not yet expunged the stain of Hitler-fascism.13

It is significant that this came at a time when Soviet rhetoric toward West Germany was becoming
somewhat less harsh. In this same article, he stated that, in pursuing a policy toward the West, "the task is
to compel the West German Federal Republic to accept coexistence with the socialist German state and to
expose Bonn’s revenge-seeking dogmas."14
Translated into Western parlance, this meant that Ulbricht
would insist upon West German recognition of the existing post-WWII inter-State boundaries, and that he
would also insist upon West German recognition of the East German government under international law.
This latter demand was to prove to be an insurmountable barrier to Brandt’s inter-German initiative for
1970. Because of obvious constraints placed upon him by the domestic opposition and even more obvious
international constraints placed upon him by NATO and the USA, Chancellor Brandt simply could not meet
this demand and thus proved to be a far more conservative politician than one might have expected.
During the parliamentary elections of 1969, and the subsequent elections for the Federal
Chancellorship, the East German press sounded the warning against the threat of increasing ultraright West
German Nationalist Party strength. With regard to the prospects of a new coalition exhibiting a less hostile
attitude toward East Germany, Neues Deutschland (the unofficial press organ of the East German
government) was skeptical, and with good reason. Writing in Isvestia in May of 1969, Günter Kartzer of
Neues Deutschland called the West German Socialist Party a Trojan horse. 15
The Cold War was still alive
in 1969, and especially so in the two Germanies. As if to accentuate this fact, at an East Berlin press
conference on September 17, 1969, a representative of the East German government made the ludicrous
claim that the East Germans had uncovered a planned coup to install Strauß, the ultraconservative Bavarian
politician, as a dictator in West Germany.16
Mutual trust was lacking between the two German states in
1969, and there was to be no decrease in this mutual suspicion by the end of 1970, despite the Eastern
initiative of Brandt.
Fearing a resurgence of ultranationalist German sentiment, or at least claiming to fear this "rising
tide of neo-Nazism," the Soviet Press largely ignored the increasingly favorable prospects of the West
German Socialists early in 1969. Not until the possibility of a German Socialist victory in Western
Germany became rather clear immediately before the federal elections did Pravda and Isvestia choose to
expound upon their views of what was soon to be a nascent coalition government. Once this eventuality

was recognized by Pravda and Isvestia, there emerged a rift in the way these two Soviet news organs
portrayed the West German Socialists in particular. Pravda (the official press organ of the Communist
Party of the Soviet Union) largely took the stance that this new government, as a socialist government
would be progressive and would, therefore, pose new opportunities for a rapprochement between the
Warsaw Pact nations and West Germany. Isvestia (the official press organ of the Soviet government) took
the opposing and rather realistic view that Brandt’s new Ostpolitik would only bring more of the same,
essentially the Christian Democrats’policy by new less openly aggressive means.17
Undoubtedly, that there
was a split within the Soviet news media shows the existence of a split between the hard liners in Moscow
and the advocates of détente, but it also demonstrates that East Berlin was being allowed a modicum of
leeway by Moscow to remain as intransigent, or as détente- oriented, as it wished.
Roots of The Brandt Doctrine:
Foreign Minister Brandt’s Contradictory Views on Ostpolitik
In considering the preparations for history’s first meeting of the heads of state of the two German
governments, it is perhaps best to examine Brandt's position on Ostpolitik during his stint as West German
Foreign Minister under the Grand Coalition. In his pronouncements on Ostpolitik while holding this post,
Brandt articulated his views quite clearly. Typical of the multitude of interviews, which Brandt granted
during his years as West German, Foreign Minister is an interview that he granted to François Schlosser of
Réalités magazine in February of 1968. In this interview Brandt characterized a thaw in West German
relations with the East, and specifically with East Germany, as the most significant world event of the
contemporary era.18
There is no reason to doubt the sincerity of this statement, but Brandt failed to
recognize the internal contradictions within his own formula for Ostpolitik.
Expressing his strong support for the NATO alliance, during this interview Brandt asserted that in
Ostpolitik "the difficulty is to strike a balance between the need for security and the wish to encourage the
thaw in relations between East and West."19
Further, to dispel the fears of all those who thought him soft on

defense, Brandt succinctly summed up the realities of the position of divided Germany at the heart of the
Cold War:
The demarcation line between East and West passes through German territory; two alliances are
drawn up along it face to face with their troops and materiel. As long as this situation lasts, and as
long as no new system of European security is worked out, we believe that the presence of
American troops on German soil is necessary.20
It was in this spirit that Brandt, as West German Foreign Minister, continuously defended the need to link
West German security to the NATO alliance and, more significantly, defended the importance of a
substantial United States military commitment in Western Germany. With respect to West Germany’s need
to remain beneath the protective umbrella of NATO, Brandt was no radical leftist. In this respect, he was
hardly even a liberal. In defining four areas of détente policy, Brandt placed West Germany's position with
respect to the West first and foremost. Of secondary importance were its relations with Moscow, as with
the Eastern nations and East Germany.21
This ordering of priorities is completely in line with the consistent
post-WWII West German foreign policy position of Chancellors Adenauer, Erhardt and Keisinger.
A more complete enunciation of Foreign Minister Brandt's views on Ostpolitik with respect to East
Germany can be found in an article that he wrote for Foreign Affairs, and which appeared in the April 1969
issue. He again declared his government's support for the NATO alliance and the American military
commitment in West Germany. Foreign Minister Brandt argued that German national reunification was no
longer the primary foreign policy consideration for Bonn, but that progress in that direction would certainly
bear upon détente between the East and West. Thus for Brandt, preconditions for an all-European security
conference did exist. In this article, Brandt declared the West German government's willingness, in the
interest of détente policy, to recognize East Germany as a state (but not a sovereign nation under
international law), recognize the Oder-Neisse line as the border between East Germany and Poland,
renounce all ambitions to obtain nuclear weapons, acknowledge the independence of West Berlin, and enter
into mutual renunciation of force agreements with all of the East Bloc nations.22
In the future, Federal
Chancellor Brandt's dealings with East Germany were to be guided by these same ideas, which became the
Ostpolitik formula of his coalition government in 1970.

Much like Chancellor Adenauer, Foreign Minister Brandt asserted in Foreign Affairs that the
subject of relations between East and West Germany "does not involve foreign policy in the exact sense of
the word, for neither part of Germany is a foreign country to the other."23
Brandt went on to explain his
"Doctrine of the Two States in Germany." He argued that there continued to be a bond of kinship between
Germans in the East and in the West, which was the product of a long cultural heritage, a common history, a
shared language and a general sense that Germans "belong together." This bond, which seems for Brandt
to have assumed an almost mystical quality, prevents there from being two separate German nations.
Brandt would grant, however, that as an irrevocable result of WWII there existed two states in Germany.
Brandt argued that the Grand Coalition had "made it clear that international legal recognition of that part of
Germany, in which one-quarter of the German nation lives, is impossible precisely because of this special
relationship," and that West Germany’s governing coalition refused "to take the path of least resistance by
granting to the East German régime a democratic legitimacy which it does not have."24
This, again, is a very
conservative position in the broad spectrum of German politics.
The Grand Coalition's policy sounded much like straight Christian Democratic policy of the last 20
some odd years. But a minor difference in tone must be noted in that Brandt, in his Foreign Affairs article,
blames East Germany for its own isolation. Brandt saw the East German government as clinging to an
"outdated Cold War rhetoric." In Brandt's own words, "it is not we who are isolating East Germany, but
East Germany which is isolating itself."25
Because Brandt was able to create a legal fiction of two states
existing upon the soil of one nation, he skirted the issue of reunification, which had not yielded any real
progress for inter-German relations up to that point, and provided a pretext for détente between the two
German states. This certainly stuck the Christian Democrats and their Bavarian sister party, the Christian
Social Union, as a dangerous policy. As the meetings at Erfurt and Kassel were to reveal, Brandt's was
also an unworkable doctrine. Brandt was to show himself to be far less of a pragmatist, at least during the
year 1970, than he claimed himself to be. However, by going half way toward a more liberal foreign policy
that inevitably extended de jure recognition to the East German régime, Brandt allowed himself to fall
victim to a unified East German assault.

The fullest enunciation of the Brandt’s thought on Ostpolitik during the period of 1969-70 can be
found in his own two autobiographical works, A Peace Policy For Europe (published in 1969) and his later
work People and Politics: The Years 1960-1975 (published in 1978). In the former, Brandt enlarged upon
the February 1969 Foreign Affairs article. A Peace Policy For Europe is a call for a cold and dispassionate
analysis of the existing tensions in Europe. It contained some suggestions for reducing these tensions.
These suggestions include recommendations to work toward mutual renunciation of force agreements and
an all-European security conference. Written while he was still German Foreign Minister, this book reads
as if it were written by someone aspiring to the Federal Chancellorship. Rather idealistically, Foreign
Minister Brandt asserts that "in Europe we are no longer in a Cold War that might turn into a hot one at any
moment."26
Reading his narrative, one is almost convinced that Brandt believed that the Cold War was truly
dead in the late 1960s. That is until one reads that he though himself compelled to "reject a German policy
that would weaken the cohesion of the NATO Treaty Organization or reduce the decisive participation of
the United States in safeguarding the freedom of Europe." 27
Freedom from what, one might ask? Were the
Cold War dead, there would have been no need for the NATO alliance. Minimally, if the Cold War were
then dying, there would have been a decreasing need for the NATO alliance. Foreign Minister Brandt
would not grant that either of these two logical outcomes was the case. As Foreign Mister, he was caught
in a contradiction, as it will be shown he was to be time and again in his negotiations at Erfurt, and then at
Kassel, as Federal Chancellor. Nevertheless, Foreign Minister Brandt gave a parting shot at East Germany’s
"particularly rigid leadership" and implored them to leave behind the Cold War which he, perhaps even
unbeknownst to himself, could not leave behind,.
Written years after his stint as the Federal Republic’s foreign minister and election as Federal
Chancellor, People and Politics: The Years 1960-1975 contained the same basic contradiction. No longer
Federal Chancellor, but retaining his post as Chairman of the West German Socialist Party, Brandt found
himself admitting in this latter work that he had already realized upon becoming Federal Chancellor that
East Germany’s "progress toward full international recognition could not, in any case, be delayed
indefinitely" and even arguing further that it had by that time become his "patriotic duty" to recognize this

fact.28
Thus Brandt became West German Federal Chancellor with what he thought to be a fully developed
formula for détente between West and East Germany. What he did not recognize fully were the
contradictions inherent in his own agenda for Ostpolitik, particularly toward the other Germany.
Anticipation of the First Meeting Between Heads of State of the Two German Governments
On October 28, 1969, only a week after his election as Federal Chancellor, Brandt made the first
statement on his new government's policies. In this initial policy statement, although he claimed that his
government was to be a "government of domestic reforms," he concerned himself almost entirely with
Ostpolitik to the virtual neglect of West German domestic politics.29
One is inclined to believe that his
heavy emphasis upon foreign policy issues was a bid to keep his coalition, and thereby his narrow
parliamentary majority, intact. The domestic opposition was all too eager to pick up on this.
In this speech, Brandt
stressed the importance of self-determination for all Germans as well as his
unwillingness to compromise upon the preservation of the German nation, as he stated again that
recognition of the East German régime under international law was "out of the question." In terms of
concrete proposals, he offered talks to the USSR and to East Germany on mutual renunciation of force
treaties.30
The worst fears of the opposition seemed to be coming true as he moved to extend de facto
recognition to the East German government by referring, as West Germany's Federal Chancellor, to the
existence of two states in Germany.31
Although Isvestia adopted a wait and see attitude toward this initial policy statement, twelve days
after this speech was delivered, Neues Deutschland praised the Brandt government for distinguishing itself
from the Kiessinger government in recognizing the post-World War Two realities by stating that there were
two states in Germany.32
But Neues Deutschland then posed an ominous question to the Brandt government
(italics added):
Why does the new Brandt government lack the courage to recognize the whole truth?
Why does the Brandt/Scheel government categorically refuse, like all of its predecessors, to
recognize the German Democratic Republic according to the principles of international law ?33

Two days after this editorial appeared, the East German parliament agreed to move toward normalization of
relations with the West German government upon the basis of international law, and empowered Willi
Stoph, Chairman of the East German Ministerial Council, with the authority to approach the West German
government with a draft treaty proposal. In an exchange of correspondence between Federal Chancellor
Brandt and Chairman Stoph, it was agreed upon that they should meet to discuss normalization of
relations.34
What was not clearly agreed upon by the two governments was that this should be in accordance
with the principles of international law, even though this was clearly enunciated in the draft treaty proposal
from Stoph to Brandt delivered to Bonn on December 18, 1969. The following is the text of that draft
treaty proposal (italics added):35
Draft of a "Treaty on the Establishment of Relations between the German Democratic
Republic and the Federal Republic of Germany on the Basis of Equality" dated December 17,
1969.
Article 1
The parties concluding the Treaty agree on the establishment of normal relations, on
terms of equality and free from any discrimination, between the German Democratic Republic and
the Federal Republic of Germany on the basis of the universally recognized principles and norms
of international law. In particular, their interrelationship is based on the principles of sovereign
equality, territorial integrity and the inviolability of the national frontiers, non-interference in
internal affairs, and mutual advantage.
Article 2
The parties concluding the Treaty mutually recognize their present territorial standing
within the existing frontiers and the inviolability of these. They recognize the frontiers in Europe
that have come into being as a result of the Second World War, in particular the frontier between
the German Democratic Republic and the Federal Republic of Germany and the frontier along the
Oder and Neisse between the German Democratic Republic and the People’s Republic of Poland.
Article 3

The parties concluding the Treaty undertake in their mutual relations to renounce the
threat and the use of force and between themselves to settle all points of controversy through
peaceful channels and by peaceful means.
Both parties undertake to abstain from all measures conflicting with the stipulations in
Article 1 and from discriminating against the other party, to rescind laws and other normative acts
conflicting with this Treaty without delay and to arrange for the revision of corresponding judicial
rulings. In the future they will also refrain from any discrimination against the other party.
Article 4
The German Democratic Republic and the Federal Republic of Germany renounce the
acquisition of nuclear weapons or the disposal of these in any form. They undertake to advocate
that negotiations on disarmament be carried out. Neither chemical nor biological weapons must be
produced, stationed or stored on the soil of either of the German States.
Article 5
The German Democratic Republic and the Federal Republic of Germany establish
diplomatic relations with one another. They allow reciprocal representation by ambassadors in
the capitals Berlin and Bonn. The ambassadors enjoy all immunities and privileges in conformity
with the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations of April 18, 1961.
Article 6
The relations concerning partial spheres of activity will be contractually agreed upon
separately.
Article 7
The German Democratic Republic and the Federal Republic of Germany undertake to
respect the status of West Berlin as an independent political entity and to adjust their relations with
West Berlin as an independent political entity and to adjust their relations with West Berlin in the
light of this status.
Article 8
In line with the principles of the universality of the United Nations Organization, the
German Democratic Republic and the Federal Republic of Germany apply without delay for their
admission to the United Nations Organization as fully-qualified members. They will publicly
recommend that other States support the admission of both German States to the United Nations
Organization.
Article 9
The Treaty will be concluded for a period of ten years. It is subject to ratification and enters
into force one month after the exchange of documents of ratification.
In accordance with Article 102 of the Charter of the United Nations, this Treaty will be
handed over to the Secretariat of the United Nations Organization for registration.
For the German Democratic Republic

For the Federal Republic of Germany
Articles 1 and 5 of this draft treaty proposal were particularly problematical, as has already been
noted. But it should also be pointed out that in this draft treaty proposal, in addition to the insistence upon
recognition of the government of East Germany under international law, there is no mention made of any
attempt to improve the living conditions of people located in the Western sector of Berlin in terms of
freedom of movement outside the city, access from West Berlin to East or West Germany, nor of the
reuniting of families separated by the Berlin Wall. It was to be expected that the draft proposal would not
mention the free self-determination for all Germans or the unity of the German nation, but in its insistence
upon recognition of the East German government according to the principles of international law, so argued
Brandt in his People and Politics, the draft proposal was totally unacceptable. Brandt also argues that
Ulbricht, the power behind the throne in East Germany, knew this.36
The Warsaw Pact, however, was not now supporting Ulbricht in this stance and it was not until a
communiqué issued by the member nations in December 1970 called for recognition of the East German
government under international law that Ulbricht finally won his fellow East Bloc nations over to his
intransigent position.37
By that time, negotiations between the two Germanies were to have stalled. At this
point, even the Soviet line toward Bonn's "militarism" had softened, since Brandt had signed the Nuclear
Non-proliferation Treaty in December 1969.38
Feeling himself isolated within the Communist Bloc, Ulbricht
had become even more intransigent in his dealings with the West.
The next major policy announcement of the Brandt government came on January 14, 1970, when
Chancellor Brandt reported to the upper house of the West German parliament on the state of the nation. In
this speech, Brandt concentrated once again almost exclusively upon Ostpolitik, to the virtual exclusion of
domestic issues. After having received the draft proposal from Stoph, Brandt sounded a much more sober
tone toward the East German régime. This policy statement was not greeted so warmly in the East. New
Times criticized the Brandt government for reasserting the linkage between European security talks and
progress on the inter-German question, a linkage which Brandt hadn't mentioned on October 28 of the
preceding year.39
Especially critical of Brandt's refusal to recognize the East German government in

international law, D. Melinkov of New Times remarked that "what chiefly strikes one about the speech is its
many contradictions. Every step in the direction of realism is accompanied by such reservations that its
value is in effect nullified."40
The speech actually contained little new material, for Brandt had asserted all
of the content of this speech at one time or another as West German Foreign Minister under the Grand
Coalition. What was new was his renewed emphasis upon non-negotiables in talks on normalization
between Bonn and East Berlin.
Chancellor Brandt said he agreed with Chairman Stoph that "there can be no intermingling no foul
compromise between our own system and what has become a set one on the other side."41
Urging the nation
to give up all illusions and face reality, Brandt stressed that the West German government was not
"wandering between two worlds." According to Brandt, neither the Paris Treaties, which established the
rights of the Four Powers over Germany and Berlin, nor the Atlantic Alliance were matters for discussion.42
Brandt also reaffirmed his government’s determination to follow through on West Germany’s traditional
commitment that "those parts of Germany which today live in freedom must be kept free."43
Brandt clarified
the points upon which his government was not willing to compromise (italics added):44
Firstly,
the right of self-determination;
Secondly,
the striving for national unity and freedom within the framework of a European peace arrangement;
Thirdly,
the ties with West Berlin without imparing the Four Powers’Responsibility for the whole of Berlin;
Fourthly,
the Federal Government respects and will continue to respect the rights and responsibilities of the
Four Powers as regards Germany as a whole and in Berlin. We have no thought of tampering nor of
letting any one tamper with these rights and responsibilities. These include the commitments both
for the Federal Government and for the Governments of the Three Powers. I have worked in Berlin
long enough to know that there are things for which our shoulders are too weak and regarding
which the Federal Republic has no interest in claiming unrestricted sovereignty for itself.
The last two non-negotiables should not have taken the Eastern world aback, for the East Germans
would certainly have affirmed that East German membership in the Warsaw Pact and adherence to the
Soviet-East German Treaty of Friendship and Alliance were not matters for discussion. Even now,

Chancellor Brandt was already striking a less conciliatory tone towards East Germany. To be sure, his
assertion that "the Federal Republic remains a Western state by its ties and conviction" seemed to
contradict, at least in the eyes of the Eastern world, his desire to seek a "European Peace Order."
Regardless, Brandt renewed his commitment to the "Doctrine of Two States in Germany" and also to a
constructive détente policy for Europe, stating that "there must, there can and finally there will be
negotiations between Bonn and East Berlin."45
Brandt also laid out in rough form his own "guiding
principles" for negotiations with East Germany, principles which were to reappear exactly in his speech at
Erfurt and then again in expanded form as the 20 points of Kassel. These principles were as follows:46
1. Both states have the obligation to preserve the German nation. They are not foreign countries for
one another.
2. Furthermore, the generally recognized principles of international law must apply, especially
exclusion of any discrimination, respect of the territorial integrity, obligation to settle all disputes
peacefully, and respect of each other’s borders.
3. This also includes the undertaking not to seek to change the social structure existing on the
territory of the other contracting party by force.
4. The two Governments and their plenipotentiaries should aim at neighborly co-operation,
especially in the technical field; understandings to facilitate such co-operation could become the
object of governmental arrangements.
5. The Four Powers’existing rights and responsibilities regarding Germany as a whole and of Berlin
shall be respected.
6. The Four Powers’ endeavors to bring about arrangements for an improvement of the situation in
and around Berlin shall be supported.
Although he failed to see the internal contradictions in his "Doctrine of the Two States in Germany,” Brandt
himself harbored no illusions that his attempts to negotiate with the East German government would be
easy. He foresaw them as fraught with extreme difficulties, and he realized that in any attempt to further
détente with East Germany, the West German government could not "exclude the possibility of failure,
although it certainly does not wish negotiations to fail."47
D. Melinkov of New Times argued that this "get tough speech" was the result of Brandt’s need to
appease the West German parliamentary opposition.48
There is certainly something to this assertion. Oskar

Fehrenbach in the Stuttgarter Zeitung commented on January 17, 1970, on the amazing consensus that was
reached after the State of the Nation Address. Despite the opposition of Strauß, a consensus was arrived at
between the coalition government and the Christian Democrats' parliamentary chairman. The opposition
pledged support for Brandt's efforts to open negotiations with the East German régime.49
Drawing a parallel
between what he saw as the realism of Chancellor Adenauer, given the situation in the 40s and 50s, and the
realism of Brandt in the late 60s and early 70s, Fehrenbach asserted:
At present it is the Brandt/Scheel administration and the SPD/FDP government that soberly
assesses the post-war situation and the Christian Democrats who seem unable to free themselves
from the anti-Communist illusion that something history long left behind can still be restored.50
It was with the begrudging consent of the opposition parliamentary bloc, however, that Chancellor Brandt
wrote Chairman Stoph on January 22, 1970 asking for a meeting to exchange declarations on the mutual
renunciation of force. Then on February 12, 1970, Stoph responded with an offer to meet in Eastern
Germany. After a series of telegraph exchanges, it was finally agreed upon by the two governments that
the heads of state of the two Germanies would meet for the first time in Erfurt, East Germany, on March 19,
1970. 51
One can be sure that Chancellor Brandt realized that the opposition at home and Ulbricht in the
East would both be watching very closely over these negotiations, ensuring that none too many concessions
were to be granted on either side. 52
The Historic Meeting at Erfurt
At 9:30 AM when Brandt stepped off the special train which had brought him to Erfurt, East
Germany, he was met by between 2,000 and 2,500 enthusiastic East German youths chanting "Willy, Willy,
Willy . . . Willy Brandt." Despite the attempts of the East German police to control them, these
demonstrators had turned out to show their support for the West German Federal Chancellor. In his People
and Politics, Brandt recalled that to get a glimpse of him "thousands of people risked life and limb bursting
through the flimsy barriers."53
Chancellor Brandt was, however, rushed quickly to the Erfurterhof where he

went immediately to his room. Hearing cries of "Willy Brandt to the Window" from outside, he appeared
in the open window. "Afraid of kindling hopes that could not be fulfilled," he "adopted a low key manner"
and signaled them to silence in the manner of a symphonic conductor motioning for a pianissimo .54
Various interpretations have been offered about the significance of this reception afforded
Chancellor Brandt at Erfurt. David Binder of the New York Times, a close associate of Brandt who
covered the Erfurt meeting for the paper, suggested that it was a spontaneous outpouring of support for the
socialist Brandt, who was for the demonstrators the foremost representative of the free part of Germany.
Binder also presents the hypothesis, quite popular in West Germany at the time, that the ultraconservative
members of the East German government might well have staged this demonstration to show how
dangerously attractive Brandt was to the impressionable youth of East Germany.55
Whether that was the
case or not, East German television excluded all coverage of the enthusiastic reception given Federal
Chancellor Brandt, choosing instead to show footage of another sparsely attended anti-Brandt counter-
demonstration which was rather obviously staged by the East German Government.56
In their statements at Erfurt, Brandt and Stoph merely expounded upon already-stated positions.
Brandt’s statement was a recapitulation of what he had already stated numerous times as West German
Foreign Minister under the Grand Coalition, and Stoph’s statement was merely an expansion upon his draft
treaty proposal of December 17, 1969 (see pp. 14-15 for text of Stoph’s draft treaty proposal). However
well known the contents of these statements were to the other party, the emphases placed by the two upon
various aspects of these agendas deserve further attention.
Being the host, Stoph spoke first. He began by stressing the joint responsibility of the two
German governments to insure that war never again originate from German soil and by rebuffing the West
Germans for their intransigence in the face of twenty years of repeated East German "peace proposals."57
But Stoph was predetermined by the oversight of the hard line East German leadership to destroy any
chance of constructive negotiations toward normalizing relations between the two states. With East German
Foreign Minister Otto Winzer in his delegation to serve as Ulbricht’s watchdog, he therefore insisted that
"this settlement can only consist of the establishment of relations under international law on the basis of full

equality."58
Throughout his speech, Stoph harped upon this perceived need for recognition of the East
German government by West Germany according to the principles of international law.
Engaging in further polemics, he could not resist the temptation to accuse the West German
government of hatching aggressive military plots against the "peace-loving East German socialist state."59
As Ulbricht had enunciated in numerous policy statements, Stoph held that the West Germans, in collusion
with the Western powers, were responsible for the divided state of Germany.60
Recalling the enormous
capital flight which occurred from East to West Germany in the late 1950s, Stoph called the erection of the
Berlin Wall a "humanitarian measure" which served to protect the livelihood of the citizens of East
Germany. Charging that the West Germans now owed the East Germans some 100,000 million marks
dating from this period, Stoph was obviously not attempting to make concessions upon which serious
negotiations could take place.61
Acknowledging that the Brandt government had made the claim that it no longer sought to
discriminate against the East German government, Stoph pointed to the continued use by the West German
government of the Hallstein Doctrine and the discriminatory principle of sole representation. Stoph accused
the Brandt government of duplicitous behavior.62
He argued that the West Germans continued to prevail
upon third nations, especially upon third world nations, not to recognize the East German régime. Further,
asserted Stoph, the West German government had blocked East German participation in such international
organizations as the United Nations, and its subsidiary the World Health Organization. 63
In concluding his
diatribe over West German discrimination against East Germany, Stoph stressed that the recognition of the
East German government under international law would be a precondition for any mutual renunciation of
force agreement. It is interesting to note that he referred to this demand more that twenty times in the
course of his speech. He also emphasized that the draft treaty proposal contained in his December 17, 1969
letter remained the basis for East Germany's negotiating position (see pp. 14-15 for the text of this draft
treaty proposal).64
Opening his response to Stoph, Brandt addressed what he perceived as the reality of the continued
existence of the German nation. Brandt expounded upon his "Doctrine of Two States in Germany" thus:

The strong bonds of mutually experienced history for which we are mutually responsible, bonds
that nobody can escape - bonds of family, of language, of culture, and of all those imponderables
that cause us to feel a sense of belonging together; these things are reality. A policy that would
seek to destroy or to ignore this foundation in a national existence would, I am convinced, be
doomed to failure.65
Stating that there exist between the Germans "relations of a special nature, of a kind that do not exist
between the residents of other states, even when friendly to each other or allied," Brandt essentially stated
again that recognition of East Germany under international law, a precondition for negotiations upon which
the East Germans continuously insisted, would be out of the question. 66
This, for Brandt, was the reality of
the post-WWII situation.
Examining the contents of Brandt’s reply, one gets the impression that these two heads of state, as
well as the governments which they represented, were not even functioning in the same world- -indeed, that
each had its own conception of "reality." Brandt disavowed the accusation that his government still
adhered to the sole representation theory, or that his government harbored aggressive designs against the
"peaceful East German socialist state." But he also thought it necessary to reassert his government’s
commitment to the principle of self-determination for all Germans.67
It is rather obvious that this would be
perceived by the East German delegation as just another way of stating "the desire to assert a Western
tutelage over East Germany." Be that as it may, Brandt continued to speak of relieving human suffering,
improving business relations and increasing the exchange of high technology between East and West
Germany. He managed to point to concrete ways in which the two governments could work out a modus
vivendi by arriving at agreements to facilitate transportation between the two states on highways and
waterways, as well as the exchange of information through improved telecommunications networks. He
restated the six points, which he had included in his 1970 State of the Nation Address before the upper
house of West German parliament, on the basis of which the West German government would seek to move
toward normalizing relations between the two Germanies (see p. 18 for the relevant portion of Brandt’s
1970 State of the Nation Address before the upper house of West German parliament).68

Brandt was obviously concerned that his negotiations not jeopardize West Germany’s standing in
NATO, thus the last two provisions. Still, he reasserted his desire for West and East Germany to participate
in an all-European peace arrangement, without the precondition of the establishment of formal diplomatic
relations between the two.69
Brandt and Stoph disagreed here over one essential point, and it was over this
point that the negotiations would stall. Since his government thought that formal recognition by the West
German government of East Germany was the only way to insure West German compliance with the
stipulations of any agreement between the two governments, Stoph saw the recognition under international
law of East Germany by the West German government as a precondition to negotiations on all other matters
touching upon relations between the two states. Given the basic anti-Communist stance of the great
majority of West German citizens, not to mention the ardent anti-Communism to be found within the
government, one senses that this precondition was not insisted upon without good reason. Denying the very
feasibility of meeting this demand, Brandt argued that "the goal of this exchange of views should be to
determine whether we can begin negotiations at the end of which would be contractual regulations of the
relationship between the FRG and the GDR (italics added)."70
Brandt might well have seen the eventual recognition of the East German government by the West
Germans under international law as the outcome of a long series of negotiations, as he seems to state in his
memoirs, but Stoph clearly wished to see immediate and formal recognition extended. Because of domestic
constraints, Chancellor Brandt would have to proceed slowly and cautiously; because of Chairman Stoph’s
comrades’intransigence, a lack of speed on Brandt’s part would doom the negotiations to failure. Given the
very logic of the situation, no progress could be made on East-West German relations at Erfurt.
The only concrete outcome of the talks at Erfurt was an agreement to continue the talks in West
Germany at Kassel on May 21, 1970. Somewhat disheartened, Brandt summed up his impressions of the
Erfurt meeting while riding back to West Germany after the meeting had ended: "It had been a day of
overwhelming display of sympathy by East German citizens, a day of subdued hope, of satisfaction at a
venture and an initiative that could not have been left untried."72
Although the New York Times could
report that these talks seemed to open the path for a long series of high-level negotiations between the two
German States, these high-level talks were to end at Kassel on a very sour note.73

Cementing the Division Between East and West Germany
Amidst The Fallout Over Erfurt and Kassel
Looking back eight years later, Brandt said of the Erfurt meeting:
My primary concern was to weaken East Berlin’s unfavorable influence upon Moscow and
simultaneously demonstrate that there were important areas in which, pursuant to our policy, we
wanted to reach accommodation with individual members of the Warsaw Pact.74
Brandt himself obviously saw the meeting within a multinational context and it is therefore necessary that
one look upon the fallout over the Erfurt meeting, as well as over the Kassel meeting two months later, with
an eye toward West Germany’s position within the NATO alliance, and East Germany’s position within the
Warsaw Pact. This should be done in addition to viewing the domestic reaction to the Erfurt and Kassel
meetings in the two Germanies.
Many would allege, Brandt among them, that Moscow had to lean upon Ulbricht rather hard to get
him to agree to sending Stoph to negotiate with West Germany.75
However, Ulbricht clearly insisted that the
Erfurt meeting would be an attempt by East Germany to extract unilateral concessions from the West
German government.76
To strengthen his position in dealing with Moscow, all that Stoph was to seek for his
government was de facto recognition from West Germany. Sending Otto Winzer to look on, Ulbricht
insured that the East German delegation would remain intransigent, and this is essentially what happened at
the meeting at Erfurt.77
The West Germans, by simply meeting with the representatives of the East German
government, had to a large extent legitimized the repressive and undemocratic East Berlin régime. The
Christian Democratic parliamentary opposition was up in arms. By simply agreeing to the meeting
between heads of state of the two Germanies, Brandt had extended de facto recognition to the East German
régime. The position of the East German government on the international scene had been strengthened,
that of West Germany's government had been weakened. There had been no quid pro quo.

Moscow saw this clearly. One notes that Pravda and Isvestia both praised Chancellor Brandt for
his agreement to meet at Erfurt with Chairman Stoph, and both condemned the West German Christian
Democrats as revenge-seeking neo-Nazis.78
After the Erfurt meeting, the Soviet press continued to praise
the Brandt government as having a progressive international policy, while condemning its policies at home
as dominated by monopoly capital in league with reactionary Christian Democratic politicians.79
As if to save face with the West in the wake of Erfurt, Chancellor Brandt went to the USA to meet
President Nixon on April 10, 1970 and reaffirm his support for the NATO alliance before meeting with
Stoph again at Kassel on May 21, 1970.80
President Nixon expressed his full support of Brandt, but failed to
mention Brandt’s Eastern initiative. Despite the fact that in other policy statements President Nixon
continued to support Brandt’s Ostpolitik, other top foreign policy officials and experts in the USA began to
publicly question the efficacy of Brandt’s new Ostpolitik. Given the movement on the Moscow and
Warsaw talks, Henry Kissinger, then National Security Advisor to President Nixon, began to sense that
Brandt’s government was not walking closely enough with the NATO alliance. Dean Acheson, a former US
Secretary of State and noted foreign policy expert, argued that Brandt needed to be "reined in" to stop the
"mad rush to Moscow."81
Brandt’s refusal to open diplomatic relations on the ambassadorial level between
the two German governments at the Erfurt meeting, and later at Kassel, obviously afforded many in the
West little comfort.
At home in West Germany, the parliamentary debate following the Erfurt meeting was heated. Dr.
Rainer Barzel, one of Brandt’s chief opponents and chairman of the opposition parliamentary group,
expressed his support for a policy effort to begin talks at the highest levels with East Germany in the interest
of a more secure world peace, but stressed that "a policy of peace must have as its aim free movement of
ideas, information, opinions and persons."82
Dr. Barzel noted that these issues, polemical though they were,
were hardly discussed at Erfurt. He also reminded Chancellor Brandt directly, one thinks rather
unnecessarily, of "the dead of the wall of the barbed wire, the dead of Ulbricht."83
It is to be expected that
Dr. Barzel would criticize Chancellor Brandt for failing to stress the free self-determination of all Germans
as a necessary precondition for the normalization of relations between East and West Germany, but it is
significant that Dr. Barzel attacks the Brandt Doctrine, although not calling it by that name, as a groundless

legal fiction.84
This is an argument for which Chancellor Brandt, just as Foreign Minister Brandt, had no
credible retort. Indeed, one must agree with Dr. Barzel that, at Erfurt, "of counter-concessions, of European
beginnings, of protection for minorities, of open European borders and of free traffic in people, information
and opinion - of these things we see nothing."85
Dr. Barzel concludes his condemnation of the Erfurt
meeting by quoting from the U. S. Declaration of Independence. The opposition, says Dr. Barzel, interprets
"the applause at Erfurt this way: It was a call to the Chancellor of free Germany from those who themselves
want to be free."86
Chancellor Brandt was also vilified in the East German parliament by Chairman Stoph. Here
Brandt was attacked for being too conservative. Stoph related to his comrades that he had directly asked
Brandt whether he was not a wolf in sheep’s clothing:
Is something like the old course, we had to ask the Federal Republic’s Chancellor, the policy that
for two decades was pursued under concepts like ’liberating’ to be continued today under another
guise . . . I left no doubts that such constructions (such as special inter-German relations) could
only serve the purpose of championing in altered form, the old assertion of the right of sole
representation; and of continuing discrimination against the GDR.87
Thus the East Germans rejected the "Brandt Doctrine of Two States in Germany," just as did the West
German opposition parties, although for different reasons. Each had an insight into the faults of the Brandt
Doctrine, and a consideration of these objections certainly reveals much about the failure of Brandt’s
Ostpolitik at Erfurt.
At Kassel, so argued Chairman Stoph before the East German parliament, Chancellor Brandt
would have to go beyond words to actual deeds, to prove the absence of discrimination by West Germany
against East Germany.88
Between Erfurt and Kassel, the Brandt government managed to secure agreements
with the East German government over postal payments and telecommunications, measures to help rectify
the inter-German trade imbalance and revocation of a "safe-conduct" law which the East Germans had long
resented.89
The meeting at Kassel, however, proved to be even less productive than had Erfurt, despite this
modest progress.

At Kassel, Chairman Stoph was rude, moralizing and intransigent. After interrupting Chancellor
Brandt’s opening statement to denounce the West German government’s inability to prevent "neo-Nazi"
demonstrations against his delegation and death threats against his person, Stoph’s morning and afternoon
statements both proved to be exceedingly polemical.90
Brandt managed to remain almost stoic in the face of
Stoph's denunciations. In addition to his denunciations of the West German government, Stoph stuck to the
contents of his draft treaty proposal, as he had at Erfurt (see pp. 14-15 for the text of this draft treaty
proposal). Once again, this in and of itself obviated all possibility for constructive negotiation.
At the morning session in particular, Chancellor Brandt avoided polemics and attempted, futile
though the attempt, to move toward a constructive exchange of viewpoints between the representatives of
the two German governments. It was at the morning session that Brandt offered his 20 points for
negotiations on the normalization of relations between the two German states. The 20 points were
essentially an expansion upon, and further definition of, the six points he had offered for negotiation in his
1970 State of the Nation Address before the upper house of the West German parliament on January 14,
1970 (see p. 18 for these six proposals). The 20 points of Kassel were as follows:91
Principles and Elements of the Treaty for the Adjustment of Relations between the Federal
Republic of Germany and the German Democratic Republic on a Basis of Equality from the
Statement of Federal Chancellor at the Morning Session in Kassel on May 21, 1970.
1. In the interest of peace as well as the future and coexistence of the nation, the Federal Republic
of Germany and the German Democratic Republic, which in their Constitutions are oriented
towards the unity of the nation, agree upon a treaty which regularizes the relations between the two
States in Germany, reinforces the links between the population and the two States and helps to
remove existing handicaps.
2. The treaty is to be forwarded for assent to the legislative bodies of the two States in the proposed
forms conforming with the Constitution.
3. The two States shall proclaim their will to adjust their relations on the basis of human rights,
equality of status, peaceful coexistence and non-discrimination as universal rules of international
law.
4. Both sides abstain from any threat or use of force and undertake to deal with all problems
pending between them with peaceful means. This includes respect for territorial integrity and
frontiers.

5. Both States respect the independence and autonomy of each of the two States in affairs affecting
their internal sovereign authority.
6. Neither of the two states can act on behalf of, or represent, the other.
7. The parties concluding the treaty declare that never again must a war originate on German soil.
8. They undertake to abstain from all acts suited to disturb the peaceful coexistence of nations.
9. Both sides confirm their will to support all efforts directed toward disarmament and armaments
control which can help to enhance the security of Europe.
10. The starting-point of the treaty must be the consequences of the Second World War and the
extraordinary situation of Germany and the Germans, who live in two States and yet are members
of one nation.
11. The respective obligations towards the French Republic, the United Kingdom of Great Britain
and Northern Ireland, the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics,
which are based upon the special rights and agreement of these States over Berlin and Germany as
a whole, remain undisturbed.
12. The quadripartite agreements on Berlin and Germany are respected. The same holds true for
the ties which have developed between West Berlin and the Federal Republic of Germany. Both
sides undertake to support the efforts of the Four Powers to normalize the situation in and around
Berlin.
13. Both sides will examine in which spheres clashes exist between the legislation of the two
States: they will endeavour to remove clashes in order to avoid disadvantages to citizens of both
States. In this connection they will start from the principle that on each side the sovereign
authority if restricted to its national territory.
14. The treaty shall provide for measures which extend mutual tourist traffic, with great efforts
made to reach the goal of freedom of movement.
15. A solution shall be found to the problems resulting from family separation.
16. The districts and communities along the common border should be enabled to solve their local
problems in neighbourly fashion.
17. In the interest of mutual advantage, both sides should confirm their readiness to intensify and
extend cooperation in the spheres of, among other things, transportation and traffic, posts and
telecommunications, information exchange, science, education, culture, environmental problems
and sport and to initiate themselves discussions concerning the details.
18. For trade between the two sides, the existing arrangements, representations and agreements
remain in force. The commercial relations shall be further cultivated.
19. The two Governments appoint plenipotentiaries of ministerial rank and set up offices for the
permanent representatives of the plenipotentiaries. The function of the plenipotentiaries and their

representatives are to be laid down in detail. At the headquarters of the specific Government they
are accorded working possibilities and granted the necessary facilities and privileges.
20. On the basis of the treaty to be agreed upon by them, the Federal Republic of Germany and the
German Democratic Republic will make the necessary arrangements to regularize their membership
and cooperation in international organizations.
As the Kassel meeting ended, even less had been accomplished than had at the Erfurt meeting. At Erfurt, a
date for another meeting was agreed upon; at Kassel, the two delegations only agreed to meet again at some
unspecified time in the future.
Looking back on the year that witnessed the Erfurt and Kassel meetings, Chancellor Brandt
addressed the upper house of the West German parliament in his 1971 State of the Nation Address, once
again limiting the subject matter almost exclusively to the subject of his Ostpolitik initiative. Admitting
that not much was accomplished at Erfurt, much less at Kassel, Brandt defended these meetings as
"important steps towards a modus vivendi between the two polities existing on German soil, even if they
were only a beginning of the dialogue."92
He felt obliged to defend his Ostpolitik by giving examples of
European support for his initiatives.93
This did not, however, convince the parliamentary opposition of the
merits of Brandt’s Ostpolitik.
After his 1971 State of the Nation Address, Chancellor Brandt was queried further by the
opposition on this same point. He was asked whether or not the other Western nations supported his
initiatives toward East Germany, or even the treaties that he had signed with Moscow and Poland during
that year. He answered that the NATO ministers on December 4, 1970 had "welcomed the beginning of an
exchange of views between the Federal Republic of Germany and the GDR."94
He also claimed that the U.
S. Department of State had acknowledged the complimentarity of West Germany's détente policy with that
of the Nixon Administration.95
When asked specifically about the results of his Ostpolitik, Brandt admitted
that "we regret that so far the effects of this policy are to be seen least in the relationship with the GDR."96
Indeed, by the end of 1970, West German Ostpolitik had shifted away from attempts toward improving
relations with East Germany, with the Brandt government tacitly recognizing defeat by concentrating its

efforts upon the more fruitful soil of negotiations with Poland, the USSR and especially with the Four
Powers over the status of Berlin.97
It was for his thought on Ostpolitik and his efforts to further détente in Europe that Brandt received
the Nobel Peace Prize in 1971. Speaking at Oslo upon receiving the prize, Brandt spoke of a "transition
from classical power politics to the business-like policy" which his government had pursued.98
Brandt
argued that the meaning of progress in international relations is to "speak more of interests than of
ideology."99
This pronouncement on Realpolitik makes his claim to have "never been of a mind to negotiate
on the principles of human rights and self- determination" seem rather hollow.100
In recognizing what he termed the realities of the post-WWII situation, Brandt denounced "that
unimaginative principle that nations with different social and economic systems cannot live side by side
without being in grave conflict."101
One must then ask, along with Neues Deutschland, why Chancellor
Brandt lacked the courage to recognize the entire truth of the post-war realities. Why would Brandt not
recognize the East German régime under international law as a sovereign nation? The logic of his own
"Doctrine of Two States in Germany," a logic which reveals itself upon close scrutiny to belong rather to
the realm of unlogic, would lead one to ask such a question. Indeed, by entering into negotiations with the
head of state of East Germany, Chancellor Brandt moved one step further towards extending de jure
recognition to the East German régime and thereby brought the German nation one step closer to the grave.
Brandt's defense of his own Ostpolitik, while still West German Foreign Minister in the Grand
Coalition, was that it "made it much more difficult for communist propaganda to make out that we (in West
Germany) have revanchist tendencies."102
But questions remain as to the purpose of that propaganda tool
which Brandt wished to pluck from the hands of the East Germany propagandist. As is clearly revealed by
East German Foreign Minister Otto Winzer in an article which appeared in the August 1971 edition of the
World Marxist Review, the propaganda used by the Communist régime against the liberal-democratic
government of West Germany was aimed at gaining an improvement in the international status of East
Germany- -and this at the expense of West Germany.103
This is exactly the outcome of Brandt's Ostpolitik
toward East Germany during the year 1970. Because it led to the opening of negotiations with the East
German government at Erfurt, and to the subjecting of his own government to the verbal lashings it received

at Kassel, Brandt’s Ostpolitik took several steps backwards for the cause of freedom and democracy in
exchange for one step forward in what had by the end of 1970 proven to be an elusive pursuit of détente
with East Germany.

Endnotes
1
David Tinnin. "Man of the Year: Willy Brandt/ On the Road to a New Reality." Time 97 (1) (4 January 1971): 1.
2
David Binder. "Brandt Victor by 3 Votes; Takes Over as Chancellor." New York Times 22 October 1969, p. A1.
3
A. E. Albert. "The Brandt Doctrine of Two States in Germany." International Affairs 46(2) (April 1970): 293.
4
Nina Heathcote. "Brandt’s Ostpolitik and Western Institutions." The World Today 26(1) (August 1970): 334.
5
Gottfried Vetter. (correspondent of North German Radio in Berlin). "Annährung mit Hindernissen: Der Wandel der
innerdeutschen Beziehungen nach dem Bonner Regierungswechsel." Europa Archiv 25 (9) (10 May 1970): 302.
6
Laszlo Görgey. "A New Ostpolitik - the limitations on foreign policy (pp.148-172)" in Bonn's Eastern Policy 1964-
1971. Hamden, Connecticut: Archon Books, 1972, 152.
7
Frank Roberts. "The German-Soviet Treaty and its Effects on European and Atlantic Policies: A British View." The
Atlantic Community Quarterly 9(2) (Summer 1971): 191.
8
David Binder. "Brandt Victor by 3 Votes; Takes Over as Chancellor." New York Times 22 October 1969, p. A12.
9
Nina. Heathcote. "Brandt's Ostpolitik and Western Institutions." The World Today 26(1) (August 1970): 335.
10
Laszlo Görgey. "A New Ostpolitik - the limitations on foreign policy (pp. 148-172)" in Bonn's Eastern Policy
1964-1971. Hamden, Connecticut: Archon Books, 1972, p.154
11
Ibid, p.158.
12
Nina Heathcote. "Brandt's Ostpolitik and Western Institutions." The World Today 26(1) (August 1970): 339.
13
Ulbricht, Walter. "Twenty fruitful years of building socialism." World Marxist Review 12 (10) (October 1969): 9.
14
Ibid, 10.
15
Georg Zalitatsch. "Die Regierung Brandt aus der Sicht der Moskauer Presse." Osteuropa Heft 20(7) (July 1970):
467.
16
Ibid, p.470.
17
Ibid, p.472.
18
Francois Schlosser. "An Exclusive Interview With Herr Willy Brandt." Réalités (English edition) 207 (February
1968): 27.
19
Ibid, p. 28.
20
Ibid.
21
Ibid.

22
Willy Brandt. "German Policy Toward the East." Foreign Affairs 46(3) (April 1968): 483.
23
Ibid, p. 476.
24
Ibid, p. 481.
25
Ibid, p. 483.
26
Willy Brandt. A Peace Policy For Europe. Holt, 1969, p. 143.
27
Ibid, p. 142.
28
WillyBrandt. People and Politics: The Years 1960-75. Little, Brown, 1978, p. 367.
29
Gottfried Vetter (correspondent of North German Radio in Berlin). "Annährung mit Hindernissen: Der Wandel der
30
"Brandt Government's Talks With East German Regime, 1969-1970(pp.229-260)" in Kessing's Research Report:
Germany and Eastern Europe Since 1945. New York: Charles Scribners' Sons, 1973, p. 229-31.
31
32
472.
33
34
"Brandt Government's Talks With East German Regime, 1969-1970(pp.229-260)" in Kessing's Research Report:
Germany and Eastern Europe Since 1945. New York: Charles Scribners' Sons, 1973, 231-2.
35
Kassel May 21, 1970: a documentation. Bonn: Press and Information Service of the Government of the Federal
Republic of Germany, 1971, pp. 81-83.
36
Willy Brandt. People and Politics: The Years 1960-75. Little, Brown, 1978, p.368.
37
Michael Tatu. "Something More Than an Interlude (article reprinted from LeMonde )." The Atlantic Community
Quarterly 9(1) (Spring 1971): 53.
38
Nina Heathcote. "Brandt's Ostpolitik and Western Institutions." The World Today 26(1) (August 1970): 335.
39
D. Melnikov. "Brandt's First Hundred Days." New Times (Moscow) 4 (27 January 1970): 5.
40
Ibid, p.4.
41
Willy Brandt. Report on the State of the Nation 1970 (also contains background material which was presented to the
Bundestag on the Federal Government's Report on the State of the Nation). Bonn: Press and Information Service of the
Government of the Federal Republic of Germany, 1970, p. 6.

42
Ibid, p. 9.
43
Ibid, p. 13.
44
Ibid, 10-11.
45
Ibid, p. 10.
46
Ibid, p. 21.
47
Ibid, p. 22.
48
Melnikov, D. "Brandt’s First Hundred Days." New Times (Moscow) 4 (27 January 1970): 5.
49
Oskar Fehrenbach. "Bonn’s Eastern Initiatives Mark Time for Time Being (article reprinted from the Stuttgarter
Zeitung of 17 January 1970)." The Atlantic Community Quarterly 8(1) (Spring 1970): 41.
50
Ibid, p. 40.
51
"Brandt Government’s Talks With East German Regime, 1969-1970(pp.229-260)" in Kessing’s Research Report:
Germany and Eastern Europe Since 1945. New York: Charles Scribners’Sons, 1973, p. 240-1.
52
Oskar Fehrenbach. "Bonn’s Eastern Initiatives Mark Time for Time Being (article reprinted from the Stuttgarter
Zeitung of 17 January 1970)." The Atlantic Community Quarterly 8(1) (Spring 1970): 42.
53
Willy Brandt. People and Politics: The Years 1960-75. Little, Brown, 1978, p.371.
54
Ibid, p. 372
55
David Binder. "Brandt and Stoph Meet For Day of ’Useful’Talks." New York Times 20 March 1970, p. A12.
56
Ibid.
57
Erfurt March 19, 1970: a documentation. Bonn: Press and Information Service of the Government of the Federal
Republic of Germany, 1971, p.12.
58
Ibid, p.13.
59
Ibid, p. 17.
60
Ibid, p. 22.
61
Ibid, p. 24.
62
Ibid, p. 28.
63
Ibid, p. 27.

64
Ibid, p. 32.
65
Ibid, p. 36.
66
Ibid, p. 38.
67
Ibid, p. 44.
68
Ibid, p. 40-41.
69
Ibid, p. 38.
70
Ibid, p. 40.
71
Willy Brandt. People and Politics: The Years 1960-75. Little, Brown, 1978, p. 367.
72
Ibid, p. 379.
73
David Binder. "Brandt and Stoph Meet For Day of ’Useful’Talks." New York Times 20 March 1970, p. A12.
74
Willy Brandt. People and Politics: The Years 1960-75. Little, Brown, 1978, p. 379.
75
"Setback at Kassel." New York Times 22 May 1970, p. A30.
76
Wolfe, James H. "Bonn's Struggle for Détente." Central Europe Journal 19(11) (November 1971): 355.
77
Laszlo Görgey. "A New Ostpolitik - the limitations on foreign policy (pp. 148-172)" in Bonn's Eastern Policy
1964-1971. Hamden, Connecticut: Archon Books, 1972, p.163.
78
473.
79
Ibid, p. 477.
80
"Welcoming Ceremony for Chancellor Brandt." Common Values, Common Cause: German Statesmen in the United
States/ American Statesmen in Germany/ 1953-1983 Statements and Speeches New York: Fred Weidner & Son Printers,
Inc., 1983, pp. 88-90.
81
David Tinnin. "Man of the Year: Willy Brandt/ On the Road to a New Reality." Time 97 (1) (4 January 1971): 13.
82
Erfurt March 19, 1970: a documentation. Bonn: Press and Information Service of the Government of the Federal
Republic of Germany, 1971, p. 62.
83
Ibid, p. 63.
84
Ibid, p. 68.
85
Ibid, p. 66.
86
Ibid, p. 72.

87
Ibid, p. 86.
88
Ibid, p. 83.
89
Germany and Eastern Europe Since 1945. New York: Charles Scribners’Sons, 1973, pp. 159-9.
90
Kassel May 21, 1970: a documentation. Bonn: Press and Information Service of the Government of the Federal
Republic of Germany, 1971, p. 7.
91
Ibid, pp. 84-86.
92
Willy Brandt. Report on the State of the Nation 1971 (also contains the reply of the Federal Government to the
major questions submitted by the SPD and FDP parliamentary groups regarding the Federal Government’s foreign policy).
Bonn: Press and Information Service of the Government of the Federal Republic of Germany, 1971, p. 7.
93
Ibid, p. 5.
94
Ibid, p. 36.
95
Ibid, p. 37.
96
Ibid, p. 45.
97
Ibid, p. 38.
98
Willy Brandt. Peace: Writings and Speeches of the Nobel Prize Winner. Verlag Neue Geselschaft, 1971, p. 150.
99
Ibid, p. 146.
100
Ibid, p. 150.
101
Ibid, p. 145.
102
Francois Schlosser. "An Exclusive Interview With Herr Willy Brandt." Réalités (English edition) 207 (February
1968): 28.
103
Otto Winzer. "Strengthen international position of GDR - a goal in the battle for peace and socialism." World
Marxist Review 14 (8) (August 1971): 106.

Bibliography
Books and Chapters in Books
Binder, David. "Erfurt, 1970 (pp.1-13)," "The Peace Chancellor (pp. 253-306)," and "The End (pp. 307-353)" in The
Other German. Washington, DC: The New Republic Book Company, Inc., 1975.
Brandt, Willy. A Peace Policy For Europe. Holt, 1969; Peace: Writings and Speeches of the Nobel Prize Winner. Verlag
Neue Geselschaft, 1971; People and Politics: The Years 1960-75. Little, Brown, 1978.
Germany and Eastern Europe Since 1945. New York: Charles Scribners’Sons, 1973.
Common Values, Common Cause : German Statesmen in the United States/ American Statesmen in Germany/ 1953-1983
Statements and Speeches New York: Fred Weidner & Son Printers, Inc., 1983.
Görgey, Laszlo. "A New Ostpolitik - the limitations on foreign policy (pp.148-172)" in Bonn's Eastern Policy 1964-1971.
Hamden, Connecticut: Archon Books, 1972.
Pritte, Hon. Terrence C. F. "The Evolution of an Ostpolitik (pp. 197-225)" and "Framing a Foreign Policy (pp. 226-255)"
in Willy Brandt: portrait of a statesman. New York: Schocken Books, 1974.
Journal Articles
Albert, A. E. "The Brandt Doctrine of Two States in Germany." International Affairs 46(2) (April 1970): 293-303.
Birrenbach, Kurt. "The West and German Ostpolitik - The German Opposition View (speech given during course of
debate over Brandt's State of the Nation Address 1971)." The Atlantic Community Quarterly 9 (2) (Summer 1971): 196-
204.
Brandt, Willy. "Aktuelle Fragen den deutschen Aussenpolitik (address before the membership of the German Society for
Foreign Policy)." Europa Archiv 26(13) (10 July 1971): 437-442; "European Unity is Germany's Hope (speech before the
European Parliament at Strasbourg)." The Atlantic Community Quarterly 12(1) (Spring 1974): 76-80; "German Policy
Toward the East." Foreign Affairs 46(3) (April 1968): 476-486, "Germany Says 'Thank You' for the Marshall Plan." The
Atlantic Community Quarterly 10(3) (Fall 1972): 351-356.
Bromke, Adam and Harald von Riekhoff. "The Polish-West German Treaty." East Europe 20(1) (January 1971): 2-8.
"Exchange of Telegrams (in Pravda and Isvestia, 25 October 1970, p.1, 175 wds., complete text)." Current Digest of the
Soviet Press (under Foreign Affairs/Central Europe/Germany) 21(43): 22.
"Communiqué on the Visit by USSR Minister of Foreign Affairs A. A. Gromyko to the German Democratic Republic(in
Pravda, 28 February 1970, p. 4; Isvestia, 1 March 1970, p.2, 750 wds. condensed text) Current Digest of the Soviet Press
(under Foreign Affairs/Central Europe/Germany) 21(9): 13.

Fehrenbach, Oskar. "Bonn’s Eastern Initiatives Mark Time for Time Being (article reprinted from the Stuttgarter Zeitung
of 17 January 1970)." The Atlantic Community Quarterly 8(1) (Spring 1970): 40-43.
Gauthier, Hermann (spokesman for the Communist Party of West Germany). "Chances for a new Bonn policy?" World
Marxist Review 13 (1) (January 1970): 45-48.
Heathcote, Nina. "Brandt’s Ostpolitik and Western Institutions." The World Today 26(1) (August 1970): 334-343.
Kewenig, Wilhelm. "Die deutsche Ostpolitik und das Grudgesetz." Europa Archiv 26(14)(25 January 1971): 469-480.
Kuzminykh, Y. "The Erfurt Meeting." New Times (Moscow) 13 (24 March 1970): 4-5.
Markowski, Paul. "The GDR and peace in Europe." World Marxist Review 15 (5) (May 1972): 102-109.
Melnikov, D. "Brandt’s First Hundred Days." New Times (Moscow) 4 (27 January1970): 4-6.
"Our Commentary: Confident Course (by Yu. Tomlin in Isvestia, 8 December 1970, p. 2. 500 wds. condensed text)
Current Digest of the Soviet Press (under Foreign Affairs/World Politics) 22 (49): 24.
"Our Commentary: Fruitful Course (by L. Stepanov in Isvestia, 28 May 1970, p. 2., 500 wds. condensed text)" Current
Digest of the Soviet Press (under Foreign Affairs/Central Europe/Germany) 21(21): 15-16.
Roberts, Frank. "The German-Soviet Treaty and its Effects on European and Atlantic Policies: A British View." The
Atlantic Community Quarterly 9(2) (Summer 1971): 184-195.
Schlosser, Francois. "An Exclusive Interview With Herr Willy Brandt." Réalités (English edition) 207 (February 1968):
27-29.
Tatu, Michael. "Something More Than an Interlude (article reprinted from LeMonde)." The Atlantic Community
Quarterly 9(1) (Spring 1971): 50-55.
"The Treaty With West Germany (five articles in Pravda and Isvestia from 8-19 August 1970, condensed text and
complete text)” Current Digest of the Soviet Press 22 (33): 1-3, 22
Ulbricht, Walter. "Twenty fruitful years of building socialism." World Marxist Review 12 (10) (October 1969): 3-11.
Vetter, Gottfried (correspondent of North German Radio in Berlin). "Annährung mit Hindernissen: Der Wandel der
innerdeutschen Beziehungen nach dem Bonner Regierungswechsel." Europa Archiv 25 (9) (10 May 1970): 301-310.
"Walter Ulbricht (In Memoriam). World Marxist Review 16 (9) (September1973): 139-40.
Weber, Eberhard. "FRG: new faces, continuity of policy (Reasons for Brandt's Resignation)." World Marxist Review 17
(7) (July 1974):102-109.
"Willy Brandt: Europe Only Stands to Gain from Good Soviet-West German Relations." New Times (Moscow) 41
(October 1971): 8-9.
Winzer, Otto. "Strengthen international position of GDR - a goal in the battle for peace and socialism." World Marxist
Review 14 (8) (August 1971): 99-106.

Wolfe, James H. "Bonn's Struggle for Détente." Central Europe Journal 19(11) (November 1971): 355-357.
Zalitatsch, Georg. "Die Regierung Brandt aus der Sicht der Moskauer Presse." Osteuropa Heft 20(7) (July 1970): 467-
478.
Government Documents
Brandt, Willy. Report on the State of the Nation 1970 (also contains background material that was presented to the
Bundestag on the Federal Government's Report on the State of the Nation). Bonn: Press and Information Service of the
Government of the Federal Republic of Germany, 1970; Report on the State of the Nation 1971 (also contains responses
of the Federal Government to the major questions submitted by the SPD and FDP parliamentary groups regarding the
Federal Government's foreign policy). Bonn: Press and Information Service of the Government of the Federal Republic of
Germany, 1971.
Erfurt March 19, 1970: a documentation. Bonn: Press and Information Service of the Government of the Federal Republic
of Germany, 1971.
Kassel May 21, 1970: a documentation. Bonn: Press and Information Service of the Government of the Federal Republic
of Germany, 1971.
Texts Relating to the European Political Cooperation. Bonn: Press and Information Service of the Government of the
Federal Republic of Germany, 1974.

Magazine and Newspaper Articles*
Binder, David. "Brandt and Stoph Hold Tense Talks and Make no Gain." New York Times 22 May 1970, p. A1, + A3;
"Brandt and Stoph Meet For Day of ’Useful’Talks." New York Times 20 March 1970, p. A1, +A12.;"Brandt Urges Stoph
to Ease His Stand." New York Times 23 May 1970, p. A30; "Brandt Victor by 3 Votes; Takes Over as Chancellor." New
York Times 22 October 1969, p. A1, +A12; "Shirt-Sleeve Manner Marks Brandt Government." New York Times 13
August 1970, p. A2.
Burns, James MacGregor. "Moscow-Bonn Pact: A Historian’s Assessment." New York Times 13 August 1970, p. A3.
"East Germany Omits Live TV of Arrival." New York Times 20 March 1970, p. A12.
Feron, James. "Brandt in Poland, Signs Pact Today For Normal Ties." New York Times 7 December 1970, p. A1, + A9.
"Four Dialogues in Germany." New York Times 23 May 1970, p. A2.
Gwertzman, Bernard. "Pact With Soviet Signed By Brandt in Kremlin." New York Times 13 August 1970, p. A1, + A2.
"Poles Due to Let Germans Migrate." New York Times 7 December 1970, p. A3.
"Reticent East German/ Willi Stoph." New York Times 20 March 1970, p. A12.
"Setback at Kassel." New York Times 22 May 1970, p. A23.
"The Two Germanies: Their Emergence and Conflicts," New York Times 20 March 1970, p. A12.
Tinnin, David. "Man of the Year: Willy Brandt/ On the Road to a New Reality." Time 97 (1) (4 January 1971): 1- 20.
"’Willy’to His Public." New York Times 22 October 1969, p. A 12.
*
For articles from the Soviet press see Current Digest of the Soviet Press in Journal Article section of bibliography.

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