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Asymmetric
 Approaches to
Anomaly Analysis



                   Martin Joseph Dudziak


                          2+2 > 4


                          July 13, 2005
Different approaches to immune defense systems

• Total isolation (plastic tent, Great Wall, Maginot Line…)
• Vaccination (smallpox, influenza)
• Camouflage and adaptability
• “Become as thy enemy”

Nomad Eyes is a systemic, “organic” architecture for early warning and
prediction, interdiction, prevention and response. The fundamental model is based
upon the use of both inverse and forward reasoning to detect both anomalies
within predictable linear systems and unstable recurrent patterns within highly
nonlinear dynamical systems. These events include internet activity as well as
specific sensor events. The goal is to create associations that match predictable,
expected sequences of activity consistent with aggravated, intentional assaults
such as the planning of terrorist attacks. A key principle is to create models and
plans “in the first person” from the perspective of the attacker and to treat the
information flow as an encrypted process not dissimilar from conventional
message encryption but involving actions and stages in a larger strategic plan.


6/2/2008                  Copyright 2005 Martin Dudziak, PhD                     2
Nomad Eyes is one effort to answer the Threat

• Distributed multi-modal sensing and real-time data acquisition
• External (physical) events plus internet traffic and events
• Based upon “thinking like a terrorist, not a defender”
• Network security and information warfare as a key toolset for the
        defense of the streets, subways, airways and more

“Philosophical” Foundations
1. Early warning, prevention, interdiction and response should be integrated,
including information and services, including systems, tools, devices
2. Civilian and labor populations must be deeply integrated in all activities
3. “Low-tech” in massive numbers, properly analyzed and controlled, can be
stronger than isolated super-high-tech that can be avoided, circumvented
4. Use the “tao of noise” principle – don’t try to analyze the whole turbulence of
data but seek small, unstable patterns that recur and look for associations between
them that fit a higher-scale pattern or logic

6/2/2008                   Copyright 2005 Martin Dudziak, PhD                         3
Two interesting quotes that inspired Nomad Eyes development




     “Grey suits in offices running a spy network will never be an
     effective measure to reduce the threat.”
                                                       Ahmad Hmoud, Jordan




     “Your security is in your own hands.”
                                  Attributed to Osama bin Laden @ 10/27/04




6/2/2008               Copyright 2005 Martin Dudziak, PhD                    4
A challenge for you as you listen and read what follows



     How much of this (Nomad Eyes, et al) could have been in
     place in 2001? By now in 2005? How much was held back
     by conventional thinking? By “hyper” security/classification
     barriers? By selfish competition? By inertia?



     How much of Nomad Eyes thinking and
     technology is already being implemented by
     al Qaeda and their allies?




6/2/2008               Copyright 2005 Martin Dudziak, PhD           5
Introduction – Roots and Objectives

•          Smooth transition and integration of methods and systems for CBRNE in both
           combat, post-combat, and civilian environments

•          Integration of CBRNE prediction, forecasting, detection, countermeasures with
           geospatial representation and analysis (more than GIS)

•          Incorporation of several maturing technologies and familiar methodologies:
       –       Mobile, wireless, wearable, portable
       –       Platform-independence, “plug and play”
       –       Commercial, conventional, cheap, familiar, cast-away
       –       Inverse methods, nonlinear methods, hybrid probabilistic reasoning


•          Adaptation of CBRNE and GIS to changing models of conflict, warfare and
           military-civilian discipline/collaboration

•          “Reusable and reconfigurable” is not only about cost-savings



    6/2/2008                       Copyright 2005 Martin Dudziak, PhD                      6
Introduction - Objections



•        Too ambitious a goal and too many differences between CBRNE situations in the
         combat field and diverse homeland sectors - “apples and oranges”

•        Too difficult to attempt assimilation of high-noise sources and low-sensitivity
         sensors

•        Consumer-grade technology not sufficiently specialized or robust

•        Problem of false-positives, esp. in bio and rad domains

•        Requires massive deployment and training - too expensive and too long

•        Simply too difficult, too much bureaucracy, interagency problems, well-
         entrenched conventionalists, etc.




    6/2/2008                    Copyright 2005 Martin Dudziak, PhD                         7
Systemic Foundations



•          Nomad Eyes architecture for open-ended deployment of sensor-analyzers

•          Use of inverse methods (from wave scattering and subsurface imaging) with
           Bayesian and RETE reasoning for analysis of distributed array data

•          Focus on a few target problems and technical (sensing) solutions
       –       radiation sensors
       –       chemical (organo-phosphate) sensors


•          Role of the GS and GIS is threefold:
       –       Locate sensor reports over time and provide correlation
       –       Locate both at-risk and risk-potential humans, machines, resources
       –       Predict likely targets and movements


•          High-speed real-time database “ETL” and other VLDB processing is necessary
           to keep track of changes in data collection and geospatial object movement

    6/2/2008                       Copyright 2005 Martin Dudziak, PhD                  8
Nomad Eyes™ Architecture and Principles (I)
Prevention by Detection of Terrakt Planning Operations
Movement of multiple types of components, not only RAD substances
Time-matching and space-matching of logically connective, supportive events
“Sensor Fusion” of the Unordinary (Необычный) Kind -
         Tracer RAD readings perhaps not individually remarkable
         Photos of suspicious individuals and vehicles that have some “matches”
         Exceptional shipping orders, out-of-sequence, special-route, handling
         Parallel transit/shipment/transaction of non-contraband components useful
           in an RDD (PRED)
Goal toward Inverse Reasoning and Abductive Assimilation with other KBs / Xsys
Fall-Back Value: Emergency public alerts and First-Responder capabilities

• Observations that point to possible events, plans for a future undertaking
• Observations with imminent value indicating an operation in progress
• Observations of value for the investigation and forensic processes after an event
 6/2/2008                  Copyright 2005 Martin Dudziak, PhD                   9
Nomad Eyes = Compound Eyes
                                       Multiple TYPES of sensor data
                                       Multiple INSTANCES at multiple TIMES
                                       INVERSE Methods applied “as if” in surface/subsurface imaging:
                                       the task is to find what events and processes may be the modifiers of
                                       known or deducible behaviors




USING
•Abductive rules
•Bayesian probabilistic inference
•Fuzzy inference
•Heuristics and “common sense” rules


For all the value of sophisticated detectors, an “outlier” element or two could make all the difference:
Requests for building or water/sewer line plans           Repeat-visits of unusual vehicle or people
“Non-sequitur” orders of shielding-quality materials      Unusual change in shipping order or pickup

   6/2/2008                          Copyright 2005 Martin Dudziak, PhD                                        10
Threat Environment

                Where are the likely targets and means?
               In the public mind’s-eye and Angst
               And the less-likely form for many reasons



                                                     Psycho-Shock is the Aim and
                                                     Nuclear Radiation is Powerful
                                                     even in non-lethal doses
                                                     The same for Chem-Bio



                    Mass-dispersion with
                    uncertain contact and
                    degree will create the
                    most widespread fears

6/2/2008                Copyright 2005 Martin Dudziak, PhD                      11
Newport-Norfolk (Hampton Roads)




6/2/2008          Copyright 2005 Martin Dudziak, PhD   12
Port of Baltimore




                                               > 30M tons per year, mainly containers


           2M+ residents in Baltimore and surrounding urban center
           Main East-Coast rail and interstate highways traverse region

6/2/2008                  Copyright 2005 Martin Dudziak, PhD                  13
RDD/Chem/Bio in the context of Prime Goals

Considering SEP Disruption and Destabilization as the “prime-directive” of
terrorist organizations capable/active in planning RDD and chem-bio tactics


•      Most likely choice is with massive dispersion through conventional+inflammatory
       attack

•      Spread the most compounds in the most uncertain paths among the largest
       number of possible affected victims

•      Affect the maximum number of structures including transportation routes

•      Aim for closure and disruption of normal use/traffic - it does not have to be for
       years, just months or weeks

•      Multiple small disruptive attacks easier and more effective than one block-buster


    6/2/2008                    Copyright 2005 Martin Dudziak, PhD                         14
Network Deployment - Where and How
•      Static but ad-hoc
        – Passage locations and nexus points for cargo and transfer vehicles
        – Likeliest places but not limited to one configuration


•      Pseudo-random

•      Personal mobile units
        – Assigned to staff personnel
        – Personal cell phones


•      Unpredictable - a “two-edged sword” that cuts in in favor of the Defenders
        – Inverse predictive models can be applied better to the data “mass”
        – Al Qaeda (or “X”) cannot predict where are our eyes and ears


•      Sun Tzu (“Art of War”) - Always Make Your Enemy Nervous


    6/2/2008                   Copyright 2005 Martin Dudziak, PhD              15
First Responder Capability as well


                             Notify Maximum Numbers of People ASAP after Terrakt
                                   Redirect Survivors
                                   Keep Other People Away
                                   Assist People Finding Loved Ones
                                   Provide Essential Life-Saving Information Real-Time




Coordinate and Inform First-Responder Teams
     Locations of People
     Active Sensor Array including useful data from public
     Coordinate with volunteers




6/2/2008                      Copyright 2005 Martin Dudziak, PhD                         16
Nomad Eyes™ Architecture and Principles (II)

                                                                            EVENT !



            Class (x) objects received by servers results
           in generation of n graphs representing
           hypothetical x      y… relational maps; the
           majority are discarded, but events of interest
           trigger feedback to both autonomous and
           human-based nodes for additional collection
           and reorienting. No node or subset of nodes
           is reliant and the whole may be considered as
           a dynamic-geometry cellular automata.




                                                            EVENT !




6/2/2008                               Copyright 2005 Martin Dudziak, PhD             17
Nomad Eyes - Mobile Wireless Portable/Handheld Nets
            for an Asymmetric, Dynamic Countermeasure System


For Rad Terrorism but also for other
types and necessarily looking for all,
not only one
                                            Mobile units using both cellular and
                                            wireless internet/intranets


     Freeform but adhering to industry
     standards
                                                  Incorporating the General Public

             Incorporating the commercial sector
             (advertising and consumer products)


                      Asynchronous, Atypical, Asymmetric Sensor Fusion

 6/2/2008                    Copyright 2005 Martin Dudziak, PhD                      18
I3 Foundations
    Inverse, Nonlinear, Counter-Intuitive (sometimes)




Source




         The Object causes diffusion and scattering of the Beam but the laws governing propagation and movement in
         different media are known or can be ascertained. Working backwards from the Result, one computes and
         estimates the Object on the basis of how the Beam must have changed in order to produce the Result instead of a
         pattern, computable, for what there would have been if no Object had been present. Now, transfer this Inverse
         Model ought of imaging and into the world of semiotics and intensions. Now, one can do inverse thinking from
         something Sensed and Observed, in actuality, to determine what were some of the intervening steps and processes
         out of the usual and ordinary process that would have produced something different, most likely less complex.

 6/2/2008                                 Copyright 2005 Martin Dudziak, PhD                                               19
Exotic Technology Translated into Plain English:


Problem 1: Small tumors or microscopic probes or nanosized drug delivery agents
are in the liver - how to accurately track, compare, recognize, and localize when
the patient is moving and the body is constantly changing?
Problem 2: Radioactive or chemical compounds are passing through a shipping
port or through the public waterworks - how to identify a pattern and link a set of
events and detections into a pattern that shows a natural or deliberate process
which can be detected, localized, and treated with countermeasures?
The IRM (Inverse Relational Map) approach is one of several using inverse
problem modeling plus other nonlinear dynamic structures and functions in order
to produce not only usable answers but answers in real-time. Many of the
underlying maths and algorithms have been known and used before in other
disciplines. Our approach is to try something new, primarily in the short cuts and
speed-ups gained through applying higher-level representations and heuristics that
can significantly reduce the compute-cycle and delays.


6/2/2008                   Copyright 2005 Martin Dudziak, PhD                     20
I3 Examples:

Problem 1: Radioactive or chemical compounds are passing through a shipping
port or through the public waterworks - how to identify a pattern and link a set of
events and detections into a pattern that shows a natural or deliberate process
which can be detected, localized, and treated with countermeasures?
Problem 2: Small tumors or microscopic probes or nanosized drug delivery agents
are in the liver - how to accurately track, compare, recognize, and localize when
the patient is moving and the body is constantly changing?


The IRM (Inverse Relational Map) approach is one of several using inverse
problem modeling plus other nonlinear dynamic structures and functions in order
to produce not only usable answers but answers in real-time. Many of the
underlying mathematics and algorithms have been known and used before in other
disciplines. Our approach is to try something new, primarily in the short cuts and
speed-ups gained through applying higher-level representations and heuristics that
can significantly reduce the compute-cycle and delays.

6/2/2008                   Copyright 2005 Martin Dudziak, PhD                     21
Making Sense of the Data (I)

•   Basic diffusion equation - usable as starting point for inverse problems

               ∂ 2u 1 ∂u




                                                                                                 Particular credits - Roger Dufour, MIT
                  2
                    =                 u( x ,0) = f ( x )          u(0, t ) = u(a, t ) = 0
               ∂x     k ∂t
•   Time-transition is accomplished in Fourier domain
                   ∞
                              x                        2 a            x
           f ( x ) = ∑ fn sin πn                   fn = ∫ f ( x ) sin πn dx
                     n =1     a                        a 0            a
                                    ∞
                                                                 n
                        u( x , t ) = ∑ fne   −k ( πn a ) t
                                                       2
                                                             sin π 
                                   n =1                          a
•   Transition backwards in time requires amplification of high frequency
    components - most likely to be noisy and skewed



6/2/2008                     Copyright 2005 Martin Dudziak, PhD                             22
Making Sense of the Data (II)
•   Heuristic and a priori constraints needed to maintain physical realism and
    suppress distortions from inverse process




                                                                                      Particular credits - Roger Dufour, MIT
•   First-pass solution best match or interpolation among a set of acceptable
    alternatives

      €
      x = arg min Ax − y                               s.t.        x∈X
                      x

•   Final solution may minimize the residual error and the regularization term

                                                2                   2
           €
           x = arg min Ax − y 2 + λ L( x − x ) 2
                          x

       Regularization offers fidelity to the observed data and an
    a priori determined (e.g., higher-scale-observed) solution model

6/2/2008                      Copyright 2005 Martin Dudziak, PhD                 23
Making Sense of the Data (III)


                                  •   Diffusion _ Attraction
                                  •   Modeling situations and schemas




                                                                                Particular credits - J. P. Thirion, INRIA
                                      as composite “images” in n-D
                                  •   Iterative process with
                                      exploration of parallel tree paths
                                       – Speculative track; not required
                                         for Nomad Eyes sensor fusion
                                         to be useful to analysts
                                       – Purpose is to enable automation
                                         of the analysis and forecasting
                                         post-collection process
                                       – Area of active current research




6/2/2008         Copyright 2005 Martin Dudziak, PhD                        24
Making Sense of the Data (IV) - I3BAT

                                                                      •    Multiple modalities
           Sensor 1                          Sensor 2                          – Acoustic, EM, Optical, Text,
                                                                                 NLP, SQL, AI-reasoning…
                                                                      •    All looking at the same topic of
                                                                           interest (aka “region”)
                                                                      •    Each sensitive to different
                                                                           physical/logical properties
                                          Property 3                           –   “Trigger” data
                                                                               –   Contiguity (space/time)
                                                                               –   Inference relations
                                         Property 2                            –   “Hits” with conventional DB
      Property 1                                                                   queries (immigration, known
                                                                                   associations, other
                                        Background                                 investigations)
                                                                      •    Compare with Terrorist Cadre
                                                                           Tactic models (schemas, maps)
Particular credits - Eric Miller, NEU



          6/2/2008                        Copyright 2005 Martin Dudziak, PhD                             25
CONFIG                                           SETUP
                                               (ETLJOB                  ADB                     (Initialize)
    ADaM - making it real-time                 ETLSPEC)          System & Meta Data


    Agent-Driven Data Mover
                                                             ORCHESTRATOR (ORCH)
•      If you cannot collate,
       coordinate and efficiently                   MONITO
                                                      R                                                     ETLP
       access the collected data, in                                    Generato
       real-time, free-form (with                                                                       functional
                                                                           r                               space
       respect to views and users)
       and without blocking users                                    Transformer
       during backup and archiving                                    Transformer
       periods, then you have a very                                    Transformer
       inefficient database and it is      Extractor                                          Insrtor
       not conducive to the open-           Extractor                                          Insertor
                                              Extractor                                          Loader
       ended purposes of BioScan                                     Control   Monitor
       or Nomad Eyes.                                                Memory    Memory
•      The ADaM software                   Docs
       outperformed that from NCR-                                    Data     Thread        Docs
                                           and                       Memory                  and
       Teradata with their own             Files
                                                                                Pool
       product as a data                                                                     Files     Databas
                                                   Databas
       warehouse. It outperformed                    es                         Machine                  es
       ab Initio, a leader in the field                                          space

       of Extract-Transfer-Load for
                                              ADaM runtime modules                Setup and configuration
       Fortune 100 VLDB
                                                                                  modules
       applications.                          ADaM runtime components             Internal elements

                                              External                                    data flow
                                              sources/destinations
6/2/2008                        Copyright 2005 Martin Dudziak, PhD                                             26
ADaM Dynamic Processes (ETLP)
                                        P_graph of ETLS (2)
                                                                                                         -                 -

                                                                                                                   +
                                                                                                             0
                                                                                                     -                 0           -
                                         -                       -

                                                 +                                                                 0
                                             0
  Actor objects                     -                    0           -
  (nodes)
                                                     0

                                                                                                         ETLPs (with                                       ETL Set (with
                                                                                                             actors)                                       ETLPs)



                                                                                                                                       -               -                      -               -
                ETL Set (with                                                                                                                  +                                      +
                ETLPs)                                                                                                                     0                                      0
                                                                                                                                   -               0       -              -               0       -

                                                                                                                                               0                                      0
                                                                                                                 P_graph of ETLP (5)
                                                                             -               -
            -               -                                                        +
                                                                                 0
                    +                                                    -               0       -                                     -                       -
                0                                                                                                                                                      P_graph of Exec
        -               0       -        -                                                                                                                             (1)
                                                             -                       0
                                                                                                                                                   +
                    0                            +                                                                                         0
                                             0                                                                                 -                       0           -   ADaM exec
                                    -                0           -                                                                                                     (program)

                                                 0                                                                                                 0

6/2/2008                                                     Copyright 2005 Martin Dudziak, PhD                                                                                                   27
Looking for Eddies in the Inferno



•      1. Kuramato-Sivashinsky (dissipative extended systems)
        –      Ut = (u2)x – ux x - νux x x x



•      2. 3-D Navier-Stokes as the general traffic paradigm
        –      Return to Hopf:
        –      Repertoires of distinguishable patterns
        –      Finite spatial resolution  finite time  finite alphabet of admissible patterns


•      3. Back to Bletchley Park
        –      Looking for “bombes” – no pun intended!!!
        –      Identifying possible, reasonable alphabets (hieroglyphics) of field operations
        –      Moving from characters and codes to patterns of activity and process:
                  •   Selected target data and telephony network traffic
                  •   Directed graph models (ETLP style) of regional and point-to-point physical traffic
                  •   Focusing on the abstract relationships, the potential background, not the foreground!!!!!


•      4. The other side of an Anomaly is a Consistency, a Tell-Tale Heartbeat…
        –      u(t) + uxxx + kuux = 0, but in terms far more complex than simple E, ν, ω !
        –      Increased silence is as important as increases in chatter!



    6/2/2008                                   Copyright 2005 Martin Dudziak, PhD                                 28
Example Scenario

•      1. Multi-modal attack on Washington Metro
        –      “Ring” targets to maximize numbers inside tunnels and stations
        –      Demobilize or “weaponize” air circulation network
        –      Shift modus operandi (e.g., no knapsacks, more upscale)
        –      Conventional explosives plus sarin and/or anthrax or Am(24x)
        –      Aim to lock-down the system through multiple strikes
        –      High-use/dependence on networked data/comms          strikes against networks to disable first response
               abilities, reaction, coordination

•      2. Network traffic anomalies to expect
        –      Increases, decreases
        –      Purchases, switches in mobile services
        –      Increases in new internet activity among similar groups, configurations of traffic


•      3. Disruption targets
        –      Police/fire/ER
        –      Medical centers
        –      Potential for concurrent major across-the-board D-o-S attacks


•      4. Remember that whatever we are looking for…
        –      They know it, too, and they know what we are looking for (in general)
        –      They are chameleons on the Go
        –      Even a well-camouflaged animal in the jungle gives away its position when it moves but only if you are
               looking not just in some narrow focus but able to take in the bigger field of vision (as in green snakes on
               banana plants)
    6/2/2008                              Copyright 2005 Martin Dudziak, PhD                                          29
Sensor Device Family



•      1. OPA ™ Organo-Phosphate Analyzer
        –      Nitrates, Organophosphates (e.g., Sarin, VX) (OPA ™)
        –      OPA in beta development with matching-fund opps

•      2. MagnetEyes ™
        –      Thin-film based magneto-optic sensing and imaging devices for desktop, industrial, and
               micro-scale applications in security, anti-counterfeiting, structural engineering, and
               biomedicine. Deployment-Ready


•      3. BioScan ™
        –      Handheld wireless base for plug-compatible interface-standardized sensors and imaging


•      4. Radiation sensors
        –      Gamma and neutron detection
        –      Compatible for GPS-locatable mobile wireless (telephony and wi-fi) devices




    6/2/2008                         Copyright 2005 Martin Dudziak, PhD                            30
OPA ™ Portable Version

                                                        The assay of OPs and other BChE
                                                        inhibitors is achieved due to the use
                                                        of nanostructured films based on
                                                        polyelectrolytes and the bi-enzyme
                                                        system cholineoxidase /
                                                        butyrylcholinesterase (ChO/BChE).

                                                        Conventional nerve agent organo-
                                                        phosphates (Sarin, VX. GB) and
                                                        carbamate type ChE-inhibitors can
                                                        be detected at extremely low levels.

                                                        Sensitivity for organophosphates
                                                        (DFP, paraoxon, trichlorfon) is
                                                        achievable @ 10 pM/L.
  •        Automated version
           processes up to 24 samples                   For classical nerve agents the
           in sequence                                  detection limits will be an order of
  •        Portable unit can be adapted                 magnitude better; for instance,
           with air sampling and                        carbamates (carbofuran, carbetamid,
           condenser                                    carbaryl) at @ 0.1 -1.0 nM/L.



6/2/2008                      Copyright 2005 Martin Dudziak, PhD                                31
OPA Comparative Sensitivity (1)

           Parameters             Gas chromatograph   GC with mass-     PolyEnergetics
                                                      spectrometer      portable handheld

           Sensitivity (SN –      1.0                 0.5               0.1
           sanitary norm)
           System price (USD)     10K – 20K           150K – 400K       400

           Test cost (USD)        12                  15                4

           Microchip sensor       n/a                 n/a               1
           element cost (USD)
           Time to perform test   hours               hours             30-70 min.

           Sample preparation     hours               hours             10-20 min.

           Field analysis         Not possible        Not possible      Yes

           Organic solvents       Necessary           Necessary         No

           Reagent consumption    High                High              Low

           Sample volume          No                  No                Yes




6/2/2008                           Copyright 2005 Martin Dudziak, PhD                       32
OPA Comparative Sensitivity (2)


           Parameters             Agilent 6890N (Gas       PolyEnergetics
                                  Chromatography)          portable handheld



           SN in air for:         Sarin (1x10-5 mg/m3)     Sarin (2x10-8 mg/m3)
           Sarin (2x10-7 mg/m3)   GB (5x10-6 mg/m3)        GB (not tested)
           GB (1x10-7 mg/m3)      VX (1x10-5- 5x10-        VX (3-5x10-8mg/m3)
                                  7mg/m3)
           VX (5x10-8 mg/m3)
           SN in water for:       ---                      Sarin (5x10-6 mg/m3)
           Sarin (5x10-5 mg/m3)   ---                      GB (not tested)
           GB (5x10-6 mg/m3)      ---                      VX (1-2x10-6mg/m3)
           VX (2x10-6 mg/m3)




6/2/2008                     Copyright 2005 Martin Dudziak, PhD                   33
Radiation sensor specs (targets)

       Parameter                                           Range
                            -25    -1                            -80    -1
Gamma sensitivity        200 +80 s (µSv/h) 2cps(µR/h) to 100 -25 s (µSv/h) 1cps(µR/h)
                             +300    -1                           +200     -1
Neutron sensitivity      200 -25 s (µSv/h) 2cps(µR/h) to 100 -25 s (µSv/h) 1cps(µR/h)
Gamma energy range       0.04 – 3.0 MeV
Neutron energy range     0.03 – 3.0 MeV
Dose equiv. rate         1 – 5000 µR/h
Dose equiv. error        +/- 30%
False alarms             < 1 per hour
Response time (gamma)    < 2.5 s
U detection               15g at 0.5m, velocity <= 0.5 m/s, background rad < 25 µR/h
Pu detection              0.5g at 0.5m, velocity <= 0.5 m/s, background rad < 25 µR/h
Isotopes and materials   U-235, U-238, Np-237, Puy-239, Pu-241, Cr-51, Ga-67, Pd-103, In-
detectable               111, I-131, Tl-201, Xe-133, Co-57, Co-60, Ba-133, Cs-137, Ir-192,
                         Se-75, Ra-226, Am-241 and others
Battery lifetime         > 20 hrs. with average cell-phone usage (i.e., reduction of cell phone
                         battery life to not less than one typical day)
Weight                   < 100g
Dimensions               smaller than 150mm x 50mm x 20mm
Cost per unit            feasible to manufacture for under $50.00 in quantities > 10,000




6/2/2008                    Copyright 2005 Martin Dudziak, PhD                               34
Today’s consumer-class RAD components




     Our simple conversion with Nomad Eyes™
                                                             Existing mobile phone
Li-ion     A/D logic                  Nomadiks                        logic
                                         or
                                        other
   Rad-sensor element                  mProc                   Interface logic to
                                                                wireless internet

6/2/2008                Copyright 2005 Martin Dudziak, PhD                      35
36




                                 CerviScan HEAD
                                                  NT1004
                                                  Video
                                                  Chip (*)
                                                                               TLWA1100
                                  (*) NT1004 or                                LED
                                  NT1003 options                               (Array)
                                                                                                        Copyright 2005 Martin Dudziak, PhD
                                 CerviScan STEM
                                     Image                   Cam/LED                       Data
                                     Recognitio              Control                       Collection
Version 1 BioScan Architecture




                                     n /                     Processor                     Processor
                                     Classifier              Module (*)                    Module (*)
                                     Processor
                                     Module (*)
                                     (*) ST-20/40. ST FIVE, ARM7, StrongARM
                                     (Dragonball), CY8C2xxxx, xX256, TE502 (SoC or
                                     16/32 micro + Flash + SRAM chipset solutions for
                                     each logical module function
                                 CerviScan BASE
                                                                                        Belkin
                                                                                        USB
                                 USB Cable Interface                                    VideoBus
                                                                                        II Logic
                                         Charger                   Li ion
                                                                                            Lucent/
                                         Interface                 Battery




                                                                                                        6/2/2008
                                                                                            Proxim
                                                                                            Wireless
                                                                                            Logic
Conclusions

•        GSR / GIS databases can adapt to handling data produced by a Nomad Eyes
         type network

•        In each C-B-R-N-E category there exist today sensors with capability for
         inclusion in a distributed network of mobile wi-fi devices

•        Inverse methods can be successfully for accuracy and computational
         performance) be applied to the problem of analyzing massive amounts of low-
         accuracy, high-noise data from reporting sources

•        Interpretation of sensor-analyzer data will benefit from adjunct and meta data
         about the environment, such as provided by today’s GSR / GIS products

•        Universality and reusability of network collection and transmission devices
         simplifies human interface, training, time-lag and reduces errors.




    6/2/2008                   Copyright 2005 Martin Dudziak, PhD                         37
Current Technology Development Status



 •      The electronics hardware for the mobile wireless image capture and
        collection has been radically simplified.
 •      Pre-contract agreements with suppliers and partners in the electronics
        hardware domain have been established.
 •      Matching fund agreements for phase-1 work have been obtained.
 •      The software development has proceeded extensively during 2001-2004
        and includes work using SOAR, GeNie, BNJ, JESS, and PNL, plus
        extensive work in the application of inverse method models.
 •      Project work can be resumed and a substantial team of technical personnel
        can be activated within 1 to 3 months.




 6/2/2008                  Copyright 2005 Martin Dudziak, PhD                   38
The Operational Dimension




•       The Tetrad “Teen Network” Experiments – US, RU, DE
    –       (How secure is Stanford U’s own security system? Not very, apparently)
•       Futures Gateway and the Unusual Doors It Opened
•       Invitations from Strange Quarters
    –       Chechnya-Dagestan and the CEED Project – a Frontline Information Attack Center?
    –       RAD Trading – knowing how and where to go fishin’ (and phishin’)
    –       SOCA
    –       Blackwater
•       Reusable Technology with Proven Experience – CMP from the Inner Banks
•       KERBEROS (not the well-known MIT protocol)
    –       “MX” for hyper-encrypted, distributed data
    –       Constantly-moving virtual sites
•       NSCIP – aiming to tie it all together
    –       ICT’s interesting ideas
    –       Fighting fire with fire




    6/2/2008                          Copyright 2005 Martin Dudziak, PhD                      39
References
 •      Early Nomad Eyes prototype including online co-development
        experiment
        http://tetradgroup.com/nomad/
 •      Early overview document (product oriented, high-level)
        http://tetradgroup.com/library/bioscan.doc
 •      Technical documents and notes available, on archived CDs
 •      Early published paper on the neural net component
        http://tetradgroup.com/library/bistablecam_ijcnn99.doc
 •      ADaM extract-transfer-load system, critical for the super-fast
        movement of image data, triggering of agents, and coordination of
        images within patient-specific and feature-specific database views
        http://tetradgroup.com/library/ADaM_Design_Description1-1.doc
 •      ADaM performance optimization, a key part of the system enabling
        massive throughput and parallelism for high-density imaging (not
        only for BioScan but more for MRI, CT, PET, 3d-ultrasound, digital
        x-ray) http://tetradgroup.com/ADaM_PerfOpt.doc
 6/2/2008                Copyright 2005 Martin Dudziak, PhD             40
Contact




• Martin Dudziak, PhD
    – (804) 740-0342
    – (202) 415-7295
    – martin@forteplan.com (also mjdudziak@yahoo.com)




                 TETRAD Technologies Group, Inc.
                 28 Chase Gayton Circle, Suite 736
                    Richmond, VA 23238-6533

6/2/2008              Copyright 2005 Martin Dudziak, PhD   41
BACKUP Material




6/2/2008   Copyright 2005 Martin Dudziak, PhD   42
Five Project Themes (focus could be on the Network/Security aspects)

  (1)
  Chechen and Central Asian Initiatives and Methods in Nonconventional Radiation-Based
  Terrorist Devices

  (2)
  Design and Simulated Implementation of a PRED Campaign directed against high-volume
  general public pedestrian and spectator traffic

  (3)
  Design and Simulated Implementation of the Seizure and Theft/Dispersion of a Radioisotope-
  based PRED

  (4)
  Comparison, Trade-off Evaluation and Synthesis of Israeli, German, Dutch, Swiss, and Russian
  Countermeasures against Rad-Bio-Chem and Selective Individual-Carrier Conventional
  Terrorist Devices

  (5)
  Analysis of Key Contemporary Weaknesses in Russian Federation and Latin American
  Countermeasures against Rad-Bio-Chem WMD Component Production and Distribution


  These can be modified to fit the needs including those of partners and internal, friendly clients
  like BW
  6/2/2008                        Copyright 2005 Martin Dudziak, PhD                                43
Some other project themes discussed recently


 ♦ “Where is Osama” Parts of Martin’s NSCIP team includes fellow mathematicians and
 complexity/cryptography gurus from Harvard, Boston, and a few other places and we have an
 approach on how to better localize and predict movements of key people and materiel. Can we
 help find Osama or Basayev or al-Zarqawi? Not sure. But it does look like we could track some
 things better and aid in the forecasting of attacks and thereby reduce some ugly surprises.

 ♦ Al Qaeda Recruitment – If we are able to team up with ICT in Israel and a few other select
 groups in the US and EU, we can have a very intelligent siphon to not only Middle Eastern but
 other terrorist-inclined and supportive people, as in individuals, fammilies, groups, companies. We
 know how to implement this and keep it appropriately under wraps. This is at the core of the
 NSCIP model. We have the shell built and plenty of expertise from our partners.

 ♦ Project Anti-Genoa – Genoa, revamped as “Total Information Awareness,” wanted to find
 needles in haystacks – mountainous haystacks. Our approach is different. First, Think Like a
 Terrorist. Get into the groove, the mindset. Martin has been there, lived it, breathed it. Now he
 can put together a Knowledge Discovery and Inference system that is more like a magnet for
 finding needles in small dustpiles, not humongous haystacks. We did our Homework.

 ♦ KISS (and I don’t mean the rock group) – We can apply some technology and business model in
 a way that creates a very effective operation for gathering and assessing intelligence about
 activities and infrastructures supporting the Jihad.


  6/2/2008                       Copyright 2005 Martin Dudziak, PhD                                  44
Braithwaite and Cross, LLC

(for example)


Registered in an appropriate European domicile
Formed by acquisition of prior smaller company
Office presence in Basel & Moscow
Some reputation in the world of anti-tampering, anti-counterfeiting world, also
a portfolio of business activity relating to polymer-based materials useful for
protection of bodies, vehicles, buildings
Involved in small-cap venture funding of projects involving more of the same
Known to have a reputation for being able to find hard-to-access equipment of
all sorts but especially in the chemical, bio and radiation detection area




6/2/2008                 Copyright 2005 Martin Dudziak, PhD                  45
Braithwaite and Cross, LLC
We are definitely not the type one would associate with established agencies and we have
the carefully crafted histories and personalities to confirm this. We are more concerned
about “friendly fire” because of how well we blend in.




     Essentially, we provide our sponsors with timely and accurate results.

6/2/2008                    Copyright 2005 Martin Dudziak, PhD                        46
OPA BACKUP Material




6/2/2008     Copyright 2005 Martin Dudziak, PhD   47
Basic Principles of OPA Operation (1)

Amperometric analysis of organophosphates (OPs), carbamates and other specific
and nonspecific inhibitors of butyrylcholinesterase (BChE).
BChE activity) is inversely related to inhibitor concentrations.
The analytical principle is based on the detection of hydrogen peroxide, released
as a result of two consequent enzymatic processes:
                              BChE
     Butyrylcholine + H2O → Choline + Butyryc acid                        (1)


                                     ChO
           Choline + 2O2 + H2O → Betain + 2H2O2                     (2)


Hydrogen peroxide is released at the final step and is detected through the
electrode.



6/2/2008                   Copyright 2005 Martin Dudziak, PhD                       48
Basic Principles of OPA Operation (2)

Enzymes are fixed on a graphite support in the microelectrodes using layer-by-
layer self-assembling nanofilm technology. At present, single-enzyme electrodes
modified by oxidoreductases (cholineoidase of tyrosinase) are available for
sensitive chemical analysis of choline and phenol.
The first prototype of the hand-portable measuring unit was developed and tested
for simple analyte detection: hydrogen peroxide, glucose, choline.
This system is based upon the prior and currently available automated desktop
system capable of processing up to 24 liquid samples per removable tray. This
system can be adapted to an air condenser system for processing upwards of 450
L volumes into 10ml samples within approx. 10 minutes.




6/2/2008                 Copyright 2005 Martin Dudziak, PhD                        49
OPA Sensitivity (2)



Numerous analytical approaches describing anticholinesterase detection are
published every year in the scientific literature, but they remain distant from
practical commercial application that can meet the demands of widespread
deployment, transit and movement, operations within intolerant physical
environments and conditions, and operation by personnel who are not expert
technicians. These are but a few of the problems that other systems face and that
our solution overcomes.

A possible reason for the difficulties with other technical approaches and
architectures is that primary attention is paid to the development of the sensitive
element but not both the sensitive element and the measuring device. Because at
present, water quality assays are based mainly on gas chromatography/gas
chromatography with mass-spectrometry techniques. A brief comparison of
performance characteristics with those that can be realized uniformly from the
handheld analyzer follows:


6/2/2008                  Copyright 2005 Martin Dudziak, PhD                      50
BioScan BACKUP Material




6/2/2008       Copyright 2005 Martin Dudziak, PhD   51
Resources

•       The following images and charts give a snapshot introduction to a few of the tool
        components that were developed and applied in the BioScan R&D process. Not all
        of these images reflect BioScan directly, cervical cancer, or skin-related imaging.
•       These images are provided to show some of what was produced and can be deployed
        now to either a new Bioscan initiative or to other projects, unrelated to BioScan, for
        which the same expertise (including mathematical modeling, image analysis,
        electronics design and testing, database and knowledgebase implementation) can be
        very easily applied.


                                    Wireless Telemed Interface




       Macromolecular
     Networks Simulation                                                 Verite interactive pattern
                                                                          detection/classification


6/2/2008                      Copyright 2005 Martin Dudziak, PhD                                  52
Resources (More)




                                                                                                                                                                    e-Presents conferencing and
Another Verite application, with EKG                                                                                                                               muilti-channel video streaming
                                                    ADaM’s exceptional performance
                                                                  16000



                                                                  14000



                                                                  12000                                                                                                                                         Typical Fastload
                                                                                                                                                                                                                Typical Tpump
                                                                                                                                                                                                                Typical Mixed
                                                                  10000
                                                                                                                                                                                                                Peak Fastload


                                                       Rows/Sec
                                                                                                                                                                                                                Peak Tpump
                                                                    8000                                                                                                                                        Peak Fstld & Tpump
                                                                                                                                                                                                                Transparent FastL
                                                                                                                                                                                                                Transparent Tpump
                                                                    6000
                                                                                                                                                                                                                Special FastL
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6/2/2008                               Copyright 2005 Martin Dudziak, PhD                                                                                                                                      53
Resources (Still More)               Screenshots of SOAR-based production-rule system




6/2/2008              Copyright 2005 Martin Dudziak, PhD                                   54
Contact


• Martin Dudziak, PhD
    – (804) 740-0342
    – (202) 415-7295
    – martin@forteplan.com (also mjdudziak@yahoo.com)




                TETRAD Technologies Group, Inc.
                28 Chase Gayton Circle, Suite 736
                   Richmond, VA 23238-6533

6/2/2008              Copyright 2005 Martin Dudziak, PhD   55

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A3 12jul05 V01

  • 1. Asymmetric Approaches to Anomaly Analysis Martin Joseph Dudziak 2+2 > 4 July 13, 2005
  • 2. Different approaches to immune defense systems • Total isolation (plastic tent, Great Wall, Maginot Line…) • Vaccination (smallpox, influenza) • Camouflage and adaptability • “Become as thy enemy” Nomad Eyes is a systemic, “organic” architecture for early warning and prediction, interdiction, prevention and response. The fundamental model is based upon the use of both inverse and forward reasoning to detect both anomalies within predictable linear systems and unstable recurrent patterns within highly nonlinear dynamical systems. These events include internet activity as well as specific sensor events. The goal is to create associations that match predictable, expected sequences of activity consistent with aggravated, intentional assaults such as the planning of terrorist attacks. A key principle is to create models and plans “in the first person” from the perspective of the attacker and to treat the information flow as an encrypted process not dissimilar from conventional message encryption but involving actions and stages in a larger strategic plan. 6/2/2008 Copyright 2005 Martin Dudziak, PhD 2
  • 3. Nomad Eyes is one effort to answer the Threat • Distributed multi-modal sensing and real-time data acquisition • External (physical) events plus internet traffic and events • Based upon “thinking like a terrorist, not a defender” • Network security and information warfare as a key toolset for the defense of the streets, subways, airways and more “Philosophical” Foundations 1. Early warning, prevention, interdiction and response should be integrated, including information and services, including systems, tools, devices 2. Civilian and labor populations must be deeply integrated in all activities 3. “Low-tech” in massive numbers, properly analyzed and controlled, can be stronger than isolated super-high-tech that can be avoided, circumvented 4. Use the “tao of noise” principle – don’t try to analyze the whole turbulence of data but seek small, unstable patterns that recur and look for associations between them that fit a higher-scale pattern or logic 6/2/2008 Copyright 2005 Martin Dudziak, PhD 3
  • 4. Two interesting quotes that inspired Nomad Eyes development “Grey suits in offices running a spy network will never be an effective measure to reduce the threat.” Ahmad Hmoud, Jordan “Your security is in your own hands.” Attributed to Osama bin Laden @ 10/27/04 6/2/2008 Copyright 2005 Martin Dudziak, PhD 4
  • 5. A challenge for you as you listen and read what follows How much of this (Nomad Eyes, et al) could have been in place in 2001? By now in 2005? How much was held back by conventional thinking? By “hyper” security/classification barriers? By selfish competition? By inertia? How much of Nomad Eyes thinking and technology is already being implemented by al Qaeda and their allies? 6/2/2008 Copyright 2005 Martin Dudziak, PhD 5
  • 6. Introduction – Roots and Objectives • Smooth transition and integration of methods and systems for CBRNE in both combat, post-combat, and civilian environments • Integration of CBRNE prediction, forecasting, detection, countermeasures with geospatial representation and analysis (more than GIS) • Incorporation of several maturing technologies and familiar methodologies: – Mobile, wireless, wearable, portable – Platform-independence, “plug and play” – Commercial, conventional, cheap, familiar, cast-away – Inverse methods, nonlinear methods, hybrid probabilistic reasoning • Adaptation of CBRNE and GIS to changing models of conflict, warfare and military-civilian discipline/collaboration • “Reusable and reconfigurable” is not only about cost-savings 6/2/2008 Copyright 2005 Martin Dudziak, PhD 6
  • 7. Introduction - Objections • Too ambitious a goal and too many differences between CBRNE situations in the combat field and diverse homeland sectors - “apples and oranges” • Too difficult to attempt assimilation of high-noise sources and low-sensitivity sensors • Consumer-grade technology not sufficiently specialized or robust • Problem of false-positives, esp. in bio and rad domains • Requires massive deployment and training - too expensive and too long • Simply too difficult, too much bureaucracy, interagency problems, well- entrenched conventionalists, etc. 6/2/2008 Copyright 2005 Martin Dudziak, PhD 7
  • 8. Systemic Foundations • Nomad Eyes architecture for open-ended deployment of sensor-analyzers • Use of inverse methods (from wave scattering and subsurface imaging) with Bayesian and RETE reasoning for analysis of distributed array data • Focus on a few target problems and technical (sensing) solutions – radiation sensors – chemical (organo-phosphate) sensors • Role of the GS and GIS is threefold: – Locate sensor reports over time and provide correlation – Locate both at-risk and risk-potential humans, machines, resources – Predict likely targets and movements • High-speed real-time database “ETL” and other VLDB processing is necessary to keep track of changes in data collection and geospatial object movement 6/2/2008 Copyright 2005 Martin Dudziak, PhD 8
  • 9. Nomad Eyes™ Architecture and Principles (I) Prevention by Detection of Terrakt Planning Operations Movement of multiple types of components, not only RAD substances Time-matching and space-matching of logically connective, supportive events “Sensor Fusion” of the Unordinary (Необычный) Kind - Tracer RAD readings perhaps not individually remarkable Photos of suspicious individuals and vehicles that have some “matches” Exceptional shipping orders, out-of-sequence, special-route, handling Parallel transit/shipment/transaction of non-contraband components useful in an RDD (PRED) Goal toward Inverse Reasoning and Abductive Assimilation with other KBs / Xsys Fall-Back Value: Emergency public alerts and First-Responder capabilities • Observations that point to possible events, plans for a future undertaking • Observations with imminent value indicating an operation in progress • Observations of value for the investigation and forensic processes after an event 6/2/2008 Copyright 2005 Martin Dudziak, PhD 9
  • 10. Nomad Eyes = Compound Eyes Multiple TYPES of sensor data Multiple INSTANCES at multiple TIMES INVERSE Methods applied “as if” in surface/subsurface imaging: the task is to find what events and processes may be the modifiers of known or deducible behaviors USING •Abductive rules •Bayesian probabilistic inference •Fuzzy inference •Heuristics and “common sense” rules For all the value of sophisticated detectors, an “outlier” element or two could make all the difference: Requests for building or water/sewer line plans Repeat-visits of unusual vehicle or people “Non-sequitur” orders of shielding-quality materials Unusual change in shipping order or pickup 6/2/2008 Copyright 2005 Martin Dudziak, PhD 10
  • 11. Threat Environment Where are the likely targets and means? In the public mind’s-eye and Angst And the less-likely form for many reasons Psycho-Shock is the Aim and Nuclear Radiation is Powerful even in non-lethal doses The same for Chem-Bio Mass-dispersion with uncertain contact and degree will create the most widespread fears 6/2/2008 Copyright 2005 Martin Dudziak, PhD 11
  • 12. Newport-Norfolk (Hampton Roads) 6/2/2008 Copyright 2005 Martin Dudziak, PhD 12
  • 13. Port of Baltimore > 30M tons per year, mainly containers 2M+ residents in Baltimore and surrounding urban center Main East-Coast rail and interstate highways traverse region 6/2/2008 Copyright 2005 Martin Dudziak, PhD 13
  • 14. RDD/Chem/Bio in the context of Prime Goals Considering SEP Disruption and Destabilization as the “prime-directive” of terrorist organizations capable/active in planning RDD and chem-bio tactics • Most likely choice is with massive dispersion through conventional+inflammatory attack • Spread the most compounds in the most uncertain paths among the largest number of possible affected victims • Affect the maximum number of structures including transportation routes • Aim for closure and disruption of normal use/traffic - it does not have to be for years, just months or weeks • Multiple small disruptive attacks easier and more effective than one block-buster 6/2/2008 Copyright 2005 Martin Dudziak, PhD 14
  • 15. Network Deployment - Where and How • Static but ad-hoc – Passage locations and nexus points for cargo and transfer vehicles – Likeliest places but not limited to one configuration • Pseudo-random • Personal mobile units – Assigned to staff personnel – Personal cell phones • Unpredictable - a “two-edged sword” that cuts in in favor of the Defenders – Inverse predictive models can be applied better to the data “mass” – Al Qaeda (or “X”) cannot predict where are our eyes and ears • Sun Tzu (“Art of War”) - Always Make Your Enemy Nervous 6/2/2008 Copyright 2005 Martin Dudziak, PhD 15
  • 16. First Responder Capability as well Notify Maximum Numbers of People ASAP after Terrakt Redirect Survivors Keep Other People Away Assist People Finding Loved Ones Provide Essential Life-Saving Information Real-Time Coordinate and Inform First-Responder Teams Locations of People Active Sensor Array including useful data from public Coordinate with volunteers 6/2/2008 Copyright 2005 Martin Dudziak, PhD 16
  • 17. Nomad Eyes™ Architecture and Principles (II) EVENT ! Class (x) objects received by servers results in generation of n graphs representing hypothetical x y… relational maps; the majority are discarded, but events of interest trigger feedback to both autonomous and human-based nodes for additional collection and reorienting. No node or subset of nodes is reliant and the whole may be considered as a dynamic-geometry cellular automata. EVENT ! 6/2/2008 Copyright 2005 Martin Dudziak, PhD 17
  • 18. Nomad Eyes - Mobile Wireless Portable/Handheld Nets for an Asymmetric, Dynamic Countermeasure System For Rad Terrorism but also for other types and necessarily looking for all, not only one Mobile units using both cellular and wireless internet/intranets Freeform but adhering to industry standards Incorporating the General Public Incorporating the commercial sector (advertising and consumer products) Asynchronous, Atypical, Asymmetric Sensor Fusion 6/2/2008 Copyright 2005 Martin Dudziak, PhD 18
  • 19. I3 Foundations Inverse, Nonlinear, Counter-Intuitive (sometimes) Source The Object causes diffusion and scattering of the Beam but the laws governing propagation and movement in different media are known or can be ascertained. Working backwards from the Result, one computes and estimates the Object on the basis of how the Beam must have changed in order to produce the Result instead of a pattern, computable, for what there would have been if no Object had been present. Now, transfer this Inverse Model ought of imaging and into the world of semiotics and intensions. Now, one can do inverse thinking from something Sensed and Observed, in actuality, to determine what were some of the intervening steps and processes out of the usual and ordinary process that would have produced something different, most likely less complex. 6/2/2008 Copyright 2005 Martin Dudziak, PhD 19
  • 20. Exotic Technology Translated into Plain English: Problem 1: Small tumors or microscopic probes or nanosized drug delivery agents are in the liver - how to accurately track, compare, recognize, and localize when the patient is moving and the body is constantly changing? Problem 2: Radioactive or chemical compounds are passing through a shipping port or through the public waterworks - how to identify a pattern and link a set of events and detections into a pattern that shows a natural or deliberate process which can be detected, localized, and treated with countermeasures? The IRM (Inverse Relational Map) approach is one of several using inverse problem modeling plus other nonlinear dynamic structures and functions in order to produce not only usable answers but answers in real-time. Many of the underlying maths and algorithms have been known and used before in other disciplines. Our approach is to try something new, primarily in the short cuts and speed-ups gained through applying higher-level representations and heuristics that can significantly reduce the compute-cycle and delays. 6/2/2008 Copyright 2005 Martin Dudziak, PhD 20
  • 21. I3 Examples: Problem 1: Radioactive or chemical compounds are passing through a shipping port or through the public waterworks - how to identify a pattern and link a set of events and detections into a pattern that shows a natural or deliberate process which can be detected, localized, and treated with countermeasures? Problem 2: Small tumors or microscopic probes or nanosized drug delivery agents are in the liver - how to accurately track, compare, recognize, and localize when the patient is moving and the body is constantly changing? The IRM (Inverse Relational Map) approach is one of several using inverse problem modeling plus other nonlinear dynamic structures and functions in order to produce not only usable answers but answers in real-time. Many of the underlying mathematics and algorithms have been known and used before in other disciplines. Our approach is to try something new, primarily in the short cuts and speed-ups gained through applying higher-level representations and heuristics that can significantly reduce the compute-cycle and delays. 6/2/2008 Copyright 2005 Martin Dudziak, PhD 21
  • 22. Making Sense of the Data (I) • Basic diffusion equation - usable as starting point for inverse problems ∂ 2u 1 ∂u Particular credits - Roger Dufour, MIT 2 = u( x ,0) = f ( x ) u(0, t ) = u(a, t ) = 0 ∂x k ∂t • Time-transition is accomplished in Fourier domain ∞  x 2 a  x f ( x ) = ∑ fn sin πn  fn = ∫ f ( x ) sin πn dx n =1  a a 0  a ∞  n u( x , t ) = ∑ fne −k ( πn a ) t 2 sin π  n =1  a • Transition backwards in time requires amplification of high frequency components - most likely to be noisy and skewed 6/2/2008 Copyright 2005 Martin Dudziak, PhD 22
  • 23. Making Sense of the Data (II) • Heuristic and a priori constraints needed to maintain physical realism and suppress distortions from inverse process Particular credits - Roger Dufour, MIT • First-pass solution best match or interpolation among a set of acceptable alternatives € x = arg min Ax − y s.t. x∈X x • Final solution may minimize the residual error and the regularization term 2 2 € x = arg min Ax − y 2 + λ L( x − x ) 2 x Regularization offers fidelity to the observed data and an a priori determined (e.g., higher-scale-observed) solution model 6/2/2008 Copyright 2005 Martin Dudziak, PhD 23
  • 24. Making Sense of the Data (III) • Diffusion _ Attraction • Modeling situations and schemas Particular credits - J. P. Thirion, INRIA as composite “images” in n-D • Iterative process with exploration of parallel tree paths – Speculative track; not required for Nomad Eyes sensor fusion to be useful to analysts – Purpose is to enable automation of the analysis and forecasting post-collection process – Area of active current research 6/2/2008 Copyright 2005 Martin Dudziak, PhD 24
  • 25. Making Sense of the Data (IV) - I3BAT • Multiple modalities Sensor 1 Sensor 2 – Acoustic, EM, Optical, Text, NLP, SQL, AI-reasoning… • All looking at the same topic of interest (aka “region”) • Each sensitive to different physical/logical properties Property 3 – “Trigger” data – Contiguity (space/time) – Inference relations Property 2 – “Hits” with conventional DB Property 1 queries (immigration, known associations, other Background investigations) • Compare with Terrorist Cadre Tactic models (schemas, maps) Particular credits - Eric Miller, NEU 6/2/2008 Copyright 2005 Martin Dudziak, PhD 25
  • 26. CONFIG SETUP (ETLJOB ADB (Initialize) ADaM - making it real-time ETLSPEC) System & Meta Data Agent-Driven Data Mover ORCHESTRATOR (ORCH) • If you cannot collate, coordinate and efficiently MONITO R ETLP access the collected data, in Generato real-time, free-form (with functional r space respect to views and users) and without blocking users Transformer during backup and archiving Transformer periods, then you have a very Transformer inefficient database and it is Extractor Insrtor not conducive to the open- Extractor Insertor Extractor Loader ended purposes of BioScan Control Monitor or Nomad Eyes. Memory Memory • The ADaM software Docs outperformed that from NCR- Data Thread Docs and Memory and Teradata with their own Files Pool product as a data Files Databas Databas warehouse. It outperformed es Machine es ab Initio, a leader in the field space of Extract-Transfer-Load for ADaM runtime modules Setup and configuration Fortune 100 VLDB modules applications. ADaM runtime components Internal elements External data flow sources/destinations 6/2/2008 Copyright 2005 Martin Dudziak, PhD 26
  • 27. ADaM Dynamic Processes (ETLP) P_graph of ETLS (2) - - + 0 - 0 - - - + 0 0 Actor objects - 0 - (nodes) 0 ETLPs (with ETL Set (with actors) ETLPs) - - - - ETL Set (with + + ETLPs) 0 0 - 0 - - 0 - 0 0 P_graph of ETLP (5) - - - - + 0 + - 0 - - - 0 P_graph of Exec - 0 - - (1) - 0 + 0 + 0 0 - 0 - ADaM exec - 0 - (program) 0 0 6/2/2008 Copyright 2005 Martin Dudziak, PhD 27
  • 28. Looking for Eddies in the Inferno • 1. Kuramato-Sivashinsky (dissipative extended systems) – Ut = (u2)x – ux x - νux x x x • 2. 3-D Navier-Stokes as the general traffic paradigm – Return to Hopf: – Repertoires of distinguishable patterns – Finite spatial resolution finite time finite alphabet of admissible patterns • 3. Back to Bletchley Park – Looking for “bombes” – no pun intended!!! – Identifying possible, reasonable alphabets (hieroglyphics) of field operations – Moving from characters and codes to patterns of activity and process: • Selected target data and telephony network traffic • Directed graph models (ETLP style) of regional and point-to-point physical traffic • Focusing on the abstract relationships, the potential background, not the foreground!!!!! • 4. The other side of an Anomaly is a Consistency, a Tell-Tale Heartbeat… – u(t) + uxxx + kuux = 0, but in terms far more complex than simple E, ν, ω ! – Increased silence is as important as increases in chatter! 6/2/2008 Copyright 2005 Martin Dudziak, PhD 28
  • 29. Example Scenario • 1. Multi-modal attack on Washington Metro – “Ring” targets to maximize numbers inside tunnels and stations – Demobilize or “weaponize” air circulation network – Shift modus operandi (e.g., no knapsacks, more upscale) – Conventional explosives plus sarin and/or anthrax or Am(24x) – Aim to lock-down the system through multiple strikes – High-use/dependence on networked data/comms strikes against networks to disable first response abilities, reaction, coordination • 2. Network traffic anomalies to expect – Increases, decreases – Purchases, switches in mobile services – Increases in new internet activity among similar groups, configurations of traffic • 3. Disruption targets – Police/fire/ER – Medical centers – Potential for concurrent major across-the-board D-o-S attacks • 4. Remember that whatever we are looking for… – They know it, too, and they know what we are looking for (in general) – They are chameleons on the Go – Even a well-camouflaged animal in the jungle gives away its position when it moves but only if you are looking not just in some narrow focus but able to take in the bigger field of vision (as in green snakes on banana plants) 6/2/2008 Copyright 2005 Martin Dudziak, PhD 29
  • 30. Sensor Device Family • 1. OPA ™ Organo-Phosphate Analyzer – Nitrates, Organophosphates (e.g., Sarin, VX) (OPA ™) – OPA in beta development with matching-fund opps • 2. MagnetEyes ™ – Thin-film based magneto-optic sensing and imaging devices for desktop, industrial, and micro-scale applications in security, anti-counterfeiting, structural engineering, and biomedicine. Deployment-Ready • 3. BioScan ™ – Handheld wireless base for plug-compatible interface-standardized sensors and imaging • 4. Radiation sensors – Gamma and neutron detection – Compatible for GPS-locatable mobile wireless (telephony and wi-fi) devices 6/2/2008 Copyright 2005 Martin Dudziak, PhD 30
  • 31. OPA ™ Portable Version The assay of OPs and other BChE inhibitors is achieved due to the use of nanostructured films based on polyelectrolytes and the bi-enzyme system cholineoxidase / butyrylcholinesterase (ChO/BChE). Conventional nerve agent organo- phosphates (Sarin, VX. GB) and carbamate type ChE-inhibitors can be detected at extremely low levels. Sensitivity for organophosphates (DFP, paraoxon, trichlorfon) is achievable @ 10 pM/L. • Automated version processes up to 24 samples For classical nerve agents the in sequence detection limits will be an order of • Portable unit can be adapted magnitude better; for instance, with air sampling and carbamates (carbofuran, carbetamid, condenser carbaryl) at @ 0.1 -1.0 nM/L. 6/2/2008 Copyright 2005 Martin Dudziak, PhD 31
  • 32. OPA Comparative Sensitivity (1) Parameters Gas chromatograph GC with mass- PolyEnergetics spectrometer portable handheld Sensitivity (SN – 1.0 0.5 0.1 sanitary norm) System price (USD) 10K – 20K 150K – 400K 400 Test cost (USD) 12 15 4 Microchip sensor n/a n/a 1 element cost (USD) Time to perform test hours hours 30-70 min. Sample preparation hours hours 10-20 min. Field analysis Not possible Not possible Yes Organic solvents Necessary Necessary No Reagent consumption High High Low Sample volume No No Yes 6/2/2008 Copyright 2005 Martin Dudziak, PhD 32
  • 33. OPA Comparative Sensitivity (2) Parameters Agilent 6890N (Gas PolyEnergetics Chromatography) portable handheld SN in air for: Sarin (1x10-5 mg/m3) Sarin (2x10-8 mg/m3) Sarin (2x10-7 mg/m3) GB (5x10-6 mg/m3) GB (not tested) GB (1x10-7 mg/m3) VX (1x10-5- 5x10- VX (3-5x10-8mg/m3) 7mg/m3) VX (5x10-8 mg/m3) SN in water for: --- Sarin (5x10-6 mg/m3) Sarin (5x10-5 mg/m3) --- GB (not tested) GB (5x10-6 mg/m3) --- VX (1-2x10-6mg/m3) VX (2x10-6 mg/m3) 6/2/2008 Copyright 2005 Martin Dudziak, PhD 33
  • 34. Radiation sensor specs (targets) Parameter Range -25 -1 -80 -1 Gamma sensitivity 200 +80 s (µSv/h) 2cps(µR/h) to 100 -25 s (µSv/h) 1cps(µR/h) +300 -1 +200 -1 Neutron sensitivity 200 -25 s (µSv/h) 2cps(µR/h) to 100 -25 s (µSv/h) 1cps(µR/h) Gamma energy range 0.04 – 3.0 MeV Neutron energy range 0.03 – 3.0 MeV Dose equiv. rate 1 – 5000 µR/h Dose equiv. error +/- 30% False alarms < 1 per hour Response time (gamma) < 2.5 s U detection 15g at 0.5m, velocity <= 0.5 m/s, background rad < 25 µR/h Pu detection 0.5g at 0.5m, velocity <= 0.5 m/s, background rad < 25 µR/h Isotopes and materials U-235, U-238, Np-237, Puy-239, Pu-241, Cr-51, Ga-67, Pd-103, In- detectable 111, I-131, Tl-201, Xe-133, Co-57, Co-60, Ba-133, Cs-137, Ir-192, Se-75, Ra-226, Am-241 and others Battery lifetime > 20 hrs. with average cell-phone usage (i.e., reduction of cell phone battery life to not less than one typical day) Weight < 100g Dimensions smaller than 150mm x 50mm x 20mm Cost per unit feasible to manufacture for under $50.00 in quantities > 10,000 6/2/2008 Copyright 2005 Martin Dudziak, PhD 34
  • 35. Today’s consumer-class RAD components Our simple conversion with Nomad Eyes™ Existing mobile phone Li-ion A/D logic Nomadiks logic or other Rad-sensor element mProc Interface logic to wireless internet 6/2/2008 Copyright 2005 Martin Dudziak, PhD 35
  • 36. 36 CerviScan HEAD NT1004 Video Chip (*) TLWA1100 (*) NT1004 or LED NT1003 options (Array) Copyright 2005 Martin Dudziak, PhD CerviScan STEM Image Cam/LED Data Recognitio Control Collection Version 1 BioScan Architecture n / Processor Processor Classifier Module (*) Module (*) Processor Module (*) (*) ST-20/40. ST FIVE, ARM7, StrongARM (Dragonball), CY8C2xxxx, xX256, TE502 (SoC or 16/32 micro + Flash + SRAM chipset solutions for each logical module function CerviScan BASE Belkin USB USB Cable Interface VideoBus II Logic Charger Li ion Lucent/ Interface Battery 6/2/2008 Proxim Wireless Logic
  • 37. Conclusions • GSR / GIS databases can adapt to handling data produced by a Nomad Eyes type network • In each C-B-R-N-E category there exist today sensors with capability for inclusion in a distributed network of mobile wi-fi devices • Inverse methods can be successfully for accuracy and computational performance) be applied to the problem of analyzing massive amounts of low- accuracy, high-noise data from reporting sources • Interpretation of sensor-analyzer data will benefit from adjunct and meta data about the environment, such as provided by today’s GSR / GIS products • Universality and reusability of network collection and transmission devices simplifies human interface, training, time-lag and reduces errors. 6/2/2008 Copyright 2005 Martin Dudziak, PhD 37
  • 38. Current Technology Development Status • The electronics hardware for the mobile wireless image capture and collection has been radically simplified. • Pre-contract agreements with suppliers and partners in the electronics hardware domain have been established. • Matching fund agreements for phase-1 work have been obtained. • The software development has proceeded extensively during 2001-2004 and includes work using SOAR, GeNie, BNJ, JESS, and PNL, plus extensive work in the application of inverse method models. • Project work can be resumed and a substantial team of technical personnel can be activated within 1 to 3 months. 6/2/2008 Copyright 2005 Martin Dudziak, PhD 38
  • 39. The Operational Dimension • The Tetrad “Teen Network” Experiments – US, RU, DE – (How secure is Stanford U’s own security system? Not very, apparently) • Futures Gateway and the Unusual Doors It Opened • Invitations from Strange Quarters – Chechnya-Dagestan and the CEED Project – a Frontline Information Attack Center? – RAD Trading – knowing how and where to go fishin’ (and phishin’) – SOCA – Blackwater • Reusable Technology with Proven Experience – CMP from the Inner Banks • KERBEROS (not the well-known MIT protocol) – “MX” for hyper-encrypted, distributed data – Constantly-moving virtual sites • NSCIP – aiming to tie it all together – ICT’s interesting ideas – Fighting fire with fire 6/2/2008 Copyright 2005 Martin Dudziak, PhD 39
  • 40. References • Early Nomad Eyes prototype including online co-development experiment http://tetradgroup.com/nomad/ • Early overview document (product oriented, high-level) http://tetradgroup.com/library/bioscan.doc • Technical documents and notes available, on archived CDs • Early published paper on the neural net component http://tetradgroup.com/library/bistablecam_ijcnn99.doc • ADaM extract-transfer-load system, critical for the super-fast movement of image data, triggering of agents, and coordination of images within patient-specific and feature-specific database views http://tetradgroup.com/library/ADaM_Design_Description1-1.doc • ADaM performance optimization, a key part of the system enabling massive throughput and parallelism for high-density imaging (not only for BioScan but more for MRI, CT, PET, 3d-ultrasound, digital x-ray) http://tetradgroup.com/ADaM_PerfOpt.doc 6/2/2008 Copyright 2005 Martin Dudziak, PhD 40
  • 41. Contact • Martin Dudziak, PhD – (804) 740-0342 – (202) 415-7295 – martin@forteplan.com (also mjdudziak@yahoo.com) TETRAD Technologies Group, Inc. 28 Chase Gayton Circle, Suite 736 Richmond, VA 23238-6533 6/2/2008 Copyright 2005 Martin Dudziak, PhD 41
  • 42. BACKUP Material 6/2/2008 Copyright 2005 Martin Dudziak, PhD 42
  • 43. Five Project Themes (focus could be on the Network/Security aspects) (1) Chechen and Central Asian Initiatives and Methods in Nonconventional Radiation-Based Terrorist Devices (2) Design and Simulated Implementation of a PRED Campaign directed against high-volume general public pedestrian and spectator traffic (3) Design and Simulated Implementation of the Seizure and Theft/Dispersion of a Radioisotope- based PRED (4) Comparison, Trade-off Evaluation and Synthesis of Israeli, German, Dutch, Swiss, and Russian Countermeasures against Rad-Bio-Chem and Selective Individual-Carrier Conventional Terrorist Devices (5) Analysis of Key Contemporary Weaknesses in Russian Federation and Latin American Countermeasures against Rad-Bio-Chem WMD Component Production and Distribution These can be modified to fit the needs including those of partners and internal, friendly clients like BW 6/2/2008 Copyright 2005 Martin Dudziak, PhD 43
  • 44. Some other project themes discussed recently ♦ “Where is Osama” Parts of Martin’s NSCIP team includes fellow mathematicians and complexity/cryptography gurus from Harvard, Boston, and a few other places and we have an approach on how to better localize and predict movements of key people and materiel. Can we help find Osama or Basayev or al-Zarqawi? Not sure. But it does look like we could track some things better and aid in the forecasting of attacks and thereby reduce some ugly surprises. ♦ Al Qaeda Recruitment – If we are able to team up with ICT in Israel and a few other select groups in the US and EU, we can have a very intelligent siphon to not only Middle Eastern but other terrorist-inclined and supportive people, as in individuals, fammilies, groups, companies. We know how to implement this and keep it appropriately under wraps. This is at the core of the NSCIP model. We have the shell built and plenty of expertise from our partners. ♦ Project Anti-Genoa – Genoa, revamped as “Total Information Awareness,” wanted to find needles in haystacks – mountainous haystacks. Our approach is different. First, Think Like a Terrorist. Get into the groove, the mindset. Martin has been there, lived it, breathed it. Now he can put together a Knowledge Discovery and Inference system that is more like a magnet for finding needles in small dustpiles, not humongous haystacks. We did our Homework. ♦ KISS (and I don’t mean the rock group) – We can apply some technology and business model in a way that creates a very effective operation for gathering and assessing intelligence about activities and infrastructures supporting the Jihad. 6/2/2008 Copyright 2005 Martin Dudziak, PhD 44
  • 45. Braithwaite and Cross, LLC (for example) Registered in an appropriate European domicile Formed by acquisition of prior smaller company Office presence in Basel & Moscow Some reputation in the world of anti-tampering, anti-counterfeiting world, also a portfolio of business activity relating to polymer-based materials useful for protection of bodies, vehicles, buildings Involved in small-cap venture funding of projects involving more of the same Known to have a reputation for being able to find hard-to-access equipment of all sorts but especially in the chemical, bio and radiation detection area 6/2/2008 Copyright 2005 Martin Dudziak, PhD 45
  • 46. Braithwaite and Cross, LLC We are definitely not the type one would associate with established agencies and we have the carefully crafted histories and personalities to confirm this. We are more concerned about “friendly fire” because of how well we blend in. Essentially, we provide our sponsors with timely and accurate results. 6/2/2008 Copyright 2005 Martin Dudziak, PhD 46
  • 47. OPA BACKUP Material 6/2/2008 Copyright 2005 Martin Dudziak, PhD 47
  • 48. Basic Principles of OPA Operation (1) Amperometric analysis of organophosphates (OPs), carbamates and other specific and nonspecific inhibitors of butyrylcholinesterase (BChE). BChE activity) is inversely related to inhibitor concentrations. The analytical principle is based on the detection of hydrogen peroxide, released as a result of two consequent enzymatic processes: BChE Butyrylcholine + H2O → Choline + Butyryc acid (1) ChO Choline + 2O2 + H2O → Betain + 2H2O2 (2) Hydrogen peroxide is released at the final step and is detected through the electrode. 6/2/2008 Copyright 2005 Martin Dudziak, PhD 48
  • 49. Basic Principles of OPA Operation (2) Enzymes are fixed on a graphite support in the microelectrodes using layer-by- layer self-assembling nanofilm technology. At present, single-enzyme electrodes modified by oxidoreductases (cholineoidase of tyrosinase) are available for sensitive chemical analysis of choline and phenol. The first prototype of the hand-portable measuring unit was developed and tested for simple analyte detection: hydrogen peroxide, glucose, choline. This system is based upon the prior and currently available automated desktop system capable of processing up to 24 liquid samples per removable tray. This system can be adapted to an air condenser system for processing upwards of 450 L volumes into 10ml samples within approx. 10 minutes. 6/2/2008 Copyright 2005 Martin Dudziak, PhD 49
  • 50. OPA Sensitivity (2) Numerous analytical approaches describing anticholinesterase detection are published every year in the scientific literature, but they remain distant from practical commercial application that can meet the demands of widespread deployment, transit and movement, operations within intolerant physical environments and conditions, and operation by personnel who are not expert technicians. These are but a few of the problems that other systems face and that our solution overcomes. A possible reason for the difficulties with other technical approaches and architectures is that primary attention is paid to the development of the sensitive element but not both the sensitive element and the measuring device. Because at present, water quality assays are based mainly on gas chromatography/gas chromatography with mass-spectrometry techniques. A brief comparison of performance characteristics with those that can be realized uniformly from the handheld analyzer follows: 6/2/2008 Copyright 2005 Martin Dudziak, PhD 50
  • 51. BioScan BACKUP Material 6/2/2008 Copyright 2005 Martin Dudziak, PhD 51
  • 52. Resources • The following images and charts give a snapshot introduction to a few of the tool components that were developed and applied in the BioScan R&D process. Not all of these images reflect BioScan directly, cervical cancer, or skin-related imaging. • These images are provided to show some of what was produced and can be deployed now to either a new Bioscan initiative or to other projects, unrelated to BioScan, for which the same expertise (including mathematical modeling, image analysis, electronics design and testing, database and knowledgebase implementation) can be very easily applied. Wireless Telemed Interface Macromolecular Networks Simulation Verite interactive pattern detection/classification 6/2/2008 Copyright 2005 Martin Dudziak, PhD 52
  • 53. Resources (More) e-Presents conferencing and Another Verite application, with EKG muilti-channel video streaming ADaM’s exceptional performance 16000 14000 12000 Typical Fastload Typical Tpump Typical Mixed 10000 Peak Fastload Rows/Sec Peak Tpump 8000 Peak Fstld & Tpump Transparent FastL Transparent Tpump 6000 Special FastL "Kitchen Sink" 4000 Peak ETL 2000 0 ed L p " p tL ad ad p tL p nk ET m m um m as ix as lo tlo pu u Si pu M lF k Tp st SQL (Oracle) Data Server tF Tp as a lT n tT Fa al cia Pe he en k F c ca & a en pi k itc e al Pe ar tld pi a Ty Sp c ar "K Pe sp Ty pi interface for image data mining Fs sp Ty an k an Tr a Pe Tr Test Type 6/2/2008 Copyright 2005 Martin Dudziak, PhD 53
  • 54. Resources (Still More) Screenshots of SOAR-based production-rule system 6/2/2008 Copyright 2005 Martin Dudziak, PhD 54
  • 55. Contact • Martin Dudziak, PhD – (804) 740-0342 – (202) 415-7295 – martin@forteplan.com (also mjdudziak@yahoo.com) TETRAD Technologies Group, Inc. 28 Chase Gayton Circle, Suite 736 Richmond, VA 23238-6533 6/2/2008 Copyright 2005 Martin Dudziak, PhD 55