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SAFETY NET



 A community service for family and community safety
 providing self-control and prevention of violence, abuse,
 and gang crime activity




(sample image (example only) courtesy AAFP)
                                         Copyright 2004 TETRAD I3 Inc.   1
The concept of SAFETY NET is extraordinarily simple


      Cell phones, especially camera-enabled
      and a civilian awareness and watchfulness program
      coupled with elementary data collection and analysis
      resulting in faster alerts and triggered responses
      to emerging, imminent crisis and catastrophe situations
      BEFORE
      they turn into violence, abuse, and terror

      at a cost for implementation of nearly zero $
      with tangible commercial benefits to both the community users and
      service providers



                          Copyright 2004 TETRAD I3 Inc.            2
SAFETY NET is a remarkable service in concept and action

      Easy to learn and use, friendly, a “no brainer”
      Hardly anything new to implement on the “tech” side
      Serves multiple goals of prevention, circumvention, intervention
      and first response
      Services family, domestic, community, and state/national security
      interests
      Addresses spouse/child abuse, sexual abuse, gang crime, and
      organized terrorism (i.e., radical Jihad)

      And is a non-profit social program that actually puts
      money and benefits into the hands of the users and the
      supplier-sponsors


                          Copyright 2004 TETRAD I3 Inc.             3
SAFETY NET is NOT-FOR-PROFIT




     But it will make money and pay for itself

     It will return back many-fold what the corporate sponsors put in at
     the beginning

     And it attracts and cultivates use and support from the public by
     given them something of value that they can touch and feel




                        Copyright 2004 TETRAD I3 Inc.                4
If this was a for-profit Venture


       It would be stupid to not invest in it




            But this is even better than merely “for-profit”




              Because it WILL SAVE LIVES (maybe yours or your kids’)




                              Copyright 2004 TETRAD I3 Inc.       5
This is also a NETWORK




     and we Can break this one if we join together


Copyright 2004 TETRAD I3 Inc.                        6
Getting to the ROOTs of family violence, domestic and
community abuse and misuse, and the GANG problem

                   Reaching to the roots of the “terror” response to problems
          =        facing individuals and societies




      Prime Cause of Terrorism = Insecurity Needing to
      Disrupt the Perceived Cause of Insecurity

      Prime Countermeasure = Reinforcing Internal
      (personal, family) Security (not merely more “Security Forces”)



                           Copyright 2004 TETRAD I3 Inc.                   7
Before we can properly neutralize gang dynamics and subdue the
“appeal” for gangs,
Before we can effectively counter organized terror cadres and
campaigns,
Before we can create sustainable community trends and “attractors”
that are alternates to violence as the solution to individual/family
conflict,
We need to understand the dynamics of Terror and Insecurity in the



            Community, Family and the Home



                             TERRORISM Starts In the HOME
                             and that is also where it must be addressed



                            Copyright 2004 TETRAD I3 Inc.                  8
Terrorism as a Response and Solution – and as an
Effective Measure - puts on an ethnic and political coat
only when there are Numbers and Family Structures and
Psychological Dispositions for both the Perpetration and
the Reception that come from the Individual and the Home



              Spouse and Child Abuse
              Sexual Subjugation
              Child Molestation
              Violence as the First (or Quick) Solution
              Venting “the easy way out”
              Devaluation of the Person including the Self


                                           CounterTERRORISM
                                                   Starts In the
                                                 Looking Glass
                             Copyright 2004 TETRAD I3 Inc.         9
Now these assertions are hard and will be resisted.



         The Basic Terrakt Response is biological and in
         everyone – and must be resisted and overcome

         So is the Basic Panic Response

         So is the Basic Strike-Back Response


                                     The Solutions are Psychological,
                                     Social and Communal

                            Copyright 2004 TETRAD I3 Inc.         10
But this cannot simply mean More Soft Social Programs,
More Special Panels, and more supercomputers!

    The answer is (in this case) “JUST DO IT”


                   Education-Gaming-Kids-Teens
                   Civilian Defense Consciousness
                   “Neighborhood Watch” a la Nomad Eyes
                   Integrated Databases
                   Expanding the counterterrorist “gene pool”


   True Homeland Security starts and ends in the homes
   and streets
                    Copyright 2004 TETRAD I3 Inc.        11
Acts of social violence – at home, in the street – share a lot in
common (formally, mathematically) with acts of natural violence over
which we may have no preventive control but plenty of adaptive
control. These are all



                Emergent Critical Processes
                Critical     Chaotic      Catastrophic         Cryptic   (“C4”)
                These can be Positive or Negative depending upon how you
                look at things and how you Direct the Energies

                           Terrorism is where some people, because they are
                           extremely Pushed Into The Corner (phenomenologically
                           speaking), are giving Nature a Helping Hand

                           It is more of an amplification of what we already face,
                           what is unconsciously making us very Insecure as a
                           species, and keeping us On-Edge

                               Copyright 2004 TETRAD I3 Inc.                      12
People are faced with constant stimuli and close-at-hand
“immediacy” experience (accented by the media and internet) of
Insecurity in whatever society or strata or generation of life. It is a
“built-in” now for growing up on planet Earth.

This makes for a Chronic State of Being “On-Edge”



                    Bombs in mass transit systems
                    Blowing up high-rise buildings
                    Creating epidemics
                    Disrupting information networks

                             This is all an extension of what is already happening or
                             close to happening on a much larger scale than ANY
                             terrorist organization could or would even contemplate,
                             but it is what makes terrorist actions so easily effective!


                               Copyright 2004 TETRAD I3 Inc.                     13
Hurricanes, floods, earthquakes, and other natural ECPs
(Emergent Critical Processes) disrupt more lives and
infrastructures than all formal terrorism

Individual terrorist acts in the home and street kill, maim or harm
more children than Beslan, more families than WTC

There are more terrorist acts in a given year than in the history of
formal terrorism campaigns in the past century. 37% of all women
admitted to Emergency/Trauma centers in the USA are for
domestic violence

                   A viable solution must include prevention, not
                   only circumvention and response, but not only
                   for the Al Qaedas

                   It must address the whole space of Security
                   and Insecurity starting in the streets and
                   homes

                              Copyright 2004 TETRAD I3 Inc.            14
Security Solutions that will make individuals and
societies more “immune” to terrorist actions require
several PARALLEL actions that must be orchestrated
and synchronized together, top-down, and working
from the abstract to the specific

                  Early indicators – signs and signals
                  Finding the triggers, detonators, and catalysts
                  Prediction and forecasting
                  Actual detection of ECPs in progress
                  Circumvention means and alternatives – fast adaptation
                  First-response
                  Triage
                  Interdiction
                  Post-event countermeasures and counter-countermeasures

                                         And these MUST apply to multiple types
                                         of ECPs because terrorist acts and
                                         “natural terrors” are fundamentally similar

                            Copyright 2004 TETRAD I3 Inc.                     15
If communities and larger infrastructures have better “handles”
on dealing with ECPs of all sorts, then this brings better
Planning, Adaptation and Response (P-A-R) for terrorist acts
as well as the unforeseen natural emergencies




                   ECPs are asymmetric behaviors, nonlinear, hard to forecast
                   in detail. No sophisticated Virtual World simulation on a
                   supercomputer can be translated into the Street.

                   The entire P-A-R system will work only when it approaches
                   being almost-everywhere, involving almost-everyone.



                             Optimal P-A-R must be in the hands of the People
                             as much as possible – it is a Collective Solution


                             Copyright 2004 TETRAD I3 Inc.                16
In this sense Osama Bin Ladin was quite correct:




       “Your security is in your own hands.”
                                                 Attributed to O.b.L. @ 10/27/04




                            And thus, the concepts and architecture of Nomad
                            Eyes was born, in order to achieve exactly that…




                           Copyright 2004 TETRAD I3 Inc.                           17
Pre-Incident Buildups:
Photo/audio recording/transmittal
Stronger than “911”
Deterrence, not “after the attack”




                   Observations:
                   Suspicious behaviors
                   Violence in progress
                   Groups and individuals that don’t “belong” somewhere or
                   sometime



                                          Smart Analysis:
                                          Auto-assessment
                                          Referral to people
                                          Auto-correlation, inference, and triggered
                                          alerts
                             Copyright 2004 TETRAD I3 Inc.                     18
Value of Mobile Wireless Portable and Handheld Nets
         for an Asymmetric, Dynamic Countermeasure System


For suspicious or obvious events of
crime and abuse
                                         Mobile units using both cellular and
                                         wireless internet/intranets


    Freeform but adhering to industry
    standards
                                                Incorporating the General Public

           Incorporating the commercial sector
           (advertising and consumer products)


                     Asynchronous, Atypical, Asymmetric Sensor Fusion

                             Copyright 2004 TETRAD I3 Inc.                         19
Nomad Eyes™ Architecture and Principles (I)
(Original Design)
Prevention by Detection of Terrakt Planning Operations
Movement of multiple types of components, not only RAD substances
Time-matching and space-matching of logically connective, supportive events
“Sensor Fusion” of the Unordinary (Необычный) Kind -
         Tracer RAD readings perhaps not individually remarkable
         Photos of suspicious individuals and vehicles that have some “matches”
         Exceptional shipping orders, out-of-sequence, special-route, handling
         Parallel transit/shipment/transaction of non-contraband components useful
           in an RDD
Goal toward Inverse Reasoning and Abductive Assimilation with other KBs / Xsys
Fall-Back Value: Emergency public alerts and First-Responder capabilities
     Just hunting for substances/persons at checkpoints with high-tech
and aiming for panaceas and Holy Grails of “Total Information Awareness”
                             Ain’t Good Enuf !
                            Copyright 2004 TETRAD I3 Inc.                      20
Nomad Eyes™ Architecture and Principles (II)

                                                                     EVENT !



      Class (x) objects received by servers results
     in generation of n graphs representing
     hypothetical x      y… relational maps; the
     majority are discarded, but events of interest
     trigger feedback to both autonomous and
     human-based nodes for additional collection
     and reorienting. No node or subset of nodes
     is reliant and the whole may be considered as
     a dynamic-geometry cellular automata.




                                                      EVENT !




                                     Copyright 2004 TETRAD I3 Inc.             21
Why it works so well
                                      P_graph of ETLS (2)
                                                                                                        -                 -

                                                                                                                  +
                                                                                                            0
                                                                                                    -                 0           -
                                       -                       -

                                               +                                                                  0
                                           0
Actor objects                     -                    0            -
(nodes)
                                                   0

                                                                                                        ETLPs (with                                       ETL Set (with
                                                                                                            actors)                                       ETLPs)



                                                                                                                                      -               -                      -               -
              ETL Set (with                                                                                                                   +                                      +
              ETLPs)                                                                                                                      0                                      0
                                                                                                                                  -               0       -              -               0       -

                                                                                                                                              0                                      0
                                                                                                                P_graph of ETLP (5)
                                                                            -               -
          -               -                                                         +
                                                                                0
                  +                                                     -               0       -                                     -                       -
              0                                                                                                                                                       P_graph of Exec
      -               0       -        -                                                                                                                              (1)
                                                           -                        0
                                                                                                                                                  +
                  0                            +                                                                                          0
                                           0                                                                                  -                       0           -   ADaM exec
                                  -                0           -                                                                                                      (program)

                                               0                                                                                                  0

                                                                   Copyright 2004 TETRAD I3 Inc.                                                                                                 22
Nomad Eyes = Compound Eyes
                                       Multiple TYPES of sensor data
                                       Multiple INSTANCES at multiple TIMES
                                       INVERSE Methods applied “as if” in surface/subsurface imaging:
                                       the task is to find what events and processes may be the modifiers of
                                       known or deducible behaviors




USING
•Abductive rules
•Bayesian probabilistic inference
•Fuzzy inference
•Heuristics and “common sense” rules


For all the value of sophisticated detectors, an “outlier” element or two could make all the difference:
Requests for building or water/sewer line plans           Repeat-visits of unusual vehicle or people
“Non-sequitur” orders of shielding-quality materials      Unusual change in shipping order or pickup

                                        Copyright 2004 TETRAD I3 Inc.                                          23
Deployment - Where and How
•   Static but ad-hoc
     – Passage locations and nexus points for cargo and transfer vehicles
     – Likeliest places but not limited to one configuration


•   Pseudo-random

•   Personal mobile units
     – Assigned to staff personnel
     – Personal cell phones


•   Unpredictable - a “two-edged sword” that cuts in in favor of the Defenders
     – Inverse predictive models can be applied better to the data “mass”
     – Al Qaeda (or “X”) cannot predict where are our eyes and ears


•   Sun Tzu (“Art of War”) - Always Make Your Enemy Nervous


                             Copyright 2004 TETRAD I3 Inc.                  24
Current Status
Building networks and relationships in Richmond business and
civic community
IRAD program (1999 – 2004)
    I3BAT Phase 1
    Sensors, phones, wi-fi networks ready
    ADaM prototype completed
    OpenNet prototype completed
    Collaboratory prototype completed
Aim to have a Core Advocacy Team of Richmond Community
Leaders from:
    Corporations (Financial, Telecomms, IT, Healthcare)
    State and Local government
    Universities
    Private NGOs
    Individual sponsors

             Copyright 2004 TETRAD I3 Inc.                     25
Goal for RICHMOND, Virginia




      Model/test system in the field in 2005 by JULY
      Corporate support First, federal/state grants later for expansion
      Make it Profitable

      Achieve some FIRSTS – reductions in gang violence, domestic
      violence, and demonstrable SAFETY NET for CRBN terrakts

      “Export” to other cities, states




                          Copyright 2004 TETRAD I3 Inc.              26
Acknowledgements
By no means do we claim that those we learn from or work with agree with all of
this, but thanks is due to more than a few…

      •   Peter Cavanagh, Cambridge Security Programme www.csp.ac.uk
      •   Dr. Marc Sageman, MD
      •   Boaz Ganor, Institute for Counterterrorism Policy, Haifa, Israel
      •   Eric Miller, David Castanon, Clem Karl, CENSSIS
      •   Eric Klopfer, Henry Jenkins, MIT
      •   Tamara Koval, MD, Forte Horizons LLC
      •   George Carr, Zurich, CH
      •   Robert Newman, Office of Commonwealth Preparedness, Virginia
      •   Michael Chandler, Institute for Strategic Studies, Singapore
      •   General A. S. Kulikov, Duma of the Russian Federation
      •   Mark Hopkins, ST Microelectronics SA



                              Copyright 2004 TETRAD I3 Inc.                       27
Contacts



Martin Dudziak, PhD
     (804) 740-0342 office
     (202) 415-7295 cell
     martin@forteplan.com

     http://tetradgroup.com




Copyright 2004 TETRAD I3 Inc.   28

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Safetynet01

  • 1. SAFETY NET A community service for family and community safety providing self-control and prevention of violence, abuse, and gang crime activity (sample image (example only) courtesy AAFP) Copyright 2004 TETRAD I3 Inc. 1
  • 2. The concept of SAFETY NET is extraordinarily simple Cell phones, especially camera-enabled and a civilian awareness and watchfulness program coupled with elementary data collection and analysis resulting in faster alerts and triggered responses to emerging, imminent crisis and catastrophe situations BEFORE they turn into violence, abuse, and terror at a cost for implementation of nearly zero $ with tangible commercial benefits to both the community users and service providers Copyright 2004 TETRAD I3 Inc. 2
  • 3. SAFETY NET is a remarkable service in concept and action Easy to learn and use, friendly, a “no brainer” Hardly anything new to implement on the “tech” side Serves multiple goals of prevention, circumvention, intervention and first response Services family, domestic, community, and state/national security interests Addresses spouse/child abuse, sexual abuse, gang crime, and organized terrorism (i.e., radical Jihad) And is a non-profit social program that actually puts money and benefits into the hands of the users and the supplier-sponsors Copyright 2004 TETRAD I3 Inc. 3
  • 4. SAFETY NET is NOT-FOR-PROFIT But it will make money and pay for itself It will return back many-fold what the corporate sponsors put in at the beginning And it attracts and cultivates use and support from the public by given them something of value that they can touch and feel Copyright 2004 TETRAD I3 Inc. 4
  • 5. If this was a for-profit Venture It would be stupid to not invest in it But this is even better than merely “for-profit” Because it WILL SAVE LIVES (maybe yours or your kids’) Copyright 2004 TETRAD I3 Inc. 5
  • 6. This is also a NETWORK and we Can break this one if we join together Copyright 2004 TETRAD I3 Inc. 6
  • 7. Getting to the ROOTs of family violence, domestic and community abuse and misuse, and the GANG problem Reaching to the roots of the “terror” response to problems = facing individuals and societies Prime Cause of Terrorism = Insecurity Needing to Disrupt the Perceived Cause of Insecurity Prime Countermeasure = Reinforcing Internal (personal, family) Security (not merely more “Security Forces”) Copyright 2004 TETRAD I3 Inc. 7
  • 8. Before we can properly neutralize gang dynamics and subdue the “appeal” for gangs, Before we can effectively counter organized terror cadres and campaigns, Before we can create sustainable community trends and “attractors” that are alternates to violence as the solution to individual/family conflict, We need to understand the dynamics of Terror and Insecurity in the Community, Family and the Home TERRORISM Starts In the HOME and that is also where it must be addressed Copyright 2004 TETRAD I3 Inc. 8
  • 9. Terrorism as a Response and Solution – and as an Effective Measure - puts on an ethnic and political coat only when there are Numbers and Family Structures and Psychological Dispositions for both the Perpetration and the Reception that come from the Individual and the Home Spouse and Child Abuse Sexual Subjugation Child Molestation Violence as the First (or Quick) Solution Venting “the easy way out” Devaluation of the Person including the Self CounterTERRORISM Starts In the Looking Glass Copyright 2004 TETRAD I3 Inc. 9
  • 10. Now these assertions are hard and will be resisted. The Basic Terrakt Response is biological and in everyone – and must be resisted and overcome So is the Basic Panic Response So is the Basic Strike-Back Response The Solutions are Psychological, Social and Communal Copyright 2004 TETRAD I3 Inc. 10
  • 11. But this cannot simply mean More Soft Social Programs, More Special Panels, and more supercomputers! The answer is (in this case) “JUST DO IT” Education-Gaming-Kids-Teens Civilian Defense Consciousness “Neighborhood Watch” a la Nomad Eyes Integrated Databases Expanding the counterterrorist “gene pool” True Homeland Security starts and ends in the homes and streets Copyright 2004 TETRAD I3 Inc. 11
  • 12. Acts of social violence – at home, in the street – share a lot in common (formally, mathematically) with acts of natural violence over which we may have no preventive control but plenty of adaptive control. These are all Emergent Critical Processes Critical Chaotic Catastrophic Cryptic (“C4”) These can be Positive or Negative depending upon how you look at things and how you Direct the Energies Terrorism is where some people, because they are extremely Pushed Into The Corner (phenomenologically speaking), are giving Nature a Helping Hand It is more of an amplification of what we already face, what is unconsciously making us very Insecure as a species, and keeping us On-Edge Copyright 2004 TETRAD I3 Inc. 12
  • 13. People are faced with constant stimuli and close-at-hand “immediacy” experience (accented by the media and internet) of Insecurity in whatever society or strata or generation of life. It is a “built-in” now for growing up on planet Earth. This makes for a Chronic State of Being “On-Edge” Bombs in mass transit systems Blowing up high-rise buildings Creating epidemics Disrupting information networks This is all an extension of what is already happening or close to happening on a much larger scale than ANY terrorist organization could or would even contemplate, but it is what makes terrorist actions so easily effective! Copyright 2004 TETRAD I3 Inc. 13
  • 14. Hurricanes, floods, earthquakes, and other natural ECPs (Emergent Critical Processes) disrupt more lives and infrastructures than all formal terrorism Individual terrorist acts in the home and street kill, maim or harm more children than Beslan, more families than WTC There are more terrorist acts in a given year than in the history of formal terrorism campaigns in the past century. 37% of all women admitted to Emergency/Trauma centers in the USA are for domestic violence A viable solution must include prevention, not only circumvention and response, but not only for the Al Qaedas It must address the whole space of Security and Insecurity starting in the streets and homes Copyright 2004 TETRAD I3 Inc. 14
  • 15. Security Solutions that will make individuals and societies more “immune” to terrorist actions require several PARALLEL actions that must be orchestrated and synchronized together, top-down, and working from the abstract to the specific Early indicators – signs and signals Finding the triggers, detonators, and catalysts Prediction and forecasting Actual detection of ECPs in progress Circumvention means and alternatives – fast adaptation First-response Triage Interdiction Post-event countermeasures and counter-countermeasures And these MUST apply to multiple types of ECPs because terrorist acts and “natural terrors” are fundamentally similar Copyright 2004 TETRAD I3 Inc. 15
  • 16. If communities and larger infrastructures have better “handles” on dealing with ECPs of all sorts, then this brings better Planning, Adaptation and Response (P-A-R) for terrorist acts as well as the unforeseen natural emergencies ECPs are asymmetric behaviors, nonlinear, hard to forecast in detail. No sophisticated Virtual World simulation on a supercomputer can be translated into the Street. The entire P-A-R system will work only when it approaches being almost-everywhere, involving almost-everyone. Optimal P-A-R must be in the hands of the People as much as possible – it is a Collective Solution Copyright 2004 TETRAD I3 Inc. 16
  • 17. In this sense Osama Bin Ladin was quite correct: “Your security is in your own hands.” Attributed to O.b.L. @ 10/27/04 And thus, the concepts and architecture of Nomad Eyes was born, in order to achieve exactly that… Copyright 2004 TETRAD I3 Inc. 17
  • 18. Pre-Incident Buildups: Photo/audio recording/transmittal Stronger than “911” Deterrence, not “after the attack” Observations: Suspicious behaviors Violence in progress Groups and individuals that don’t “belong” somewhere or sometime Smart Analysis: Auto-assessment Referral to people Auto-correlation, inference, and triggered alerts Copyright 2004 TETRAD I3 Inc. 18
  • 19. Value of Mobile Wireless Portable and Handheld Nets for an Asymmetric, Dynamic Countermeasure System For suspicious or obvious events of crime and abuse Mobile units using both cellular and wireless internet/intranets Freeform but adhering to industry standards Incorporating the General Public Incorporating the commercial sector (advertising and consumer products) Asynchronous, Atypical, Asymmetric Sensor Fusion Copyright 2004 TETRAD I3 Inc. 19
  • 20. Nomad Eyes™ Architecture and Principles (I) (Original Design) Prevention by Detection of Terrakt Planning Operations Movement of multiple types of components, not only RAD substances Time-matching and space-matching of logically connective, supportive events “Sensor Fusion” of the Unordinary (Необычный) Kind - Tracer RAD readings perhaps not individually remarkable Photos of suspicious individuals and vehicles that have some “matches” Exceptional shipping orders, out-of-sequence, special-route, handling Parallel transit/shipment/transaction of non-contraband components useful in an RDD Goal toward Inverse Reasoning and Abductive Assimilation with other KBs / Xsys Fall-Back Value: Emergency public alerts and First-Responder capabilities Just hunting for substances/persons at checkpoints with high-tech and aiming for panaceas and Holy Grails of “Total Information Awareness” Ain’t Good Enuf ! Copyright 2004 TETRAD I3 Inc. 20
  • 21. Nomad Eyes™ Architecture and Principles (II) EVENT ! Class (x) objects received by servers results in generation of n graphs representing hypothetical x y… relational maps; the majority are discarded, but events of interest trigger feedback to both autonomous and human-based nodes for additional collection and reorienting. No node or subset of nodes is reliant and the whole may be considered as a dynamic-geometry cellular automata. EVENT ! Copyright 2004 TETRAD I3 Inc. 21
  • 22. Why it works so well P_graph of ETLS (2) - - + 0 - 0 - - - + 0 0 Actor objects - 0 - (nodes) 0 ETLPs (with ETL Set (with actors) ETLPs) - - - - ETL Set (with + + ETLPs) 0 0 - 0 - - 0 - 0 0 P_graph of ETLP (5) - - - - + 0 + - 0 - - - 0 P_graph of Exec - 0 - - (1) - 0 + 0 + 0 0 - 0 - ADaM exec - 0 - (program) 0 0 Copyright 2004 TETRAD I3 Inc. 22
  • 23. Nomad Eyes = Compound Eyes Multiple TYPES of sensor data Multiple INSTANCES at multiple TIMES INVERSE Methods applied “as if” in surface/subsurface imaging: the task is to find what events and processes may be the modifiers of known or deducible behaviors USING •Abductive rules •Bayesian probabilistic inference •Fuzzy inference •Heuristics and “common sense” rules For all the value of sophisticated detectors, an “outlier” element or two could make all the difference: Requests for building or water/sewer line plans Repeat-visits of unusual vehicle or people “Non-sequitur” orders of shielding-quality materials Unusual change in shipping order or pickup Copyright 2004 TETRAD I3 Inc. 23
  • 24. Deployment - Where and How • Static but ad-hoc – Passage locations and nexus points for cargo and transfer vehicles – Likeliest places but not limited to one configuration • Pseudo-random • Personal mobile units – Assigned to staff personnel – Personal cell phones • Unpredictable - a “two-edged sword” that cuts in in favor of the Defenders – Inverse predictive models can be applied better to the data “mass” – Al Qaeda (or “X”) cannot predict where are our eyes and ears • Sun Tzu (“Art of War”) - Always Make Your Enemy Nervous Copyright 2004 TETRAD I3 Inc. 24
  • 25. Current Status Building networks and relationships in Richmond business and civic community IRAD program (1999 – 2004) I3BAT Phase 1 Sensors, phones, wi-fi networks ready ADaM prototype completed OpenNet prototype completed Collaboratory prototype completed Aim to have a Core Advocacy Team of Richmond Community Leaders from: Corporations (Financial, Telecomms, IT, Healthcare) State and Local government Universities Private NGOs Individual sponsors Copyright 2004 TETRAD I3 Inc. 25
  • 26. Goal for RICHMOND, Virginia Model/test system in the field in 2005 by JULY Corporate support First, federal/state grants later for expansion Make it Profitable Achieve some FIRSTS – reductions in gang violence, domestic violence, and demonstrable SAFETY NET for CRBN terrakts “Export” to other cities, states Copyright 2004 TETRAD I3 Inc. 26
  • 27. Acknowledgements By no means do we claim that those we learn from or work with agree with all of this, but thanks is due to more than a few… • Peter Cavanagh, Cambridge Security Programme www.csp.ac.uk • Dr. Marc Sageman, MD • Boaz Ganor, Institute for Counterterrorism Policy, Haifa, Israel • Eric Miller, David Castanon, Clem Karl, CENSSIS • Eric Klopfer, Henry Jenkins, MIT • Tamara Koval, MD, Forte Horizons LLC • George Carr, Zurich, CH • Robert Newman, Office of Commonwealth Preparedness, Virginia • Michael Chandler, Institute for Strategic Studies, Singapore • General A. S. Kulikov, Duma of the Russian Federation • Mark Hopkins, ST Microelectronics SA Copyright 2004 TETRAD I3 Inc. 27
  • 28. Contacts Martin Dudziak, PhD (804) 740-0342 office (202) 415-7295 cell martin@forteplan.com http://tetradgroup.com Copyright 2004 TETRAD I3 Inc. 28