SlideShare a Scribd company logo
1 of 43
1 28/06/09On the Use of Radio Resource Tests in Wireless ad hoc Networks
Distributed Systems Group - INESC-ID
technology
from seed
On the Use of Radio Resource Tests in Wireless ad hoc
Networks
Diogo Mónica, João Leitão, Luís Rodrigues, Carlos Ribeiro
INESC-ID/IST
{diogo.monica, joao.c.leitao, ler, carlos.ribeiro} @ist.utl.pt
 Introduction
Radio Resource Tests
Analysis
Summary
2
Distributed Systems Group - INESC-ID
technology
from seed
Road Map
28/06/09On the Use of Radio Resource Tests in Wireless ad hoc Networks
3
Distributed Systems Group - INESC-ID
technology
from seed
Introduction – Wireless ad hoc
Networks
Securing Wireless ad hoc Networks is
particularly difficult
28/06/09On the Use of Radio Resource Tests in Wireless ad hoc Networks
• Denial-of-service
• Eavesdropping
• Node hijacking
• Impersonation
- Sybil
Attack
4
Distributed Systems Group - INESC-ID
technology
from seed
Introduction – The Sybil Attack
The sybil identity can be generated by the malicious node, or
stolen from an existing correct node
28/06/09On the Use of Radio Resource Tests in Wireless ad hoc Networks
A Sybil attack happens when a malicious node
participates with multiple identities in a system
5
Distributed Systems Group - INESC-ID
technology
from seed
Introduction – The Sybil Attack
The sybil identity can be generated by the malicious node, or
stolen from an existing correct node
28/06/09On the Use of Radio Resource Tests in Wireless ad hoc Networks
A Sybil attack happens when a malicious node
participates with multiple identities in a system
6
Distributed Systems Group - INESC-ID
technology
from seed
Introduction – The Sybil Attack
The sybil identity can be generated by the malicious node, or
stolen from an existing correct node
28/06/09On the Use of Radio Resource Tests in Wireless ad hoc Networks
A Sybil attack happens when a malicious node
participates with multiple identities in a system
7
Distributed Systems Group - INESC-ID
technology
from seed
Introduction – The Sybil Attack
Easily defeats quorum systems, or other voting
schemes
In order to obtain a majority in a network with 5 correct nodes,
a malicious node has to create 5 sybil identities
28/06/09On the Use of Radio Resource Tests in Wireless ad hoc Networks
8
Distributed Systems Group - INESC-ID
technology
from seed
Introduction – Resource Tests
28/06/09On the Use of Radio Resource Tests in Wireless ad hoc Networks
In resource testing we determine if a set of
identities possess fewer aggregated
resources than would be expected
• Computational Power
• Storage
• Network Bandwidth
• …
• Radio Resource
Introduction
 Radio Resource Tests
Analysis
Summary
9
Distributed Systems Group - INESC-ID
technology
from seed
Road Map
28/06/09On the Use of Radio Resource Tests in Wireless ad hoc Networks
10
Distributed Systems Group - INESC-ID
technology
from seed
Radio Resource Tests
Radio Resource Tests (RRTs) assume that each
node has access to a single radio device, and
builds upon the limitations of these devices
28/06/09On the Use of Radio Resource Tests in Wireless ad hoc Networks
The first RRT was introduced by Newsome et. al
2004
We will call it Sender Test
11
Distributed Systems Group - INESC-ID
technology
from seed
Radio Resource Tests – Sender Test
28/06/09On the Use of Radio Resource Tests in Wireless ad hoc Networks
• The Sender Test is based on the assumption that nodes
cannot simultaneously transmit in more than one channel
Sender Test (SST)
12
Distributed Systems Group - INESC-ID
technology
from seed
Radio Resource Tests – Sender Test
28/06/09On the Use of Radio Resource Tests in Wireless ad hoc Networks
Sender Test (SST)
• The Sender Test is based on the assumption that nodes
cannot simultaneously transmit in more than one channel
13
Distributed Systems Group - INESC-ID
technology
from seed
Radio Resource Tests – Detection
Probability
28/06/09On the Use of Radio Resource Tests in Wireless ad hoc Networks
• Denoting by h the number of simultaneously tested
identities, and by pd the probability of detection of a Sybil
Identity in a test, we have
The challenger is unable listen in more than
one channel at the same time, so we repeat
the test r times
14
Distributed Systems Group - INESC-ID
technology
from seed
Radio Resource Tests – Contribution
We introduce two new tests and an
optimization for the Sender Test
28/06/09On the Use of Radio Resource Tests in Wireless ad hoc Networks
• Optimized Sender Test (oSST)
• Receiver Test (SRT)
• Collision Test (FCT)
15
Distributed Systems Group - INESC-ID
technology
from seed
Radio Resource Tests - Framework
Each RRT is characterized by a set of
parameters, RRT(h, c, w)
28/06/09On the Use of Radio Resource Tests in Wireless ad hoc Networks
• h – Size of the set of simultaneously tested identities
• c – Number of challenger identities actively participating in
the test
• w – Number of tester nodes that extract information from
the test
16
Distributed Systems Group - INESC-ID
technology
from seed
Radio Resource Tests – Sender Test
28/06/09On the Use of Radio Resource Tests in Wireless ad hoc Networks
• h is limited by the number of available channels (K)
• c is one, since the challenger needs to assign in which
channel identities transmit in
• w is one since only the challenger extracts information
from the test
The Sender Test is a RRT(K,1,1)
17
Distributed Systems Group - INESC-ID
technology
from seed
Radio Resource Tests – Optimized
Receiver Test
28/06/09On the Use of Radio Resource Tests in Wireless ad hoc Networks
• h is limited by the number of available channels (K)
• c is zero, since the channels can be chosen
deterministically
• w is N – K, since every node not participating in the test
can extract information from it
The Optimized Sender Test is a RRT(K,0,N-K)
18
Distributed Systems Group - INESC-ID
technology
from seed
Radio Resource Tests – Receiver Test
Receiver Test
28/06/09On the Use of Radio Resource Tests in Wireless ad hoc Networks
• The Simultaneous Receiver Test is based on the assumption that
nodes cannot simultaneously listen in more than one channel
19
Distributed Systems Group - INESC-ID
technology
from seed
Radio Resource Tests – Receiver Test
Receiver Test
28/06/09On the Use of Radio Resource Tests in Wireless ad hoc Networks
• The Simultaneous Receiver Test is based on the assumption that
nodes cannot simultaneously listen in more than one channel
20
Distributed Systems Group - INESC-ID
technology
from seed
Radio Resource Tests – Receiver Test
28/06/09On the Use of Radio Resource Tests in Wireless ad hoc Networks
• h is limited by the number of available channels K
• c is one, since the challenger needs to send a challenge
on one of the channels
• w is one since only the challenger can extract information
from the test (no other node knows the chosen channel)
The Receiver Test is a RRT(K,1,1)
Introduction
Radio Resource Tests
 Analysis
Summary
21
Distributed Systems Group - INESC-ID
technology
from seed
Road Map
28/06/09On the Use of Radio Resource Tests in Wireless ad hoc Networks
22
Distributed Systems Group - INESC-ID
technology
from seed
Radio Resource Tests - Analysis
28/06/09On the Use of Radio Resource Tests in Wireless ad hoc Networks
• Vulnerability to collusion
• Message cost
• Resource consumption
• Synchronization requirements
• Number of messages needed to achieve
a desired probability of detection
We compared the tests using the following
metrics
23
Distributed Systems Group - INESC-ID
technology
from seed
Analysis – Optimized Sender Test –
Vulnerability to collusion
28/06/09On the Use of Radio Resource Tests in Wireless ad hoc Networks
Vulnerability to collusion
24
Distributed Systems Group - INESC-ID
technology
from seed
Analysis – Optimized Sender Test –
Vulnerability to collusion
28/06/09On the Use of Radio Resource Tests in Wireless ad hoc Networks
The Optimized Sender Test Handles at most h – 1 colluding
malicious nodes (m)
Vulnerability to collusion
25
Distributed Systems Group - INESC-ID
technology
from seed
Analysis – Optimized Sender Test –
Message Cost
28/06/09On the Use of Radio Resource Tests in Wireless ad hoc Networks
Message Cost
26
Distributed Systems Group - INESC-ID
technology
from seed
Analysis – Optimized Sender Test –
Message Cost
28/06/09On the Use of Radio Resource Tests in Wireless ad hoc Networks
In the Optimized Sender Test, tested nodes send a total
of h messages per round
Message Cost
27
Distributed Systems Group - INESC-ID
technology
from seed
Analysis – Optimized Sender Test –
Resource Consumption
28/06/09On the Use of Radio Resource Tests in Wireless ad hoc Networks
Resource Consumption (DoS Opportunity)
28
Distributed Systems Group - INESC-ID
technology
from seed
Analysis – Optimized Sender Test –
Resource Consumption
28/06/09On the Use of Radio Resource Tests in Wireless ad hoc Networks
In the Optimized Sender Test, when there is a malicious
tester, Δ = rh – 1.
Resource Consumption (DoS Opportunity)
29
Distributed Systems Group - INESC-ID
technology
from seed
Analysis – Optimized Sender Test –
Synchronization Requirements
28/06/09On the Use of Radio Resource Tests in Wireless ad hoc Networks
Synchronization Requirements
30
Distributed Systems Group - INESC-ID
technology
from seed
Analysis – Optimized Sender Test –
Synchronization Requirements
28/06/09On the Use of Radio Resource Tests in Wireless ad hoc Networks
In the Optimized Sender Test, tested nodes are required
to transmit simultaneously
Synchronization Requirements
31
Distributed Systems Group - INESC-ID
technology
from seed
Analysis – Comparison Table
28/06/09On the Use of Radio Resource Tests in Wireless ad hoc Networks
Metric Tests
Optimized
Sender Test
Receiver Test Collision Test
Collusion h - 1 h - 1 1
Message Cost h 2 2
Resource
Consumption
(malicious tester)
Synchronization Strong Strong Weak
Metric Tests
Optimized
Sender Test
Receiver Test Collision Test
Collusion h - 1 h - 1 1
Message Cost h 2 2
Resource
Consumption
(malicious tester)
Synchronization Strong Strong Weak
32
Distributed Systems Group - INESC-ID
technology
from seed
Analysis – Comparison Table
28/06/09On the Use of Radio Resource Tests in Wireless ad hoc Networks
33
Distributed Systems Group - INESC-ID
technology
from seed
Analysis – Testing a Population of
Nodes
28/06/09On the Use of Radio Resource Tests in Wireless ad hoc Networks
Every node in the one-hop neighborhood has to test every
other node
Testing a group of nodes
34
Distributed Systems Group - INESC-ID
technology
from seed
Analysis – Testing a Population of
Nodes
28/06/09On the Use of Radio Resource Tests in Wireless ad hoc Networks
Every node in the one-hop neighborhood has to test every
other node
Testing a group of nodes
35
Distributed Systems Group - INESC-ID
technology
from seed
Analysis – Testing a Population of
Nodes
28/06/09On the Use of Radio Resource Tests in Wireless ad hoc Networks
Every node in the one-hop neighborhood has to test every
other node
Testing a group of nodes
36
Distributed Systems Group - INESC-ID
technology
from seed
Analysis – Testing a Population of
Nodes
28/06/09On the Use of Radio Resource Tests in Wireless ad hoc Networks
Every node in the one-hop neighborhood has to test every
other node
Testing a group of nodes
37
Distributed Systems Group - INESC-ID
technology
from seed
Analysis – Testing a Population of
Nodes
28/06/09On the Use of Radio Resource Tests in Wireless ad hoc Networks
Every node in the one-hop neighborhood has to test every
other node
Testing a group of nodes
38
Distributed Systems Group - INESC-ID
technology
from seed
Radio Resource Tests - Performance
Performance in number of messages
28/06/09On the Use of Radio Resource Tests in Wireless ad hoc Networks
For a probability of sybil detection of 0.95.
39
Distributed Systems Group - INESC-ID
technology
from seed
Radio Resource Tests - Performance
Performance with collusion tolerance
28/06/09On the Use of Radio Resource Tests in Wireless ad hoc Networks
For a network with 20 nodes and a probability of sybil
detection of 0.95.
Higher collusion
40
Distributed Systems Group - INESC-ID
technology
from seed
Radio Resource Tests – Application
Scenarios
Application Scenarios
28/06/09On the Use of Radio Resource Tests in Wireless ad hoc Networks
Test Best Performance Context
Optimized
Sender Test
No DoS threat
Receiver Test High collusion and/or DoS threat
Collision Test One Channel
Introduction
Radio Resource Tests
Analysis
 Summary
41
Distributed Systems Group - INESC-ID
technology
from seed
Road Map
28/06/09On the Use of Radio Resource Tests in Wireless ad hoc Networks
42
Distributed Systems Group - INESC-ID
technology
from seed
Summary
28/06/09On the Use of Radio Resource Tests in Wireless ad hoc Networks
• Radio Resource Tests are a viable mechanism for
detecting sybil identities in Wireless ad hoc Networks
• We presented two new RRTs and an optimization to an
existing RRT
• We presented a framework to compare the RRTs
• We analyzed all the tests both in isolation, and when used
to test a one-hop neighborhood.
• We have shown that each test is best adapted to a specific
scenario, which we described.
43 10/08/2008Thwarting the Sybil Attack in Wireless Ad Hoc Networks
Distributed Systems Group - INESC-ID
technology
from seed
technology
from seed

More Related Content

What's hot

Investigation of TV White Space for Maximum Spectrum Utilization in a Cellula...
Investigation of TV White Space for Maximum Spectrum Utilization in a Cellula...Investigation of TV White Space for Maximum Spectrum Utilization in a Cellula...
Investigation of TV White Space for Maximum Spectrum Utilization in a Cellula...Onyebuchi nosiri
 
Troubleshooting Coherent Optical Communication Systems
Troubleshooting Coherent Optical Communication SystemsTroubleshooting Coherent Optical Communication Systems
Troubleshooting Coherent Optical Communication SystemsCPqD
 
Dynamic Spectrum Access and the race for mobile capacity
Dynamic Spectrum Access and the race for mobile capacityDynamic Spectrum Access and the race for mobile capacity
Dynamic Spectrum Access and the race for mobile capacityAndrew Stirling
 
Solving synchronization challenges with critical infrastructures
Solving synchronization challenges with critical infrastructuresSolving synchronization challenges with critical infrastructures
Solving synchronization challenges with critical infrastructuresADVA
 
Massive MIMO: Opportunities & Challenges
Massive MIMO: Opportunities & ChallengesMassive MIMO: Opportunities & Challenges
Massive MIMO: Opportunities & ChallengesRahul Goswami
 
Flexible Optical Transmission
Flexible Optical TransmissionFlexible Optical Transmission
Flexible Optical TransmissionCPqD
 
Cognitive Radio from a Mobile Operator's Perspective: System Performance and ...
Cognitive Radio from a Mobile Operator's Perspective: System Performance and ...Cognitive Radio from a Mobile Operator's Perspective: System Performance and ...
Cognitive Radio from a Mobile Operator's Perspective: System Performance and ...paalrg
 
Photonics21 – Next-Generation Optical Internet Access: Roadmap for Broadband ...
Photonics21 – Next-Generation Optical Internet Access: Roadmap for Broadband ...Photonics21 – Next-Generation Optical Internet Access: Roadmap for Broadband ...
Photonics21 – Next-Generation Optical Internet Access: Roadmap for Broadband ...Xi'an Jiaotong-Liverpool University
 
IRJET- Simulating Spectrum Sensing in Cognitive Radio Network using Cyclostat...
IRJET- Simulating Spectrum Sensing in Cognitive Radio Network using Cyclostat...IRJET- Simulating Spectrum Sensing in Cognitive Radio Network using Cyclostat...
IRJET- Simulating Spectrum Sensing in Cognitive Radio Network using Cyclostat...IRJET Journal
 
New connectivity in 5G: Avoiding dead-ends in the road to mobile growth
New connectivity in 5G: Avoiding dead-ends in the road to mobile growthNew connectivity in 5G: Avoiding dead-ends in the road to mobile growth
New connectivity in 5G: Avoiding dead-ends in the road to mobile growthADVA
 
Open wireless network case study analysis - Ritu Raj and Amitesh
Open wireless network case study analysis - Ritu Raj and AmiteshOpen wireless network case study analysis - Ritu Raj and Amitesh
Open wireless network case study analysis - Ritu Raj and AmiteshRituraj Tripathi
 
Multi Channel Protocols In Cognitive Radio Networks
Multi Channel Protocols In  Cognitive Radio NetworksMulti Channel Protocols In  Cognitive Radio Networks
Multi Channel Protocols In Cognitive Radio NetworksMuhammad Mustafa
 
Harish presentation
Harish presentationHarish presentation
Harish presentationpikuldash9
 
Workshop 3 - Mobile broadband and LTE for critical communications - Session 1
Workshop 3 - Mobile broadband and LTE for critical communications - Session 1Workshop 3 - Mobile broadband and LTE for critical communications - Session 1
Workshop 3 - Mobile broadband and LTE for critical communications - Session 1Comms Connect
 
Spectrum Policy Forum Cluster 4 Meeting on 5G parameters
Spectrum Policy Forum Cluster 4 Meeting on 5G parametersSpectrum Policy Forum Cluster 4 Meeting on 5G parameters
Spectrum Policy Forum Cluster 4 Meeting on 5G parameterstechUK
 
Eu harmonisation on dynamic spectrum access
Eu harmonisation on dynamic spectrum accessEu harmonisation on dynamic spectrum access
Eu harmonisation on dynamic spectrum accessJussi Kahtava
 
Single vs. multi-carrier in ROADM networks
Single vs. multi-carrier in ROADM networksSingle vs. multi-carrier in ROADM networks
Single vs. multi-carrier in ROADM networksADVA
 

What's hot (19)

Investigation of TV White Space for Maximum Spectrum Utilization in a Cellula...
Investigation of TV White Space for Maximum Spectrum Utilization in a Cellula...Investigation of TV White Space for Maximum Spectrum Utilization in a Cellula...
Investigation of TV White Space for Maximum Spectrum Utilization in a Cellula...
 
Troubleshooting Coherent Optical Communication Systems
Troubleshooting Coherent Optical Communication SystemsTroubleshooting Coherent Optical Communication Systems
Troubleshooting Coherent Optical Communication Systems
 
Dynamic Spectrum Access and the race for mobile capacity
Dynamic Spectrum Access and the race for mobile capacityDynamic Spectrum Access and the race for mobile capacity
Dynamic Spectrum Access and the race for mobile capacity
 
Solving synchronization challenges with critical infrastructures
Solving synchronization challenges with critical infrastructuresSolving synchronization challenges with critical infrastructures
Solving synchronization challenges with critical infrastructures
 
Massive MIMO: Opportunities & Challenges
Massive MIMO: Opportunities & ChallengesMassive MIMO: Opportunities & Challenges
Massive MIMO: Opportunities & Challenges
 
Flexible Optical Transmission
Flexible Optical TransmissionFlexible Optical Transmission
Flexible Optical Transmission
 
Cognitive Radio from a Mobile Operator's Perspective: System Performance and ...
Cognitive Radio from a Mobile Operator's Perspective: System Performance and ...Cognitive Radio from a Mobile Operator's Perspective: System Performance and ...
Cognitive Radio from a Mobile Operator's Perspective: System Performance and ...
 
Photonics21 – Next-Generation Optical Internet Access: Roadmap for Broadband ...
Photonics21 – Next-Generation Optical Internet Access: Roadmap for Broadband ...Photonics21 – Next-Generation Optical Internet Access: Roadmap for Broadband ...
Photonics21 – Next-Generation Optical Internet Access: Roadmap for Broadband ...
 
IRJET- Simulating Spectrum Sensing in Cognitive Radio Network using Cyclostat...
IRJET- Simulating Spectrum Sensing in Cognitive Radio Network using Cyclostat...IRJET- Simulating Spectrum Sensing in Cognitive Radio Network using Cyclostat...
IRJET- Simulating Spectrum Sensing in Cognitive Radio Network using Cyclostat...
 
Qual2
Qual2Qual2
Qual2
 
New connectivity in 5G: Avoiding dead-ends in the road to mobile growth
New connectivity in 5G: Avoiding dead-ends in the road to mobile growthNew connectivity in 5G: Avoiding dead-ends in the road to mobile growth
New connectivity in 5G: Avoiding dead-ends in the road to mobile growth
 
Open wireless network case study analysis - Ritu Raj and Amitesh
Open wireless network case study analysis - Ritu Raj and AmiteshOpen wireless network case study analysis - Ritu Raj and Amitesh
Open wireless network case study analysis - Ritu Raj and Amitesh
 
Spectrum WG @ AWF-9
Spectrum WG @ AWF-9Spectrum WG @ AWF-9
Spectrum WG @ AWF-9
 
Multi Channel Protocols In Cognitive Radio Networks
Multi Channel Protocols In  Cognitive Radio NetworksMulti Channel Protocols In  Cognitive Radio Networks
Multi Channel Protocols In Cognitive Radio Networks
 
Harish presentation
Harish presentationHarish presentation
Harish presentation
 
Workshop 3 - Mobile broadband and LTE for critical communications - Session 1
Workshop 3 - Mobile broadband and LTE for critical communications - Session 1Workshop 3 - Mobile broadband and LTE for critical communications - Session 1
Workshop 3 - Mobile broadband and LTE for critical communications - Session 1
 
Spectrum Policy Forum Cluster 4 Meeting on 5G parameters
Spectrum Policy Forum Cluster 4 Meeting on 5G parametersSpectrum Policy Forum Cluster 4 Meeting on 5G parameters
Spectrum Policy Forum Cluster 4 Meeting on 5G parameters
 
Eu harmonisation on dynamic spectrum access
Eu harmonisation on dynamic spectrum accessEu harmonisation on dynamic spectrum access
Eu harmonisation on dynamic spectrum access
 
Single vs. multi-carrier in ROADM networks
Single vs. multi-carrier in ROADM networksSingle vs. multi-carrier in ROADM networks
Single vs. multi-carrier in ROADM networks
 

Viewers also liked

From 0 to 0xdeadbeef - security mistakes that will haunt your startup
From 0 to 0xdeadbeef - security mistakes that will haunt your startupFrom 0 to 0xdeadbeef - security mistakes that will haunt your startup
From 0 to 0xdeadbeef - security mistakes that will haunt your startupDiogo Mónica
 
Leveraging Honest Users: Stealth Command-and-Control of Botnets
Leveraging Honest Users: Stealth Command-and-Control of BotnetsLeveraging Honest Users: Stealth Command-and-Control of Botnets
Leveraging Honest Users: Stealth Command-and-Control of BotnetsDiogo Mónica
 
PhD Thesis Diogo Mónica
PhD Thesis Diogo MónicaPhD Thesis Diogo Mónica
PhD Thesis Diogo MónicaDiogo Mónica
 
An IDS for browser hijacking
An IDS for browser hijackingAn IDS for browser hijacking
An IDS for browser hijackingDiogo Mónica
 
WiFiHop - mitigating the Evil twin attack through multi-hop detection
WiFiHop - mitigating the Evil twin attack through multi-hop detectionWiFiHop - mitigating the Evil twin attack through multi-hop detection
WiFiHop - mitigating the Evil twin attack through multi-hop detectionDiogo Mónica
 
Observable Non-Sybil Quorums Construction in One-Hop Wireless Ad Hoc Networks
Observable Non-Sybil Quorums Construction in One-Hop Wireless Ad Hoc NetworksObservable Non-Sybil Quorums Construction in One-Hop Wireless Ad Hoc Networks
Observable Non-Sybil Quorums Construction in One-Hop Wireless Ad Hoc NetworksDiogo Mónica
 
MultiPath TCP - The path to multipath
MultiPath TCP - The path to multipathMultiPath TCP - The path to multipath
MultiPath TCP - The path to multipathDiogo Mónica
 
Secure Software Distribution in an Adversarial World
Secure Software Distribution in an Adversarial WorldSecure Software Distribution in an Adversarial World
Secure Software Distribution in an Adversarial WorldDiogo Mónica
 
ESORICS 2014: Local Password validation using Self-Organizing Maps
ESORICS 2014: Local Password validation using Self-Organizing MapsESORICS 2014: Local Password validation using Self-Organizing Maps
ESORICS 2014: Local Password validation using Self-Organizing MapsDiogo Mónica
 
MTLS in a Microservices World
MTLS in a Microservices WorldMTLS in a Microservices World
MTLS in a Microservices WorldDiogo Mónica
 
Docker presentation | Paris Docker Meetup
Docker presentation | Paris Docker MeetupDocker presentation | Paris Docker Meetup
Docker presentation | Paris Docker MeetupdotCloud
 
Why Docker
Why DockerWhy Docker
Why DockerdotCloud
 
Cloud conf keynote - Orchestrating Least Privilege
Cloud conf keynote - Orchestrating Least PrivilegeCloud conf keynote - Orchestrating Least Privilege
Cloud conf keynote - Orchestrating Least PrivilegeDiogo Mónica
 
Docker 101: Introduction to Docker
Docker 101: Introduction to DockerDocker 101: Introduction to Docker
Docker 101: Introduction to DockerDocker, Inc.
 

Viewers also liked (15)

From 0 to 0xdeadbeef - security mistakes that will haunt your startup
From 0 to 0xdeadbeef - security mistakes that will haunt your startupFrom 0 to 0xdeadbeef - security mistakes that will haunt your startup
From 0 to 0xdeadbeef - security mistakes that will haunt your startup
 
Leveraging Honest Users: Stealth Command-and-Control of Botnets
Leveraging Honest Users: Stealth Command-and-Control of BotnetsLeveraging Honest Users: Stealth Command-and-Control of Botnets
Leveraging Honest Users: Stealth Command-and-Control of Botnets
 
PhD Thesis Diogo Mónica
PhD Thesis Diogo MónicaPhD Thesis Diogo Mónica
PhD Thesis Diogo Mónica
 
An IDS for browser hijacking
An IDS for browser hijackingAn IDS for browser hijacking
An IDS for browser hijacking
 
WiFiHop - mitigating the Evil twin attack through multi-hop detection
WiFiHop - mitigating the Evil twin attack through multi-hop detectionWiFiHop - mitigating the Evil twin attack through multi-hop detection
WiFiHop - mitigating the Evil twin attack through multi-hop detection
 
Observable Non-Sybil Quorums Construction in One-Hop Wireless Ad Hoc Networks
Observable Non-Sybil Quorums Construction in One-Hop Wireless Ad Hoc NetworksObservable Non-Sybil Quorums Construction in One-Hop Wireless Ad Hoc Networks
Observable Non-Sybil Quorums Construction in One-Hop Wireless Ad Hoc Networks
 
MultiPath TCP - The path to multipath
MultiPath TCP - The path to multipathMultiPath TCP - The path to multipath
MultiPath TCP - The path to multipath
 
Secure Software Distribution in an Adversarial World
Secure Software Distribution in an Adversarial WorldSecure Software Distribution in an Adversarial World
Secure Software Distribution in an Adversarial World
 
ESORICS 2014: Local Password validation using Self-Organizing Maps
ESORICS 2014: Local Password validation using Self-Organizing MapsESORICS 2014: Local Password validation using Self-Organizing Maps
ESORICS 2014: Local Password validation using Self-Organizing Maps
 
MTLS in a Microservices World
MTLS in a Microservices WorldMTLS in a Microservices World
MTLS in a Microservices World
 
Docker presentation | Paris Docker Meetup
Docker presentation | Paris Docker MeetupDocker presentation | Paris Docker Meetup
Docker presentation | Paris Docker Meetup
 
Bletchley
BletchleyBletchley
Bletchley
 
Why Docker
Why DockerWhy Docker
Why Docker
 
Cloud conf keynote - Orchestrating Least Privilege
Cloud conf keynote - Orchestrating Least PrivilegeCloud conf keynote - Orchestrating Least Privilege
Cloud conf keynote - Orchestrating Least Privilege
 
Docker 101: Introduction to Docker
Docker 101: Introduction to DockerDocker 101: Introduction to Docker
Docker 101: Introduction to Docker
 

Similar to On the use of radio resource tests in wireless ad hoc networks

APPLICATIONS OF COGNITIVE RADIO
APPLICATIONS OF COGNITIVE RADIOAPPLICATIONS OF COGNITIVE RADIO
APPLICATIONS OF COGNITIVE RADIOFAIZAN SHAFI
 
Ingrid Moerman, Stefan Bouckaert: IP CREW - Cognitive Radio Experimentation ...
Ingrid Moerman, Stefan Bouckaert:  IP CREW - Cognitive Radio Experimentation ...Ingrid Moerman, Stefan Bouckaert:  IP CREW - Cognitive Radio Experimentation ...
Ingrid Moerman, Stefan Bouckaert: IP CREW - Cognitive Radio Experimentation ...FIA2010
 
An Ant colony optimization algorithm to solve the broken link problem in wire...
An Ant colony optimization algorithm to solve the broken link problem in wire...An Ant colony optimization algorithm to solve the broken link problem in wire...
An Ant colony optimization algorithm to solve the broken link problem in wire...IJERA Editor
 
Multi-hop Communication for the Next Generation (xG) Wireless Network
Multi-hop Communication for the Next Generation (xG) Wireless NetworkMulti-hop Communication for the Next Generation (xG) Wireless Network
Multi-hop Communication for the Next Generation (xG) Wireless NetworkM. Shamim Kaiser
 
EAACK-A Secure Intrusion Detection System Overview
EAACK-A Secure Intrusion Detection System OverviewEAACK-A Secure Intrusion Detection System Overview
EAACK-A Secure Intrusion Detection System Overviewvpmmguys
 
Intelligent black hole detection in mobile AdHoc networks
Intelligent black hole detection in mobile AdHoc networksIntelligent black hole detection in mobile AdHoc networks
Intelligent black hole detection in mobile AdHoc networksIJECEIAES
 
Sensor networks a survey
Sensor networks a surveySensor networks a survey
Sensor networks a surveywsnapple
 
Stat of the art in cognitive radio
Stat of the art in cognitive radioStat of the art in cognitive radio
Stat of the art in cognitive radioMohsen Tantawy
 
IRJET- Channel and Rate Selection in Cognitive Radio Network
IRJET- Channel and Rate Selection in Cognitive Radio NetworkIRJET- Channel and Rate Selection in Cognitive Radio Network
IRJET- Channel and Rate Selection in Cognitive Radio NetworkIRJET Journal
 
Cognitive radio wireless sensor networks applications, challenges and researc...
Cognitive radio wireless sensor networks applications, challenges and researc...Cognitive radio wireless sensor networks applications, challenges and researc...
Cognitive radio wireless sensor networks applications, challenges and researc...Ameer Sameer
 
V5_I1_2016_Paper19.doc
V5_I1_2016_Paper19.docV5_I1_2016_Paper19.doc
V5_I1_2016_Paper19.docIIRindia
 
Effective Audio Storage and Retrieval in Infrastructure less Environment over...
Effective Audio Storage and Retrieval in Infrastructure less Environment over...Effective Audio Storage and Retrieval in Infrastructure less Environment over...
Effective Audio Storage and Retrieval in Infrastructure less Environment over...IRJET Journal
 
Enhancing Opportunistic Routing for Cognitive Radio Network
Enhancing Opportunistic Routing for Cognitive Radio NetworkEnhancing Opportunistic Routing for Cognitive Radio Network
Enhancing Opportunistic Routing for Cognitive Radio NetworkIRJET Journal
 
Defending Reactive Jammers in WSN using a Trigger Identification Service.
Defending Reactive Jammers in WSN using a Trigger Identification Service.Defending Reactive Jammers in WSN using a Trigger Identification Service.
Defending Reactive Jammers in WSN using a Trigger Identification Service.ijsrd.com
 
Methods for Detecting Energy and Signals in Cognitive Radio: A Review
Methods for Detecting Energy and Signals in Cognitive Radio: A ReviewMethods for Detecting Energy and Signals in Cognitive Radio: A Review
Methods for Detecting Energy and Signals in Cognitive Radio: A ReviewIRJET Journal
 
Low Priced And Efficient Energy Replica Detection In WSN
Low Priced And Efficient Energy Replica Detection In WSNLow Priced And Efficient Energy Replica Detection In WSN
Low Priced And Efficient Energy Replica Detection In WSNIRJET Journal
 
Online opportunistic routing using Reinforcement learning
Online opportunistic routing using Reinforcement learningOnline opportunistic routing using Reinforcement learning
Online opportunistic routing using Reinforcement learningHarshal Solao
 

Similar to On the use of radio resource tests in wireless ad hoc networks (20)

MU- mimo [autosaved]
MU- mimo [autosaved]MU- mimo [autosaved]
MU- mimo [autosaved]
 
Christoph Heller - EADS for CREW
Christoph Heller - EADS for CREWChristoph Heller - EADS for CREW
Christoph Heller - EADS for CREW
 
APPLICATIONS OF COGNITIVE RADIO
APPLICATIONS OF COGNITIVE RADIOAPPLICATIONS OF COGNITIVE RADIO
APPLICATIONS OF COGNITIVE RADIO
 
Ingrid Moerman, Stefan Bouckaert: IP CREW - Cognitive Radio Experimentation ...
Ingrid Moerman, Stefan Bouckaert:  IP CREW - Cognitive Radio Experimentation ...Ingrid Moerman, Stefan Bouckaert:  IP CREW - Cognitive Radio Experimentation ...
Ingrid Moerman, Stefan Bouckaert: IP CREW - Cognitive Radio Experimentation ...
 
An Ant colony optimization algorithm to solve the broken link problem in wire...
An Ant colony optimization algorithm to solve the broken link problem in wire...An Ant colony optimization algorithm to solve the broken link problem in wire...
An Ant colony optimization algorithm to solve the broken link problem in wire...
 
Multi-hop Communication for the Next Generation (xG) Wireless Network
Multi-hop Communication for the Next Generation (xG) Wireless NetworkMulti-hop Communication for the Next Generation (xG) Wireless Network
Multi-hop Communication for the Next Generation (xG) Wireless Network
 
EAACK-A Secure Intrusion Detection System Overview
EAACK-A Secure Intrusion Detection System OverviewEAACK-A Secure Intrusion Detection System Overview
EAACK-A Secure Intrusion Detection System Overview
 
Intelligent black hole detection in mobile AdHoc networks
Intelligent black hole detection in mobile AdHoc networksIntelligent black hole detection in mobile AdHoc networks
Intelligent black hole detection in mobile AdHoc networks
 
Sensor networks a survey
Sensor networks a surveySensor networks a survey
Sensor networks a survey
 
Stat of the art in cognitive radio
Stat of the art in cognitive radioStat of the art in cognitive radio
Stat of the art in cognitive radio
 
IRJET- Channel and Rate Selection in Cognitive Radio Network
IRJET- Channel and Rate Selection in Cognitive Radio NetworkIRJET- Channel and Rate Selection in Cognitive Radio Network
IRJET- Channel and Rate Selection in Cognitive Radio Network
 
Cognitive radio wireless sensor networks applications, challenges and researc...
Cognitive radio wireless sensor networks applications, challenges and researc...Cognitive radio wireless sensor networks applications, challenges and researc...
Cognitive radio wireless sensor networks applications, challenges and researc...
 
V5_I1_2016_Paper19.doc
V5_I1_2016_Paper19.docV5_I1_2016_Paper19.doc
V5_I1_2016_Paper19.doc
 
Effective Audio Storage and Retrieval in Infrastructure less Environment over...
Effective Audio Storage and Retrieval in Infrastructure less Environment over...Effective Audio Storage and Retrieval in Infrastructure less Environment over...
Effective Audio Storage and Retrieval in Infrastructure less Environment over...
 
Enhancing Opportunistic Routing for Cognitive Radio Network
Enhancing Opportunistic Routing for Cognitive Radio NetworkEnhancing Opportunistic Routing for Cognitive Radio Network
Enhancing Opportunistic Routing for Cognitive Radio Network
 
Defending Reactive Jammers in WSN using a Trigger Identification Service.
Defending Reactive Jammers in WSN using a Trigger Identification Service.Defending Reactive Jammers in WSN using a Trigger Identification Service.
Defending Reactive Jammers in WSN using a Trigger Identification Service.
 
Methods for Detecting Energy and Signals in Cognitive Radio: A Review
Methods for Detecting Energy and Signals in Cognitive Radio: A ReviewMethods for Detecting Energy and Signals in Cognitive Radio: A Review
Methods for Detecting Energy and Signals in Cognitive Radio: A Review
 
Ad-Hoc Networks
Ad-Hoc NetworksAd-Hoc Networks
Ad-Hoc Networks
 
Low Priced And Efficient Energy Replica Detection In WSN
Low Priced And Efficient Energy Replica Detection In WSNLow Priced And Efficient Energy Replica Detection In WSN
Low Priced And Efficient Energy Replica Detection In WSN
 
Online opportunistic routing using Reinforcement learning
Online opportunistic routing using Reinforcement learningOnline opportunistic routing using Reinforcement learning
Online opportunistic routing using Reinforcement learning
 

Recently uploaded

2024: Domino Containers - The Next Step. News from the Domino Container commu...
2024: Domino Containers - The Next Step. News from the Domino Container commu...2024: Domino Containers - The Next Step. News from the Domino Container commu...
2024: Domino Containers - The Next Step. News from the Domino Container commu...Martijn de Jong
 
The Role of Taxonomy and Ontology in Semantic Layers - Heather Hedden.pdf
The Role of Taxonomy and Ontology in Semantic Layers - Heather Hedden.pdfThe Role of Taxonomy and Ontology in Semantic Layers - Heather Hedden.pdf
The Role of Taxonomy and Ontology in Semantic Layers - Heather Hedden.pdfEnterprise Knowledge
 
A Domino Admins Adventures (Engage 2024)
A Domino Admins Adventures (Engage 2024)A Domino Admins Adventures (Engage 2024)
A Domino Admins Adventures (Engage 2024)Gabriella Davis
 
How to Troubleshoot Apps for the Modern Connected Worker
How to Troubleshoot Apps for the Modern Connected WorkerHow to Troubleshoot Apps for the Modern Connected Worker
How to Troubleshoot Apps for the Modern Connected WorkerThousandEyes
 
Boost PC performance: How more available memory can improve productivity
Boost PC performance: How more available memory can improve productivityBoost PC performance: How more available memory can improve productivity
Boost PC performance: How more available memory can improve productivityPrincipled Technologies
 
Automating Google Workspace (GWS) & more with Apps Script
Automating Google Workspace (GWS) & more with Apps ScriptAutomating Google Workspace (GWS) & more with Apps Script
Automating Google Workspace (GWS) & more with Apps Scriptwesley chun
 
08448380779 Call Girls In Friends Colony Women Seeking Men
08448380779 Call Girls In Friends Colony Women Seeking Men08448380779 Call Girls In Friends Colony Women Seeking Men
08448380779 Call Girls In Friends Colony Women Seeking MenDelhi Call girls
 
Axa Assurance Maroc - Insurer Innovation Award 2024
Axa Assurance Maroc - Insurer Innovation Award 2024Axa Assurance Maroc - Insurer Innovation Award 2024
Axa Assurance Maroc - Insurer Innovation Award 2024The Digital Insurer
 
Unblocking The Main Thread Solving ANRs and Frozen Frames
Unblocking The Main Thread Solving ANRs and Frozen FramesUnblocking The Main Thread Solving ANRs and Frozen Frames
Unblocking The Main Thread Solving ANRs and Frozen FramesSinan KOZAK
 
Handwritten Text Recognition for manuscripts and early printed texts
Handwritten Text Recognition for manuscripts and early printed textsHandwritten Text Recognition for manuscripts and early printed texts
Handwritten Text Recognition for manuscripts and early printed textsMaria Levchenko
 
Finology Group – Insurtech Innovation Award 2024
Finology Group – Insurtech Innovation Award 2024Finology Group – Insurtech Innovation Award 2024
Finology Group – Insurtech Innovation Award 2024The Digital Insurer
 
Workshop - Best of Both Worlds_ Combine KG and Vector search for enhanced R...
Workshop - Best of Both Worlds_ Combine  KG and Vector search for  enhanced R...Workshop - Best of Both Worlds_ Combine  KG and Vector search for  enhanced R...
Workshop - Best of Both Worlds_ Combine KG and Vector search for enhanced R...Neo4j
 
The 7 Things I Know About Cyber Security After 25 Years | April 2024
The 7 Things I Know About Cyber Security After 25 Years | April 2024The 7 Things I Know About Cyber Security After 25 Years | April 2024
The 7 Things I Know About Cyber Security After 25 Years | April 2024Rafal Los
 
Driving Behavioral Change for Information Management through Data-Driven Gree...
Driving Behavioral Change for Information Management through Data-Driven Gree...Driving Behavioral Change for Information Management through Data-Driven Gree...
Driving Behavioral Change for Information Management through Data-Driven Gree...Enterprise Knowledge
 
IAC 2024 - IA Fast Track to Search Focused AI Solutions
IAC 2024 - IA Fast Track to Search Focused AI SolutionsIAC 2024 - IA Fast Track to Search Focused AI Solutions
IAC 2024 - IA Fast Track to Search Focused AI SolutionsEnterprise Knowledge
 
Partners Life - Insurer Innovation Award 2024
Partners Life - Insurer Innovation Award 2024Partners Life - Insurer Innovation Award 2024
Partners Life - Insurer Innovation Award 2024The Digital Insurer
 
Data Cloud, More than a CDP by Matt Robison
Data Cloud, More than a CDP by Matt RobisonData Cloud, More than a CDP by Matt Robison
Data Cloud, More than a CDP by Matt RobisonAnna Loughnan Colquhoun
 
08448380779 Call Girls In Greater Kailash - I Women Seeking Men
08448380779 Call Girls In Greater Kailash - I Women Seeking Men08448380779 Call Girls In Greater Kailash - I Women Seeking Men
08448380779 Call Girls In Greater Kailash - I Women Seeking MenDelhi Call girls
 
Scaling API-first – The story of a global engineering organization
Scaling API-first – The story of a global engineering organizationScaling API-first – The story of a global engineering organization
Scaling API-first – The story of a global engineering organizationRadu Cotescu
 
🐬 The future of MySQL is Postgres 🐘
🐬  The future of MySQL is Postgres   🐘🐬  The future of MySQL is Postgres   🐘
🐬 The future of MySQL is Postgres 🐘RTylerCroy
 

Recently uploaded (20)

2024: Domino Containers - The Next Step. News from the Domino Container commu...
2024: Domino Containers - The Next Step. News from the Domino Container commu...2024: Domino Containers - The Next Step. News from the Domino Container commu...
2024: Domino Containers - The Next Step. News from the Domino Container commu...
 
The Role of Taxonomy and Ontology in Semantic Layers - Heather Hedden.pdf
The Role of Taxonomy and Ontology in Semantic Layers - Heather Hedden.pdfThe Role of Taxonomy and Ontology in Semantic Layers - Heather Hedden.pdf
The Role of Taxonomy and Ontology in Semantic Layers - Heather Hedden.pdf
 
A Domino Admins Adventures (Engage 2024)
A Domino Admins Adventures (Engage 2024)A Domino Admins Adventures (Engage 2024)
A Domino Admins Adventures (Engage 2024)
 
How to Troubleshoot Apps for the Modern Connected Worker
How to Troubleshoot Apps for the Modern Connected WorkerHow to Troubleshoot Apps for the Modern Connected Worker
How to Troubleshoot Apps for the Modern Connected Worker
 
Boost PC performance: How more available memory can improve productivity
Boost PC performance: How more available memory can improve productivityBoost PC performance: How more available memory can improve productivity
Boost PC performance: How more available memory can improve productivity
 
Automating Google Workspace (GWS) & more with Apps Script
Automating Google Workspace (GWS) & more with Apps ScriptAutomating Google Workspace (GWS) & more with Apps Script
Automating Google Workspace (GWS) & more with Apps Script
 
08448380779 Call Girls In Friends Colony Women Seeking Men
08448380779 Call Girls In Friends Colony Women Seeking Men08448380779 Call Girls In Friends Colony Women Seeking Men
08448380779 Call Girls In Friends Colony Women Seeking Men
 
Axa Assurance Maroc - Insurer Innovation Award 2024
Axa Assurance Maroc - Insurer Innovation Award 2024Axa Assurance Maroc - Insurer Innovation Award 2024
Axa Assurance Maroc - Insurer Innovation Award 2024
 
Unblocking The Main Thread Solving ANRs and Frozen Frames
Unblocking The Main Thread Solving ANRs and Frozen FramesUnblocking The Main Thread Solving ANRs and Frozen Frames
Unblocking The Main Thread Solving ANRs and Frozen Frames
 
Handwritten Text Recognition for manuscripts and early printed texts
Handwritten Text Recognition for manuscripts and early printed textsHandwritten Text Recognition for manuscripts and early printed texts
Handwritten Text Recognition for manuscripts and early printed texts
 
Finology Group – Insurtech Innovation Award 2024
Finology Group – Insurtech Innovation Award 2024Finology Group – Insurtech Innovation Award 2024
Finology Group – Insurtech Innovation Award 2024
 
Workshop - Best of Both Worlds_ Combine KG and Vector search for enhanced R...
Workshop - Best of Both Worlds_ Combine  KG and Vector search for  enhanced R...Workshop - Best of Both Worlds_ Combine  KG and Vector search for  enhanced R...
Workshop - Best of Both Worlds_ Combine KG and Vector search for enhanced R...
 
The 7 Things I Know About Cyber Security After 25 Years | April 2024
The 7 Things I Know About Cyber Security After 25 Years | April 2024The 7 Things I Know About Cyber Security After 25 Years | April 2024
The 7 Things I Know About Cyber Security After 25 Years | April 2024
 
Driving Behavioral Change for Information Management through Data-Driven Gree...
Driving Behavioral Change for Information Management through Data-Driven Gree...Driving Behavioral Change for Information Management through Data-Driven Gree...
Driving Behavioral Change for Information Management through Data-Driven Gree...
 
IAC 2024 - IA Fast Track to Search Focused AI Solutions
IAC 2024 - IA Fast Track to Search Focused AI SolutionsIAC 2024 - IA Fast Track to Search Focused AI Solutions
IAC 2024 - IA Fast Track to Search Focused AI Solutions
 
Partners Life - Insurer Innovation Award 2024
Partners Life - Insurer Innovation Award 2024Partners Life - Insurer Innovation Award 2024
Partners Life - Insurer Innovation Award 2024
 
Data Cloud, More than a CDP by Matt Robison
Data Cloud, More than a CDP by Matt RobisonData Cloud, More than a CDP by Matt Robison
Data Cloud, More than a CDP by Matt Robison
 
08448380779 Call Girls In Greater Kailash - I Women Seeking Men
08448380779 Call Girls In Greater Kailash - I Women Seeking Men08448380779 Call Girls In Greater Kailash - I Women Seeking Men
08448380779 Call Girls In Greater Kailash - I Women Seeking Men
 
Scaling API-first – The story of a global engineering organization
Scaling API-first – The story of a global engineering organizationScaling API-first – The story of a global engineering organization
Scaling API-first – The story of a global engineering organization
 
🐬 The future of MySQL is Postgres 🐘
🐬  The future of MySQL is Postgres   🐘🐬  The future of MySQL is Postgres   🐘
🐬 The future of MySQL is Postgres 🐘
 

On the use of radio resource tests in wireless ad hoc networks

  • 1. 1 28/06/09On the Use of Radio Resource Tests in Wireless ad hoc Networks Distributed Systems Group - INESC-ID technology from seed On the Use of Radio Resource Tests in Wireless ad hoc Networks Diogo Mónica, João Leitão, Luís Rodrigues, Carlos Ribeiro INESC-ID/IST {diogo.monica, joao.c.leitao, ler, carlos.ribeiro} @ist.utl.pt
  • 2.  Introduction Radio Resource Tests Analysis Summary 2 Distributed Systems Group - INESC-ID technology from seed Road Map 28/06/09On the Use of Radio Resource Tests in Wireless ad hoc Networks
  • 3. 3 Distributed Systems Group - INESC-ID technology from seed Introduction – Wireless ad hoc Networks Securing Wireless ad hoc Networks is particularly difficult 28/06/09On the Use of Radio Resource Tests in Wireless ad hoc Networks • Denial-of-service • Eavesdropping • Node hijacking • Impersonation - Sybil Attack
  • 4. 4 Distributed Systems Group - INESC-ID technology from seed Introduction – The Sybil Attack The sybil identity can be generated by the malicious node, or stolen from an existing correct node 28/06/09On the Use of Radio Resource Tests in Wireless ad hoc Networks A Sybil attack happens when a malicious node participates with multiple identities in a system
  • 5. 5 Distributed Systems Group - INESC-ID technology from seed Introduction – The Sybil Attack The sybil identity can be generated by the malicious node, or stolen from an existing correct node 28/06/09On the Use of Radio Resource Tests in Wireless ad hoc Networks A Sybil attack happens when a malicious node participates with multiple identities in a system
  • 6. 6 Distributed Systems Group - INESC-ID technology from seed Introduction – The Sybil Attack The sybil identity can be generated by the malicious node, or stolen from an existing correct node 28/06/09On the Use of Radio Resource Tests in Wireless ad hoc Networks A Sybil attack happens when a malicious node participates with multiple identities in a system
  • 7. 7 Distributed Systems Group - INESC-ID technology from seed Introduction – The Sybil Attack Easily defeats quorum systems, or other voting schemes In order to obtain a majority in a network with 5 correct nodes, a malicious node has to create 5 sybil identities 28/06/09On the Use of Radio Resource Tests in Wireless ad hoc Networks
  • 8. 8 Distributed Systems Group - INESC-ID technology from seed Introduction – Resource Tests 28/06/09On the Use of Radio Resource Tests in Wireless ad hoc Networks In resource testing we determine if a set of identities possess fewer aggregated resources than would be expected • Computational Power • Storage • Network Bandwidth • … • Radio Resource
  • 9. Introduction  Radio Resource Tests Analysis Summary 9 Distributed Systems Group - INESC-ID technology from seed Road Map 28/06/09On the Use of Radio Resource Tests in Wireless ad hoc Networks
  • 10. 10 Distributed Systems Group - INESC-ID technology from seed Radio Resource Tests Radio Resource Tests (RRTs) assume that each node has access to a single radio device, and builds upon the limitations of these devices 28/06/09On the Use of Radio Resource Tests in Wireless ad hoc Networks The first RRT was introduced by Newsome et. al 2004 We will call it Sender Test
  • 11. 11 Distributed Systems Group - INESC-ID technology from seed Radio Resource Tests – Sender Test 28/06/09On the Use of Radio Resource Tests in Wireless ad hoc Networks • The Sender Test is based on the assumption that nodes cannot simultaneously transmit in more than one channel Sender Test (SST)
  • 12. 12 Distributed Systems Group - INESC-ID technology from seed Radio Resource Tests – Sender Test 28/06/09On the Use of Radio Resource Tests in Wireless ad hoc Networks Sender Test (SST) • The Sender Test is based on the assumption that nodes cannot simultaneously transmit in more than one channel
  • 13. 13 Distributed Systems Group - INESC-ID technology from seed Radio Resource Tests – Detection Probability 28/06/09On the Use of Radio Resource Tests in Wireless ad hoc Networks • Denoting by h the number of simultaneously tested identities, and by pd the probability of detection of a Sybil Identity in a test, we have The challenger is unable listen in more than one channel at the same time, so we repeat the test r times
  • 14. 14 Distributed Systems Group - INESC-ID technology from seed Radio Resource Tests – Contribution We introduce two new tests and an optimization for the Sender Test 28/06/09On the Use of Radio Resource Tests in Wireless ad hoc Networks • Optimized Sender Test (oSST) • Receiver Test (SRT) • Collision Test (FCT)
  • 15. 15 Distributed Systems Group - INESC-ID technology from seed Radio Resource Tests - Framework Each RRT is characterized by a set of parameters, RRT(h, c, w) 28/06/09On the Use of Radio Resource Tests in Wireless ad hoc Networks • h – Size of the set of simultaneously tested identities • c – Number of challenger identities actively participating in the test • w – Number of tester nodes that extract information from the test
  • 16. 16 Distributed Systems Group - INESC-ID technology from seed Radio Resource Tests – Sender Test 28/06/09On the Use of Radio Resource Tests in Wireless ad hoc Networks • h is limited by the number of available channels (K) • c is one, since the challenger needs to assign in which channel identities transmit in • w is one since only the challenger extracts information from the test The Sender Test is a RRT(K,1,1)
  • 17. 17 Distributed Systems Group - INESC-ID technology from seed Radio Resource Tests – Optimized Receiver Test 28/06/09On the Use of Radio Resource Tests in Wireless ad hoc Networks • h is limited by the number of available channels (K) • c is zero, since the channels can be chosen deterministically • w is N – K, since every node not participating in the test can extract information from it The Optimized Sender Test is a RRT(K,0,N-K)
  • 18. 18 Distributed Systems Group - INESC-ID technology from seed Radio Resource Tests – Receiver Test Receiver Test 28/06/09On the Use of Radio Resource Tests in Wireless ad hoc Networks • The Simultaneous Receiver Test is based on the assumption that nodes cannot simultaneously listen in more than one channel
  • 19. 19 Distributed Systems Group - INESC-ID technology from seed Radio Resource Tests – Receiver Test Receiver Test 28/06/09On the Use of Radio Resource Tests in Wireless ad hoc Networks • The Simultaneous Receiver Test is based on the assumption that nodes cannot simultaneously listen in more than one channel
  • 20. 20 Distributed Systems Group - INESC-ID technology from seed Radio Resource Tests – Receiver Test 28/06/09On the Use of Radio Resource Tests in Wireless ad hoc Networks • h is limited by the number of available channels K • c is one, since the challenger needs to send a challenge on one of the channels • w is one since only the challenger can extract information from the test (no other node knows the chosen channel) The Receiver Test is a RRT(K,1,1)
  • 21. Introduction Radio Resource Tests  Analysis Summary 21 Distributed Systems Group - INESC-ID technology from seed Road Map 28/06/09On the Use of Radio Resource Tests in Wireless ad hoc Networks
  • 22. 22 Distributed Systems Group - INESC-ID technology from seed Radio Resource Tests - Analysis 28/06/09On the Use of Radio Resource Tests in Wireless ad hoc Networks • Vulnerability to collusion • Message cost • Resource consumption • Synchronization requirements • Number of messages needed to achieve a desired probability of detection We compared the tests using the following metrics
  • 23. 23 Distributed Systems Group - INESC-ID technology from seed Analysis – Optimized Sender Test – Vulnerability to collusion 28/06/09On the Use of Radio Resource Tests in Wireless ad hoc Networks Vulnerability to collusion
  • 24. 24 Distributed Systems Group - INESC-ID technology from seed Analysis – Optimized Sender Test – Vulnerability to collusion 28/06/09On the Use of Radio Resource Tests in Wireless ad hoc Networks The Optimized Sender Test Handles at most h – 1 colluding malicious nodes (m) Vulnerability to collusion
  • 25. 25 Distributed Systems Group - INESC-ID technology from seed Analysis – Optimized Sender Test – Message Cost 28/06/09On the Use of Radio Resource Tests in Wireless ad hoc Networks Message Cost
  • 26. 26 Distributed Systems Group - INESC-ID technology from seed Analysis – Optimized Sender Test – Message Cost 28/06/09On the Use of Radio Resource Tests in Wireless ad hoc Networks In the Optimized Sender Test, tested nodes send a total of h messages per round Message Cost
  • 27. 27 Distributed Systems Group - INESC-ID technology from seed Analysis – Optimized Sender Test – Resource Consumption 28/06/09On the Use of Radio Resource Tests in Wireless ad hoc Networks Resource Consumption (DoS Opportunity)
  • 28. 28 Distributed Systems Group - INESC-ID technology from seed Analysis – Optimized Sender Test – Resource Consumption 28/06/09On the Use of Radio Resource Tests in Wireless ad hoc Networks In the Optimized Sender Test, when there is a malicious tester, Δ = rh – 1. Resource Consumption (DoS Opportunity)
  • 29. 29 Distributed Systems Group - INESC-ID technology from seed Analysis – Optimized Sender Test – Synchronization Requirements 28/06/09On the Use of Radio Resource Tests in Wireless ad hoc Networks Synchronization Requirements
  • 30. 30 Distributed Systems Group - INESC-ID technology from seed Analysis – Optimized Sender Test – Synchronization Requirements 28/06/09On the Use of Radio Resource Tests in Wireless ad hoc Networks In the Optimized Sender Test, tested nodes are required to transmit simultaneously Synchronization Requirements
  • 31. 31 Distributed Systems Group - INESC-ID technology from seed Analysis – Comparison Table 28/06/09On the Use of Radio Resource Tests in Wireless ad hoc Networks Metric Tests Optimized Sender Test Receiver Test Collision Test Collusion h - 1 h - 1 1 Message Cost h 2 2 Resource Consumption (malicious tester) Synchronization Strong Strong Weak
  • 32. Metric Tests Optimized Sender Test Receiver Test Collision Test Collusion h - 1 h - 1 1 Message Cost h 2 2 Resource Consumption (malicious tester) Synchronization Strong Strong Weak 32 Distributed Systems Group - INESC-ID technology from seed Analysis – Comparison Table 28/06/09On the Use of Radio Resource Tests in Wireless ad hoc Networks
  • 33. 33 Distributed Systems Group - INESC-ID technology from seed Analysis – Testing a Population of Nodes 28/06/09On the Use of Radio Resource Tests in Wireless ad hoc Networks Every node in the one-hop neighborhood has to test every other node Testing a group of nodes
  • 34. 34 Distributed Systems Group - INESC-ID technology from seed Analysis – Testing a Population of Nodes 28/06/09On the Use of Radio Resource Tests in Wireless ad hoc Networks Every node in the one-hop neighborhood has to test every other node Testing a group of nodes
  • 35. 35 Distributed Systems Group - INESC-ID technology from seed Analysis – Testing a Population of Nodes 28/06/09On the Use of Radio Resource Tests in Wireless ad hoc Networks Every node in the one-hop neighborhood has to test every other node Testing a group of nodes
  • 36. 36 Distributed Systems Group - INESC-ID technology from seed Analysis – Testing a Population of Nodes 28/06/09On the Use of Radio Resource Tests in Wireless ad hoc Networks Every node in the one-hop neighborhood has to test every other node Testing a group of nodes
  • 37. 37 Distributed Systems Group - INESC-ID technology from seed Analysis – Testing a Population of Nodes 28/06/09On the Use of Radio Resource Tests in Wireless ad hoc Networks Every node in the one-hop neighborhood has to test every other node Testing a group of nodes
  • 38. 38 Distributed Systems Group - INESC-ID technology from seed Radio Resource Tests - Performance Performance in number of messages 28/06/09On the Use of Radio Resource Tests in Wireless ad hoc Networks For a probability of sybil detection of 0.95.
  • 39. 39 Distributed Systems Group - INESC-ID technology from seed Radio Resource Tests - Performance Performance with collusion tolerance 28/06/09On the Use of Radio Resource Tests in Wireless ad hoc Networks For a network with 20 nodes and a probability of sybil detection of 0.95. Higher collusion
  • 40. 40 Distributed Systems Group - INESC-ID technology from seed Radio Resource Tests – Application Scenarios Application Scenarios 28/06/09On the Use of Radio Resource Tests in Wireless ad hoc Networks Test Best Performance Context Optimized Sender Test No DoS threat Receiver Test High collusion and/or DoS threat Collision Test One Channel
  • 41. Introduction Radio Resource Tests Analysis  Summary 41 Distributed Systems Group - INESC-ID technology from seed Road Map 28/06/09On the Use of Radio Resource Tests in Wireless ad hoc Networks
  • 42. 42 Distributed Systems Group - INESC-ID technology from seed Summary 28/06/09On the Use of Radio Resource Tests in Wireless ad hoc Networks • Radio Resource Tests are a viable mechanism for detecting sybil identities in Wireless ad hoc Networks • We presented two new RRTs and an optimization to an existing RRT • We presented a framework to compare the RRTs • We analyzed all the tests both in isolation, and when used to test a one-hop neighborhood. • We have shown that each test is best adapted to a specific scenario, which we described.
  • 43. 43 10/08/2008Thwarting the Sybil Attack in Wireless Ad Hoc Networks Distributed Systems Group - INESC-ID technology from seed technology from seed

Editor's Notes

  1. Overview of the road map. TEMPO: 10s
  2. We will start to talk about the environment (Wireless ad hoc networks) We will then talk about the problem we wish to address And then we will briefly introduce the generic class of solutions Then we will talk about our specific solution – radio resource tests About the framework we created to be able to compare them And the analysis of all the tests according to a set of relevant metrics Finally we will conclude our presentation
  3. This work is focused on the development of security mechanisms for wireless ad hoc networks. These networks are particularly difficult to protect due to a series of characteristics First of all we have the communication medium, in this case the air, which is more vulnerable than the cable communications The nodes are also vulnerable since they are normally more exposed than in conventional networks The absence of infrastructure makes the usage of centralized security mechanism much more difficult, since there is no centralized resource in ad hoc networks
  4. The Sybil attack is in its essence a impersonation attack, and happens when a malicious user is able to participate with multiple identities in a system This way, we assume that a correct entity is always associated with one identity, in contrary to malicious entities that can present multiple identities simultaneously, whether it is by stealing other nodes identities, or simply generating new ones For example, in this figure, the malicious entity represented in red can present a series of distinct identities. It presents identity a, but it can also present Tempo:30s
  5. Identity b Tempo:30s
  6. Or even identity C If a malicious entity is able to present multiple valid identities to a system, its said that it successfully did a sybil attack What are the disadvantages of a sybil attack, what does the attacker gain in doing one. Tempo:30s
  7. One attack to which this attack is effective is against quorum systems (or other systems based on voting) As shown in this figure, a malicious entity can vote multiple times, with different identities, being able to deterministically alter the final outcome TEMPO:30s
  8. In resource tests… Tempo:45s
  9. The way in which this assumption is explored is by requesting identities to transmit some message on distinct channels If these identities belong in fact to distinct nodes, they will be able to do so
  10. While working in these radio resource tests, we realized there were some distinguishing parameters in all the tests, that allowed us to caracterize them, and compare them with each other. So, we devised a framework with these parameters. Tempo:30s
  11. We are now going to apply this framework to the previously described sender test. Tempo:30s
  12. The sender test is a RRT with h equal to K, c equal to one, and w equal to 1. The number of identities that are tested simultaneously in the test h, is limited by the number of available channels. If we only have two channels, we can only have two identities communicating simultaneously. Regarding the number of active challengers, we have that the challenger node assigns the frequencies to every tested identity, so, there is only one active challenger. Finally, regarding the parameter w, since only the challenger node knows in which frequencies each identity is transmiting, there is only one node that can extract information from the test. Repetir: As said before, we devised an optimization for this test, that is based on the exact same assumptions: no node possesses more than one radio device, and no radio device is able to transmit simultaneously on two distinct frequencies. Tempo:30s
  13. There are essentially two main differences: First, we realized that channel assignment can be done deterministically. This removes the need for an explicit channel assignment from a challenger node. Also, this also increases the number of witnesses w, since now, and due to the deterministic channel assignment, every non-participating node is able to extract information from the test. One other test that we devised was the Receiver Test. Tempo:30s
  14. This test is based on a different assumption than the previous two. Instead of assuming nodes cannot simultaneously transmit in two distinct channels, we assume that they cannot listen simultaneously, on more than one channel. Tempo:30s
  15. As before, we also have to repeat the test for a certain number of Rounds, to be able to increase the probability of detection. Now applying our framework for the Receiver Test Tempo:30s
  16. With all these tests, we analyzed and compared them for a series of metrics
  17. With these metrics, lets go back to our first example, the osst. Tempo:30s
  18. The first metric analyzed is the vulnerability to collusion. The problem with colluding nodes is the following, imagine if we have a malicious node in the network. If this node presents two identities to the network and is tested, at least one of the identities will be excluded as a sybil identity. However, if there is another malicious node, and both of them are colluding, the node not being tested could defend the sybil identity by simply transmitting in the corresponding channel.
  19. The first metric analyzed is the vulnerability to collusion. The problem with colluding nodes is the following, imagine if we have a malicious node in the network. If this node presents two identities to the network and is tested, at least one of the identities will be excluded as a sybil identity. However, if there is another malicious node, and both of them are colluding, the node not being tested could defend the sybil identity by simply transmitting in the corresponding channel.
  20. The different tests have a different assymetry in the resource spent by the nodes beeing tested, and the tester,. For example, If a malicious node is able to ask for several tests, it could make an effective denial-of-service, requiring the nodes to do unecessary tests So, we use resource consumption essentially as a metric of the denial of service threat of the tests.
  21. The different tests have a different assymetry in the resource spent by the nodes beeing tested, and the tester,. For example, If a malicious node is able to ask for several tests, it could make an effective denial-of-service, requiring the nodes to do unecessary tests So, we use resource consumption essentially as a metric of the denial of service threat of the tests.
  22. In practice, nodes are not required to have a perfect synchronization; it is enough to ensure that the time to transmit a message is orders of magnitude larger than the allowed amount of desynchronization among nodes (such that a node cannot leverage on the desynchronization to send a message on both channels)
  23. In practice, nodes are not required to have a perfect synchronization; it is enough to ensure that the time to transmit a message is orders of magnitude larger than the allowed amount of desynchronization among nodes (such that a node cannot leverage on the desynchronization to send a message on both channels)
  24. Until now we analyzed each test individually. However, one has to consider the application of this test to a group of nodes.
  25. From this we can conclude the following application scenarios for our test examples Tempo:30s
  26. We can also analyse the number of messages in relation to the number of nodes in the network Tempo:30s
  27. Meter FCT Tempo:30s
  28. With all these tests, we analyzed and compared them for a series of metrics
  29. Tempo:30s
  30. Chegamos assim, ao fim da nossa apresentação, muito obrigado pela atenção. Se tiverem alguma questão…