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SEMINAR
                   ON
         IP TRACEBACK SECURITY




Guided by:                    Presented By:
Miss Ranjita Mishra   Deepak Kumar Marndi
                       Regd No-0801106165
                            CET,BBSR
CONTENTS
 Introduction
 Overview of Trace back system
 Classification of Trace back Methods
 Technologies For Preventing Network Attacks
 Limitation and open Issues
 Challenges and Future Works
 Conclusion
 References
INTRODUCTION
   DOS(denial of service)

   DDOS(distributed denial of
    service

   Spoofed IP address

   IP Trace back
       To identify the address of
                                    Fig A Scenario of DOS Attack
    the true source of the
    packets causing a DOS.
OVERVIEW OF TRACEBACK
          SYSTEM
 Able to trace the attacker with a single packet.

 Minimal processing overhead.

 Very low level of ISP involvement.

 High level of protection is preferred in a trace back system.

 Producing meaningful traces are limited to the range of
  deployment the trace back system.
CLASSIFICATION OF TRACEBACK
           SYSTEM
 Preventing Methods
        Ingress Filtering
 Reactive Methods
        Link Testing
             Input Debugging
             Controlled Flooding
        Logging
        ICMP Trackback
        Packet Marking Algorithm
        FDPM Trackback
        TBPM Trackback
CLASSIFICATION(Contd….)
• Ingress Filtering
 Configure routers to block
  packets that arrive with
  illegitimate source
  addresses.
 Examine the source address
  to distinguish between
                                 Fig Ingress Filtering
  legitimate and illegitimate
  addresses.
 Is most feasible in
  customer or at the border of
  the ISPs.
CLASSIFICATION(Contd….)
• Link Testing
 Starts from the router closest to the victim.
 It determines which link carries the attacker’s traffic.
 It is divided into two types.
         Input debugging.
         Controlled flooding.
 Disadvantage
    Consumes huge amount of resources.
    Causes denial of service when the no. of sources needed
    to be increased.
CLASSIFICATION(Contd….)
• Logging
 It logs packets at key routers.
 It determines the attacker’s path based on the packet
  traversing.

 Drawback
    Enormous resource requirements.
CLASSIFICATION(Contd….)
• ICMP TRACEBACK
 It trace out the full path
  of the attack.
 It generates an iTrace at
  every router directed to
  the same destination as
  the selected packet.
 ICMP message contains
  part of a traversing         Fig ICMP Traceback Mechanism

  packet and sends the
  message to the packet’s
  destination.
CLASSIFICATION(Contd….)
• Packet Marking Algorithm
 In this algorithm when it forwards a packet it also
  insert a mark in the packet which is an unique
  identifier to the particular router.
 The victim can determine all the intermediate hops
  for each packet by observing inserted marks.
 This makes the reconstruction of the attack path at the
  victim’s trivial.
 It is divided into two marking schemes.
         Deterministic Packet Marking scheme.
         Probabilistic packet Marking scheme.
CLASSIFICATION(Contd….)
• FDPM Traceback
 It is the optimized version of DPM.
 It utilizes various bits(called marks) in the IP header
  which has a flexible length depending on the network
  protocol used to mark packets.
 When an IP packet enters the protected network, it is
  marked by the interface close to the source of the packet.
 Reconstruction of path can be made as that of DPM to
  identify the source of the attack if detected.
CLASSIFICATION(Contd….)
• Advantages

 Number of packets required is comparatively less.

 Better Tracing Capability.

 It has Different probabilities that a router marks the
  attack packets.
CLASSIFICATION(Contd….)
• TBPM Method
 It is based on the bloom filter which utilizes router’s
  local topology information.
 It helps to design a single packet IP traceback system
  that needs not to be fully deployed in the entire
  network.
 Topology Based Packet Marking has been a new
  approach in Anti-IP spoofing techniques.
 TBPM techniques are compatible with both IPv4 and
  IPv6; unlike present packet marking techniques that
  cannot be effectively implemented in IPv6 networks.
TECHNOLOGIES FOR PREVENTING
    NETWORK ATTACKS
• Firewalls

• Intrusion Detection

• Intrusion Source Identification
LIMITATION AND OPEN ISSUES
 It has the problem with tracing beyond corporate
  firewalls.
 To accomplish IP traceback, we need to reach the host
  where the attack originated.
 To trace packets through firewalls into corporate
  intranets the last- traced IP address might be the
  firewall’s address.
CHALLENGES AND FUTURE
         WORK
 Identifying the indirect sources of reflector based
  DDoS attacks.
 Identifying the attacker who conceals himself/herself
  with stepping stones.
 Integrating defensive measures with traceback so that
  one mechanism may perform tracing as well as
  detection and/or defense.
 Automatic traceback to speed up tracing and reduce
  human intervention.
CONCLUSION
 One conclusion we can draw from this is that unless
  IP trace back measures are deployed all over the
  Internet, they are only effective for controlled
  networks than for the Internet.
 Today we can find many tools for doing DoS attacks.
  DoS attacks have become very popular. Hence we
  need to design proper mechanisms to protect systems
  from such attacks.
REFERENCES
 http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/IP_traceback

 http://dslab.csie.ncu.edu.tw/93html/paper/pdf/IP%20Traceb
  ack:A%20New%20Denial-of-Service%20Deterrent.pdf

 http://cseweb.ucsd.edu/~savage/papers/Ton01.pdf

 http://www.cs.plu.edu/courses/netsec/arts/w2020.pdf

 http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/download?doi=10.1.1.2
  .4574&rep=rep1&type=pdf
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Ip trace ppt

  • 1. SEMINAR ON IP TRACEBACK SECURITY Guided by: Presented By: Miss Ranjita Mishra Deepak Kumar Marndi Regd No-0801106165 CET,BBSR
  • 2. CONTENTS  Introduction  Overview of Trace back system  Classification of Trace back Methods  Technologies For Preventing Network Attacks  Limitation and open Issues  Challenges and Future Works  Conclusion  References
  • 3. INTRODUCTION  DOS(denial of service)  DDOS(distributed denial of service  Spoofed IP address  IP Trace back To identify the address of Fig A Scenario of DOS Attack the true source of the packets causing a DOS.
  • 4. OVERVIEW OF TRACEBACK SYSTEM  Able to trace the attacker with a single packet.  Minimal processing overhead.  Very low level of ISP involvement.  High level of protection is preferred in a trace back system.  Producing meaningful traces are limited to the range of deployment the trace back system.
  • 5. CLASSIFICATION OF TRACEBACK SYSTEM  Preventing Methods Ingress Filtering  Reactive Methods Link Testing Input Debugging Controlled Flooding Logging ICMP Trackback Packet Marking Algorithm FDPM Trackback TBPM Trackback
  • 6. CLASSIFICATION(Contd….) • Ingress Filtering  Configure routers to block packets that arrive with illegitimate source addresses.  Examine the source address to distinguish between Fig Ingress Filtering legitimate and illegitimate addresses.  Is most feasible in customer or at the border of the ISPs.
  • 7. CLASSIFICATION(Contd….) • Link Testing  Starts from the router closest to the victim.  It determines which link carries the attacker’s traffic.  It is divided into two types. Input debugging. Controlled flooding.  Disadvantage Consumes huge amount of resources. Causes denial of service when the no. of sources needed to be increased.
  • 8. CLASSIFICATION(Contd….) • Logging  It logs packets at key routers.  It determines the attacker’s path based on the packet traversing.  Drawback Enormous resource requirements.
  • 9. CLASSIFICATION(Contd….) • ICMP TRACEBACK  It trace out the full path of the attack.  It generates an iTrace at every router directed to the same destination as the selected packet.  ICMP message contains part of a traversing Fig ICMP Traceback Mechanism packet and sends the message to the packet’s destination.
  • 10. CLASSIFICATION(Contd….) • Packet Marking Algorithm  In this algorithm when it forwards a packet it also insert a mark in the packet which is an unique identifier to the particular router.  The victim can determine all the intermediate hops for each packet by observing inserted marks.  This makes the reconstruction of the attack path at the victim’s trivial.  It is divided into two marking schemes. Deterministic Packet Marking scheme. Probabilistic packet Marking scheme.
  • 11. CLASSIFICATION(Contd….) • FDPM Traceback  It is the optimized version of DPM.  It utilizes various bits(called marks) in the IP header which has a flexible length depending on the network protocol used to mark packets.  When an IP packet enters the protected network, it is marked by the interface close to the source of the packet.  Reconstruction of path can be made as that of DPM to identify the source of the attack if detected.
  • 12. CLASSIFICATION(Contd….) • Advantages  Number of packets required is comparatively less.  Better Tracing Capability.  It has Different probabilities that a router marks the attack packets.
  • 13. CLASSIFICATION(Contd….) • TBPM Method  It is based on the bloom filter which utilizes router’s local topology information.  It helps to design a single packet IP traceback system that needs not to be fully deployed in the entire network.  Topology Based Packet Marking has been a new approach in Anti-IP spoofing techniques.  TBPM techniques are compatible with both IPv4 and IPv6; unlike present packet marking techniques that cannot be effectively implemented in IPv6 networks.
  • 14. TECHNOLOGIES FOR PREVENTING NETWORK ATTACKS • Firewalls • Intrusion Detection • Intrusion Source Identification
  • 15. LIMITATION AND OPEN ISSUES  It has the problem with tracing beyond corporate firewalls.  To accomplish IP traceback, we need to reach the host where the attack originated.  To trace packets through firewalls into corporate intranets the last- traced IP address might be the firewall’s address.
  • 16. CHALLENGES AND FUTURE WORK  Identifying the indirect sources of reflector based DDoS attacks.  Identifying the attacker who conceals himself/herself with stepping stones.  Integrating defensive measures with traceback so that one mechanism may perform tracing as well as detection and/or defense.  Automatic traceback to speed up tracing and reduce human intervention.
  • 17. CONCLUSION  One conclusion we can draw from this is that unless IP trace back measures are deployed all over the Internet, they are only effective for controlled networks than for the Internet.  Today we can find many tools for doing DoS attacks. DoS attacks have become very popular. Hence we need to design proper mechanisms to protect systems from such attacks.
  • 18. REFERENCES  http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/IP_traceback  http://dslab.csie.ncu.edu.tw/93html/paper/pdf/IP%20Traceb ack:A%20New%20Denial-of-Service%20Deterrent.pdf  http://cseweb.ucsd.edu/~savage/papers/Ton01.pdf  http://www.cs.plu.edu/courses/netsec/arts/w2020.pdf  http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/download?doi=10.1.1.2 .4574&rep=rep1&type=pdf