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Technical Risk Methodology

  Cameco Fuel Systems Proposal
Methodology
• Technical Risk Assessment and
  subsequent counter measures or
  containment is not about FMEA or FTA.
• Risk Mitigation Methodology proposed by
  QAI Inc. utilizes several levels of analysis
  and increasing levels of detail as risk is
  determined to exist.
Methodology
• Technical Risk Assessment and
  subsequent counter measures or
  containment is not about FMEA or FTA.
• Risk Mitigation Methodology proposed by
  QAI Inc. utilizes several levels of analysis
  and increasing levels of detail as risk is
  determined to exist.
Process Risk Factors
• When working with various causes of
  Failure Modes in a process or assembly,
  there are several categories to consider.
  – Methods
  – Machines
  – Materials
  – Measurement
  – Mother Earth (Engineering Noise Factors)
  – Man
Causal Considerations
• The primary items are typically part of :
  – Aristotle’s Theory of Causality
  – Ishakawa’s Cause and Effects Diagram
    (Fishbone)
• Most are self explanatory.
• Mother Earth and Man require additional
  explanation.
Noise Factors
• Mother Earth refers to the Noise factors which
  when present can affect proper function.
• A Parameter or P Diagram is a common
  Input/output tool used to capture the noises.
• There are five noises which are investigated.
  –   Environment
  –   Process/Design Interfaces
  –   Degradation
  –   Customer/Processor/User/Duty Cycles
  –   Unit to Unit or Batch to Batch variation
P-Diagram
                   Noise
                  Factors




         Product or Process
Input                                 Outputs
                                     Response




        Control             Error
        Factors             States
FMEA Working Model
Per AIAG FMEA
Handbook, pg 3

                                  What                          Severity 9 & 10           What can be done?
                                                    How bad
                                 are the                                                  • Design Changes
                                                      is it?
                                Effect(s)?
                                                                                          • Process Changes
     What are the
      Functions,                             Severity < 9 and 9/10 inclusive              • Special Controls
     Features, or
    Requirements?                                                                         • Changes to
                                                                                   Pot.     Standards,
                                                          What       How often
                                                         are the      does it      KPCs     Procedures, or
                                                                                            Guides
                                                        Cause(s)?    happen?

               What can go wrong?
               • No Function

               • Partial/Over
                 Function/Degraded                                      How can
                 Over Time                                             the cause
                                                                           be                        All items
               • Intermittent                                          prevented                     requiring
                 Function                                                 and                        test
                                                                       detected?      How good
               • Unintended                                                                          planning
                                                                                       is this
                 Function                                                             method at
                                                                                      detecting
                                                                                         it?
The Completed Characteristics
               Matrix
      Characteristics
     Ranked in Order of
        Importance
                                Process Operations
                                from Process Flow




Potential Significant
    and Critical
  Characteristics
   from DFMEA




                                High / Medium Interactions
                                 become Causes / Failure
                                    Modes in PFMEA
          Prioritized Ranking
           of Process Steps
            Relative to Risk
Level III           Process
                                         Operations
                       QFD                                                    Level IV
                                                                               QFD
       Level III                                                                                Process
    Characteristics                                   High Priority Process                   Parameters /
        Matrix                                             Operations                          Variables




                                                            Level IV
                                                          Characteristics
                                                             Matrix




                             KPC’s

                                                   Failure          Causes on
Process related                                   Modes on           PFMEA
     KPC’s                                                                                    Key Control
from all DFMEA’s
                                                   PFMEA                                     Characteristics
                                                                        Process FMEA
                                     Inputs
                          •Failure Data •Process Flow
                                                                                         Control Plan
                          •Process      •Line Layout
                          Capability    •MFMEA


                                         KCC Development
Selective on Processes
• Perform FMEA as required
  – New processes or technology
  – Process or design changes affecting KPC’s &
    KCC’s
  – Poor performance in the past
• Focus only on exceptions to the Legacy of
  “what we know we know”
  – Drives mistake proofing
  – Process capability and variation control
  – Kaizen and Lean events
Example of Significant / Critical
         Threshold
       10
                    CRITICAL CHARACTERISTICS
   S    9                           Safety / Regulatory

   E   8
                                      SIGNIFICANT
   V   7
                                    CHARACTERISTICS
   E   6
                                      Customer Dissatisfaction
   R   5
   I   4                                     ANNOYANCE
   T   3                                        ZONE
   Y   2    ALL OTHER CHARACTERISTICS

                  Appropriate actions /
       1        controls already in place
            1      2     3      4     5     6     7       8   9   10
                       OCCURRENCE
Actions
• Derived from focused effort and are timely
• Can be based on Kaizen and area
  improvement activities
• Actions should be tracked outside of the
  FMEA for efficiency
  – Concerns database at York
• Actions drive control activities when
  mistake proofing cannot be deployed
FMEA                         Control Plan

PFMEA
                     Recommended
                        Actions
KPC’s &
 KCCs     Current
          Controls


                                   Pre - Launch
                                     Control
                                       Plan
Legacy Matrix Example
                                          Detective
                                           controls
                                          related to
                                         the Failure
                                            Mode

                            Issues
Occurrence                color-coded
values from                 by risk
  PFMEA

   Worst                                 Preventive
  severity                                controls
values from                              related to
  PFMEA                                 the process
                                        parameters
                                          / causes
Fault Tree Analysis
• FTA Example:             Spindle Failure




                                                 Bearing
             Motor           Inadequate
                                                 Failure
             Failure             PM
                                                   1




                                             Improperly
             Incorrect Supplier
                                             Scheduled
             Recommendations
                                                 2
Human Factors

Operator Dependant Operations
Human Factors
• Man or Manpower is often thought of as
  operator error.
• Operator Error is possible but not
  actionable therefore the study of Operator
  impacts on process and product is
  required.
• Human Factor analysis and design is the
  technical approach used to quantify the
  human impact on product or process.
Human Factors
Operator Error
Level 1 Cause

         Why?             Level 2 Causes



                            Why?
                                           Level 3 Causes          Level…n Cause


                                           Why?
When operator dependant operations
   are the main cause of a Failure
   Mode:                                              Operator Error must be
                                                      translated to an
Operator Error is not an                              actionable state.
  acceptable response!
3. The Level 2 Cause must be
   selected.
4. If Risk (Severity or/and
   Occurrence) is unacceptable
   therefore level 3…n is required.
Human Factors
                              Level 1


                  Operator Error


                1.0 Work Station Layout
                                              Level 2
                2.0 Ergonomics
                3.0 Documentation and Training
                4.0 Assist/tool Design
                5.0 Attention/Concentration
                                                        Level 3
      See following pages for Level 3 Causes

    1.1….n


   Level …n (multiple why) to root cause level
1.1.1…n
Human Factors
• Man or Manpower is often thought of as
  operator error.
• Operator Error is possible but not
  actionable therefore the study of Operator
  impacts on process and product is
  required.
• Human Factor analysis and design is the
  technical approach used to quantify the
  human impact on product or process.
Example of Significant / Critical
         Threshold
       10
                    CRITICAL CHARACTERISTICS
   S    9                           Safety / Regulatory

   E   8
                                      SIGNIFICANT
   V   7
                                    CHARACTERISTICS
   E   6
                                      Customer Dissatisfaction
   R   5
   I   4                                     ANNOYANCE
   T   3                                        ZONE
   Y   2    ALL OTHER CHARACTERISTICS

                  Appropriate actions /
       1        controls already in place
            1      2     3      4     5     6     7       8   9   10
                       OCCURRENCE
Human Factors
Operator Error
Level 1 Cause

         Why?             Level 2 Causes



                            Why?
                                           Level 3 Causes          Level…n Cause


                                           Why?
When operator dependant operations
   are the main cause of a Failure
   Mode:                                              Operator Error must be
                                                      translated to an
Operator Error is not an                              actionable state.
  acceptable response!
3. The Level 2 Cause must be
   selected.
4. If Risk (Severity or/and
   Occurrence) is unacceptable
   therefore level 3…n is required.
Human Factors
                               Level 1


                   Operator Error


             1.0 Work Station Layout           Level 2
             2.0 Ergonomics
             3.0 Documentation and Training
             4.0 Assist/tool Design
             5.0 Cognitive/Attention/Concentration
                                                         Level 3
      See following pages for Level 3 Causes

    1.1….n


   Level …n (multiple why) to root cause level
1.1.1…n
Level 2 Causes Work Station
              Design
• Level 3 Causes
  – Bench/Table Height
  – Organization of work tools (5S)
     • # of tools and placement
  – Component Positions
     • Quantity
     • Similarity
  – Extended Reach (occasional)
  – Lighting
  – Comfort Features
     • foot rests/seat position
     • Standing work bench position
Level 2 Causes Ergonomics
•   Level 3 causes
•   Height and Reach
     – Work type
•   Weight
     – Lifting
•   Motion
     – #of steps
     – Degrees of freedom
•   Work station interface
     – Blind operation
•   Posture
•   Insertion force
•   Static insertions
     – Plastic deformation of end source
•   Tool
     – vibration
     – Tool design
Level 2 Causes Documentation and
             Training
•   Level 3 Causes
•   Illustrations on Process Documentation
•   “A4” One page
•   No Documentation
•   Validation of Work Practice
     – Testing
     – Demonstration
     – Frequency of validation
•   Training definition
•   Complexity of documentation
•   Labeling
•   Legibility of work instructions
     – # of pages
     – Understandability (5 second rule)
     – Fonts size and type
Level 2 Causes Assists and Tool
                Design
• Level 3 Causes
• Error proofing features
• Tool calibration
    – Pallet compliance
•   Correct tool
•   Life of tool
•   Fixture control
•   Clamp pressure
•   Cycle completion/interruption
•   Locator/proximity life
•   Measurement instrument
Level 2 Causes
              Cognitive/Perception
• Level 3 Causes
• Audible Noise
• Environment
   – Temperature
   – Humidity
• Sensitivity to Interruption
• Repetition
   – Motion
• Trance/Zone Inducement
   – Sound Quality
   – Harmonics
   – Vibration/cyclical noise

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Human Factors

  • 1. Technical Risk Methodology Cameco Fuel Systems Proposal
  • 2. Methodology • Technical Risk Assessment and subsequent counter measures or containment is not about FMEA or FTA. • Risk Mitigation Methodology proposed by QAI Inc. utilizes several levels of analysis and increasing levels of detail as risk is determined to exist.
  • 3. Methodology • Technical Risk Assessment and subsequent counter measures or containment is not about FMEA or FTA. • Risk Mitigation Methodology proposed by QAI Inc. utilizes several levels of analysis and increasing levels of detail as risk is determined to exist.
  • 4. Process Risk Factors • When working with various causes of Failure Modes in a process or assembly, there are several categories to consider. – Methods – Machines – Materials – Measurement – Mother Earth (Engineering Noise Factors) – Man
  • 5. Causal Considerations • The primary items are typically part of : – Aristotle’s Theory of Causality – Ishakawa’s Cause and Effects Diagram (Fishbone) • Most are self explanatory. • Mother Earth and Man require additional explanation.
  • 6. Noise Factors • Mother Earth refers to the Noise factors which when present can affect proper function. • A Parameter or P Diagram is a common Input/output tool used to capture the noises. • There are five noises which are investigated. – Environment – Process/Design Interfaces – Degradation – Customer/Processor/User/Duty Cycles – Unit to Unit or Batch to Batch variation
  • 7. P-Diagram Noise Factors Product or Process Input Outputs Response Control Error Factors States
  • 8. FMEA Working Model Per AIAG FMEA Handbook, pg 3 What Severity 9 & 10 What can be done? How bad are the • Design Changes is it? Effect(s)? • Process Changes What are the Functions, Severity < 9 and 9/10 inclusive • Special Controls Features, or Requirements? • Changes to Pot. Standards, What How often are the does it KPCs Procedures, or Guides Cause(s)? happen? What can go wrong? • No Function • Partial/Over Function/Degraded How can Over Time the cause be All items • Intermittent prevented requiring Function and test detected? How good • Unintended planning is this Function method at detecting it?
  • 9. The Completed Characteristics Matrix Characteristics Ranked in Order of Importance Process Operations from Process Flow Potential Significant and Critical Characteristics from DFMEA High / Medium Interactions become Causes / Failure Modes in PFMEA Prioritized Ranking of Process Steps Relative to Risk
  • 10. Level III Process Operations QFD Level IV QFD Level III Process Characteristics High Priority Process Parameters / Matrix Operations Variables Level IV Characteristics Matrix KPC’s Failure Causes on Process related Modes on PFMEA KPC’s Key Control from all DFMEA’s PFMEA Characteristics Process FMEA Inputs •Failure Data •Process Flow Control Plan •Process •Line Layout Capability •MFMEA KCC Development
  • 11. Selective on Processes • Perform FMEA as required – New processes or technology – Process or design changes affecting KPC’s & KCC’s – Poor performance in the past • Focus only on exceptions to the Legacy of “what we know we know” – Drives mistake proofing – Process capability and variation control – Kaizen and Lean events
  • 12. Example of Significant / Critical Threshold 10 CRITICAL CHARACTERISTICS S 9 Safety / Regulatory E 8 SIGNIFICANT V 7 CHARACTERISTICS E 6 Customer Dissatisfaction R 5 I 4 ANNOYANCE T 3 ZONE Y 2 ALL OTHER CHARACTERISTICS Appropriate actions / 1 controls already in place 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 OCCURRENCE
  • 13. Actions • Derived from focused effort and are timely • Can be based on Kaizen and area improvement activities • Actions should be tracked outside of the FMEA for efficiency – Concerns database at York • Actions drive control activities when mistake proofing cannot be deployed
  • 14. FMEA Control Plan PFMEA Recommended Actions KPC’s & KCCs Current Controls Pre - Launch Control Plan
  • 15. Legacy Matrix Example Detective controls related to the Failure Mode Issues Occurrence color-coded values from by risk PFMEA Worst Preventive severity controls values from related to PFMEA the process parameters / causes
  • 16. Fault Tree Analysis • FTA Example: Spindle Failure Bearing Motor Inadequate Failure Failure PM 1 Improperly Incorrect Supplier Scheduled Recommendations 2
  • 18. Human Factors • Man or Manpower is often thought of as operator error. • Operator Error is possible but not actionable therefore the study of Operator impacts on process and product is required. • Human Factor analysis and design is the technical approach used to quantify the human impact on product or process.
  • 19. Human Factors Operator Error Level 1 Cause Why? Level 2 Causes Why? Level 3 Causes Level…n Cause Why? When operator dependant operations are the main cause of a Failure Mode: Operator Error must be translated to an Operator Error is not an actionable state. acceptable response! 3. The Level 2 Cause must be selected. 4. If Risk (Severity or/and Occurrence) is unacceptable therefore level 3…n is required.
  • 20. Human Factors Level 1 Operator Error 1.0 Work Station Layout Level 2 2.0 Ergonomics 3.0 Documentation and Training 4.0 Assist/tool Design 5.0 Attention/Concentration Level 3 See following pages for Level 3 Causes 1.1….n Level …n (multiple why) to root cause level 1.1.1…n
  • 21. Human Factors • Man or Manpower is often thought of as operator error. • Operator Error is possible but not actionable therefore the study of Operator impacts on process and product is required. • Human Factor analysis and design is the technical approach used to quantify the human impact on product or process.
  • 22. Example of Significant / Critical Threshold 10 CRITICAL CHARACTERISTICS S 9 Safety / Regulatory E 8 SIGNIFICANT V 7 CHARACTERISTICS E 6 Customer Dissatisfaction R 5 I 4 ANNOYANCE T 3 ZONE Y 2 ALL OTHER CHARACTERISTICS Appropriate actions / 1 controls already in place 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 OCCURRENCE
  • 23. Human Factors Operator Error Level 1 Cause Why? Level 2 Causes Why? Level 3 Causes Level…n Cause Why? When operator dependant operations are the main cause of a Failure Mode: Operator Error must be translated to an Operator Error is not an actionable state. acceptable response! 3. The Level 2 Cause must be selected. 4. If Risk (Severity or/and Occurrence) is unacceptable therefore level 3…n is required.
  • 24. Human Factors Level 1 Operator Error 1.0 Work Station Layout Level 2 2.0 Ergonomics 3.0 Documentation and Training 4.0 Assist/tool Design 5.0 Cognitive/Attention/Concentration Level 3 See following pages for Level 3 Causes 1.1….n Level …n (multiple why) to root cause level 1.1.1…n
  • 25. Level 2 Causes Work Station Design • Level 3 Causes – Bench/Table Height – Organization of work tools (5S) • # of tools and placement – Component Positions • Quantity • Similarity – Extended Reach (occasional) – Lighting – Comfort Features • foot rests/seat position • Standing work bench position
  • 26. Level 2 Causes Ergonomics • Level 3 causes • Height and Reach – Work type • Weight – Lifting • Motion – #of steps – Degrees of freedom • Work station interface – Blind operation • Posture • Insertion force • Static insertions – Plastic deformation of end source • Tool – vibration – Tool design
  • 27. Level 2 Causes Documentation and Training • Level 3 Causes • Illustrations on Process Documentation • “A4” One page • No Documentation • Validation of Work Practice – Testing – Demonstration – Frequency of validation • Training definition • Complexity of documentation • Labeling • Legibility of work instructions – # of pages – Understandability (5 second rule) – Fonts size and type
  • 28. Level 2 Causes Assists and Tool Design • Level 3 Causes • Error proofing features • Tool calibration – Pallet compliance • Correct tool • Life of tool • Fixture control • Clamp pressure • Cycle completion/interruption • Locator/proximity life • Measurement instrument
  • 29. Level 2 Causes Cognitive/Perception • Level 3 Causes • Audible Noise • Environment – Temperature – Humidity • Sensitivity to Interruption • Repetition – Motion • Trance/Zone Inducement – Sound Quality – Harmonics – Vibration/cyclical noise