IEEE MACSec and NSA ESS: How to Protect Your WAN, LAN and Cloud
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In this technical deep dive, Emil Isaakian will explain the details of the protocol, cryptography, key management and vulnerabilities mitigated by MACSec/ESS. Additionally he’ll show use cases to show how to succesfully deploy MACSec/ESS technologies (Network Encryptors + NVF) to protect your WAN (MPLS, PBBN, Carrier Ethernet), LAN and cloud infrastructure. (Source: RSA Conference USA 2017)
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IEEE MACSec and NSA ESS: How to Protect Your WAN, LAN and Cloud
- 4. #RSAC Data Center/Cloud security 4 But wait we’re moving to the Cloud…. It’s all fixed now! Sure it is.... Data Center (aka the cloud) traffic is mostly east/west now 99% unsecured as well L N9K-M6PQ STS 1 ACT ACT ACT ACT ACT ACT 2 3 4 5 6 Servers Compute + Storage N9K-M6PQ STS 1 ACT ACT ACT ACT ACT ACT 2 3 4 5 6 VM Replication/Migration N9K-M6PQ STS 1 ACT ACT ACT ACT ACT ACT 2 3 4 5 6 SAN/DAS/NAS Volumes N9K-M6PQ STS 1 ACT ACT ACT ACT ACT ACT 2 3 4 5 6 Blade Compute N9K-M6PQ STS 1 ACT ACT ACT ACT ACT ACT 2 3 4 5 6 Internet/SNMP/DNS NextGen Firewall IDS/IPS 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60 61 62 63 64 65 66 67 68 69 70 71 72 73 74 75 76 77 78 79 80 81 82 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 90 91 92 93 94 95 96 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 STS BCN ACT 1 2 Cisco Nexus 93128TX >80-90% Traffic is East West Intra-DataCenter Communication NextGen Firewall IDS/IPS 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60 61 62 63 64 65 66 67 68 69 70 71 72 73 74 75 76 77 78 79 80 81 82 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 90 91 92 93 94 95 96 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 STS BCN ACT 1 2 Cisco Nexus 93128TX 1000's+ of East West 10-100GbE Links Load Balancing/Redundancy 100's of North South 10-100GbE Links Security is Here But all the Traffic is Here
- 5. #RSAC Why are We so Insecure? 5 Fundamental Answer#1: Software is insecure by design Fundamental Answer#2: Encryption Not deployed everywhere — And we actually need to communicate outside our intra-net ;) Why not? — Most Encryption done by Application ¡ Most applications are hard to secure (Certificates, Passwords, RADIUS, Keys, etc) ¡ Leaves all network/Link (Layer-2) protocols open — Very hard to do right… Easy to get wrong — OpenSSL… Can you patch fast enough (Sorry – I know you devs are trying!) Without Layer-2 Encryption + Isolation APT Lateral Movement is easy
- 6. #RSAC Easy/Hard L2 Encryption Targets 6 Data In Transit (DIT) Encryption significantly reduces cyber vulnerability footprint Easy Areas to protect: — Enterprise to Enterprise (CPE to CPE) links ¡ Over dark fiber or over leased infrastructure (MAN/WAN Intra-net links etc) — Enterprise to Cloud/ Datacenter to Datacenter (cloud/Hybrid IT) Hard(er) Areas to protect: — Internal Networks: ¡ PC/Laptop shared LAN ¡ Connection to shared NAS/SAN Data Storage ¡ Printers, End Points, Network IT closets — L2 Encryption not available yet at end points — Few switches have line rate L2 Encryption available on all ports yet — …But were moving in that direction
- 9. #RSAC Boil it down 9 MACSec (IEEE 802.1AE) by itself is useless Requires all these IEEE specs + RFC’s: — Key Distribution & Exchange, Trusted Secure Device Authentication, External Authentication (RADIUS) Lots of options…. — Options == not(interoperable) == not(secure) == not(used) ESS 1.0 == NSA Tailored Spec version of MACSec Removes most options – only allows maximum security — XPN-AES-256-GCM (64-bit PSN, secTAG, No-Bypass, Suite-B compliant) Adds better support for Carrier Ethernet/MEF — PBN/PBBN, VPLS topologies, – C-TAG, S-TAG, VLAN aware etc ¡ E.g. To make MACSec Hop-to-Hop suport service provider bridged networks Adds TRANSEC (Fixed Frame Padding SuperTunnels) – Traffic Analysis protection Adds Tunnel Mode (MAC in MAC encapsulation) to cover internal Addresses
- 13. #RSAC Key Management Protocol (MKA) 13 MKA Provides Protected control protocol at Layer-2: Identifies Live Peers Creates Connectivity Associations (CA’s) between 2+ Peers Distributes Security Association Keys (SAKs) among Peers in CA Timeliness check (optional) to prevent delayed packets (inverse of anti-replay) Protection: — Each packet has a Cryptographic ICV (AES-CMAC) using ICK (Derived from CAK) — SAKs encrypted (AESKW) using KEK (Derived from CAK) ¡ All derivation uses AES-CMAC based KDF ¡ Forward Security – New SAKs distributed on Peer List Change — Per Packet Counter for Anti-Replay (Strict)
- 15. #RSAC Ethernet Data Encryption (EDE) Device Types 15 IEEE/ESS Created new MACSec Device Types to support Networks EDE-T — Two Port Mac Relay. No VLAN awareness (Encapsulates) EDE-M — Port Based or C-Tagged single service (VLAN Agnostic), or Customer Bridged Network EDE-CC — C-Tagged to C-Tagged (Customer VLAN Tag) EDE-CS — C-Tagged to S-Tagged EDE with internal translation EDE-SS — S-Tagged to S-Tagged EDE (Service Provider VLAN Tag) Refer to: http://www.ieee802.org/1/files/public/docs2013/ae-seaman-ede-0713-v02.pdf
- 16. #RSAC Bridge Group Addressing 16 IEEE specs EAPOL to use 802.1Q Reserved Addresses for Broadcast Allows easy visibility of group peers — But overlaps with common protocols (Spanning Tree) ¡ Refer to: http://ieee802.org/1/files/public/docs2015/ae-seaman-ede-interop-1115-v05.pdf — -0x Rsvd Address Filtered at various domains: — Requires careful setup and selection of EDE-x device ¡ Based on customer vs service provider location
- 17. #RSAC Network Vulnerability Mitigated 17 Attack/Vulnerability Description Does MAC-SEC Protect against Does ESS Protect against this? Description of protection Application Level DOS/DDOS Denial Of Service, Distributed Denial Of Service attacks where large volumes (Floods) of packets are directed at servers to overload network Yes Yes Packets that are not encrypted/authenticated are dropped at the link layer preventing application services from seeing the large volume of traffic preventing DOS. L2 MAC Address Tables DOS Denial Of Service targeting Router/Switch by sending large volumes (Floods) of packets with different MAC Addresses Yes Yes Line rate classification of L2 packets forces dropping of all un-authorized L2 packets on ingress (e.g. non-MAC-SEC Frames). Spanning Tree Protocol DOS Denial Of Service targeting Router by sending large volumes (Floods) of STP packets (BPDUs) to cause Router control plane overload. Yes Yes Line rate classification of L2 packets forces dropping of all un-authorized L2 packets on ingress (e.g. non-MAC-SEC Frames) ARP Poisoning/Man in the Middle Eavesdropping Malicious ARP responses from compromised or unsecure end devices can poison the ARP cache causing traffic to be redirected Yes Yes Un-authorized devices cannot communicate on a MAC-SEC authenticated/encrypted network Port Mirroring Eavesdropping Reconfiguration or physical tapping of a switch/router port Yes Yes Un-authorized devices cannot decrypt data sent on a MAC-SEC authenticated/encrypted network Replay A adversary/malicious user can capture valid authenticated/encrypted traffic and replay (re-send) it. Partial Partial MAC-SEC provides anti-replay protection via a authenticated window (configurable) mechanism that discards packets with sequence numbers that are out of the replay window. Traffic Flow Analysis Even without being able to decrypt and recover a packets Plain- Text, inspection of the MAC source/destination addresses can allow a adversary to map a networks topology and gain intelligence on end-points, communication activity, etc. No Yes ESS Provides continous fixed frame sizes encapsulating the underlying network packets preventing analysis Covert Channels A compromised end-point, or malicious user or application can indirectly create a un-secured covert communications channel over a secure network by varying packet sizes, rates, source- dest addresses of transmitted packets. No Yes ESS Provides continous fixed frame sizes encapsulating the underlying network packets preventing analysis Repudiation Sending secure (or un-secure) packets and later dis-avowing that the packets were sent from the specified end device. Partial Partial Since MAC-SEC provides confidentiality and authentication with a anti-replay window there is inherently some protection against repudiation depending on how many end-devices are assigned to a SA. MAC Address Spoofing A unsecure end-device can masquerade as a trusted devices MAC Address both to re-route traffic for DOS attacks and potentially eavesdrop on communications. Yes Yes Un-authorized devices cannot communicate on a MAC-SEC authenticated/encrypted network so will be unable to eavesdrop.
- 20. #RSAC Intranet Protection 20 CPE to CPE Encryption is obvious and Easy to do…. But what about reducing Cyber vulnerability threat vectors? VM Isolation of external vs internal applications + Encryption — Move all non-critical applications to VM ¡ E.g. IE, Chrome, Firefox, web-apps, Facebook, Streaming Music, Dropbox — Isolate via MACSec encryption all internal Enterprise port access ¡ Shared NAS/SAN, Printers, VDI, Email, Sharepoint, etc operate over encrypted L2 link Completely isolates internal vs external flows Next two slides show How Enterprise Network normally gets Hacked vs Protected Network
- 23. #RSAC Cloud Protection 23 How to we extend these principles to the Cloud? Same techniques work inside Datacenter — Encrypt External Links — Encrypt Groups of VMs/Applications Internally ¡ Minimize Lateral movement on compromise — Isolate separate clients to separate Cryptographic Domains (CA’s) — Allow Users to Encrypt all the way to VM (e.g. MACSec at vSwitch layer)
- 25. #RSAC What to Do next 25 Analyze your internal network…. Get scared! Encrypt your inter-office links Stop using openSSL to “Secure” your network — You cant possibly patch fast enough…. And all Layer-2 is exposed L Deploy High Grade Encryption Appliances or Embedded Hardware Encryption Require Switches to support MACSec/ESS L2 Encryption on all ports — Only use Software based encryption in VMs and applications — For follow up - Contact me: ¡ Yep after all that security talk I’ll give you an email address K