Socio economic rights of citizenship and regional inequality

National Civic Forum (NCF)

@

Workshop

Citizenship in a Multi Ethnic, Multi Cultural Society
Towards a National Social Contract in Sudan

Socio-Economic Rights of Citizenship and Regional
Inequality in Sudan liberalized Economy: 1989-2010
Prof. Atta El-Battahani

4-5 October 2011
Al Neel Hall
Sudanese Bankers Union Building
Jamhoriya St., Khartoum

2011 ‫اآﺘﻮﺑﺮ‬ ‫ورﺷﺔ اﻟﻤﻮاﻃﻨﺔ ﻓﻰ اﻃﺎر اﻟﺘﻌﺪد اﻟﻌﺮﻗﻰ و اﻟﺜﻘﺎﻓﻰ‬ ‫ﻟﻤﻨﺘﺪى اﻟﻤﺪﻧﻰ اﻟﻘﻮﻣﻰ‬

Socio-Economic Rights of Citizenship and Regional Inequality
in Sudan liberalized Economy: 1989-2010

Prof. Atta El-Battahani
Introduction/Abstract
In line with liberal concept of citizenship, liberal economic policies take, as a central blank,
leveling the playing field for economic actors across both social and geographical space
where market rationality is the catchword. One apparent objective of this market oriented,
playing field leveling policies is to reduce and eventually eliminate disparities not only
between citizens but also between regions. Taking a different perspective, Marshallian
concept of citizenship is seeks to move beyond what is considers formal and abstract nature
of liberal concept of citizenship to situate citizen’s rights and their entitlement to resources
and services in a political context of power relations and constraints of macro, political-
economic, environment.

This paper discusses Liberal-Marshall debate on citizenship in the context of Sudan emerging
liberal economy since early 1990s. Official government endorsement of liberal economic
measures will be discussed in relation to attempts to economically empower citizens and
provide basic services to all citizens paying particular attention to less-developed regions.
This emphasis of less developed regions is meant to redress regional inequality inherited
from the past.

This paper examines policy commitment of liberalized economy to safeguarding socio-
economic rights of citizens in less developed regions of Sudan; and gauges efforts to redress
inequalities. The paper argues that rather than lessening regional inequalities and providing
basic (socio-economic) services to citizens, liberal economic policies reinforces and
augmented regional disparities to an extent of threatening social cohesion of society and
undermining territorial integrity of the state. The net result of liberalized economic policies
has augmented and deepened regional inequalities.

The paper consists of six short sections. Section one deals with concepts of citizenship,
equality and also touches on regional inequality in relation to liberalized, globalized economy
in peripheral, dependent economies. Section two focuses on regional inequality and Inqaz
regime liberal economic policies, Section three discusses how these liberal economic policies
augmented, rather than, reducing inequalities and undermined socio-economic rights of
citizens in both centre and less developed regions of Sudan. The conclusion comes in section
four, and section five gives a list of references

1. Liberal-Marshall Debate on Citizenship
Space constraint here does not allow full exploration of concepts of citizenship and the
ensuing debate in the literature. Yet some brief definitions are in order. As far as liberals are
concerned, citizenship is defined as “..A set of normative expectations specifying the
relationship between the nation-state and its individual members which procedurally establish
the rights and obligations and a set of enforcement practices”. (Davis: 1996; 2002) Critics
haste to point to the abstract nature of such a definition, and that it glosses over actually
existing differences of class, gender and ethnicity.

A counter definition of citizenship is proposed by Marchall who defines citizenship as: “..a
status bestowed on those who are full members of a community. All who possess the status

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are equal with respect to the rights and duties with which the status is endowed”.(Davis:
1996; 2002) In this concept of citizenship, rights and entitlements to protection and resources
are anchored into membership of a community.

Compared to the liberal concept, Marshallian concept of citizenship seems to be more
realistic, yet critics pose a number of questions and point to the vague nature of the concept
of community: real or imagined? And what are the conditions for acquiring membership of a
communities? And what is more important membership of a state or a community? How are
rights of members of different communities in one state is regulated and protected?

For Marxist theorists, citizenship is a historical construct designed to confer juridical sanctity
for certain (class) individuals to access to resources, both material and non-material.
Accession of resources is mediated by a state apparatus controlled by economically
influential classes.

Citizens Rights and Equality

Without going into the details of the debate, it is does seem that theories relating to national
integration i.e. molting pot and unity in diversity were proposed to deal with some of thorny
issues pertaining to these theories. Analysis highlights what it calls “multi-hierarchical nature
of citizens in diverse societies”. Depending on dominance of a community and the leverage it
has over the state, members of such communities first class citizens, less-influential
communities with weak leverage on the state are second class citizens. So, entitlements to
rights are construed as being commensurate to political power of the communities to which
individuals belong.

Controversy over rights takes special significance in diverse societies passing through
conflict and where state institutions and legitimacy are yet to be firmly established.
Constitutional debates revolve around construction of social contract, nature of the state, and
defining equality. (State and rights and social contract, Whose rights? Who negotiated rights?
Rights clinched not offered? Are Citizenship Rights and Human Rights?)

It is important here to align discussion of citizenship to competing concepts of equality. A
distinction between formal and substantive concepts of equality is a suitable entry point to
such a discussion. Formal equality means treating likes alike, those who are similarly situated
be treated similarly. One major criterion for equality is sameness: Sameness is entitling
criteria for equality. i.e a male Muslim is treated like a male Muslim.

On the other hand, substantive equality recognizes that equality sometimes requires that
individuals be treated differently. Criticizing formal concepts of equality, proponents of
substantive perspective argue that “..the problem with formal concept of equality is that it
makes the recognition of difference a threat to the premise behind equality. If to be equal is to
be the same, then to be different is to be unequal”. (”.(Davis: 1996; 2002) Differences are
conceived as product of historic or systemic discrimination, therefore the objective of
substantive equality is the elimination of inequality of disadvantaged groups in society.
Substantive concept takes into account inequalities of social, economic and educational
background of the people and seeks the elimination of existing inequalities by positive
measures.

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At the policy level, a number of approaches stem from the above discussion. Three main
approaches are usually considered: (i) protectionist, paternalist approach: for example,
women are constructed as weak and subordinate, and are thus in need of protection.
Difference is essentialized, natural and this justifies differential treatment, such that weak
groups need to be patronized and protected. This is more a colonial, patriarchal approach; (ii)
radical, sameness approach: all people are constructed and ought to be treated exactly the
same in rational market situation. Here differences, regional, ethnic, gender or class, are not
relevant; (iii) corrective approach: some regions, social groups (women, blacks,) are seen as
requiring special treatment as a result of past discrimination. Socio-economic and cultural
differences are relevant and require treatment in policies and legislations.

Table on Concepts of Citizenship, Rights and Economic Policies.

Concept of Citizenship Perspective on Rights Economic Policies
Liberal All citizens equal, civil- Market rationality to ensure
political rights equality and justice
Marshall Citizens members of Economic policies reflect
community, hierarchical order hegemony of dominant
of communities leading to communities
Multi-layered citizship.
Marxist Legal rights reflects relations Economic policies reflect
to material resources, interest of dominant class
hierarchical order based on irrespective of region, ethnic
classes ties.
Source: Author

Economic Policies and Inequality
Debating state economic policies and their success or failure in redressing inequalities is a
matter that can not glossed over particularly when the issue of citizens’ rights is the centre of
the debate.

From a liberal perspective, economic development is rarely even and balanced. Rather,
economic development within territorially defined space always lead to disequilibrium,
putting some ethnic groups at an advantage and others at a disadvantage. But according to
modernization theory, in the course of economic expansion and social progress ethnic
tensions and regional conflicts are gradually. Thus in many countries national and regional
development and planning strategies are based on growth-pole (or spearhead) models which
maintain that concentration of investment in a favoured region will create a centre of growth
to which labour, raw material and food stuff are drawn and from which-after an unspecified
period of time-capital, techniques and skills are diffused to an even widening area. Structural
adjustment and economic liberalization programmes incorporate major assumption of this
market-led models and promise a trickle-down effect only after a certain period.

However, generalizations derived from modemization theory and growth-pole models are
rejected on both theoretical and empirical grounds3. It maintained that once a certain region
has been able, through some initial advantage, to move ahead of other regions the "backwash
effect" or "polarization effect" that arises as productive resources-like labour, capital and
commodities-are drawn into the growth area will greatly resist opportunities for development
in the rest of the country4. From the perspective of core-periphery and internal-colonialism

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the "trickle-down effect" from the advanced regions to the less advanced ones are generally
too weak and may never materialize in poor countries where the normal tendency is for an
increase in regional inequalities. This is particularly the case where regional equalities
intertwine with ethnic differentiation, with powerful ethnic groups resisting any attempts to
redress the grievance of marginalized ethnic minorities in peripheral region.

In other words, liberalized markets are the best way to organize economies, developed or
developing. The state should protect property rights and ensure the supply of public goods,
but not impart directional thrust. More specifically, the state should create and sustain (a)
efficient, rent-free markets, (b) efficient, corruption-free public sectors able to supervise the
delivery of a narrow set of inherently public services, and (c) decentralized arrangements of
participatory democracy. The more these conditions are in place the more- development and
prosperity will follow (Wade: 2004).

The alternative for market oriented and growth-pole development models is state-intervention
in the economy. Depending on the complex relations between regional and ethnic political
forces, the state may rid itself from the influence of the powerful groups at the centre and
move towards redressing regional-ethnic grievances. Whereas market mechanisms rely on tax
incentives and other concessions to induce private capital invest in peripheral areas, state
intervention strategies use central planning which are based on political will and allocating
mechanism through national and regional planning to achieve even economic development.

Sudan’s history of economic development shows clear shifts from state-led economy, to
market oriented policies; and in between there was a transition period.

2. Inequalities in Resourceful yet Underdevelopment Sudan Economy
Like many Africa countries, British colonialism superimposed state territorial boundaries on
ethnically heterogeneous communities with built-in regional inequalities. In this regard Sudan
in not an exception. Sudanese nationalist movements, later on and after attaining
independence, pledged to preserve the integrity of these newly established political entities.

According to 1955/ 56 population census, the main ethnic groups are the Arabs (39%),
Southerners (3%) and Funj (1.7%)(ref6). Some scholars classify these ethnic groups into 19
nationalities and 56 ethnic groups (Bashir: 1988). Obviously, socio-economic changes since
1956, ecological disaster and civil war have resulted in significant changes in demographic
weight of these ethnic-national groups. Moreover, ethnic diversities have been sustained by
cultural, linguistic, religious and social differences. On the other hand, the country is divided
into five geo-economic and administrative regions: North, South, East, West and centre. Each
region is predominantly inhabited by certain ethnic groups. Studies on regional economic
development have largely been conducted in terms of regional disparities. A number of these
studies have clearly illustrated the existing regional inequalities in relation to the distribution
of productive assets and educational, health and social services (Ibrahim: 1985; Umbadda:
1990).

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Table on Area and Population of Sudan
Region Area (Sq. Km.) 1956 1973 1983
Central 142,000 2,070,000 3,740,000 4,013,000
Darfur 496,000 1,329,000 2,140,000 3,094,000
Eastern 341,000 941,000 1,547,000 2,208,000
Khartoum 21,000 505,000 1,146,000 1,802,000
Kordofan 381,000 1,763,000 2,202,000 3,202,000
Northern 477,000 871,000 1,545,000 1,083,000
Southern 748,000 2,795,000 3,025,000 5,272,000
Total 2,506,000 10,274,000 15,345,000 20,565,000
Source: Yong-Bure, B., The First Decade of Development in the Southern Sudan,
Institute of African and Asian Studies, University of Khartoum, February 1985, P. 3

That regional inequality is an established fact in post-colonial Sudan is matter that hardly
invites debate. [[see appendices]]. What is debatable is the extent of success or failure of
governments’ efforts since independence is alleviating these regional inequalities.
Economic Policies of Inqaz Regime

The Inqaz regime took over after a decade of extremely poor economic performance with
marked evidence of regional inequalities manifesting themselves in protracted civil war and
ethnic conflicts. While during the first half of the 1980s the economy was manipulated by
IMF/ World Bank co-operation under the Structural Adjustment Programme, the second half
of the 1980s witnessed economic chaos under both the transitional and elected civilian
governments. Although Sudan reverted to a Western-type tax system after Numeiri’s
overthrow in 1985, the current regime has declared its intention to Islamize the economy
again and in contrast to its predecessors, it has adopted an activist approach to economic
policy, relying on repression to stifle the unrest arising from its radical measures. (Economist
Intelligence Unit: 1993).

The political leadership pushed through its economic policy based upon the following the
main guiding tenets:

1. Recovery of the public rights lost, properties robbed and resources wasted by the corrupt
party system.
2. Reallocation of meager resources left to achieve the objective of self-independence,
particularly in view of the economic pressure put on the regime by some external powers
through reduced external assistance and the suspension of aid.
3. Designing an original alternative economic programme based on independent national
thinking and guided by the religious and social values of the people.

The general objectives of the medium term programme emphasized: (a) the revitalization of
the economy through reallocation of resources towards production; (b) Enhancement of the
role of the private sector, whether national or foreign, to play a more active role in achieving
the objectives of the programme; and to reorient financial, economic, and institutional
structures to create a more conducive environment for private sector participation; (c) the
maintenance of social balance by protecting the poor during the adjustment period.

The general means of the programme are: (1) to put more emphasis on agricultural
development as a leading sector, (2) encouragement of export through liberalization of export

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prices and the scrapping of the export license system and (3) mobilization of domestic and
external resources by encouraging all nationals to use their resources in a productive manner
and by creating the environment conducive to domestic and foreign private sector investment,
particularly for investors from the Arab Islamic world (4) to implement institutional reform
by removing all administrative, economic or legal impediments to pave the way for investors
through:

(i) Removal of government monopoly ii1 the areas of agriculture, industrial production,
domestic marketing, foreign trade and economic services and opening the door for the private
sector in all areas of economic activity with the exception of mining for oil production.
(Wolmuth: 1994)

(ii) Fundamental reform of the parastatal sector through liquidation, privatization or turning
public to enterprises joint ventures with domestic and foreign private sector participation.
(iii) Institutional and legal reforms including laws governing taxation, custom dutic3, prices
and industrial relations to facilitate and enhance more efficient resource allocation.

(iv) A comprehensive review of the credit system and the regulations governing provision of
bank credit to public and private sectors with the aim of linking bank credit to production in
the context of national priorities.

(v) The deregulation of price and profit controls with an immediate and complete
liberalization of export prices, followed by the gradual deregulation of most prices of goods
and limiting price controls to a short list of basic items.

(vi) The introduction of a wide and comprehensive solidarity system to cater for the low
income groups of society by mitigating the higher costs which normally accompany
restructuring of the economy. But, later on these policies changed.

In order to achieve the programme objectives, a policy action programme was stated to cover
many areas. For the area of production, growth and investment, emphasis was put on the
1990 Investment encouragement Act to stimulate investment, especially in agriculture in
order to achieve self-sufficiency in food grains by 1990/91. Many incentives, such as tax
exemption, abandoning ceiling of agricultural finance and the establishment of specialized
funds to finance agriculture and animal production, were proposed to encourage production.
Financial policies included in the programme aimed at reducing and completely eliminating
budget deficits by reducing expenditure, removing subsidies, abandoning deficit finance and
broadening the tax and zakat collection. The main concern of monetary and credit policies in
the programme was to stabilize the exchange rate at its current level for a reasonable period
of time and adjust credit policies to create direct linkage to production and curb non-
productive activities

For the parastatal sector, the general policy was to reduce government involvement in the
economy. Many public enterprises were recommended to be either sold, liquidated or
privatized by changing them into mixed form ownership. With regard to the social sector, a
special fund for social welfare (the Social Solidarity Fund) was established to help low
income groups of the population and mitigate the harsh cost of adjustment for the vulnerable.
In the 1990/9 1 budget an initial amount of Ls 1000 million was earmarked for the fund.

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To mitigate the negative impact of adjustment, the National Comprehensive Strategy went
even further by incorporating a commitment to social and political development in its
objectives. Vulnerable and poor groups were not only to be protected from the negative
impact of adjustment, but they ‘were entitled to have their basic needs (employment, housing,
health and education) satisfied. Special attention would be given to the urban and rural poor,
women and small producers. By building the productive capacities of these groups, the
government would create an environment conducive for their ability to play an active role in
economic development. In the field of political development, NCS stressed the need for
building a political system and administrative structures to enable people to participate in the
decision-making process and supervise the functioning of government officials. The political
system would ensure more accountability and transparency in the functioning of the
government institutions at federal, state and local levels.

3. Inqaz Economy: deepening Inequalities and Denying Socio-Economic Rights

Tables in the appendices show that development has failed to reduce regional-ethnic
disparities. Again, space does not allow an exhaustive analysis here, yet some major
observations (bending further verification) are in order.

1. Centre-region Oligarchy
Despite the rhetoric of market economy, Inqaz regime adopted in the first half of 1990s state
interventionist type and overtaxing producers and thereby severely affecting producers in
rural areas and less-developed regions.(Kabaj: 2010; Ibrahim: 2009). From late 1990s,
government increasing reliance on oil sector has had the effect of reinforcing rentier, non-
productive policies of the state with the result that peripheral regions and rural producers in
the North were forced to invent coping strategies to adapt to harsh economic conditions.
Parallel to this course of policies, federal structures of government were set up in all the
country thus increasing government expenditure and, more important, giving rise to new
clients (in both rural North and peripheral regions) attracted to the patronage of the Centre.
The emerging alliance between these elements and ruling Islamists in the Centre was further
consolidated and mediated by by an ideology the basic tenets of which are discriminatory: i.e
emopowring one particular category of citizens against others in the so-called altamkeen
policies. This tamkeen has symbiotic relationship with hierarchical order of citiztens (El-
Battahani: 1996; Ibrahim: 2009; Abdelsalam: 2010; Abdalla: 2009)

2. Revisiting the Concept of Region
Notwithstanding tamkeen ideology, one might have given economic policies during 199s
(policies of economic transition from state-led economy to “market-oriented” economy) the
benefit of doubt had these policy measures succeeded in transforming the economy and
alleviating regional inequalities. We tentatively hypothesize here that the underlying class
interest of ruling oligarch militated against redressing regional inequalities.

Region refers to geographical area with particular features (ethnic, cultural or economic) that
differentiate it from adjacent areas, or which serves as a unit of government administration or
state. Since it lends itself to a variety of meaning, the concept of region is often used in a
broad and vague way. In the context of multi-ethnic Sudan the concept of region suffers from
some defects. First-regional (Spatial) differentiation is considered at an abstract level
forgetting that we are dealing with ethnic divisions and groups, and does not consider
population movements.

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Secondly, for centuries, trade relations, religious activities and population movements had
gradually and slowly sown the seeds of national integration and homogenization and as a
result led to a considerable ethnic interpenetration in different region. The emerging patterns
of economic development had further maintained this trend. For example, the Gezira Scheme
and Gezira region is not inhabited by the 'Arabs'. In 1976-77 about 47% of Western's Sudan
original population was found to have migrated to Khartoum and Kassala Provinces.
Moreover, in Khartoum, Kassala and Blue Nile Provinces the percentage of in-migrants to
total population of province were 35%, 17% and 13% respectively in 1976-77. Recently
government officials maintained that more than 4.5 millions southern people are now living
in the North.

Thirdly, most studies institute regions apriori and take their existence for granted, whereas
"… regions must be constituted as an affect of analysis", they should be defined in relation to
spatial uneven development in the process of wealth making and its effect on social and
ethnic relations.” (Massey: 1978) Analysis of regional disparities have revealed a lot about
uneven development but have not cast enough light on inter-ethnic economic relations
particularly at the national level. Political conflicts in Sudan are partly ethnic in nature and
not purely regional, administrative, political or economic. Hence regional categorization must
incorporate ethnic and class factors in order to come to terms with the real issues of the
conflict over equal development.

Fourthly, In Sudan, the ethnic factor intertwines with non-ethnic factors (education, wealth,
occupation, status) to produce complex unschematic stratification matrix. This does not mean
that social differentiation in Sudan is exclusively ethnic-based as some studies have tried to
establish. It is our position here that the stratification system is a class-determined one in
which ethnic (or religious) elements constitute a relatively more visible index of a more
complex structured peripheral capitalist societies, like Sudan, where class, status and
ethnicity interpenetrate, the public signification of the stratification system. (El-Battahani:
2007)

That is, members of marginalized ethnos, classes and social categories (e.g. women)
struggling to protect their rights have to negotiate and/or confront public signification of the
social structure along several axes (Marshallian concept of citizenship). A corollary of this is
that groups seeking attainment of socio-economic rights of citizenship would face social and
cultural prejudice from dominant groups: the latter protecting the status and the former trying
to promote their position.

3. Crony Capitalism: Rents Collected but not Invested
It is not unnatural that economies in transition provide opportunities for well positioned
individuals and groups to collect rents through their clientelistic ties with state apparatus. (ref
middle east ). Some researchers condone this attitude and see it as ‘normal’ during these
exceptional times, on the condition and expectation that these accumulated fortunes would
then find their way to productive investments in the economy. There are ample evidence to
support the case that individuals and groups have succeeded in collecting rents from
disorderly transition of the economy in Sudan since early 1990s and that these collected rents
have never found their way to productive investments.( El-Battahani: 1996; Ali: 2006;;
Ibrahim: 2009; Abdelgadir: 2010; Umbadda: 2011)

Firstly, the government had embarked on a comprehensive structural adjustment and
economic liberalization without strictly attending to condition to ensure that these are

8


properly implemented course of policies and actions. Students of first year economics know
that the impersonal dictates of the market should override biases of race, religion, ethnicity,
class and gender. Buyers and sellers with greater preference for any of these biases only
restrict their choices and usually must pay a higher price for that choice; and the same
invisible hand which regulates market prices should contribute to the inter-ethnic
collaboration needed in the capital market to channel investment into national economic
development18. This situation, however, obtains in the ideal world. In Sudan, there are
ethnically structural capital and labour markets19. And because of market imperfection choice
made on the bases of tribal, ethnic and religious consideration are rewarded rather than
punished.(Abdelnabi: ) Emerging Finance infrastructure and monopolistic tendencies were
imposed on trade and finance to serve the interest of the new-boy network and punish the old-
boy network.

Secondly, the political leadership has opted for liberalization of the economy in order to
correct economic imbalances and adjust the cost of its products to international competitive
standards. A number of other related measurers have also been adopted. But the effect of this
on inter-ethnic relations is very serious. This is because poverty and liberalization-induced
poverty-tend to take an ethnic profile as the weak ethnic minorities are hard hit most by these
economic and social disciplinary measures. In urban centers those negatively affected by the
regulation of the informed sector and marginal profession are generally drawn from ethnic
peripheries. So, rather than easing tensions, liberalization policies are likely to deepen ethnic
grievances.

Thirdly, there is the fear that state-directed privatization may fuel ethnic suspicious. Old fears
of ethnic exclusion from positions of power and wealth surface to the top-as ethnic groups
watch the sale of public assets and corporation to the same old faces. Drawing lessons from
similar experiences, observers warn that no dominant group should be able to exclude any
other while privatization, restitution and property rights are being introduced, thus securing
for themselves an unfair head start.

In Sudan the government must be cautious in its privatization programme. Otherwise
disposing of commercial enterprises would giver undue advantage to capital-rich, better-
positioned and well-established Northern merchants and industrialists-whom, rightly or
wrongly, non-Northerners in the South, East and West consider to be responsible for their
economic miseries and whom they eye with a lot of suspicion and jealousy.

From the available material on privatized public sector assets and corporations, not a single
undertaking passed to a non-Arab Northerners. Not only that, but state officials who provided
over deregulation committees confirmed that these matters were conducted in business spirit
and there were no federal guideline to urge them pay particular attention to underprivileged
ethnic business21. Evidently, such policies would contribute little to reducing ethnic tensions.
Rather, economic liberalization is thereby unwittingly by sowing the seeds for further
political mobilization of ethnic grievances. This is particularly the case, since from the point
of view of ethnic minorities liberalization in maintaining the Northern monopoly over wealth
making and is therefore a mere combination of pre-existing policies.

4. Policy Dilemmas of Liberalized Economy in Conflict Situation
Discrimination in a Liberalized Economy
In a situation that is inherently unequal, market-oriented economic reforms at present are not
likely going to reduce economic inequalities between ethnic groups. State policy

9


interventions to support vulnerable groups and less-developed regions are called for. But is it
possible to synchronize this with commitment to a liberal economy? Legislation against
discrimination and codification of the right and responsibilities are always constructive,
although never sufficient in themselves. They function as confidence-building measures for
the weaken groups in society.

However, what is needed is not legislation against discriminatory practice, but concrete,
actual steps to redress long-standing ethnic grievances by taking affirmative actions.
Fortunately this is not new to Sudanese politics. Since Addis Accord in 1972, and
Comprehensive Peace Agreement in 2005, it has generally been accepted that marginalized
ethnic groups should have the right to some autonomy, to cultural facilities to preserve their
identity and, if the federal commitment to wealth sharing is anything to go by, ethnic groups
must be able to own property at national level, have a position in the commanding heights of
the economy in order to participate fully and equally in the economic development of the
country.

Positive discriminatory measures, which have been taken in the field of education, should be
extended to the filed of business and economic activities. The objective of these measures is
to create and promote ethnic entrepreneurs and small business by assisting them acquire the
needed entrepreneurial business, and technical skills. Among other things, this require
extending certain facilities to deprived groups in peripheral regions and urban centres.

How Liberal is the Liberalized Economy
Well organized labour and civil society and rule of law, prerequisites for ensuring
observation and implementation of socio-economic rights of citizens across geographical and
social divide. While the government pride itself in embarking on a comprehensive structural
adjustment and economic liberalization programme, it on the other hand severely represses
labour and professional groups from organizing and from using bargaining power to protect
their interests from both business and government misuse of power. Wages were kept below
basic minimum, and industrial actions were put by force in both rural and urban areas. (El-
Hassan: 2010; Ibrhaim: 2009; ) No wonder then that these policies fit in neatly with broad
interests of authoritative capitalism in peripheral societies.

In a way, the present Ingaz regime shows signs of a regime with a “strong” political will, that
is, in terms of its capacity using repressive and allocating mechanisms of the central state to
serve the interests of its power-base. This power base is oligarchic in nature, and combines a
conglomerate of power groups from both Centre and regions ….ruling Sudan. Both groups
from the centre and (certain influential groups from the) regions are drawn from military,
business, national security and ideological groups. Some of these groups are more
enlightened than others, keen to open up the Sudanese society, not only for foreign capital,
but also for liberal ideas concerning democracy and human rights. As far as redressing
regional inequalities, this conglomerate has no vision. From current policy measures it is
evident that when it comes to redressing economic grievances of marginalized regions and
social strata the logic of business as usual (in a distorted market) takes precedence over
politics of economic justice. It is this which creates incompatibility and inconsistency
between public pronouncement of government to serve all citizens and realities of economic
strategies.

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5. Conclusion
In order to better account for the relationship between liberalized economic development and
regional inequalities in Sudan, the above analysis calls for a revisiting concepts of region,
citizenship and rights in order to incorporate socio-class aspects into the analysis.

This is because regional conflicts are at the root causes of political conflicts and liberal
policies introduced to reduce regional (socio-ethnic inequalities) failed to deliver; this is
because the thrust of economic liberalization posed many questions as to the consistency and
compatibility between liberalization and redressing (social, ethnic) inequalities embedded in
the concept of regional equality. While we maintain that promoting small-scale and ethnic
entrepreneurs and business would not necessarily ensure the integrity of society, it would
nevertheless, considerably reduce regional and ethnic tension and create a more favourable
climate for national integration. Certainly, this is a policy objective that liberalized economy
so far ailed to deliver.

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University of Khartoum, November, 1988.

Economist Intelligence Unit, Sudan: Country Profile, 1993-94.

El Battahani, A.National Building Between Democracy and Dictatorship, Paper Presented to
Erkawit 11th. Conference, Nov. 1988 (in Arabic).

El-Battahani, A. The Social ad Political Impact 0 Economic Liberalization ad Social Welfare
In Sudan Working Paper 6/96, IDS, University of Helsiki.

Davis, Yuval, N. (1996) see chapter on “Citizenship and Difference” in Gender and Nations.
London: Sage Press.

Davis, Yuval, Women, Ethnicity ad Empowerment: towards transversal politics, 2002

Haider Ibrahim, Economic Collapse in Sudan, 2009

Ibrahim, A.A. Regional Inequality and Underdevelopment in Western Sudan, Ph.D. Thesis,
University of Sussex, 1985;

Kabaj, Mohamed Ibrahim, a series of articles on Sudan economy in al-Sahafa, 2010

Mahmoud, F., The Sudanese Bourgeoisie: Vanguard of Development, Khartoum University
Press, Khartoum, 1986; and

11


Massey, D., "Regionalism: some Current Issues", Capital and Class, Autumn, 1978.

Niblock, T., Class and Power in Sudan, Macmillan, London, 1987;

Republic of Sudan, Department of Statistics, First Population Census 1955/56 Final Report 3,
Khartoum, 1962, Table 6.8.

Siddiq Umbadda, Indicators of Development Grievances in Rural Sudan, A Discussion paper,
DSRC, 1988.

Siddiq Umbadda, Inqaz from al-Ageeda to al-Gabeela (Inqaz Regime from Creed to
Tribalism), al-Ayam newspaper 2011.

Wade, Robert, Governing the Market, 2004.

Wohlumth, K., “Alternative Economic Strategies for the Sudan”, in Harir, S. and Tvedt T.,
(eds), Short-Cut to Decay: the Case of the Sudan, Nordiska Afrikainstitutet, Uppsala, 1994, p.
219.

Yongo-Bure, B. The First Decade of Development in the Southern Sudan, Institute of African
and Asian Studies, University of Khartoum., 1985, p. 3.

12


Appendices
Figure: Manufacturing establishments in Sudan by state

Table: poverty incidence by region in North Sudan 2009

Poverty gap Poverty
among the poor Severity Poverty gap Incidence
34.8 7.8 16.2 46.5 Northern Sudan
26.6 2.7 7.1 26.5 Urban
36.9 10.6 21.3 57.6 Rural
24.7 2.4 6.4 26.0 Khartoum
28.0 3.8 9.4 33.7 Northern
30.4 6.1 13.8 45.4 Central
38.2 9.0 17.7 46.3 Eastern
39.3 11.7 23.1 58.7 Kordofan
39.3 12.6 24.6 62.7 Darfur

Source: National Base Line Household Survey NBLHS, 2009

Recent report on Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) of Sudan testify to the growing
regional inequalities

Regional disparities on the Rise
The daily Minimum Dietary Energy Requirement (MDER) per person in Sudan was 1751
Kcals. In northern Sudan, the proportion of the population below the minimum level of
dietary consumption is estimated at 31.5%. The percentage in urban areas is almost similar to
the rural areas -- 31% and 34% respectively. Across the Northern states, the level of food
deprivation varies significantly. It registered 44% in the Red Sea, 15% in the Gazira and
River Nile states.

13


MDER by States of Sudan, 2009

1850
1817
1801
1800 1793
1786 1786
1779 1778
1773
1762
1745
1750 1740 1739
1734 1730 1730
1725
1717 1714 1713
1711 1707
1705
1700
1700 1685

1652
1650

1600

1550

i ty
S o e rn k e s
ar

K o ra p

i
Ka e a
A l a la
ar n

a

le
W if
N o il e

ile
le
R e um

e s r th e rn D u r
E q gle
q u fu r

r
G ia

A l o ria
A l fa n
Jo a n

La a

ue l

Un l
W e z ir
K h er

rn r n K a r f u
ar

B l aza

za
U p Ni
nn
Ni

ri
S

A l to r
rN

rn er N
f
ss

a

uf
to

N o th D a r
rth

to
r

ad

n

h r rd u

ha
ra D a
d

Si

t
te
G

h
a

rd

ua
ua
ve

G

G
hi

p
o
n t rn
Ri

Eq
lE
Ce th e

e
t
rn

rn

hr
es
r

u
he

rth s te
te

Ba

Ba
No

W
es
ut

Ea

n
So

W

er
te

No
W
Health and Malaria Prevalence

In northern Sudan, the percentage of households with at least one Insecticide Treated Net
(ITNs) stood at 41% in 2009. Sudan carries 15% of the TB burden in the Eastern
Mediterranean Region (EMR). In 2009, the estimated incidence of new smear-positive TB
cases was 60 per 100,000 population, translating to almost 18,536 new smear-positive cases.
The actual detected were 8572 cases. This means a case detection rate of 46.2%. In Southern
Sudan tuberculosis is one of the major causes of mortality and morbidity.

Figure: Malaria Prevalence in Northern Sudan

Child mortality
Pneumonia, malaria, diarrhea, and malnutrition usually still represent the major causes of
under-five illness and deaths. Less than five Mortality Rate (northern Sudan dropped to 102
per 1000 live births in 2006. Infant Mortality Rate (IMR) in northern Sudan increased to
71/1000 live births in 2006. The overall picture shows inter-regional variations, where
(U5MR) in Blue Nile, South Kordofan, West Darfur and Red Sea reached 178, 147, 138 and

14


126 per 1000 L.B (SHHS 2006), respectively. IMR remained high in the same states
mentioned above in addition to Ghadarif (86/1000 LB). In Southern Sudan the
young children face daily threats from Malaria, diarrheal diseases, Acute Respiratory
Infection (ARI), vaccine preventable diseases and malnutrition. In southern Sudan U5MR
declined from an estimated 250 per 1,000 live births in 2001 to 135 in 2006.

15

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