Abstract. The aim of this paper is to delve into the topic of human rights, consequently showing that the fight for recognising the cultural identity develops through the system of human rights. Specifically speaking, the latter is achieved through civil and political rights, individual rights, and the first-generation rights. Individual’s collective practices for cultural self-identification develop exactly through the civil rights, namely, the right of self-determination. The collective identity and practices also influence and determine the political system. Therefore, in this paper I direct the focus towards the democratic form of the political system of segmented or pluralistic multicultural societies and countries. The implication of this paper is that the consociational democracy (or consensual according to some authors), as a democratic and political system in multi-cultural societies, and cultural diversity in politics are tightly intertwined with the source of their rights, i.e. the human rights system. Keywords: human rights, civil and political rights, individual and collective identity, consociational democracy.
Group rights, group cultural identity and democracy
1. Group rights, group cultural identity and democracy
Flora Kadriu
UBT – Higher Education Institution
Abstract. The aim of this paper is to delve into the topic of human rights, consequently showing that the
fight for recognising the cultural identity develops through the system of human rights. Specifically
speaking, the latter is achieved through civil and political rights, individual rights, and the first-generation
rights. Individual’s collective practices for cultural self-identification develop exactly through the civil
rights, namely, the right of self-determination. The collective identity and practices also influence and
determine the political system. Therefore, in this paper I direct the focus towards the democratic form of
the political system of segmented or pluralistic multicultural societies and countries. The implication of this
paper is that the consociational democracy (or consensual according to some authors), as a democratic and
political system in multi-cultural societies, and cultural diversity in politics are tightly intertwined with the
source of their rights, i.e. the human rights system.
Keywords: human rights, civil and political rights, individual and collective identity, consociational
democracy.
Introduction
Human rights are among the key concepts of today. On the one hand, ardourously, through the
trauma of the two world wars and countless pogroms, they have earned their place in the fundamentals of
modern democracy – constituting the concept of parliamentary liberal democracy. On the other hand, via
globalisation, they have instituted themselves as one of the universal (or nearly universal) principles
underlying modern international relations. Consequently, Francis Fukoyama would declare the “end of
history”, referring to the factthat liberalism, human rights and democracy are growing into global concepts,
with no alternative to them. Regardless of whether we find him overoptimistic, especially in light of civil
war expansion, ethnic cleansing, genocide (around 153 armed conflicts following the Second World War)1
or in light of dictators, racism, and discrimination still present in international relations – there is,
nonetheless, truth to the thesis that human rights are becoming a movement, gaining global dimensions and
turning into a global policy factor.
However, the most important and controversial issues concerning human rights protection cannot
be resolved by merely invoking individual human rights. Traditional human rights principles ought to be
reinforced with the theory of the rights of ethnic and national minorities, which are culturally determined,
whereas balance ought to be sought – a “concrete” one for each society. The problem, namely, ensues from
the fact that such balance is hard to attain, since individual and collective rights rest on different paradigms:
individual rights on the principle of the individual as a baseline, and collective rights on the principle of the
collectivity – the community as a value prior to the individual. “Cultural diversity” in public space is
articulated in the “identity politics” or the “politics of recognition” (politics of recognising differences as
an inherent part of the social equality ideal), thus, in a way, being conceptually opposing to the logic of
human rights universality, liberal idea of social justice, neutral state and national homogeneous society.
Still, the complexity of the identity politics in cultural pluralism is not reflected in the fact that different
segments exercise different culture and institutional internal practice, but instead, in the fact that such
segments foster different relations towards the wider society and their macroinstitutions.2
2. Owing to that conception of diversity, there are numerous debates on whether group rights are a
novel multiculturalistic idea and whether it is possible for a country to recognise these rights without
jeopardising and disrupting the culture of the dominant community, since the issue of dominant community,
in particular, refers to the protection of own interests and values from “foreign” cultures, whereas the
perspective of ethnic and national communities revolves around shielding their own interests from the
dominant culture.
The model of liberal multiculturalism is advocated by the Canadian philosopher Will Kymlicka,
who, in spite of the criticism, strives to illustrate the enshrining of his own philosophy in the protection of
ethnic and national minority rights in liberalism, making efforts to establish justice without disrupting the
dominant culture, but also without disrupting country’s order.
Some civil and political rights forming the basis ofcitizen’s cultural self-identification
Intrinsic to the corpus of human rights, the civil and political rights, being the oldest and
fundamental rights of man, classified in the first-generation (“blue”) human rights, differ from other moral
issues for the protection and promotion of special concern for autonomy and liberty. Ensuing from human
autonomy and liberty, they safeguard the safety and immunity of the individual, through civil status, from
the state, and allow the citizen to participate in governance. Since the individual with a civil status holds
irrefutable rights, he/she representsthe centrepiece of the community’s political system.Civil statusreflects
individual political identity. Therefore, traits of a community are best discerned from the position of its
citizens.
Civil rights are defined as a category of rights essential to the establishment of autonomy
(activities and initiative) for the citizens in the political system, whereby they are being treated equally
with other citizens of the same system. These rights are closely associated with the political rights, which
are participation rights that entail a guarantee toperform politicalactivity inone’scountry and participate
in governance.
Detailed according to the international instruments for protection, the current list of civil and
political rights is as follows: right to life; right to be free fromtorture and cruel, inhuman and degrading
treatment or punishment; right to humane treatment of prisoners; freedomfromdebtors’ prison; freedom
of movement and residence; right to a fair trial; right to an effective judicial remedy; right to an effective
remedy before a court;rightto judicialprotection;rightto execution ofjudgement;rightto protection from
retroactive criminal law; right to recognition as a person before the law; right to privacy; freedom of
thought, conscience and religion; freedomof thought and expression; prohibition of propaganda forwar
and inciting national, racial or religious hatred; right to peaceful assembly; freedomof assembly; right to
marry and found a family; rights of the child; political rights; right to equality before the law; freedomof
aliens from arbitrary expulsion; right to gender equality; prohibition of discrimination; rights of
minorities; right of peoples to self-determination (collective right).3
The civil and political rights are not confronting, but complementary to eachother,thereby assisting
in the enhancement of personal responsibility – they spur individual initiative and sense of responsibility
for one’s life. Their constitutional status also empowers them to enhance the credibility of the system.
Here, however, a separate group4
of civil and political rights shall be delineated, the exercise of
which forms the first circle of cultural self-identification of the individual citizen. In this instance reference
is made about the citizen belonging to a cultural group other than the country’s majority culture. This
primarily pertains to: freedom of thought, conscience and religion; right to peaceful assembly and
association; freedomof thought and expression; right to participation in governance and equal access to
public service; right to liberty and security; right to be free fromtorture and cruel, inhuman and degrading
treatment or punishment; freedom from arbitrary interference with privacy, family, home or
correspondence; right to a nationality.
Then follow the classical rights, which, although relevant, are not pivotal in defining the right to
cultural identity, namely: right to recognition as a person before the law; right to life; freedom from
arbitrary arrest, detention or exile; right to a fair and public trial before independent and impartial
tribunal; right to be presumed innocent; etc.
3. This first circle of rights, which makes up the backbone of the civil and political rights, is further
complemented by rights from additional international instruments of economic, social and cultural
provenance. They constitute the second concentric circle around the first, and often contain positive
obligations, so that the state can assist the exercise of the first circle of civil and political rights and provide
social accommodation to diversity. Such rights are: right to employment; right to just and favourable
conditions of work; right to safe and healthy working conditions; right to organise; right to protection of
working women; right to equal opportunities and equal treatment in matters of employment without
discrimination basedon sex;rightto the family to social,legaland economic protection;rightto protection
and assistance of migrant workers and their families; right to health; right to social and medical
assistance.5
The third concentric circle consists of the quasi-collective and collective (group) rights of
minorities and indigenous peoples, also including rights of migrant workers. Such rights, as established for
the collectivities of minorities, indigenous peoples and migrants, build up on the previous two circles of
rights and frame the complexity of the so called social and cultural rights or rights of the differentiated
citizenship.6
In view of the abovementioned, this separate group of civil and political rights presents the basis
for cultural self-identification of the citizen, i.e. the individual.
Cultural (group) identity
Identity can be defined as a “mental structure organisation of both cognitive and affective
characteristics which represent individual’s self-perception as a different entity; in concord with self, and
yet detached from others; with reasonable degree of coherence concerning behaviour, needs, motivation
and interests”7
or as a “subjectively sanctioned entity, individual’s overall sense of self, a process which
ensures integration of observations, feelings and thoughts for one’s own personality”.8
Nevertheless,the cultural identity is not just a mere reflection of given features of culture, but an
interpretation towards individual self-identification – personification (Who amI?,What am I?,Where do I
come from?, Where do I belong?),and endeavour for gaining status (power) in the wider society; primarily
a struggle for recognition of resources, position and development.9
The struggle around values, and the
perception of exclusion, power and resources, is fuelled from the impression that such interests are
incompatible with those of other groups, i.e., there is limitation of resources in the given social moment,
and so the interests of all groups cannot be satisfied entirely and at once.In fact,the struggle for recognising
group’s cultural identity is carried out through the human rights system10
, especially via the civil and
political rights. Exercising human rights in a society implies taking over political power or entering its
streams so it can be harnessed towards fruition of the concept of human rights.11
Today we recognise two
lines of struggle: the one demands regard for cultural identity, which is consistent with the comprehension
of the concept of dignity12
, whereas the other is discernible in the acceptance of economic demands for
resources, aimed at protecting integrity of traditions and lifestyle acquired by members of the given
groups13
.
Modern democratic society highlights differentiation and self-regulation of independent
individuals and their creative potentials, and for this reason, the need for cultural identity represents the
basic condition for the development of such society. Only a democratic society has the moral dignity, since
it supports complete and complex development of man, whereas man is incomplete without satisfying own
personal relations.14
The impact of culture on democracy and liberalism in politics manifests in individuals’
different access to cultural resources and their utilisation, and also in forming opinions for one another and
for themselves.
Different cultural segments do not only exercise different cultural practices and institutions, but
their attitudes towards the wider society are also dictated by the cultural perception determined by that
particular segment. We call these societies multicultural,wherein cultural pluralism becomes dominant and
multifaceted, hence overcoming the “majority – minority” dynamics.15
Still, irrefutable is the fact that the
politics of cultural diversity bears serious conflict potential; hence the essential need to recognise
multiculturalism and provide equal treatment to cultural differences and diversity values. As specific
4. cultures associatedwith increasing complexity and heterogeneity of social life, social and cultural mutations
suggest that cultural knowledge should be perceived in a heterogeneous,instead of homogeneous context.16
In that sense, due consideration should be given to the dynamic quality of the cultural phenomenon –
understanding how to create culture in complex situations, whereas emphasis is put on the culture as an
action, and not on the culture as an object, which is the postulate of interculturalism.17
Group rights and democracy
Genuine group rights are those lacking the dilemma whether,from beginning to end, their subject
is a group (for example, the right of peoples to self-determination, the right to development, or some
minority rights), that is, group or collective rights are considered those the holder of which is a group – a
collective, in the same way individual rights are those the holder of which is an individual with a civil
status.
Group or “[c]ollective rightsrefertothe rightsaccordedtoand exercisedby collectivities,where
these rights are distinct from, and perhaps conflicting with, the rights accorded to the individuals who
compose the collectivity.”18
According to the recent understanding of liberalism, group rights are seen as negation of
individual’s equality vis-à-vis the state.
Through the group rights, inequalities in regard to the position of minority groups are overcome
and minorities are provided equal opportunities for employment and life in their own cultures. Group or
“collective” rights are compensation for the unfair conditions for different groups, and it is the sole area
where true equality does not imply equal treatment, but rather different, so that groups can adjust to the
different needs. In that regard, Kymlicka underlines that individual and group rights cannot compete in the
same moral space of liberal theory, since group’s values are a product of its contribution to the life values
of individuals.19
“The idea that groups are prior to individuals, even if true, cannot by itself explain [the] asymmetry
between groups.”20
Sometimes, group members are to be treated differently in order to achieve effective
equality in the opportunities of their members – the individuals. This “intervention” is attained through
legalising special group rights, dubbed by some authors as “differential treatment of the citizenship” or
“differentiated citizenship”. In view of such intervention, Kymlicka points out that some forms of
differencesamong groupsmay be acceptable only if their members hold certain rights specific only to that
group – what Iris Young calls “differentiated citizenship”.21
Therefore the debate is shifted from the subject “over the primacy of the individual or the
community“22
to the real debate over whether it is necessary, for the sake of fair treatment of different
cultures and their members, to accord different rights (differentiated citizenship) in order to attain effective
equality and fairness in expressing individual cultural identity in a society.
The answer to this quandary is: yes; different rights – additional, special – or so called group-
differentiated rights can be accordedin order to attain the goal, and that is compatible with the liberal theory
on the rights of man.
Demands different national and ethnic groups put forth to the majority hinge on the type and nature
of the issues faced in their society.
Still, even the utter fulfilment of these demands fails to resolve the issues of the ethnic and minority
groups. Since these group members differ from others, the consistent application of the formal and legal
equality is insufficient. All efforts, therefore, focus on providing members of different ethnic groups who
suffered discrimination the needed support and assistance (differential treatment) to exercising certain
rights, in order to attain genuine and actual equality. Or at least come close to it. Hence the demand to
recognise collective rights of minorities, equal, but distinct from those accorded to the majority. Bhiku
Parekh, in that sense,underscores that equality includes freedom and opportunity to be different,23
whereas
Will Kymlicka maintains that all collective rights should be described as permanent,deriving from the basic
liberal principles and values, such as“equality”, and therefore they should not be accordedascompensation
for discrimination or repression24
.
5. If one accepts the concept of social justice, according to which equality precludes equal
starting position for the different ethnocultural groups, the collective rights, in principle, are not
conflicting with the liberal idea of equality.25
The multinational state providing to all its citizens general, equal individual rights, regardless of
their group affiliation, may seem “neutral” in regard to different national groups. But, in given cases,it can
substantively favour the majority (as it often does).
Namely, instead of democracy, the rule of the majority in deeply divided societies spawns
dictatorship of the majority and segregation of citizens. The complexity of politics in pluralistic
multicultural societies is reflected in the separate relations of the different segments towards the wider
society, its macroinstitutions and the underlying values, thus impeding wider consensus.26
What such
societies require is a democratic regime ensuing from a consensus, and not from opposition, one of
inclusion, not exclusion, one that strives to maximise the size of the ruling majority instead of satisfying
with tight majority, which implies consensual democracy.27
This model may be neither perfect nor the most adequate to the new and old EU member states
alike, but it is a new model, nonetheless, and so it is too early to arrive at a conclusion whether its concept
is better and where it leads to.
Concluding notes
This paper highlights the separation of the basic civil and political rights from the corpus of human
rights and freedoms, constituting the ground for the “right to cultural identity”. The latter has not yet been
proclaimed a separate right, with no perspective, whatsoever, of emerging as such. However, efforts here
were made to demonstrate that some of the classical civil and political rights, along with the rights of
minorities, indigenous peoples and just a few social and economic rights, are regrouped to form the basis
of the so called “right to cultural identity”.
This earlier regrouping conceived the notion of collective cultural identity (Bhiku Parekh) or
societal groups, also known as the group-differentiated rights (Will Kymlicka), so that later on the cultural
group identity would change into policy of accommodation (adjustment, adaptation) for the mentioned
cultural groups in the context of democratic political system.
The culture group, namely, emerges as a resonator of political articulation and mobilisation, and so
it represents a new political stakeholder, that is, a new political factor, in a democracy some authors call
consociational democracy, or in more general terms – democracy in multicultural societies. Mutual
cohabitation between collective cultural identity and its political articulation, and classical individual rights
and their political accommodation, createsa newpolitical situation that requires intervention into the system
of liberal justice and majoritarian democracy hitherto known and elaborated. In some authors’ conviction,
it requires establishment of new liberal justice and a system of consociational democracy based upon it.
This system will develop new and effective balance between the individual rights – individual citizenship
and underlying political institutions, and the collective cultural rights – differentiated citizenship and
underlying participative political institutions. Such a project is neither simple nor easy to realise, and since
multicultural societies have no major options to choose from, finding the new balance becomes an “urgent”
focus point.
Although this is a fermenting debate “zigzagging” and going “back and forth”, I share the opinion
with a group of authors who maintain that collective cultural rights are an essential element in the re-
democratisation of the political landscape and the establishment of new practices in democracy, which are
imposing, advancing and lasting. On the contrary, it is one of the basic components of democratic changes
taking place in the 21st
century.
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27
Ibid.