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Leaders Study Program, Paris 2019- Great paris
- 1. STORY OF AN INFRASTRUCTURE
Grand Paris Express 2009-2018
16 February 2018
- 2. © Arcadis 2018
“How can we recreate urbanity, citizenship, civic and social connections, conviviality,
solidarity? How can we make our cities a place of progress, of prosperity, of sharing?
How can we invent a sustainable urban model, the post-Kyoto city, the ecological city that
will ally itself with nature rather than fight it?
This may be the biggest political challenge of the twenty-first century.
Transportation is going to be the decisive piece. Because mobility is crucial, because the
Greater Paris transportation system is reaching its limits. We need to invent the
transportation system that drives the territorial dynamics we want and the principles we
want for the urban development of Greater Paris.
It Starts With an Ambition
Grand Paris needs to be at the heart of our
attractiveness strategy. The improvement of quality of
life will attract investors, entrepreneurs, researchers.
Grand Paris needs to be at the heart of our strategy
for economic development; we need to support activity
while preparing the future.
Together we will build the city of the twenty-first
century.”
President Sarkozy at the Cité de l'Architecture et du Patrimoine on April 29th, 2009
- 3. © Arcadis 2018
Governance
Grand Paris is not just a metro system – it has three
essential strands to compose a vision for future Paris
TransportationUrban Projects
A Total Vision for Greater Paris
- 4. © Arcadis 2018
A New Network for Greater Paris
The new network as
presented by the national
government in 2010
Nicolas Sarkozy created
a Ministry for Greater
Paris in 2009 and
entrusted it to Christian
Blanc. Blanc’s team
developed a plan for a
major new trans-
portation infra-structure
materializing Sarkozy’s
ambition for Greater
Paris.
- 5. © Arcadis 2018
To execute the plan under the State’s
central control, rather than entrust it to the
Ile-de-France Region or to an existing
authority, the government created a
dedicated vehicle in June 2010.
Société du Grand Paris was created as a
state-owned commercial company, which
can employ outside the civil service, but
remains a public administration for legal
and accounting purposes.
A Dedicated Project Company
Its role is to build and finance – but not operate – the new infrastructure. The
entity will be dissolved once it has accomplished its mandate
Société du Grand Paris has a two-tier governance structure:
• a Supervisory Board where the State holds the voting majority but local
elected officials have a large minority presence
• a Executive Board (Directoire) led by the CEO of Société du Grand Paris
- 6. © Arcadis 2018
The Arc Express Scheme
The new network as
presented by the
regional government
in 2010
The Ile-de-France
region, which has
responsibility for
transportation in
Greater Paris, had
its own plan for an
orbital rail
connection around
central Paris
- 7. © Arcadis 2018
The Compromise
The two schemes were both
put to public consultation in
2010. A compromise
scheme was agreed
between the State and the
Region in early 2011.
- 8. © Arcadis 2018
Christian Blanc’s vision of the of financial approach was as follows:
• The State would make an initial investment of € 4 bn as the company’s
starting equity capital
• This starting capital would allow Société du Grand Paris to fund feasibility
and design studies as well as meet early-stage investment needs
• A non-budgetary stream of cash flows would be allocated to Société du
Grand Paris to shield it from the vagaries of future political decisions
• Once the network was in place, a fee would be paid by the operator to SGP
for the use of the infrastructure
• SGP would capture other revenue opportunities, such as the sale of land
made more valuable by the project and the operation of a fiber-optic network
• With the starting capital and the different streams of revenue, Société du
Grand Paris would be in a position to raise debt to fund itself until the
principle was fully paid down (expected to be approximately 40 years)
A Unique Financial Model
- 10. © Arcadis 2018
The State never made its initial investment of € 4 bn in Société du Grand Paris
– it only invested € 1 bn and SGP immediately had recourse to debt funding
The State did not set the fee for the use of the infrastructure that the SGP will
receive, as was supposed to by law, making it difficult to engineer the financial
model
The Supervisory Board never played its role:
• The State role was divided among four Ministries and the Prefect, with the
result that no one took ownership
• The local elected officials were focused on the impact on their precincts and
showed no interest in the broader project
• No one on the Supervisory Board was experience with projects of this type
or technically qualified so no one assumed actual oversight
Having a well-funded entity at hand, the government repeatedly expanded
SGP’s scope and made it responsible for satisfying unrelated funding needs
With heavy constraints of its status as a government entity created by a
national law, SGP had insufficient staff and was forced to outsource heavily
Issues With The Model in Reality
- 12. © Arcadis 2018
• 200 kilometers of new network with close to 200 ventilation and security
shafts (every 800 meters maximum)
• Line 14 North extension: 10 kilometers
• Line 14 South extension: 14 kilometers
• Line 15: 75 kilometers divided in three segments (South, East, West)
• Line 16: 25 kilometers
• Line 17: 27 kilometers
• Line 18: 35 kilometers
• Line 11 extension: 10 kilometers
• 68 stations, including many inter-connections (train, tram, metro, bus, air…)
• Seven new operational centers with train maintenance centers and depots,
infrastructure maintenance centers and central command posts
• Average commercial speed between 55 and 66 km/h (vs 21 to 27 km/h for
the Paris metro)
• Frequency of as little as 85 second between trains
• Capacity of up to 1,000 passengers per train
Technical Characteristics
- 19. © Arcadis 2018
Balcon Sur Paris around Bry - Villiers Champigny station, Kengo Kuma & associates, X-TU, OXO Architectes, KOZ Architectes,
Stefano Boeri, James Corner Field Operations, Paul Arène
- 20. © Arcadis 2018
Challenges of Project Delivery
A very complex project, with a multitude of consultants and contractors
simultaneously on six different lines within a very tight time schedule
Need for a sophisticated procurement strategy to maintain competitive
tension in a context of high supply-side stress
Challenging very heterogenous geology that required adaptations of the
project (e.g. station depth at Saint Maur Créteil)
Environmental challenge of 45 million tons of excavated tunnel material:
decontamination, traceability, transportation and destination
Challenging design issues, for example passing under La Défense,
already built up with skyscrapers, underground rail lines, underground
highways, utility networks…
Some complex construction challenges, for example building the new
platforms alongside the final position and sliding them in over a
functioning rail line at Arcueil
Many local stakeholders to manage in view of disruption to existing road
or rail service or disturbances caused by works
The selection of Paris for the 2024 Olympic Games accelerated the
timeline for delivery and led to the compression of certain design stages
Digital model of quarries
Complexity of infrastructure at La
Défense
Food and music for project stake-
holders at the sliding of the Arcueil
platform into place
- 21. © Arcadis 2018
Project Costs
The project costs have doubled since the first estimate in 2010
due to both scope expansion and higher project costs
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
35
40
45
2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2017
+ Line 14
North and
Line 15
East
+ Line 14
South
+ Eole + Works on existing
network, infrastructure
maintenance vehicles
€ bn
Increase in construction
costs due to more granular
technical understanding
Higher land acquisition costs
Cost overruns
Reevaluation of
risks and
contingencies
- 22. © Arcadis 2018
Recent Developments
President Macron’s election introduced the third administration to oversee the
Grand Paris Express – there have therefore been two changes of party control
at State level during the life of the project without a fundamental change of
orientation.
After a thorough review of the project, the Minister of Transportation, Elizabeth
Borne, announced the government’s measures on January 31st:
• Maintain the full project, with no changes to the network layout and design
• Prioritize three segments for completion in time for the 2024 Olympic
Games: Line 14 North and South, the common segment of lines 16 and 17
• Create a commission to establish a realistic schedule line by line, taking into
account technical risks
• Increase the resources available to SGP in line with the new project estimate
by allocation of new tax revenue
- 23. © Arcadis 2018
Tunneling equipment that began operations in early 2018The lifting into place of the first tunneler at Champigny on February 3rd, 2018
- 24. © Arcadis 2018
A Perspective
“The Grand Paris Express is not just a Parisian project but a undertaking
that projects France globally. Our history gave us the good fortune to be in
the small group of global cities with New York, London, Tokyo and
Shanghai.
Paris as a global city is not just an opportunity but also a responsibility for
the future, which requires efforts and works in line with this responsibility.
The Grand Paris of the twenty-first century is an essential means to ensure
the durability and the cohesion of our nation in a context of constant
acceleration of globalization and to make the universal presence of our
values endure.”
Christian Blanc
February 2nd, 2018
Les Echos