Justin B. Bullock is assistant professor in the Bush Schoo.docx

Justin B. Bullock is assistant professor
in the Bush School of Government and
Public Service at Texas A&M University. His
research interests include public manage-
ment, public policy analysis, bureaucratic
discretion, decision-making theory, and
research methodology.
E-mail: [email protected]
Justin M. Stritch is assistant professor
in the School of Public Affairs and
senior research affi liate in the Center of
Organization Research and Design at
Arizona State University. His research
interests include public service motivation,
human resource management, organiza-
tional social capital, decision making, and
organizational performance.

Hal G. Rainey is the Alumni Foundation
Distinguished Professor in the School of
Public and International Affairs at The
University of Georgia. His research concen-
trates on organizations and management
in government, with emphasis on change,
leadership, incentives, privatization, and
comparisons of governmental management
to management in business fi rms. His book
Understanding and Managing Public
Organizations was recently published
in its fi fth edition. He is a fellow of the
National Academy of Public Administration.
International Comparison of Public and Private Employees’
Work Motives, Attitudes, and Perceived Rewards 479
Public Administration Review,
Vol. 75, Iss. 3, pp. 479–489. © 2015 by

The American Society for Public Administration.
DOI: 10.1111/puar.12356.
Justin B. Bullock
Texas A&M University
Justin M. Stritch
Arizona State University
Hal G. Rainey
The University of Georgia
Abstract: Th is article presents a conceptual perspective on the
distinctive characteristics of public organizations and
their personnel. Th is perspective leads to hypotheses that
public organizations deliver distinctive goods and services that
infl uence the motives and rewards for their employees. Th ese
hypotheses are tested with evidence from the International
Social Survey Programme in order to compare public and
private employees in 30 nations. Public employees in 28 of
the 30 nations expressed higher levels of public-service-
oriented motives. In all of the countries, public employees were
more likely to say they receive rewards in the form of perceived
social impact. In most of the countries, public employees
placed less importance on high income as a reward and
expressed higher levels of organizational commitment.
Practitioner Points
• Th e fi ndings presented here add to previous evidence that
public employees seek and attain more altruistic
and public-service-oriented rewards than private sector
employees. In particular, we add evidence that these
diff erences hold in many diff erent nations and cultural
contexts.

• Compensation and incentive system reforms in many
governments have often concentrated on fi nancial
incentives and streamlining procedures for discipline and
removal. Such matters are important but should
not drive out concerns with showing public employees the
impact of their work on the well-being of others
and on the community and society. Leaders and managers
should invest in incentive systems that emphasize
such motives and rewards.
• Leaders and managers should invest in the use of altruistic and
socially benefi cial motives and rewards in
recruiting systems.
In this article, we propose a conceptual perspective on
the institutional context and societal roles of public
organizations, the public and quasi-public goods and
services they provide, and the governmental functions
they discharge. Th is perspective leads to hypotheses
that public organizations deliver distinctive goods
and services that infl uence the motives, work atti-
tudes, and rewards for their employees. We test these
hypotheses across 30 nations using evidence from the
International Social Survey Programme (ISSP).
While organizational theorists have tended to place
little emphasis on a distinction between public and
private organizations, public administration research-
ers have provided numerous theoretically based
empirical analyses of the distinction. Th e many exam-
ples include studies of public and private employ-
ees’ motivations (e.g., Buelens and Van den Broeck
2007; Crewson 1997), sector values (e.g., Boardman,
Bozeman, and Ponomariov 2010), leadership (e.g.,
Andersen 2010; Trottier, Van Wart, and Wang 2008),

and organizational performance (e.g., Amirkhanyan
2010; Meier and O’Toole 2011).1
Work Motives, Attitudes, and Perceived Rewards
Scholars in public administration, political science, and
economics have written that the distinctive characteristics of
public organizations
and the people in them have signifi cant implications
for public administration and for governance (e.g.,
Dahl and Lindblom 1953; Downs 1967; Lindblom
1977; Wamsley and Zald 1973). Organization theo-
rists, however, have usually downplayed the impor-
tance of public sector distinctiveness (e.g., Daft 2012;
Simon 1995; Th ompson 1962). Additionally, more
and more empirical research in public administra-
tion represents authors and samples from diff erent
nations (among many examples, see Andersen and
Kjeldsen 2013; Andersen and Pedersen 2013; Dur
and Zoutenbier 2014; Kim et al. 2013; Vandenabeele
2008). Th e diff ering perspectives about public
distinctiveness, coupled with the growing interest in
international research, raise two questions of theoreti-
cal and practical importance: Do public organizations
and their personnel have characteristics that make
them diff erent from other types of organizations such
as business fi rms? Are such distinctions generalizable
across nations?
480 Public Administration Review • May | June 2015
railroad operated by government will resemble a privately
operated

railroad more than the government-operated railroad will
resemble
a government-operated electric utility. Texts in organization
theory
and organizational behavior typically apply general
organizational
concepts and theories to business, government, and nonprofi t
organizations (e.g., Daft 2012; Uhl-Bien, Schermerhorn, and
Osborn 2014).
Experts and observers have repeatedly emphasized the
“blurring”
of the public, private, and nonprofi t sectors (e.g., Bozeman
1987;
Musolf and Seidman 1980). Th ese experts argue that the
sectors are
mingled and overlapping, making simple distinctions
impossible.
Th e contexts of organizations, moreover, can vary widely
within
and across nations (Houston 2011; Kjeldsen and Anderson 2013;
O’Toole and Meier 2015). Th e contexts of government
organiza-
tions can vary in the degree to which power is dispersed among
political institutions, as in the United States, or is concentrated
in a
more unitary system (e.g., the United Kingdom), and contexts
can
diff er between adversarial and corporatist systems. Countries
diff er
in the wage diff erential between the public and private sectors,
in
other labor market conditions, and in the general preference for
public employment among the population (Dur and Zoutenbier
2014; Taylor and Taylor 2011; Van de Walle, Steijn, and Jilke,
forthcoming). Individuals vary in their motives, of course, with

some people preferring government employment not for public-
service-oriented reasons but for secure employment and benefi
ts,
especially in less developed countries (Donahue 2008; Dur and
Zoutenbier 2014).
Th e variations among respondents to large sample surveys such
as
the ISSP might also reduce the probability of fi nding public
and pri-
vate diff erences. Th e samples include people from multiple
organiza-
tional levels—employees, supervisors, managers—and
respondents
from many types of organizations with diff erent functions and
tasks
and with a wide variety of professional and occupational
catego-
ries. Th e wide variations reduce the likelihood of fi nding diff
er-
ences between public and private sector samples in work
attitudes,
motives, and rewards in multiple nations. Indeed, one might be
surprised to fi nd any diff erences.
Reasons to Hypothesize Differences: A Conceptual
Perspective on Public Organizations
Perry and Rainey (1988) pointed out that while many
organization
theorists usually do not treat public organizations as distinct,
major
organization theorists have sometimes referred to public
organiza-
tions as if they do have distinctive characteristics (e.g., Blau
and
Scott 1962; Cohen, March, and Olsen 1972; Mintzberg 1979).

Th ese authors suggest that public status can be an important
factor
in determining some organizational characteristics.
Given the variations among nations in governmental contexts,
however, can we conceive a general explanation of why public
organizations and personnel would show
similar distinctions from private sector coun-
terparts in many diff erent nations? People in
all countries face decisions about the govern-
ance of their societies and political economies,
including how to organize for the production
of goods and services and how to achieve
More than 100 published comparisons of public and private
organizations (Rainey 2014) provide evidence of the distinctive
characteristics of public organizations. In addition, the evidence
increasingly comes from nations not previously studied. Th is is
particularly interesting because national context can have
impor-
tant implications for the roles of public and private organiza-
tions (Dur and Zoutenbier 2014; O’Toole and Meier 2015).
Obviously, government plays a larger role in the political
economy
in some countries, and nations diff er in their state welfare
regimes
(Houston 2011; Kjeldsen and Andersen 2013). Reward systems
in government and business resemble each other more in some
nations than in others—for example, in most nations, execu-
tive compensation levels are not as diff erent as the
compensation
levels for public and private sector executives in the United
States
(Donahue 2008). Can one identify distinctive characteristics of
public organizations and the people in them that apply across

numerous countries?
Many of the studies of public and private diff erences in work
motives, attitudes, and perceived rewards focus on only one
country.
Th is begs the question of whether the diff erences generalize
interna-
tionally. Scholars have turned to international data sets,
including
the International Social Survey Programme (Battaglio and
Legge
2009; Bullock, Wenger, and Wilkins 2014; Houston 2011;
Taylor
and Taylor 2011; Van de Walle, Steijn, and Jilke, forthcoming;
Van
Ryzin 2011) and the World Values Survey (Dur and Zoutenbier
2014; Gilman and Lewis 1996; Van de Walle, Van Roosbroek,
and
Bouckaert 2008), to study public employees’ work motives, atti-
tudes, and perceived rewards.
In this article we focus on whether respondents who are
actually
in government jobs (as distinguished from those who express a
preference for government jobs) express stronger altruistic and
societal benefi t motives than respondents in private sector
employ-
ment. We also examine the diff erences between public and
private
employees’ levels of organizational commitment. In addition,
no study to date has analyzed whether public sector employees
report that their jobs actually provide rewards in the form of
opportunities to help other people and to do work that benefi ts
society. We present the fi rst evidence that they do in 30
nations.
Th is suggests a theoretically and practically relevant

commonality
among governmental contexts in multiple nations and a
fundamental generalization about public administration.
No Distinctive Characteristics of Public Organizations
and Their Personnel?
For many reasons, one might predict no signifi cant diff erences
between public and private employees’ survey responses about
motives, rewards, and attitudes in diff erent nations. Many
organi-
zation theorists have emphasized commonalities among public,
private, and nonprofi t organizations. Th ese commonalities,
they
contend, make those categories of little value for predicting dif-
ferences among the people in the organiza-
tions (e.g., Th ompson 1962). Organization
theorists also emphasize the greater infl uence
on organizational characteristics of many
factors other than public or private auspices,
such as technology, task, size, and environ-
mental uncertainty. Obviously, for example, a
People in all countries face
decisions about the governance
of their societies and political
economies.
Public-Service-Oriented Motives
Public-service-oriented motives should serve as a motivational
force

for those who choose employment in the public sector (see
Brewer
and Selden 1998; Perry 1996; Perry and Wise 1990). According
to
Wright, Moynihan, and Pandey (2012), PSM predisposes
individu-
als to motives focused on public service and drives them to
work
for organizations with strong service- and community-oriented
mis-
sions. Public service motivation has been examined in a number
of
country contexts, including the United States, Korea
(Christensen
et al. 2013; Kim 2009), Australia (Taylor 2008), China (Liu and
Tang 2011), and Italy (Bellé 2013), among many others.
Recently,
public administration scholars have even sought to create a
measure-
ment instrument of the PSM constructs that is valid cross-
nationally
(Kim et al. 2013).
Because the ISSP data do not provide a
full PSM index of the sort developed by
Perry (1996) and other researchers (Kim
et al. 2013), we compare public and private
employees on what Park and Rainey
(2008) described as public-service-oriented
motives. Scholars have argued that proso-
cial or public-service-oriented motives can
be better fulfi lled by employment in the
public sector (Perry and Wise 1990). If
this is indeed a characteristic of public organizations in diff
erent

countries, government organizations should show an
international
tendency to attract individuals with other-regarding motives and
motives oriented to serving others and society. Public employ-
ees should also be more likely to be motivated by organizational
missions that they regard as benefi cial to society and to
citizens
(Goodsell 2011).
Recent research using international survey responses indicates
that those who express altruistic motives and motives for jobs
that benefi t society tend prefer government jobs (e.g., Norris
2003; Ritz and Waldner 2011; Van de Walle, Steijn, and Jilke,
forthcoming; Vandenabeele 2008). Across many countries,
survey
respondents who actually work in the
public sector (as opposed those who simply
prefer such work) express higher levels of
altruistic and public-service-oriented work
motives (Dur and Zoutenbier 2014; Van
de Walle, Steijn, and Jilke, forthcoming;
Vandenabeele 2008; Vandenabeele and
Van de Walle 2008). While these and similar
studies provide important international
evidence, they analyze aggregated data
that do not distinguish and examine
individual countries. International comparisons that also
analyze
individual countries will make valuable contributions to this
stream of research.
Given our conceptual perspective on public organizations as
well
fi ndings from previous research, we test the following

hypothesis:
Hypothesis 1: Public employees will have higher levels of
public-service-oriented motives than their private sector
counterparts.
national security, public safety, and legal order. Two
fundamental
modes of organizing include economic markets and
governmental
authority (see Dahl and Lindblom 1953; Lindblom 1977).2 Th
ese
modes of organizing involve organizations, including business
fi rms
that produce and sell goods and services and government agen-
cies that render services as directed by government authorities.
As
observers have repeatedly pointed out, in contemporary political
economies, these two populations of organizations, business fi
rms
and government agencies, mingle together in many ways (e.g.,
Bozeman 1987; Musolf and Seidman 1980). Nevertheless, the
blur-
ring of a distinction does not obviate the need for the
distinction
and its value for certain purposes.
Th e institutional, legal, and political traditions of a country
deter-
mine the extent to which products and services can be
exchanged
on decentralized economic markets. In the
United States and other democratic republics,
a large scope of economic activity is organ-
ized through markets. Markets often do not
adequately provide public and quasi-public

goods, nor do they discharge functions such
as stabilization and redistribution. Most
organizations that governments authorize
to provide such goods are not subject to the
information and incentives of economic mar-
kets. Th ey must be governed by politically constituted
governmental
authorities. Economists, political scientists, and public
administra-
tion scholars, in contrast to many organization theorists,
contend
that public organizations are distinctive because of the
character-
istics and conditions described earlier. Th ey contend that those
conditions lead to distinctive behaviors, structures, and
processes in
public organizations (e.g., Dahl and Lindblom 1953; Downs
1967;
Wamsley and Zald 1973; Warwick 1975).3
Th e analysis presented here examines predictions that these
con-
ditions infl uence work attitudes and behaviors in government
organizations. Because external governmental authorities
govern
government organizations, they will be subject to constraints on
extrinsic rewards such as fi nancial rewards.
Also, because they produce public and
quasi-public goods, alternative rewards and
incentives, such as opportunities to feel that
one is benefi ting others or benefi ting broader
communities, should play a stronger role in
individual motivation and work attitudes.
In their analysis of public service motivation
(PSM), Perry and Wise (1990) conceived of
PSM as associated with governmental institu-

tions,4 and they posited that those with higher
PSM will be more likely to seek employ-
ment in a public organization. Researchers have found in
multiple
nations that stronger public service motives tend to be
associated
with stronger attraction to government service (Dur and
Zoutenbier
2014; Vandenabeele 2008). While altruistic and public-
regarding
motives may not be the exclusive province of government, one
can
hypothesize that public organizations have distinctive
characteristics,
especially compared with private fi rms, that relate to their
members’
motives, attitudes and rewards, and especially public service
motives
and rewards.
Th e institutional, legal, and
political traditions of a country
determine the extent to which
products and services can be
exchanged on decentralized
economic markets.
While altruistic and
public-regarding motives
may not be the exclusive
province of government, one
can hypothesize that public
organizations have distinctive

characteristics.
Van den Broeck (2007) found that public sector employees were
less
extrinsically motivated than their private sector counterparts.
Th ese
fi ndings reinforce those of Karl and Sutton (1998), who found
that
public sector employees placed less emphasis on economic
rewards
than their private sector counterparts. We will test the following
hypothesis:
Hypothesis 3: Private sector employees will place higher
importance on high income from their work than public
sector employees.
Organizational Commitment
We also examine sector diff erences in organizational
commitment.
In using data from completed surveys such as the ISSP, a
researcher
must use the questions on the survey, which may not represent
con-
cepts and variables in the way the researcher would prefer. We
were
able to use some questions to represent respondents’
commitment
to the employing organization, even though the resulting index
does
not fully represent organizational commitment in the way many
researchers measure the concept (e.g., Mowday, Porter, and

Steers
1982). Nevertheless, it is useful to examine organizational
commit-
ment because it represents a variable distinct from the others in
the
analysis in ways that refl ect on the diff erences in public and
private
respondents’ orientations toward their work and organizations.
If
public employee respondents express the motives of helping
others
and having work useful to society, does this mean that they will
show stronger commitment to their employing organizations?
Th ere
are reasons both to predict that they will and to predict that they
might not.
Mowday, Porter, and Steers (1982) defi ned organizational com-
mitment as the strength of an individual’s identifi cation with a
particular organization and involvement in it. Th is
organizational
commitment construct has been used in a number of studies of
public employees (Balfour and Wechsler 1996; Choi 2009;
Crewson
1997; Liou and Nyhan 1994; Yang and Pandey 2009).
Additionally,
the organizational commitment construct has been tested and
used
internationally (Coyle-Shapiro and Kessler 2003; Steijn and
Leisink
2006; Zeff ane 1994).
Past fi ndings on the public and private diff erences with
respect to
organizational commitment paint a complex picture. Balfour and
Wechsler (1990) found that public employees were more

commit-
ted to the goals and values of their organizations than private
sector
employees; public sector employees, however, derived fewer
feelings
of affi liation from membership in the organization.
On the other hand, Steinhaus and Perry (1996) found no
diff erences among public and private sector employees.
Studies
have also found lower levels of organizational commitment
among
public employees than among employees of private
organizations.
Buchanan (1974) found lower organizational commitment
among
federal managers compared with private managers. Zeff ane
(1994)
found that employees of Australian private organizations have
higher levels of organizational commitment than their public
sector
counterparts. In an American sample, Goulet and Frank (2002)
found that among public, private, and nonprofi t employees, the
public employees demonstrated the lowest level of
organizational
commitment.
Perception of Social Impact
Th ere has been much less international comparative research on
whether public and private sector personnel report diff erent
reward
opportunities in their jobs. A search locates no such
comparative
studies before the present one.
Th is analysis uses a perception of social impact construct. Th e

con-
struct draws on earlier work on task signifi cance, a concept
that is
strongly related to job satisfaction and job performance.
Hackman
and Oldham defi ned task signifi cance as “the degree to which
the
job has a substantial impact on the lives or work of other peo-
ple” (1976, 257). More recently, researchers have focused on
task
signifi cance as it pertains to employees’ positive impacts on
society
through their work (see Grant 2008).
We hypothesize diff erences among sectors in employees’
percep-
tions of the social impact of their work. Individuals with strong
public-service-oriented motives might be more likely to
emphasize
the prosocial aspects of their work (Stritch and Christensen
2014).
In addition, public organizations provide public goods and
services
to a community, whereas private sector employees are more
likely to
be involved in market-driven exchanges of goods and services
with
individual customers. Th erefore, public employees should
recognize
a broader social importance of their work.
Hypothesis 2: Public employees will identify their work as
having a greater prosocial impact than their private sector
counterparts.
High-Income Motives

Extrinsic benefi ts are externally mediated rewards or
opportunities
that a job or an organization provides an employee. While an
indi-
vidual might have many extrinsic motives, we will focus on
high-
income motives. Interestingly, there have been relatively few
studies
comparing the relative importance of money as a job motivator
for public and private employees. With respect to sector choice,
Frank and Lewis (2004) found that people who placed a high
value on personal income were more likely to work in the
private
sector, although those in core public administration positions
did
not diff er from private sector respondents. In his study of
public
service motives, Crewson (1997) found that public sector
employees
expressed lower concern for monetary incentives than for other
ben-
efi ts. Langbein and Lewis (1998) reported that electrical
engineers
employed in government placed less emphasis on the
importance
of pay as a reward compared with private sector electrical engi-
neers. Th e perception that public sector employment pays less
than
the private sector persists in many nations, even among
precareer
individuals. Feeney (2008, 468) cited a 2005 Partnership for
Public
Service survey in which low pay and poor benefi ts were the
com-
mon response from college students asked why they would not
work

in the public sector.
We posit that public organizations face diff erent constraints
with
respect to employee benefi ts. For instance, numerous surveys
and
other evidence indicate that public sector managers and
employees
feel that formalized systems of compensation in the public sec-
tor prevent managers from being able to provide employees with
monetary compensation in exchange for performance (e.g.,
Feeney
and Rainey 2010; OPM 2013). In a Belgian sample, Buelens and
summative indices. Here we list and briefl y
explain each of the four dependent variables
and the measures used to construct them.7,8
Public-service-oriented motives. These
motives include the perceived importance of
having a job that both helps others and is
useful to society. The responses to the
following two questions were summed to
construct the measure:
• “How important do you personally think it is in a job that the
job allows someone to help other people?” (“not important at
all” = 1, “very important” = 5)
• “How important do you personally think it is in a job that
the job is useful to society?” (“not important at all” = 1, “very

important” = 5)
Perception of social impact. This measures the degree to which
individuals perceive that their work benefi ts society. The
responses to the following questions were summed to construct
the measure:
• “In my job I can help other people.” (“strongly disagree” = 1,
“strongly agree” = 5)
• “My job is useful to society.” (“strongly disagree” = 1,
“strongly
agree” = 5)
Importance of high-income motives.9 The response to the
following question was used to measure the importance of high-
income motives:
• “How important do you personally think it is in a job that the
job provides a high income?” (“not important at all” = 1, “very
important” = 5)
Organizational commitment. To examine organizational
commitment, we constructed an index using the following three
questions:
• “I am willing to work harder than I have to in order to help
the fi rm or organization I work for succeed.” (“strongly disa-
gree” = 1, “strongly agree” = 5)
• “I am proud to be working for my fi rm or organization.”
(“strongly disagree” = 1, “strongly agree” = 5)
• “I would turn down another job that off ered quite a bit
more pay in order to stay with this organization.” (“strongly
disagree” = 1, “strongly agree” = 5)

Independent Variables
Public sector employment. As discussed in the hypotheses, the
main independent variable is the individual’s sector of
employment.
This variable gives the respondent a value of 1 if the respondent
works for government and a value of 0 if the respondent works
for a
private fi rm.
Controls. In all of our models, we control for sex, age,
education,
marital status, and whether the individual is in a supervisory
position.
Th ese mixed fi ndings coincide with reasons
to expect either higher or lower organiza-
tional commitment on the part of govern-
ment employees. Government personnel
might regard their organizations as venues
for the fulfi llment of altruistic and socially
benefi cial motives. On the other hand,
public employees might have lower organi-
zational commitment because they have a
diminished sense of control as a result of
external constraints placed on the organiza-
tion and the general “public” ownership of the organization (see
Buchanan 1974, 1975). In their study comparing public and
private schools, Chubb and Moe (1990) found that administra-
tors and teachers in public schools had a lower sense of control
of
the organization as a consequence of external controls placed
on.
Public employees might also have lower organizational commit-
ment because they identify with the clients of the organization
or the general public. As a consequence, the formal rules and

procedures commonly attributed to bureaucratic organizations
might lower organizational commitment because they make the
organization a barrier to providing services. We will test the
fol-
lowing hypothesis:
Hypothesis 4: Private sector employees will demonstrate
higher levels of organizational commitment than their public
sector counterparts.
Data and Methods
We use data collected by the International Social Survey
Programme. We analyze the Work Orientation 2005 module,
which
consists of 32 countries and 43,400 respondents. We limit the
analysis to those who are currently employed and those who
either
work for the government or the private sector. We exclude those
who self-report as working for a nationalized fi rm, self-
employed,
or other.5 Th is exclusion focuses the analysis on those who
work
for the government and those who work for private
organizations.6
Table 1 presents summary statistics.
Dependent Variables
Th e previous section described our interest in four dependent
vari-
ables: public-service-oriented motives, perception of social
impact,
high-income motives, and organizational commitment. Th e
ISSP
survey asked questions that can be used to measure these
constructs.
Th ese data give us an opportunity to confi rm whether the

hypoth-
esized diff erences among public and private sector employees
hold
across countries. Th e dependent variables were constructed
using
Table 1 Summary Statistics
Variable Obs. Mean SD Min. Max.
Public-service-oriented motives 17,916 7.98 1.54 2 10
Perception of social impact 17,763 7.61 1.79 2 10
Importance of high income 18,110 4.12 0.79 1 5
Organizational commitment 17,031 9.84 2.55 3 15
Government worker 18,267 0.26 0.44 0 1
Male 18,258 0.5 0.5 0 1
Age 18,189 40.43 12.15 16 90
Education 17,808 15.01 13.77 0 96
Married 18,150 0.6 0.49 0 1
Supervisor 17,872 0.3 0.46 0 1
Th e formal rules and procedures
commonly attributed to
bureaucratic organizations
might lower organizational
commitment because they make
the organization a barrier to
providing services.

In 22 of the 30 countries, government workers report higher
levels
of organizational commitment than private sectors workers. Of
these
22 relationships, 15 are statistically signifi cant at the .05 level,
and
16 are statistically signifi cant at the .10 level or higher. Th ese
initial
fi ndings run contrary to our initial hypothesis 4, that private
sector
employees will demonstrate higher levels of organizational
commit-
ment than their public sector counterparts. Tables 2 and 3 show
that
in most countries (22 out of 30), public employees reported
higher
levels of organization commitment than the private employees.
Th e
nations where public sector respondents reported lower
organizational
commitment than the private sector respondents all fall into two
groups, one including the Scandinavian countries (Denmark,
Finland,
Norway, and Sweden) and Switzerland and another including
the
Anglophone nations (Canada, Great Britain, and New Zealand).
Ordinary Least Squares Results
We complement these initial fi ndings with a set of results using
ordinary least squares regression to control for other factors
that
might infl uence a respondent’s response to our constructs. In
these
models, we control for sex, age, education, marital status, and
supervisory role. Next we discuss these more robust fi ndings to

see whether the initial fi ndings hold while controlling for
multiple
covariates. We also estimate robust standard error to address
con-
cerns of heteroscedasticity.
In 27 of the 30 models, the coeffi cient for the government
worker
variable is positive, and in 17 of these models, the coeffi cient
is
statistically signifi cant at the .05 level or greater. Th e coeffi
cient is
only negative and statistically signifi cant in one model
(Dominican
Republic). Th e magnitude of the coeffi cient is greatest in
Sweden,
Denmark, and Norway, with coeffi cients of .920, .836, and
.813,
respectively. Th is provides additional strong evidence to
support
hypothesis 1.
Th e multivariate model for perception of social impact also
pro-
vides strong evidence in support of hypothesis 2. Th e coeffi
cient
for government worker is positive in 29 of the 30 models, and it
is statistically signifi cant in 27 of these 29 models at the .05
level
or greater and in 27 models at the .01 level. Only one coeffi
cient
is negative (Mexico), and it is not statistically signifi cant. Th e
only
other country that is not both positive and statistically signifi

cant
is Slovenia. Th e two countries with the largest coeffi cients
are Spain
and Denmark, with coeffi cients of 1.898 and 1.685,
respectively.
Importance of High-Income Motives
In 22 of the 30 models, the coeffi cient for government
employees
is negative, and three of these coeffi cients are signifi cant at
the .05
level or greater. While the statistical evidence is not as strong
as
that for hypotheses 1 and 2, we believe this still provides
reasonable
evidence to support hypothesis 3. Th e largest negative coeffi
cient is
Slovenia, with a coeffi cient of –.339, while the largest positive
coef-
fi cient is for Cyprus at .151.
As with the t-test analysis, 22 of the 30 models have a positive
coef-
fi cient. In these models, 13 of the 22 coeffi cients are
statistically
Method
To test the hypotheses about the nature of public versus private
diff erences in this international sample, we use t-tests and
ordinary
least squares (OLS) regressions. For the regression analysis,
four
models are generated to explain each of the following variables:
public-service-orientated motives, perception of social impact,
importance of high-income motives, and organizational commit-

ment. Instead of using country fi xed eff ects, as some
researchers
have done, we estimate the full model separately for each
country.
Doing so allows us to demonstrate country-level diff erences
among
the sectors and variables and to control for variables such as
gender,
age, education, and supervisory role. In addition, we examine
diff er-
ences between public and private employees on the work
attitudes
and motives previously discussed. To our knowledge, such com-
parisons have not previously been studied for such a large
sample of
countries.
T-Tests of Group Means10
To begin the analysis of the diff erences between sectors by
country,
we run a t-test on the country-level means of each of our con-
structs. Th is initial analysis serves three purposes: (1) to see,
for each
construct, whether there is a sector diff erence in the mean
response
at the country level that occurs consistently across countries;
(2) to
see whether there are trends in the direction of the diff erence,
and
if so, whether they are statistically signifi cant; and (3) to
determine
whether we can easily identify the “extreme” where the means
have
the greatest diff erence and begin to consider the cultural
dynamics

of why this might be so.
In 28 of the 30 countries we analyze (the exceptions being the
Dominican Republic and South Korea), government workers
have
higher levels of public-service-oriented motives. Furthermore,
among these 28 countries, 17 of the diff erences are statistically
sig-
nifi cant at the .05 level, and 23 of them are statistically signifi
cant at
the .10 level. Th is provides strong initial evidence for
hypothesis 1,
that public employees have higher levels of public-service-
oriented
motives than their private sector counterparts.
In 30 of the 30 countries we analyze, government workers have
stronger perceptions of the social impact of their jobs. Twenty-
eight of these relationships are signifi cant at the .05 level, and
29
of the 30 relationships are statistically signifi cant at the .10
level
or higher. We believe that this provides very strong initial
evidence
for hypothesis 2, that public employees will identify their work
as having a greater positive social impact than their private
sector
counterparts.
High-Income Motives
In 24 of the 30 countries, government workers report lower
levels
of high-income motives than their private sector counterparts.
Among these 24 countries, only seven of the relationships are

statistically signifi cant at the .05 level, and 10 of the
relationships
are statistically signifi cant at the .10 level or higher. While
there is
some evidence for hypothesis 3, that public employees place
less
importance on high income than their private sector
counterparts,
the hypothesis did not receive the same level of statistical
support as
hypotheses 1 and 2.
Table 2 T-Test Results across Sector by Country
Public-Service-Oriented Motives Perception of Social Impact
Importance of High Income Organizational Commitment
Country t-score p-value t-score p-value t-score p-value t-score
p-value
Australia 2.038** .042 8.303*** .000 –1.049 .294 1.662* .097
Bulgaria 1.664* .097 5.547*** .000 1.02 .308 4.333*** .000
Canada 1.179 .239 4.794*** .000 0.0956 .924 –0.845 .399
Cyprus 2.870*** .004 5.740*** .000 2.400** .017 7.280***
.000
Czech Republic 1.392 .165 2.655*** .008 –0.0985 .922 1.455
.146
Denmark 10.36*** .000 15.12*** .000 –1.320 .187 –5.238***
.000
Dominican Republic –1.787* .074 2.755*** .006 –2.179** .030
1.06 .289

Finland 5.829*** .000 9.904*** .000 –1.101 .271 –1.503 .133
Flanders/Belgium 6.188*** .000 8.309*** .000 –2.899*** .004
2.822*** .005
France 5.366*** .000 10.78*** .000 –2.166** .031 1.041 .298
Great Britain 4.867*** .000 8.792*** .000 –1.104 .270 –0.146
.884
Hungary 1.881* .061 2.820*** .005 –0.250 .803 2.538** .012
Ireland 3.872*** .000 8.442*** .000 –2.086** .038 0.22 .826
Israel 1.766* .078 6.330*** .000 1.692* .091 5.230*** .000
Japan 1.673* .095 3.901*** .000 –0.393 .694 2.872*** .004
Latvia 1.671* .095 5.271*** .000 –2.033** .0426 3.438***
.001
Mexico 0.866 .387 1.495 .136 0.939 .348 2.759*** .006
New Zealand 3.717*** .000 8.534*** .000 –0.872 .384 –0.865
.387
Norway 9.123*** .000 13.65*** .000 –0.485 .628 –0.374 .708
Philippines 0.549 .584 4.920*** .000 –1.348 .179 2.788***
.006
Portugal 4.566*** .000 7.116*** .000 –0.0174 .986 1.13 .259
Russia 2.568** .011 5.389*** .000 –1.992** .047 4.100***
.000
Slovenia 1.109 .268 1.773* .077 –1.904* .058 2.202** .029
South Africa 2.934*** .003 5.786*** .000 0.565 .572 4.057***
.000
South Korea –0.953 .341 3.795*** .000 –1.626 .105 3.178***
.002
Spain 1.660* .098 7.148*** .000 –1.464 .144 1.15 .251
Sweden 9.360*** .000 12.90*** .000 0.44 .660 –3.230*** .001
Switzerland 3.778*** .000 6.627*** .000 –1.832* .068 –1.474
.141
Taiwan 3.011*** .003 4.578*** .000 –1.872* .062 3.155***
.002
United States 2.817*** .005 8.048*** .000 –1.973** .049
2.177** .030
Note: Positive t-scores represent a higher public sector mean.

Signifi cance levels: *** .01; **.05; * .10.
Table 3 OLS Results for Sector Impact on Motivations across
Countries
Public-Service-Oriented Motives Perception of Social Impact
Importance of High Income Organizational Commitment
Country Coeff. SE Coeff. SE Coeff. SE Coeff. SE
Australia 0.190* (0.106) 1.003*** (0.117) –0.045 (0.061) 0.177
(0.163)
Bulgaria 0.223 (0.157) 0.854*** (0.181) 0.043 (0.045) 0.915***
(0.286)
Canada 0.120 (0.158) 0.700*** (0.161) –0.001 (0.079) –0.253
(0.251)
Cyprus 0.399** (0.176) 0.631*** (0.143) 0.151** (0.067)
1.455*** (0.273)
Czech Republic 0.326 (0.303) 0.927*** (0.254) –0.008 (0.168)
0.903** (0.440)
Denmark 0.836*** (0.106) 1.685*** (0.122) –0.038 (0.059) –
1.014*** (0.206)
Dominican Republic –0.270* (0.138) 0.323* (0.170) –0.147*
(0.081) 0.184 (0.195)
Finland 0.568*** (0.140) 1.358*** (0.161) –0.033 (0.066) –
0.330 (0.234)
Flanders/Belgium 0.697*** (0.126) 1.166*** (0.142) –0.140**
(0.055) 0.450** (0.188)
France 0.575*** (0.114) 1.386*** (0.128) –0.082* (0.049)
0.118 (0.183)
Great Britain 0.685*** (0.157) 1.458*** (0.161) –0.045 (0.076)
–0.174 (0.250)
Hungary 0.369 (0.294) 0.676*** (0.252) 0.038 (0.132) 0.975*
(0.500)
Ireland 0.490*** (0.135) 1.414*** (0.145) –0.134 (0.092) 0.019
(0.254)

Israel 0.217 (0.171) 1.207*** (0.201) 0.117* (0.070) 1.516***
(0.327)
Japan 0.369** (0.181) 1.219*** (0.271) –0.092 –0.129
1.169*** (0.392)
Latvia 0.137 (0.168) 0.655*** (0.143) –0.131** (0.058)
1.003*** (0.292)
Mexico 0.0849 (0.166) –0.041 (0.212) 0.047 (0.087) 0.736**
(0.321)
New Zealand 0.410*** (0.131) 1.252*** (0.143) –0.048 (0.079)
–0.339 (0.226)
Norway 0.813*** (0.111) 1.367*** (0.116) –0.028 (0.056) –
0.132 (0.166)
Philippines –0.018 (0.234) 0.741*** (0.201) –0.086 (0.092)
0.389 (0.293)
Portugal 0.448*** (0.0912) 0.910*** (0.130) 0.031 (0.053)
0.070 (0.189)
Russia 0.291** (0.145) 0.812*** (0.159) –0.096* (0.051)
1.060*** (0.257)
Slovenia 0.333 (0.211) 0.572 (0.383) –0.339** (0.151)
1.012*** (0.389)
South Africa 0.325** (0.141) 0.834*** (0.193) 0.061 (0.069)
0.670** (0.277)
South Korea –0.159 (0.196) 0.967*** (0.224) –0.143 (0.105)
1.224*** (0.339)
Spain 0.398* (0.231) 1.898*** (0.282) –0.104 (0.130) 0.351
(0.464)
Sweden 0.920*** (0.131) 1.403*** (0.146) 0.021 (0.062) –
0.617*** (0.190)
Switzerland 0.419*** (0.123) 0.846*** (0.120) –0.104 (0.073)
–0.236 (0.201)
Taiwan 0.273*** (0.105) 0.453*** (0.114) –0.131* (0.073)
0.486** (0.194)
United States 0.304*** (0.110) 0.934*** (0.114) –0.025 (0.072)
0.333 (0.216)
Notes: Results are from an OLS model with the following

control variables: sex, age, education, marriage status, and
supervisory role. The reported standard errors are
robust to a heteroscedastic error distribution.
Signifi cance levels: ***.01; **.05; *.10.
motivations and attitudes are often consist-
ent across workers from diff erent cultures
and institutional contexts. Specifi cally, our
study provides evidence for public manag-
ers that public sector workers, throughout
most nations, are more motivated to serve the
public, highlight the importance of their work
for society, and are less motivated by fi nancial
rewards than their private sector counter-
parts. Internationally, public managers can
use these lessons in the day-to-day management of their
employees.
Second, public sector personnel consistently place higher
emphasis
on work rewards that involve helping others and serving society
and
not as much emphasis on income. Internationally, leaders in
public
organizations need to strive to provide such rewards. One way
in
which leaders can do this is to closely tie public employees’
tasks to
obvious benefi ts to society. Demonstrating public employees’
proso-
cial impact is an important procedure for maintaining and
increas-

ing their motivation. Th ird, public managers should be
particularly
conscious of the cultural context in which they operate with
respect
to utilizing commitment to the organization as a motivation
tool.
Managers should consider highlighting how an employee’s work
benefi ts society and how the organization’s mission benefi ts
society
rather than just appealing to the employee’s sense of
commitment to
the organization.
Conclusion
Th e fi ndings presented here help explain why research on
public
service motivation has become an active international
movement.
Researchers have found that public service motivation and ethos
appear to vary in diff erent cultures and nations (Kim et al.
2013).
Nevertheless, while public institutions may not be the sole
reposi-
tories of public service motivation, the evidence reported here
indi-
cates that public institutions tend to attract and reward
individuals
with such motives.
Do the responses of the government employees in the many
nations
surveyed simply represent a social desirability response or a pro
forma response? (For example: “I work for government, so I
guess
I must benefi t society”). Even if they do, the consistent
responses

across many nations, languages, and cultures make it
remarkable
that such a social desirability or pro forma response to the
survey
questions would recur across all these settings.
Th e fi ndings on high income are consistent with previous
research
showing that public sector respondents tend to place lower
valuation on monetary compensation, but not always, and that
the diff erences compared with private employees are not
always
statistically signifi cant (e.g., Crewson 1997). Pay diff erentials
between the public and private sectors vary among nations, and
in some nations, government positions pay more than private
sector jobs (Norris 2003; Vandenabeele and Van der Walle
2008).
In the United States and other nations, the pay diff erentials are
highest at the higher executive and professional levels but com-
parable or higher for the public sector below those levels (e.g.,
Donahue 2008). Th ese conditions complicate the relationship
between income preferences and sector employment choices and
demonstrate the need to take additional variables into account
in
analyzing such diff erences.
signifi cant at the .05 level or higher. Th is
complements the earlier evidence that suggests
that hypothesis 4 was in the wrong direction.
It appears that higher levels of organizational
commitment are more likely to be expressed
by government workers than private sector
workers, and this fi nding seems to be relatively
consistent throughout our sample. Th ere are
two notable exceptions to this generalization:
in both Denmark and Sweden, government

workers expressed signifi cantly lower levels of organizational
commit-
ment than their private sector counterparts. However, there are
several
countries in which the coeffi cient is particularly large and
positive.
Th ese countries include Cyprus, Israel, and South Korea, with
coeffi -
cients of 1.455, 1.516, and 1.224, respectively. Again, the
results show
the same pattern described earlier for the t-tests. Th e
Scandinavian
countries and Switzerland, and the same Anglophone nations,
are
those where public sector respondents reported lower
organizational
commitment.
Discussion
Th e analysis supports some of our hypotheses about public and
private diff erences in survey responses in an international
context.
Across the 30 countries, we fi nd strong evidence that public
sector
workers have higher levels of public-service-oriented motives
and
greater perceptions of their job’s social impact. We fi nd
evidence
that public sector workers are less motivated by monetary gain
than
their private sector counterparts, although the diff erences are
often
not large enough to show statistical signifi cance. Finally,
contrary
to our expectations, in many nations, public sector personnel
have

higher levels of organizational commitment than their private
sector
counterparts. Th e organizational commitment fi ndings,
however,
show an interesting pattern: the countries where public sector
respondents expressed lower organizational commitment fall
into
one of two categories. One category includes the Scandinavian
nations and Switzerland, and the other set includes the
Anglophone
nations of Canada, Great Britain, and New Zealand.
As discussed earlier, it would be easy to predict no consistent
pat-
terns across nations in comparisons of public and private
employ-
ees’ survey responses on work motives, rewards, and attitudes.
Th e
consistent diff erences in almost all the nations on the public-
service-
oriented motives index and in all the countries on perception of
social impact are striking. Th ey suggest a pattern of diff
erences
between public employees and private sector employees across
many
nations. Th e diff erences are consistent with the literature on
public
organizations that we have cited and with the conceptual
perspective
that we have advanced. Th ese fi ndings add to the stream of
research
on the motives and reward preferences of public versus private
employees that we have cited. Th ey add original fi ndings
about pub-
lic employees’ perceptions, compared with private employees,
that

their jobs actually provide the rewards of having work that
helps
others and that benefi ts society. Th ese diff erences have
seldom, if
ever, been examined in a country-by-country analysis in 30
nations.
Our fi ndings also suggest three important lessons for public
managers. First, with an increase in international collaboration
among government and private sector entities, it is important
to know that the diff erences in public and private employee
Public sector personnel
consistently place higher
emphasis on work rewards that
involve helping others and
serving society and not as much
emphasis on income.
3. For example, one can posit that because external political
authorities exert
stronger infl uences on government agencies, those agencies
tend toward higher
levels of formalization and centralization of their structures.
Empirical research
supports this proposition (e.g., Feeney and Rainey 2010;
Kalleberg et al. 1996).
4. “Public service motivation may be understood as an

individual’s predisposition
to respond to motives grounded primarily or uniquely in public
institutions and
organizations” (Perry and Wise 1990, 368).
5. Th ese categories represent 10.1 percent, 15.1 percent, and
1.1 percent of the
sample, respectively.
6. We also excluded two countries because of data constraints.
Th e ISSP diff erenti-
ates between East and West Germany. Both East and West
Germany are left out
of this analysis because those surveys do not diff erentiate
between public and
private workers.
7. In a factor analysis, each group of items (survey questions)
loaded signifi cantly
on only one factor. Additionally, we report the Cronbach’s
alpha coeffi cient for
each of the indexes: public-service-oriented motives = .80;
perception of social
impact = .74; organizational commitment = .69.
8. It is important to note that these indexes are slightly skewed
toward the higher
responses and have ranges from 2 to 15 depending on the index.
Th is may create
concerns for our choice of OLS as an estimator, but we fi nd
very similar results
when we run the models using an ordered logit.
9. A single item, fi ve-point response dependent variable is not
continuous and, in
this instance, is heavily weighted to the top three responses. Th

is should present
us with diffi culties in our estimation. However, we estimated
this model using
an ordered logit estimator, and the results were not
substantively diff erent from
those we provide here. We report OLS results for ease on
interpretation.
10. Th e t-tests are reported to present simple and
straightforward results that dem-
onstrate a consistent diff erence in responses by public and
private employees.
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an alternative model
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Theory Dec. (2014) 76:241–263
DOI 10.1007/s11238-013-9371-6
Motivation and mission in the public sector: evidence
from the World Values Survey
Edd Cowley · Sarah Smith
Received: 27 February 2013 / Accepted: 19 March 2013 /
Published online: 11 May 2013
© Springer Science+Business Media New York 2013
Abstract It is well-recognised that workers may have intrinsic—
as well as extrinsic—
motivations. Previous studies have identified that public sector
workers typically have
a higher level of intrinsic motivation, compared to workers in
the private sector. This
paper compares (measures of) intrinsic motivation among
30,000+ workers in the two
sectors across 51 countries using data from the World Values
Survey. We find that
public sector workers exhibit higher intrinsic motivation in
many countries, but that
this is not a universal relationship. One possibility is that public
sector mission may
influence whether or not motivated workers choose to work in

the sector. In support of
this, we show that the level of (public) corruption—which
plausibly affects mission—
can explain some of the variation across countries in the
proportion of motivated
workers in the sector.
Keywords Intrinsic motivation · Public sector · Corruption ·
Worker selection
1 Introduction
Tabellini (2008) emphasized that political and economic
outcomes reflect not just the
design of public policies but also the behaviour of public
officials. While his main
focus was on culture and shared normative values, another
potentially important
E. Cowley
Centre for Market and Public Organisation, University of
Bristol, 2 Priory Road, Bristol, BS8 1TX, UK
S. Smith (B)
Department of Economics and CMPO, University of Bristol, 2
Priory Road, Bristol, BS8 1TX, UK
e-mail: [email protected]
123
242 E. Cowley, S. Smith
factor affecting their behaviour is public officials’ motivation.
A number of studies
have found that workers in the public sector typically have a

higher level of intrinsic
motivation than private, for-profit workers. Public sector
workers are more likely to
self-report a higher level of intrinsic motivation towards their
jobs (Houston 2000;
Lewis and Frank 2002; John and Johnson 2008) and this
translates into additonal
effort on the job—both self-reported effort (Frank and Lewis
2004) and an objective
measure of “donated labour”, captured by unpaid overtime
(Gregg et al. 2011). It is
plausible that such intrinsic motivation is an important
determinant of outcomes in
a range of public services, for example health and education,
where some aspects of
effort may be non-contractible and hence hard to reward
directly (see Francois and
Vlassopoulos 2008, for further discussion).
Previous empirical studies looking at intrinsic motivation
among public sector
workers have tended to focus on individual countries. The main
focus of this paper
is on variation in levels of intrinsic motivation across counties.
We use data from the
World Values Survey (WVS) to look at measures of motivation
among more than
30,000 workers in the public and private sectors across 51
countries that cover a range
of income levels, political regimes and cultures. We show that
there are many countries
in which public sector workers do indeed show a higher level of
intrinsic motivation,
but that this is not a universal relationship—there are also many
countries where public
sector workers are less intrinsically motivated than private

sector workers.
The second contribution of this paper is to try to explain at least
some of this
difference across countries. We focus on the potential
importance of the “mission” of
the public sector in explaining the variation. Besley and Ghatak
(2005), Wright (2007),
and Dur and Zoutenbier (2011) all emphasize the role of the
mission of the public sector
as an important factor in attracting intrinsically motivated
people and in triggering pro-
social behaviour. We suggest that the level of corruption in the
public sector is likely
to affect its mission—a more corrupt public administration is
likely to be less attrctive
to intrinsically motivated workers. In a cross-country regression
framework, we show
that corruption, appropriately instrumented, has a negative
effect on the (average)
proportion of motivated workers in the public sector relative to
the private sector. In
an individual-level regression framework we also show that
intrinsically motivated
workers are less likely to work in the public sector when levels
of corruption are
higher.
An alternative to the mission matching story that would be
consistent with the
observed negative cross-country relationship between
corruption and motivation is
adaptation—i.e. that the level of corruption directly affects
workers’ motivation. We
cannot test this explicitly, but we show that the negative effect
of corruption on the

likelihood of motivated workers being in the public sector is
stronger among younger
workers. This tends to support mission matching rather than
adaptation.
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. The next section
provides more
discussion of intrinsic motivation among public sector workers
and the potential effect
of corruption on mission alignment and the selection of
motivated workers. Section 3
describes the World Values Survey and the main variables used.
Section 4 compares
characteristics of public and private sector workers across
countries while Sect. 5
looks at the relationship between the level of motivation and
corruption. Section 6
concludes.
123
Motivation and mission in the public sector 243
2 Intrinsic motivation among public sector workers
A sizeable literature in public administration and economics has
identified that workers
in the public and private sectors are likely to differ in their
motivation (see Perry et al.
2010; Francois and Vlassopoulos 2008 for summaries). Workers
in both sectors are
assumed to care about extrinsic rewards such as wages. But
public sector workers are
thought to have a higher level of intrinsic motivation, linked to

caring directly about
the job that they are doing.
Originally, in the public administration literature, this
motivation was seen as being
grounded primarily or uniquely in public institutions and
organisations (Perry and Wise
1990). Later, the concept was broadened so that it was more
similar to a general feeling
of altruism (Rainey and Steinbauer 1999). Here, we use intrinsic
motivation among
public sector workers to capture individuals’ altruistic or other-
regarding motivations
in relation to their involvement in the provision of goods and
services by the public
sector.1
To make things clearer, we present a simple framework
following Francois and
Vlassopoulos (2008). Suppose the public sector is engaged in
the production of a
single good, g, which is a function of worker effort (ei ):
g = k(ei ...e−i )
Similarly for the private sector, there is a production function in
which there is a single
good, p, which is a function of worker effort.
Workers are characterised as having the following utility
function:
U si = ws − ϕ (ei ) + hi λs (ei )
For worker i in sector s, utility depends positively on their wage
and negatively on
their work effort (ei ). Workers are assumed to vary in the
extent to which they may

also derive some positive utility from their effort, hi ∈ [0, 1]. If
hi = 1, workers
are impure, or action-oriented, altruists and are assumed to care
directly about their
contribution to the public sector good, i.e. (λPUB)’ > 0. We
define these workers
as being intrinsically motivated. Impurely altruistic workers are
assumed not to care
about their contribution to the privately produced good, i.e
(λPRI)’ = 0.2
A number of implications follow, developed in inter alia Besley
and Ghatak (2005)
and Delfgauuw and Dur (2008). The first is that intrinsically
motivated individuals
will be more likely to work in the public sector than in the
private sector. A second
is that such motivated workers will require less strong
incentives to induce the same
level of effort; and, finally, that the public sector may optimally
offer lower wages in
order to attract intrinsically motivated workers.
1 This seems similar to many definitions of public service
motivation in the public administration literature
which specifically focus on individuals’ intrinsic motivations
with regard to their employment rather than
a broader conception of altruism.
2 We ignore the possibility that intrinsically motivated workers
may be pure altruists and care about the
public sector good, whoever is providing it since there is less
empirical support for this behaviour (see Tonin
and Vlassopoulos 2010; Gregg et al. 2011).
123

In this simple framework, intrinsically motivated workers are
assumed always to
care about their contribution to the public good, irrespective of
the characteristics of
the public sector. However, a number of papers emphasize the
importance of “mission”
such that workers only care about their effort if there is mission
alignment between
themselves and the organisation (Besley and Ghatak 2005;
Wright 2007; Dur and
Zoutenbier 2011).
To make things more explicit we extend the framework to allow
for mission
alignment following Dur and Zoutenbier (2011). They model
workers’ utility as
depending on being in the public sector rather than directly on
effort, i.e. U
pub
i =
w pub − ϕ (ei ) + βi hi . βi ∈ [0, 1] captures mission alignment,
i.e. whether or not
workers value the mission of the public sector. In their paper,
mission alignment is
measured by the extent to which indivdiuals express confidence
in political parties,
allowing mission alignment to vary across individuals within a
country. Using data
from the World Values Survey they show that mission
alignment as well as intrinsic

motivation is important to explain who works in the public
sector. In this paper, we
consider variation in mission alignment that might vary across
countries as a result of
institutional corruption.
Although in principle, corruption can apply to both the public
and the private
sectors, we use a measure of corruption (the Corruption
Perception Index) that focuses
on corruption in the public sector. This captures things such as
the bribery of public
officials, kickbacks in public procurement, embezzlement of
public funds, and the
strength and effectiveness of anti-corruption efforts.
The basic idea is a very simple one—if there is a high level of
corruption we
assume a low level of mission alignment between intrinsically
motivated individ-
uals and the public sector. This seems intuitively plausible.
Intrinsically motivated
individuals are unlikely to derive any utility from working in
the public sector and
exerting effort if this benefits corrupt public officials. Only if
public corruption is
low will intrinsically motivated individuals be mission-aligned
with the public sec-
tor.
Our expectation is that, for intrinsically motivated workers, the
likelihood of work-
ing in the public sector will be inversely related to the degree of
corruption. In the
absence of mission alignment, i.e. when corruption is high,
motivated workers will

be equally likely to work in the public and private sectors. Note
that if workers feel
that the public sector is so corrupt that it is harmful to the
public interest, they may
actually prefer to work in the private sector. We therefore
expect intrinsically moti-
vated workers to be more likely to locate in the public sector
where corruption is
lower.
To date, there has been very little empirical work that has
directly explored the rela-
tionship between corruption and workers’ choice between the
public and private sector.
One exception is Serra et al. (2011) who, looking at Ethiopia,
argue that “the original
mission of the public sector ... has been eroded by decades of
central planning, weak
monetary incentives and poor accountability”. They find
evidence that pro-social and
philanthropic health professionals choose not to work in the
public sector (but instead
choose the not-for-profit sector). We explore this issue across a
much wider range of
countries.
123
3 The World Values Survey
We analyse data from wave five of the World Values Survey,
carried out over the period

1st April 2005 – 31st December 2006. Our sample consists of
59,604 respondents
(34,789 workers) from 51 countries, representing a total
population of 4.8 billion
(73.3 % of the world population)3. Information on the sample
sizes for each country,
which range between 668 and 2,697, is given in Table 1.
Table 1 Summary statistics
World Values Survey ILO pub-
lic sector
Corruption
measure
(CPI)Obs Proportion
employed
Propn in
private
Propn in
Public
Propn in
NFP
Andorra (AN) 881 0.95 0.78 0.21 0.01
Argentina (AR) 740 0.49 0.72 0.26 0.02 0.16 7.1
Australia (AU) 965 0.78 0.69 0.25 0.06 0.16 1.3
Brazil (BR) 1, 225 0.41 0.67 0.27 0.05 6.7
Britain (GB) 725 0.66 0.71 0.25 0.04 0.2 1.4

Bulgaria (BU) 706 0.60 0.71 0.29 0.00 0.29 6
Burkina Faso
(BF)
1, 223 0.35 0.48 0.27 0.25 6.8
Canada (CA) 1, 503 0.68 0.69 0.28 0.03 0.19 1.5
Chile (CH) 770 0.54 0.82 0.13 0.05 0.15 2.7
China (CN) 1, 705 0.24 0.57 0.42 0.01 6.7
Cyprus (CY) 870 0.65 0.74 0.23 0.03 0.18 4.4
Egypt (EG) 2, 697 0.38 0.55 0.44 0.01 6.7
Ethiopia (ET) 1, 330 0.50 0.67 0.29 0.05 7.6
Finland (FI) 724 0.66 0.57 0.41 0.03 0.27 0.4
France (FR) 720 0.68 0.68 0.28 0.04 0.29 2.6
Georgia (GE) 1, 112 0.40 0.59 0.32 0.09 0.21 7.2
Germany (DE) 1, 306 0.62 0.56 0.22 0.21 0.15 2
Ghana (GH) 1, 278 0.64 0.83 0.12 0.05 6.7
India (I) 1, 736 0.45 0.39 0.17 0.44 6.7
Indonesia (IN) 1, 766 0.49 0.67 0.30 0.03 7.6
Iran (IR) 2, 268 0.43 0.64 0.31 0.04 0.19 7.3

Italy (IT) 773 0.54 0.70 0.27 0.03 0.15 5.1
Japan (JA) 796 0.71 0.82 0.15 0.03 0.08 2.4
Malaysia (MY) 977 0.66 0.74 0.18 0.08 0.17 5
Mali (MA) 1, 197 0.32 0.34 0.26 0.40 7.2
Mexico (ME) 1, 289 0.50 0.68 0.23 0.08 0.12 6.7
3 Population figures based on World Bank population statistics
for 2006 http://data.worldbank.org/
indicator/SP.POP.TOTL
123
http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SP.POP.TOTL
http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SP.POP.TOTL
Table 1 continued
World Values Survey ILO public
sector
Corruption
measure
(CPI)Obs Proportion
employed
Propn in
private
Propn in

Public
Propn in
NFP
Moldova (MO) 821 0.62 0.56 0.43 0.01 0.27 6.8
Morocco (MC) 1, 066 0.90 0.89 0.10 0.01 0.1 6.8
Netherlands (NE) 741 0.61 0.66 0.26 0.08 1.3
Norway (NO) 778 0.85 0.62 0.38 0.01 0.35 1.2
Peru (PE) 1, 246 0.27 0.66 0.29 0.05 6.7
Poland (PO) 730 0.58 0.61 0.38 0.01 0.27 6.3
Romania (RO) 1, 253 0.54 0.66 0.34 0.00 0.21 6.9
Russia (RU) 1, 513 0.72 0.55 0.40 0.06 0.33 7.5
Rwanda (RW) 1, 265 0.63 0.79 0.14 0.07 7.5
South Africa (SA) 2, 278 0.54 0.71 0.19 0.10 5.4
South Korea (SK) 1, 026 0.51 0.62 0.27 0.10 4.9
Serbia (SE) 1, 040 0.57 0.58 0.42 0.00 7
Slovenia (SL) 762 0.63 0.63 0.35 0.02 0.29 3.6
Spain (SP) 809 0.58 0.82 0.18 0.00 0.15 3.2
Sweden (SV) 720 0.83 0.59 0.40 0.01 0.34 0.8
Switzerland (SW) 797 0.83 0.65 0.31 0.04 0.9

Taiwan (TA) 982 0.78 0.84 0.15 0.01 4.1
Thailand (TH) 1, 235 0.71 0.35 0.16 0.49 0.09 6.4
Trinidad
Tobago (TT)
763 0.62 0.68 0.30 0.01 0.27 6.8
Turkey (TU) 1, 167 0.40 0.81 0.18 0.01 0.14 6.2
Ukraine (UK) 784 0.67 0.41 0.53 0.06 0.22 7.2
Uruguay (UR) 668 0.50 0.80 0.18 0.01 0.16 3.6
USA (US) 907 0.66 0.70 0.19 0.11 0.16 2.7
Vietnam (VI) 1, 199 0.25 0.36 0.61 0.03 7.4
Zambia (ZA) 1, 203 0.38 0.54 0.39 0.07 7.4
Total 57, 035 34,789 20,572 8,569 2,331
3.1 Sector of employment
The 2005 wave for the first time collected information on sector
of employment—
either for current employment or for previous “major work”. We
focus only on current
employees in line with the approach taken in most previous
studies.
Specifically, the question asks the following:
Are you working for the government or public institution, for

private business or
industry, or for a private non-profit organization? Do you or did
you work for:
1 Government or public institution
2 Private business or industry
3 Private non-profit organization
123
Fig. 1 Employment in the public sector (WVS and ILO
comparison). Line indicates best fit from a linear
regression See Table 1 for details of country names
The proportions who report working in each sector are shown in
Table 1, together
with an external benchmark of employment in the public sector,
which we take from
the International Labour Organisation
http://laborsta.ilo.org/applv8/data/SSMe.html.
Ideally, we would like separately to analyze employment in the
not-for-profit sector
(since motivated workers may select to work in this sector if the
public sector is corrupt)
but the sample sizes for most countries are too small to do this
in a meaningful way.
Our focus is therefore on workers in the public sector and the
private, for-profit sector.
There is some suggestion that the WVS under-estimates the
proportion that works
in the public sector compared to the ILO figures, but public
sector size measured

in the WVS is positively and significantly correlated with the
external benchmark4
(the correlation coefficient is 0.337). Figure 1 shows this more
clearly.
3.2 Measures of intrinsic motivation
The World Values Survey contains a number of potential
indicators of intrinsic motiva-
tion. Two of these are based on individuals’ self-reported
motivation—the first focuses
4 In this paper unless otherwise stated we define WVS public
sector employment as those who responded
that they currently work for ‘Government or a public
institution.’ However, when comparing the relative
size of the public sector in the WVS with the ILO measure of
the public sector, we also include NFP workers
in the WVS definition of the public sector. This is because the
public sector in the ILO database is defined
as all market or non market activities which at each institutional
level are controlled and mainly financed
by a public authority. This therefore includes non-market Non
Profit Institutions (NPIs) that are controlled
and financed by a public body.
http://laborsta.ilo.org/applv8/data/SSMe.html.
123
http://laborsta.ilo.org/applv8/data/SSMe.html
http://laborsta.ilo.org/applv8/data/SSMe.html

on individuals’ self-reported motivation specifically in relation
to employment, while
the second relates more broadly to their overall motivation in
life.
The employment motivation question asks:
Regardless of whether you’re actually looking for a job, which
one would you,
personally, place first if you were looking for a job:
1 A good income so that you do not have any worries about
money
2 A safe job with no risk of closing down or unemployment
3 Working with people you like
4 Doing an important job that gives you a feeling of
accomplishment
We interpret the response, “doing an important job”, as an
indicator of intrinsic moti-
vation, following a number of earlier studies of public service
motivation (Houston
2000; Lewis and Frank 2002; John and Johnson 2008). The
advantage of this measure
is that is relates directly to the individual’s motivation in
relation to employment. One
potential issue is that it may capture an individual’s concern
with status (for example,
how others perceive them, which may be affected by the level of
public corruption)
as well as pro-social motivation. However, to the extent that it
reflects individuals’
desired self-image as someone seen to be doing good, it
arguably still reflects an
intrinsic rather than an extrinsic motivation.
We also use a second measure, used by Dur and Zoutenbier

(2011), that captures
the extent to which individuals are altruistically motivated by
asking about what things
are important to them in their life:
Now I will briefly describe some people. Would you please
indicate for each
whether that person is very much like you, like you, somewhat
like you, not like
you, or not at all like you?
It is important to this person to help the people nearby, to care
for their
wellbeing.5
We define people as being intrinsically motivated if they
respond that this person is
“very much like them” or “like them”. Compared to the question
on employment
motivation, the potential drawback of this measure is that it
relates to a much wider
conception of altruism, not specifically related to employment.
We also considered a third possible measure, suggested by some
earlier studies
(Brewer 2003; Houston 2006), that captures the extent to which
individuals engage
in altruistic acts outside of their main job. The World Values
Survey asks individuals
whether they are active in organisations that might be
considered pro-social, including
charity, and environmental organisations. However, as we show
in the next section, we
observe similar patterns across sectors when looking at the
proportion who engage in
sports activities, suggesting that activity measures may capture
other factors that vary

across sectors, such as individuals’ time availability, rather than
their motivation. Our
main focus is therefore on the two self-reported motivation
measures.
5 Another potential indicator of pro-sociality is individuals who
agree that it is important to this person to
look after the environment. This yields very similar results.
123
4 Comparison of public and private sector workers
Table 2 summarizes for each country in our sample the
proportions of public and
private sector workers who are defined as intrinsically
motivated according to the
different indicators. The raw data show a tendency for workers
in the public sector
to be more intrinsically motivated than workers in the private
sector, but this is not
universal. Looking at work motivation, for example, there are a
number of countries,
including Mali, South Korea, Bulgaria and Spain, where private
sector workers have
a higher level of motivation.
To examine the relationship further, and to control for other
differential character-
istics of public sector workers, we run regressions of the
following form for each of
the 51 countries in the World Values Survey for which we have

information:6
P ubi = β0 + β1 Mi + X i γ + ui
Where Pubi is a binary indicator that takes the value 1 if the
individual works in the
public sector (equal to zero if the individual works in the
private sector) and Mi is
an indicator of intrinsic motivation (each indicator is included
separately). X i is a
vector of control variables, including age, gender and education
level. We estimate
these regressions using a linear probability model which makes
it easier to interpret
the coefficients – the results from running a probit model are
very similar.
Coefficients from the 51 regressions are reported in Table 3.
One striking finding is
that there are clear differences in the demographic
characteristics of public and private
sector workers.7 There is a near-universal tendency for public
sector workers to be
older, to be more likely to be female and to be better educated
than private sector
workers. In 44 out of 51 countries, age has a positive effect on
the probability of
working in the public sector (this is statistically significant for
31). In 44 countries,
being female has a positive effect (statistically significant for
28) and in all but one
country, having a degree has a positive effect (statistically
significant for 45). When
we control for some of the difference in job types between the
two sectors by looking
only at non-manual workers, the results are qualitatively similar
although there is less

statistical significance because of the smaller sample sizes.8
The regression results confirm that there is a tendency for
public sector workers to
have a higher level of intrinsic motivation than private sector
workers, but show that
this is far from being a universal relationship. For 30 (out of
51) countries workers
reporting that their primary motivation is doing an important
job are more likely to
work in the public sector (statistically significant for 6).
However, there are 21 countries
6 This approach is very similar to Aknin et al. (2013) who look
at the relationship between giving to charity
and subjective well-being across a large number of different
countries. In the WVS we also find that people
with higher levels of subjective well-being are also more likely
to work in the public sector (positive for 41
out of 51 and statistically significant for 18).
7 We report the coefficients on the demographic characteristics
from the regressions that include our
preferred indicator of intinsic motivation relating to
individuals’ employment motivation. Using other
motivation indicators yields similar results.
8 The survey does not have any information on occupations that
would allow us to control further for
differences in job types.
123
Table 2 Self-reported motivation among public/private sector

workers
Country Proportion who are pro-socially motivated, according
to different indicators
(1) Work motivation (2) Life motivation (3) Active charity/env
org.
Public Private Diff Public Private Diff Public Private Diff
Britain 0.467 0.289 0.178 0.642 0.583 0.059 0.308 0.195 0.113
Andorra 0.602 0.436 0.166 0.729 0.758 −0.029 0.192 0.156
0.036
USA 0.384 0.226 0.158 0.509 0.530 −0.021 0.241 0.162 0.080
Norway 0.583 0.447 0.136 0.719 0.700 0.019 0.149 0.086 0.062
Canada 0.496 0.361 0.135 0.785 0.729 0.056 0.340 0.235 0.105
Peru 0.423 0.298 0.125 0.663 0.631 0.033 0.265 0.133 0.133
Turkey 0.313 0.194 0.119 0.663 0.560 0.102 0.036 0.026 0.010
Finland 0.357 0.247 0.110 0.418 0.424 −0.006 0.128 0.055
0.072
Germany 0.266 0.160 0.106 0.540 0.385 0.155 0.078 0.044
0.035
Sweden 0.544 0.441 0.104 0.755 0.708 0.048 0.109 0.066 0.043
Chile 0.222 0.129 0.093 0.698 0.651 0.047 0.204 0.091 0.113
China 0.230 0.145 0.086 0.676 0.601 0.075 0.143 0.064 0.079
Argentina 0.260 0.177 0.083 0.745 0.641 0.104 0.094 0.065
0.029

Iran 0.375 0.292 0.083 0.582 0.562 0.020 0.180 0.130 0.050
Vietnam 0.133 0.075 0.058 0.425 0.453 −0.027 0.202 0.150
0.053
Ethiopia 0.096 0.050 0.046 0.463 0.346 0.117 0.234 0.134 0.100
Indonesia 0.213 0.169 0.044 0.717 0.590 0.126 0.322 0.253
0.068
Thailand 0.124 0.082 0.042 0.316 0.276 0.040 0.161 0.160
0.001
Serbia 0.161 0.120 0.041 0.541 0.489 0.052 0.156 0.101 0.054
Australia 0.355 0.315 0.040 0.516 0.462 0.054 0.160 0.127
0.033
Japan 0.293 0.253 0.040 0.185 0.192 −0.006 0.012 0.009 0.003
Rwanda 0.202 0.162 0.040 0.574 0.541 0.033 0.284 0.154 0.131
Uruguay 0.136 0.099 0.036 0.754 0.562 0.192 0.115 0.048 0.066
Ukraine 0.158 0.126 0.032 0.585 0.522 0.063 0.043 0.014 0.029
Mexico 0.336 0.306 0.029 0.711 0.687 0.024 0.233 0.128 0.105
Burkina Faso 0.088 0.059 0.029 0.598 0.604 −0.006 0.070 0.063
0.007
Georgia 0.160 0.137 0.023 0.653 0.675 −0.022 0.007 0.000
0.007
Romania 0.101 0.078 0.022 0.687 0.555 0.132 0.028 0.005
0.023
Taiwan 0.214 0.193 0.021 0.652 0.610 0.042 0.107 0.071 0.036

India 0.101 0.081 0.020 0.496 0.513 −0.016 0.323 0.184 0.139
France 0.279 0.261 0.018 0.584 0.553 0.031 0.161 0.117 0.043
Morocco 0.134 0.119 0.015 0.515 0.434 0.082 0.071 0.021
0.050
Poland 0.184 0.169 0.015 0.669 0.547 0.122 0.061 0.034 0.027
Ghana 0.101 0.086 0.015 0.636 0.580 0.057 0.333 0.127 0.206
Cyprus 0.162 0.149 0.013 0.838 0.763 0.075 0.131 0.061 0.069
Malaysia 0.111 0.100 0.011 0.293 0.288 0.005 0.147 0.048
0.099
Netherlands 0.328 0.317 0.010 0.708 0.595 0.114 0.108 0.074
0.035
123
Table 2 continued
Country Proportion who are pro-socially motivated, according
to different indicators
(1) Work motivation (2) Life motivation (3) Active charity/env
org.
Public Private Diff Public Private Diff Public Private Diff
Brazil 0.283 0.273 0.010 0.790 0.828 −0.039 0.232 0.142 0.090
Russia 0.122 0.115 0.007 0.402 0.366 0.036 0.009 0.023 −0.014

Egypt 0.095 0.090 0.005 0.709 0.649 0.060 0.047 0.016 0.031
Zambia 0.149 0.145 0.003 0.540 0.544 −0.004 0.173 0.135
0.038
Switzerland 0.524 0.521 0.003 0.602 0.585 0.017 0.155 0.142
0.014
Trinidad and
Tobago
0.343 0.340 0.003 0.708 0.691 0.017 0.215 0.169 0.046
Italy 0.313 0.319 −0.007 0.123 0.072 0.050
Moldova 0.115 0.122 −0.007 0.488 0.449 0.040 0.074 0.045
0.028
Slovenia 0.117 0.125 −0.008 0.186 0.180 0.006 0.055 0.024
0.031
South Africa 0.078 0.089 −0.012 0.324 0.278 0.046 0.016 0.012
0.005
Spain 0.138 0.153 −0.015 0.632 0.647 −0.015 0.115 0.049 0.066
Bulgaria 0.092 0.110 −0.018 0.517 0.470 0.047 0.033 0.013
0.020
South Korea 0.261 0.297 −0.036 0.646 0.601 0.046 0.120 0.102
0.019
Mali 0.072 0.164 −0.092 0.724 0.648 0.076 0.364 0.264 0.100
Ordered in terms of the difference in the work motivation
variable between the public and private sectors
for which the relationship runs in the other direction
(statistically significant for 1).
When we include people whose second motivation is an
important job (results not
reported), the relationship appears slightly stronger—the
coefficients are positive in
38 countries (statistically significant for 16)—although again
there are some countries

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