1

1
Federal State Educational Institution of Higher Professional Education
«Moscow State Institute of International Relations (University) of the Ministry of
Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation»
of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation»
School of Governance and Politics
Department of Public Governance
MASTER’S THESIS
IN THE FIELD OF 38.04.04 PUBLIC AND MUNICIPAL ADMINISTRATION
‘LEGAL AND COMMERCIAL ISSUES OF THE EU-RUSSIA RELATIONS IN
THE CONTEXT OF SANCTION POLICY’
Author:
Second year master’s degree student
Sofia Del Coco
Scientific supervisors:
Professor of the Department of Legal Foundations of Administration,
MGIMO University
Vitaly V. Subochev
Professor of International Politics and Economic Relations,
University of Macerata
Federica Monti
Moscow
2020

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TABLE OF CONTENTS
INTRODUCTION................................................................................................... 3
CHAPTER 1: THE ROOTS, REASONS AND TRIGGER FACTORS OF THE
SANCTION POLICY IN THE EU-RUSSIA RELATIONS..................................8
1.1. Development and dynamics of the EU-Russia relations in the pre-sanction
period: 1994-2013 ......................................................................................................8
1.2. Basic reasons and symptoms of the sanction policy ........................................ 18
1.2.1. Complex socio-economic and political foundations for the deterioration in
the EU-Russia relations ........................................................................................... 18
1.2.2. Ukrainian crisis as the main trigger factor of the sanction policy ..............23
CHAPTER 2: LEGAL GROUNDS AND JUDICIAL CONSEQUENCES OF
THE EU SANCTION POLICY............................................................................. 29
2.1. EU sanctions: issues of legal nature and legitimacy ........................................ 29
2.2. EU bodies and the European Nation States: imposition of the sanction policy
vs. its implementation...............................................................................................36
2.3. Sanction policy and its impact on the international treaties and contractual
discipline in EU-Russia relations............................................................................. 46
CHAPTER 3. COMMERCIAL ISSUES OF THE SANCTION POLICY IN EU-
RUSSIAN RELATIONS........................................................................................64
3.1. Restrictive measures of the EU and Russia’s counter-sanction policy: correlative
analysis ................................................................................................................... 64
3.1.1. EU sanctions, the Russian import substitution policy and the move towards
non-western markets: winners and losers..................................................................64
3.1.2. Sanction policy and its influence on the agri-food sector ........................ 80
3.2. The sanction policy and the dynamics of the trade turnover between the EU and
Russia: statistical comparative analysis ....................................................................88
3.3. Perspectives and ways of optimising EU-Russia relations ..............................95
Conclusion ............................................................................................................103
Bibliography .........................................................................................................108

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INTRODUCTION
The urgency of the research is defined by the importance of studying the
issues that arose from the imposition of sanctions between the Russian Federation
and the European Union relations in the context of sanction policy.
Relations between the European Union and the Russian Federation have never been
simple, starting with the collapse of the Soviet Union which subsequently became a
Federation. Despite everything, a collaboration between the two powers has been
sought over the years, which has led to the creation of new partnerships, which have
turn represented very important steps for the Russian Federation.
Therefore, particular attention has also been paid to the pre-sanctions period to
effectively understand how the relationships between the two powers were before,
what other factors have contributed in recent years and whether the sanctions have
truly and effectively had such a negative impact from the relations point of view
between the European Union and the Russian Federation.
The relevance of the topic of this research is fundamentally relevant today, as it is
an ongoing theme, within a constantly evolving situation, of which the possible
developments are still not known with certainty, and which is also considered a
thorny topic to be addressed even today as it is strictly dominated by the political
sphere.
This analysis was also possible thanks to two internships, carried out in embassy of
Italy located in Moscow and ‘Confindustria Russia’. The internship at the political
office of the Embassy has allowed close contact with the diplomatic world, in order
to better analyse the international relations between the two powers. Instead, the
internship at 'Confindustria Russia' has been useful in the close analysis of the real
interests of the different parties and of the various dynamics that have followed over
the years.
The legislative and regulatory framework of this dissertation includes the
regulations of the Russian Federation issued in response to western sanctions as per

4
regulation dated July 14, 2014 No. 656, ‘on prohibition of admission of certain
engineering goods, originating from foreign states, for the purposes of central and
local government procurement’, the Decree of August 11, 2014 No. 791, ‘On the
establishment of a ban on the admission of light industry goods originating from
foreign states, in order to make purchases to meet federal needs’. As far as European
Union is concerned, the Council Decision 2014/512/CFSP of 31 July 2014
‘concerning restrictive measures in view of Russia's actions destabilising the situation
in Ukraine’ and Council Regulation EU) No 833/2014 of 31 July 2014 ‘concerning
restrictive measures in view of Russia's actions destabilising the situation in Ukraine’.
The degree of scientific development has also been addressed through the
analysis of scientific elaboration of this research topic shows that the subject matter
of sanction policy in the sphere of international relations has gained some extension
in current literature. However, opinions on this issue are highly debated among
scholars and do not always coincide, especially among authors from different
countries. The majority of research is mainly addressed by western authors, which
supports the thesis of the violation of international law, which has as a consequence
of the imposition of sanctions. On the contrary it is very rare to come across
publications of authors, mainly Russian authors, who contest this and who claim the
illegality of the sanctions imposed. In addition, there are also very few pieces of work
that analyse the topic from an economic point of view, to understand if these
sanctions have really brought about changes in the economies of the affected
countries and in their policies.
The object of this research is the relations created, maintained and developed
between the Russian Federation and the European Union both before the sanctions
and after the imposition of sanctions in the sphere of international relations and in
terms of political, economic and legal aspects.
The subject of the research carried out are the theoretical, practical, commercial
and legal aspects of issues which arose in the context of sanction policy in the sphere
of international relations between the Russian Federation and the European Union.

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The goal hereof is to analyse the current issues of relations between the Russian
Federation and the European Union and how they have developed in the sphere of
international relations, including the identification of the issues that have arisen in a
bid to understand whether a way exists to finally bring an end to this situation in the
near future.
In order to accomplish the established goal, it is necessary to identify the following
targets:
- To analyse the legal framework in the sphere of international relations.
- To analyse the international relations between the Russian Federation
and the European Union which has been in existence since the nineties, in
order to understand what the problems were that led to the imposition of the
sanctions.
- To find the possible ways to optimise EU-Russian relations
- To identity and compare the different problems that arose in the relations
between the Russian Federation and the European Union from 2014 to the
present day.
- To study the data of the various exchanges between the European Union
and the Russian Federation to understand if the parties were affected actually.
The methodological framework of the dissertation consists of general scientific
and special methods, including the comparative legal method, methodology in
international relations research and the statistical method. The comparative legal
method was used to compare the different legal framework applied for the imposition
of sanctions. The methodology in international relations research explained the broad
range of political interaction and relations between the Russian Federation and the
European Union. The statistical method was applied to analyse the exchange that
took place in recent years between the Russian Federation, the European Union and
other countries, in order to try to understand what degree the sanctions may have
affected the aforementioned.

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The theoretical basis of the research consists of writings of international
scholars dedicated to the study of international law, history, international relations,
economics and the sanction policy: A.A. Gnidchenko, O.V. Danilova, D. Grosand, F.
Mustilli, E. Ashford, C. Morviducci, L. Gruszczynski, M. Menkes, Y.S. Kozheurov,
V.Voinikov, E. Leonaite, D. Zalimas, R. Alcaro, V. Briani, M. Happold, O. P.
Ivanov, V.A. Kopylov.
The structure of the dissertation consists of the introduction, three chapters,
which, in turn, are divided into paragraphs, conclusion and bibliography.
The first chapter is dedicated to a historical analysis in which the relationship of the
nineties are retraced, from after the fall of the Soviet Union, until 2013, before the
start of the Ukrainian crisis. Also included are the years of partnerships and a series
of agreements between the European Union and the Russian Federation which have
enabled the establishment and development of future relationships. In order to better
understand the sanctions that have been imposed on the Russian Federation by the
States, it is essential to analyse what happened before said sanctions were put into
effect.
The second chapter analyses the legal aspects of the crisis. The violations of
international law reported by both parties will be analysed, including the repeated
violations of international law in which the parties involved have generated strong
tensions in the relations between the main protagonists of the crisis.
Additionally, the effective effectiveness of the sanctions is questioned, since what
having case of the Russian Federation it has not provided any change since having
entered into force, on the contrary the States which have applied them have obtained
the response of the Russian Federation through an embargo which also had
repercussions on other economies. Finally, the case 'C 72/15' is analysed through
Rosneft, which forms a part of the sanctioned companies, affected by the sanctions.
The third chapter, on the other hand, presents an analysis from the commercial point
of view, in order to better understand how the sanctions and the embargo have
influenced the Russian and European economies, analysing, however, also the

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context in which they occurred, in addition to analysing the strategies that the
Russian Federation has adopted in response to them. To conclude, an analysis of the
exchange between the two powers is presented, to better understand who the winners
and who the losers were and whether they can truly be defined as such in this
situation.

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CHAPTER 1. THE ROOTS, REASONS AND TRIGGER FACTORS OF THE
SANCTION POLICY IN THE EU-RUSSIA RELATIONS
1.1. Development and dynamics of the EU-Russian relations in the pre-
sanction period: 1994-2013
In the aftermath of the collapse of the Soviet Union, world fortunes have changed
profoundly and rapidly, redesigning not only geographical borders but also political
and strategic balances. Testimony to which are the cases of the Russian Federation
and the European Union, which have undergone intense internal transformation
processes since the 1990s1
. These aforementioned processes have consequently had
significant effects on the system of international relations. On one hand, there is the
Russian Federation, which after a rapid and painful transformation became a
Federation. Following the dissolution of the Soviet Union, the president of the then
Soviet Federative Socialist Republic Boris Yeltsin remained in office as president of
the new State. He presented himself as an alternative to communism, capable of the
enormous task of reforming and transforming the country post-Soviet Union, in order
to make it more similar to the western model.
On the other hand, there is the European Union, which has also undergone an
important phase of reconfiguration of its institutional system. Starting in the 1990s,
the European Union was the protagonist of a gradual enlargement process starting
with the 12 member states of 1991. This phenomenon is essentially attributable to the
Copenhagen criteria2
, contained in the final document of the 1993 European Council.
However, the Union has not only enlarged from a numerical point.
1
I rapporti tra l’Unione Europea e la Russia, 1995 // MEMO/95/85 // Commissione Europea.
Available at https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/it/MEMO_95_85
2
The Treaty on the European Union sets out the conditions (Article 49) and principles (Article 6(1))
to which any country wishing to become an EU member must conform. They include: the stability
of institutions guaranteeing democracy, the rule of law, human rights, respect for and the protection
of minorities; a functioning market economy and the ability to cope with competitive pressure and
market forces within the EU; the ability to take on the obligations of membership, including the

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Relations between the Russian Federation and the European Union have not
always been as difficult as that seen at present. There are many points of contact,
since the European Union and the Russian Federation are linked by a multiplicity of
relationships: the Russian Federation is the third trading partner of the European
Union, fourth trading partner of the Euro area and an essential energy supplier for the
European Union. On the other hand, the European Union has not only economic and
commercial interests with the Russian Federation, but in addition the further
objective of acting in the international arena, also including responsibility for global
issues and issues concerning neighbouring common European countries.
In 1993, negotiations for the Partnership and Cooperation Agreement (also known
as PCA1
) began. The agreement2
, which had a ten-year duration, but which was
automatically renewable every year after its expiry, constituted a reference
framework for the development of the Russian Federation's relations with the EU. It
was however, only signed in 1994, and did not enter into force until 1997, due to the
war in Chechnya3
. This agreement took into account all the main aspects of
cooperation between the two powers, including trade, human rights and democracy,
science and technology, education and training, customs, anti-crime, transport,
energy and telecommunications, the environment and culture. The aim was to create
a more stable climate for traders and better relations between the populations of the
EU and the Russian Federation. This agreement covered three main areas: political
dialogue, trade relations and the investment and business environment. It definitively
capacity to effectively implement the rules, standards and policies that make up the body of EU law
(the 'acquis'), and the adherence to the aims of political, economic and monetary union.
For EU accession negotiations to be launched, a country must satisfy the first criterion.’
https://eur-lex.europa.eu/summary/glossary/accession_criteria_copenhague.html?locale=en
1
https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=LEGISSUM%3A28010102_2
2
Accordo Storico fra la Russia e l’Unione Europea per rafforzare i legami commerciali e
politici // IP/94/565 // Commissione Europea. Available at
https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/it/IP_94_565
3
The first Chechen war took place between 1994 and 1996 and saw Russian armed forces attempt
to regain control over the country that had declared itself independent in 1991.

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closed the Cold War period and made the EU's recognition of the Russian
Federation's achievements in the democratic and economic reform process manifest.
In 1997 there was another event that marked an important step for the "new"
Russia: it joined the G71
.
The entry of the Russian Federation into G72
, which later evolved into G8, was a
lengthy and difficult process, hindered, by internal and external factors that followed
one another successively over the years. Indeed, initial negotiations first began in
1989 when the then president of the Soviet Union, Mikhail Gorbachev, started this
transition period, which saw the beginning of cooperation between the G7 and the
Soviet Union.
However, what really marked the beginning of the integration of the Soviet Union
into the G7, however, was the London Summit3
in 1991, during which the G7 leaders
declared themselves ready to aid and support the Soviet Union, with the aim of
creating an open democracy and pluralistic. The main objective of this Summit was
to take steps to undertake the long process aimed at fully integrating the Soviet Union
into the world economy.
In 1992 during the Munich Summit4
the new President Boris Yeltsin and the then
American President George H.W. Bush applied for the Russian Federation to join the
1
Lukov. V., Russia’s G8 history: from guest to president, 2006
2
The G8 is an informal group (not an International Institution) which annually brings together the
heads of state and government of the major industrial democracies (Canada, France, Great Britain,
Germany, Japan, Italy, The Russian Federation and the United States) in accordance with the
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) supported by the International
Monetary Fund (IMF), the World Bank (BM) and the World Trade Organization (WTO).
3
‘Official Documents. July 15-17, 1991, London’
Issues which were discussed at this summit included: Economic Policy; International Trade;
Energy; Central and Eastern Europe; The Soviet Union; The Middle East; The Developing
Countries and Debt; Environment; Drugs; Migration
4
‘1992 Munich Summit: Official Documents; Munich 6-8 July 1992’
Issues which were discussed at this summit included: World Economy; the United Nations
Conference on Environment and Development (UNCED); Developing Countries; Central and

11
G7, but the application did not acquire the desired result. That being said, although
the Russian Federation's application for membership was rejected, the G7 continued
to financially support Russia's transition into the democratic market system by
granting an aid package.
A series of meetings followed in 1993 and 1994 and during this time Yeltsin stated
his intention to abolish the former Communist Export Control Committee (COCOM)
and to decrease inflation rates. Following the significant Russian progress towards
accession, the G7, the World Bank and the IMF began to increase subsidies to the
Russian Federation, with the hope that this would lead to a progressive improvement
in the Russian Federation's situation.
During the Naples Summit1
in 1994, permission was given to the Russian
Federation to participate in political discussions. From this moment the term 'eight
politicians' (P8) was coined, which specifically indicated the participation of the
Russian Federation in the summit whilst also limiting involvement to political issues.
During the 1997 American presidency, the nations gained a new name and became
known as the 'Summit of eight'. However, the Russian Federation was still not yet
given full powers during this Summit, nor in the subsequent summit, as even the
Denver Summit2
in 1997 represented no change for the Russian Federation.
However, during the Birmingham Summit3
in 1998 there was the first meeting of
the group of eight (G8). The completion of the membership was made possible by the
Eastern Europe; New Independent States of the Former Soviet Union; Safety of Nuclear Power
Plants in the New Independent States of the Former Soviet Union and in Central and Eastern
Europe
1
‘G7 Naples Summit: Official Documents; July 9, 1994, Naples’
Issues which were discussed at this summit included: Jobs and economic growth; Trade;
Environment; Developing Countries; nuclear safety; Ukraine; Russia; Other countries in transition;
Cooperation against transnational crime and money-laundering.
2
Issues which were discussed at this summit included: Plutonium Management; Anti-Personnel
Landmines; Transnational Organized Crime; Counterterrorism; UN Reform and Political Situations.
3
‘1998 Birmingham Summit’
Issues which were discussed at this summit included: the environment; Nuclear safety; UN issues;

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great steps forward that had moved the Russian Federation in recent years towards
economic reforms and a free market. Despite the fact that during its first 'official
appearance', the Russian Federation showed that it was still lacking in some political
and economic areas, and that it was unable to finance certain agreements.
During the 2002 Summit in Kananaskis1
the leaders of joint agreements decided2
that the Russian Federation would host the next summit in 2006, stressing that this
decision reflected the recent economic and democratic transformation of the Russian
Federation. Despite the long years of negotiations that saw the Russian Federation as
the main protagonist in 2014, the G7 leaders subsequently decided3
to suspend the
Russian Federation's participation in the G8.
Non-Proliferation, Arms control and disarmament; Anti-personnel landmines; Democracy and
human rights; Terrorism; Infectious Diseases; Intellectual property-related crime and regional
issues.
1
‘2002 Kananskis Summit: Documents June 26-27, 2002’
Issues which were discussed at this summit included: Promoting Peace and Security; Strengthening
Institutions and Governance; Fostering Trade, Investment, Economic Growth and Sustainable
Development; Implementing Debt Relief; Expanding Knowledge: Improving and Promoting
Education and Expanding Digital Opportunities; Improving Health and Confronting HIV/AIDS;
Increasing Agricultural Productivity and Improving Water Resource Management.
2
‘Russia's role in the G8’
"The World and Japan" Database (Project Leader: TANAKA Akihiko)
Database of Japanese Politics and International Relations
National Graduate Institute for Policy Studies (GRIPS); Institute for Advanced Studies on Asia
(IASA), The University of Tokyo
3
‘7 Leaders Statement on the Situation in Ukraine’
"The World and Japan" Database (Project Leader: TANAKA Akihiko)
Database of Japanese Politics and International Relations
National Graduate Institute for Policy Studies (GRIPS); Institute for Advanced Studies on Asia
(IASA), The University of Tokyo

13
In 2003, during the 11th
summit in St. Petersburg1
, a joint declaration was adopted
in which the parties decided to strengthen cooperation between themselves in order
to create four common spaces in the long term2
: economic, freedom, justice and
internal security, external security and research and education.
In the common area of economy, the goal was to create an open and integrated
market between the EU and Russia, by removing barriers to trade and investment and
by promoting reforms, based on the principles of non-discrimination, transparency
and governance.
In the second, in the common area of freedom, security and justice: cooperation in
this area had assumed a decisive importance with the expansion of common borders,
following the enlargement of 1 May 2004, and intended to contribute to the general
objective of creating a new Europe without dividing lines, facilitating travel for all
Europeans while effectively combating illegal immigration.
In the third common area was requested cooperation in the field of external
security. This included three shared responsibility of the EU and the Russian
Federation for an international order based on effective multilateralism and their
determination to work together to strengthen the role of the United Nations as well as
relevant international organizations, such as the OSCE and the Council of Europe.
Finally, in the area of research and education which also included cultural aspects,
the intention was to promote economic growth, strengthen the links between research
1
The Summit agenda spanned all areas of relations between Europe and The Russian Federation as
a whole, analysing the results already achieved and forecasting possible future developments. In the
Join statement, at the end of the summit, it reads «We agreed to reinforce our co-operation with a
view to creating in the long term a common economic space, a common space of freedom, security
and justice, a space of co-operation in the field of external security, as well as a space of research
and education, including cultural aspects. The gradual development of these spaces should
take place in the framework of the Partnership and Co-operation Agreement (PCA)»
‘Road map for the Common Economic Space – Building blocks for sustain economic growth –
annex 1
2
IP/03/768; Bruxelles, 28 maggio 2003
‘Undicesimo vertice UE-Russia, San Pietroburgo, 31.05’

14
and innovation, encourage close cooperation in the education sector and promote
cultural and linguistic diversity.
Subsequently in 2005, four road maps were agreed to achieve these objectives,
which are listed and defined as: ‘The Common Economic Space’ which covered
economic and trade relations and aimed to make the Europe’s and the Russian
Federation’s economic and regulatory frameworks more compatible, thus boosting
investment and trade;
‘The Common Space of Freedom, Security and Justice’ which covered justice and
home affairs, including the rule of law, and human rights; ‘The Common Space of
External Security’ which includes crisis management and non-proliferation, and also
dealt with bilateral and global cooperation between the EU and the Russian
Federation; and finally ‘The Common Space of Research and Educational laws’
which was created in order to enhance cooperation in these fields, including cultural
aspects1
.
Unfortunately, even this agreement did not give the expected results. Too many,
indeed, were the cultural differences and the difference in values between the two
protagonists, which among other things, promoted very different integration models
in the vast post-Soviet area.
After the automatic expiry of the PCA in 2007, economic interdependence between
the two countries had led to further negotiations, in a bid to give new impetus to
bilateral relations, however these negotiations stopped after the outbreak of the war in
Georgia2
, in which the Russian Federation played a fundamental role.
1
The EU-Russia Partnership -basic facts and figures,
http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_MEMO-11-104_en.htm?locale=en
2
Georgia, once a part of the Soviet Union, gained independence in 1991, after which the first
separatist clashes took place in the regions of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, which led to a war in
which the Georgian army was deployed on the one hand and the oppressed secessionists were
supported by The Russian Federation on the other. The conflict, after numerous negotiations, ended
in a "ceasefire" which was accepted by both sides in 1992. In 2008 however hostilities resumed
between Georgia, and the separatists of South Ossetia and The Russian Federation who actively

15
In 2010 the dialogue was reopened, materializing in the political project of
Partnership for Modernization1
, which undoubtedly contributed to the growth of trade
relations between the Russian Federation and Europe.
The continued persistence of frictions in relations between Moscow and Brussels
can be explained by the profound differences existing between their respective
political and economic models. In particular, the Russian Federation has seen and
continues to see with much concern the enlargement to the east of the Union, in effect
since the early post-Soviet years with the aim of stabilizing the neighbouring areas,
which have long remained on the margins of Europe.
The European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP)2
intervention which has been
implemented by the European Union with the aim of rebalancing the disparities
existing between the various countries and stabilizing the surrounding regions, is in
stark contrast to Moscow's foreign policy that, while not having the intention of
reviving the Soviet empire, has always tried to reaffirm its leadership in the post-
communist area and to this end has woven a dense network of relations with
neighbouring States giving birth to the Commonwealth of the Independent States.
A few years before the entry into force of the provisions, another important step taken
by the Russian Federation was the entry into the WTO in 2012.
The Russian Federation's entry into the WTO3
was a bid to try to restructure and
reform the country's economy in the post-Soviet era. The economic transition has
been longer and more difficult than in other States. This is due to the fact that the
Russian Federation, at the time, had no experience with respect to the market
economy in general and more specifically the Russian economy was structured in
such a way as to favour military production.
participated in the conflict with the employment of military troops in support of separatists. The
Russian intervention was decisive for the victory of the latter and led to the secession of the region.
1
Serena Giusti, ‘L’alleanza per la modernizzazione fra Bruxelles e Mosca’
2
https://www.nti.org/learn/treaties-and-regimes/commonwealth-independent-states-cis/
3
https://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/acc_e/a1_russie_e.htm

16
After the Second World War, the Soviet Union did not participate in the General
Agreement on tariffs and trade (also known as GATT)1
due to the positions of the
Soviet government of that period. The cause of this can be attributed to the
substantial incompatibility of market liberalism, on which GATT was founded, with
the planned economy system of the USSR. The USSR's critical unilateral approach to
GATT activity predominated until the late 1980s.
In 1990 the Soviet Union applied for observer status and was granted said status,
subsequently then passing it to the Russian Federation in 1992.
In 1993 Boris Nikolaevich Yeltsin started the Russian accession process to the
WTO. The realization of this project however was then hindered by various political
instabilities that characterized the early nineties post-regime. Furthermore, in this
period the economy was battling a severe in crisis due to high inflation, high interest
rates and additionally the fall of the foreign rouble exchange rate. Obviously, this
environment, both political and economic, was far from favourable to lay the
foundations for future annexation to the WTO.
The situation began to change with the election of President Vladimir Putin, who
had promoted Russian integration into the world economy as part of his country's
development and reorganization strategy. Indeed, this strategy laid the foundations
for faster membership into the organization. In order to become part of the
organization Moscow has agreed to comply with the 'rules' dictated by the WTO,
including important legislative changes, expected to be admitted to the organization.
The long road to be granted such access was very troubled, however due not only to
the difficulties related to the adaptation of the Russian legislative and customs system
to the WTO regulations, but also to some internal and external political problems.
Both the European Union and the United States, which had already declared
themselves in favour of Russian accession, continued to support it, focusing on the
greater opening of the country's markets.
1
Santana R., GATT 1947: How Stalin and the Marshall Plan helped to conclude the negotiations,
World Trade Organization.

17
Finally, even the Russian authorities were convinced that although the act of
joining the WTO would have mean adapting to certain standards, but this would
subsequently have brought benefits for the modernization and development of the
modern industrial sectors that the Russian Federation had a great need for. After
eighteen years of negotiations, the president Vladimir Putin has ratified1
the entry
after the approval of the Duma2
and the go-ahead was given from the Federation
Council3
. The Russian Federation's accession4
to the WTO was defined by the EU
commissioner for trade, Karel De Gucht, as a great step forward for the Russian
Federation's further integration into the world economy.
The objectives declared for the Russian Federation during the negotiations in
addition to acquiring a greater international status was also to have a better and easier
access to the markets of the WTO member countries and in particular that of
European5
. It also aimed to create a climate in the country that would be most
favourable to direct foreign investment. In addition, the increased competition that
would be created with the opening of the Russian market to other markets should
favoured the qualitative adjustment of Russian production. Finally, there was a desire
for greater integration of the Russian financial and banking market with that of other
countries.
This latter point was with regard to the economic objectives that should have a
positive growth impact for the Russian market, thanks to a greater diversification of
the Russian economy as direct consequences of the benefits of international trade.
While, as regards to other sectors, first of all the rules on the commercial policy of
the WTO do not apply to trade in gas and oil and therefore to 70% of Russian
1
Lamy hails Russia’s WTO accession ratification
https://www.wto.org/english/news_e/pres12_e/pr668_e.htm
2
The lower house of the Parliament
3
The Moscow Senate
4
EU welcomes Russia's WTO accession after 18 years of negotiations // European Commission//
Press release // Brussels, 22 August 2012.
5
Main outlet market for Russian goods.

18
exports. This means that the excess of international markets concerned the export of
Russian agricultural goods and manufactured goods, which were limited. On the
contrary, the Russian Federation mainly imported manufactured goods, and, in this
sector, it had to open its own market.
1.2. Basic reasons and consequences of the sanction policy.
1.2.1. Complex socio-economic and political foundations for the
deterioration in EU-Russian relations
The Russian Federation and the European Union must be considered two
fundamental players in the field of international relations. The recent Ukrainian crisis
has further deteriorated relations, which in recent years and for various reasons have
been characterized by both ascending phases, yet more frequently by periods of
difficulty.
The current crisis is the manifestation of the contradictions that have accumulated
over the years and has exposed the systemic flaws of European security architecture,
which has not been updated in relation to the possibilities that arose after the end of
the ideological clash. Therefore, it would be limited to attribute everything solely to
the legal and political aspects1
. In order to understand the deep reasons and the
intensity of the current crisis it is necessary to take into account a plurality of other
aspects: such as those relating to economic, social and cultural spheres. These were
characterized by a divergent political and economic vision between the EU and the
Russian Federation.
In the post-Cold War period there were profound political, economic and social
changes within the Russian Federation2
. The European Union began to develop closer
relations with States belonging to the former Soviet bloc, many of which made the
1
Ferrari A., Oltre la Crimea Russia contro l’Europa? Ispi, 2014 (pp.72-78).
2
Арбатова Н.К. Отношения Евросоюз-Россия и Украиский кризис, Москва, ИМЭМО РАН
2014 (pp. 6-24)

19
decision to contribute to the enlargement of the European Union that was taking place
in those years and many also decided to join NATO. On this basis, it can be said,
therefore, that important changes were not only taking place within the Russian
Federation, but also that the geopolitical context around it was changing. The most
pertinent being that, after the Cold War, Western strategies have always been
perceived by the Russian Federation as 'without the Russian Federation, means
against the Russian Federation'. Both powers had 'too high expectations' for each
other.
The European Union believed that a European-style democracy could be created in
the Russian Federation, while the latter believed that relations with Europe, under
various factors, would develop better, gaining the Russian Federation a privileged
place of partnership within the European Union. Continuous European criticism has
concerned many aspects of the Russian Federation's internal and external policy.
The latter is accused of a departure from the values and principles that underpin the
partnership and cooperation between the Russian Federation and the European Union.
There are serious disagreements on a number of fundamental issues, in particular
democracy, protection of human rights and the fight against terrorism.
There has been mutual dissatisfaction on both sides relating to mutual policies
towards the CIS countries. The EU was concerned about the prospect of some form
of restoration of the new ‘Russian empire’, while the Russian Federation was afraid
of the complementarity of EU and NATO expansion strategies in the CIS as a
Moscow expulsion policy. At the same time, despite said mutual dissatisfaction, in
the most difficult moments of the international crises, such as in the Yugoslav
situation in 1999 and in the 2008 Caucasus conflict, the EU took on the task of
establishing relations between the Russian Federation and the US / NATO.
The current crisis1
of relations between the Russian Federation and the West, in
addition to mistakes and erroneous calculations, is a consequence of the tension that
1
Арбатова Н. Евро-Атлантические отношения в XXI веке: проблемы и сценприи, мировая
экономика и международные отношения, 2015

20
arose in some parts of the multipolar system caused by the dynamics of international
relations after the end of bipolarism.
Towards the end of the twentieth century the attention of the European Union and
the United States / NATO focused mainly on post-communist Europe, namely on: the
war in Yugoslavia and on the preparation of the Central and Baltic countries for
accession into NATO and the EU.
After having solved the problems relating to the USSR nuclear heritage, the
European Union and the US / NATO began to consider the CIS countries, helping
them to achieve a model of democracy and as a further guarantee that the USSR
would not be reborn in one form or another. By doing so, West began to erect a new
border in Europe.
Regarding ideological reason it can be said that the main principle of the NATO
and EU regional strategy was to achieve the maximum separation possible of the
CIS1
countries from the Russian Federation. This proved to be an incorrect and
counterproductive policy. This policy confirmed Moscow's worst fears and spurred
nationalist sentiments in Russia.
Another problem that can be identified and that led to a completely different vision
between the two subjects was the economic sphere, as is stated by some scholars the
capitalist model of the Russian Federation had not evolved in a manner that was
deemed compatible with the market economies of the Member States of the EU or
with the single market. Obviously, this factor has also played a part in the
development of increasingly difficult relations between the powers.
Among the political reasons it is worth mentioning two very important crises of the
post-bipolar era, which further contributed to the deterioration of relationships. One
would be the NATO operation against Yugoslavia in 1999 and the other being the
conflict around South Ossetia in 2008, which were in fact, the embodiment of the
fundamental contradictions between the Russian Federation and the West in the field
1
Арбатова Н. Фактов СНГ в отношения России и Запада: истоки конфлткта, мировая
экономика и международные отношения, 2018

21
of security commonly and informally known as the "NATOization" of the European
security system. Furthermore, the eastward expansion of the EU and NATO has
traditionally been presented by Brussels as complementary processes. Although
NATO membership as a prerequisite for EU membership is not recorded in the
Copenhagen criteria, the latest waves of EU expansion in the post-communist
countries of Central and Eastern Europe indicate that it has de facto become a
prerequisite. This changed the initially positive attitude of the Russian Federation
towards the enlargement of the European Union and its neighbourhood policy.
The ideological or idealistic approach which prevailed in the politics of the United
States and its European allies, whose goal was the transformation of the world
according to its own ideas about what should be, seriously damaged the international
relations. The NATO bombings of Yugoslavia, the secession of Kosovo, the war in
Iraq, the humanitarian intervention of the ‘coalition of the willing’ in Libya that has
circumvented the United Nations and, finally, the active intervention of the West in
the ‘coloured revolutions’ in Georgia and Ukraine are the most vivid proof of this.
Eight years after the end of the conflict in Kosovo, the United States explained the
need for Kosovo's independence by stating that ‘Albanians simply do not want to live
with Serbs’. However, if the desire of the national minority is a sufficient reason for
separation, then, apparently, it applies to the Abkhazians who ‘simply do not want to
live with the Georgians’, and to the Crimeans who ‘simply do not want to live with
the Ukrainians’.
Among socio-economic reasons it is worth mentioning problems relating to
disagreements over the WTO + and the third energy package. As for the WTO +, the
European Union would have liked the economic section to be as detailed as possible.
One instrument for the Russian Federation's further rapprochement with the EU was
the new basic agreement, which replaced the Partnership and Cooperation agreement.
While in the Russian Federation, it was believed that the document should not
describe the details of commercial and economic relations, establishing only general
principles of cooperation and that specific issues should be resolved in the framework
of further agreements. In the economic part of the agreement, Moscow would like to

22
reproduce exactly the conditions agreed in the context of accession to the WTO. In
Brussels, however, they believed that this was not enough, so the EU insisted on
introducing a number of points1
into the agreement that were not covered by the
Russian Federation agreements with the WTO.
Another obstacle was the disagreement over the third energy package. Gazprom
was not part of the Brussels policy of liberalizing the European electricity and gas
market. The third energy package, approved by the European Union in 2009, includes
six legislative acts which provide for restrictions to vertically integrated companies
on the right to own and manage energy transmission grids. The reason for the
activation of the European Union to create a unified energy market was the start of an
official investigation by the European Commission on the monopolistic activity of the
Russian Gazprom (which is more than 50% owned by the state), which prevents free
competition in Europe.
The escalation of tension in Ukraine has led to the reduction of practical
cooperation between the Russian Federation and the EU and to the mutual ‘war of
sanctions’, which has affected not only their economic ties, but also their political
relations. The main reason is that in the Russian Federation and the EU there are two
directly opposing views on the dramatic events in Ukraine.
From Moscow’s point of view, through the Association Agreement, the European
Union has sought to tear Ukraine from the Russian Federation and the CIS integration
structures, subordinate it to its financial and economic standards and destroy the
greatest scientific potential, post-Soviet technology and industrialiam after the
Russian Federation. In the future, Ukraine would have agreed to join NATO, and
placed the American fleet and missile defence bases there. A completely different
interpretation of the events prevails in the countries of Europe, members of NATO
and the European Union, who have claimed that the goal of Moscow is to keep the
country at risk of further collapse and either subjugate the new democratic leadership
of Kiev or overthrow it. The support of separatists in the eastern regions of Ukraine,
1
It concerned trade and investment legislation, competition and public procurement.

23
according to the West, is the first step on the road to Moscow's strong gathering and
nurturing of the ‘Russian world’. With the application of sanctions and the limitation
of multifaceted ties with the Russian Federation, the West has tried to make Moscow
change its attitude towards Crimea and force it to stop supporting the Ukrainian
rebels so that Kiev can regain power over the country.
1.2.2. The Ukrainian crisis as the main trigger factor of the sanction policy.
The rise to power of a pro-Russian president in Ukraine, Viktor Yanukovych
marked the beginning of a new phase in the country1
. A series of protests began by
demonstrators from the 'Euromaidan' group following the announcement by president
Yanukovych, on the occasion of the Eastern Partnership Summit held in Vilnius, to
renounce the association agreement with the European Union, which had already
been underway for several years previously, and which was necessary to complete the
accession agreements to become a part of the European Union.
From these protests2
the internal division of the country became even more
evident. From this moment on, Ukraine became increasingly chaotic, especially after
Yanukovych’s escape. This led to new elections in May 2014. A popular referendum
was subsequently held which sanctioned the 'yes' victory for the return of Crimea
under Moscow's sovereignty. This referendum was contested by most of the
international, purely western community. The countries which were opposed to this
manoeuvre decided to sanction Russia.
Following this referendum, the People's Republic of Donetsk (DPR) was
proclaimed on April 7, followed by the institution of the People's Republic of
Luhansk (LPR) on April 27, endowed with popular armies and a self-styled
government. A popular republic was also proclaimed in Kharkiv on April 8 but has
never enjoyed wide acceptance. The separatist leaders of Donetsk, Luhansk and
1
Ferrari A., Oltre la Crimea Russia contro l’Europa? Ispi, 2014 (pp.1-11)
2
Burke J., Panina-Burke S., the reunification of Crimea and the City of Sevastopol with the
Russian Federation, Russian Journal, 2017 (pp.39-55)

24
Kharkiv held a referendum on independence on May 11, which would be held
simultaneously in the three regions. Similarly, even this referendum was not viewed
positively by Ukraine and western countries. On May 25, the national presidential
elections took place in a generally peaceful climate, except for the neo-republics of
Donetsk and Luhansk. The elections were not held in Crimea and Simferopol nor in
the Kiev government. Following the elections in Kiev, a new president, Petro
Poroshenko, who was pro-European, was elected against his rival Julia Tymoshenko.
During this phase a new sequence of clashes began within the two rebel regions.
After the shooting down of the Malaysian Airlines flight MH17, while flying over the
Republic of Donetsk, the tension between Ukraine, the West and the Russian
Federation increased even more, followed by a series of diplomatic interventions and
meetings between Ukraine and the Russian Federation in a bid to cool down and
mitigate the conflict.
In November 2014, the parliamentary and presidential elections were held in the
two separatist republics, independently from the national parliamentary elections.
Their result was recognized only by the Russian Federation, while the government of
Kiev, supported by the US and the EU, declared them illegitimate as they did not take
place in accordance with the Minsk protocol and Ukrainian legislation. Aleksandr
Zakharchenko in the Donetsk People's Republic and Igor Plotnitsky in the Luhansk
People's Republic won the presidential election.
The position declared by the European Union in the face of the escalation of the
conflict with the outbreak of the crises in Crimea and Donbass was in support for the
independence and territorial integrity of Ukraine, support for economic and political
reforms in the country, condemnation and non-recognition of the annexation of
Crimea to the Russian Federation, defined as an occupation.
This situation did not trigger positive reactions from the other States, which were
followed by sanctions, which will be analysed in more detail in the following
chapters. Starting in March 2014, EU foreign ministers proposed the first diplomatic
and political sanctions. The EU and the Member States of the G8 also ordered the
suspension of participation in the preparatory work for the G8 in Sochi, scheduled for

25
the following June. Additionally, the European Council, meeting on March 6,
confirmed the suspension of negotiations with the Russian Federation on visa
liberalization and on the new agreement replacing the 1997 treaty. These first
sanctions have seen the deterioration of relations between Moscow and Brussels,
which then have deteriorated with the imposition of other sanctions. Indeed, only in
1997 the Russian Federation had joined the G7 after the difficult negotiations that
have followed over the years. Moreover, the EU-Russia summit, scheduled for June
of the same year, was cancelled due to ‘the seriousness of the situation’.
The elimination of sanctions is subject to the implementation of the Minsk
agreements, but this has not occurred, indeed since their entry into force they are
renewed every six months. At the summit that took place in Wales, new methods for
collective defence were approved and new tools such as the RAP (also known as
Readiness Action Plan) were established and all forms of cooperation with the
Russian Federation were suspended. The major issues that were addressed concern:
increasing the military presence in Eastern Europe, improving the reactivity and
speed of troop action-response to attacks and improving political reactivity. Indeed,
this action plan allowed NATO forces stationed in the border countries of the
Alliance to intervene quickly in the event of a military attack or threat.
The first mediation effort occurred in Geneva, although it was considered totally
bankrupt. It was a meeting between Russia, Ukraine, the USA and the EU,
represented by the High Representative Catherine Ashton. The result was a five-point
agreement, which included, among other things, the cessation of hostilities, the
disarmament of all illegal groups and the start of a constitutional reform that would
guarantee the decentralization of powers.
In those months, several trilateral EU-Ukraine-Russia meetings were held, to
discuss the consequences of the implementation of the European free trade area on
the agreements already in force between Ukraine and the Russian Federation and on
the economy of the countries included in the EEC customs union.
In September, a new meeting was reached between Ukraine, the Russian
Federation, the OSCE and representatives of the pro-Russian provinces of Donetsk

26
and Lugansk in Minsk and the goal of the ceasefire was reached. The Minsk Protocol
provides for the creation of a 30km-wide demilitarized zone, which is placed under
the protection of the OSCE, in addition to which Ukraine must guarantee the regions
of Donetsk and Lugansk greater autonomy at the regional level and grant it new
elections on the inside the area.
The truce did not last long, in fact by October the conflict had rekindled near
Donetsk, when Ukrainian army and separatists clashed for control of the airport.
Both the parties involved accused each other of violating the ceasefire. In November,
the self-proclaimed republics held new elections for independence and annexation to
the Russian Federation, which were not recognized by the Kiev government, the
OSCE and the international community, and were also considered in violation of
Ukrainian law and protocol.
In 2015 in Minsk, after Putin, Poroshenko and representatives of the autonomous
republics of eastern Ukraine laid the foundations for peace by signing a new
document, called ‘Minsk II’. The turning point of the agreement was the decisive
entry of two countries of the European Union, namely France and Germany, to act as
a meeting point between Russia, Ukraine and rebels.
To sum up, obviously this situation has had a great impact on relations between the
Russian Federation and the European Union, leading to a deteriorate of agreements
and collaborations that had been built over the years, as has been previously
described, that was to bring to ruin a situation that over the years had still not been
successful in establishing complete stability.
The Ukrainian crisis is considered to be the metaphorical ‘straw that broke the
camel’s back’ due to the already unstable situation of previous years, as previously
described. This situation did not trigger a positive reaction in other States and the
sanctions imposed were not only diplomatic in nature, as already mentioned. These
diplomatic sanctions were followed by other sanctions that deteriorated the economic
relations between the Russian Federation and the European Union, affecting the
financial, energy and commercial sectors and also single individuals, who were held
responsible for certain actions.

27
To date, six years after the imposition of sanctions, they have not succeeded in
changing the situation, although it may be said that have contributed to the worsening
of relations between Europe and the Russian Federation and also failing in their
objective which was to push Moscow to review its foreign policy in Ukraine. In
addition to reaffirming the ineffectiveness of the two Minsk agreements.
In subsequent chapters these sanctions will be analysed in more detail both from a
legal point of view, to better understand the accusations that have been imputed to the
Russian Federation after their imposition, and from a commercial point of view to
understand what impact they have had on the various States and sectors most
affected.
Conclusions:
As has been seen since the beginning of this chapter, relations between the
European Union and the Russian Federation have never been simple, starting with the
collapse of the Soviet Union which subsequently became a Federation. Despite
everything, over the years a collaboration between the two powers has been sought,
which has led to the creation of new partnerships, which represented very important
steps for the Russian Federation.
From a Russian perspective, the European Union is not necessarily a danger akin
to NATO, yet the fact that the two organizations (and their membership) are
increasingly connected, however, suggests that the Union is not an interlocutor , but
essentially the Trojan horse of the US presence in the ex-Soviet area. This challenge
for the influence finds its ideal field of competition on the European continent and in
the double neighbourhood, which since the 1990s has been increasingly restricted and
less and less capable of acting as a screen for the Russian Federation. The latter's
position is essentially to maintain a previously acquired position, and not to conquer
new spaces. At the time when the famous red line is violated, a series of defensive
behaviours are put in place to counter this interference and recover the influence
affected in the country, with peaceful or aggressive methods. It then remains to be

28
considered that precisely in the matter of foreign policy, in this as in many other
matters, it seems that it is going in the opposite direction to that of
communitarization: substantially, within the Union there are too many voices, now
twenty-seven , so that only one can be expressed. To understand how the situation
will evolve in the future and what role the European Union will play in this process,
we will have to wait for the facts to provide the answer to some questions: does a
unitary interest of the Union exist or can it ever exist?
If so, will it be determined collectively or by the group that will eventually manage
to achieve hegemony within it? If this happens, then it is possible that the European
Union will finally succeed in assuming an autonomous and credible international
position in the eyes of its interlocutors; otherwise, the risk is that this organization,
undermined by internal disagreements and attacks from numerous fronts, will become
less supranational and increasingly intergovernmental.

29
CHAPTER II. LEGAL GROUNDS AND JUDICIAL CONSEQUENCES OF
THE EU SANCTION POLICY
2.1. EU sanctions: issues of legal nature and legitimacy.
The term 'sanctions' encompasses multiple meanings that vary according to the
context in which they are used. The first definition that can be given is any means by
which authority is affirmed and a respect for a norm (moral, religious, juridical) is
required. In particular, in in terms of law it can be considered as an afflictive measure
(in a broad sense) prepared by the legal system against the person responsible for an
illegal act.1
The second definition, in terms of international law sanctions are defined as a
measure or set of measures, consisting of various forms of retaliation that can be
decided by a single State (individual sanctions) or by a plurality of States (collective
sanctions) against a country that has violated the rules governing international
relations; if the measures concern interests and commercial, financial, or economic
exchanges with other countries, there is talk of economic sanctions (of which one of
the most severe is the embargo).2
The latter are used by the States, supranational institutions such as the European
Union and international organizations such as the United Nations against those
countries, not with a punitive character, but only for the purpose of ending illegal
conduct. They can be both unilateral and multilateral. In most cases bilateral
sanctions are more effective than unilateral sanctions. Unilateral sanctions are widely
criticized as they violate the principle of State sovereignty and the rule of law and
risk violating other principles of international law. The sanctions may include travel
bans, arms embargo, capital movement restrictions, reductions in foreign aid and
trade restrictions.
1
http://www.treccani.it/vocabolario/sanzione/
2
Ibidem.

30
That being said, it is useful at this point to distinguish the difference between the
terms 'sanction' and 'countermeasure', which are not synonymous.
The first case refers to the existence of an international organization that enjoys
particular powers, while the second case of ‘countermeasure’ is made in reference to
the decisions of individual States or international organizations against a third State1
.
Sanctions can be divided into three categories, depending on the context in which
they are applied and the objective that the country or the supranational sanctioning
institution wants to pursue on the sanctioned country2
.
- The first category of sanctions emphasizes respect for international law. An
example can be provided by the embargo put into effect by the UN Security Council
against Iraq in 1990 after the invasion of Kuwait.
- In the second category, the intention is to contain the threat to peace. In this case
an example is nuclear proliferation in Iran.
- Finally, the third category concerns the condemnation by the United Nations of
the actions or policies of States.
Punitive sanctions can be divided into 'general' and 'targeted'.
In the first case, no specific section is affected, whilst in the case of the 'targeted'
sanctions these are directed towards particular sectors or specific geographical areas.
In contemporary international law3
, sanctions involving the use of force are
considered illegal, except for the power of the United Nations Security Council to
impose collective military sanctions if the sanctioned country has threatened or
violated peace or has committed acts of aggression against other States.
The sanctioned country can appeal and declare them illegal. In the case of military
sanctions, States can appeal to infringement of the right of defence. The sanctions can
be applied by the United Nations Security Council, on the basis of the powers
1
Gioia A., Diritto Internazionale, Giuffrè Editore, 2015, pag. 143.
2
Sanctions, Countermeasures and Human Rights // Event Report British Institute of International
and Comparative Law.
3
The discipline of international sanctions has changed profoundly since the era before the United
Nations Charter came into force.

31
attributed to it by the UN Charter1
for the maintenance of international peace and
security. States whose subjective right has been infringed by the violation of an
international obligation are also entitled to adopt sanctions or countermeasures. In
addition, an unharmed State is entitled ‘to invoke the responsibility of another State’
even in the event that ‘the violated obligation arises towards the international
community as a whole’.
The European Union, given its geopolitical weight and the size of the market, it is
one of the most involved subjects when it comes to sanctions2
. They are applied
following violations of international rules, sanctioning regimes defined as ‘sanctions’
in the event that, similarly to what happens for those adopted by the Security Council
pursuant to Art. 41 of the UN Charter3
, are configured as reactions to a threat to peace
or an act of aggression, or ‘countermeasures’ when dealing with decentralized
actions, such as, for example, unilateral measures taken by one injured State against
another which is deemed responsible for the international violation that damaged it.
International organizations, as well as States, have the power to use countermeasures
under international law in response to acts that, in contrast to it, have directly
damaged them.
The use of EU sanctions can contribute to the achievement of numerous objectives
in the context of the common foreign and security policy: from the management of
ongoing conflicts to the promotion of democracy and human rights, from the
consolidation of institutions in post-war situations to non-conflict proliferation of
nuclear weapons, from the international fight against terrorism to the safeguarding of
sovereignty and territorial integrity, as happened in the Russian case of 2014.
1
The Charter of the United Nations indicates the conditions under which force can be used in
relations between States, for example in self-defence or if authorized by the Security Council. The
United Nations may resort to international sanctions as a collective security tool.
2
Hörbelt C., A Comparative Study: Where and Why Does the EU Impose Sanctions, Revista
UNISCI, 2017.
3
Chapter VII: Action with respect to Threats to the Peace, Breaches of the Peace and Acts of
Aggression, article 41, Charter of the United Nations.

32
There are basically three types of sanctions applied by the European Union in close
connection with the sanctioning regimes of the United Nations1
.
The first type, as previously mentioned, consists of those aimed at strengthening
the restrictive measures adopted by the Security Council and which the UN member
States are bound to apply. This means that they become part of the sanctions
applicable according to the criteria of the United Nations and as such arelegitimized.
The second category is represented by the sanctions applied autonomously by the
Union which go beyond those decided by the Security Council and therefore
constitute a sort of surpassing of UN regimes. They often refer to particular requests
from the Council to the Member States of the United Nations and can therefore be
considered as ‘additional’. These sanctions are sometimes concomitant with the
implementing mandates of the United Nations but can be adopted even years after the
implementation of the UN measures. It may also happen that EU sanctions are
applied to recipients already subject to restrictions by the United Nations, as has often
happened in the event of a crisis that subsequently worsened at a point in time
following the adoption of restrictive measures by the Security Council.
The third type of sanctions adopted by the Union are represented by the restrictive
measures taken in the absence of other measures decreed by the UN. They are often
inherent in disputes on which the Security Council is unable to take action due to a
lack of agreement due to the opposition of at least one of its permanent members and
have become one of the foreign policy instruments most recently used by the EU.
Often these sanctions can add to the restrictive measures applied by other subjects
towards the same recipient, so as to integrate with them, thereby strengthening them.
In practice, EU sanctions have repeatedly followed measures taken by Washington,
although they have not always been identical. On a final note, when looking to the
past it has happened that the sanctions imposed by the EU were a prelude to
restrictive measures subsequently taken by the United Nations.
1
Biersteker T., and Portela C,. EU sanctions in context: three types, European Union Institute for
Security Studies, 2015

33
Other aspects of these restrictive measures are also considered important. The first,
of which being that, the restrictive measures have a deadline, after which they are, if
necessary, renewed with a unanimous vote.
Secondly, targeted sanctions contain multiple exceptions and exemptions to
prevent them from translating into violations of the rights of those who are not
directly targeted.
Thirdly, European sanctions have no extra-territorial effects, which means that the
EU's restrictive measures do not apply to non-European companies that do business
with countries against which the EU has adopted sanctions when operating outside
the EU's borders.
The restrictive measures adopted by the European Union following the crisis in
Ukraine fall within the scope of the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP)
decisions.
The CFSP1
is governed by Title V of the TEU ‘General provisions on the Union's
external action and specific provisions on the common foreign and security policy2
’.
These matters are specifically excluded from the TFEU, so that the CFSP differs
from other Union policies. The action of the Member States is conducted according
to the ‘intergovernmental’ method3
. The CFSP ‘is defined and implemented by the
European Council and the Council’, as established by Art. 244
, par. 2 of the TEU,
thus leaving a marginal role for Parliament, the Commission and the Court of Justice.
1
Former second pillar of the Union before the Lisbon Treaty.
Keukeleire S., Delreux,T ., The Foreign Policy of the European Union, Palgrave Macmillan, 2014
2
https://op.europa.eu/it/publication-detail/-/publication/7414df8f-5f75-4110-a487-c04034c6e4aa
3
It differs from the ‘Community’ method of decision mainly in that decisions, in order to be
adopted, require not only the majority, but unanimity, ‘except in cases where the treaties provide
otherwise’. The intergovernmental method provides that the Commission's right of initiative is
shared with the Member States of the Union or limited to specific areas of activity, where the
European Council is endowed with deliberative power, unlike the Parliament which instead has a
purely consultative role, and that the Council, as already mentioned, deliberates unanimously.
4
Trattato sull’Unione Europea, Titolo V Disposizioni Generali sull’azione Esterna dell’Unione e
Disposizioni Specifiche sulla Politica Estera e di Sicurezza Comune, Capo 2, Disposizioni

34
The objectives to be pursued are defined in Article 21 of the TEU. These include
the promotion of the rule of law, the universality and indivisibility of human rights
and fundamental freedoms, respect for human dignity, and the principles of equality.
The competences of the CFSP remain not fully defined, as they cannot be classified
as competitive or as competitors, and concern ‘all areas of foreign policy and all
matters relating to the security of the Union, including the progressive definition of a
common defence policy which can lead to a common defence’.
Coordination is needed between the Union's external action on the basis of the
CFSP and the Union's external action on the basis of material skills, a requirement
that emerges from Art. 211
of the TEU where it states that ‘the Union ensures
coherence between the various sectors of external action and between these and other
policies’. However, this provision does not establish with certainty that material skills
are sufficient for the pursuit of foreign policy objectives in the case of the existence
of a CFSP act.
The common foreign and security policy is enforced by the Union by adopting two
types of legal acts: general systems and decisions. The general orders are acts of the
European Council which define the guidelines on which to move in the context of the
CFSP. Decisions are Council acts that define the actions that the Union must take, the
positions it must take, and the methods for implementing these decisions, favouring
systematic cooperation between Member States for the conduct of their policy.
Through decisions, specific situations are addressed that require operational activity
and therefore require the definition of the means to be used, the scope of the
interventions to be carried out and, if necessary, their duration and conditions of
Specifiche sulla Politica Estera e di Sicurezza Comune, Sezione 1, Disposizioni Comuni, articolo 24
(ex articolo 11 del TUE) // C326/13 // 26.10.2012 // Gazzetta ufficiale dell’Unione Europea.
1
Trattato sull’Unione Europea, Titolo V Disposizioni Generali sull’azione Esterna dell’Unione e
Disposizioni Specifiche sulla Politica Estera e di Sicurezza Comune, Capo 1, Disposizioni Generali
sull’azione esterna dell’Unione, articolo 21 // C326/13 // 26.10.2012 // Gazzetta ufficiale
dell’Unione Europea.

35
implementation. The acts are adopted not on the initiative of the Commission, but on
the initiative of the Member States or the High Representative.
An integral part of the CFSP is the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP)
which establishes how many procedures and by what means the need for
peacekeeping are obtained, including conflict prevention and strengthening
international security. This being said however, the acts adopted in the CFSP field do
not have a legislative value pursuant to Art. 24 of the TEU but only bind the Member
States ‘in their position and in the conduct of their action1
’.
On a further note, with further reference to part 1 of Art. 24 of the TEU it is stated
that 'the common foreign and security policy is subject to specific rules and
procedures2
'.
Therefore, on the basis of the CFSP decisions which are taken in reference to the
violations of international law by the Russian Federation, numerous Regulations and
Implementing Regulations have also been adopted to give full implementation and
legislative character to the measures taken. On the basis of what has just been said,
one can see the path that the European Union has chosen to take in order to give a
decisive and clear-cut response in support of the customary principles and violated
agreements of the Russian Federation.
To sum up, sanctions are exceptional foreign policy measures that are used on rare
occasions to manage international crises or to respond to serious violations of
international law. Their effectiveness has been widely debated in the past, a debate
which still continues even now, and an exact assessment is not always possible.
However, the discussions of the last decade have allowed us to define a series of
factors to consider when assessing the effectiveness of said sanctions or of the
opportunity to lift them. The EU has gradually intensified its foreign policy activity
and, consequently, sanctions have also been used with greater frequency when
responding to increasingly varied crises, from human rights and conflict management
1
https://eur-lex.europa.eu/resource.html?uri=cellar:2bf140bf-a3f8-4ab2-b506-
fd71826e6da6.0017.02/DOC_1&format=PDF
2
Ibidem

36
through to the democratic consolidation of new regimes. The evolution of sanctions
from overall measures to targeted measures has increased the flexibility of the tool.
2.2. EU bodies and the European Nation States: imposition of the sanction
policy vs. its implementation.
Within the European Union, the authority responsible for adopting restrictive
measures is the Council of Ministers, which may decide to impose on sanctions
entities, or individual restrictive measures, towards third countries which must be
consistent with the CFSP objectives, in accordance with Article 21 of the Treaty on
European Union (TEU).
Restrictive measures are imposed by the EU to induce a change in the policy or
activities of the country, region of a country, government, entity or individuals to
whom they are directed, in accordance with the objectives set out in the Council's
CFSP decision. Consequently, the EU will modify the restrictive measures according
to the developments registered with regard to the objectives of the Council's CFSP
decision.’1
In the European Union, there will no longer be any talk of sanctions, but of
'restrictive measures'. In any case, these restrictive measures must always comply
with international law: they must respect human rights and fundamental freedoms.
Sometimes these are, or have been, unilateral acts which, however, since the Union is
a collective of States, cannot be defined as such, but simply countermeasures. In
other cases, restrictive measures have been adopted aimed at the implementation of
binding sanctions already previously imposed by the Security Council.
The countermeasures decided by the European Union were very different from
those adopted by the UN in the 1990s; in fact, it generally involved smart sanctions
and, therefore, blocks of products or travel bans addressed to particular companies or
1
Orientamenti sull’attuazione e la valutazione delle misure restrittive (sanzioni) nel contesto della
politica estera e di sicurezza comune dell’UE p.5 part 4
Bruxelles,4 maggio2018. 5664/18

37
individuals. As already seen, since the countermeasures in themselves are measures
which are not compliant with international law, but legitimized as responses to
violations of others, it is up to the Union to provide adequate justification for their
adoption.
Restrictive measures are adopted on the proposal of the High Representative for
Foreign Affairs and Security Policy by means of a specific regulatory act, the EU
decision, as established by Chapter 2 of Title V of the Treaty on European Union
(TUE).
The High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, in
addition to holding the office of Vice-President of the Commission, chairs the
Foreign Affairs Council and implements the CFSP 'as an agent of the Council1
'.
The task of which is to decide on the validity of the sanctioning tool and to give life
to it by establishing which types of measures to use.
When the restrictive measures concern commercial or financial restrictions, an
implementing regulation is needed, normally drawn up in collaboration with the
Commission, but approved by the Council of Ministers as required by Article 215 of
the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union2
(TFEU).
Furthermore, the Union can also decide on sanctions on the basis of Article 75
TFEU; but in the international case the sanctions of art 215 are those that must be
applied, as they are intended to protect international security. The basic sanctions on
article 753
are, however, aimed at guaranteeing the Union a high level of internal
security. The CFSP decision is the legal prerequisite for the second act, which must
be adopted by majority vote, on a joint proposal from the High Representative and
the Commission, after informing Parliament.
The EU regulation, the second EU regulatory act, has direct application in all
Member States. It performs the function of giving uniform execution to the measures
1
Trattato sull’Unione Europea article 28 Gazzetta ufficiale dell’Unione Europea
326/15 26.10.2012
2
Trattato sull’Unione Europea, Gazzetta ufficiale dell’Unione Europea // 326/15 26.10.2012
3
Ibidem

38
contemplated in the CFSP decision. To avoid regulatory gaps, the CFSP decision and
the EU regulation are approved in the same session so as to enter into force
simultaneously. In the Russian case of 2014, the acts that gave rise to the sanctions
were decision 2014/119 / CFSP and regulation no. 208/2014. Decisions almost
always have a deadline in order to establish, after an appropriate review of the
situation, whether the measures envisaged in them should be extended or on the
contrary repealed. The regulations do not provide for a deadline, since if the
restrictive measures are repealed, they automatically lapse, while if the existing
regulations are extended, they simply continue to apply.
For the implementation of these restrictive measures the European Union follows
the legal foundations and among these some of which are particularly highlighted
such as1
: the 'Basic principles on the use of restrictive measures ' which was adopted
in 2004 and illustrates the modalities and circumstances in which the restrictive
measures can be applied and goes on to specifies that these can be adopted either in
coordination with the UN or in an independent manner . In the first case, it is easier to
maintain the sanctions over time, as any extensions, tightening or on the contrary
reductions or suspensions of the restrictive measures are always decided by the
United Nations and simply implemented at European level. When sanctions,
however, are decided autonomously, it may be more difficult to obtain the necessary
consensus from all States, a consensus which must then be maintained for a period of
time sufficient for the sanctions to produce any result.
Secondly, 'the best EU practices for the effective implementation of the restrictive
measures' of which the last modification dates to 2018 and contains information
fundamental for correctly defining the lists and the application of financial sanctions.
Finally, the 'Guidelines on the implementation and evaluation of restrictive
measures (sanctions) in the context of the EU's common foreign and security policy '
which give technical indications for the formulation, implementation and control of
1
Sanctions: how and when the EU adopts restrictive measures// European Council. Available at
https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/policies/sanctions/

39
restrictive measures and which also contain the standard formulas to be used for
drafting the CFSP legal instruments.
When the restrictive measures concern trade in goods or services with third
countries, the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) and the General
Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS) apply.
The reactions to the repeated violations of the territorial integrity of Ukraine have
been manifold and in particular several States, including the United States and some
member countries of the European Union, have individually adopted sanctioning
measures in order to induce to termination and reparation of the international offense
the Russian Federation. These are restrictive measures ranging from the limitation of
the granting of visas, reductions in imports of specific goods and also includes the
freezing of assets, capital and funds belonging to certain natural or legal persons, of
Russian and Ukrainian nationality, who are deemed responsible for compromising
territorial integrity and the independence of Ukraine in any way.
These restrictive measures find legal basis in general international law thanks to
the draft articles adopted in 20011
by the Commission on International Law which
establishes the rules on the international responsibility of States. According to art. 48
of the Project, in accordance, among other things, with what is established by
customary law, also third States, which are States other than the injured State, are
entitled 'to invoke the responsibility of another State' even in the event that the
'violated obligation arises towards the international community as a whole'.
Furthermore, the sanctions comply with the general eligibility criteria and the limits
of the countermeasures provided for by the Project in Articles 49 and 50. They,
indeed, are of an economic nature, are of a temporary nature, have been declared
1
The draft articles on State responsibility were approved by the Commission on international law.
at second reading in 2001 and even if it does not bind all States, it is increasingly taken into
consideration by international and State jurisprudence as a point of reference. For this reason, it can
be assumed that it corresponds to customary international law and that, as such, it imposes itself on
States.

40
revocable or modifiable at any time and are executable before internal courts or
international jurisdictions.
As already mentioned, many States have taken the initiative by taking
countermeasures to induce those responsible for the violations to change course, but
it has not been possible to obtain an institutionalized position from the UN Security
Council. Indeed, the latter, the only body within the United Nations that can adopt
legally binding acts, in particular for matters relating to the maintenance of
international peace and security, was unable to make any decision due to the
involvement of its permanent member1
.
Following the first package of sanctions adopted by the west and just a few days
before the referendum confirming the proclaimed independence of Crimea from
Ukraine, the United States presented a draft2
resolution3
to the Security Council
aimed at reaffirming respect for the territorial integrity, sovereignty, unity and
independence of Ukraine, and furthermore to referring to Art. 2 of the United Nations
Charter, which requires members in their international relations to abstain from the
threat or use of force against territorial integrity or political independence4
, and
subsequently reaffirms the principle of non-recognition of the acquisition of
territories taken by force or through threats.
The document was presented, in addition to the United States, by 41 other
countries including the 28 Member States of the European Union, however it clashed
at the time of the vote in the Council with the abstention of the Chinese representative
and, clearly , with the Russian veto.
1
Indeed, the Russian Federation is a permanent member of the Security Council and as such has the
right of veto pursuant to Chapter V of the United Nations Charter, in which Art. 27, part. 3 it is
established that for any non-procedural matter the decisions must be taken 'with a favourable vote
of nine Members, which includes the votes of the permanent Members'.
2
United Nations S/2014/189Security Council Distr.: General15 March 2014.
3
General Assembly Adopts Resolution Calling upon States Not to Recognize Changes in Status of
Crimea Region, United Nations, 2014
4
Charter of the United Nations, Chapter I, Part. 2, par. 4.

41
Sometime later the General Assembly also expressed itself, adopting on March 27,
2014 Resolution 68/262 on the territorial integrity of Ukraine, of which however no
legally binding power is held1
. The document, adopted by a majority of its members,
urges Members to abstain from any action that has as their objective the total or
partial compromise of Ukrainian national unity and territorial integrity and not to
recognize any change in the status of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea and of the
city of Sevastopol, in light of the invalidity of the referendum of 16 March.
Subsequently, during the meeting of the Security Council on 28 August 2014, a
request for help was made by the Ukrainian representative, for the first time since the
beginning of the crisis in Ukraine, who made a request for assistance from the
international community, referring to Art. 51 of the United Nations Charter.
By doing so, he explicitly invoked the right to defend himself to repel the armed
aggression suffered on his territory and further legitimized a collective defence
intervention, remaining pursuant to Art. 51 of the Charter. Some members of the
international community, States and international organizations, have individually
taken countermeasures to induce the end of the violations of international law by the
Russian Federation. Among them, the major players are the member countries of the
European Union.
Wanting at this point to reflect on the sanctioning action of the Union during the
Ukrainian crisis, it is appropriate to distinguish the internal plan, relating to the ability
shown by the Union to create and maintain restrictive measures, from the external
one, concerning the impact that these measures have had on the recipients and on the
rest of the international community.
With regard to the internal plan, during the crisis, the Union, despite a first phase
of uncertainty, even in the face of the blockade of the Security Council, managed to
create a complex set of measures which, as seen, with the succession of events, has
become increasingly broad and diverse, both for the nature of the recipients and for
1
According to Chapter IV of the United Nations Charter, in fact, the General Assembly has the
power to only adopt ‘recommendations’ and therefore non-legally binding acts.

42
the type of measures taken. This result demonstrates how the Union, over time, has
been able to develop a mechanism for developing sanction systems that is now quite
efficient, capable, even in complex situations, of giving rise to direct measures
against States and individuals.
However, there are areas of uncertainty, not connected to the sanctions as such, but
rather mostly connected to the political and strategic context in which they have been
inserted, or rather to the substantial lack of such a context. Indeed, it should once
again be underlined that sanctions have been practically the only tool to with which
the Union has had at its disposition to face the Ukrainian crisis, in particular after the
Russian annexation to the Crimean Peninsula.
In part, this situation has objective justifications. First of all, immediately and for
obvious reasons, the use of the military was excluded, while the absence of relations
of cooperation or partnership with the Russian Federation, formalized in international
agreements or in any case sufficiently structured, prevented the Union from using the
other two tools which are often used to give greater substance to its international
action: or that of pressure, to be exercised through the total or partial suspension of
the aforementioned agreements or relationships (with consequent interruption of any
financial aid or support program that may exist), and that of persuasion, usually
implemented through dialogues, on which the aforementioned agreements or
relationships have practically always been established.
Less justifiable, however, is that during the various phases of the crisis the Union
has almost never managed to develop and express its own foreign policy which,
alongside the sanctioning instrument, could give it greater weight and effectiveness.
Political management of the crisis has mostly been left to the individual initiative of
individual Member States which have acted on many occasions as a sort of
representation of the Union and with the its support, although not necessarily in its
interest. Nonetheless, the member States nevertheless initially managed to create a
climate of exchange and collaboration between themselves and with the Union (in
particular with the High Representative), which supported and favoured the
development of the sanctioning systems. In reality, this way of proceeding does not

43
stand in full contrast with the nature of European foreign policy which, as is known,
is a far from perfect example of supranational logic, relying mostly on a continuous
exchange of national foreign policies, which are expressly called to support and give
greater authority to the European one.
This however, over time, has started to show serious limitations. Due to the
growing strategic role played by the Russian Federation in the solution of the Syrian
conflict and more generally in the fight against international terrorism, a progressive
‘distancing’ of European States from the Ukrainian crisis and a lessened emphasis on
condemning the behaviour of the Russian Federation has begun.
Paradoxically, this has not affected the sanctioning systems prepared by the Union
which, thanks also to the habit of resorting to simplified procedures for the adoption
of renewal decisions, have all been extended several times without any particular
problems. These same procedures, however, precisely because of their substantial
‘automaticity’, prevented the adoption of the renewal decisions from being preceded
by a political confrontation between the European leaders, in which they could
discuss in depth the opportunity and effectiveness of the measures to be renewed,
which, indeed, has disempowered these leaders in front of their public opinions.
As a result of this, a situation has arisen whereby some Member States, also
pressured by the negative economic repercussions of Russian ‘counter-sanctions’ on
the national economy, have ended up expressing dissent and criticism more and more
frequently towards measures established by the Union, undermining the integrity and
coherence of European action.
Since the entry into force of the sanctions in 2014 between the States of the
European Union, there has never been unanimity for an extension of the aforesaid.
The different positions of the States are dictated by the economic, political and
geopolitical factors that entertain or have been entertained over the years with the
Russian Federation. The underlying problem with sanctions is that they are always
established on a very strenuous decision, whose labour leaves no time even for a
negotiation on their expiry. To lift sanctions, another unanimous decision is usually
required. It is not a mystery then, and it has not been since the times of enlargement

44
in the east of 2004, that on the issue of relations with the Russian Federation, Europe
is at least partially divided.
On one side are the countries that were part of the Warsaw Pact or even the Soviet
Union, which suffered over the centuries from Russian and / or Germanic
imperialism (the case of Poland is obviously the most emblematic) and which today
legitimately and understandably express fears or even hostility towards Moscow.
The Ukrainian crisis has thrown oil on this fire, multiplying the fears of Russian
invasion, but the perceptions just described precede the facts of Maidan, Crimea and
Donbass. On the other hand, the ‘old’ Europe developed instead from the end of the
cold war and from the fall of the USSR until the entry into force of the sanctions of
an attempt to approach Russian semi-democracy, are of a partnership that was
supposed to help the process of democratization in the great eastern neighbour.
The most hostile States against Moscow continue to push to tighten the sanctions that
have already been in place since 2014, and would like, for example, to extend their
application to one year1
. The current practice is as described: before each extension, a
political transfer is made to the European Council, with Merkel and Macron taking
stock of compliance with the Minsk agreements. Having ascertained the absence of
progress, the green light for renewal is given.
Countries that support a tougher line include2
Germany, the United Kingdom,
Sweden, Poland, the Baltic States, Denmark and Finland. Denmark and the United
Kingdom particularly support a tougher transatlantic position, while other countries
see the Russian Federation as a threat to security and support the strengthening of
sanctions. Germany's position, however, deteriorated after the flight of the MH17 was
shot down. As for France, the close Franco-Russian relationship made it difficult for
France to take a tough stance towards the Russian Federation. While in the case of
Spain and Portugal, however, also due to their geographical distance and the
dependence of the Russian Federation in some sectors, they led to a 'calmer' attitude
1
Today sanctions last six months, renewable.
2
Shagina M., Friend or Foe? Mapping the positions of EU Member States on Russia sanctions,
European Leadership Network, 2017.

45
towards sanctions. The attitude of the Netherlands has also changed after the flight
was shot down, the latter having good economic relations with the Russian
Federation, which in fact had led them to take a position contrary to the strengthening
of the sanctions. As for countries like the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Slovenia and
Bulgaria, however, theirs is a rather ambiguous position, deriving from the tensions
between political forces for and against sanctions, led by geopolitical concerns and
economic relations with the Russian Federation.
Italy, Hungary, Greece, Cyprus and Austria have never shown themselves
favourable to the extension of sanctions, and have always been united by close
political, economic, cultural and religious ties, in addition to energy, tourism and
economic based relationships.
Last, but not least, Ireland, Luxembourg, Belgium and Malta have always shown
themselves to be fairly neutral during the EU discussions on the renewal of sanctions,
showing neither support nor objection.
In light of what has been described, it does not seem risky to recognize in the
behaviour of those States a violation of the principle of loyal cooperation, specifically
provided for in the CFSP matter by art. 24, par. 3, TEU. The latter, in fact, in
providing that States must '... actively and without reserve show support for the
common foreign and security policy ... refraining from any action contrary to the
interests of the Union or such as to harm its effectiveness…1
’, does nothing but recall
what was considered previously, which is, that in this sector the Union cannot ignore
neither a strong cohesion between the Member States, nor a clear support of these for
its international conduct. Consequently, member States cannot act differently from
these indications without infringing the aforementioned principle.
On the other hand, however, sanctions are also indispensable, as they currently
represent the only way remaining for the Union to ‘make its voice heard’ in the
international community. This is in order to stigmatize (at least formally) Russian
politics and thus demonstrate that it has not remained completely inert in the face of
1
Trattato sull’Unione Europea, Gazzetta ufficiale dell’Unione Europea // 326/15 26.10.2012

46
the perpetuated aggression against Ukraine, while giving greater substance to the
non-recognition of the annexation of the Crimean Peninsula and by Sevastopol.
2.3. Sanction policy and its impact on the international treaties and
contractual discipline in EU-Russia relations
After describing the situation from the historical and geopolitical point of view on
the conflict in Ukraine in the first chapter and based on what has been said from the
legal point of view in the previous paragraphs, this paragraph will analyse the
accusations made against the Russian Federation, following which the sanctions were
imposed, as a 'justification' for the entry into force of the sanctions by the States that
imposed them.
At the outbreak of the conflict, the States made several accusations against the
Russian Federation, as a result of which the sanctions imposed by the States came
into force. From a legal point of view, the accusations that have been imputed in
Moscow since the beginning were the illegal annexation of Crimea, followed by the
charge for the conflict in Ukraine.
The Russian Federation has been accused of violating the Charter of the United
Nations1
, international law2
, the Statute of the Council of Europe3
, the Helsinki Final
1
The Russian Federation is part of the organization and is a member of the Security Council.
2
However, it would also be worth mentioning other violations of international law that have
occurred over the years. The US and its allies have initiated various military interventions in recent
years by transgressing the United Nations Charter and acting without endorsement by the UN
Security Council. The 1999 bombing of Serbia by NATO was without the seal of international law
and was carried out despite the objections of Russia, Serbia's ally. The subsequent declaration of
independence of Kosovo from Serbia, recognized by the US and most EU countries, constitutes a
precedent to which the Russian Federation has appealed to legitimize the work in Crimea. After the
Kosovo war, the US led those in Afghanistan and Iraq, fought without the approval of the Security
Council and, in the case of Iraq, in spite of vigorous objections and other cases where international
law has been violated.
3
Of which the Russian Federation is a part of.

1

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