Jay FriedmanDrew HallettJoyce LeeJackie MaurnoAllie White
The Wall Street Journal StatisticsNational Edition1,698,990 circulationEastern Edition780,256 circulationNew York Metro: 289,418
Southern Region: 244,070
New England Region: 130,733
Florida Region: 129, 228
South Atlantic Region: 120,717
Wash./Baltimore Region: 77,330Early Coverage of Housing Bubbleā€œExisting-Home Prices Accelerate Ascent – Median Figures Jump 6.4% Amid a Weak Economy, Spurring Talk of Bubbleā€ – Patrick Barta (Aug 14, 2001) Pg. A.2
ā€œI see some of these houses around here, and these are really crummy houses, selling for $300,000 or $400,000ā€
ā€œPrices are heading toward a level ā€˜a lot farther beyond what people will pay, and I think [they’re] going to fall quite a bit.ā€™ā€
ā€œThe Prospect of a Housing Bubble Floats Againā€ – Patrick Barta (Feb 8, 2002) Pg. A.2
Price-to-Earnings ratio is 1.6 when it’s usually 1.2
ā€œHigh cost of housing … is being masked by extraordinarily low interest rates. An uptick in interest rates … could ā€˜cause the housing market to tip over.ā€™ā€
Computer model rates housing market on 0 to 100 scored below 50, meaning the ā€œmarket’s look is ā€˜unfavorable.ā€™ā€ā€œThe Fall of Bear Stearnsā€Kate KellyPart I: May 27, 2008	ā€œā€™I just simply have not been able to come up with anything, even with the benefit of hindsight, that would have made a difference.ā€™ā€ -- Alan Schwartz, chief executive Bear Stearns	ā€œā€¦the firm’s leaders missed opportunities that might have been able to save the 85-year-old brokerage.ā€	ā€œTo outsiders, it was beginning to look as if Bear Stearns had navigated the crisis relatively deftly. Inside the firm, that view wasn’t as prevalent.ā€Part II: May 28, 2008	ā€œIt was the beginning of a frantic 72 hours that would bring the Wall Street firm to its knees…show how quickly a company that took 85 years to build could unravel.ā€ 	ā€œcredit- default swaps — a big, barely regulated market where one party, for a price, assumes the riske that bond or loan will go bad.ā€ (layman’s terms)	ā€œInside the sixth-floor conference room…executives cheered and exchanged high-fives. They thought they had four weeks to sort out their problems.ā€ā€œIf This Is a Bubble, It Sure Is Hard to Popā€Tuesday March 30,1999 --- Dow hit 10,000
Part III: May 29, 2008ā€œā€¦capped a helter-skelter week — and presaged another 10 days of chaos. Interviews with more than two dozen executives and others directly involved show that Bear Stearns nearly died not once, but twice.ā€ 	ā€œBear Stearns Chief Financial Officer Samuel Molinaro Jr. — tired and in the same suit he’d left home in 36 hours beforeā€¦ā€	ā€œIf there were hazards, moral and otherwise, luring in the deal, the future would have to sort them out.ā€ Conclusions: May 30, 2008ā€œBear Stearns Cos., a powerhouse on Wall Street for nearly nine decades, ceased to exist Thursday in a meeting that lasted 11 minutes.ā€ ā€œIn doing so, they sealed a deal made in haste two months ago amid one of the most terrifying bank runs in history.ā€
Housing Bubble Coverageā€œU.S. Mortgage Crisis Rivals S&L Meltdown; Toll of Economic Shocks May Linger for Years; A Global Credit Crunchā€ – Greg Ip et al. (Dec 10, 2007) Pg. A.1
Clear, 3000-word explanation of housing bubble origin and impact on economy
ā€œMarketWatch: Surviving the Big, Scary ā€˜Mega-Bubble’ – Paul Farrell (Jul 17, 2005)

Wsj Presentation

  • 1.
    Jay FriedmanDrew HallettJoyceLeeJackie MaurnoAllie White
  • 2.
    The Wall StreetJournal StatisticsNational Edition1,698,990 circulationEastern Edition780,256 circulationNew York Metro: 289,418
  • 3.
  • 4.
  • 5.
  • 6.
  • 7.
    Wash./Baltimore Region: 77,330EarlyCoverage of Housing Bubbleā€œExisting-Home Prices Accelerate Ascent – Median Figures Jump 6.4% Amid a Weak Economy, Spurring Talk of Bubbleā€ – Patrick Barta (Aug 14, 2001) Pg. A.2
  • 8.
    ā€œI see someof these houses around here, and these are really crummy houses, selling for $300,000 or $400,000ā€
  • 9.
    ā€œPrices are headingtoward a level ā€˜a lot farther beyond what people will pay, and I think [they’re] going to fall quite a bit.ā€™ā€
  • 10.
    ā€œThe Prospect ofa Housing Bubble Floats Againā€ – Patrick Barta (Feb 8, 2002) Pg. A.2
  • 11.
    Price-to-Earnings ratio is1.6 when it’s usually 1.2
  • 12.
    ā€œHigh cost ofhousing … is being masked by extraordinarily low interest rates. An uptick in interest rates … could ā€˜cause the housing market to tip over.ā€™ā€
  • 13.
    Computer model rateshousing market on 0 to 100 scored below 50, meaning the ā€œmarket’s look is ā€˜unfavorable.ā€™ā€ā€œThe Fall of Bear Stearnsā€Kate KellyPart I: May 27, 2008 ā€œā€™I just simply have not been able to come up with anything, even with the benefit of hindsight, that would have made a difference.ā€™ā€ -- Alan Schwartz, chief executive Bear Stearns ā€œā€¦the firm’s leaders missed opportunities that might have been able to save the 85-year-old brokerage.ā€ ā€œTo outsiders, it was beginning to look as if Bear Stearns had navigated the crisis relatively deftly. Inside the firm, that view wasn’t as prevalent.ā€Part II: May 28, 2008 ā€œIt was the beginning of a frantic 72 hours that would bring the Wall Street firm to its knees…show how quickly a company that took 85 years to build could unravel.ā€ ā€œcredit- default swaps — a big, barely regulated market where one party, for a price, assumes the riske that bond or loan will go bad.ā€ (layman’s terms) ā€œInside the sixth-floor conference room…executives cheered and exchanged high-fives. They thought they had four weeks to sort out their problems.ā€ā€œIf This Is a Bubble, It Sure Is Hard to Popā€Tuesday March 30,1999 --- Dow hit 10,000
  • 14.
    Part III: May29, 2008ā€œā€¦capped a helter-skelter week — and presaged another 10 days of chaos. Interviews with more than two dozen executives and others directly involved show that Bear Stearns nearly died not once, but twice.ā€ ā€œBear Stearns Chief Financial Officer Samuel Molinaro Jr. — tired and in the same suit he’d left home in 36 hours beforeā€¦ā€ ā€œIf there were hazards, moral and otherwise, luring in the deal, the future would have to sort them out.ā€ Conclusions: May 30, 2008ā€œBear Stearns Cos., a powerhouse on Wall Street for nearly nine decades, ceased to exist Thursday in a meeting that lasted 11 minutes.ā€ ā€œIn doing so, they sealed a deal made in haste two months ago amid one of the most terrifying bank runs in history.ā€
  • 15.
    Housing Bubble Coverageā€œU.S.Mortgage Crisis Rivals S&L Meltdown; Toll of Economic Shocks May Linger for Years; A Global Credit Crunchā€ – Greg Ip et al. (Dec 10, 2007) Pg. A.1
  • 16.
    Clear, 3000-word explanationof housing bubble origin and impact on economy
  • 17.
    ā€œMarketWatch: Surviving theBig, Scary ā€˜Mega-Bubble’ – Paul Farrell (Jul 17, 2005)
  • 18.
    Addresses readers’ concernsby informing them of experts’ opinions about how to best prepare for potential bursting of bubble
  • 19.
    Ineffective: Large decreaseof ā€œhousing bubbleā€ mentions in 2006ā€œLehman Races to Find a Buyerā€September 12, 2008ā€œEmployees taking lunch breaks or a few minutes for a smoke… discussed the firm’s future.
  • 20.
    ā€œā€˜It’s over, man…unless we get bought out in the next 24 hours, it’s over,’ said a young man, in conversation with someone on his cellphone.
  • 21.
    At a fast-foodvendor across the street, people waiting to order food discussed the dive into Lehman’s share price this week
  • 22.
    ā€œAt some point,where does it stop?ā€ one said, as he headed back to the officeReporting Figuresā€œAs a result, Lehman shares fell by as much as 48% by midday Thursday, touching their lowest point since 1995ā€ – Lehman Races to Find a Buyer
  • 23.
    ā€œEvergreen Money MarketFund had $309 million, or 1.9% of its assets, invested in Lehman creditā€ – Sponsors to back Some Lehman Exposure
  • 24.
    ā€œMoney Market Fundhad $110 million, or 1.66% of its assets investedā€ – Sponsors to back Some Lehman ExposureInvestors Flee Money Funds, Moving Cash to Safer Spotsā€œAs credit markets locked up world-wide, investors have started moving their cash from money funds to safer locales, such as U.S. Treasurys and bank certificates of depositā€
  • 25.
    ā€œA run onmoney funds would have implications for corporations that depend on short-term funding such as commercial paperā€
  • 26.
    ā€œIf the fundsdon’t buy this paper, it could cause a cash crunchā€¦ā€
  • 27.
    ā€œAnother source offund money comes from ā€˜sweep accounts,’ through which brokerage customers’ spare cash is automatically deposited in a money fund.ā€Sponsors to Back Some Lehman Exposure;ā€œRussell Investments Co. said that it and its parent company, Northwestern Mutual Life Insurance Co., will support… value of Lehman credit held in two of its money fundsā€
  • 28.
    ā€œRIC Money Marketfund had $403 million in exposure to Lehman credit… RTC Short Term Investment had $75 million in exposure.ā€
  • 29.
    ā€œFidelity Investments said…nine of its general-purpose money funds had minimal exposure to a single Lehman Brothers repurchase agreement. But all of these holdings were paid in full Tuesday, so Fidelity’s taxable money-market funds now have no exposure.ā€Lehman Bankruptcyā€œLehman files for bankruptcy, Merill Sold, AIG Seeks Cashā€ Carrick Mollenkamp, Susanne Craig, Serena Ng, Aaron Lucchetti September 16, 2008ā€œRegulators and others were preparing for a hectic Monday. The New York Stock Exchange prepared contingency plans over the weekend to reassign the approximately 200 blue-chip stocks that Lehman's specialist unit trades, according to people familiar with the matter.ā€Lehman Bankruptcy Coverage Cont’dSimple break-down over the decreasing stock prices of three key companies involved in the crisis
  • 30.
    Shows significant dropin stock prices at Lehman Brothers, Merrill Lynch and AIG.
  • 31.
    Visually displayed, translatedin dollars and percentage points, understandable to everyone.September 17th, 2008:ā€œtaxpayers could reap a big profit through the government's equity stakeā€ā€œcrisis could begin to spill over into seemingly safe investments held by small investorsā€ā€œcould not get the cash quickly enough to satisfy the collateral demandsā€ā€œpotential domino effect could reach around the worldā€ā€œAIG's cash squeeze is driven in large part by losses in a unit separate from its traditional insurance businesses. That financial- products unitā€¦ā€
  • 32.
    Tracing The MoneyMarch2009:ā€œ[bail-out money] stand to benefit hedge funds that bet on a falling housing marketā€
  • 33.
    ā€œits gambling debtsare what taxpayers are paying off right nowā€
  • 34.
    ā€œFrom mid-September tothe end of last year, AIG and the government paid $5.4 billion to Deutsche and $8.1 billion to Goldman under credit default swap contracts the insurer had written.ā€
  • 35.
    ā€œindicating the underlyingassets are valued at roughly 27 cents on the dollarā€
  • 36.
    December 12th, 2009ā€œThetrades yielded Goldman less than $50 million in profits, which were mostly booked from 2004 to 2006, according to a person familiar with the matter. But they piled risks onto AIG's books, which later came to haunt the insurer and Goldman. The trades also gave Goldman a unique window into AIG's exposure to losses on securities linked to mortgages. When the federal government bailed out the insurer, Goldman avoided losses on its trades with AIG covering a total of $22 billion in assets.ā€ā€œGoldman charged more than AIG for the protection, so it was able to pocket the difference, making millions while moving the default risks to AIGā€ā€œGoldman officials said the company believed it would have been fully protected had AIG been allowed to fail because of collateral it had amassed and the additional insurance it had bought against an AIG default. The auditor, however, questioned that conclusion. The report said Goldman would have had a difficult time selling the collateral and that the firm might have been unable to actually collect on the additional insurance.ā€
  • 37.
    One Year Laterā€œLessonsof the Financial Crisis – One Year Laterā€ – Gregory Zuckerman (Aug 30, 2009) Pg. 1
  • 38.
    Gives a listof lessons learned from the crisis using hindsight that can be used to avoid a future crisis
  • 39.
    Doesn’t blame aparticular entity
  • 40.
    ā€œThe End ofWall Streetā€ Documentary
  • 41.
    Three 10 minuteparts: What Happened?, Why It Happened?, What Happens Next
  • 42.
    Collection of WSJreporters review crisis and give input on each major event
  • 43.
    End documentary bysharing how they think the economy will progress
  • 44.
  • 45.

Editor's Notes

  • #14Ā All of these items could have and would be discussed in depth further in separate articles to come in the future. They did a good job of mentioning the important issues and trying not to skew things, however more attention could have been paid to how they got into this mess in the first place with the financial products division, leverage, and CDS.
  • #15Ā In the months after, questions would rise through congress regarding where the bailout money came from, when taxpayers are being paid back, and where the money went to. In March 2009, developments surrounding the bets of AIG entered the media.Discussion of payouts to banks begins, but is not discussed, or explained very clearly, especially when it comes to determining why the government paid the banks. Goldman claims they were hedged, but this has not been discussed.This needed to be investigated more.Because it was so widespread, filtered, and complicated, it took a lot of time to sort through where the money that went to AIG actually went. This, the bailout, financial regulation (such as hedge funds and short selling) and revelations on corporate spending and compensation lingered for the next year. You can go numerous routes here – but this is one area that should have been discussed more.