The document discusses the ongoing trade case between the US and China regarding solar photovoltaic panels. It provides background on dumping and countervailable subsidy investigations, outlines the timeline of the case so far, and discusses the larger economic and political context of US-China trade relations. It argues that negotiations between the two countries could help establish mutually agreeable rules and practices to support the global solar industry in a sustainable way.

1. Solar PV and US-China Trade
William G. Morin
Senior Director, Government Affairs
Applied Materials, Inc.
GWU Solar Symposium – Economic and
Policy Barriers to the Development of
Solar Energy | 12 April 2012
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2. Solar Trade Case: The Basics
 Dumping: foreign producer sells a product in the United States at a
price that is below that producer's sales price in the “home market" or
price below cost of production
 Countervailable Subsidy: foreign government unfairly subsidizes
industry via direct cash payments, tax credits, subsidized loans and
other (not all subsidies are prohibited)
 Commerce: Import Administration (DoC-ITA) investigates foreign
producers and governments to determine whether dumping or
subsidization has occurred and calculates the amount of dumping or
subsidies
 USITC: ITC determines injury, considering all relevant economic factors
(including the domestic industry's output, sales, market share,
employment, and profits)
Both Commerce and the ITC must make affirmative determinations
on subsidies/dumping and injury (respectively)
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3. Solar Trade Case: Timeline
 19 October 2011: Coalition for American Solar Manufacturing
(SolarWorld, Helios, MX Solar, And Four Unnamed US CPV cell and
module manufacturers) files case
 8 November 2011: USITC preliminary hearing
o 7 Nov petition to change scope to include modules made in China
 16 November 2011: Commerce initiates AD case
 2 December 2011: USITC votes 6-0 to find material injury (not just
“threat of injury”) to the domestic CPV industry
 13 December 2011: USITC issues staff report explaining 6-0 vote
 30 January 2012: Commerce Department announces preliminary
“critical circumstances” in the CVD portion of the case (90 day
retroactivity)
o Comparison of May-Jul vs. Sep-Nov 2011 and May-Aug vs. Sep-Dec 2011
yielded import growth >15 percent (>15 percent = “massive”)
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4. Solar Trade Case: Timeline
 20 March 2012: Commerce imposes preliminary CVDs of 2.90 percent
(Suntech), 4.73 percent (Trina) and 3.61 percent (all others)
o Limits scope to cells made in China; no thin-film
 17 May 2012: Expected announcement of Commerce preliminary
determination in AD portion of the case
 4 June 2012: Commerce scheduled to make its final CVD determination
 11 June 2012: Commerce could – but will not – issue final AD
determination
 19 July 2012: USITC scheduled to make its final injury determination
(assuming a final affirmative determination from Commerce)
 26 July 2012: CVD order issued (assuming affirmative final
determinations from Commerce and USITC)
 5 October 2012: latest date for Commerce final AD determination
 26 November 2012: latest date for orders to issue
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5. Solar Trade Case: Industry Context
As a $90+ billion global industry, the list of solar
PV-related trade issues continues to grow
 Potential SolarWorld filing in Brussels
 China unfair trade investigations
o US state incentives (DE, MA, MN, NJ, OR, WA)
o US polysilicon manufacturers (potential)
 Japan/EU/Canada WTO dispute over Ontario FiT domestic content
requirement
 India’s NNSM local content requirements and potential AD/CVD case
against Chinese solar producers
 Growing use of local content requirements or bonus schemes
o Malaysia, Italy, Ukraine, Buy America
 Customs issues – challenge to US Customs’ decision regarding tariff
classification of AC-ready modules (and previous bypass diode issue)
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6. Solar Trade Case: US-China Context
No shortage of bilateral tensions
 Strategic: Taiwan, South China Sea, North Korea, Iran, Syria, Sudan,
cyber attacks, natural resource competition, …
 Economic: currency, debt, industrial espionage
 Trade: $300 billion trade deficit, industrial policies (indigenous
innovation), IPR, discriminatory standards, sectoral disputes (raw
materials, rare earths, tires, chickens, wind, autos, steel wheels, sinks,
wire, …)
o China’s tit-for-tat trade cases (autos, US renewable energy subsidies in 6
states; threatened polysilicon case)
o Recent White House creation of Interagency Trade Enforcement Center
Do we really need another log on the fire?
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7. Lose-Lose or Win-Win?
“To jaw-jaw is always better than to war-war”
─Winston Churchill, White House, 26 June 1954
 Litigation and enforcement are part of the rules-
based international trading system – and so are
negotiations
 “The future of renewable alternative energy, and in
this case solar energy, is too important to be left to
be ‘solved’ by litigation. …Beijing and Washington
have the means to work out a mutually and
globally beneficial way to work out a solution to the
solar panel trade case.”
─Alan Wolff, The New York Times, 20 March 2012
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8. Potential Negotiating Pathways
 Global Solar Industry Statement on Government
Support and Trade Competition (SEIA-led initiative)
o Proposes a proactive and collaborative approach
o Recommends the WTO develop “WTO Best Practices for
Solar Support Programs”
 APEC Initiative
o Working with Chinese Renewable Energy Industries
Association (CREIA) and national solar trade associations
o Consensus-based, public-private dialogue
o Development of government support best practices
o Multilateral path to improve bilateral trade dialogue
o Chemical Dialogue and Life Sciences Dialogue
 EGSA – Environmental Goods & Services Agreement
 Global Solar Council (work in progress)
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9. Potential Negotiating Pathways
World Semiconductor Council as Model?
 Global solar PV industry faces issues similar to those threatening
the semiconductor industry a generation ago –
o technology advances,
o changing market dynamics,
o Government incentive programs for R&D and manufacturing,
o intense national competition, etc.
 Creation of World Semiconductor Council (WSC) in 1996 brought
together the national trade associations and governments to
agree on a common set of approaches and a dialogue to
minimize disputes.
 Analogy not exact, but it could bring together industry and
government to craft “the rules of the road” to benefit the entire
global solar value chain
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10. A Jaw-Jaw Framework
Substitute “solar” for “semiconductor” in the WSC’s statement of
purpose and the applicability of this template becomes apparent:
“The purpose [of the WSC] will be to promote cooperative
semiconductor industry activities, to expand international
cooperation in the semiconductor sector in order to facilitate the
healthy growth of the industry from a long-term, global
perspective. WSC activities shall be undertaken on a voluntary
basis and shall be guided by principles of fairness, respect for
market principles, and consistency with WTO rules and with laws
of the respective countries or regions of each Member. The WSC
recognizes that it is important to ensure that markets will be open
without discrimination. The competitiveness of companies and
their products should be the principal determinant of industrial
success and international trade.”
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