2. Supervisors:
Prof : Hassan Elkamchouchi
Dr : Yasmine Abouelseoud
Dr : Sherif Khattab1
Alexandria University
1Cairo University
EGYPT
3. This work has been published in IEEE military
communication conference (MILCOM 2015)
“A secure geographical routing protocol for highly-
dynamic aeronautical networks”
5. Problem Statement
Traditional IFF systems use a predistributed shared key in advance. Which
make it vulnerable to some attacks.
In 1990 during the gulf war 25% of the friendly systems has been destroyed
because of traditional IFF systems
IFF systems have limited message width (low data rate)
6. Contribution
Design SAeroRP secure routing protocol message headers and modes
of the protocol.
Implement AeroRP on NS3 simulator. The source code for AeroRP
was not available because of restricted rules from the university
because this protocol was designed for US DOD (department of
defense)
Implement GS (Ground Station) updates. It provides location updates
for aircrafts.
Implement SAeroRP on NS3.
Implement attack types on AeroRP and analyze the results using NS3
simulator.
Implement AES-GCM authentication encryption method on NS3
simulator.
7. Identification Friend or Foe (IFF)
IFF System
IFF system consists of interrogator
and transponder
Interrogator uses a secondary
radar to send an encrypted
challenge message to aircraft
Aircraft decrypts the challenge
message using its transponder and
replies to the secondary radar with
a response message
8. History of IFF
In 1939 a set of half-wavelength rods was used for identification
Mark I and Mark II developed in Britain
In 1941 Mark III was developed using different frequency which we call
secondary radar
Mark IV was developed which used different frequencies for the query and
the response
In 1942 Mark V was developed
Mark X had a dozen query and response channels available
Mark XII sends out a query using L band radar
9. Network Centric Warfare
It is a military theory
that uses networking to
control all the troops in
a battle to defeat
enemies for different
types of attacks
It consists of many
layers
10. Aeronautical Ad-hoc Network (AANET)
Source: An ADS-B based secure geographical routing protocol
for aeronautical ad hoc networks
AANET Network Topology
A class of MANETs
Aircraft acts as a self-aware node
and communicates with other
aircraft and ground entities
Very high mobility of nodes in 3D
Short contact time between nodes.
11. AANET Challenges
Network-based
limited spectrum on legacy point-to-point links
highly dynamic environment
high speed of nodes (up to 7 Mach)
short contact times
frequent link breaks
long time delays for the packets delivered
Security-related
active attacks
passive attacks
12. AANET Routing protocols
AeroRP
AANET routing protocols
Topology-based Geographical
Reactive Proactive Hybrid
GLSR
GRAA
ADS-B/GPSR
ARPAM
Hierarchical Routing
Mesh in The Sky
CBHR
Link Longevity
Routing Protocol
MUDOR
DASR
13. AeroRP
● Position-based
● Ground station (GS) sends geolocation or topology updates to
improve routing accuracy
● only single-hop routing decisions
● Two phases
● neighbor discovery
● data forwarding
14. Calculating TTI in AeroRP
S
D
Vx= -14.15 m/s
Vy=-14.15m/s
Ө = -135.0
-135.0 – (-111.8) = -23.2 Ө = -111.8
200
400
600
800
1000
1200
0 200 400 600 800 1000 1200 1400 1600
Geographical Routing Protocol for Highly Dynamic Aero Nautical Networks IEEE WCNC
2011
21. Authentication and Key Transport using X.509
• Strong two-way authentication
• mutual entity authentication with optional key transport in a
challenge-response way
AN GS
CertA Ta Ra B Sa (Da)
Da
CertB Tb Ra A Sb (Db)
Db
Rb Ea (K)
22. Authenticated Encryption AES-GCM
NIST Special Publication 800-38D Draft, Recommendation for Block Cipher Modes of Operation— Galois/Counter Mode
(GCM) for Confidentiality and Authentication, April 2006.
23. Block Diagram of AES-GCM Encryption
NIST Special Publication 800-38D Draft, Recommendation for Block Cipher Modes of Operation— Galois/Counter Mode
(GCM) for Confidentiality and Authentication, April 2006.
24. Expermintal Results
• Physical layer simple wireless
• Data link layer TDMA
• Network layer AeroRP
• Transport layer UDP
• Application layer CBR
• Mobility model 3D Gauss Markov 0 pause time
• Simulation Area 150 × 150 × 1 (km)
• Simulation time 1000 sec
• Velocity 1200 m/s
• packet size 1000 byte
• Bit rate 8000 b/s
• transmission range 27800 m for AN node and 150 km for GS
Simulation Parameters
29. Conclusion And Future Work
• SAeroRP, secure geographical protocol
• Highly-dynamic aeronautical Ad-hoc networks.
• Confidentiality, authentication, and integrity for the geo-location
information and data packets
• Identify ANs as a friend or foe in the authentication phase
• Resists both black-hole and fake ground-station attacks
• Slight increase in processing time and increased bandwidth
requirements
• Future research extensions to this work include studying other
mobility models of the nodes and applying the proposed protocol
to more complex network configurations.
This work presents Secure identification techniques in air borne network. The author are Amir Reda
I would like to represent supervisors (I really appreciate their big efforts helping me to do such work)
It has been published Date at 26-28 Oct. 2015
The outline of the talk is as follows:
We first describe our problem statement and our contribution to solve these problems. Then we give a brief about traditional IFF systems. We then describe the idea of network centric warfare. We then describe Aeronautical Ad-hoc Network (AANET), with its challenges and routing protocols. We then describe AeroRP, a geographical routing protocol used for AANET. We demonstrate its security vulnerabilities, and our proposed solution to these vulnerabilities. We present the building blocks of the solution, and describe its operation in detail. Then we present experimental results and conclude.
In 1939, the U.S. Navy mounted atop a destroyer a set of half-wavelength rods on a pole. A motor rotated the pole and the rods along with it. The rotation changed the orientation of the rods, hence their degree of resonance with a distant radar and thus the strength of the radar echoes. The radar echo from the destroyer oscillated in an obvious way that identified it as a friend.
The first transponders were the Mark I and Mark II developed in Britain. These devices scanned all radar frequencies in use by friendly forces and retransmitted a pulse at the appropriate frequency whenever radar was detected.
In 1941, radar frequencies required that IFF devices go to a single frequency, independent of the radar’s frequency. Thus, the radar could operate on whatever frequency was most appropriate and an additional signal, part of the so-called “secondary” radar, would query the target’s identity. The Mark Ill was the first such device, sending and receiving signals in the 157-187 MHz.
The Mark IV, developed at the U.S. Naval Research Laboratory (NRL), was the first IFF system to use different frequencies for the query and the response 470 MHz and 493.5 MHz-but it never came into widespread use.
In 1942, the NRL began development of the Mark V, also called the UNB or “United Nations Beacon,” which was to operate near 1 GHz. The frequencies used-1 .03 GHz for queries and 1.09 GHz for replies-are still used today on both civilian and military transponders.
Mark “X,” which had a dozen query and response channels available. Mark X originally allowed aircraft to identify themselves as friendly but did not allow different responses from different friendly aircraft.
Mark XII sends out a query in the ‘‘L” radar band, at a frequency of 1.03 GHz. The query is a pair of radio pulses. The time between the two pulses can be varied and the transponder will interpret the query differently depending on the separation time between the pulses. It consists of 5 modes as in table.
Network-centric warfare is a military theory It seeks to translate an information advantage, enabled in part by information technology into a competitive advantage through the robust networking of well informed geographically dispersed forces.
AANET is a part of the network centric warfare
This movie shows different types of attacks from enemy on troops and how they defeat it
Aeronautical Ad-hoc Network (AANET) is a class of MANETs where each aircraft acts as a self-aware node and communicates with other aircraft and ground entities. AANETs are charachterized by very high mobility of nodes in 3D, which leads to a short contact time between nodes.
In AANETs we have both aircraft to aircraft communication, where each aircraft or air borne node (AN) work as a router.
AANETs have many challenges that we divide into two main categories:
First category is network-based. The limited spectrum on legacy point-to-point links, the highly dynamic environment, and the high speed of nodes (up to 7 Mach) lead to short contact times between nodes, frequent link breaks and long time delays for the packets delivered.
The second category of challenges is security-related issues, which make AANETs vulnerable to both active and passive attacks.
ANNET routing protocols can be divided into two main categories, topology-based and geographical routing protocols.
Topology-based routing protocols can be divided into three categories: reactive, proactive, and hybrid.
Reactive protocols compute an on-demand route to the destination by flooding the network using route request packets and saving the on-demand data in a routing table, which will be used later to calculate the shortest path to destination . MUDOR takes in consideration relative speed and Doppler shift to measure the quality of the link.
Proactive protocols maintain a fresh list of destinations and their routes by periodic messages.
Hybrid protocols initially establish proactive routes then it serves the demand from additionally activated nodes through reactive flooding. ARPAM is a hybrid AODV protocol for commercial aviation networks that utilizes the geographic locations to choose the shortest end to end path.
The Spray protocol involves unicast packets to a node away from destination then this node multicasts to a number of levels of neighbors.
Geographical routing protocols control and data packets can be sent in the general direction of the destination if the geographical coordinates are known. This reduces control overhead in the network.
The focus of this thesis is on a geographic routing protocol, namely AeroRP. AeroRP is a suitable routing protocol for highly dynamic AANETs and it has a better performance than traditional AANET or MANET protocols according to the researches introduced by Kansas researchers. More details on AeroRP are presented in the next few slides.
As just mentioned, we are interested in AeroRP as a good-performance routing protocol in AANETs.
AeroRP is a position-based routing protocol developed for highly dynamic airborne networks. The Ground station (GS) sends geolocation or topology updates to improve routing accuracy. AeroRP makes only single-hop routing decisions. This is reasonable as the nodes in the airborne network move at very high velocities (1200 m/s) often leading to breakage of links after an end-to-end path is determined.
AeroRP operations is divided into two phases: neighbor discovery phase and data forwarding phase.
In neighbor discovery phase, an air borne node (AN) gathers information about the network topology by using the following ways: Hello beacons, transmitted by the AN if it is not transmitting any data. This ensures that its neighboring ANs are aware of the node's presence. These messages are usually broadcasted periodically; and Ground Station Advertisements (GSAs), geo-location information updates transmitted by the ground station and broadcasted periodically.
In the data forwarding phase, the sender node determines the best next-hop to forward a packet to by using the neighbor table built in the neighbor-discovery phase. The Time-to-intercept (TTI) metric is used in determining this next hop neighbor. TTI is calculated for every node from the neighbor table.
This figure presents an example of how TTI is calculated in AeroRP. A source S sends a data packet to destination D. S is moving at 20 m/s. In order to calculate TTI, first the relative speed is calculated. The speed of S is decomposed into two components Vx and Vy along the imaginary line between S and D. Then the needed angles are calculated.
TTI is calculated by dividing the relative distance between S,D and relative speed
However, AeroRP is vulnerable to passive and active security attacks. AeroRP depends on geolocation information that it gets from GS and ANs.
The black-hole attack is one of the active attacks where a malicious node impersonates as the best neighbor and simply drops the data packet when it receives it.
The active GS attack is an active attack where a GS node sends a false geolocation information for the destination. Ans calculate wrong TTI and forward the data to nodes other than the best neighbors.
Passive attacks make any eavesdropper able to locate all the ANs that are flying nearby.
We have simulated the two types of active attacks black-hole attack and active GS attack. We studied the effect of each attack alone and their combined effect on AeroRP performance.
For the black-hole AN attack, the percentage of attackers has been varied from 10% to 40% of the total number of ANs. The AN attack has been applied to a 50–node network first to study the effect of varying the absolute number of malicious nodes.
The graph shows AeroRP with no attackers. We apply the black-hole attack with 10% of the total number of the network Ans. We found that the PDR decreased by a high percentage. When we increased the number of attackers, PDR decreased by a smaller percentage.
The reason for this diminishing losses that the attacking ANs were distributed randomly in the network. Some of the attacking nodes resided near other attacking nodes so the attacking nodes effect was slightly decreased. Also, some of the ANs were near the destination and away from attackers.
When we applied the GS Active attack, the PDR decreased. When we applied both attacks, the PDR decreased even more.
We studied the end to end delay also
1- when the ANs increased this make the packet delay decreased
2- when we apply both attacks the delay decreased allot because the data packets are lost due to attackers
In order to solve the previous problems, we propose secure the AeroRP protocol by having a strong authentication protocol due to the open nature of aeronautical environment that needs strong authentication and authenticated encryption. We also propose ion band key transport to avoid the pre-distributed shared key problems. Finally, our proposal should be fast in terms of computation to avoid incurring time delays which would affect the data forwarding and decision making of best neighbor.
In the next few slides we start by describing the building blocks of SAeroRP, our security enhancement of AeroRP.
We use X509 for authentication and shared key transport, and we use the shared key for authenticated encryption using AES-GCM
SAeroRP, which we propose in this work, is a secure geolocation routing protocol that depends on AeroRP. It is divided into two phases: Authentication and key transport phase and Authenticated encryption phase.
Authentication and key transport phase is based on X.509 strong two-way authentication. AN sends an authentication request packet that has its certificate, time stamp, random number for providing freshness for the packet, and signature of the previous data. The GS checks the validity of the request packet and replies with authentication reply packet which has its certificate, time stamp, random number, the random number that it received from AN, encrypted shared key and signature of the previous data. The AN validates the authentication reply packet and extracts the shared key to be used in phase 2.
Authenticated encryption phase is based on using AES-GCM. AN uses the shared key to authenticate and encrypt hello messages, which we call SHello. AN uses the shared key to authenticate-encrypt the data packets. The GS uses the shared key to authenticate-encrypt GS advertisement messages, which we call SGS.
The X.509 protocol provides “strong two-way” authentication message exchange, providing mutual entity authentication with optional key transport in a challenge-response way.
We suppose that each node in the network has its own certificate and 2048-bit RSA key pairs. We suppose that AN sends an authentication request packet, which includes its own certificate, time stamp, random number to guarantee freshness of message, identifier of GS and signature of the previous data.
The GS checks the validity of the packet first and then sends the authentication reply packet which includes its own certificate, time stamp, random number, AN random number from the request packet, identifier of AN that asked for authentication, the encrypted shared key and the sign of the previous data.
In the shown figure, the Air Borne Node (A) sends authentication request to GS (B), then B verifies the message and replies with the shared key and the node verifies the message and extracts the key.
CertA and CertB are the certificates of A and B. Ta and Tb are the time stamps for A and B. Ra and Rb are the random numbers generated by A and B. A and B are the identifiers of A and B. Ek(K) is the RSA public key encryption of shared key K. Sa and Sb are the digital signatures of the data.
AES-GCM is a block-cipher mode of operation that uses universal hashing over a binary Galois field to provide authenticated encryption. It can be implemented in hardware to achieve high speeds with low cost and low latency.
GCM is a mode of operation that can efficiently provide authenticated encryption at speeds of 10 gigabits per second.
In encryption we use the header as additional authenticated data used by the GHASH function and a packet sequence number as initial value (IV) to create 16-bit authentication tag and concatenate it to the encrypted data.
The destination checks the validity of the packet using the authentication tag; if valid it decrypts the packet, if not, discards it.
In encryption, the number of parallel iterations depends on the data size. The IV is encrypted using the shared key and XOR’ed with the plain text (PT) to make the cipher text (CT). Additional authenticated data is added by using GHASH function and XOR’ed with the CT. We got the authentication tag, which is concatenated to the encrypted packet. The decryption is the same process as the encryption.
The simulation parameters were as follows: The physical layer was simple wireless with TDMA scheduling, the transport layer was UDP, the application layer CBR, the mobility model 3D Gauss Markov with zero pause time, the simulation Area 150 × 150 × 1 (kms), simulation time 1000 sec, node velocity 1200 m/s, packet size 1000 bytes, CBR bit rate 8000 b/s, transmission range 27800 m for AN nodes and 150 km for GS.
We now present our ns-3 simulation results.
We compared between SAeroRP and AeroRP under the black-hole attack
SAeroRP PDR decreased slightly because the attacking nodes were not recorded in neighbor table, so the source nodes keep the data packets queued until it finds a non attacking AN or the packet is dropped.
We compared between PDR for AeroRP and SAeroRP under no attacks. They were almost the same.
The end-to-end delay for AeroRP and SAeroRP were almost the same because the fast AES-GCM added negligible delays.
This graph demonstrates the network overhead introduced by SAeroRP under no attacks. The network overhead is the amount of bytes used for control messages. Overhead for data packets was calculated by adding all control packets in bits and dividing by the simulation time; all divided by the data packet length in bits. The overhead increased in SAeroRP vs. AeroRP mainly due to the use of the authentication tag.
To summarize, SAeroRP is a secure geographical protocol in highly-dynamic aeronautical Ad-hoc networks. SAeroRP is designed to provide confidentiality, authentication, and integrity for the geo-location information and data packets of the AeroRP protocol via cryptographic techniques. SAeroRP is also used to identify the AN nodes as a friend or foe in the authentication phase. SAeroRP resists both black-hole and fake ground station attacks. The increased security comes at the cost of a slight increase in the processing time and increased bandwidth requirements.
