The Role of the United States in the Turkish Coup of 1960

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Sean Ryan 5/08/2012
Professor Carruthers U.S. – Muslim Relations
The Role of the United States in the Turkish Coup of 1960
This paper seeks to research US–Turkish relations focusing on economic aid and military
affairs. Specifically this paper focuses on the role of the U.S. in the 1960 military coup. In
my research I have discovered that the U.S. role in the military coup revolves around foreign
aid, including military and economic aid, and specifically the 1958 aid package granted to
Turkey. I argue the military coup was a consequence of the foreign aid. Turkish Prime
Minister Adnan Menderes had used the aid not to develop the Turkish economy, but rather to
sustain his position as PM of Turkey. Through the economic aid, including the 1958 aid
package, the U.S. permitted a corrupt politician who did little to develop the Turkish
economy to remain in power. By the spring of 1960, Turkey had become dangerously
unstable, both politically and economically. As a result, P.M. Menderes was ousted by a
military coup, at which time the funds from the economic aid granted to Turkey in 1958 had
been depleted, leaving Turkey unstable and unable to develop.
In researching US – Turkish relations, the intersection where the two countries primarily
meet is in military affairs. All other interactions, including economic aid are a by-product of their
military relationship. US –Turkish relations began after World War II in 1947 when Turkey lost
economic support from Britain and looked towards the US for help to stabilize their country.
Throughout the 1950’s Turkey would receive over two billion dollars in economic and military
aid from the West, primarily economic aid, with the majority coming from the US. During that

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time Turkish Prime Minster Adnan Menderes used the aid to exploit the political system to take
power at the cost of Turkey’s economic stability and their newly adopted democracy. By 1958
the Turkish situation grew increasingly unstable, resulting in a military coup in 1960.
The period from 1947 to 1960, which this paper discusses, is the first era of modern US –
Turkish relations. During this time period the US had profound effects in Turkey. Turkey’s
infrastructure was developed by the US, the latter financing projects to create roads and
highways, as well as build a dam and energy grid. In addition, their military was nearly cut in
half from 700,000 troops, to somewhere between 350,000 and 400,000, “without any loss in
military capability.”1 This was accomplished through the creation of roads which allowed for the
greater mobility of the Turkish armed forces as well as through the supply of more powerful
weapons.
However, not all the effects in US – Turkish relations were positive. While the US
developed relations with Turkey investing and providing billions of dollars in foreign aid to
develop Turkey, the US failed to promote democracy. While the US provided aid to develop
their Turkish military and economy, nowhere in the first fifteen years of US – Turkish relations
did the US government outline the promotion of democracy. Moreover, the culmination of the
foreign aid led to the indirect empowerment of Prime Minister Menderes. As soon as Prime
Minister Menderes began to receive economic aid from the US he used it to not only strengthen
his power by undermining democracy, but also turned Turkey into an autocracy. As a result of
accumulating such great power through the foreign aid provided by the US, the Turkish military
chose to oust him through a military coup.
1
George S. Harris, Troubled Alliance; Turkish-American problems in historical perspective,
1945-1971. (Washington:American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research, 1972), 53.

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This topic is relevant today as it acts as a case study for state building and providing aid
to foreign regimes. Currently the US is providing military and economic aid to a number of
countries such as Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Egypt. This is a case study because, Turkey was
being provided military and economic aid in order to resist and repel Soviet influence. Today the
US is providing aid to the above countries to build allies against terrorism. Just as Pakistan is the
barrier to Afghanistan, Turkey was the barrier to Europe and the Middle East. By using Turkey
as a case study, the not so obvious consequences of providing economic aid emerge.
Currently, there is very little new research being done on the Turkish coup of 1960. The
bulk of work that focuses on the Turkish coup of 1960 was published in the 1960’s and 1970’s.
During this time, dozens of scholarly works were published, with little being said about the
effects of the U.S. aid given to Turkey. When the majority of what has been written about the
Turkish coup of 1960, the authors did not have access to some of the primary sources that are
now available. Beginning in the later 80’s and 90’s a slew of State Department documents and
Congressional records became declassified, granting researchers more information to work with.
In order to better address what has been said by other scholars on the topic, it is important to
review primary documents including: cables to and from the Ambassador in Turkey, CIA
records, National Security Council documents, and speeches by President Truman and President
Eisenhower. By understanding what the State Department was saying and doing, a stronger
argument can be made to address the role of the U.S. in the Turkish coup of 1960.
Furthermore, newspaper articles can be compared with State Department documents
with, in order to gain a better idea of what the government knew about the situation in Turkey.
Moreover, since the majority of the books on the topic were published during the 1960’s and
1970’s, when digital archives didn’t exist, it is possible that new information can be discovered.

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By combing books, newspaper articles, and government documents, it will be possible to build
on what has previously been said on the subject, and answer my question.
The first section of this paper will briefly introduce the context out of which US –
Turkish relations rose, and then discuss the question: what was US foreign aid and what was it
intended for? This question is important to answer in order to understand the nature of US –
Turkish relations and more importantly the influence the US had on Turkey. Although the
answer to the aid question may seem obvious it is important to define foreign aid in order to see
how intensely it affected Turkey. By answering this question, a better understanding of the
second section will emerge.
The second section of this paper discusses the question: Why couldn’t the Turkish
political system resolve its own problems and what influence if any did the US have on the
Turkish political System? This section discusses the political developments in Turkey, and the
US support for PM who turned Turkey, a newly democratic country into an autocracy. In this
section, I argue the US not only failed to foster the growth of democracy, but also influenced the
decline of democracy, which ultimately lead to the Turkish coup of 1960.
The third section of this paper takes into consideration the reaction of the US government
to the Turkish coup of 1960 and what that reaction says about US influence on foreign regimes.
This section is particularly interesting since it points out how the US quickly abandoned its long-
time partner, PM Menderes, in support of the Turkish military. Not only had democracy been
undermined in Turkey by the PM with the help of the US, but democracy had been further
undermined through the coup without interruption to the US-Turkish relationship. The
importance of this section is that it highlights the fact that it did not matter to policy makers in
Washington who was in control in Turkey as long as they acted in the interest of the US.

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The fourth section and conclusion of this paper answers the question: how did the US
influence the Turkish coup of 1960. This is accomplished by elaborating on points and
implications made in the three previous sections. This includes the effects of foreign aid, mainly
the indirect empowerment of a corrupt PM. In addition the section considers US influence of
foreign regimes arguing that the US has the power to influence political policy just as it has the
power of influencing economic policy through the use of foreign aid. The goal of this review is
to heighten awareness of US influence on foreign regimes along with the not so obvious
consequences of providing foreign aid.
Context
US-Turkish relations began with the start of the Cold War. The Cold War was the
contention between the Soviet Union and the West initially over the division of Europe, but
expanding to include the rest of the world. One of the divisions the Soviet Union sought was
Turkey. At the time, Turkey was coming out of WW II, with a depressed economy, characterized
by high inflation. At the time, Turkey was under diplomatic pressure from the USSR which
threatened to take possession of the Turkish straits as well as several Turkish provinces along the
Black Sea coast and the Armenian border. As a result therefore, Turkey was experiencing
enormous pressure from the Soviet threat, which led to Turkey concentrating thirty five percent
of its national budget to strengthen the Turkish armed forces in order to meet the demands
necessary to resist a Soviet invasion. This led to the US decision to provide Turkey with military
aid so that Turkey could dedicate more of its funds towards the development of the Turkish

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economy. 2 In addition, Britain was no longer able to provide Turkey with economic aid. For
these reasons, Turkey sought to develop a military alliance with the US. And the US decided to
provide Turkey with military aid so that Turkey could dedicate more of its funds towards the
development of the Turkish economy. 3
At the time when the Cold War began the US was fearful of the USSR. What the US
feared most was the massive conventional forces of the Soviet Union that could potentially
overrun Europe in a matter of weeks. During WW II the SU displayed a powerful opposition not
only to Germany, but also to the way the world would be divided up after the war ended. In
addition, the threat of the Cold War was the threat of nuclear war. Moreover, the US was afraid
smaller weaker nations would move towards Soviet influence. Two nations which heavily
impressed the US were Greece and Turkey. According to the US assessment, Greece was highly
vulnerable to Soviet pressure against its sovereignty as they sought to undermine the political
climate in Greece through the support of guerrilla warfare. The result of the success of Soviet
pressure in Greece would act as an entrance point for Soviet influence in Europe and Turkey.
Therefore, the US needed to take counteraction, which was when foreign aid to Turkey began.
2 U.S. Department of State, Current Policies of the Government of the United States of America Relating to the
National Security: Volume I, Geographical Area Policies: Part V, Middle East - Turkey. Washington,DC: U.S.
GPO, (November 1, 1952), 2.
3 U.S. Department of State, Current Policies of the Government of the United States of America Relating to the
National Security, 2.

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This map highlightsthe Turkish straitsincluding the Bosphorus and the Dardanelles,the oceans they connect,as
well as the base areas along the straitswhich the Soviet's sought to control.The loss of control over the straits
would effectively close off global trade routes,an act which constitutes war.
What was Foreign aid from the US intended for?
Foreign aid from the US to Turkey was a National Security expenditure. Within US–
Turkish relations aid was initially in the form of military assistance, but would evolve into a
more dynamic program including: economic development, trade, foreign support, and the
promotion of America’s image as “leaders of the free world”. When US–Turkish relations began,
aid to Turkey was outlined by the Greek – Turkish Assistance Act of 1948 which was a part of
the Truman Doctrine (1947).
In 1947 American foreign policy, the Cold War, and American foreign aid was laminated
in the Truman Doctrine. The Truman Doctrine was a unique Presidential statement since it was
the first US Act that reached out to the global theater as the foremost global power as well as
world police. The Truman Doctrine was significant for several reasons. First of all, it was the
first major doctrine which directly set out a US policy to combat the Cold War. Another
significant characteristic of the Truman doctrine was that it outlined US commitment to foreign

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assistance for developing countries that needed military and economic aid in order to help sustain
them and contain Soviet influence. In the Truman doctrine, President Harry Truman stated US
foreign policy’s primary object was "to support free peoples who are resisting attempted
subjugation by armed minorities or by outside pressures."4 The free peoples Truman spoke of
were the Greeks and Turks. The Truman Doctrine set out to provide aid for the Greeks and Turks
to resist Soviet aggression through the Greek – Turkish Aid Act.
The Greek-Turkish Assistance Act of 1948 outlined US commitment to Turkey and
Greece. Within this commitment was a provision of financial assistance for the Turkish military,
in return for US access to Turkish territories. The primary concern of this Act was the US
concern for Turkey’s military capabilities as compared to Greece which received both military
and economic aid from the US. This was because the NSC viewed Turkey as being more stable,
while Greece’s future was “precarious” making Turkey a more reliable strategic partner in
combating the SU. As a result, the NSC’s interest was more greatly directed towards Turkey
with a vested interest in “greater long-range strategic interest in the military establishment of
Turkey.”5
Within US–Turkish relations the second form of aid economic, which was outlined under
the Marshall Plan (MP), the economic counterpart to and following the Truman Doctrine. The
Marshall Plan influenced a new mode of national security in the form of economic aid. Also
known as the Economic Cooperation Act, it was a an economic aid coordination system headed
by the US, in partnership with European countries in order to help develop not only European
countries, but also Turkey, to resist Soviet influence. Under the Marshall Plan Turkey would
4 Harry Truman, “ The Truman doctrine.” Speech, Remarks to Congress,(Washington,DC, March 12, 1947).
5 U.S. Department of State, Executive Secretary Report to the National Security Council. US Objectives with
Respect to Greece and Turkey to Counter Soviet Threats to US Security. (Washington,DC: U.S. GPO, March 4,
1949), 7.

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receive significantly less aid than most other European Countries, thought the actual amount
received is difficult to determine.
The idea was to provide assistance to help aid Europe and Turkey recover from the
economic effects of World War II. Congress rationalized, “[I]ndustrial production in Europe was
rising, but imported raw materials and foodstuffs were relatively much higher in price than
before the war and could only be procured for dollars which Europe [and Turkey] did not have
and could not quickly earn.”6 In order for Europe and Turkey to develop their economies,
assistance was provided to invest in their economies so they could increase exports and in turn
afford imports such as raw materials. In addition, the MP erased trade barriers and promoted
trade amongst European countries to support each other’s economies. While the MP lasted a
short four years, economic aid from the US to Turkey would continue after the MP ended.
An additional objective of providing economic aid to Turkey was to help develop the
Turkish economy enough so that the Turkish economy would be more independently capable in
supporting its own military with less US assistance. The NSC viewed “military and economic
assistance programs closely intertwined and interdependent.”7 While military aid was meant to
take the burden of the Turkish national budget so Turkey could work on strengthening its
economy, economic aid was meant to boost the Turkish economy so they could reduce the strain
of US military aid.
However, to limit the objective of helping Turkey “make progress in the direction of the
goal of standing on their own feet” through economic aid seems naïve considering the exploits
6 United States, The Foreign Aid Program: Hearings Before the Special Committee to Study the Foreign Aid
Program, United States Senate, Eighty-fifth Congress,first session,pursuant to S. Res. 285, 84th Cong., and S. Res.
35, 85th Cong. (Washington,DC: U.S. GPO, 1957), 6.
7 U.S. Department of State, Foreign relations of the United States, 1955-1957. Volume X, Foreign Aid and
Economic Defense Policy. (Washington,DC: U.S. GPO, 1989), 48.

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that benefited the US from the US–Turkish relationship as it stood in the 1950s.8 By providing
aid, the US was able to exploit Turkey’s weakness. In addition to helping to strengthen the
Turkish armed forces, conditions were agreed to which benefited the US. In the aid agreements,
in return for aid the US was given access to Turkey including the stationing of American
soldiers, as well as the use of Turkish air force bases. According to the Executive Secretary,
Turkey could be used for its proximity to the waterways leading to Russia, the Suez Canal, and
Arab oil fields. One example fell under National Security Council Resolution 36, which the
stated objective was to negotiate with Turkey to agree to the construction of airfields by the US,
in return for aid, so long as “Turkey would facilitate immediate US access to such air fields in
the event of war.”9 US soldiers in Turkey during the 1950s numbered over thirteen thousand, and
access to bases was strategically important in US missions in the Middle East as well as the
installation of Intermediate Range Ballistic Missiles (IRBM). Both the USSR’s threat to Turkish
sovereignty and their poor economy made Turkey vulnerable to US national interests.
What’s most outstanding about the US – Turkish relationship in relation to foreign aid
was the commitment the US made to Turkey. Up until 1955, the US provided Turkey with nearly
two billion dollars in aid, in return for their support in fighting the USSR.10 While military and
economic aid from the US to Turkey appears to be benevolent it directly benefits the US and US
interests at a cost. This commitment included making Turkey more vulnerable to Russian
aggression due not only to the building up and strengthening of the Turkish armed forces, but
also to the military access to Turkey by the US.
8 U.S. Department of State, Foreign relations of the United States, 48.
9 U.S. Department of State, Executive Secretary Report to the National Security Council. US Objectives with
Respect to Greece and Turkey to Counter Soviet Threats to US Security. (Washington,DC: U.S. GPO, March 4,
1949), 17.
10 “Prime Minister of Turkey Sensitive to Criticism,” Geneva Daily Times, April 21, 1955. (New York State Digital
library. accessed November 12, 2011).

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However, in 1955, the National Security Council considered cutting off relations with
Turkey after the large amount of aid the US provided to Turkey had done little to affect the
Turkish economy or Turkish economic policy. Yet it seems US image may have been equally
important to the development of the Turkish economy. According to the NSC:
Mr. Hughes, referring to Secretary Hoover's earlier statement, inquired where the Turks
could go if they came to a parting of the ways with the United States. Secretary Hoover
replied that he did not think they would "go" anywhere, but that they could cease to be
satisfactory allies. Admiral Radford commented that it was well within the realm of
possibility that the Turks would withdraw from NATO and embrace neutralism. Such
moves would greatly embarrass U. S. policy. Admiral Radford went on to point out that
we ourselves were largely responsible for the elevated force goals which the Turks and
adopted.11
This quotation illustrates the concern of the US with its image as measureable by the amount of
aid they provided Turkey. In conclusion, the US decided to continue relations with Turkey at
least in part to preserve its image in the world, illustrating foreign aid as an expenditure of
national security. In the end, they resolved to cut off economic aid to Turkey.
This view and the failure of Turkey to develop their economy led to a review of the
foreign aid given to Turkey in 1956 and 1957. According to the NSC, economic aid should
remain suspended until Turkey made certain economic reforms including the devaluation of the
11
U.S. Department of State, Discussion at the 264th Meeting of the NSC 11/3/55, Topics Include: U.S. Policy on
Turkey; National Security; U.S. Policy Toward Taiwan; Arab-Israeli Situation; Situation in Brazil Following the
Elections. (Washington,DC: U.S. GPO, Nov 4, 1955), 5.

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Turkish lira12. This was because any aid to Turkey, military or economic, would not be able to be
absorbed. The NSC rationalized that since the Turkish economy’s poor trade balance prevented
them from affording raw imports as well as the overvaluation of the Turkish lira, aid would be
more harmful than helpful in the development of the Turkish economy.
A US Congressional report on the US Foreign Aid Program, the 10th anniversary of the
US – Turkish relations in 1957 reiterated this claim. In the report it was suggested that “no
substantial increase in economic aid to Turkey over present levels be made available.”13 In
addition, the Turkish government was induced to devalue their currency, increase investments to
education, and complete unfinished projects before any more economic aid would be distributed.
In 1958, the US provided Turkey with an aid including 359 million credits, and the
consolidation of 400 million dollars in debt.14 The timing of the aid is peculiar considering the
events surrounding it, and their repercussions. Turkey was on the brink of defaulting on its debts,
which would be a huge blow to the usefulness of Turkey. However, the Turkish Prime Minister
did agree to devalue the Turkish lira and several other reforms, which was a condition to
reinstate aid from the US. Yet, it was also at this time there were rumors of a vote of
confidence.15 Moreover, the Iraqi Monarch, a member of the Baghdad Pact, was overthrown in a
coup a few weeks prior to this aid agreement. Since Turkey, also a member of the pact, was
highly dissatisfied with Turkish Prime Minister over the handling of the economy, the US must
have been concerned for his fate. If the Prime Minister were overthrown, the US faced losing an
12 Lira is the dollar currency used in Turkey.
Feroz Ahmad, The Turkish Experiment in Democracy: 1950-1975 (Boulder, Colo: Westview Press, for the Royal
Institute of International Affairs, London. 1977), 140.
15 Sam Pope Brewer, “Turkish Premier Challenged; Ailing Economy May Oust Him,” New York Times, October 13,
1958.

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important ally, and strategic asset. As a result, it seems aid once again resumed as an expenditure
of national security.
Why couldn’t the Turkish political system resolve its own problems and what influence if any
did the US have on the Turkish political System?
Turkey’s political system, from the Ottoman Empire to the nineteenth century, was
rooted in despotism. The Ottoman Empire was ruled by the Sultan who was akin to a King and
the state a monarchy. In the second half of the nineteenth century, the Ottoman Empire began to
make reforms in order to compete with the west, and in doing so looked to the west. In 1876 a
constitution was introduced by the Sultan. Later in 1923 Turkey, a secular republic was founded,
and the Sultanate was abolished. From the founding of the Turkish Republic to 1950, Turkey
was a single-party republic. Obviously, Turkey had little experience with democracy. While
Turkey adopted democracy in 1950, they were vulnerable to the challenges of both adopting and
maintaining a democracy. This meant Turkey needed guidance from experienced democracies in
order to overcome such challenges. Yet despite the Turkish search for western aid, the US failed
to foster the growth of democracy.
In 1950, the Democratic Party won the first democratic election, and Adnan Menderes
became the Prime Minister. The Democratic Party had won by running on the platform as
progressives, promising to reform Turkey, and representing and addressing the needs of the
Turkish population. However, PM Menderes quickly became an autocratic leader. During his
time in power, he exploited economic aid for political gains, limited the freedom of the press,
limited the opposition party, and manipulated in various ways the 1954 and 1958 elections. The
culmination of these undemocratic and self-serving policies ultimately led to both a usurpation of

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power and destruction of the Turkish economy by PM Menderes. Therefore, I argue that the US
through foreign aid enabled the PM to stay in power as long as he did, which in turn wrought
political instability, and destroyed the Turkish economy.
After PM Menderes was elected, he began a series of economic projects to develop the
Turkish economy. However, his chief goal seemed to have been in the creation of jobs in order
to galvanize his voting base. Menderes spread economic aid across Turkey far and thin.
According to George Harris:
Menderes sought high-impact, showy projects; he was noted for scattering state economic
enterprises, such as sugar factories, over the countryside to reward the politically faithful,
but in locations and numbers that made efficient operation unlikely.16
As a result, the Turkish state spent more money than it earned due to the country’s poor trade
balance. The consequence of the poor trade balance made it impossible to import batteries and
spark plugs for the tractors, and Turkey was unable to produce beats for the sugar factories
further decreasing exports. By 1954, Turkey was on the verge of bankruptcy and demanded more
aid from the US.
Since the US began to distribute aid to Turkey, they continued to be troubled by Turkey’s
economic policies including low taxation, lax import policies, heavy subsidies of the agriculture
sector, and the overvaluation of the Turkish currency. While it was necessary for Turkey to
increase taxes, finance imports through capital earned with Turkish exports, minimalize
agricultural subsidies, and devalue the Turkish currency, it was politically unattractive. Since
16 George S. Harris, Troubled Alliance; Turkish-American problems in historical perspective,
1945-1971. (Washington:American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research, 1972), 72.

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Menderes was concerned with his re-election, increasing taxes would decrease his popularity. In
addition, he relied on the agricultural subsidies for the same purpose. Therefor it was necessary
for him to rely on aid for raw imports. Moreover, not only would devaluing the Turkish currency
harm his re-election, “it would mean slower economic growth.”17
The US reaction to Menderes’ demand for more economic aid in 1954 was cautious. The
continuation of further military and economic aid was re-evaluated in addition to the US-Turkish
relationship. The NSC saw Turkey as a huge and costly problem. On the one hand, the US had
made a commitment to Turkey. Yet on the other hand, any aid to Turkey would further hurt
Turkey’s economy since any further aid would increase inflation. In regards to economic aid, the
US could not justify any more aid until Menderes would carry out the above mentioned reforms
which were a pre-requisite to economic development. It would be nearly four years before such
reforms were agreed upon and the recommencing of aid.
While the US used leverage to force economic reforms in Turkey, the NSC appeared to
have been unconcerned with the political developments in Turkey. The first and obvious problem
of PM Menderes was that he used the economic aid not to develop the Turkish economy, but for
his own self-interest. The US did not cut off the aid because of corruption. They cut off aid
because of the economic consequences of the misuse of funds which interfered with the goal of
making Turkey independently able to support the own military. Moreover, Menderes self-serving
policies were not limited to economic development as they were also intertwined with political
developments as he challenged the virtues of the democratic process.
In 1953, PM Menderes began to undermine democracy to ensure his re-election, as well
as bring in his own men into office. First, he boldly confiscated the funds of the Republican
17 Harris, Troubled Alliance,74.

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Peoples Party (RPP), the dominant opposition party in Turkey. The RPP funds which totaled
more than 250 million was more capital than the Turkish National Bank possessed.18 The DP
was able to justify this move “on the grounds that it had been illegally acquired through the
misuse of public funds during the single party era.”19 Menderes did not confiscate the RPP
finances in the name of justice. He confiscated the funds for the ulterior motive of empowering
the DP since it was the DP who took possession of them. Moreover, by confiscating their funds,
he took away their ability to run a successful political campaign.
Not only did Menderes undermine democracy in order to attack the opposition party, but
he also undermined democracy to limit members of his own party. In the 1954, Menderes chose
his own DP candidates as he “overrode the electoral list of the provincial bodies and put up his
own candidates in the coming general election.”20 In this case, Menderes could not use justice as
a pretext for his actions. They show not only a blatant disregard for democratic process, but also
the furthering of his political interests. By lining the assembly seats with his own appointed men,
he was able to implement his own legal policies, such as limiting the freedom of press, vis-à-vis
selected appointment.
Around the same time Menderes also sought to limit the freedom of the press. After the
election of 1954, Turkey’s deteriorating economy was becoming obvious, Menderes sought to
silence any criticisms against him or the DP and elaborated on the Turkish Press Law to make it
criminal offense to say anything negative about the Turkish government. Since the DP was the
Turkish government, sans 31 assembly seats, this meant anything negative about the DP or its
18 Feroz Ahmad, The Turkish Experiment in Democracy: 1950-1975 (Boulder, Colo: WestviewPress, for the Royal
19 Cihat Göktepe, “1960 ‘Revolution’ in Turkey and the British Policy Towards Turkey". Milletlerarası
MünasebetlerTürk Yıllığı. 30: 139-189, (2001): 148.
20 Feroz Ahmad, The Turkish Experiment in Democracy: 1950-1975 (Boulder, Colo: WestviewPress, for the Royal

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policies. In 1956, the Press Law was updated “for which papers could be closed and newsmen
jailed for ‘damaging public confidence in or the prestige of the government’”.21 As a result,
Menderes was able to further limit opposition to the DP or himself.
By 1957, conditions in Turkey had further eroded. Many raw materials and other imports
such as coal, sparkplugs, batteries, and coffee were virtually non-existent. Freedom and
economic prosperity were limited due to Menderes destructive policies, and the PM feared a loss
of dominance of the DP in the upcoming general election in 1958. Since 1954 Menderes was
gasping for aid. Without it, conditions in Turkey were worsening since he had no aid to exploit
to satisfy his constituents. Consequently, “only on 4 September (1957) did the democrats
announce that the general election would be held on October 27 (1957), since holding them in
1958 would further reduce the dominance of the DP.”22 By holding elections early, and giving
the opposition little time to prepare for the election, the DP was able to maintain dominance in
Turkey.
The tide against Menderes was overwhelming in 1958. Turkey’s foreign debt rose to 600
million dollars. Protests were widespread, and opposition to his rule was continually increasing.
With the lack of consumer imports and raw materials life in Turkey and the inability to continue
to make payments on her debts, Turkey was nearing collapse. As a result, Menderes finally gave
into the demands of the US to reform the Turkish economy through a stabilization program
implemented by the US. However by this point it was obvious that Turkey was dangerously
unstable, and the likelihood of Turkey turning itself around and becoming stable was
improbable.
21 Walter F. Weiker, The Turkish Revolution 1960-1961; aspects ofmilitary politics. (Washington:Brookings
Institution, 1963), 11.
22
Feroz Ahmad, The Turkish Experiment in Democracy: 1950-1975 (Boulder, Colo: WestviewPress, for the Royal

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The US knew development in Turkey at this point would be slow and drawn out. The
commitment of the PM to the stabilization program would at the very least ensure the reduction
of inflation so that aid could start to be effective. Still, the US had no other option than to
continue to give their support to as well as maintain positive relations with Menderes. The
possible consequences of losing Turkey would be a huge setback for the US in the Cold War.
First of all, since Turkey was next to the USSR, and a member of NATO, the US could not take
the risk of losing Turkey. If the US could prevent the fall of Turkey, then they would do
whatever within their power to do so.
In addition to Turkey’s proximity to the USSR, Turkey’s strategic geographic location
could serve as a portal to Europe and the Middle East for the Soviets. Two weeks prior to the
1958 aid package President Eisenhower elaborated:
The domination of the Arab Middle East by Nasser with the support of the vast power of
the Soviet Union would have certain grave consequences for the western world ... I need
not dwell on what such a course of developments would entail for Israel and Turkey.23
It seems President Eisenhower was reminiscing over recent events in Egypt where Gamal Abdel
Nasser took over power in Egypt and nationalized the Suez Canal. From this, the Suez Crisis
ignited since Nasser restricted passage between the Mediterranean and Red Seas causing Israel,
France and Britain to invade Egypt. Influenced by a Nasser controlled Egypt, Soviet influence in
the Middle East, the occurrence of the coup in Iraq, the mass-discontent and presence of protests
in Turkey, US support for Menderes became a top priority as “a threat to… political
23 J. Abadi, "Israel and Turkey: From Covert to Overt Relations," CONFLICT QUARTERLY. 15 (2): 104-128,
(1995): 108.

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independence of the [Baghdad Pact] members would be viewed by the US with the utmost
gravity.”24 However unlikely the chances of a coup were, with the great instability in the region,
the US had to act or the whole of the Middle East could be lost and its peripheral area including:
North Africa, Israel, and Iran would be further threatened. So obviously the US concern for
Turkey was not limited to Turkey but also the greater region.
However, not even the aid package could have saved Turkey by this point. The
culminating effects of Menderes rule were far reaching giving the perfect ingredients for a coup.
Turkey’s economy had been miserable, and even after aid was again in motion there was no
improvement. Moreover, with Menderes turning into an autocratic leader with none of the
reforms that the Turks wanted made, Turkey became politically unstable. In becoming an
autocratic leader, Menderes alienated much of Turkish society. Certainly Menderes was aware of
his having alienated the RPP, members of his own party, as well as journalists. Yet, the most
glaring and costly consequence of the PM’s autocratic rule was the inadvertent alienation of the
Turkish military.
Since the Turkish economy was so bad, soldiers pay did not increase while the cost of
living did. The Turkish soldiers were demoralized and wounded by the poor conditions that they
had succumbed to due to his inept policies. Throughout Turkish history, soldiers had been among
the most highly respected members of Turkish society and professions.25 But with little money to
live on, their social position was significantly lowered; with the attitude of Turkish citizens
towards them changing. Considering the amount of aid Turkey received, with none of it reaching
the soldiers, another group, with guns, become alienated as well. So it was no surprise in May
24 Dwight Eisenhower, “U.S. Role in the Middle East.” Speech, Remarks to Congress, (Washington,DC, January 5,
1957).
25
Metin Tamkoç, The Warrior Diplomats. (Salt Lake City: University of Utah Press, 1976), 54.

20
1960 when the military launched a coup. It lasted a mere four hours, completed by 8:30 in the
morning. 26
Map source: Report to the congress on the mutual security program. 1957. Washington:U.S. Government Printing
Office. Pg. 26.
What was the reaction of the US to the Turkish coup of 1960 and what does it say about US
influence on foreign regimes?
The reaction of the US to the Turkish coup of 1960 was both cautious and positive. On
the one hand, Menderes was an unreliable ally. Due to his destructive economic policies, Turkey
was extremely vulnerable to Soviet control. In addition, the NSC agreed with the admissions of
the Turkish General Cemal Gürsel. In a conversation with the NSC he:
26
Feroz Ahmad, The Turkish Experiment in Democracy: 1950-1975 (Boulder, Colo: WestviewPress, for the Royal

21
[F]elt Menderes government had forgotten about the rights of individual, freedom of
press, constitutionality of its acts and in fact had embarked upon series of legislative acts
which had for their purposes further repression of people in Turkey.27
Moreover, since General Gürsel had expressed shared political and economic values the
American response was amicable. Moreover, the US was pleased that US – Turkish relations
would continue. More importantly was it was now possible, though in the longer term, for
Turkey to begin to develop herself. Within a few short days after the coup, the US recognized the
new leadership in Turkey. Yet on the other hand, the US was worried about the successful
transfer of government, and political stability. Before the US could resume foreign aid, and
Turkey continue to strengthen itself, Turkey’s political house had to be in order.
What’s interesting to note is how the US continued relations with Menderes as
destructive and uncooperative he was, but in a single day they established cordial relations with
the military regime. Fletcher Warren, the US Ambassador to Turkey had commented in his
conversation with the general “referring to my service in Latin America… it was by far the most
precise, most efficient, and most rapid coup I had ever seen.” From this admission it seems the
US was genial for the first time in nearly a decade in reference to US – Turkish relations.
While it is obvious why the US would make relations with Turkey a priority the reaction
still leaves some bewilderment. This is because of the Turkish General made the paradoxical
response stating that the coup was necessary to protect the rights and freedoms of Turkish people
from its government. Not only are military coups undemocratic as they don’t involve political
progress, but the US had supported PM Menderes while he was extremely despotic.
27 U.S. Department of State, Foreign relations of the United States, 1958-1960. Volume X, Part 2, Eastern Europe ;
Finland ; Greece ; Turkey: Diplomatic Papers, (Washington,DC: U.S. GPO, 1993), 846.

22
A main reason for this seems to be the US was more confident in Turkey’s ability to
strengthen herself under than control of the military than they were with PM Menderes. Only at
the end of his career did the US become despondent with his undemocratic actions. This is
because things had gotten so completely out of hand that they worried “over possibility of his
taking drastic actions against prominent and respected leaders of the opposition.”28 Ironically, the
result of such an action would be a military coup. The bottom line was that the US did not care
who was in power as long as Turkey remained an ally, and was stable enough to resist
succumbing to Soviet control, thereby serving US interests.
Finally, what was the role of the US in the Turkish coup in 1960?
The role of the US in the Turkish coup of 1960 was indirect, as it was a consequence of
the economic aid it provided to Turkey. Through the economic aid, the US created a political
climate in Turkey where the military action against the government was necessary to take control
of a country on the verge of collapsing. Throughout his term in power, Menderes had exploited
economic aid from the US for his own benefit. Without economic support from the US, PM
Menderes would not have been able to build up his power as he used the aid to reward those who
politically favored him. In receiving the aid, PM Menderes was “inevitably, although not
deliberately” empowered.29 By 1954 it was apparent to the US State Department that the PM was
misusing the aid. While the US was troubled with the PM they only used the aid as leverage to
induce economic reforms, as they cut off economic aid until he made the necessary economic
reforms.
28 U.S. Department of State, Foreign relations of the United States, 1958-1960. Volume X, Part 2, Eastern Europe ;
Finland ; Greece ; Turkey: Diplomatic Papers, (Washington,DC: U.S. GPO, 1993), 834.

23
This is not to say that the US was not concerned with the political circumstances, as
in a 1955 unsigned telegram from the US Embassy in Turkey to the Department of State
remarked:
The logical conclusion of our approach would be that since we cannot change his policy,
we would have to change his government. Did we want Turkey to become another Syria?
He [Menderes] feared we had no realization of the importance of Turkey vis-à-vis the
Soviet Union of the essentiality in this critical spot. He was beginning to feel that he
could just drop the whole matter. Turkey could get along and would confound our
predictions. He was sure our refusal to help Turkey in her time of need would long
remain to trouble our conscience.30
This remark on Turkey becoming another Syria refers to the series of coups Syria experienced
between 1949 and 1954, with the US involvement in the first of the three. This comment
illustrates how the US was troubled by Menderes, viewing him as an obstacle to the US goal of
helping to strengthen Turkey to resist Soviet dominance. Yet the concern of the US resolved to
focus on Turkey’s backwards economic policies and try and fix them by using aid as leverage
and hope for the best. What was most important for the US was for Turkey to remain an ally to
the West, to share some of the burden in supporting the Turkish military and resist Soviet
dominance.
What was not so obvious was how Menderes’ political and economic policies were
intertwined and interdependent. As Menderes continued to use aid for his own political gains, he
30 U.S. Department of State, Foreign relations of the United States, 1955-1957. Volume XXIV, Soviet Union;
Eastern Mediterranean: Diplomatic Papers, (Washington,DC: U.S. GPO, 1989), 632.

24
became more and more authoritarian. In fact in 1959, the British Ambassador to Turkey Sir
Bernard Burrows pointed out:
Menderes was heard to mention rather enviously on more than one occasion how much
easier it was for a totalitarian system like Russia to carry out measures of economic
development in a short time.31
While the US was providing aid to Turkey, Menderes was using it to transform himself into the
very same entity which the aid was meant to resist. As a result, the Turkish military had no
option other than to depose him and take over the country’s political system.
While the outcome of the Turkish coup of 1960 was positive for the US and the Turkish
people with the military returning control to a civilian government in four months, the outcome
in a similar situation could be different. The lesson for the US is that thoughtful dissemination of
aid is necessary to avert future unintended outcomes. In addition, the US should be cautious in
supporting foreign regimes whose political aims are contrary to the causes for which foreign aid
is intended.
31 Cihat Göktepe, “1960 ‘Revolution’ in Turkey and the British Policy Towards Turkey". Milletlerarası
MünasebetlerTürk Yıllığı. 30: 139-189, (2001): 154.

25
Bibliography
Primary Sources:
Dwight Eisenhower, “U.S. Role in the Middle East.” Speech, Remarks to Congress,Washington,DC, January 5,
1957.
Harry Truman, “The Truman doctrine.” Speech, Remarks to Congress,Washington,DC, March 12, 1947.
U.S. Department of State, Current Policies of the Government of the United States of America Relating to the
National Security: Volume I, Geographical Area Policies: Part V, Middle East - Turkey. Washington,DC: U.S.
GPO, Nov 1, 1952, 2.
U.S. Department of State, Discussion at the 264th Meeting of the NSC 11/3/55, Topics Include: U.S. Policy on
Turkey; National Security; U.S. Policy Toward Taiwan; Arab-Israeli Situation; Situation in Brazil Following the
Elections. Washington,DC: U.S. GPO, Nov 4, 1955, 5.
U.S. Department of State, Executive Secretary Report to the National Security Council. US Objectives with Respect
to Greece and Turkey to Counter Soviet Threats to US Security. Washington,DC: U.S. GPO, March 4, 1949, 7, 8,
17.
U.S. Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955-1957. Volume X, Foreign Aid and Economic
Defense Policy. Washington,DC: U.S. GPO, 1989, 48.
U.S. Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955-1957. Volume XXIV, Soviet Union; Eastern
Mediterranean: Diplomatic Papers, Washington,DC: U.S. GPO, 1989, 632.
U.S. Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958-1960. Volume X, Part 2, Eastern Europe ;
Finland ; Greece ; Turkey: Diplomatic Papers, Washington,DC: U.S. GPO, 1993, 834, 846.
United States,The Foreign Aid Program: Hearings Before the Special Committee to Study the Foreign Aid
35, 85th Cong. Washington,DC: U.S. GPO, 1957, 6, 1172, 1173.
United States,Report to the Congress on the Mutual Security Program, Washington,DC: U.S. GPO, 1957, 27.
Newspapers:
Geneva New York Times
“Prime Minister of Turkey Sensitive to Criticism,” Geneva Daily Times, April 21, 1955. New York State Digital
library. accessed November 12, 2011,
http://fultonhistory.com/Newspaper%2011/Geneva%20NY%20Daily%20Times/Geneva%20NY%20Daily%20Time
s%201955%20Apr Jun%201955%20Grayscale/Geneva%20NY%20Daily%20Times%201955%20Apr-
Jun%201955%20Grayscale%20-%200279.pdf
New York Times
Sam Pope Brewer, “Turkish Premier Challenged; Ailing Economy May Oust Him,” New York Times, October 13,
1958.

26
Secondary Sources:
Cihat Göktepe, “1960 ‘Revolution’ in Turkey and the British Policy Towards Turkey". Milletlerarası Münasebetler
Türk Yıllığı.30: 139-189, (2001): 148, 154.
Feroz Ahmad, The Turkish Experiment in Democracy: 1950-1975 Boulder, Colo: Westview Press,for the Royal
Institute of International Affairs, London. 1977, 47, 56, 87, 140, 154.
Frederick W. Frey, The Turkish Political Elite. Cambridge, Mass: M.I.T. Press, 1965
George S. Harris, Troubled Alliance; Turkish-American problems in historical perspective,
1945-1971. Washington:American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research, 1972, 53, 72, 74.
Harry N. Howard, Turkey, the Straits, and U.S. Policy. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins
University Press,1974.
J. Abadi, "Israel and Turkey: From Covert to Overt Relations," CONFLICT QUARTERLY. 15 (2): 104-128,
(1995): 108.
Metin Tamkoç, The Warrior Diplomats. Salt Lake City: University of Utah Press, 1976.
Walter F. Weiker, The Turkish Revolution 1960-1961; aspects ofmilitary politics. Washington:Brookings
Institution, 1963, 11.

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