Internationalization of the Civil
 Conflicts: the Case of Spanish
     Civil War (1936-1939)
Contents
Section I: Definitions and Theoretical Framework

Section II: International context of the 1930’s

Section III: The process of internationalization of
Spanish conflict. (1936 July-September)
Internationalization is the process through
which an explicit and conscious decision is
made: the decision to involve international
actors in any phase-hostilities or negotiation –
of a domestic conflict.

The alternative strategy is to isolate the internal
conflict and consciously exclude international
actors.

Internationalize                         Isolate
The decision to internationalize (or not to) can be
              made by different agents:




                     Internationalization       Internal agents
External actor                                 (local parties to
                                                 the conflict)
In fact, internationalization is a
decision making process made by
specific agents with specific goals
      and interests in mind.

 Internationalization is clearly
   intentional, intended and
           calculated.
Explanations of Internationalization:
                                       Internationalization
                                             process



                  Domestic factors                            International factors



    Domestic actors‟
                                     Identity
       interests

                                                              Opportunism             Intervention


                  Diversionary       Construction
Externalization
                    theories         of alliances
Explanations of Internationalization:
                                          Domestic actors‟ interests


  Externalization                                         Diversionary
  is a phenomenon according to which
                                                            theories            Construction
  governments engaged in civil wars can
  initiate military action against neighboring                                  of alliances
                                                       According to this
  states for two fundamental reasons.                  perspective, leaders
                                                       in civil war states      (Barnett and
                                                       seek to draw             Levy‟s
                           A second form of            attention away from      approach)
First, these
                           externalization             domestic problems.
governments may
                           occurs when states          International conflict
undertake cross-
                           experiencing civil          serves a twofold
border
                           wars engage in              purpose: it diverts
counterinsurgency
                           retaliatory attacks         attention form
actions because
                           against                     domestic struggles
rebels often seek out
                           interventionist             and it serves as a
foreign sanctuaries
                           neighbors in the            pretext to crack
or attempt to flee
                           hope of coercing            down on domestic
repression by
                           them into                   opponents.
slipping across
                           withdrawing
borders
                           support
Explanations of Internationalization:

                                 International factors



   Opportunism suggests that civil
   wars can increase the risk of
   interstate violence by lowering the                   Intervention
   expected benefits of using military
   force. Another theory that
   emphasizes the role of international
   actors is related to the concept of
   intervention and the main question is
   what motivates external actors to
   intervene in domestic conflict or what
   are the conditions that make
   intervention.
Interventions during civil war can be categorized into two major
                            groups.



                                       Intervention




  Neutral (multilateral)                              Military intervention
 (main goal is to restore peace in                         (unilateral)
 the target country, bring stability
           to the region)
Military intervention – Unilateral convention-breaking military
activity in the internal affairs of another state targeted at the
authority structure of that state in order to alter the balance of
power between the government and rebel group in favor of one
over the other. Intervention in a civil war includes actions such as
providing loans to a civil war combatant for military purchases,
offering military training and advising, allowing territory to be
used for bases and camps, supplying weapons and war material,
enacting and enforcing n arms blockade against one of the
combatants, the shelling of one of the combatants, and the
deployment of forces to the civil war state.
Regularities in interventionary behavior
Much has been written about intervention, the bulk of this literature consists of case
histories, rather that explanations of patterned regularities in interventionary behavior.
Those who attempt to explain regularities usually draw from four sets in independent
variables:
                                             2
                                  Socio-cultural cleavages
                                   and political stability
                                          (Holst)


              1                                                             3
                                                                  Geographical proximity
     Economic (Kolko)                                                    (Luard)
     Strategic (Gurtov)                                             Power differentials
                                                                        (Vincent)


                                              4
                                    Alliance polarization
                                          (Kaplan)
                                    Capability distribution
                                          (Young)
Internationalizing their conflict local parties have two main
interess:

 1. Military support (material resources to fight the war)

 2. International legitimacy


                                                Military
      Military support
                                          Internationalization


        International                           Political
         legitimacy                       Internationalization
The European and International context of the 1930‟s
   The main threat to the dominant international order in inter-war and
 especially in 30‟s Europe came from the new counter-revolutionary and
  totalitarian regimes imposed by Benito Mussolini in Italy (1922) and
      Adolf Hitler in Germany (1933), both the Fascist and the Nazi
    dictatorships practised a belligerent and revisionist foreign policy.
(1) The recovery of full
    military capacity and of
    those territories lost by the
    Treaty of Versailles in 1919;


(2) The    transformation   of
    Germany into a hegemonic
    power in central Europa,
    annexing or neutralizing
    rivals such as Austria,
    Czechoslovakia or Poland;


(3)    The conquest of European
      Russia in order to become
      an impregnable continental
      power and a world power
      without parallel.
WHY DID WEST NOT TAKE
 STEPS TO STOP HITLER
  WHEN THEY HAD THE
       CHANCE?

 At first he acted cautiously
 Talked of desire for peace
 Never had predetermined
 timetable
 Took advantage of
 opportunities as they arose,
 avoided risks, and accepted
 success when it occurred
 Emphasized desire to avoid
 war
 Stressed that all he wanted to
 do was make fair changes to
 Versailles Treaty
The revisionist plans of Fascist Italy and Nazi Germany were in direct contrast to the
interests and objectives of the two principal powers which benefited from and guaranteed
the status quo in Europe: the democratic regimes of France and Great Britain. In both
countries the territorial revisionism of the Nazi and Fascist imperial irredentism were
perceived with apprehension. For this reason, the Franco-British entente remained
unchanged during the entire inter-war period. Nevertheless, a hostile combination of both
dictatorships was considered very improbable because there was a clear antagonism in
their respective foreign policies. The German aim to annex Austria and to achieve
hegemony in the Balkans came up against the Italian aspiration to guarantee Austrian
independence (as a ,cushion state, in the north) and to exercise a de facto protectorate over
the Balkans.
Rearmament
As Germany was still militarily weak in 1933, Hitler had to move cautiously at first. He withdrew from
the Disarmament Conference and the League of Nations on the grounds that France would not agree to
German equality of armaments. Hitler insisted that Germany was willing to disarm if other states agreed to
do the same, and that he wanted only peace.
Germany was forced to disarm by the Treaty of Versailles, but France did not disarm at the same time, and
this caused tensions between the two countries. The Germans resented the French and feared military
interference. For instance, France was able to simply walk unopposed into the Ruhr in 1923 to
secure reparations payments.

The Saar 1935
The Saar was returned to Germany (January 1935) after a plebiscite resulting in a 90% vote in favour.
Though the plebiscite had been provided for at Versailles, Nazi propaganda made the most of the success, and
Hitler announced that now all causes of grievance between France and Germany had been removed.

The Rhineland 1936
Encouraged by Mussolini‟s fall out with Britain and France, Hitler took the risk of sending troops into the
demilitarised zone of the Rhineland in March 1936. Though the troops had orders to withdraw at the first sign
of French opposition, no resistance was offered beyond the usual protests. This was a vital step in rebuilding
German power. Strong fortifications and forces here would stop France coming to the help of her East
European allies.
INVASION OF ETHIOPIA
                              Ethiopia invaded in
                              October 1935 by
                              Italian army

                              Used modern
                              weapons against
                              Ethiopian forced
                              who still primarily
                              used spears and
                              bows and arrows

                              Invasion was
                              encouraged by Hitler



Haile Selassie appealed to the League of Nations
League imposed economic sanctions against Italy But left sanctions weak by
excluding oil from list of embargo products. Did not close Suez Canal to Italian
ships heading for Ethiopia
Over 500,000 Ethiopians killed in fighting (only 5000 Italian casualties).
Country falls in May 1936.
Mussolini had blatantly defied the League of Nations and had gotten away with
it.
Spain a country that had long been relegated to the sidelines of history suddenly
                      thrust itself on the world‟s attention.
One of Giral's first steps, on the night of I9-20 July, was to
                                 send an urgent request to the French Government for
                                      assistance in the form of military supplies.




  ,,Are surprised by dangerous military uprising <...>
 Request you to come to immediate agreement with us
for the supply of arms and air- craft. Fraternally yours,
                        Giral.”
French Premier Leon Blum decided on 21 July secretly to accept the republican
   request for support after consulting with his government coalition partners.
French public opinion and political circles became deeply divided over the issue.



                            ,,What is being
                              planned, this
                          delivery of arms to
                           Spain, may mean
                          war or revolution in
                                France”




                                                        President of the French Republic
                                                        Alber Lebren
Uncompromisingly neutral British position deeply worried the Franch
      government and led it to overturn its initial decision .
On 25 July 1936, following an intense debate in the cabinet, Leon
   Blum announced the decision not to intervene in the Spanish
     conflict and the cancellation of any shipment of arms and
                             munitions.
The Franch leaders believed that in this way they could contribute
to appeasing the domestic situation, reinforcing their alliance with
Britain, and confining the conflict to Spain to avoid the threat of its
   transformation into a European war. Nevertheless, the French
 retraction did nothing to prevent the rapid internationalization of
                            the conflict.
Chairman of the Council of Ministers
Madrid 25 July 1936
To the Ambassador of the USSR in France

Dear Sir:
The government of the Republic of Spain needs to supply its army
with modern armaments in significant quantities to conduct the
struggle against those who began and are continuing the civil war
against the legal authority and constitutional government and who are
being supplied with weapons and ammunition from abroad in
abundant quantities. the government I head, knowing what sort of
means and availability of military material are at the disposal of the
USSR, decided to appeal to you to notify your government about the
desire and necessity, which our government is experiencing, for
supplies of armaments and ammunition of all categories and in very
great quantities, from your country.
Taking the opportunity, etc.

Signature: José Giral


                José Giral

 Document RGVA f.33987 op. 3 d. 991 ll. 56-59
Soviet involvement in the civil war was developed in such forms:

1. From 18 July to 2 August 1936, the Soviet government attempted to assess the
situation in Spain through consultations with its agents in the field, but the regime
took no action, either domestically or internationally.

2. From 3 August to 20 August, Moscow began exploiting events in Spain for a
propaganda campaign, both domestically and internationally.

3. From 21 August to 1 October, the Soviet regime stepped up its involvement
with the Republic on the diplomatic and humanitarian fronts, and began paving the
way for long-term military intervention.
Franco instructed Bolin to go to Rome to seek help. He gave him a
sheet of paper containing the cryptic message... And when Bolin asked
what kind of aircraft and supplies, Franco added a scribbled footnote in
                               pencil ....
The Italian decision to intervene in the Spanish
civil war was taken sometimes between 25 and
27 July.

  Benito Duce Mussolini




                                                    Galeazo Ciano
                                                   ,,Ministro Degli Affary Esteri “
                                                    Son-in-love of Duce
On 23 July 1936 the German foreign Ministry rejected a request for support
   from the rebels.




 Foreign Office on Wilhelmstrasse No. 76   Konstantin von Neurath




              Party Line




Francos‟
emissaries
Hitler‟s advisors in Bayreuth: Goring, Canaris, Blomberg




• Hitlers decision at Bayreuth set off a chain of events that led to continued
  German military intervention in Spain.
• In summary Hitler‟s military intervention escalated in at least three stages:
  1. Operation ,,Feurzauber” in July-August 1936; 2. Operation Otto in
  September 1936 and 3. Legion Condor‟s dispatch in October-November
Franch government proposed on 1 August 1936 that
the main European powers subscribe to an agreement
of non-intervention in Spain.
At the end of August 1936, the twenty-seven
European states had officially subscribed to the Non-
Intervention in Spain Agreement, whereby they
deplored „the tragic events being enacted in Spain‟,
decided „to strictly abstain from all interference,
either direct or indirect, in the internal affairs of this
country‟, and banned „the exporting … re-exporting
and delivery to Spain, Spanish possessions or the
Spanish zone in Morocco, of all types of arms,
munitions and war materiel‟. The monitoring of this
agreement was conducted by a Non-Intervention
Committee, set up in London on 9 September under
the chairmanship of the Conservative Lord Plymouth,
Motivations of Intervention (or Non-Intervention) of Great Powers in
                                Spanish civil war

                  Motives                        Great     Frence   Germany   Italy   USSR
                                                 Britain


Localization of conflict
                                                   +         +        +        +       +
Territorial integrity of Spain
                                                   +         +        +        +       +
Geostrategic goals
                                                   +         +        ±        +       ±
Liquidation of pro-Communist seat
                                                   +         ±        +        +       -
Use Spanish soil as a testing Ground
                                                   -         -        +        +       +
Solidarity with Spanish Republic
                                                   -         ±         -       -       +
Establish or straighten          of   existing
military political alliance                        +         +        +        +       +

The Internationalization of civil conflict. The case of Spanish civil war

  • 1.
    Internationalization of theCivil Conflicts: the Case of Spanish Civil War (1936-1939)
  • 2.
    Contents Section I: Definitionsand Theoretical Framework Section II: International context of the 1930’s Section III: The process of internationalization of Spanish conflict. (1936 July-September)
  • 3.
    Internationalization is theprocess through which an explicit and conscious decision is made: the decision to involve international actors in any phase-hostilities or negotiation – of a domestic conflict. The alternative strategy is to isolate the internal conflict and consciously exclude international actors. Internationalize Isolate
  • 4.
    The decision tointernationalize (or not to) can be made by different agents: Internationalization Internal agents External actor (local parties to the conflict)
  • 5.
    In fact, internationalizationis a decision making process made by specific agents with specific goals and interests in mind. Internationalization is clearly intentional, intended and calculated.
  • 6.
    Explanations of Internationalization: Internationalization process Domestic factors International factors Domestic actors‟ Identity interests Opportunism Intervention Diversionary Construction Externalization theories of alliances
  • 7.
    Explanations of Internationalization: Domestic actors‟ interests Externalization Diversionary is a phenomenon according to which theories Construction governments engaged in civil wars can initiate military action against neighboring of alliances According to this states for two fundamental reasons. perspective, leaders in civil war states (Barnett and seek to draw Levy‟s A second form of attention away from approach) First, these externalization domestic problems. governments may occurs when states International conflict undertake cross- experiencing civil serves a twofold border wars engage in purpose: it diverts counterinsurgency retaliatory attacks attention form actions because against domestic struggles rebels often seek out interventionist and it serves as a foreign sanctuaries neighbors in the pretext to crack or attempt to flee hope of coercing down on domestic repression by them into opponents. slipping across withdrawing borders support
  • 8.
    Explanations of Internationalization: International factors Opportunism suggests that civil wars can increase the risk of interstate violence by lowering the Intervention expected benefits of using military force. Another theory that emphasizes the role of international actors is related to the concept of intervention and the main question is what motivates external actors to intervene in domestic conflict or what are the conditions that make intervention.
  • 9.
    Interventions during civilwar can be categorized into two major groups. Intervention Neutral (multilateral) Military intervention (main goal is to restore peace in (unilateral) the target country, bring stability to the region)
  • 10.
    Military intervention –Unilateral convention-breaking military activity in the internal affairs of another state targeted at the authority structure of that state in order to alter the balance of power between the government and rebel group in favor of one over the other. Intervention in a civil war includes actions such as providing loans to a civil war combatant for military purchases, offering military training and advising, allowing territory to be used for bases and camps, supplying weapons and war material, enacting and enforcing n arms blockade against one of the combatants, the shelling of one of the combatants, and the deployment of forces to the civil war state.
  • 11.
    Regularities in interventionarybehavior Much has been written about intervention, the bulk of this literature consists of case histories, rather that explanations of patterned regularities in interventionary behavior. Those who attempt to explain regularities usually draw from four sets in independent variables: 2 Socio-cultural cleavages and political stability (Holst) 1 3 Geographical proximity Economic (Kolko) (Luard) Strategic (Gurtov) Power differentials (Vincent) 4 Alliance polarization (Kaplan) Capability distribution (Young)
  • 12.
    Internationalizing their conflictlocal parties have two main interess: 1. Military support (material resources to fight the war) 2. International legitimacy Military Military support Internationalization International Political legitimacy Internationalization
  • 13.
    The European andInternational context of the 1930‟s The main threat to the dominant international order in inter-war and especially in 30‟s Europe came from the new counter-revolutionary and totalitarian regimes imposed by Benito Mussolini in Italy (1922) and Adolf Hitler in Germany (1933), both the Fascist and the Nazi dictatorships practised a belligerent and revisionist foreign policy.
  • 14.
    (1) The recoveryof full military capacity and of those territories lost by the Treaty of Versailles in 1919; (2) The transformation of Germany into a hegemonic power in central Europa, annexing or neutralizing rivals such as Austria, Czechoslovakia or Poland; (3) The conquest of European Russia in order to become an impregnable continental power and a world power without parallel.
  • 15.
    WHY DID WESTNOT TAKE STEPS TO STOP HITLER WHEN THEY HAD THE CHANCE? At first he acted cautiously Talked of desire for peace Never had predetermined timetable Took advantage of opportunities as they arose, avoided risks, and accepted success when it occurred Emphasized desire to avoid war Stressed that all he wanted to do was make fair changes to Versailles Treaty
  • 16.
    The revisionist plansof Fascist Italy and Nazi Germany were in direct contrast to the interests and objectives of the two principal powers which benefited from and guaranteed the status quo in Europe: the democratic regimes of France and Great Britain. In both countries the territorial revisionism of the Nazi and Fascist imperial irredentism were perceived with apprehension. For this reason, the Franco-British entente remained unchanged during the entire inter-war period. Nevertheless, a hostile combination of both dictatorships was considered very improbable because there was a clear antagonism in their respective foreign policies. The German aim to annex Austria and to achieve hegemony in the Balkans came up against the Italian aspiration to guarantee Austrian independence (as a ,cushion state, in the north) and to exercise a de facto protectorate over the Balkans.
  • 17.
    Rearmament As Germany wasstill militarily weak in 1933, Hitler had to move cautiously at first. He withdrew from the Disarmament Conference and the League of Nations on the grounds that France would not agree to German equality of armaments. Hitler insisted that Germany was willing to disarm if other states agreed to do the same, and that he wanted only peace. Germany was forced to disarm by the Treaty of Versailles, but France did not disarm at the same time, and this caused tensions between the two countries. The Germans resented the French and feared military interference. For instance, France was able to simply walk unopposed into the Ruhr in 1923 to secure reparations payments. The Saar 1935 The Saar was returned to Germany (January 1935) after a plebiscite resulting in a 90% vote in favour. Though the plebiscite had been provided for at Versailles, Nazi propaganda made the most of the success, and Hitler announced that now all causes of grievance between France and Germany had been removed. The Rhineland 1936 Encouraged by Mussolini‟s fall out with Britain and France, Hitler took the risk of sending troops into the demilitarised zone of the Rhineland in March 1936. Though the troops had orders to withdraw at the first sign of French opposition, no resistance was offered beyond the usual protests. This was a vital step in rebuilding German power. Strong fortifications and forces here would stop France coming to the help of her East European allies.
  • 18.
    INVASION OF ETHIOPIA Ethiopia invaded in October 1935 by Italian army Used modern weapons against Ethiopian forced who still primarily used spears and bows and arrows Invasion was encouraged by Hitler Haile Selassie appealed to the League of Nations League imposed economic sanctions against Italy But left sanctions weak by excluding oil from list of embargo products. Did not close Suez Canal to Italian ships heading for Ethiopia Over 500,000 Ethiopians killed in fighting (only 5000 Italian casualties). Country falls in May 1936. Mussolini had blatantly defied the League of Nations and had gotten away with it.
  • 19.
    Spain a countrythat had long been relegated to the sidelines of history suddenly thrust itself on the world‟s attention.
  • 20.
    One of Giral'sfirst steps, on the night of I9-20 July, was to send an urgent request to the French Government for assistance in the form of military supplies. ,,Are surprised by dangerous military uprising <...> Request you to come to immediate agreement with us for the supply of arms and air- craft. Fraternally yours, Giral.”
  • 21.
    French Premier LeonBlum decided on 21 July secretly to accept the republican request for support after consulting with his government coalition partners. French public opinion and political circles became deeply divided over the issue. ,,What is being planned, this delivery of arms to Spain, may mean war or revolution in France” President of the French Republic Alber Lebren
  • 22.
    Uncompromisingly neutral Britishposition deeply worried the Franch government and led it to overturn its initial decision .
  • 23.
    On 25 July1936, following an intense debate in the cabinet, Leon Blum announced the decision not to intervene in the Spanish conflict and the cancellation of any shipment of arms and munitions. The Franch leaders believed that in this way they could contribute to appeasing the domestic situation, reinforcing their alliance with Britain, and confining the conflict to Spain to avoid the threat of its transformation into a European war. Nevertheless, the French retraction did nothing to prevent the rapid internationalization of the conflict.
  • 24.
    Chairman of theCouncil of Ministers Madrid 25 July 1936 To the Ambassador of the USSR in France Dear Sir: The government of the Republic of Spain needs to supply its army with modern armaments in significant quantities to conduct the struggle against those who began and are continuing the civil war against the legal authority and constitutional government and who are being supplied with weapons and ammunition from abroad in abundant quantities. the government I head, knowing what sort of means and availability of military material are at the disposal of the USSR, decided to appeal to you to notify your government about the desire and necessity, which our government is experiencing, for supplies of armaments and ammunition of all categories and in very great quantities, from your country. Taking the opportunity, etc. Signature: José Giral José Giral Document RGVA f.33987 op. 3 d. 991 ll. 56-59
  • 25.
    Soviet involvement inthe civil war was developed in such forms: 1. From 18 July to 2 August 1936, the Soviet government attempted to assess the situation in Spain through consultations with its agents in the field, but the regime took no action, either domestically or internationally. 2. From 3 August to 20 August, Moscow began exploiting events in Spain for a propaganda campaign, both domestically and internationally. 3. From 21 August to 1 October, the Soviet regime stepped up its involvement with the Republic on the diplomatic and humanitarian fronts, and began paving the way for long-term military intervention.
  • 26.
    Franco instructed Bolinto go to Rome to seek help. He gave him a sheet of paper containing the cryptic message... And when Bolin asked what kind of aircraft and supplies, Franco added a scribbled footnote in pencil ....
  • 27.
    The Italian decisionto intervene in the Spanish civil war was taken sometimes between 25 and 27 July. Benito Duce Mussolini Galeazo Ciano ,,Ministro Degli Affary Esteri “ Son-in-love of Duce
  • 28.
    On 23 July1936 the German foreign Ministry rejected a request for support from the rebels. Foreign Office on Wilhelmstrasse No. 76 Konstantin von Neurath Party Line Francos‟ emissaries
  • 29.
    Hitler‟s advisors inBayreuth: Goring, Canaris, Blomberg • Hitlers decision at Bayreuth set off a chain of events that led to continued German military intervention in Spain. • In summary Hitler‟s military intervention escalated in at least three stages: 1. Operation ,,Feurzauber” in July-August 1936; 2. Operation Otto in September 1936 and 3. Legion Condor‟s dispatch in October-November
  • 31.
    Franch government proposedon 1 August 1936 that the main European powers subscribe to an agreement of non-intervention in Spain. At the end of August 1936, the twenty-seven European states had officially subscribed to the Non- Intervention in Spain Agreement, whereby they deplored „the tragic events being enacted in Spain‟, decided „to strictly abstain from all interference, either direct or indirect, in the internal affairs of this country‟, and banned „the exporting … re-exporting and delivery to Spain, Spanish possessions or the Spanish zone in Morocco, of all types of arms, munitions and war materiel‟. The monitoring of this agreement was conducted by a Non-Intervention Committee, set up in London on 9 September under the chairmanship of the Conservative Lord Plymouth,
  • 32.
    Motivations of Intervention(or Non-Intervention) of Great Powers in Spanish civil war Motives Great Frence Germany Italy USSR Britain Localization of conflict + + + + + Territorial integrity of Spain + + + + + Geostrategic goals + + ± + ± Liquidation of pro-Communist seat + ± + + - Use Spanish soil as a testing Ground - - + + + Solidarity with Spanish Republic - ± - - + Establish or straighten of existing military political alliance + + + + +