This document defines a concept of operations for cyber warfare in targeting, accessing and running operations within allocated information space. Maneuvering offensive operations in such an information space requires a framework to handle operational tasks such as target recognition, payload delivery and execution. The joint requirements such as planning and tasking with other interoperable dimensions make
things very difficult without such a framework approach. In the worst case each of the elements is being
handled in un-coordinated manner, rendering effects of potential capabilities low and simultaneously
possessing a threat for manipulating organizations.
Based on the understanding shown, offensive cyber warfare operates quite differently compared to its
kinetic counterparts. It creates its own operational theory and models not directly aligned with others.
However, the need for tactical interoperability is obvious but quite controversial. Offensive capabilities in
the larger context up to a specific mission area for other domains and disciplines. This breaks the uniform
model.
Please note that this is excerpt from larger study related to maneuvering and tactics in cyber warfare. It
focuses only on elements that can be found in offensive capabilities
Cyber Operation Planning and Operational Design_YayımlandıGovernment
Â
This document discusses adapting cyber operations to operational design and planning processes. It proposes a "cyber operational design" model to help cyber and military planners comprehensively understand complex cyber incidents and plan preventative approaches. The document outlines operational planning and the military decision making process (MDMP), and provides samples of how cyber factor analysis and identification of a cyber center of gravity could fit into these processes. The goal is to help planners understand cyber operations complexity and leverage analytical planning tools to improve technical personnel's understanding of operational planning.
Army plan for Cyber Offensive Operations -- ESF 18David Sweigert
Â
This document provides an overview of current and emerging Army cyber requirements and capabilities gaps. It identifies the top priority gaps as improving commanders' situational awareness across all echelons, including understanding the social media dimension. Other high priority gaps include defending networks in depth, conducting defensive and offensive cyber operations, and extending cyber capabilities to tactical units. The document recommends solutions such as integrating cyber and electronic warfare planning, developing trained and ready cyber forces, and transforming Army doctrine to fully leverage cyber capabilities in operations.
The document outlines National Policy Guidance for protecting NASA space systems from various threats. It discusses principles, goals, and guidelines for assuring the resilience of mission-essential functions enabled by space assets. It also categorizes NASA's existing protection policies for space assets and the environments they operate in. Finally, it analyzes potential threats like physical attacks, information/network exploits, electronic attacks, and computer network attacks that could disrupt NASA space systems.
US military report on cyber guard use of National GuardDavid Sweigert
Â
The document summarizes the findings of a Reserve Forces Policy Board task group on the Department of Defense's approach to using the National Guard and Reserve in the Cyber Mission Force. The task group found that USCYBERCOM, service cyber organizations, and the Joint Staff have made exceptional progress in developing training programs and guidance to field a fully operational Cyber Mission Force. However, initial plans did not embrace reserving integrating, and the task group makes several recommendations to better leverage reserve capabilities and experience.
This document provides information about an upcoming conference on integrated air and missile defense (IAMD) to be held from September 28-30, 2016 in Arlington, Virginia. The conference will focus on developing sustainable and reliable solutions to next generation air and missile threats. It will include workshops and presentations on topics such as directed energy applications, improving ballistic missile defense architecture, and examining gaps in detection capabilities for non-ballistic threats. Military leaders, industry representatives, and defense experts will speak at the event. The document provides details on the agenda, speakers, sponsoring organizations, and registration information.
The ballistic missile threat is increasing both quantitatively and qualitatively and will likely continue to do so over the next decade. Missile systems are becoming more advanced with greater range, accuracy, mobility, and effectiveness against missile defenses. Several states are developing nuclear, chemical, and biological warheads for their missiles, posing military and coercive threats. Regional actors like North Korea and Iran continue developing long-range missiles threatening the US, though the maturity of this threat is uncertain. In the near term, the growing threat of short and medium-range missiles in regions where the US has forces and allies presents a clear danger.
The document discusses several challenges related to applying artificial intelligence and machine learning to military applications.
Challenge 1 aims to free up personnel by applying innovative machine learning and AI to automate tasks. It discusses opportunities in areas like activity classification, cognitive computing, combining human and machine models, and predictive analytics.
Challenge 2 focuses on making more effective use of operator cognitive capacity through human-machine teaming. It is interested in solutions related to memory, reasoning, defining relevant roles between humans and machines, and improving individual and team interaction.
Challenge 3 provides context from an army perspective on revolutionizing the human information relationship through defense. It discusses considerations around bandwidth, size/power constraints, and ensuring information is treated as an essential
The document discusses various military communication systems and procedures. It describes systems like ADNS, CUDIXS, and VERDIN that transfer data between Navy ships and networks. It also explains procedures for emergency messages through the Red Cross, handling potential deception on communications networks through "GINGERBREAD", and protecting sensitive information by identifying Essential Elements of Friendly Information (EEFI) that should not be disclosed.
Cyber Operation Planning and Operational Design_YayımlandıGovernment
Â
This document discusses adapting cyber operations to operational design and planning processes. It proposes a "cyber operational design" model to help cyber and military planners comprehensively understand complex cyber incidents and plan preventative approaches. The document outlines operational planning and the military decision making process (MDMP), and provides samples of how cyber factor analysis and identification of a cyber center of gravity could fit into these processes. The goal is to help planners understand cyber operations complexity and leverage analytical planning tools to improve technical personnel's understanding of operational planning.
Army plan for Cyber Offensive Operations -- ESF 18David Sweigert
Â
This document provides an overview of current and emerging Army cyber requirements and capabilities gaps. It identifies the top priority gaps as improving commanders' situational awareness across all echelons, including understanding the social media dimension. Other high priority gaps include defending networks in depth, conducting defensive and offensive cyber operations, and extending cyber capabilities to tactical units. The document recommends solutions such as integrating cyber and electronic warfare planning, developing trained and ready cyber forces, and transforming Army doctrine to fully leverage cyber capabilities in operations.
The document outlines National Policy Guidance for protecting NASA space systems from various threats. It discusses principles, goals, and guidelines for assuring the resilience of mission-essential functions enabled by space assets. It also categorizes NASA's existing protection policies for space assets and the environments they operate in. Finally, it analyzes potential threats like physical attacks, information/network exploits, electronic attacks, and computer network attacks that could disrupt NASA space systems.
US military report on cyber guard use of National GuardDavid Sweigert
Â
The document summarizes the findings of a Reserve Forces Policy Board task group on the Department of Defense's approach to using the National Guard and Reserve in the Cyber Mission Force. The task group found that USCYBERCOM, service cyber organizations, and the Joint Staff have made exceptional progress in developing training programs and guidance to field a fully operational Cyber Mission Force. However, initial plans did not embrace reserving integrating, and the task group makes several recommendations to better leverage reserve capabilities and experience.
This document provides information about an upcoming conference on integrated air and missile defense (IAMD) to be held from September 28-30, 2016 in Arlington, Virginia. The conference will focus on developing sustainable and reliable solutions to next generation air and missile threats. It will include workshops and presentations on topics such as directed energy applications, improving ballistic missile defense architecture, and examining gaps in detection capabilities for non-ballistic threats. Military leaders, industry representatives, and defense experts will speak at the event. The document provides details on the agenda, speakers, sponsoring organizations, and registration information.
The ballistic missile threat is increasing both quantitatively and qualitatively and will likely continue to do so over the next decade. Missile systems are becoming more advanced with greater range, accuracy, mobility, and effectiveness against missile defenses. Several states are developing nuclear, chemical, and biological warheads for their missiles, posing military and coercive threats. Regional actors like North Korea and Iran continue developing long-range missiles threatening the US, though the maturity of this threat is uncertain. In the near term, the growing threat of short and medium-range missiles in regions where the US has forces and allies presents a clear danger.
The document discusses several challenges related to applying artificial intelligence and machine learning to military applications.
Challenge 1 aims to free up personnel by applying innovative machine learning and AI to automate tasks. It discusses opportunities in areas like activity classification, cognitive computing, combining human and machine models, and predictive analytics.
Challenge 2 focuses on making more effective use of operator cognitive capacity through human-machine teaming. It is interested in solutions related to memory, reasoning, defining relevant roles between humans and machines, and improving individual and team interaction.
Challenge 3 provides context from an army perspective on revolutionizing the human information relationship through defense. It discusses considerations around bandwidth, size/power constraints, and ensuring information is treated as an essential
The document discusses various military communication systems and procedures. It describes systems like ADNS, CUDIXS, and VERDIN that transfer data between Navy ships and networks. It also explains procedures for emergency messages through the Red Cross, handling potential deception on communications networks through "GINGERBREAD", and protecting sensitive information by identifying Essential Elements of Friendly Information (EEFI) that should not be disclosed.
The team has identified a breakthrough opportunity to partner with the Maritime and Port Security Information Sharing and Analysis Organization (MPS-ISAO) to develop a port cybersecurity assessment framework. This would allow the United States Transportation Command (USTRANSCOM) to evaluate cyber resilience at strategic US seaports through aggregated data from commercial port authorities. Key activities would include defining critical infrastructure, providing framework guidelines, and establishing a partnership between USTRANSCOM and MPS-ISAO for valuable data sharing. The framework aims to provide a standard for evaluating ports and incentivizing improved cyber readiness for both military and commercial beneficiaries.
mission model, mission model canvas, customer development, Hacking for Defense, lean startup, stanford, startup, steve blank, Pete Newell, Joe Felter, minimum viable product
Innovation fund themed competition webinar - session 2Heather-Fiona Egan
Â
Free up personnel through the application of innovative use of machine learning algorithms and artificial intelligence (AI) for military advantage. The RAF requires solutions to manage, analyze, and exploit multiple information sources at pace to gain decision advantage over exponentially growing data in comparison to constrained human analytic capacity. The RAF is interested in combining human-derived models that exploit domain knowledge with machine-derived models requiring large datasets and machine learning to close the gap between data and human capacity to identify the right information.
The document discusses how agile methods can be applied to certain projects within the U.S. Department of Defense (DoD). It notes that agile is already being used successfully for many web applications and could provide benefits for other projects. The document outlines how agile principles align with DoD objectives and describes how projects within DoD are classified, with smaller "ACAT III" software projects seen as potential candidates for agile methods, particularly those following an evolutionary acquisition lifecycle. It also discusses the roles and authorities of program managers within the DoD acquisition system who could approve the use of agile for appropriate projects.
DRONES THE NEW WEAPON OF CHOICE - ALSO FOR HACKERSReputelligence
Â
My talk will be about drone threats in general and how you can assess drone based threats. I will show the comprehensive threat assessment methodology and the countermeasures you can take against the drone threat. The threat assessment is based on a catalog of about 140 items. Particularly interesting will be looking at the drone threats in relation to:
Planting payload at specific locations (i.e. hacking equipment transported to target location for instance)
Tampering communication equipment with the help of drones
Insider threat communicate with an insider with the help of a drone
Hacking the communication of a drone
Privacy violations
etc.
The Need for Drone Forensic Investigation Standardisation (Evangelos Mantas) ...DroneSec
Â
Evangelos Mantas (Infili Intelligence)
Talk Recording: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=W0ZNpj7QZtM
The Global Drone Security Network (GDSN) is the only event of its kind focusing on Cyber-UAV security, Drone Threat Intelligence, Counter-UAS, and UTM security. Watch the full recording here: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=vZ6sRr65cSk
Speaker: https://www.linkedin.com/in/evangelos-mantas-0aa82619a/
DroneSec is a cyber-uav security and threat intelligence company who hosted this second series of the GDSN community event.
https://dronesec.com/
The document summarizes the evolution of a team's project from helping analysts automate the time-consuming process of drawing geospatial boundaries around protected sites, to developing voice transcription tools to help pilots and ground troops communicate more effectively during time-sensitive military operations, in order to minimize civilian casualties. The team interviewed experts from the military, intelligence community, tech companies, and NGOs to understand the challenges and shifted their focus based on feedback to address the problem of potential mischaracterization of targets during dynamic strikes requiring quick decision-making. They are now building prototypes to streamline radio communications between pilots and ground troops to reduce cognitive load and improve confidence in targeting.
Team SPAWAR aims to deliver decision superiority to the warfighter through three overarching strategies: developing sustainable capability through business and acquisition excellence; developing a culture of productivity; and refreshing, shaping, developing, and enabling a diverse workforce. The document outlines strategic objectives and guiding principles to achieve these strategies and Team SPAWAR's vision of being the recognized leader in delivering integrated solutions for decision superiority.
Network Centric Warfare - An IntroductionD.A. Mohan
Â
The document is an introduction to network centric warfare presented by D.A.Mohan, CEO of DAC Intl. It discusses how warfare has evolved from platform centric to network centric due to innovations in technology. Network centric warfare involves tightly integrating sensors, communication networks, command centers, and platforms to achieve situational awareness and synchronization between sensors and weapons. This allows for fast decision making and coordinated action. However, network centric warfare also faces challenges such as overreliance on technology, interoperability issues, and vulnerability to cyber attacks. Mitigation strategies include training, redundancy, and hardening against cyber threats.
Each week DroneSec releases a summary of the last week's incidents and reports regarding drone security.
This edition is free for public use. To receive similar reports like these, subscripe here: https://dronesec.com/pages/dronesec-notify
To view the Threat Intelligence platform, view more information here: https://dronesec.com/pages/notify
business model, business model canvas, mission model, mission model canvas, customer development, hacking for defense, H4D, lean launchpad, lean startup, stanford, startup, steve blank, pete newell, bmnt, entrepreneurship, I-Corps,
BMNT's Hacking for Defense - Mission Results 2016BMNT Partners
Â
Born out of a combination of the rapid problem sourcing and curation Pete Newell developed on the battlefields of Iraq and Afghanistan, and Steve Blankâs Lean Startup process, Hacking for Defense (H4D) has set the national security arena afire. H4D projects have earned recognition as the fastest way to bring technological innovations to bear on defenseâs thorniest problems,
whether through a BMNT enterprise effort, or a graduate-level course facilitated by Hacking for Defense, Inc (H4Di).
Weâve developed strong partnerships with academics at Stanford, Columbia, and Georgetown Universities; military organizations like DIUx, JIDO and the NGA; and with countless startups throughout Silicon Valley. Through these relationships, weâve been able to create a vibrant ecosystem passionate about identifying, isolating and solving problems no matter what their form.
We are proud of how far weâve come in the last year and we are already gearing up for more in 2017. Next year promises explosive growth throughout our ventures and our team is sure that they will continue to deliver the transformative results our national security forces need.
Tech USA Government Solutions (TGS) is a premier provider of innovative technology and communications solutions to the Department of Defense, federal agencies, and intelligence community. Headquartered in Maryland with 13 program offices and nearly 1,000 technical employees, TGS has over a decade of experience supporting mission-critical programs through services such as IT, engineering, cybersecurity and more. Their capabilities include classified support up to the Top Secret level.
The document discusses challenges with rapidly integrating new sensors for military use. It describes how sensors currently have different data formats and standards, making integration difficult. It proposes developing common preprocessing and postprocessing functions, as well as an open architecture algorithm repository, to allow automated integration and fusion of data from various sensors. This would help overcome issues around scalability and real-time performance when exploiting sensor data for military operations.
Tiedonhallinnan haasteista tietovuotojen estÀmiseen - Information Assurance -...Mikko Jakonen
Â
Tiedonhallinnanhaasteista tietovuotojen estÀmiseen; Kuinka sinun tulisi ottaa huomioon organisaatiossasi liikkuvan tiedon suojaaminen ja miten toteutat sen hallinnan?
Tools make work easier but machines are more complex, containing multiple parts. A pick is a simple tool that makes holes while a road drill, as a machine, is more complex but still makes holes. Machines can be used for transportation like cars, planes, and bikes or communication devices like computers, TVs, and phones. Machines have various parts like a central processing unit and use different power sources like petrol, batteries, or electricity. Different professions utilize different tools in their work such as doctors, farmers, firefighters, and more.
The document discusses events in Ukraine in March 2014. Protests in Kiev led to the ousting of President Yanukovych, who fled to Russia. A new interim government took control of Ukraine, but Russia annexed Crimea and supported separatists in eastern Ukraine, leading to ongoing tensions and conflict.
The team has identified a breakthrough opportunity to partner with the Maritime and Port Security Information Sharing and Analysis Organization (MPS-ISAO) to develop a port cybersecurity assessment framework. This would allow the United States Transportation Command (USTRANSCOM) to evaluate cyber resilience at strategic US seaports through aggregated data from commercial port authorities. Key activities would include defining critical infrastructure, providing framework guidelines, and establishing a partnership between USTRANSCOM and MPS-ISAO for valuable data sharing. The framework aims to provide a standard for evaluating ports and incentivizing improved cyber readiness for both military and commercial beneficiaries.
mission model, mission model canvas, customer development, Hacking for Defense, lean startup, stanford, startup, steve blank, Pete Newell, Joe Felter, minimum viable product
Innovation fund themed competition webinar - session 2Heather-Fiona Egan
Â
Free up personnel through the application of innovative use of machine learning algorithms and artificial intelligence (AI) for military advantage. The RAF requires solutions to manage, analyze, and exploit multiple information sources at pace to gain decision advantage over exponentially growing data in comparison to constrained human analytic capacity. The RAF is interested in combining human-derived models that exploit domain knowledge with machine-derived models requiring large datasets and machine learning to close the gap between data and human capacity to identify the right information.
The document discusses how agile methods can be applied to certain projects within the U.S. Department of Defense (DoD). It notes that agile is already being used successfully for many web applications and could provide benefits for other projects. The document outlines how agile principles align with DoD objectives and describes how projects within DoD are classified, with smaller "ACAT III" software projects seen as potential candidates for agile methods, particularly those following an evolutionary acquisition lifecycle. It also discusses the roles and authorities of program managers within the DoD acquisition system who could approve the use of agile for appropriate projects.
DRONES THE NEW WEAPON OF CHOICE - ALSO FOR HACKERSReputelligence
Â
My talk will be about drone threats in general and how you can assess drone based threats. I will show the comprehensive threat assessment methodology and the countermeasures you can take against the drone threat. The threat assessment is based on a catalog of about 140 items. Particularly interesting will be looking at the drone threats in relation to:
Planting payload at specific locations (i.e. hacking equipment transported to target location for instance)
Tampering communication equipment with the help of drones
Insider threat communicate with an insider with the help of a drone
Hacking the communication of a drone
Privacy violations
etc.
The Need for Drone Forensic Investigation Standardisation (Evangelos Mantas) ...DroneSec
Â
Evangelos Mantas (Infili Intelligence)
Talk Recording: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=W0ZNpj7QZtM
The Global Drone Security Network (GDSN) is the only event of its kind focusing on Cyber-UAV security, Drone Threat Intelligence, Counter-UAS, and UTM security. Watch the full recording here: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=vZ6sRr65cSk
Speaker: https://www.linkedin.com/in/evangelos-mantas-0aa82619a/
DroneSec is a cyber-uav security and threat intelligence company who hosted this second series of the GDSN community event.
https://dronesec.com/
The document summarizes the evolution of a team's project from helping analysts automate the time-consuming process of drawing geospatial boundaries around protected sites, to developing voice transcription tools to help pilots and ground troops communicate more effectively during time-sensitive military operations, in order to minimize civilian casualties. The team interviewed experts from the military, intelligence community, tech companies, and NGOs to understand the challenges and shifted their focus based on feedback to address the problem of potential mischaracterization of targets during dynamic strikes requiring quick decision-making. They are now building prototypes to streamline radio communications between pilots and ground troops to reduce cognitive load and improve confidence in targeting.
Team SPAWAR aims to deliver decision superiority to the warfighter through three overarching strategies: developing sustainable capability through business and acquisition excellence; developing a culture of productivity; and refreshing, shaping, developing, and enabling a diverse workforce. The document outlines strategic objectives and guiding principles to achieve these strategies and Team SPAWAR's vision of being the recognized leader in delivering integrated solutions for decision superiority.
Network Centric Warfare - An IntroductionD.A. Mohan
Â
The document is an introduction to network centric warfare presented by D.A.Mohan, CEO of DAC Intl. It discusses how warfare has evolved from platform centric to network centric due to innovations in technology. Network centric warfare involves tightly integrating sensors, communication networks, command centers, and platforms to achieve situational awareness and synchronization between sensors and weapons. This allows for fast decision making and coordinated action. However, network centric warfare also faces challenges such as overreliance on technology, interoperability issues, and vulnerability to cyber attacks. Mitigation strategies include training, redundancy, and hardening against cyber threats.
Each week DroneSec releases a summary of the last week's incidents and reports regarding drone security.
This edition is free for public use. To receive similar reports like these, subscripe here: https://dronesec.com/pages/dronesec-notify
To view the Threat Intelligence platform, view more information here: https://dronesec.com/pages/notify
business model, business model canvas, mission model, mission model canvas, customer development, hacking for defense, H4D, lean launchpad, lean startup, stanford, startup, steve blank, pete newell, bmnt, entrepreneurship, I-Corps,
BMNT's Hacking for Defense - Mission Results 2016BMNT Partners
Â
Born out of a combination of the rapid problem sourcing and curation Pete Newell developed on the battlefields of Iraq and Afghanistan, and Steve Blankâs Lean Startup process, Hacking for Defense (H4D) has set the national security arena afire. H4D projects have earned recognition as the fastest way to bring technological innovations to bear on defenseâs thorniest problems,
whether through a BMNT enterprise effort, or a graduate-level course facilitated by Hacking for Defense, Inc (H4Di).
Weâve developed strong partnerships with academics at Stanford, Columbia, and Georgetown Universities; military organizations like DIUx, JIDO and the NGA; and with countless startups throughout Silicon Valley. Through these relationships, weâve been able to create a vibrant ecosystem passionate about identifying, isolating and solving problems no matter what their form.
We are proud of how far weâve come in the last year and we are already gearing up for more in 2017. Next year promises explosive growth throughout our ventures and our team is sure that they will continue to deliver the transformative results our national security forces need.
Tech USA Government Solutions (TGS) is a premier provider of innovative technology and communications solutions to the Department of Defense, federal agencies, and intelligence community. Headquartered in Maryland with 13 program offices and nearly 1,000 technical employees, TGS has over a decade of experience supporting mission-critical programs through services such as IT, engineering, cybersecurity and more. Their capabilities include classified support up to the Top Secret level.
The document discusses challenges with rapidly integrating new sensors for military use. It describes how sensors currently have different data formats and standards, making integration difficult. It proposes developing common preprocessing and postprocessing functions, as well as an open architecture algorithm repository, to allow automated integration and fusion of data from various sensors. This would help overcome issues around scalability and real-time performance when exploiting sensor data for military operations.
Tiedonhallinnan haasteista tietovuotojen estÀmiseen - Information Assurance -...Mikko Jakonen
Â
Tiedonhallinnanhaasteista tietovuotojen estÀmiseen; Kuinka sinun tulisi ottaa huomioon organisaatiossasi liikkuvan tiedon suojaaminen ja miten toteutat sen hallinnan?
Tools make work easier but machines are more complex, containing multiple parts. A pick is a simple tool that makes holes while a road drill, as a machine, is more complex but still makes holes. Machines can be used for transportation like cars, planes, and bikes or communication devices like computers, TVs, and phones. Machines have various parts like a central processing unit and use different power sources like petrol, batteries, or electricity. Different professions utilize different tools in their work such as doctors, farmers, firefighters, and more.
The document discusses events in Ukraine in March 2014. Protests in Kiev led to the ousting of President Yanukovych, who fled to Russia. A new interim government took control of Ukraine, but Russia annexed Crimea and supported separatists in eastern Ukraine, leading to ongoing tensions and conflict.
Paul D. Mullins is a senior cyber operations leader and project manager with over 29 years of experience in the Army, Joint, Special Operations Forces, and interagency environments. He has expertise in creating and managing cutting-edge cyber operations and advising senior executives. Some of his roles include serving as the Senior Offensive Cyber Advisor to the Commander of European Command and chief of offensive cyber operations for the European Command Joint Cyber Center. He has a proven track record of successfully managing complex projects, developing requirements, and leading teams.
This document summarizes a presentation about tracking and implications of the Stuxnet computer worm. Stuxnet targeted Siemens industrial control systems and was designed to damage Iranian nuclear centrifuges. It spread using five Windows exploits and a Siemens password to infiltrate industrial networks. Stuxnet hid its activities using rootkit techniques and destroyed centrifuges by manipulating their speeds. Its discovery revealed vulnerabilities in critical infrastructure protection and demonstrated that industrial systems could be attacked remotely for sabotage.
1. China leverages computer network attack and exploitation techniques, harvesting information critical to building a modern nation-state and "informationalized", technical military forces.
2. China adapted ancient stratagems for CNA & CNE operations.
3. China can claim plausible denial for nation-sponsored hacking activities, hiding within the sea of everyday hackers.
4. On the other hand, north Korea must take CNA & CNE operations outside its country's boundaries.
The Importance of Educating the Force on Cyberspace Operations: TechNet Augus...AFCEA International
Â
August 25, 2015
Col. Stephen Elle, U.S. Army Cyber Center of Excellence & Fort Gordon
This discussion includes the new initiatives currently being designed such as the Future Leader Cyber Course, the Strategic Cyber Planners Course, and others. Additionally, the goal will be to ensure the materials prepared for the institutional and operational domain can also be used later for self-development.
This document discusses cyber warfare trends in the Middle East. It covers several key points:
1) Many Middle Eastern countries are developing advanced cyber capabilities and establishing national computer emergency response teams. Countries like Iran and Israel have very sophisticated state-sponsored cyber programs.
2) Significant cyber attacks have occurred between countries in the region, including attacks on Saudi Aramco and Qatari gas fields, and ongoing attacks between Israel, Iran, and their allies.
3) Non-state actors like the Syrian Electronic Army are also actively involved in cyber attacks, targeting media organizations and Western companies.
Rebranding IO (Information Operations) June 2013Ulrich JanĂen
Â
This document discusses rebranding information operations (IO) and strategic communications. It notes the evolution of concepts from combat support to joint enabling functions. It addresses challenges in behavioral conflict like understanding people, motivation, and perception management. It proposes ensuring "C5" through transforming command and control, and refining planning and decision-making. The desired effect is to achieve integration in crisis management through a comprehensive approach.
Ew asia cw and ew joint space for comments (14 sep2016)TBSS Group
Â
Brief Summary
Cyber warfare and electronic warfare are similar in many ways. Electronic warfare is a general tool used to Deny, Disrupt, Destroy, Degrade, and Deceive which are largely achieved through the interactions with enemyâs radio frequency systems. Cyber warfare is similar and more with additional targeted effects on computer systems, networks, and applications. Information operations, however, intend to influence the person sitting behind the keyboard, resulting to wrong decision making.
Col Timothy Presby, Training and Doctrine Command Capabilities Manager of Cyber, Army said in August this year: âWe need to be aware that we are very likely going to fight an adversary that is converging using [cyber and electromagnetic activity] integration, ISR and fires across full spectrum conflict, so unless we actually work together and converge our capabilities, we will be left short.â. This shows the importance of being aware and protected in the joint space.
This paper attempts to discuss the significance, seriousness and real threat in the cyber and electronics intelligence joint space. Critical military information can be obtained via cyber means and use by the forces to launch attacks in shortest possible time to cause severe damages to properties and lives.
Office Chief of Cyber Personnel Presentation: TechNet Augusta 2015AFCEA International
Â
LTC Chris Wade, USA
The Office Chief of Cyber will provide a Cyber Personnel Overview focusing on the military occupational specialties (MOS) and areas of concentration (AOC) that enable Cyber Defensive and Offensive Operations.
The document discusses building and developing the U.S. Army's Cyber Branch career field. It outlines several initiatives to fill officer and enlisted roles to 90% by focusing on voluntary transfer programs, commissioning new second lieutenants, and capitalizing on experienced Cyber Mission Force personnel. It also discusses developing the branch's identity, culture and cohesion while training personnel to joint cyber standards and work roles.
Learn all about the ever-increasing influence of ISIS and Cyber Terrorism...Although the use of cyberspace by Jihad organizations is not new, ISIS uses the Internet, and primarily social media, more effectively than any other terrorist organization before it. Here's a link for more information: https://www.concise-courses.com/learn/isis-cyber-terror/
The document discusses the C2 Agent Grid (C2AG), a proposed architectural solution using intelligent software agents to achieve information superiority for the US military. C2AG would use different types of agents to fuse data from diverse sources, provide commanders with an integrated view of the battlefield, and assist with decision-making. Interface agents would provide a personalized human-computer interface. Application agents would integrate data and functions from existing military systems. Service agents would provide access to non-military data sources like sensors and databases. Together, these agent types would help achieve the vision of dominating 21st century battlespaces with information dominance.
Management High-level overview of the OMG Data Distribution Service (DDS)Gerardo Pardo-Castellote
Â
This document provides a good management-lever introduction to the Data-Distribution Service (DDS) technology and capabilities. It was prepared by the OMG at the request of the US Navy in order to educate on the data-centric software architectural principles of DDS and how they can help meet its agility and cost-control requirements.
This document proposes the development of an In-Time Information Integration System (I3S) to provide decision makers with integrated information from diverse sources by 2025. The system would include an advanced global network of intelligent microprocessor nodes linked by secure communications to share sensor data, documents, expertise and analyses. It aims to help military and political leaders achieve "top-sight vision" and information dominance by anticipating threats, understanding adversaries, and facilitating rapid, well-informed decisions. The document outlines technical requirements for the I3S network and argues that overcoming organizational barriers to information sharing across services and agencies will be critical to the system's success.
This document proposes a concept to improve cooperation between intelligence operations (IO) and the intelligence community (IC). It suggests using IO capabilities selectively during exercises to test responses from adversaries and gain intelligence. This would help develop a symbiotic relationship where the IC provides planning support and feedback to IO operations, and IO helps the IC test hypotheses and reduce analytical biases. The document outlines a 5-step approach where the IC and IO communities collaborate to develop testable hypotheses, analyze targets, design test messages, employ IO capabilities to elicit responses, and monitor and assess feedback to support analysis. This could help answer policymaker questions and produce intelligence in denied environments like Syria.
https://utilitasmathematica.com/index.php
Our journal has a actively working to create a more diverse editorial board that represents a wide range of perspectives and experiences within the statistics field. It encourages authors to consider JEDI aspects in their research and actively participates in outreach programs to attract and support a more diverse group of researchers.
This document describes a proposed high interaction multi-agent system model for automatic prediction. The model uses five agents working together: a preprocessing agent prepares the data, three learning agents staff train on the data using different machine learning algorithms (Random Forest, Naive Bayes, KNN), and a decision-making agent integrates the results to make a prediction. The agents work sequentially, with the preprocessing agent passing data to the learning agents who build models and pass results to the decision-making agent. The goal is for the agents to collaborate to make more accurate predictions than single models.
The document outlines 10 guiding principles for designing computer-based decision support systems to assist human decision makers with complex problems. The principles emphasize partnership between humans and computers, with the system taking a distributed and open architecture. The system should provide tools rather than solutions, utilize high-level representations, embed knowledge, and decentralize decision making. A key principle is identifying conflicts rather than automatically resolving them. The goal is to design highly interactive systems that integrate planning and execution functions.
SECURE COLLABORATIVE PROCESSING ARCHITECTURE FOR MITB ATTACK DETECTIONIJNSA Journal
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The Elements of Offensive Cyber Warfare Operations
1. PUBLIC
The Elements of Offensive Cyber Warfare Operations
An excerpt
Mikko Jakonen
19th of September 2013
2. Abstract
This document defines a concept of operations for cyber warfare in targeting, accessing and running
operations within allocated information space. Maneuvering offensive operations in suchan information
space requires a framework to handle operational tasks such as target recognition, payload delivery and
execution. The joint requirements such as planning and tasking with other inter-operable dimensions make
things very difficult without such a framework approach. In the worst case each of the elements is being
handled in un-coordinated manner, rendering effects of potential capabilities low and simultaneously
possessing a threat for manipulating organizations.
Based on the understanding shown, offensive cyber warfare operates quite differently compared to its
kinetic counterparts. It creates its own operational theory and models not directly aligned with others.
However, the need for tactical interoperability is obvious but quite controversial. Offensive capabilities in
the larger context up to a specific mission area for other domains and disciplines. This breaks the uniform
model.
Please note that this is excerpt from larger study related to maneuvering and tactics in cyber warfare. It
focuses only on elements that can be found in offensive capabilities.
Keywords
Cyber warfare, tactics, maneuvering, intel, deployment, framework, @mikk0j
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Table of Contents
Table of Contents .............................................................................................................................................. 4
Operational theory ......................................................................................................................................... 5
Information space .......................................................................................................................................... 6
Tactical space ................................................................................................................................................ 7
Maneuvering within tactical space ............................................................................................................ 8
Time as a constraint in tactical space ........................................................................................................ 8
Tactical and technical interoperability .......................................................................................................... 8
Maneuvering in tactical space ....................................................................................................................... 9
Elements of Cyber Warfare Operations....................................................................................................... 10
Target....................................................................................................................................................... 11
Command & Control ............................................................................................................................... 11
Playbook and scenarios ........................................................................................................................... 11
Tasking and Planning .............................................................................................................................. 12
Intel .......................................................................................................................................................... 12
Deployment ............................................................................................................................................. 13
Information flows .................................................................................................................................... 13
Capability areas ....................................................................................................................................... 13
Enabling and supporting elements ........................................................................................................... 14
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Operational theory
Operational theory of offensive cyber warfare constructs its brain, heart and its self-regulating
functions constructing the aim. The aim is the predetermined definition in which the effect is reflected by its
entire accomplishment before its taking a place. That being said, aim constitutes both critical path and the
success vector for operations happening inside information space. Compared to kinetic warfare, the system
does not create controlled disequilibrium between general aim and specific missions, as there are only
specific or ancillary âtiedâ missions. Volumetric mechanisms cannot be counted as attaching force.
War is an undertaking which must be coordinated from the highest levels of policymaking to the basic
levels of execution1. Therefore all the layers of operational art that inherit the policy must translate to broad
divisions of activities in preparation and conducting war. Offensive cyber warfare conducts various types of
maneuvers simultaneously or successively according to concept or plan aimed to accomplish goals in theatre;
the targeted information space in a strategic or operational direction in predetermined period of time.
Tactical interoperability with offensive capabilities is a specific mission area for other domains and
disciplines, not to be utilized in generalized terms. This underpins the nature of offensive cyber maneuvering
very close to strategic objectives.
Figure 1 Aligning operational theory with offensive maneuvering
To verify the operational theory of the offensive part of cyber warfare is solid we must look into
characteristics of the framework in display:
ï·
ï·
ï·
ï·
1
Offensive cyber warfare reflects cognitive tension and transpires from general orientation
ALWAYS towards the strategic aim, releasing from single mission.
Computerized offensive capability is product of âproduction lineâ, thus industrialized and
possess dynamic interaction with information space and strategic aim.
Computer programs used to interact with information space are synergetic by nature.
Offensive operations are conducted towards adversary.
Shimon Naveh, In Pursuit of Military Excellence (pg.1964)
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ï·
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Information space is chaotic by its definition.
All operations conducted by and with cyber warfare capabilities are non-linear, asymmetric,
hierarchically structured and expressing depth by maneuvering nature.
Offensive maneuvers can cause unexpected interactions between maneuvering and attrition
expressing its unique nature compared to kinetic world. Every system embraces erosion thus
making every interaction important and highly effect driven.
Operational plan of offensive cyber capability is never completely independent entity as it
relies heavily on deployment and intel. However, including these elements with operational
plan, the outcome can and should be used as autonomous entity within adversary controlled
information space. In addition, planning relies heavily on strategic definition of aims,
restrictions and allocation of resources.
Offensive cyber warfare may suffer from operational shock quite easily rendering it unable to
accomplish its aims. Rendering such threat minimum, stretching operational loops over adversaries is loops
key success factors on utilizing such capability.
Information space
Information space comprises of the full spectrum of connected or separate information capabilities and
domains, which are under administration of different parties. Full spectrum information space does not limit
information being structured, unstructured or being on-wire or over-the-air transferrable, or not even handled
by different chunks of electromagnetic communications. It is equally available in depth, height and in width.
Information space width is determined by ability to utilize and consume information resources in own
and other partiesâ information space. Depth is determined by the dominance within targeted information
space. As information space allows height value as attribute for information, it can be defined as viability of
information or level of access towards the information space.
Figure 2 Full Spectrum Information Space
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Own information space is seen as controlled information space as long as actor has dominance over it.
Actors may create joint information space(s), which are accessible and consumable by other defined
operators. The adversary controlled information space is surrounded with control capabilities and may
exposure a surface being used to access targeted, allocated information space required by the operation and
task.
This surface exposure is 2-ways; it resides on the outer perimeter of the adversary information space
and it can be found in operationally targeted information space.
Tactical space
A Cyber domain is information space which extends to other warfare domains in kinetic space, air,
ground and sea. Cyber domain declares possibilities for maneuvering, information usage and usable options
for operations. On cyber domain, each target has its own tactical depth, width and height of information
space where maneuvering is possible. They own different view to its capabilities, exposure and
vulnerabilities. Among own space, there is JOINT TACTICAL space which comprises over coupled
companion spaces AND kinetic world space.
Depending interoperability, the coupling may be strong or loose and have different kind of options â
such as limited maneuverability. The spaces adjoined together complete larger tactical space where cyber
warfare maneuvering may conclude.
Figure 3 Tactical width, height and depth
Traditional XYZ-dimensioning can be used to define the space. Joint tactical space may grant
resilience, adaptability and yield for operations. On the other hand, same space may defect for the same basic
reasons: resilience is only as strong as the weakest link, adaptability is created by dynamic and capable
resourcing options and yield of information space is defined by the controllable space â which can vary quite
substantially.
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Maneuvering within tactical space
Figure 4 Example of making insertion on tactical space
Moving in information space allows step-by-step insertion to gain the objectives within adversary
space. It should be noted that offensive cyber maneuvering may utilize kinetic world capabilities, such as
progression in designated tasks to create forward looking network visibility.
The ability to move in all directions makes it possible to create clear model for achieving the desired
objective in timely fashionable manner IF all the precursors are positive and designated time-slot can be
managed. Hardly ever attack surface allows such exposure that objective can be reached with single
insertion. While maneuverability allows great possibilities it simultaneously demands strict discipline in
elements, such as planning, tasking, intel and in deployment.
Time as a constraint in tactical space
Time can be seen as a constraint and attribute for operations. If affects in all operational angles and in
parallel delimits and allows the ingenious models and capabilities may be produced on-the-fly to gain the
objectives. it is not matter of slow or fast, purely matter of speed. More precisely, matter of controlling the
time allows mastering the rhythm of battlespace. Time can be used to influence adversary to cause confusion
and disorientation.
Due the critical role of time, timing and controlling the rhythm of battlespace based on time, the
maneuvering simultaneous operations in different domains emphasizes focus greatly on cyber environment.
Tactical and technical interoperability
Offensive cyber-capability requires a continuous process of collecting vulnerabilities, creating
exploits, platforms and payloads (detonable or intel) and building a network of deniable hosts on available
information space. As these are low cost operations when compared to kinetic military capabilities, it can be
argued that these preparations should be made even if the current doctrine does not include use of offensive
cyber-capabilities. 2
The need for interoperability is obvious but making, quite controversially, offensive capabilities in
large context a specific mission area for other domains and disciplines. This breaks the uniform model.
2
Kiravuo, SÀrelÀ (pg. 10)
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Maneuvering in tactical space
Maneuvering has been central concept in warfare for thousands of years.3 Alike in kinetic
counterparts, in cyber domain most important activities are to operate inside adversaryâs a) observationorientation-decision-action (OODA) loops, b) get inside mind-timepenetrate preset or alternative objectives on information-moral-mental-physical space in order to isolate
adversary from its dominance over its controlled information space.
Cyber maneuver allows utilization of force to capture, disrupt, deny, consume, degrade, destroy or
manipulate information and its confidentiality, availability, integrity and /or origins to gain advantage over
adversariesâ control of allocated information space. Cyber maneuver does not necessary lead to manipulation
of kinetic/physical assets, but it may allow such complete. As cyber capabilities are mainly used as
specialized or strategic asset, they should be undertaken to give actor a competitive advantage over another.
Speed
Stealth
Limited attribution
Operational reach
Rapid concentration
(volumetricity)
Distributed
Access & Control
Non-serial
Concentrated
Dynamic
Component based
Platformized
Exploitive
Positional
Influencing
Figure 5 Characteristics and features of cyber weapon used with maneuvers
Cyber warfare allows great deal stratagems (or ruses) due the nature of its domain. Most of the kinetic
world stratagems support directly maneuvering in cyber space, some of them require support from kinetic
world and some of them allow influencing towards kinetic world. Example below: Making sudden
movement in new direction, to and from irregular and unpredictable pattern to confuse adversary.
Figure 6 Example 1step maneuver to misdirect adversary
3
Applegate et al, CyCon presentation âThe principle of Maneuver in Cyber Operationsâ
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Elements of Cyber Warfare Operations
Cyber weapons and their architecture is one part of the cyber warfare operations. Referencing to
kinetic world, they form the ammunition and the platform. Running the cyber platform however differs
greatly from utilizing cannon with kinetic ammunition. The platform is inseparable from command structure,
and while not requiring constant communications â it is part of the munitions side of the equation.
Cyber weapons shelf time is very low. All operations should be run on the assumption that any
deployed weapon will be found, analyzed and reverse-engineered. Modules deployed in weapons should be
grouped in such a way, that when a weapon connected to its creators, it does not reveal all deployed
weapons. This creates operational problem for running such offensive cyber space operation efficiently and
consistently. 4
Ability to maneuver in information space utilizing cyber warfare aim requires a framework eventually
executing the strategic campaign set for the dimension. In its paramount requirement, the elements making
the offensive cyber warfare engine running must be constructed so that maneuvering in dynamic, adversary
controlled information and tactical depth is possible. The operational theory states the operational guidelines
for the system. However, many of the constraints inherits from the technological abilities and capabilities
held by the actor.
Figure 7 Elements of Offensive Cyber Warfare Operations
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Kiravuo, SÀrelÀ (pg. 10)
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Target
Objectives for offensive cyber operation â being it purely based on intel information gathering or
influencing on target system, has been set prior its engagement on operational level. Typical objective to use
cyber capabilities is some profound strategic reason, which a) needs to be done in some exact time period
b) allows enough time for the operational preparedness and c) carries high value â high risk potential
and most likely d) is located out of the physical reach of manpower. There must be some sort of access
towards the exposure for the engagement in question prior any active operation starts. Preparing cyber
influence needs time thus making it suitable for precision effect driven functions.
By following relaxed decision making model based on OODA, the operational loop extends around
target information space, making adversary loop part of the cycle.5
Figure 8 Target element
Target has two operational inlets; one for intel and one for deployment. Intel means variety of things
on different phases of operation. First, it can be purely target recognition and network information
exploitation. Second, it can be adversary movement tracking and information gathering. This allows intel to
be highly maneuverable tool within target information space. Simultaneously, intel is something to take the
ultimate care away from adversaryâs reach.
Second inlet, the deployment, allows interaction of variety operational capabilities and influences
within target information space. This element deploys all platforms, payloads and handles delivery options â
such as electromagnetic spectrum, e.g. via network comms, wireless etc. AND kinetic, being it courier,
airdrop, UAV and so on.
Platforms may vary based on use-case requirements, however, each of the platforms carry at least
some of the similar characteristics on maneuverability, comms. with command & control (C&C) structures
and handling of payloads.
Command & Control
Every system needs ability to make decisions. The operational aspects of CC may vary per ongoing
mission and may have sub-units to handle specific or long lasting operations. CC assumes the decision
making point supported by ACTIVE intel and deployment activities and PARALLEL tasking and planning
activities.
Playbook and scenarios
Playbook and scenario guide among with tasking manual is used to preplan certain maneuvers possible with enabling scenario and raise questions of
potential unwilling action paths.
Playbook contents are derived from strategic campaign. Being it how
comprehensive, however, no playbook or static pre-described manual of
5 http://www.goalsys.com/books/documents/DESTRUCTION_AND_CREATION.pdf
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Figure 9 Command & Control stack
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operations should be taken into fully account as expanding information space allows n*n times maneuvering
which potentially renders predefined, even localized scripts useless.
Tasking and Planning
Fast paced maneuvering and operational tempo demands able tasking model. Tasking element handles
task specific resourcing and operator assignment, technical resources allocation in parallel with weapon
targeting and scheduling of activities. Main function is the weapon, effect targeting based on the campaign
demands and operational information retrieved through intel and current deployment activities. Tasking is
highly scalable function.
Figure 10 Tasking & Planning stack
Planning creates âburnâ and consumables for the resources, deployment platforms, payloads and
delivery options. Those are to be utilized based on the current mission tasking portfolio. Planning (office)
obtains capabilities required by the mission statement and offers immediate capabilities for current task
running. Threat analysis has been integrated with capability acquisition function as they support naturally
each other. Threat analysis creates requirements for capabilities to fulfill based on the assessment and
external/internal immediate information feed, information exploitation and target recognition.
Intel
Intel is basically responsible on only 2 tasks: target recognition and data acquisition on foreign
information space. Intelligence on adversary data, formation and activities is everything as gathered and then
disseminated information forms the backbone of operations carried out by other elements. The ability being
able to deliver effect or influence on adversary controlled domain is directly coordinated by the effectiveness
of intel information, thus demanding it to be as precise as possible.
Kinetic world may allow even large mishaps with disseminated information, but customized piece of
software running through maneuvering cycle does most likely not. To make comparison with kinetic world:
precise adversary troop location, current capabilities and support.
Intel has another role as well. It is constantly in-contact and in-the-loop element with outside
information space. It feeds information to command and control structures, mission planning- and tasking. It
is the early watchdog of observation and orientation within the loop. Payloads maintained by platforms may
contain elements of intel capabilities as effect.
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Figure 11 Intel 6 Deployment elements
Deployment
Platforms, payloads and delivery of them are on deployment element responsibilities. Deployment
oversees and controls campaign related insertion or evasion of offensive effects through defined attack
surface. After target is being acquired, deployment prepares designated platform to produce task and defines
steps to be taken to enable required weapon through exposured vulnerability.
Making cyber warfare scalable, deployment may compile 6the needed payload from other components.
Some of the deliverables may contain vulnerability search modules, or other specialized âwarheads.â 7
Delivery of weapon (delivery method + platform + payload, delivery method + payload, or pure
payload) may require kinetic counterpart (example: Stuxnet technology demonstration) to achieve its mission
in areas whereas required electromagnetic insertion is impossible.
Information flows
Both TASKING and PLANNING elements inherit intelligence and deployment information feed. This
is paramount. In parallel, both elements respectfully administer intel and deployment elements on interfacing
target. Command & Control (CC) structure receive only initial status and changes in adversary information
space. This cuts down towards the necessities.
Capability areas
Offensive cyber warfare assumes full blown information space maneuverability. Therefore functions
such as information control, network exploitation and access methods are vital. Without ability to control
campaign related misinformation, propaganda and/or collaboration part of the maneuvering abilities seize to
exist. Network exploitation and access methods are equally important for recognizing, penetrating and
controlling access on adversary information space and beyond it while maneuvering in tactical space.
Capabilities and vulnerabilities â production line that must exceed artisan in scalability, integration
and assembly of payloads where needed. Making offensive cyber warfare scalable, many of the capability
areas must be able to automate its functions.
All capability areas represent repositories of such discipline area, being active part of the development
cycle together with planning and tasking elements.
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Roelke, DARPA cyber colloquim on âScalable cyberwarfare, 2009â
Kiravuo et al, 2012
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Potentially the best example of such capabilities is the deployment composition. The âwarheadâ may
contain vulnerability or capability to seek certain information and deliver it to the management engine for
further processing allowing creation of new, purpose build payload.
Another great example of capability is âvolumetricâ data, which can be used to consume or disable
adversary applications with a large amount of data being pushed towards targeted structure thus maneuvering
for example Denial of Service or utilization of advanced evasion capabilities. Such capability can and most
often is being used in conjunction (stratagems) with others, more pinpoint accuracy weapons to create cover
flux data while actually deploying in stealth.
Enabling and supporting elements
The example showing some of the necessary and auxiliary support services needed to run focused
campaign. Studies and experiences have shown that even a simple thing like shared clipbook can make a
difference in timely fashionable operations.
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