- In early August 2008, fighting broke out between Georgian forces and South Ossetian militia, escalating into a war with Russian involvement. On August 7th, Georgian forces launched an attack on South Ossetia to restore order, and Russia entered South Ossetia on August 8th to protect peacekeepers and civilians. A ceasefire agreement was reached on August 12th. - Tensions between Georgia and South Ossetia date back to the 1920s when South Ossetia was an autonomous region within Georgia. Disputes over South Ossetia's status led to conflicts in the 1990s and 2004. On August 7th 2008, the conflict escalated into a major clash between Georgian and Russian forces.

1. Introduction
During the second week of August, the brief war between Georgian forces and South
Ossetian militia became the largest outbreak of fighting with Russian involvement
later. It was the largest conflict in Europe since the Kosovo war in 1999 and first of its
type after disintegration of Soviet Union in 1991. On 07 August 2008, Georgian
forces launched an attack on breakaway region of South Ossetia in order to restore
the peace and security in the region. Russia has described Georgian attack on South
Ossetia as “Russia’s 9/11”1
. On 08 August 2008, Russian forces entered in South
Ossetia to protect their peacekeepers and civilian2
. On 12 August 2008, Russian
President Mr Medvedv in his joint press conference in Moscow with French
President Nicolas Sarkozy announced Russia has agreed to a “six-point ceasefire
agreement”3
. Later in Tbilisi, Georgian President Mr Saakashvilli announced
acceptance of the six-point ceasefire agreement4
. On 26 August 2008, Russia
recognises South Ossetia and Abkhazia (another disputed territory in the region) as
independent states5
.
Background of the Crisis
Tension in Georgia has an old history going back at least to the 1920s, when South
Ossetia attempted to declare independence but ended up as an autonomous region
under the Soviet- Georgia after the Soviet forces conquered Georgia in 19216
. The
South Ossetia is situated in Georgia, separated from North Ossetia which is a part of
Russia. The Soviet Government declared South Ossetia as autonomous oblast within
Georgia in April 1922. During the Soviet rule, South Ossetia enjoyed a certain degree
1
Allison R, 'Russia resurgent? Moscow's campaign to 'coerce Georgia to peace'', (2008) 84
International Affairs
2
Day-by-day: Georgia-Russian Crisis, Available at:
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/7551576.stm (Accessed: 10 Feb.2009)
3
Text of Six-Point Agreement, Available at
:http://graphics8.nytimes.com/packages/pdf/world/2008/08/20080813_GEORGIA_ACCORD.
pdf( Accessed: 10Feb.2009)
4
See no.1
5
Available at: http://www.kremlin.ru/eng/speeches/2008/08/26/1543_type82912_205752.shtm
(Accessed: 15 Feb.2009)
6
Nichol J, Russia-Georgia Conflict in South Ossetia: Context and implications for U.S Interests,
(CRS, 2008).

2. of autonomy. At the same time, Georgian nationalist groups were beginning
escalating renewed tension between Georgia and South Ossetia.
In 1988, the South Ossetia demanded that the “Oblast” be made an autonomous
Republic; Georgian Government rejected this demand leading to protests on both
sides. In 1990, the Georgia firmly opposed the declaration of independence of South
Ossetia within the U.S.S.R, following the declaration of emergency in the region and
abolished the autonomous oblast status of the territory. In January 1991, an armed
conflict sparked between Georgian and Ossetian forces and continued until 1992. At
that point, a ceasefire agreement is known as the Sochi agreement agreed upon by
Georgian, Soviet Union and South Ossetian authorities. In April 1991, Georgia
declared independence from Soviet Union7
.
On 24 June 1992, the Sochi Agreement established ceasefire between Georgian and
Ossetian forces and defined the conflict zone around the South Ossetian capital
Tskhinvali8
. According to the Sochi agreement, a joint control commission (JCC) and a
peacekeeping body, the joint peacekeeping forces (JPKF) established. The JPKF is
consists of Russian, Georgian and South Ossetian forces under the Russian
command9
. The United Nation and the Organization for Security and Cooperation in
Europe (OSCE) approved these efforts and sent their representatives to the region10
.
The situation in the region remained very peaceful from 1994 to 2004. In 2004,
tension increased as President Saakashvili, who was elected in 2004 committed his
regime to restore Georgia’s lost territories. On 07 August 2008, limited conflict
spilled over into a major clash between Georgian and South Ossetian forces, which
quickly converted into an open battle between Georgia and Russia.
7
John Mackinlay, P C (ed.) Regional Peacekeepers: The Paradox of Russian Peacekeeping, United
Nations University Press, 2003
8
Roudik P, Russian Federation: Legal Aspects of War in Georgia, (01474), (Law Library of Congress,
2008).
9
Galbreath D J, The Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe, Rutledge, 2007).
10
Lavrov S, 'The Cold War Is Long Over’ ' Newsweek, (2008) 23 August 2008,

3. Georgia’s Case
Georgia defends its attack on South Ossetia on the principle of sovereignty11
. Tbilisi
claims that South Ossetia is still an integral part of Georgia, because it has not
received recognition by international community. According to Georgian authorities,
Russian peacekeepers and OSCE observer admitted that they were unable to stop
the rebel’s attacks on the Georgian civilian in the region12
. Tbilisi exercised use of
force against separatist militia that threatens the sovereignty of Georgia. Georgia
named it as “operation to restore constitutional order.”13
Use of force to restore
peace is an internationally recognized norm accepted by UN Charter.
Georgian forces attacked South Ossetia first14
and by doing so Tbilisi violated the
international law. There is an internationally recognised peacekeeping force in the
region. If there was any problem, Georgia should point out the problem to the JPKF
and OSCE. Instead of following the peaceful means to resolve the issue Georgia tried
to follow the US footsteps to settle the issues with power. Perhaps Georgia did not
realise this fact that Russia, the world’s second most powerful army is not like Iraq
and Afghanistan, where US can do whatever she wants.
Another argument of Georgian authorities is that crossing of Georgian border by
Russian forces was an act of aggression and Georgia responded in defence.
According to OSCE monitors report, Georgia did not act defensively. In fact, Georgia
started shelling to the Tskhinvali. By opening the indiscriminate firing of rockets on
the Tskhinvali, Georgian forces threatened the lives of Russian peacekeepers and
OSCE observers in the city15
. Ryan Grist, a senior OSCE representative in Georgia held
that Georgian attack on South Ossetia was fully arbitrary and irrational to any
alleged provocation16
. Indeed, there was no act of aggression by Russia; Moscow
11
Saakshvili M, 'Georgia Acted in Self-Defence ' Wall Street Journal, (2008) 02 December, 2008
12
See no. 10
13
Karon T, 'Has Georgia Overreached in Ossetia?' (2008) Time
14
Seeno.10
15
C. J. Chivers E B, 'Georgia Claims on Russia War Called Into Question' The New York Times, (2008)
06 November 2008,
16
See No. 14

4. ordered their forces to enter the conflict area to protect their peacekeepers and
civilians in the region.
For many western nations, Russian invasion of Georgia is seen as resurrection of new
cold war, but it is not necessary that every development in Russia is the replay of
Soviet history. During the Falkland war 1982 between Argentina and United
Kingdom, Henry Kissinger, the former US Secretary of State comment, “No great
power retreats for ever”. May be, it is an end of Russia’s retreat, which started under
Mikhail Gorbachev17
. Unlike in Eastern Europe, Russian forces are very popular in
South Ossetia and Abkhazia; The Russians are seen as protectors against ethnic
cleansing by Georgia.
In fact, Mikhail Saakashvili has managed humiliation for himself by attacking South
Ossetia; he tried to win western sympathy and Georgia’s NATO bid. It was an effort
to restore his rapidly denting political image because of corruption and political
violence in Georgia. The former head of European monitoring team blame Georgia
for violence and killings of hundreds of civilians. Ryan Grist, head of a team monitors
for the OSCE said Georgian response to any provocations was disproportionate18
.
Saakashvili has sent Georgian troops to Iraq (2000 third largest number of soldiers
after the US and UK) 19
and Afghanistan in order to win American support and to get
an entry to NATO. By sending his forces to Iraq and Afghanistan, he felt he had got
American support, but he ignored Kissinger’s famous saying “Great powers do not
commit suicide for their allies20
”. He disregarded the reality that Americans are well
known to leave their allies in middle of nowhere, as they always did in past and still
doing with Pakistan, one of the US’s closest allies in the so called war against terror.
Russia’s Case
17
Almond M, Plucky little Georgia? No, the cold war reading won't wash' The Guardian, (2008) 09
August,
18
The Washington Times, Available at: <http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2008/nov/23/ex-
monitor-faults-georgia-for-august-war/> (Accessed: 09 Feb 2009).
19
See No-12
20
See No-17

5. Some experts perceive Russian intervention in South Ossetia as clear violation of
international laws. It seems that initial Russian response to the conflict was legal21
,
but it became doubtful when Russian forces penetrated deeply in Georgian territory
beyond the conflict zone. Russian Foreign minister stated that objective of Russian
intervention was to stop the killing the innocent people and Russian peacekeepers in
South Ossetia. Moreover, these measures are absolutely according to the Article 51
of UN charter on the right of self defence22
.
Russia has presented different justifications for its military campaign in South
Ossetia. On August 2008, Russian President described the Georgian attack on South
Ossetia as “an act of aggression”23
. He stated Russian involvement as an act of
providing support and defence against offensive Georgian forces. An act of
aggression can be acknowledged by UN Security Council with careful consideration
of all the surrounding circumstances to a military conflict. Furthermore, an act of
aggression requires use of armed forces of one state against the sovereignty,
territorial integrity and political independence of another independent state24
.
Despite the declaration of independence by South Ossetia from Georgia, It had not
achieved the status of an internationally recognised yet as an independent state. On
08 August 2008, South Ossetia was part of Georgian territory; this fact excludes the
factor of Georgian aggression against South Ossetia and challenges the use of this
International law theory as justification of Russian action25
.
The law on use of force is one of the most controversial areas of international law.
This is one area where international law seems ineffective26
. Prohibition on use of
force is universally recognized norm established in Article 2(4) of UN Charter.
21
Toal D G, 'Russia's Kosovo: A Critical Geopolitics Of The August War Over South Ossetia', (2009) 50
Eurasian Geography and Economics
22
Lavrov S, 'The Cold War Is Long Over’ ' Newsweek, (2008) 23 August 2008,
23
Russian President's Statement on the Situation in South Ossetia, Available at:
<http://president.kremlin.ru/eng/speeches/2008/08/08/1553_type82912type82913_205032.shtml>
(Accessed: 02 February 2009).
24
UN General Assembly resolution 3314 (XXIX), Available at:
<http://daccessdds.un.org/doc/RESOLUTION/GEN/NR0/739/16/IMG/NR073916.pdf?OpenElement>
(Accessed: 02 Feb 2009).
25
See No:8
26
Evans M D (ed.) International Law, OUP, 2006).

6. Article 2(4):
“All members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of
force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in any
other manner inconsistent with the purpose of United Nations”27
There are certain exception to this general rule of prohibition on the use of force,
self-defence is the most common one. Article 51 of UN Charter provides that:
“Nothing in the present charter shall impair the inherent right of individual or
collective self-defence if an armed attack occurs against a Member of the United
Nations, until the Security Council has taken measures necessary to maintain
international peace and security”28
Since the UN Charter enters into force self-defence has become the preferred excuse
to justify the use of force by many states. There are deep differences between states
and between writers about the self-defence. Despite divergent opinion on the scope
of self-defence, modern world has the same opinion that self-defence should be
necessary and proportionate. Although these requirements are not mentioned in UN
Charter, but established through state practices since 1945 and now a part of
customary international law. The requirement of necessity and proportionately were
recently recognised by ICJ in the Nicaragua Case29
, Nuclear weapons Advisory
opinion30
and the Oil Platforms Case31
. Russian forces entered in Georgia to protect
their peacekeepers and civilian. Use of force by Russian forces was necessary and
proportionate when they entered into the breakaway region of South Ossetia, but
Russian claims seems beyond reality when they penetrated deep into the Georgian
territory.
27
Charter of the United Nations, Available at: <http://www.un.org/aboutun/charter/chapter1.shtml>
(Accessed: 09 Feb 2009).
28
See No: 26
29
Nicaragua Case [1986]
30
Legality of the Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion [1996]
31
Oil Platforms Case [2003]

7. Russian officials justify their attack on Georgia to protect Russian nationals in the
region32
. The protection of national abroad is one of the most controversial issues in
international law. Some authors argue that nationals abroad are an extension of
state territory, so an attack on citizens abroad is an attack on the state itself33
. States
and academic writers define protection of national in the light of Sir Humphrey
Waldock’s famous conditions, which are:
“
• There must be an imminent threat of injury to nationals
• A failure or inability on the part of the territorial sovereignty to protect them,
and
• The action of intervening state must be strictly confined to the object of
protecting its nationals against injury “34
Some intellectuals say that use of force for protections of nationals lies outside the
scope of Article 2(4) of the UN Charter. Since the use of force does not harm the
territorial integrity and political independence of a state. It is just matter of
protections of nationals, which territorial state ca not protect35
.
There are number of cases involving armed intervention to protect nationals abroad
in recent state practices36
. The United Kingdom is first country to use “protection of
national abroad” justification after 1945, which cited it to defend the intervention
during the Suez crisis in 195637
. In 1964, The United States and Belgium’s operation
in Congo to rescue hostages from rebels38
, Cambodia (1975)39
, Entebbe (1976)40
, Iran
32
See No.24
33
Ronzitti N, 'The Expanding Law of Self-Defence', (2006) 11 JCSL 343.
34
Ruys T, 'The ‘Protection of Nationals’ Doctrine Revisited', (2008) 13 JCSL 233.
35
See No:33
36
Gazzini T, The Changing Rules on the Use of Force in International Law, Manchester University
Press, 2005)
37
See No:33
38
Shaw M N, International Law, Sixth Edition, CUP, 2008)
39
See no.37
40
Dinstein Y, Israel Yearbook on Human Rights 1976, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1989).

8. (1980)41
, Granada (1983)42
and Panama (1989)43
are few cases where states used the
theory of “Protection of Nationals Abroad” as justification to use of force against
other states. Unite Nation denounces US intervention in Granada and Panama as US
forces stationed longer after the rescue of the civilian were secured. Protection of
nationals abroad should be similar to that in the home country because if nationals
abroad attacked due to their nationality, there is a direct relation between attack
and nationality.
It is evident that Russian justification of intervention to protect Russian
peacekeepers and forces is valid. If we look at the situation in the light of Waldock’s
conditions, Russia justifies the most of conditions. There are enough state practices
(mentioned above) in form of customary international law to justify Russian claim. It
is rumour that Moscow issued a large number of passports to the South Ossetian
residents in order to justify the direct intervention on the grounds of right to protect
its own nationals44
. Is it possible to provide passport to such a large number of
people against their will? It means South Ossetian public wants to be part of Russia.
It is Georgia, which is using force to kill the civilians.
Perhaps Russia’s most valid defence of her action is the precedent set by NATO in
Kosovo. In 1999, NATO violated Serbian sovereignty by launching a bombing
campaign against it. Moscow exploits Kosovo’s justification to intervene in the South
Ossetia. International law normally does not support separatist groups declaring
their own states, but it happened in Kosovo where NATO intervened and did what
Russians have done in South Ossetia in August 2008. Russia argued that recognition
of Kosovo was illegal, but western countries ignored Russian objection and
recognized Kosovo as an independent state. Now Russia argues that if Kosovo could
be an independent state, then why not South Ossetia and Abkhazia? Russia used the
justification of humanitarian intervention that was offered by NATO during the
41
Eichensehr K, 'Defending Nationals Abroad: Assessing the Lawfulness of Forcible Hostage Rescues',
(2007) 48 VJIL
42
See No:33
43
See 13
44
BBC, Available at: <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/7549662.stm> (Accessed: 05 Feb, 2009).

9. Kosovo war. Moscow argues that recognition of South Ossetia and Abkhazia is
morally and politically justified45
.
Conclusion
Georgia can not justify its military campaign in South Ossetia in August 2008. OSCE
monitors report is enough evidence to prove that it is Georgia, which started this
war. Tbilisi tried to win western sympathies in order to get NATO’s entry. Georgia
assumed that because of their cooperation with US in Iraq and Afghanistan US would
be more proactive in helping Georgia in the war against Russia. Actually, Georgia
totally ignored the ground realities in war against South Ossetia. The Georgian
intentions were quite clear in the beginning when Georgia attacked South Ossetia
without any consultation with internationally recognised peacekeeping forces and
OSCE.
While, on the other hand Moscow’s first response to the conflict was to convene an
emergency meeting of the UN Security Council expecting to pass a resolution for
immediate ceasefire between Georgia and South Ossetia. But unfortunately, The US
and its allies did not agree with the language used in the draft and Security Council
failed to pass a resolution. Russia used valid grounds of protection of nationals to
invade Georgia. There have been many state practices where different states used
this plea to intervene. Protection of nationals is duty of a state no matter where they
are and attack on the nationals abroad is the same as attack on the state itself.
If, US can intervene in Iraq and Afghanistan without any legal justification, then why
not Russia in South Ossetia? Russia has valid legal grounds of protection of Russian
peacekeepers and civilians in South Ossetia. In the Balkan, the west supported
disintegration of Yugoslavia by the recognition of Kosovo and mafia dominated
Montenegro’s independence. Then what is wrong with Caucasus, and it is not fair
enough just because of pro-Russia territories? It is simply double standard. If we
want this world to be a better place to live, there should be same treatment for
45
See No:43

10. every state. No matter, it is powerful or weak.
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