The document summarizes the history of Georgia's independence and military transformation since the late 1980s. It discusses Georgia declaring independence in 1991 after the dissolution of the Soviet Union, which led to civil wars in South Ossetia and Abkhazia as tensions rose over regional autonomy. While Georgia faced defeats during these conflicts, it has since undertaken military reforms and partnerships with countries like the US and NATO. The document aims to analyze Georgia's social factors, conflicts, post-conflict reforms, and defense adaptations to understand its contributions to 21st century security.

1. www.mca-marines.org/gazette 13Marine Corps Gazette • January 2017
W
ith about 870 soldiers,
Georgia is the second
largest troop contribu-
tor to the NATO-led
RESOLUTE SUPPORT (ORS) mission
in Afghanistan.1 While the United
States is still by far the largest con-
tributor, providing more than half of
the 13,000 troops serving with ORS,
the Republic of Georgia supported
counterinsurgency campaigns in Iraq
from 2003 to 2008, deploying 2,300
troops during the 2007 troop “surge.”
A battalion of 550 troops also sup-
ported the United Nations assistance
mission in Iraq. Currently, Georgian
Land Forces are being deployed with
their U.S. Marine Corps partners to
Afghanistan in support of ORS. This
enduring mission and strategic part-
nership has demonstrated an effective
partnership model and is paving the
way for not only military moderniza-
tion, security assistance, and foreign
internal defense but also political and
economic reform. This article seeks
to highlight both the transformation
and contribution that the Republic of
Georgia has made to cope with the 21st
century security environment and will
do so through analyses of social vari-
ables, conflicts, post-conflict military
reforms and partnerships, and defense
and security force adaptation.
The Republic of Georgia—Social
Operational Variable: Demographic
Mix, Ethnicity, Religion and Com-
mon Language
Georgia is an ethnically diverse, sov-
ereign nation located on the combined
continental landmass of Europe and
Asia (Eurasia) with Tbilisi as its largest
city and capital. Eurasia is frequently
used in geopolitics to refer to affairs and
organizations associated with the post-
Soviet states, in particular the Trans-
Caucasian republics. Trans-Caucasia, or
the South Caucasus, is a region located
on the border of Eastern Europe and
Southwest Asia, and spans the southern
portion of the Caucasus Mountains.
This region encompasses all of Armenia,
the majority of Georgia and Azerbaijan,
and parts of Iran and Turkey. Geopo-
litically, Trans-Caucasia remains one
of the most ethnically heterogeneous
and politically volatile regions in the
post-Soviet era. The region also con-
tains three heavily disputed areas: the
autonomous republics of Abkhazia and
South Ossetia in Georgia and Nagorno-
Karabakh in Azerbaijan. According to
the Central Intelligence Agency’s World
Factbook, as of July 2015, the population
of Georgia is estimated as 4.9 million
people. The ethnically diverse country
is comprised of Georgians (83.8 per-
cent), Azeris (6.5 percent), Armenians
(5.7 percent), Russians (1.5 percent),
and a minority of regional ethnicities
(2.5 percent). Historically and contem-
porarily, the ethnic complexity of the
Regarding
the Republic
Understanding Georgia’s contributions to security
through history, military reform, and partnerships
by Victor R. Morris
>Mr. Morris is the Counter Impro-
vised Explosive Device (C-IED) Train-
er and Integrator, U.S. Army Europe’s
Joint Multinational Readiness Cen-
ter, Germany.
Georgian soldiers conduct a mission brief before conducting an MRE, February 2015. (Photo by
Sgt Tyler Kingsbury.)

2. 14 www.mca-marines.org/gazette Marine Corps Gazette • January 2017
Ideas & Issues (Leadership)
Caucasus region accounts not only for
the root cause but also the main impetus
of instability in the region.
Another factor that is tightly coupled
with ethnic components in the Cau-
casus is religion: Georgia is primarily
and officially Orthodox Christian (83.9
percent), Muslim (9.9 percent), Arme-
nia-Gregorian (3.9 percent), Catholic
(.8 percent), and other or none (.15
percent). Language, however, is an im-
portant and influential factor in such
a socially diverse country as Georgia;
Georgian, or Kartuli, is the official and
most widely spoken language, followed
by Russian, Armenian, and Azerbaijani.
It is important to note that Abkhaz,
Ossetic, and Russian are the official
languages of Abkhazia and South Os-
setia.2
Independence, Civil War, “Color Rev-
olutions,” and New Generation War:
1988–2008
This section provides a historical,
20-year military-centric review of the
evolution of 21stcentury new generation
war,3 non-linear or hybrid warfare, in
the Caucasus region. New generation
war in the region has involved exploita-
tion of political and ethnic vulnerabili-
ties and social strife (prepare/shape),
subversion, state supported irregular
and hybrid separatist formations (at-
tack), and conflict ceasefire initiatives
and justification for peacekeeping
operations (strategic stabilization).4
Precursors for new generation warfare
and supra-means combination refine-
ment5 in Chechnya (First and Second
Chechen Wars), Estonia, and Ukraine
included non-military means, protest
potential of the population, ethnic
and economic manipulation, irregular
and regular maneuver forces, and con-
stant external influence as deliberate
foreign policy. Lessons learned from
the Russo-Georgian War were applied
to the War in Donbass and primarily
involved non-military, informational,
and irregular means (as outlined in this
author’s previous article in Small Wars
Journal entitled “Grading Gerasimov:
Evaluating Russian Non-linear War
through Modern Chinese Doctrine (17
September 2015).”) Additionally, gross
miscalculations and lessons learned in
the Donbas region of Ukraine include
the overestimation of population-centric
core grievances, separatist support, and
Ukrainian regular and paramilitary
forces fighting ability. The current ap-
plication of devastating conventional
military means in Syria demonstrates
the complete advancement of hybrid
capabilities. It also demonstrates the po-
tential for more successful applications
in all domains, first through escalation
dominance, and then through both cal-
culated direct and indirect effects-based
combinations to reach political objec-
tives.
Just a few months before the formal
dissolution of the Soviet Union on 26
December 1991, Georgia declared inde-
pendence on 9 April 1991. Shortly after
this declaration of independence, the
newly-elected president implemented
nationalistic initiatives to exercise more
direct control over the historically au-
tonomous regions of Abkhazia and
South Ossetia. The objective of these
initiatives was to attempt to politically
stabilize these regions embroiled in rising
tensions since 1988. Historically, how-
ever, modern tensions in Ossetia and
Abkhazia can be traced to the Soviet
Union foundation and Stalin eras. In
1922, Ossetia was divided into parts of
the Russian and Georgian Soviet So-
cialist Republic (SSR). South Ossetia
became an autonomous oblast (AO) in
the Georgian SSR, and in 1931, Abkha-
zia was an Autonomous Soviet Socialist
Republic (Abkhazian ASSR) also located
in the Georgian SSR. Both regions ex-
isted autonomously within the Geor-
gian SSR and were heavily populated
by Russian, Georgian, and Armenian
populations due to large scale migration
but remained politically independent
from the USSR. Despite their political
autonomy, throughout the late 1970s
and early-80s, majorities in the two
regions advocated for both succession
from Georgian influence and for incor-
poration into the former Russian Soviet
Federative Socialist Republic (Russian
SFSR).6 Then, only months after taking
office, the aforementioned acting presi-
dent was deposed in a coup d’état. This
action resulted in the Georgian Civil
War, with interethnic and intra-national
conflicts first in the South Ossetian War
(1991–1992) and next in Abkhazia from
1992–1993.
The First South Ossetian War em-
ployed both regular and irregular forces
and tactics. On one side were the Geor-
gian Government Forces (regular) and
ethnic Georgian militias (irregular).
On the opposing side were the Rus-
sian Federation Forces (regular), ethnic
Ossetian militias (irregular), and North
Ossetian Volunteers (irregular). Due to
escalation of the on-going conflict in
Abkhazia, the Russian-brokered Sochi
ceasefire agreement was then signed. In
South Ossetia, a peacekeeping mission
composed of Georgian, Russian, and
North Ossetian forces was launched,
in which South Ossetian peacekeepers
served with North Ossetian forces. Fur-
thermore, the Organization for Security
Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) agreed
to both monitor the ceasefire and facili-
tate the negotiations, which were finally
resolved in 1992. The flow of refugees
into Northern Ossetia aggravated the
tense ethnic situation there and played
a significant role in the North Ossetian
borderland.
The war in Abkhazia also involved
both regular and irregular forces fight-
ing on either side of the conflict. One
side was composed of Georgian Armed
Forces (regular) and ethnic Georgians
in Abkhazia (irregular). The opposing
side was composed of Russian Federa-
tion Armed Forces (regular), the Ab-
khaz separatists (irregular), Northern
Caucasian mercenaries (irregular), and
Cossacks (irregular). By the end of Sep-
tember 1993, Russian-backed separatists
had not only violated the Sochi ceasefire
agreement but also counterattacked and
seized the regional capital of Sukhumi.
This decisive operation resulted in a
military defeat for Georgia and was fol-
lowed by the ethnic cleansing of the
Georgian majority in Abkhazia.
... Georgia declared in-
dependence on 9 April
1991.

3. www.mca-marines.org/gazette 15Marine Corps Gazette • January 2017
Similar to the war, the “Revolu-
tion of Roses” in late 2003 had drastic
repercussions both in Georgia and in
the international community. The Rose
Revolution can also be used as a case
study involving civil resistance, disobe-
dience, and “protest potential of the
population.” According to GEN Valery
Gerasimov, Chief of the General Staff
of the Russian Federation, population-
centric non-military means involving
protests and riots have the potential to:
transform a perfectly thriving state into
chaos, provoke humanitarian catastro-
phe, and result in civil war. Specifically
in Georgia, the revolution resulted in
a change of power that took place only
after widespread protests over contest-
ed parliamentary elections. Although
both the United States and Russia had
significant involvement in Georgian
affairs historically and leading up to
the revolution, the Rose Revolution ef-
fectively marked the end of the Soviet
era of leadership and set the conditions
for new presidential and parliamentary
elections. The revolution also created
conditions for more liberalizing reforms
such as the rise of an independent me-
dia, foreign support through USAID
(U.S. Agency for International Develop-
ment), the OSCE, and anticorruption
campaigns. Therefore, the Rose Revo-
lution acted as a catalyst for Georgia’s
transition toward democracy and is also
said to have inspired the Orange Revo-
lution in Ukraine just one year later.
Furthermore, in 2006, the Georgian
parliament voted unanimously for a bill
that called for the integration of Georgia
into NATO, which effectively symbol-
ized Georgia’s increased participation
and contributions on an internationally
cooperative level.
Next, Georgia’s international activity
increased as they joined the effort in
Iraq and, just five years after doing so,
engaged in the Russo-Georgian War.
The prelude to war can be traced to
March 2008 when Russia indicated in-
creased interest and activity in Abkhazia
and South Ossetia, with the South Os-
setia region contained arguably within
geographically Georgian territory, and
Abkhazia lying between Russian and
Georgian territory. For instance, Rus-
sia lifted economic sanctions imposed
on Abkhazia in 1996, discussed rec-
ognition of the former autonomous
soviet republics, and increased direct
involvement in Abkhazian and South
Ossetian political matters. Tensions
were exacerbated by the traditional
concept of “maskirovka” (deception or
camouflage) being employed politically
through provocation operations. Such
operations were augmented by both 21st
century information and cyber capabili-
ties. Examples of tactics are the denial
of service attacks on key government
websites through coordinated hacking,
downing Georgian unmanned aerial
systems, and anti-Georgian Army pro-
paganda. The most indirect military
tactic in asserting increased influence,
however, was Russia’s decision to deploy
“peacekeeping” forces to focus on in-
zone military infrastructure buildup.
This decision signaled the arrival of
“polite green men” to fix a railway line
in Abkhazia as a civil engineering proj-
ect which Moscow later insisted was
for “humanitarian” purposes. Only a
few weeks later, however, 9,000 Russian
troops entered Georgia, with a portion
entering via Abkhazia using the railroad
repaired under humanitarian pretenses.7
On 8 August 2008, Georgian forces
subsequently launched a large-scale
military offensive on the South Osse-
tia capital of Tskhinvali. This offensive
was supported by artillery and advanced
quickly in order to restore constitutional
order following sporadic fighting in and
around the city. Approximately 30 min-
utes after the Georgian advance was
launched, tank columns of the Russian
58th Army began crossing into Georgia.
These columns entered Georgia from
a tunnel in North Ossetia and moved
for Tskhinvaliin an attempt to stop the
“genocide” of Ossetians. The Georgian
military is reported to have withdrawn
its last troops from South Ossetia on
the morning of 11 August.8
Shortly before Georgia withdrew its
troops, from 8–10 August 2008, the
war in South Ossetia spread to Abkha-
zia. Separatist rebels and the Russian
air force launched a full scale attack
on Georgian forces occupying the last
part of Abkhaz territory known as the
Kodori Gorge. The Russian air cam-
paign lasted for three days and not only
forced the displacement of 3,000 eth-
nic Georgians but also the removal of
Georgian Armed Forces. Within days,
Tbilisi officials claimed more than
20,000 troops had crossed the border
from Russia into South Ossetia and had
arrived by land and sea into Abkha-
zia.9 Fighting was described as intense
and resulted in military and civilian
deaths on both sides.10 Finally, French
President Nicolas Sarkozy mediated a
six-point ceasefire document which was
formalized on 12 August. Russia was
the first to agree, followed shortly by
Georgia—the formal agreement was
signed between 15–16 August in Tbilisi
and in Moscow with assistance from
the United States. On 26 August, the
Russian Federation officially recognized
both South Ossetia and Abkhazia as
autonomous republics independent of
both Russia and Georgia. In response
to Russia’s recognition of Abkhazia and
South Ossetia, the Georgian govern-
ment announced that it would cut all
diplomatic relations with Russia. This
announcement, and at great cost, “in-
ternationalized” the conflicts, effec-
tively exposing Russia’s inability to act
as a neutral peacekeeper or negotiator.
Subsequently, the Georgian parliament
unanimously passed a resolution on 28
August formally declaring Abkhazia
and South Ossetia as “Russian-occu-
pied territories,” calling Russian troops
“occupying forces.”11 The Russian mili-
tary has since increased military pres-
ence in Abkhazia and South Ossetia in
violation of the 2008 ceasefire agree-
... the Rose Revolution effectively marked the end of
the Soviet era of leadership and set the conditions for
new presidential and parliamentary elections.

4. 16 www.mca-marines.org/gazette Marine Corps Gazette • January 2017
Ideas & Issues (Leadership)
ment. According to the Russian Defense
Ministry, as of 13 January 2016, more
than 2,000 soldiers participated in mili-
tary exercises at the Dzartsemi Firing
Range in northern Tskhinvali in South
Ossetia. These exercises coincide with
the 2015 reception of military hardware
and modern weapons systems in the
same region.12
Post Conflict Partnerships and Re-
forms (2009–2016)
Following the 2008 conflict with
Russia, Georgia continued increasing
its involvement in and contributions to
domestic and international security ini-
tiatives. The Georgian Train and Equip
Program (GTEP), for instance, began
in May 2002 and was one of the earliest
defense capacity building partnerships
between Georgian and U.S. forces (rep-
resented by U.S. Special Operations and
Marine Corps forces). Furthermore, one
year after Georgia joined the Afghani-
stan war, the Georgian Security and Sta-
bility Operations Program (SSOP) fol-
lowed from 2005–2007. After the 2008
Russo-Georgian War, Georgia began a
process of rearmament, modernization,
and strategic partnering. In 2009, the
Georgian Minister of Defense agreed to
contribute an infantry battalion to serve
under the United States supporting the
NATO-led International Security As-
sistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan.
Thus, Marine Corps Forces, Europe
(MARFOREUR) began a training
program called the Georgia Deploy-
ment Program-International Security
Assistance Force (GDP-ISAF).13 The
objective of this program was to pre-
pare Georgian units for deployment
to southern Afghanistan in support of
Marine counterinsurgency operations.
Additionally, in 2011, Georgian high
command decided to divide its military
forces into two main operational units,
with one in the eastern part of the coun-
try and the other in the west. The aim
was to create two independently acting
military districts which would consist
of equally balanced forces aligned with
strategic deployment areas. The Geor-
gia Deployment Program-Resolute
Support Mission (GDP-RSM) is the
current training and deployment model
and is the focus of the modernization
and enduring partnership between the
Georgian Armed Forces and Marine
Corps. MARFOREUR is the lead
component for coordinating the GDP,
while the Marine Corps Security Co-
operation Group (MCSCG) is the lead
command component responsible for
training the Georgian battalions with
support from other Marine Corps Units.
United States Marine Corps Forces, Af-
rica (MARFORAF) also plays a key and
decisive role in the program. Because of
the model’s overwhelming success, both
Georgian and U.S. participants have
called for the strategic partnership to
be extended. Such an extension would
not only support on-going operations in
Afghanistan but also set the conditions
for Georgia’s prospective inclusion in
and interoperability within NATO.
Furthermore, the GDP-RSM is
a training period comprised of six
phases. The period begins with Ma-
rine predeployment training and is
followed by in-country training and
validation. A company and battalion
field exercise is conducted in Georgia
prior to the culminating Battalion Mis-
sion Readiness Exercise (MRE) at the
Joint Multinational Readiness Center
(JMRC) in Germany. The MRE is the
last event prior to deployment of the
Georgian battalion and Marine liaison
teams to Afghanistan and subsequent
redeployment. The USMC predeploy-
ment training shapes the conditions for
the multi-location deployment and is
designed to properly prepare Marines
with the knowledge and skills required
to effectively engage foreign security
forces. Predeployment training involves
a variety of technical aspects, such as
training management fundamentals,
force protection techniques, and for-
eign weapons familiarization as well as
cultural aspects, including Georgian
language proficiency and cultural
awareness skills. Other goals are aligned
with achieving national level objectives
effectively.
Next, the nucleus of the partner-
ship involves the Georgian battalions
and their USMC training and liaison
teams. The Georgian Training Team
The GDP-RSM is a program between the Marine Corps and the Georgian Armed Forces. (Photo
by PFC Lloyd Justine Villanueva.)
Georgia continued in-
creasing its involve-
ment in and contribu-
tions to domestic and
international security
initiatives.

5. www.mca-marines.org/gazette 17Marine Corps Gazette • January 2017
(GTT) and Georgian Liaison Team
(GLT) are drawn from both Reserve
and Active Components. The purpose
of the Georgian Training Team (GTT)
is to advise Georgian light infantry bat-
talions and Krtsanisi National Training
Center staff in order to build a part-
nership with both entities and enhance
readiness within the Georgian forces.
Complimentary to the GTT are the
Georgian Liaison Team (GLT), whose
members also serve as advisors in order
to develop and prepare the battalion
for the Mission Ready Exercise (MRE)
and also for their follow on mission in
Afghanistan. GLTs integrate with their
assigned Battalions during situational
training, as well as during Company
and battalion field exercises. The GLTs
also deploy with their partner battalion
to Afghanistan. Finally, the air and na-
val gunfire liaison company provide a
supporting and advisory role for mul-
tinational aviation operations together
with all parties mentioned above.
The overall mission undertaken by
all of the above elements that constitute
the Georgia Deployment Program is
twofold: first, to advise and support
the Georgian Armed Forces, and sec-
ond, to facilitate the overall mission of
ORS through training, advising, and
assisting Afghan security forces during
enduring counterinsurgency operations.
This mission is, therefore, a strategic
mission because it not only facilitates
on-going security and stability efforts
but also bolsters the Afghan security
forces’ capabilities. In order to ac-
complish the above two mission goals,
Marine Corps teams and Georgian
Armed Forces must undergo a series
of rigorous counterinsurgency-centric
training events prior to the MRE in
Germany. The light infantry battalions
must first complete staff planning for
brigade-level orders. Second, it is im-
perative to exercise simulated battalion
mission command. Third, culture and
language training must be conducted,
and finally, squad and platoon lane
training as well as field training exercises
must be executed (company-battalion).
Specialty C-IED individual training
is also conducted to support collective
tasks and prepare the unit for replicated
and improvised weapons threats. An
example of this training is tactical-level
biometrics screening and collection as
a critical enabler utilized by all unified
action partners. Biometrics operations
provide support not only for C-IED
operations but also for force protection
and all-source intelligence fusion. This
support, in turn, facilitates force pro-
tection and full-spectrum lethal and
non-lethal engagement efforts (support,
influence, disrupt, and neutralize activi-
ties) across the entire range of military
operations.
Finally, the MRE in Germany tests
the battalion’s ability to effectively con-
duct lethal and non-lethal operations.
Each MRE is designed to put Georgian
forces in an environment in which they
must simultaneously deal with civil-
ians in the battlespace and highly active
and dynamic opposing forces working
against them. Additionally, Georgian
soldiers and U.S. Marines must inte-
grate and face challenges replicating
what they may face during their de-
ployment to Afghanistan. The MRE is
the culmination of the GDP-RSM rota-
tion and highlights the effectiveness,
readiness, and partnership between the
USMC GLTs and Georgian soldiers as
they make final preparations for deploy-
ment. To date, Georgia continues to
pledge troops to the NATO-led, non-
combat mission in Afghanistan (post-
2014). Since the start of their mission,
more than 11,000 Georgian soldiers
have served in Afghanistan.14
Adapting Georgian Military and
Police Forces to Counter Complex
Threats: NATO 2020
Defense capacity building requires
sustainable training, varying levels of
technology, and equipment solutions
at all levels. For both Georgian and
U.S. Marine Corps forces, biometric
equipment is the perfect example of a
technological requirement at the tactical
level to support contemporary combat
operations at the operation and strate-
gic levels. Currently, Georgian Armed
Forces are applying tactical-level bio-
The national colors of Georgia and the United States fly alongside the NATO Flag. (Photo by Sgt
Tatum Vayavananda.)
Each MRE is designed to put Georgian forces in an
environment in which they must simultaneously deal
with civilians in the battlespace and highly active and
dynamic opposing forces working against them.

6. 18 www.mca-marines.org/gazette Marine Corps Gazette • January 2017
Ideas & Issues (Leadership)
metrics screening and collection via
live-scan biometric capture. Live-scan
biometric capture is when an operator
uses an electronic device and associ-
ated software to scan and capture bio-
metric samples (e.g., fingerprints, iris,
and face) directly from a subject and
in conjunction with biographic and
contextual information.15 The Secure
Electronic Enrollment Kit (SEEK II)
is the electronic biometric device cur-
rently used by the GDP-RSM to facili-
tate biometric support for operations in
Afghanistan. The SEEK II is manu-
factured by Crossmatch Technologies
and is a comprehensive, multimodal
identification and enrollment platform.
The compact and portable design for
use in rugged environments makes
SEEK II quick and easy for military
users, border control, and additional
agencies to identify subjects and verify
their identities in the field. The SEEK
II leverages a 120,000 person watch list,
which can be updated to match varying
levels of known and suspected terror-
ists (KST) for biometric comparison
and identification.16 This collection
capability and subsequent biometric-
enabled intelligence is extremely valu-
able to force protection operations (base
security). It is also crucial to stability
operations and overall identity intel-
ligence products and capabilities in
support of lethal and non-lethal (pros-
ecutorial) targeting efforts. Finally, this
is an enduring capability and must be
tailored, for example, through software
applications in the host nation language
and expanded to other national secu-
rity organizations in order to develop
a comprehensive approach to security.
Other organizations include, but are
not limited to, Georgian Police and civil
authorities conducting counterterrorism
operations as well as the Georgian Land,
Special, and National Guard Forces.
Conclusion
In conclusion, Georgia has a diverse
cultural history and vast experience
fighting in and supporting irregular
conflicts. At this time, they are suc-
cessfully employing tactical biomet-
rics collection and subsequent inter-
governmental production and sharing
of biometric enabled intelligence as a
means to accurately identify dynamic
and adaptive known or suspected ter-
rorists living amongst the population.17
These solutions support on-going part-
nered operations in Afghanistan and
collective European security initiatives
and readiness action plans involving
modernization of military forces, pre-
dictive and early warning intelligence,
prosecution of combatants, and border
management. The Republic of Georgia,
much like Europe as a whole, is at a criti-
cal point in their military and political
reform and deserve to be acknowledged
for their professionalism, diligent part-
nership, and contribution to collective
security and defense.
Notes
1. “Georgian Defense Minister Visits Afghani-
stan,” Georgian Times, (18 January 2016), ac-
cessed at http://www.geotimes.ge.
2. Central Intelligence, CIA World Factbook,
accessed at http://www.cia.gov.
3. More recently, Sergei Chekinov and Sergei
Bogdanov have described “new generation war,”
noting that “the role of mobile joint forces op-
erating in an integrated reconnaissance and
information environment is rising.” In their
view, information superiority has become a
necessity in contemporary warfare. For more
information, see Sergei Chekinov and Sergei
Bogdanov, “The nature and content of a new-
generation war,” Military Thought, (as reported
by the MacKenzie Institute, Toronto, Canada:
November 2015).
4. Andras Racz, “Chapter 4: Operational Phas-
es of the Hybrid War,” Russia’s Hybrid War in
Ukraine: Breaking the Enemy’s Ability to Resist,
(Helsinki: The Finish Institute of International
Affairs, 2015), accessed at http://www.fiia.fi/
assets/publications/FIIAReport43.pdf.
5. Supra-means combinations unite aspects
of military and non-military means to reach
desired objectives. See Oiao Liang and Wang
Ziangsui, Unrestricted Warfare, (Panama City:
Pan American Publishing Company, 2002).
6. “La Russie a ete poussee a changer
d’orientation,” (2008), accessed at http://www.
humanite.fr/node/400231.
7. RAND Corporation, “Conflict in the Cau-
casus 1991,” (Arlington, VA: 2009), accessed
at http://www.rand.org.
8. Ibid.
9. Ibid.
10. Fighting was often intense. On 19 August
2016, a Georgian government official reported a
total of 215 killed on the Georgian side, includ-
ing 133 defense ministry personnel, 13 interior
ministry personnel, and 69 civilians. He also
reported nearly 1,500 wounded, both civilian
and military, and 70 soldiers missing. The Rus-
sians claim that 64 of their forces were killed
and 323 injured. There is no verifiable figure
for South Ossetian casualties, although initial
Ossetian and Russian reports of up to 2,000
civilian deaths have been significantly reduced.
11. Tibilisi, “Abkhazia, S. Ossetia Formally
Declared Occupied Territory,” Civil Georgia,
(28 August 2008), accessed at http://www.
civil.ge/eng.
12. “Georgian Defense Minister Visits Af-
ghanistan.”
13. Cpl Gabrielle Quire, USMCR, “MCSCG
deploys to the Republic of Georgia,” (Virginia
Beach, VA: 14 April 2015), accessed at www.
marines.mil.
14. NATO, “Georgian Army Ends Mission in
Helmand,” (Brussels, Belgium: 16 July 2014),
accessed at http://www.rs.nato.int.
15. Maj Jeroen van Kleef, “Counter-IED Re-
port,” Countering Threat Anonymity: Biometrics
in Support of Military Operations, (NLD Minis-
try of Defense, 2016). Maj Kleef is senior staff
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17. Victor R. Morris, Enhancing Intergovern-
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