1. Farley 1
The College of William and Mary
Blind Guidance:
The Cause of Ethnic Extremism in Croatian and Hungarian Political Parties
Dylan Thomas Farley
Politics of Eastern Europe
Professor Pickering
15 November 2013

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Blind Guidance:
The Cause of Ethnic Extremism in Croatian and Hungarian Political Parties
The ethnic extremism displayed by Eastern European political parties, specifically in
Croatia and Hungary, stems from the political elites’ quest for power. Croatian political elites in
parties such as the Croatian Democratic Union, the Croatian Party of Rights, and the Croatian
Liberation Movement foster hatred towards the Serbs, Jews, and Roma in order to gain more
influence among the Croat populations in Croatia and the Balkan region. In Hungary, the heads
of the Jobbik party fabricate ethnic tensions with the Jews and the Roma in order to increase
their power and support. Historical animosities are dug up and revitalized by the political elites
in these peaceful heterogeneous societies. Economic tensions are used to disorient the public and
make them believe in the falsified ethnic tensions. The political elites of certain parties in Croatia
and Hungary use ethnic extremist propaganda in order to further their own power.
The Eastern European socio-political landscape is incredibly complex. This paper seeks
to explain the political elite source of ethnic extremism by first giving a historical analysis of the
basis of tensions in Croatia and then Hungary, secondly to solidify the argument based on these
historical facts, and lastly to break down the current situation in Croatia and Hungary as given
the outline of historical facts and political realities explained in earlier sections.
Croatian Extremism Background
The current state of Croatian political parties ethnic extremism is based off actions
around the Second World War. In 1941 Nazi Germany set up a fascist puppet state called the
Independent State of Croatia, encompassing most of modern Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina. It
was in this context that a fascist-Neoconservative group known as Ustaša came into prominence.
The Ustaše were Croat ultra-nationalists, made up of intellectuals and political elites who

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branched out and expanded their base to the general Croat population by making appeals to
Croat irredentism.1 The goal of the Ustaše was to further their own biased beliefs, as well as to
gain as much power and wealth as possible. By appealing to the nationalist feelings of the
scattered Balkan Croat populations, the Ustaše ensured support because the dispersed Croats
wanted to join their ethnic kin. Although the Ustaša had been founded several years prior to the
creation of the Independent State of Croatia, it was not until the new state formed that it held
significant power, when it took control of the puppet state. The Ustaša militia was notorious for
its hardline policies and atrocities against non-Croats. The most well known atrocity was the
running of the Jasenovac extermination camp, where an estimated 300,000 to 700,000 Serbs,
Jews, and Roma were killed.2 Their main enemy was the Chetniks, or Serb nationalists. Once the
war ended, the Ustaše were sought out for trial but many escaped and the extreme tensions
eventually simmered down. The hatreds expressed by the fascist-neoconservative Ustaše
remained veiled for many years, but were still harbored by those former Ustaše who escaped to
countries like Canada and Argentina. It was from this escaped Ustaša base that the modern
ethnocentricity in Croatia was formed.
The reasons that each of the three ethnic groups was targeted vary greatly. In regards to
the Jews, the Ustaše were collaborating with the Nazis, although general anti-Semitism existed in
the Croat-populated areas due to envy of the large wealth of local Jewish merchants and
industrialists. The Roma were persecuted once again due to Nazi policies, but also because of
general European antiziganism because they are seen as outsiders and impoverished criminals.3
Roma are often mistreated throughout Europe and suffer from poverty, illiteracy, and
1 Irredentism – advocating annexation of territories due to ethnic ties or historical ownership
2 "What Was Jasenovac?" Jasenovac Research Institute. Jasenovac Research Institute, 2006.
3 Antiziganism – anti-Roma prejudice

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homelessness, all mainly due to prejudices and historical antiziganistic laws. The Serb case is
extremely telling however, as the Serbs were persecuted because they were such adamant
proponents of Yugoslavism and because they were the most powerful group in the pre-war
Yugoslavia.4 Yugoslavism was the antithesis of Croatian nationalism, a main tenet of the Ustaša.
Modern Croatia’s three main ethnocentric political parties are the Croatian Democratic
Union5, the Croatian Party of Rights6, and the Croatian Liberation Movement7. The HOP is the
oldest, founded in 1956 in order to organize the mainly nationalist voting block of Croatian
émigrés, many of who were the escaped Ustaše mentioned above. The HDZ and HSP were both
founded in the early 1990s during the drive for Croatian independence. The initial leaders of the
ethnocentric ideology were the former Ustaše in the HOP. Other former Ustaše who had stayed
in Croatia after WWII formed the HDZ and HSP, each party also promulgating ethnocentric
policies stemming from the Ustaša regime.
Hungarian Extremism Background
Hungarian ethnic extremism starts with the end of WWI, when the Austro-Hungarian
Empire was dismantled into its two constituent kingdoms in 1918. The Kingdom of Hungary was
then forced to sign the Treaty of Trianon in 1920, which separated nearly 3.5 million ethnic
Hungarians from their homeland, giving a bloody wound to Hungarian nationalists.8
The next phase of extremism occurred during WWII. Hungary, led by the fascist Arrow
Cross Party, sought to regain its lost glory and allied itself with Nazi Germany. Hungary’s war
4 Yugoslavism – the ideology of unity for all of the South Slavs, Yugo- being a Slavic prefix for
south. South Slavs include Slovenes, Croats, Bosniaks (Bosnian Muslims), Serbs, Montenegrins,
Macedonians, Albanians, and Bulgarians.
5 In Croatian, Hrvatska demokratska zajednica, referred to in this paper as HDZ
6 In Croatian, Hrvatska stranka prava, referred to in this paper as HSP
7 In Croatian, Hrvatski oslobodilački pokret, referred to in this paper as HOP
8 Frucht 359

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goals were to regain any territory lost after WWI that was populated by ethnic Hungarians.
Hungary followed the Nazi lead on ethnic extremism, pursuing anti-Semitic and antiziganistic
policies. The fascist Hungarian regime collaborated with the Nazis during the Holocaust, killing
over 500,000 Jews and also countless Roma.9 This is significant because Hungary had, and still
does have, the third largest Jewish population in Europe. Although Hungary did temporarily gain
territory back during the war, its pre-1938 borders were reestablished upon the cessation of
hostilities. This second blow to the nationalists paved the way for modern ethnic extremism.
The culprit for modern Hungarian ethnic extremism is Jobbik, The Movement for a
Better Hungary. Jobbik is considered to be radical Hungarian nationalist, as well as neo-fascist.
Although it is a new party that was only founded in 2003, Jobbik follows some old Hungarian
nationalist ideals, such as the abolishment of the Treaty of Trianon. Jobbik is attempting to gain
power by recruiting supporters through claims of ethnic tensions continued from the World
Wars.
The Reason for Extremism
Political elites always want to stay in office. By staying in office they retain their power,
which in corrupt political systems such as those of Eastern Europe goes hand in hand with
increased wealth. One of the ways that political parties can gain more power is with more
supporters. On election day, supporters are voters and many Eastern Europeans countries
including Croatia and Hungary allow all ethno-nationals to vote.10 The strongest supporters for
ultranationalist parties, such as the ones discussed in this paper, are members of the ethnic group
9 "The Holocaust in Hungary." Degob.org. National Committee for Attending Deportees
10 Ethno-nationals – all citizens of a nation-state who belong to that nation. Example: ethnic
French citizens of France as opposed to ethnic Algerian citizens of France.

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who are living in a different state where they are a significant minority.11 These stranded peoples
often have misperceived injustices and prejudices and are openly nationalistic to the point of
violence. Political parties appeal to these disaffected groups because they offer such unwavering
support. An example of this being done was Franjo Tudjman’s HDZ inflating Serb tensions in
1995 to increase the number of HDZ supporters in the Serb populated areas. When a political
party creates and inflates ethnic tension and extremism or extends irredentist policies, these
disaffected populations become more vocal and supportive of the party that expresses its support
for nationalism and revanchism.12 If for some reason the irredentist policies of the nationalist
parties were fulfilled, there would be more power for these parties, as the state would have more
of its ethno-nationals back as well as having better trade access and resource access with the
expanded geography.
Conservative parties are against reform by definition. Furthermore, the authoritarian
parties seek to keep their power strong. Authoritarian states create and inflate conflicts, because
during conflicts citizens are more willing to sacrifice their civil liberties, which gives the
authoritarian state more power. Conservatives can also stay in power or at the very least delay
reform because societies are significantly less likely to undergo power changes during conflicts.
Also, in times of conflict reformists are ignored. Conflict creates a common goal, which unites
the population behind a single banner (typically the one in power) and increases support for
nationalism. These tactics help out authoritarian, conservative, nationalist parties, three of the
determining factors of the HDZ, the HSP, the HOP, and Jobbik.
11 For example, the Croats in Bosnia-Herzegovina and the Hungarians in Slovakia and
Transylvania.
12 Revanchism – seeking to reverse territorial losses; example: Mexico seeking to regain the
territories lost to the United States during the 1840s

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Leaders of political parties, in addition to creating more power and wealth for
themselves, pursue policies based off their own beliefs while in office. Party leaders sometimes
are personally extreme for various reasons. Franjo Tudjman, who was a President of Croatia and
leader of the HDZ when it was vehemently fighting the Serbs, was himself anti-Serb and was
pursuing his own personal beliefs. He was in the military for years and one of the highest-
ranking Croats in the Yugoslav National Army (JNA), which showed preference towards Serbs.
In addition, the Yugoslav Secret Police (OZNA) presumably killed Tudjman’s father. This type
of ethnic murder is a reason that an individual would potentially become an extremist. In our
Hungarian example Jobbik, its current leader Gábor Vona is pursuing his own ethnic extremist
policies. His ultranationalist views are based off his background when he was growing up in a
conservative, rural environment where few outsiders were present.
Modern Croatian Extremism
Modern Croatian political ethnic extremism of the HOP, the HSP, and the HDZ has
decreased from its high point in the early 1990s, but has not ceased entirely. Of the three ethnic
extremism parties, only the HSP and the HDZ function electorally. The HSP height of popularity
was the election of August 1992 when it received 7.1% of the vote.13 This number has since
decreased to 2.8%, so it is not represented in the Croatian Parliament.14 The HDZ is significantly
more powerful, and has been the lead party in Croatia in the recent past. The HDZ once had
control of 48.7%15 of the vote in 1990, before declining and rising again to 45.23%16 in 1995, but
now only retaining 23.5%17 of the vote in Parliament, where it is the main opposition party.
13 Croatia: Parties and Elections
14 Ibid
15 Gagnon 133
16 Croatia Government
17 CIA

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The ethnic extremist political parties openly endorse policies that curtail the rights of the
Serb minority in Croatia. This minority tried to split off during the Croatian War of
Independence in 1991 and form the Republic of Serbian Krajina. Many left wing and reformist
parties try to pass legislature recognizing and protecting the rights of Serbs, especially in terms
of creating bilingual areas. The HDZ in office openly contests such policies, countering with
restrictions to the minority instead. Furthermore, HDZ sponsored vandals stir up ethnic tensions
with rallies and graffiti. The antiziganistic and anti-Semitic feelings of the HDZ are carried out
this way too, with limited recognition for minorities and an HDZ-sponsored graffiti and hate
campaign, although officially unendorsed.
Croats are willing to follow the policies set by their corrupt extremist leaders due to the
high unemployment in the country, between 17.3% and 21.9% over the past two years.18 The
general Croatian economy has been dismal as well, recently stagnating and contracting. Bad
economic ties make people more likely to follow the extremist views portrayed by political
leaders. Ultranationalists will promise economic reform and prosperity, hand in hand with ethnic
purity. They claim that in return they need more support and limited civil liberties, which is
where they derive their power.
Modern Hungarian Extremism
Jobbik has become increasingly popular in Hungary since its inception. Although in 2006
it only received 2.2% of the vote, it received 16.7% of the vote in 2010, enough to become the
third-largest party in Hungarian Parliament.19 Jobbik promises a better future for Hungary
through ultraconservative policies and Hungarian ethno-nationalism, including expansion.
Hungary has been in a bad financial situation for nearly a decade, having entered a period of
18 "Croatia Unemployment Rate." TRADING ECONOMICS.
19 Hungary: Parties and Elections

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austerity measures in 2006. The economy briefly recovered in 2010 and 2011, but was in
recession again in 2012 and has been above 10% unemployment until very recently.20
Due to the grim economic circumstances, Hungarians have been supportive of their
leaders ethnic extremist policies. For example, the new Hungarian Constitution from January 1,
2012 has been changed four times in fifteen months. The goal of the new constitution is to be
more conservative and restructure finance, attempting to solve the country’s economic issues.
The fourth amendment to the new constitution criminalizes homelessness and curtails religious
freedoms. These two laws target the Roma and the Jews, the Roma often being homeless and the
Jews being the main religious minority.
Modern Hungarian Jews form one of the largest in Europe. The 120,000-member
community that survived the Holocaust still receives open hostility from the Hungarian political
scene and the Hungarian people. Jobbik uses similar symbols to the Arrow Cross Party fascists,
such as the Arpad stripes, a common symbol for Hungarian ultranationalists. The Roma also
have a large presence in Hungary, with over 800,000 Roma out of the Hungarian population of
10 million. These Roma live in squalid conditions and ethnic murders are common, with
offenders often not prosecuted by the authorities. The main offender is often the Magyar Gárda
Mozgalom, an ultranationalist paramilitary militia that is openly anti-Semitic and antiziganistic,
leading extremist rallies throughout the country.21 Another group responsible for extremism the
Sixty-Four Counties Youth Movement, which wants to unite all ethnic Hungarians separated by
the Treaty of Trianon.22
20 “Hungary Unemployment Rate.” TRADING ECONOMICS.
21 In Hungarian, Hungarian Guard Movement, referred to in the paper as Magyar Garda
22 Pre-Treaty of Trianon Hungary was divided into 64 counties, hence the name.

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Why Other Factors for Extremism are only Secondary to Elites
Although other factors for ethnic extremism exist in Croatia and Hungary, these are only
secondary causes because elites use them to further their claims. Hence, elites are still the
primary cause. Political elites use the conflict of historical threats and injustices to make new
false claims of conflict. Extremist Croatians claim new Chetnik conflict with Serbia. Likewise
extremist Hungarians claim threats from their Roma and Jew minorities as well as suppression of
the Hungarian minorities in Slovakia, Transylvania, and Vojvodina in Serbia. These threats do
not exist; clearly Slovakia, Romania, and Serbia are not oppressing Hungarians in mass abuses of
human rights as the Hungarian ultraconservatives suggest. Rather, right wing parties use
perceived ethnic tensions in order to rally supporters, giving them more power. Another
suggested cause for ethnic extremism is the terrible economic situation of Eastern Europe, which
makes ethnic groups compete for scarce jobs and creates tension. However, unemployment is not
the main issue; rather it is the elites who use the unemployed masses as their paramilitary power
base, such as the Magyar Garda. In addition, when the elites propagandize and inflate the
economic conditions, it only increases their support and therefore power.
The reason that these reasons are only secondary causes of ethnic extremism is due to one
main fact: the great majority of people in both Croatia and Hungary get along with their
neighbors of different ethnic backgrounds. In Croatia for example only 8.7% of Croats
characterized relations with Serbs in the own communities as bad, and only 3.5% of the Serbs in
the same poll felt that relations were bad.23 Although conflict has erupted in the past between
Croats and Serbs, for the majority of history they have been peaceful neighbors and often allies.
In both Croatia and Hungary Jews have historically been viewed as successful traders who add
23 Gagnon 36

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vigor to the economy, specifically in the banking and mercantile sectors. The Roma population
in both countries has experienced prejudice, but these prejudices have no base. The Roma live
peacefully in isolated farming villages and maintain jobs in certain sectors of the economy that
no one else wants. There has never been conflict between the Roma and Croats or Hungarians.
In both countries all the ethnicities peacefully coexist, even during the tough economic times. It
is only the political elites who claim there is conflict, using this perceived conflict to increase
their support and power.
Conclusion
Ethnic extremism displayed by political parties in post-socialist East Europe is a
fabrication by political elites maintained in order to increase and retain power. Croatian party
elites in the HDZ and HSP manufacture conflicts with Jews, Roma, and Serbs in order to instill a
sense of fear and increase nationalism in ethnically mixed areas, giving them electoral power.
Hungarian party elites in Jobbik pursue antiziganistic and anti-Semitic policies hand in hand with
their conservative economic policies. Jobbik does this because the Hungarian population follows
both policies blindly because of the current economic problems. This gives Jobbik power, and
the perceived conflict makes their supporters more militant and vocal. Although critics argue that
there is a historical tendency for interethnic conflict in Croatia and Hungary, this conflict is
nonexistent in the general populace today, only being used in political propaganda in order to
mobilize support. Croatians and Hungarians of all ethnicities live peacefully together, and the
only conflicts are perceived ones created by political elites. Political parties and their elites in
Croatia and Hungary seek more power by pursuing ethnically extreme policies, blindly guiding
their supporters into an abyss of ethnic conflict.

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