The document discusses the targeting of schools and teachers by separatist insurgents in southern Thailand. It provides background on the conflict, noting that the three southern provinces have a majority Malay Muslim population that sees itself as culturally distinct from the rest of predominantly Buddhist Thailand. The insurgents use attacks on schools and teachers as a tactic, seeing the education system as promoting Thai culture and assimilation. Over the past decade, insurgents have killed over 170 teachers and bombed or burned over 300 schools. While these attacks aim to undermine the Thai state, they have not significantly furthered the insurgents' goals due to a lack of coverage and understanding of the conflict's roots.

1. Insurgent Communications:
Targeting Schools & Teachers
The Case of Southern ThailandThe Case of Southern Thailand
July 2014
Jeremy E. Plotnick, PhD
jeremy.plotnick@gmail.com

2. Introduction
• This document presents a short case study and
discussion of the conscious targeting of schools and
teachers by separatist guerillas operating in the
southernmost provinces of Thailand.
• The specific issue to be addressed is the use of
targeting choices as a means of communications in
the context of an asymmetrical conflict
• The materials presented in the following slides
represent a high level overview of the case and a
more complete study is presently under development

3. Key Concepts
• Asymmetric Warfare
– Conflicts between belligerents that have significantly
different resource levels. This type of conflict is often
associated with guerilla warfare, insurgencies and terrorism
• Propaganda of the Deed (POTD)• Propaganda of the Deed (POTD)
– Originally, a philosophy in which actions (often violent)
were used to inspire the public to undertake revolution. It
uses violence focused on symbolic targets as a means of
communications with a audience beyond the immediate
conflict zone. Many contemporary terrorist campaigns are
informed by this philosophy

4. Southern Thailand: The Conflict Zone
Source: UCA News

5. Background
• The three southernmost provinces of Thailand
(Yala, Pattani and Narathiwat) have been the site
of periodic unrest and insurgency since they were
fully incorporated into the Thai state in the early
20th century.20th century.
• The most recent outbreak of violence began in
early 2004 and has continued up to the presnt day

6. Background
• The basis for this insurgency relates to the ethno-
cultural composition of the provinces in question,
which are majority Malay Muslim, while the rest
of Thailand is overwhelmingly Buddhist
• The level of violence in the south has remained
relatively constant throughout the 10 years of the
insurgency and at a significantly higher level than
in previous outbreaks

7. Background
Deaths = 6,097 Injuries 10,908
Between January 2004 and April 2014, there were 14,128
violent incidents and 17,005 deaths & injuries associated with
separatist violence in the south of Thailand
Deaths = 6,097
Buddhists
Muslims
Unknown
Injuries 10,908
Buddhists
Muslims
Unknown
Source: Deep South Watch, 2014

8. Background

9. Background
Source: Deep South Watch, 2014

10. Background
• The current manifestation of the insurgency has a
number of key attributes that are relevant to this
project:
– There is a lack of a unified command structure and
very limited political organization
– With a few notable exceptions, insurgent operations– With a few notable exceptions, insurgent operations
have been limited to the three provinces in question
– The insurgents have not proactively targeted symbols
of US or ‘western culture’
– The insurgents have not undertaken a significant or
prolonged communications program using either
traditional or social media

11. Background
• The types of communications techniques that have
been used by the southern insurgents include:
– Leaflets
– Graffiti
– Banners (hung in high traffic areas)– Banners (hung in high traffic areas)
– Static webpages
– Graphic acts of violence (beheadings, mutilations,
burning of victims bodies)
– Coordinated bombings of civilian targets
– Selective targeting of schools and teachers

12. Background
• Primary
– Insurgent cadres and supporters
– Potential recruits
– Local Muslim civilians
• Secondary
– International media outlets
– International Islamic
organizations
Potential Insurgent Audiences
– Local Muslim civilians
– Local Buddhist civilians
– Thai media outlets
– Locally based government
representatives
– Thai security forces (military,
paramilitary and police)
– The Thai national government
– The Thai public
organizations
– The Malaysian public (esp. in
the northern states)
– Regional and/or Jihadist
organizations

13. Competing Narratives
• An important element of most successful insurgencies and/or
separatist movements is the narrative used to justify their actions
• In the case of the insurgents in southern Thailand this narrative is
based on the memory of the Sultanate of Patani and its conquest
by the Kingdom of Siam.
• This narrative also includes:• This narrative also includes:
– Mismanagement and poor governance of the provinces by the
central government
– Economic injustice and underdevelopment
– Attempts by the government to destroy the local culture and way
of life through migration of Buddhist Thais into the south and by
the assimilation of southern children via the government school
system

14. “The public school system [in Thailand] is
secular and national and becoming more so, with
much of the culture and history taught consisting
of the culture and history of Buddhist Thailand,
Competing Narratives
of the culture and history of Buddhist Thailand,
and in the Thai language.”
Dr. Douglas Macdonald, “Why The Teachers?”,
Strategic Studies Institute, December 1, 2005

15. “Schools and universities are seen as
representing the Thai government and Buddhist-
Thai culture. ‘Insurgents are terrorizing the
civilian population by attacking teachers and
schools, which they consider symbols of the Thai
Competing Narratives
schools, which they consider symbols of the Thai
states,’Brad Adams, Asia Director of Human
Rights Watch.”
Brendan O’Malley, “Education Under Attack”,
UNESCO, April 27, 2007

16. Competing Narratives
• While the great majority of Malay Muslims in the
south do not embrace violence, elements of the
insurgent narrative still resonate
• Based on their narrative the southern insurgents are
focused on:focused on:
– Enforcing on the local population a traditional Malay
Muslim lifestyle and relatively strict adherence to
Islamic norms
– Driving Buddhist residents out of what they see as
traditional Muslim territory
– The destruction of symbols of central government
authority in Yala, Pattani and Narathiwat

17. “Insurgents also attack teachers and government
run schools as part of a wider campaign to
eradicate symbols of the Thai state and drive the
Thai Buddhist population out of what insurgents
Competing Narratives
Thai Buddhist population out of what insurgents
claim is Malay Muslim land.”
Human Rights Watch, “Thailand: Separatists
Targeting Teachers in South”, March 20, 2014

18. Competing Narratives
• The government’s counter-narrative is geared for the
general population of Thailand and focuses on a strong
unified state that has never been colonized and which
has Buddhism as the predominant religion
• The government’s worldview thus appears to be ironic
in the south, where some elements of the population
see themselves as second class citizens, if not the
decedents of victims of Thai colonization

19. Thai Southern Insurgents:
Targeting and Tactics
• The tactics and targeting choices of the insurgents
have evolved in response to both their own
operational skills as well as the actions of the Thai
security forces
• The initial attacks were launched against military and
police installations and seem to have been used to
• The initial attacks were launched against military and
police installations and seem to have been used to
demonstrate the viability of the movement and help
driver recruitment.
– The use of human wave type assaults led to high levels
of insurgent causalities but showed security forces and
the civilian population that the insurgents were a
serious movement and not simply a criminal enterprise

20. Thai Southern Insurgents:
Targeting and Tactics
• After the early attacks on military installations the
insurgents quickly shifted focus to ‘softer’ targets
including local government officers, commercial
establishments frequented by Buddhist citizens, and
educational infrastructureeducational infrastructure
• The tactics employed have focused primarily on the use
of stand-off IEDs*, though at the outset of this
insurgency simple arson was often employed
• In addition to IEDs insurgents have employed targeted
assassinations (normally from the back of a motorcycle)
and the occasional ambush of police or military convoys
*Improvised Explosive Device

21. Focus on Schools and Teachers
• Since the early days of the insurgency a primary
target has been the state’s educational infrastructure
in the three provinces – schools, teachers and
administrators
• This has included arson attacks and bombings of
school buildings, assassinations of teachers and
administrators, and attacks on the so called ‘teacher
protection convoys’

22. Focus on Schools and Teachers
• According to Human Rights Watch, in the 10 years of
the conflict insurgents have killed at least 171 teachers
and burned or detonated bombs at over 300 government
run schools in the southern border provinces
Photo: asiasociety.org

23. Focus on Schools and Teachers
• At the outset of the current insurrection the attacks on
schools came primarily in the form of fire bombings
in the late night hours
• During this period teachers were also targeted on• During this period teachers were also targeted on
their way two or from school and were attacked with
knives, hammers and sometime firearms
• There has also been at least one report of a teacher
killed inside their classroom by insurgents who had
infiltrated the facility disguised as students

24. Focus on Schools and Teachers
• When the government security forces recognized the
insurgent focus on teachers and schools they
undertook several counter-measures
– Guards (either soldiers, paramilitary forces, or police)
were posted at schools in an attempt to ‘harden’ themwere posted at schools in an attempt to ‘harden’ them
– Teachers were permitted to carry personal weapons in
school and were given weapons training
– Some districts organized escorts for teachers

25. Focus on Schools and Teachers
• The increased security at school facilities along with
the growing sophistication of insurgent tactics has led
to a decline in attacks on school facilities
• Teachers and administrators are still targeted
individually at or near their homesindividually at or near their homes
– These are often executed as drive-by shootings
• They are also targeted while traveling in teacher
protection convoys
– These are often executed through the use of an IED
sometimes combined with an ambush

26. Focus on Schools and Teachers
• At present Thai security forces are unable to guarantee
the security of the educational personnel working in
the deep south
• There appear to be limited options open to security• There appear to be limited options open to security
forces in increasing protection of these individuals
short of boarding them in military facilities or on
school grounds and further hardening the schools
• The fact that these individuals continue to be targeted
indicates that the insurgents continue to see value in
tasking resources against this objective

27. Focus on Schools and Teachers
• There are several possible rationales for this targeting
strategy
– By their nature these are soft targets that are difficult to
‘harden’ due to their role in the community
– They are symbols of the central government’s presence in– They are symbols of the central government’s presence in
the deep south
– They are seen as agents for the cultural and linguistic
assimilation of the local Yawi speaking Malay Muslim
population by the Buddhist Thai state

28. Focus on Schools and Teachers
• There are several rationales for this targeting
strategy
– With the advent of the teacher protection convoy system
insurgents can strike both military and educational
targets simultaneously at times and places of their
choosing
– By demonstrating the ability to strike at schools and
teachers the insurgents furthered their objective of
driving away the Thai Buddhist population and also
made it hard for the Ministry of Education to find
teachers willing to work in the deep south.

29. Communications Effectiveness of
Targeting Teachers
• Through the attacks on teachers and schools the
separatists have been able to:
– terrorize local teachers, administrators and students
– significantly disrupt school operations in the deep south– significantly disrupt school operations in the deep south
– Increase the costs of education through the need to offer
hazard pay to teachers and the need to task military and
police personnel to provide security for teachers and
schools
– Complicate counter-insurgency operations by requiring
security assets be tasked for daily ‘teacher protection
convoys

30. Communications Effectiveness of
Targeting Teachers
• Have the attacks on schools and the assassinations of
teachers and other education system workers been an
effective communications tool?
• If viewed through the filter of the POTD philosophy the
answer is no, because these attacks have not led to actionsanswer is no, because these attacks have not led to actions
beneficial to the insurgents
– They have not radicalized the population or led to an uprising
– They have not caused the security forces to undertake
exceedingly harsh countermeasures that led to increased
radicalization
– They have not led to major concessions by the Thai government

31. Communications Effectiveness of
Targeting Teachers
• The attacks have consistently received local media
coverage and to some degree international coverage,
and it has led various NGO’s and multilateral agencies
to focus on the situation in the south
• The coverage is a demonstration of operational
effectiveness and so may have benefited insurgent
requirement programs
• This coverage and attention has not significantly
furthered the insurgents cause at a strategic level

32. Communications Effectiveness of
Targeting Teachers
• An important question is why these attacks have not
had more of an impact on both internal and external
audiences?
• There have been a number of reports that have• There have been a number of reports that have
identified several factors that explain why the
coverage (or lack of coverage) has not led to the
actions that may have been expected by the insurgents

33. Communications Effectiveness of
Targeting Teachers
• In his study of Thai media coverage of the southern
insurgency Noi Thammasathien identifies factors that have
led to the focus on simple reporting of violent actions
without analysis of root causes
– The lack of local contacts or understanding of the reality of– The lack of local contacts or understanding of the reality of
southern life
– The lack of local professional journalists in the south
– The cost of having Bangkok reporters based in the south
– Pressure from both the government and the insurgents on
reporters/editors
– The fact that there is no end in sight for the current cycle of
violence has reduced the newsworthiness of the topic

34. Communications Effectiveness of
Targeting Teachers
• International media gives less attention of the southern
insurgency than do local media, there is also less coverage
than for other violent ‘Islamic’ movements in developing
countries
• Joshua Kurlantzick of the Council on Foreign Relations• Joshua Kurlantzick of the Council on Foreign Relations
identifies several explanations for this
– Geographic remoteness and linguistic challenges
– The decentralized nature of the insurgency
– The lack of connections with international terrorists/jihadists
– The lack of a southern diaspora to help raise awareness of the
situation in major media markets

35. Communications Effectiveness of
Targeting Teachers
• Ultimately, the highly local and repetitive nature of the
insurgency has limited the communications impact of its
actions including the targeting of schools and teachers
• As the conflict continues into its second decade, media
attention (both local and international) will continue toattention (both local and international) will continue to
decline in the absence of significant new developments on
the ground
• More extreme acts of violence against teachers are unlikely
to change the media dynamic over the long term due to the
previously stated challenges in covering the story as well as
general audience fatigue regarding southern violence

36. Conclusions
• The targeting of teachers and schools is often viewed
as a violation of the norms of civilized behavior
• While this may be true, it does not take into account
the worldview and objectives of the insurgents and/orthe worldview and objectives of the insurgents and/or
terrorists who are striking these targets
• To these groups the teachers and schools represent an
extension of state power that is not necessarily
distinguished from that of the military or police

37. Conclusions
• In ethno/cultural/religious conflicts schools are often seen
as a threat to the long-term viability of the minority
culture – due to their role in assimilation
– Beyond teaching the ‘3 R’s’, schools teach a historical
perspective and cultural norms that are often determined byperspective and cultural norms that are often determined by
the central government
• In the Thai case it is clear that the assimilationist role
played by schools is a key factor making them a target for
the insurgents
– The fact that local religious schools or ‘pandoks’ and their
teachers were targeted by Thai security forces did not help
matters

38. • While there were several efforts made to increase the
security of school facilities and personnel, there has
been very little attention given to changing the
perception of the school as a threat to local culture
and/or as an extension of central government power
Conclusions
and/or as an extension of central government power
• The possibility of greater local input into curriculum
development has not been seriously considered and
conducting at least some instruction in the local dialect
has been slow to materialize

39. • Ironically, after the May 22, 2014 coup the Ministry
of Education has indicated that it will increase the
amount of time it dedicates to culture, history and
citizenship – the very subjects that are likely to lead
to increased insurgent targeting of teachers and
Conclusions
to increased insurgent targeting of teachers and
schools in the south
– It seems important to recognize that in the case of the three
southernmost provinces a one-size-fits-all approach to
educational curriculum is a dangerous policy that risks
drawing increased attacks

40. • The purely security oriented approach to stopping the
threats to schools and teachers in the south has largely
failed. It seems clear that a new and more
multidimensional approach is required – one that
involves the local community, the curriculum, the
Conclusions
involves the local community, the curriculum, the
teachers and the security apparatus
• The new government’s focus on unity, centralization
of power (with reduced local autonomy), and the
ideal attributes of ‘Thainess’ do not bode well for the
teachers in the south.

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