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State-encouraged BGP hijacking
Marco d’Itri
<md@linux.it>
@rfc1036
End Summer Camp 2K15 - Sep 5, 2015
Background
Hacking Team
A provider of offensive intrusion and surveillance software used by law
enforcement and intelligence agencies in many countries.
The 2015 data breach
An unknown entity thoroughly owned Hacking Team and managed to
exfiltrate over 400 GB of data, among them the employees’ mailboxes,
which then have been indexed by Wikileaks.
My analysis
This presentation is based on the content of these emails, whose
veridicity has not been challenged, and corroborated by BGP routing
data publicly archived by third parties.
State-encouraged BGP hijacking Marco d’Itri
Chains of anonymizing proxies
Hacking Team’s flagship product is RCS, a malware which uploads the
data gathered from the target’s computer to a remote server, using a
chain of special purpose anonymizing proxies installed on rented
servers all over the world.
In august 2013 Santrex, a Russian supplier of some proxy servers
used by HT for their customers, had serious technical issues that
caused some of these proxies to become unreachable by instances of
RCS deployed by the Carabinieri.
State-encouraged BGP hijacking Marco d’Itri
A request for BGP hijacking
On 14 august 2013 the Carabinieri sent to Company X a request to:
[...] publish and then propagate, at least at a national level on
the internet network, of the network 46.166.163.0/24.
(my translation)
and to make available a server with a specific IP address on this
network.
46.166.163.136/29 is a network assigned to Santrex.
It is my understanding that this is a normal request for providing
commercial services and not a mandatory order.
State-encouraged BGP hijacking Marco d’Itri
Verifying with hard data
Thanks to the awesome RIPEstat service I was able to quickly verify
that 46.166.163.0/24 was announced by Company X in this period.
State-encouraged BGP hijacking Marco d’Itri
The actual scope of this hijacking
Verification
Downloaded a BGP table dump for 20 august 2013 from the RIPE
RIS archive.
Processed it with my zebra-dump-parser program to extract the
routes for 46.166.163.0/24.
Apparently Company X advertised the network to all their peers since
it was also received e.g. by Hurricane Electric at MIX-IT.
The hijacking was not limited to a couple of local networks: the route
was also propagated to others foreign networks.
State-encouraged BGP hijacking Marco d’Itri
An unprecedented breach of trust
Company X deliberately announced the IP addresses of a foreign
competitor, without their permission, to solve a technical issue of
an italian law enforcement agency.
The hijacked network was propagated all over the world.
This kind of activity is forbidden by the policies of exchange points,
by peering agreements and by transit providers.
But Company X argues that this is totally fine since a LEA asked
them do do it.
As far as I know, this never happened before.
State-encouraged BGP hijacking Marco d’Itri
Questions?
http://www.linux.it/~md/text/state-hijacking.pdf
(Google . . . Marco d’Itri . . . I feel lucky)
State-encouraged BGP hijacking Marco d’Itri
Bonus slide
Independent confirmations of my research:
BGPmon/OpenDNS
Renesys/Dyn Research
Articles about the hijacking:
Ars Technica
Brian Krebs
Heise online
Golem.de
Engadget
Wired UK
The emails from the Hacking Team archive:
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
State-encouraged BGP hijacking Marco d’Itri

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State-encouraged BGP hijacking

  • 1. State-encouraged BGP hijacking Marco d’Itri <md@linux.it> @rfc1036 End Summer Camp 2K15 - Sep 5, 2015
  • 2. Background Hacking Team A provider of offensive intrusion and surveillance software used by law enforcement and intelligence agencies in many countries. The 2015 data breach An unknown entity thoroughly owned Hacking Team and managed to exfiltrate over 400 GB of data, among them the employees’ mailboxes, which then have been indexed by Wikileaks. My analysis This presentation is based on the content of these emails, whose veridicity has not been challenged, and corroborated by BGP routing data publicly archived by third parties. State-encouraged BGP hijacking Marco d’Itri
  • 3. Chains of anonymizing proxies Hacking Team’s flagship product is RCS, a malware which uploads the data gathered from the target’s computer to a remote server, using a chain of special purpose anonymizing proxies installed on rented servers all over the world. In august 2013 Santrex, a Russian supplier of some proxy servers used by HT for their customers, had serious technical issues that caused some of these proxies to become unreachable by instances of RCS deployed by the Carabinieri. State-encouraged BGP hijacking Marco d’Itri
  • 4. A request for BGP hijacking On 14 august 2013 the Carabinieri sent to Company X a request to: [...] publish and then propagate, at least at a national level on the internet network, of the network 46.166.163.0/24. (my translation) and to make available a server with a specific IP address on this network. 46.166.163.136/29 is a network assigned to Santrex. It is my understanding that this is a normal request for providing commercial services and not a mandatory order. State-encouraged BGP hijacking Marco d’Itri
  • 5. Verifying with hard data Thanks to the awesome RIPEstat service I was able to quickly verify that 46.166.163.0/24 was announced by Company X in this period. State-encouraged BGP hijacking Marco d’Itri
  • 6. The actual scope of this hijacking Verification Downloaded a BGP table dump for 20 august 2013 from the RIPE RIS archive. Processed it with my zebra-dump-parser program to extract the routes for 46.166.163.0/24. Apparently Company X advertised the network to all their peers since it was also received e.g. by Hurricane Electric at MIX-IT. The hijacking was not limited to a couple of local networks: the route was also propagated to others foreign networks. State-encouraged BGP hijacking Marco d’Itri
  • 7. An unprecedented breach of trust Company X deliberately announced the IP addresses of a foreign competitor, without their permission, to solve a technical issue of an italian law enforcement agency. The hijacked network was propagated all over the world. This kind of activity is forbidden by the policies of exchange points, by peering agreements and by transit providers. But Company X argues that this is totally fine since a LEA asked them do do it. As far as I know, this never happened before. State-encouraged BGP hijacking Marco d’Itri
  • 8. Questions? http://www.linux.it/~md/text/state-hijacking.pdf (Google . . . Marco d’Itri . . . I feel lucky) State-encouraged BGP hijacking Marco d’Itri
  • 9. Bonus slide Independent confirmations of my research: BGPmon/OpenDNS Renesys/Dyn Research Articles about the hijacking: Ars Technica Brian Krebs Heise online Golem.de Engadget Wired UK The emails from the Hacking Team archive: 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 State-encouraged BGP hijacking Marco d’Itri