This document provides background information for a Senate committee hearing on improving outcomes for large, costly infrastructure projects known as megaprojects. It discusses how megaprojects often experience significant cost overruns and schedule delays. Factors that contribute to these issues include unrealistic initial cost estimates that fail to properly account for risks, as well as political and economic uncertainties. The document uses the replacement of the eastern span of the San Francisco-Oakland Bay Bridge as a case study, noting its final cost exceeded $6.4 billion compared to initial estimates of $1.3 billion. The committee hearing aims to examine why megaprojects regularly face these challenges and identify potential solutions to improve the state's delivery of such
This document provides background information on heavy lift operations in Manhattan. It defines heavy lift as cargo over 100 metric tons and notes that utility companies like ConEd regularly require waterfront access to transport heavy equipment. The document reviews precedents for heavy lift sites, including the current use of Pier 86 by ConEd and the Cornell Tech campus project's use of barging to reduce truck traffic. It also includes diagrams of standard heavy lift barge and cargo trailer equipment. The goal of the project is to identify suitable waterfront sites on Manhattan that could accommodate heavy lift needs for emergency response or construction projects.
The document discusses the benefits of exercise for mental health. Regular physical activity can help reduce anxiety and depression and improve mood and cognitive functioning. Exercise causes chemical changes in the brain that may help protect against mental illness and improve symptoms for those who already suffer from conditions like depression and anxiety.
Mike antonovich metro_board_710study_alternatives_analysis_draft_eir_eispeggydrouet
The document discusses the benefits of exercise for mental health. Regular physical activity can help reduce anxiety and depression and improve mood and cognitive functioning. Exercise causes chemical changes in the brain that may help protect against mental illness and improve symptoms.
The Transportation Committee was provided direction regarding submittal of comments on the SR-710 North EIR-EIS. The draft EIR evaluated five alternatives, including a no build option, traffic management improvements, rapid bus service, light rail, and a freeway tunnel extension. Public comments are due by July 6. An alternative proposal from the Beyond 710 coalition also outlined non-freeway strategies like transit, active transportation, and demand management to address traffic in the region. The Committee was asked to provide guidance to staff on submitting comments to Metro and Caltrans on the draft EIR.
The document is a city council agenda for a meeting on October 1, 2013 in Long Beach, California. It includes items on the agenda such as proclamations, hearings, reports, and recommendations that require council approval. The agenda lists the order of business and officers present. Items on the consent calendar are to be voted on together in one motion unless any items are removed for individual discussion.
This document provides background information on heavy lift operations in Manhattan. It defines heavy lift as cargo over 100 metric tons and notes that utility companies like ConEd regularly require waterfront access to transport heavy equipment. The document reviews precedents for heavy lift sites, including the current use of Pier 86 by ConEd and the Cornell Tech campus project's use of barging to reduce truck traffic. It also includes diagrams of standard heavy lift barge and cargo trailer equipment. The goal of the project is to identify suitable waterfront sites on Manhattan that could accommodate heavy lift needs for emergency response or construction projects.
The document discusses the benefits of exercise for mental health. Regular physical activity can help reduce anxiety and depression and improve mood and cognitive functioning. Exercise causes chemical changes in the brain that may help protect against mental illness and improve symptoms for those who already suffer from conditions like depression and anxiety.
Mike antonovich metro_board_710study_alternatives_analysis_draft_eir_eispeggydrouet
The document discusses the benefits of exercise for mental health. Regular physical activity can help reduce anxiety and depression and improve mood and cognitive functioning. Exercise causes chemical changes in the brain that may help protect against mental illness and improve symptoms.
The Transportation Committee was provided direction regarding submittal of comments on the SR-710 North EIR-EIS. The draft EIR evaluated five alternatives, including a no build option, traffic management improvements, rapid bus service, light rail, and a freeway tunnel extension. Public comments are due by July 6. An alternative proposal from the Beyond 710 coalition also outlined non-freeway strategies like transit, active transportation, and demand management to address traffic in the region. The Committee was asked to provide guidance to staff on submitting comments to Metro and Caltrans on the draft EIR.
The document is a city council agenda for a meeting on October 1, 2013 in Long Beach, California. It includes items on the agenda such as proclamations, hearings, reports, and recommendations that require council approval. The agenda lists the order of business and officers present. Items on the consent calendar are to be voted on together in one motion unless any items are removed for individual discussion.
The document discusses the poor performance of megaprojects, which are defined as projects valued over $1 billion. Only one Australian resource project out of the last seven years came in on time and budget, with most experiencing substantial cost overruns and schedule delays. The poor performance is attributed to political interference, unrealistic optimism, lack of accountability, and inadequate risk management. Megaprojects face risks such as political and regulatory changes, environmental impacts, deception and unrealistic forecasts, and technological challenges given their large scale and long timelines. Improved planning, risk management, and contracting strategies are needed to enhance megaproject performance.
52 a risk-management_approach_to_a_successful_infrastructure_projectEng. Mohamed Muhumed
This document discusses the need for effective risk management across the entire life cycle of large infrastructure projects in order to avoid costly failures and overruns. It notes that poor risk assessment and allocation early in the planning process can lead to higher costs and delays later on. The document advocates taking a comprehensive risk management approach that considers risks at each stage of project initiation, financing, construction, and operation. It also emphasizes the importance of allocating risks to the parties best able to manage them and of involving private financing perspectives early in the development process.
BNamericas Project Risk Analytics - June 2015 Inaugural reportnatans
The document summarizes the findings of a report analyzing cost overruns and delays in the top 100 infrastructure projects in Latin America with a total original cost estimate of $242 billion. It finds that the projects have collectively experienced cost increases of over $133 billion (51% overrun) and delays in 58% of the projects. The largest cost overruns and delays have occurred in large, complex projects like refineries and hydroelectric dams. Later stage projects have seen greater increases to cost estimates, calling into question the traditional view that uncertainty decreases as projects progress. Financial management issues were the most commonly cited factor for cost increases.
CAUSES OF DELAY IN TALL BUILDING PROJECTS IN GCC COUNTRIESMuizz Anibire
CAUSES OF DELAY IN TALL BUILDING PROJECTS IN GCC COUNTRIES
ICCEPM2020, HONG KONG, 7-8 DEC, 2020
The 8th International Conference on Construction Engineering and Project Management
Infrastructure and Design Build ContractingWagner College
This monograph was written for Wagner College's Hugh L. Carey Institute for Government Reform in August 2020 by Peter J. Kiernan, of counsel at Schiff Hardin in New York. Kiernan previously served as counsel to New York Gov. David Paterson, counsel to the deputy mayor for finance of the City of New York, and chief counsel to the New York State Senate Minority. As a Littauer fellow at the Kennedy School of Government at Harvard University, he wrote an analysis of the New York City fiscal crisis, which was published by Harvard. He is a graduate of John Carroll University, the Kennedy School of Government at Harvard, and Cornell Law School.
The Construction Manager-General Contractor method for consctruction of trans...Angel Damian Rivera-Saez
The document discusses the Construction Manager-General Contractor (CM/GC) project delivery method for transportation projects in Puerto Rico. It provides background on Puerto Rico's transportation infrastructure needs and fiscal problems. It then summarizes the key characteristics and benefits of the CM/GC method seen in other states, including reduced risks, costs savings, and shortened project timelines. The document proposes implementing CM/GC for Puerto Rico projects like PR-18 reconstruction and bridge replacements. It outlines necessary changes to laws and regulations and provides a flowchart for selection and bidding processes to successfully adopt the CM/GC method in Puerto Rico.
Common Characteristics Of Mega Construction Projects EssaySusan Kennedy
The London 2012 Olympics was a large-scale project that required an effective risk management framework. The framework included foundations like policies and objectives, as well as organizational arrangements like risk management processes. A key part of the framework was a clear risk hierarchy that assigned the right people to manage different risk levels. Quantitative risk analysis and sufficient contingency funding helped control risks. Regular reporting and audits promoted transparency. This comprehensive framework helped ensure the project was completed on time and budget despite risks.
2016 McKinsey Tim McManus Managing big projectsTim McManus
The document discusses five lessons for successfully managing large infrastructure projects: 1) Manage functional performance in addition to time and budget, 2) Apply the appropriate project delivery method based on conditions, 3) Balance risks between organizations rather than shifting all risks, 4) Involve operations and maintenance experts from the start, and 5) Consider broader community benefits as part of the project's legacy. Following these lessons can help reduce cost overruns, delays, and ensure projects meet intended goals.
A Case Study In Complex Project Management T-RexJose Katab
This document presents a case study of the T-REX transportation project in Colorado, which combined highway expansion and light rail development. The project was completed two years ahead of schedule using a design-build approach. Key factors for the project's success included early risk management planning, partnering between agencies and the contractor, and highly disciplined project management to coordinate the complex funding, stakeholders, and public impacts. The case study analyzes the contract and management practices that enabled completing such a large, multi-modal project faster than traditional delivery methods.
Public-Private- Partnership Projects - What, Why & How Is Risk Allocatedm_l_u
1) The document discusses risk allocation in public-private partnership (P3) infrastructure projects. It notes that while P3 projects are often touted as beneficial, some studies have found 30% of surveyed P3 projects in the US ended in default or bankruptcy.
2) Improper risk allocation between public and private sectors has been cited as a key reason for failures of some P3 transport projects in London. The document aims to further examine how risks are and should be allocated on P3 projects.
3) Large infrastructure projects inherently carry more risk than smaller projects. The document will analyze typical risks for P3 projects and how to properly assess, manage, and allocate those risks between public and private partners.
In the third of a series of reports, commissioned by HSBC, we look at the challenge of building capital-efficient infrastructure in the age of austerity. Governments and companies have sought to maximise the productivity of assets and minimise the costs associated with building, operating and maintaining infrastructure. However, focusing too intensely on cost cutting has its perils.
Public Private Partnerships - State of the Market and the Future of P3'sJonathan Hunt
This document discusses public-private partnerships (P3s) for infrastructure projects in the United States. It notes that America's infrastructure received a poor grade and an estimated $4.6 trillion is needed for repairs by 2025. P3s are growing in popularity as a way to efficiently finance and deliver infrastructure projects. However, the US still has a large funding gap for infrastructure needs across many sectors like transportation, water, and schools. The Trump administration aims to address this through proposals to expand funding programs that support P3s like TIFIA and private activity bonds.
Since the financial crisis, asset management companies, including some private equity firms and hedge funds, have become the backers of choice for huge, multiyear infrastructure development efforts like this one. Following on the heels of Blackstone’s success, many of the world’s largest private investment firms have begun to view these projects — mostly involving basic services like energy, transit, and water, but also medical and educational facilities — as an attractive channel for investment-grade credit. J.P. Morgan, Allianz Global Investors, BlackRock, and KKR are among the asset managers pouring hundreds of millions of dollars into capital projects in both the operating and construction phases. Pension funds have also begun to invest, finding that they can hire the expertise themselves instead of paying fees to asset managers. This unlikely romance between private asset management and infrastructure development could become the critical factor enabling industrial society to keep pace with the ever-growing needs of billions of people around the world.
Many of these global infrastructure investments have traditionally been the province of major commercial banks (U.S. projects tended to be funded by municipal bonds). The banks viewed these investments as desirable because the returns they offered were generally higher than those from sovereign or corporate debt. But the global banking collapse changed the investment landscape. When the dust settled from the crash and money began to flow again around the world, the banks were left with very different rules of engagement. Increased capital-to-debt requirements forced them to clean up their loan books, and tighter controls on derivatives and other proprietary trading activities limited their ability to invest widely. Seeking more liquidity and wanting to simplify their portfolios, many banks pulled out of infrastructure investments, which are generally long-term instruments and complex to manage.
This presentation provides a keen insight into the issues that arose during the construction of the Channel Tunnel (Chunnel), that forms a 50.5 km rail lifeline between France and UK.
The passage discusses external factors that influenced infrastructure development in South Korea. In the 1970s-1980s, the Korean government focused on regional development rather than infrastructure, which led to traffic bottlenecks. In the early 1990s, the government acknowledged limits to public funding for needed infrastructure projects. To mobilize new sources, South Korea introduced a PPP program and modified related laws and policies over time to promote PPP highway projects. As of 2015, 24 PPP highway projects have been planned, are under construction or operating in South Korea.
The Boeing Virtual Fence project was initiated by the Department of Homeland Security to curb illegal border crossings along the Mexican border. Boeing was contracted to build a virtual fence using sensors and surveillance technology at an initial estimated cost of $1.1 billion, though this later increased to $8 billion and possibly $30 billion. The project lacked comprehensive integration and oversight of its 100 subcontractors. Poor scope management and oversight allowed costs to balloon out of control over 7 years before cancellation, despite never achieving its objectives. While the scope was unrealistic, lack of oversight also allowed Boeing too much control and too little accountability.
This document discusses key steps to reduce costs, risks, and uncertainties for offshore wind power project development in Southeast European economies. It identifies several challenges including high upfront costs, technical difficulties of operating in marine environments, and uncertainties around wind resource assessment and production levels. The document recommends using innovative IT tools and standardized methodologies to help optimize project layouts, conduct financial modeling, and identify and mitigate risks throughout the development process to improve the viability and bankability of offshore wind projects.
Societal Impact of the Seismic Retrofit Project of the Dumbarton Bridge, CAPablo Naoki Manzano Miura
The document discusses the seismic retrofit project of the Dumbarton Bridge in California from 2010-2013. The retrofit included modifications to the superstructure and deck to allow for increased lateral movement during an earthquake. It cost $55 million and was led by Caltrans and BATA. The retrofit had socioeconomic impacts like increased drivers' delays and environmental impacts from increased pollution, but preventative measures were taken to minimize harm to local bird populations like the California Clapper Rail. The retrofit ultimately improved safety and reduced costs from a collapsed bridge, though more analysis is needed on societal impacts and perspectives.
The document is a letter from Senator Carol Liu providing comments on the Analysis of Costs and Benefits for the SR 710 North Study Alternatives conducted by the Los Angeles County Metropolitan Transportation Authority. The letter notes several deficiencies in the analysis, including the omission of key financial metrics, failure to address mitigation costs, discounting of important sensitivity analysis results, and limitations of the cost-benefit model used. Specifically, the letter states that the analysis omitted return on investment and benefit-cost ratios, did not account for mitigation costs, downplayed significant impacts found in sensitivity analysis, and did not sufficiently address project funding sources or impacts.
The document provides the agenda and minutes for the June 18, 2015 meeting of the San Gabriel Valley Council of Governments Governing Board. Key items included: recognizing a former SGVCOG president, adopting previous meeting minutes and financial reports, appointing representatives to various committees and boards, supporting or opposing various state bills, authorizing the executive director to execute contracts, adopting legislative platforms, and receiving strategic plan and correspondence updates. Consent calendar items were approved in a single motion.
More Related Content
Similar to State senate transpo hearings 11 13-13 backgroundpaper
The document discusses the poor performance of megaprojects, which are defined as projects valued over $1 billion. Only one Australian resource project out of the last seven years came in on time and budget, with most experiencing substantial cost overruns and schedule delays. The poor performance is attributed to political interference, unrealistic optimism, lack of accountability, and inadequate risk management. Megaprojects face risks such as political and regulatory changes, environmental impacts, deception and unrealistic forecasts, and technological challenges given their large scale and long timelines. Improved planning, risk management, and contracting strategies are needed to enhance megaproject performance.
52 a risk-management_approach_to_a_successful_infrastructure_projectEng. Mohamed Muhumed
This document discusses the need for effective risk management across the entire life cycle of large infrastructure projects in order to avoid costly failures and overruns. It notes that poor risk assessment and allocation early in the planning process can lead to higher costs and delays later on. The document advocates taking a comprehensive risk management approach that considers risks at each stage of project initiation, financing, construction, and operation. It also emphasizes the importance of allocating risks to the parties best able to manage them and of involving private financing perspectives early in the development process.
BNamericas Project Risk Analytics - June 2015 Inaugural reportnatans
The document summarizes the findings of a report analyzing cost overruns and delays in the top 100 infrastructure projects in Latin America with a total original cost estimate of $242 billion. It finds that the projects have collectively experienced cost increases of over $133 billion (51% overrun) and delays in 58% of the projects. The largest cost overruns and delays have occurred in large, complex projects like refineries and hydroelectric dams. Later stage projects have seen greater increases to cost estimates, calling into question the traditional view that uncertainty decreases as projects progress. Financial management issues were the most commonly cited factor for cost increases.
CAUSES OF DELAY IN TALL BUILDING PROJECTS IN GCC COUNTRIESMuizz Anibire
CAUSES OF DELAY IN TALL BUILDING PROJECTS IN GCC COUNTRIES
ICCEPM2020, HONG KONG, 7-8 DEC, 2020
The 8th International Conference on Construction Engineering and Project Management
Infrastructure and Design Build ContractingWagner College
This monograph was written for Wagner College's Hugh L. Carey Institute for Government Reform in August 2020 by Peter J. Kiernan, of counsel at Schiff Hardin in New York. Kiernan previously served as counsel to New York Gov. David Paterson, counsel to the deputy mayor for finance of the City of New York, and chief counsel to the New York State Senate Minority. As a Littauer fellow at the Kennedy School of Government at Harvard University, he wrote an analysis of the New York City fiscal crisis, which was published by Harvard. He is a graduate of John Carroll University, the Kennedy School of Government at Harvard, and Cornell Law School.
The Construction Manager-General Contractor method for consctruction of trans...Angel Damian Rivera-Saez
The document discusses the Construction Manager-General Contractor (CM/GC) project delivery method for transportation projects in Puerto Rico. It provides background on Puerto Rico's transportation infrastructure needs and fiscal problems. It then summarizes the key characteristics and benefits of the CM/GC method seen in other states, including reduced risks, costs savings, and shortened project timelines. The document proposes implementing CM/GC for Puerto Rico projects like PR-18 reconstruction and bridge replacements. It outlines necessary changes to laws and regulations and provides a flowchart for selection and bidding processes to successfully adopt the CM/GC method in Puerto Rico.
Common Characteristics Of Mega Construction Projects EssaySusan Kennedy
The London 2012 Olympics was a large-scale project that required an effective risk management framework. The framework included foundations like policies and objectives, as well as organizational arrangements like risk management processes. A key part of the framework was a clear risk hierarchy that assigned the right people to manage different risk levels. Quantitative risk analysis and sufficient contingency funding helped control risks. Regular reporting and audits promoted transparency. This comprehensive framework helped ensure the project was completed on time and budget despite risks.
2016 McKinsey Tim McManus Managing big projectsTim McManus
The document discusses five lessons for successfully managing large infrastructure projects: 1) Manage functional performance in addition to time and budget, 2) Apply the appropriate project delivery method based on conditions, 3) Balance risks between organizations rather than shifting all risks, 4) Involve operations and maintenance experts from the start, and 5) Consider broader community benefits as part of the project's legacy. Following these lessons can help reduce cost overruns, delays, and ensure projects meet intended goals.
A Case Study In Complex Project Management T-RexJose Katab
This document presents a case study of the T-REX transportation project in Colorado, which combined highway expansion and light rail development. The project was completed two years ahead of schedule using a design-build approach. Key factors for the project's success included early risk management planning, partnering between agencies and the contractor, and highly disciplined project management to coordinate the complex funding, stakeholders, and public impacts. The case study analyzes the contract and management practices that enabled completing such a large, multi-modal project faster than traditional delivery methods.
Public-Private- Partnership Projects - What, Why & How Is Risk Allocatedm_l_u
1) The document discusses risk allocation in public-private partnership (P3) infrastructure projects. It notes that while P3 projects are often touted as beneficial, some studies have found 30% of surveyed P3 projects in the US ended in default or bankruptcy.
2) Improper risk allocation between public and private sectors has been cited as a key reason for failures of some P3 transport projects in London. The document aims to further examine how risks are and should be allocated on P3 projects.
3) Large infrastructure projects inherently carry more risk than smaller projects. The document will analyze typical risks for P3 projects and how to properly assess, manage, and allocate those risks between public and private partners.
In the third of a series of reports, commissioned by HSBC, we look at the challenge of building capital-efficient infrastructure in the age of austerity. Governments and companies have sought to maximise the productivity of assets and minimise the costs associated with building, operating and maintaining infrastructure. However, focusing too intensely on cost cutting has its perils.
Public Private Partnerships - State of the Market and the Future of P3'sJonathan Hunt
This document discusses public-private partnerships (P3s) for infrastructure projects in the United States. It notes that America's infrastructure received a poor grade and an estimated $4.6 trillion is needed for repairs by 2025. P3s are growing in popularity as a way to efficiently finance and deliver infrastructure projects. However, the US still has a large funding gap for infrastructure needs across many sectors like transportation, water, and schools. The Trump administration aims to address this through proposals to expand funding programs that support P3s like TIFIA and private activity bonds.
Since the financial crisis, asset management companies, including some private equity firms and hedge funds, have become the backers of choice for huge, multiyear infrastructure development efforts like this one. Following on the heels of Blackstone’s success, many of the world’s largest private investment firms have begun to view these projects — mostly involving basic services like energy, transit, and water, but also medical and educational facilities — as an attractive channel for investment-grade credit. J.P. Morgan, Allianz Global Investors, BlackRock, and KKR are among the asset managers pouring hundreds of millions of dollars into capital projects in both the operating and construction phases. Pension funds have also begun to invest, finding that they can hire the expertise themselves instead of paying fees to asset managers. This unlikely romance between private asset management and infrastructure development could become the critical factor enabling industrial society to keep pace with the ever-growing needs of billions of people around the world.
Many of these global infrastructure investments have traditionally been the province of major commercial banks (U.S. projects tended to be funded by municipal bonds). The banks viewed these investments as desirable because the returns they offered were generally higher than those from sovereign or corporate debt. But the global banking collapse changed the investment landscape. When the dust settled from the crash and money began to flow again around the world, the banks were left with very different rules of engagement. Increased capital-to-debt requirements forced them to clean up their loan books, and tighter controls on derivatives and other proprietary trading activities limited their ability to invest widely. Seeking more liquidity and wanting to simplify their portfolios, many banks pulled out of infrastructure investments, which are generally long-term instruments and complex to manage.
This presentation provides a keen insight into the issues that arose during the construction of the Channel Tunnel (Chunnel), that forms a 50.5 km rail lifeline between France and UK.
The passage discusses external factors that influenced infrastructure development in South Korea. In the 1970s-1980s, the Korean government focused on regional development rather than infrastructure, which led to traffic bottlenecks. In the early 1990s, the government acknowledged limits to public funding for needed infrastructure projects. To mobilize new sources, South Korea introduced a PPP program and modified related laws and policies over time to promote PPP highway projects. As of 2015, 24 PPP highway projects have been planned, are under construction or operating in South Korea.
The Boeing Virtual Fence project was initiated by the Department of Homeland Security to curb illegal border crossings along the Mexican border. Boeing was contracted to build a virtual fence using sensors and surveillance technology at an initial estimated cost of $1.1 billion, though this later increased to $8 billion and possibly $30 billion. The project lacked comprehensive integration and oversight of its 100 subcontractors. Poor scope management and oversight allowed costs to balloon out of control over 7 years before cancellation, despite never achieving its objectives. While the scope was unrealistic, lack of oversight also allowed Boeing too much control and too little accountability.
This document discusses key steps to reduce costs, risks, and uncertainties for offshore wind power project development in Southeast European economies. It identifies several challenges including high upfront costs, technical difficulties of operating in marine environments, and uncertainties around wind resource assessment and production levels. The document recommends using innovative IT tools and standardized methodologies to help optimize project layouts, conduct financial modeling, and identify and mitigate risks throughout the development process to improve the viability and bankability of offshore wind projects.
Societal Impact of the Seismic Retrofit Project of the Dumbarton Bridge, CAPablo Naoki Manzano Miura
The document discusses the seismic retrofit project of the Dumbarton Bridge in California from 2010-2013. The retrofit included modifications to the superstructure and deck to allow for increased lateral movement during an earthquake. It cost $55 million and was led by Caltrans and BATA. The retrofit had socioeconomic impacts like increased drivers' delays and environmental impacts from increased pollution, but preventative measures were taken to minimize harm to local bird populations like the California Clapper Rail. The retrofit ultimately improved safety and reduced costs from a collapsed bridge, though more analysis is needed on societal impacts and perspectives.
Similar to State senate transpo hearings 11 13-13 backgroundpaper (20)
The document is a letter from Senator Carol Liu providing comments on the Analysis of Costs and Benefits for the SR 710 North Study Alternatives conducted by the Los Angeles County Metropolitan Transportation Authority. The letter notes several deficiencies in the analysis, including the omission of key financial metrics, failure to address mitigation costs, discounting of important sensitivity analysis results, and limitations of the cost-benefit model used. Specifically, the letter states that the analysis omitted return on investment and benefit-cost ratios, did not account for mitigation costs, downplayed significant impacts found in sensitivity analysis, and did not sufficiently address project funding sources or impacts.
The document provides the agenda and minutes for the June 18, 2015 meeting of the San Gabriel Valley Council of Governments Governing Board. Key items included: recognizing a former SGVCOG president, adopting previous meeting minutes and financial reports, appointing representatives to various committees and boards, supporting or opposing various state bills, authorizing the executive director to execute contracts, adopting legislative platforms, and receiving strategic plan and correspondence updates. Consent calendar items were approved in a single motion.
The City of South Pasadena provided comments on SCAG's Notice of Preparation for the 2016-2040 RTP/SCS PEIR. Key issues raised included: 1) Inclusion of the SR-710 North tunnel project is flawed and should not influence the separate SR-710 North Study; 2) Labeling the SR-710 project as a "gap closure" is inaccurate; 3) A SR-710 tunnel is not financially constrained; and 4) The PEIR needs to prioritize GHG reduction and VMT reduction over mobility and economic goals to comply with state law. The city urged SCAG to recognize changed circumstances and legal requirements to prepare an adequate PEIR for the 2016 plan.
The document discusses the benefits of exercise for mental health. Regular physical activity can help reduce anxiety and depression and improve mood and cognitive function. Exercise causes chemical changes in the brain that may help protect against mental illness and improve symptoms for those who already suffer from conditions like anxiety and depression.
The document discusses the benefits of exercise for mental health. Regular physical activity can help reduce anxiety and depression and improve mood and cognitive functioning. Exercise causes chemical changes in the brain that may help protect against mental illness and improve symptoms.
The document provides details about an upcoming meeting of the California Transportation Commission (CTC) to be held on October 8, 2014 in Glendale, California. The meeting will include a tour of transportation projects in the morning, the commission meeting at 12:30 PM, and a reception at 5:30 PM. The estimated timed agenda lists over 47 items to be discussed, including resolutions, reports, allocation requests, and updates on various transportation programs and policies in California.
The document discusses the benefits of exercise for mental health. Regular physical activity can help reduce anxiety and depression and improve mood and cognitive function. Exercise causes chemical changes in the brain that may help protect against developing mental illness and improve symptoms for those who already suffer from conditions like anxiety and depression.
Sr 710 north eir eis tac mtg #14-draft agenda (feb 2014)peggydrouet
The document provides the preliminary agenda for the State Route 710 North EIR/EIS Technical Advisory Committee Meeting No. 14. The agenda includes items on public outreach and community involvement, a project report and environmental studies documentation update covering previous meetings, preliminary engineering, environmental studies, and traffic analysis. It also allocates time for open discussion and notes the date and location of the next meeting.
This document summarizes discussions from a Technical Advisory Committee meeting and Stakeholder Outreach Advisory Committee meeting regarding the SR 710 North Study. It provides an agenda and overview of topics discussed, including public outreach activities, updates on project reports and environmental studies, feedback from previous meetings, a value analysis study exploring potential project alternatives and enhancements, and next steps. A number of specific proposals to improve study alternatives were presented from the value analysis workshop for consideration, focusing on opportunities to increase project value and identify cost savings.
Sr710 study update_power_point final finalpeggydrouet
The document summarizes several options being considered for the SR-710 project and their potential effects on the City of South Pasadena. The options discussed include:
1) A "No Build" option that would have no direct effects but other projects could still be built.
2) Bus Rapid Transit that could significantly affect local businesses through removal of parking and elimination of sidewalk extensions.
3) Light Rail Transit with two stations in the city and the entire segment underground to minimize construction and business impacts.
4) Transportation demand management and system management improvements at several intersections and streets in the city. The addition of reversible lanes on the SR-110 could also significantly impact South Pasadena.
5
This document provides an overview and update on the Purple Line Extension project. It discusses the project schedule and sections, introduces the construction relations team, and focuses on upcoming work at the Wilshire/La Cienega station. Key details include that advanced utility relocation is beginning in July 2013, station box construction will start with soldier pile installation and decking, and Metro is seeking exemptions to work restrictions to complete the project faster and minimize impacts. The document aims to inform stakeholders on project progress and receive their feedback.
The document discusses the benefits of exercise for mental health. Regular physical activity can help reduce anxiety and depression and improve mood and cognitive functioning. Exercise causes chemical changes in the brain that may help protect against mental illness and improve symptoms.
Sr 710 study-proposed-exploration-plan_02-25-13peggydrouet
The document presents a proposed exploration plan for studying the SR 710 corridor in Los Angeles. It includes existing and proposed seismic surveys, borings, and alignments for light rail and tunnel options being considered to address transportation needs in the area. A map shows the locations of existing and proposed exploration activities along the corridor.
Sr 710 study boring schedule draft 022513peggydrouet
The document is a draft field investigation schedule for the SR 710 North Study from February to April 2013. It lists the proposed boring locations along the SR 710 corridor and adjacent streets in Los Angeles and South Pasadena. Exploratory borings will be drilled to depths ranging from 50 to 280 feet deep at each location to assess subsurface conditions. The schedule assigns dates for different drilling contractors to complete the work over the three month period.
“An Outlook of the Ongoing and Future Relationship between Blockchain Technologies and Process-aware Information Systems.” Invited talk at the joint workshop on Blockchain for Information Systems (BC4IS) and Blockchain for Trusted Data Sharing (B4TDS), co-located with with the 36th International Conference on Advanced Information Systems Engineering (CAiSE), 3 June 2024, Limassol, Cyprus.
Dr. Sean Tan, Head of Data Science, Changi Airport Group
Discover how Changi Airport Group (CAG) leverages graph technologies and generative AI to revolutionize their search capabilities. This session delves into the unique search needs of CAG’s diverse passengers and customers, showcasing how graph data structures enhance the accuracy and relevance of AI-generated search results, mitigating the risk of “hallucinations” and improving the overall customer journey.
Threats to mobile devices are more prevalent and increasing in scope and complexity. Users of mobile devices desire to take full advantage of the features
available on those devices, but many of the features provide convenience and capability but sacrifice security. This best practices guide outlines steps the users can take to better protect personal devices and information.
Essentials of Automations: The Art of Triggers and Actions in FMESafe Software
In this second installment of our Essentials of Automations webinar series, we’ll explore the landscape of triggers and actions, guiding you through the nuances of authoring and adapting workspaces for seamless automations. Gain an understanding of the full spectrum of triggers and actions available in FME, empowering you to enhance your workspaces for efficient automation.
We’ll kick things off by showcasing the most commonly used event-based triggers, introducing you to various automation workflows like manual triggers, schedules, directory watchers, and more. Plus, see how these elements play out in real scenarios.
Whether you’re tweaking your current setup or building from the ground up, this session will arm you with the tools and insights needed to transform your FME usage into a powerhouse of productivity. Join us to discover effective strategies that simplify complex processes, enhancing your productivity and transforming your data management practices with FME. Let’s turn complexity into clarity and make your workspaces work wonders!
Programming Foundation Models with DSPy - Meetup SlidesZilliz
Prompting language models is hard, while programming language models is easy. In this talk, I will discuss the state-of-the-art framework DSPy for programming foundation models with its powerful optimizers and runtime constraint system.
How to Get CNIC Information System with Paksim Ga.pptxdanishmna97
Pakdata Cf is a groundbreaking system designed to streamline and facilitate access to CNIC information. This innovative platform leverages advanced technology to provide users with efficient and secure access to their CNIC details.
GraphRAG for Life Science to increase LLM accuracyTomaz Bratanic
GraphRAG for life science domain, where you retriever information from biomedical knowledge graphs using LLMs to increase the accuracy and performance of generated answers
In the rapidly evolving landscape of technologies, XML continues to play a vital role in structuring, storing, and transporting data across diverse systems. The recent advancements in artificial intelligence (AI) present new methodologies for enhancing XML development workflows, introducing efficiency, automation, and intelligent capabilities. This presentation will outline the scope and perspective of utilizing AI in XML development. The potential benefits and the possible pitfalls will be highlighted, providing a balanced view of the subject.
We will explore the capabilities of AI in understanding XML markup languages and autonomously creating structured XML content. Additionally, we will examine the capacity of AI to enrich plain text with appropriate XML markup. Practical examples and methodological guidelines will be provided to elucidate how AI can be effectively prompted to interpret and generate accurate XML markup.
Further emphasis will be placed on the role of AI in developing XSLT, or schemas such as XSD and Schematron. We will address the techniques and strategies adopted to create prompts for generating code, explaining code, or refactoring the code, and the results achieved.
The discussion will extend to how AI can be used to transform XML content. In particular, the focus will be on the use of AI XPath extension functions in XSLT, Schematron, Schematron Quick Fixes, or for XML content refactoring.
The presentation aims to deliver a comprehensive overview of AI usage in XML development, providing attendees with the necessary knowledge to make informed decisions. Whether you’re at the early stages of adopting AI or considering integrating it in advanced XML development, this presentation will cover all levels of expertise.
By highlighting the potential advantages and challenges of integrating AI with XML development tools and languages, the presentation seeks to inspire thoughtful conversation around the future of XML development. We’ll not only delve into the technical aspects of AI-powered XML development but also discuss practical implications and possible future directions.
Climate Impact of Software Testing at Nordic Testing DaysKari Kakkonen
My slides at Nordic Testing Days 6.6.2024
Climate impact / sustainability of software testing discussed on the talk. ICT and testing must carry their part of global responsibility to help with the climat warming. We can minimize the carbon footprint but we can also have a carbon handprint, a positive impact on the climate. Quality characteristics can be added with sustainability, and then measured continuously. Test environments can be used less, and in smaller scale and on demand. Test techniques can be used in optimizing or minimizing number of tests. Test automation can be used to speed up testing.
Let's Integrate MuleSoft RPA, COMPOSER, APM with AWS IDP along with Slackshyamraj55
Discover the seamless integration of RPA (Robotic Process Automation), COMPOSER, and APM with AWS IDP enhanced with Slack notifications. Explore how these technologies converge to streamline workflows, optimize performance, and ensure secure access, all while leveraging the power of AWS IDP and real-time communication via Slack notifications.
UiPath Test Automation using UiPath Test Suite series, part 5DianaGray10
Welcome to UiPath Test Automation using UiPath Test Suite series part 5. In this session, we will cover CI/CD with devops.
Topics covered:
CI/CD with in UiPath
End-to-end overview of CI/CD pipeline with Azure devops
Speaker:
Lyndsey Byblow, Test Suite Sales Engineer @ UiPath, Inc.
In his public lecture, Christian Timmerer provides insights into the fascinating history of video streaming, starting from its humble beginnings before YouTube to the groundbreaking technologies that now dominate platforms like Netflix and ORF ON. Timmerer also presents provocative contributions of his own that have significantly influenced the industry. He concludes by looking at future challenges and invites the audience to join in a discussion.
Removing Uninteresting Bytes in Software FuzzingAftab Hussain
Imagine a world where software fuzzing, the process of mutating bytes in test seeds to uncover hidden and erroneous program behaviors, becomes faster and more effective. A lot depends on the initial seeds, which can significantly dictate the trajectory of a fuzzing campaign, particularly in terms of how long it takes to uncover interesting behaviour in your code. We introduce DIAR, a technique designed to speedup fuzzing campaigns by pinpointing and eliminating those uninteresting bytes in the seeds. Picture this: instead of wasting valuable resources on meaningless mutations in large, bloated seeds, DIAR removes the unnecessary bytes, streamlining the entire process.
In this work, we equipped AFL, a popular fuzzer, with DIAR and examined two critical Linux libraries -- Libxml's xmllint, a tool for parsing xml documents, and Binutil's readelf, an essential debugging and security analysis command-line tool used to display detailed information about ELF (Executable and Linkable Format). Our preliminary results show that AFL+DIAR does not only discover new paths more quickly but also achieves higher coverage overall. This work thus showcases how starting with lean and optimized seeds can lead to faster, more comprehensive fuzzing campaigns -- and DIAR helps you find such seeds.
- These are slides of the talk given at IEEE International Conference on Software Testing Verification and Validation Workshop, ICSTW 2022.
GraphSummit Singapore | The Art of the Possible with Graph - Q2 2024Neo4j
Neha Bajwa, Vice President of Product Marketing, Neo4j
Join us as we explore breakthrough innovations enabled by interconnected data and AI. Discover firsthand how organizations use relationships in data to uncover contextual insights and solve our most pressing challenges – from optimizing supply chains, detecting fraud, and improving customer experiences to accelerating drug discoveries.
Goodbye Windows 11: Make Way for Nitrux Linux 3.5.0!SOFTTECHHUB
As the digital landscape continually evolves, operating systems play a critical role in shaping user experiences and productivity. The launch of Nitrux Linux 3.5.0 marks a significant milestone, offering a robust alternative to traditional systems such as Windows 11. This article delves into the essence of Nitrux Linux 3.5.0, exploring its unique features, advantages, and how it stands as a compelling choice for both casual users and tech enthusiasts.
TrustArc Webinar - 2024 Global Privacy SurveyTrustArc
How does your privacy program stack up against your peers? What challenges are privacy teams tackling and prioritizing in 2024?
In the fifth annual Global Privacy Benchmarks Survey, we asked over 1,800 global privacy professionals and business executives to share their perspectives on the current state of privacy inside and outside of their organizations. This year’s report focused on emerging areas of importance for privacy and compliance professionals, including considerations and implications of Artificial Intelligence (AI) technologies, building brand trust, and different approaches for achieving higher privacy competence scores.
See how organizational priorities and strategic approaches to data security and privacy are evolving around the globe.
This webinar will review:
- The top 10 privacy insights from the fifth annual Global Privacy Benchmarks Survey
- The top challenges for privacy leaders, practitioners, and organizations in 2024
- Key themes to consider in developing and maintaining your privacy program
State senate transpo hearings 11 13-13 backgroundpaper
1. Senate Transportation and Housing Committee
Informational Hearing
How to Save the State Billions:
Improving Megaproject Outcomes
Wednesday, November 13, 2013
10:00 a.m. – John L. Burton Hearing Room (4203)
BACKGROUND PAPER
Introduction
On November 13th this committee will consider megaproject development and how the
state could improve how it selects, develops, and delivers these costly projects. While this
hearing is the first in a series of informational hearings examining the development and
construction of the eastern span of the San Francisco-Oakland Bay Bridge, this hearing is
focused more broadly as a discussion of megaprojects in general. The hearing participants come
from varied backgrounds and are experts in the field of megaproject development.
Improving the state’s performance in delivery of megaprojects is a critical and timely
topic. Many of the state’s challenges today require grand, visionary, expansive solutions. While
megaproject development is often first associated with transportation, this topic truly touches
nearly every realm of public infrastructure – from energy to education facilities, water to walls
protecting us from rising sea levels, prisons to park systems. As essential projects grow in size
and complexity, so does the challenge for the state to properly select and deliver these projects in
a responsible, honest manner. Due to the sheer size of these projects, taking steps such as setting
up governance and management structures in ways that control risk and avoid escalating costs
and extended timelines can save the state billions of dollars.
1|Page
2. This background paper provides some context by summarizing some of the recent
thinking on the subject and suggests some potential solutions for the committee to consider.
Background
What is a megaproject?
For the purposes of this hearing, a megaproject is a large, complex, public infrastructure
project with costs exceeding $1 billion and substantial impacts to communities, budgets, and the
environment. Besides the high cost and complexity, megaprojects share other characteristics,
such as:
Long Duration – Sometimes spanning decades, the length of time necessary for the
development and construction of a megaproject creates more ambiguity, uncertainty, and
risk than most projects experience.
Design and Construction Complexity – By their very nature, megaprojects embrace
complex design decisions and construction methods, contributing to the difficulty of
successful delivery.
High Public Profile – People pay closer attention to megaprojects, and keeping the
public informed as the project development progresses is critical.
Multiple Stakeholders – Because the megaproject is almost always embedded in a
complex network of public and private interests, the developer must strive to maintain the
support of multiple and diverse stakeholders over a long period of time.
Project Delivery and Procurement – Complex projects such as megaprojects often
require innovation in contracting and procurement to properly allocate risk between the
involved parties.
Case Study: The Bay Bridge
On Labor Day 2013, the new eastern span of the San Francisco-Oakland Bay Bridge
(East Span) opened to traffic. California built this structure to replace the span it originally
2|Page
3. constructed in 1936, which the 1989 Loma Prieta earthquake damaged and made it unlikely to
withstand another major seismic event. The California Department of Transportation (Caltrans)
initially proposed completing construction of the new East Span by 2003 at an estimated cost of
$1.3 billion. By the time it opened nearly a decade late, the actual cost exceeded $6.4 billion.
Some have described the East Span as an “engineering marvel.” It has an expected 150year service life (double that of standard bridges), is designed to withstand the largest seismic
event expected in the San Francisco Bay Area over 1,500 years, and includes numerous other
engineering innovations. Moreover, its signature feature, the asymmetrical self-anchored
suspension span, gives the bridge a unique and distinctive appearance. Nevertheless, it is
difficult to characterize the project as a success not only in light of the significant cost increases
but also in light of the increased risk to public safety caused by delays that forced motorists to
travel on the seismically deficient 1936 span for years longer than initially expected.
Many factors drove the delays and cost growth that plagued the East Span project
throughout its history. These included political disagreements, complex environmental
challenges, and compounding economic factors such as increased bonding costs following the
tragedy of September 11, 2001, and increased international demand for construction materials.
Unfortunately, the East Span replacement project is far from unique among megaprojects with
respect to cost escalation and delay. Other high-profile megaprojects, including the Central
Artery/Tunnel Project or “Big Dig” in Boston, the Øresund Bridge tunnel connecting Denmark
and Sweden, and the Channel Tunnel linking the United Kingdom to France via high-speed rail,
all experienced a similar pattern of cost growth and delay.
This phenomenon of exorbitant costs and long delays has serious public policy
implications, primarily:
Lack of reliable initial cost analyses and projections hampers policymakers’ efforts to
make responsible decisions between various project alternatives or whether to move
forward with the project at all.
3|Page
4.
Failure to deliver on expectations (in terms of cost and schedule) generally
undermines public confidence in government and encourages cynicism, thus making
it substantially more difficult to pursue future investments.
Severe cost overruns adversely impact other infrastructure needs as resources must be
shifted to backfill shortfalls in the megaproject budget.
Today, California stands at a critical juncture. The state is on the precipice of beginning
construction of another megaproject, the high-speed rail project, which will dwarf the East Span
in both cost and scope. The state is contemplating other huge infrastructure projects in
transportation, water, and energy. The purpose of today’s hearing is to examine the factors that
seem to undermine success with regard to megaprojects and, more importantly, to explore what
steps the state can take, from a legislative, administrative, and project development perspective,
in order to improve the likelihood of success in the future.
Discussion on Megaproject Development “Success”
How Do We Measure Success?
Traditionally, people judge the success of an infrastructure project, whether of megaproportion or not, in terms of its completion on time and within budget. In the case of
megaprojects, limiting cost growth is particularly critical because the project’s sheer size
compounds the risk of such escalation. For example, a 10 percent cost overrun for a typical $200
million project ($200 million) may be recovered through cost savings from other projects. The
same relatively reasonable 10 percent cost overrun for a $2 billion megaproject could mean that
another $200 million project must be delayed or canceled. Nevertheless, as discussed below,
research suggests that judging megaproject success solely on the basis of cost and schedule may
be inadequate. Among the questions that this committee may wish to explore in this hearing is
whether or not judging success with respect to megaprojects requires a broader analysis that
considers additional metrics, and, if so, what such an evaluation might look like.
4|Page
5. The Phenomenon of Cost Growth
Among the first to document a systemic pattern of extreme cost growth and schedule
delay on megaprojects was Danish economist Bent Flyvbjerg. In his seminal work,
Megaprojects and Risk (2003), Flyvbjerg asserts that large-scale delays and cost overruns are
more the norm than the exception on megaprojects. He references multiple studies, the largest of
which examined 258 projects in 20 different countries, which together document cost overruns
on 90 percent of these large projects. Cost growth averaged 20 percent for road projects, 34
percent for bridge/tunnel projects, and 45 percent for rail projects. He observed, however, that
overruns of 80 percent were not uncommon.1
Flyvbjerg cites a lack of realism in initial cost estimates as the primary driver of cost
overruns on megaprojects. He asserts that initial cost estimates for megaprojects routinely
underestimate, downplay, or otherwise fail to account for the level of risk associated with a
megaproject, including political, economic, environmental, and geological uncertainties.
Failure to adequately account for such risks up front – or in some cases to acknowledge them at
all – inevitably leads to costly delays and expensive mitigation or design changes later in the
project. Flyvbjerg attributes these failures largely to a phenomenon he calls “appraisal
optimism,” the idea that project developers typically base projections on a best case scenario
even though such an outcome is rarely realistic, especially on large, complex endeavors.
Moreover, he suggests that such unfounded optimism is frequently intentional - elsewhere he
calls it strategic misrepresentation2 - on the part of those with a vested interest in seeing that the
project moves forward, whether for self-interested or more altruistic motives. 3
Flyvbjerg argues that the antidote to strategic misrepresentation is comprehensive and
rigorous risk-analysis, done during the initial planning phase as part of the project feasibility
study. Moreover, rather than using a best-case scenario, risk analysis needs to follow the MLD1
Flyvbjerg, Bent, Megaprojects and Risk: An Anatomy of Ambition, Cambridge University Press, New York 2003,
p. 15-16.
2
Bent Flyvbjerg, Mette Skamris Holm, and Søren Buhl, "Underestimating Costs in Public Works Projects: Error or
Lie?" Journal of the American Planning Association, vol. 68, no. 3, Summer 2002, pp. 279-295.
3
Megaprojects and Risk. p. 73, 137.
5|Page
6. principle (most likely development) and also include worst-case scenarios. This information
must be fully disclosed to public and private investors, political leaders, and the general public.
He notes that feasibility studies and risk analyses for future, related, projects (or stages of a
project) should be conducted together because costs and risks of one can impact the others.4
While academics and development professionals frequently reference Flyvbjerg’s
research on megaprojects, his conclusions are not without critics. Indeed, a recent analysis of 30
megaprojects by the Omega Centre at the Bartlett School of Planning in London found
significantly less pronounced average cost growth and schedule delay than Flyvbjerg’s research
suggests.5 Even more noteworthy, the Omega study concluded that the presence of cost growth
and schedule delay, even when significant, doesn’t automatically constitute project failure. This
conclusion may seem odd, of course, as it appears to directly contradict conventional wisdom.
Indeed, within the world of project development the so-called “iron triangle” of cost, schedule,
and scope is seen as the key barometer of success or failure. The Omega study, however, argues
that certain inherent characteristics of megaprojects make them, in important ways, different
from conventional projects. As a result, the study suggests that while the iron-triangle remains
important, a broader, more complex, and more nuanced framework of criteria is needed to
adequately evaluate success with respect to megaprojects.6
A Broader Definition of Success
To be clear, the Omega study does not suggest that cost growth and delay on
megaprojects is inconsequential, nor does it dismiss the possibility that in some instances project
proponents could or did engage in strategic misrepresentation. Omega researchers suggest,
however, that such behavior may not be endemic or a key driver of cost growth. Ultimately, the
key conclusion of the Omega study is that while cost, schedule, and scope are important, when
applied to megaprojects they constitute an inadequate tool for measuring overall success.
Indeed, they argue that measuring megaprojects primarily or exclusively using this framework
4
Megaprojects and Risk. p. 84, 85.
5
Mega Projects: Lessons for Decision Makers: An Analysis of Selected Large-scale Transport Infrastructure
Projects. Omega Centre, Bartlett School of Planning, London. Executive Summary, p. 22.
6
Mega Projects: Lessons for Decision Makers. p. 23
6|Page
7. may lead to projects that while meeting time and cost schedules, are spectacular failures in other
critical ways.
The Omega study identifies several critical characteristics common to megaprojects that
distinguish them from traditional construction projects. For example, Omega researchers also
argue that megaprojects need to be understood as organic phenomena, which inevitably evolve
and adapt to changing circumstances over time. In addition, megaprojects have the capacity to
function as agents of change in affected communities or even for society at large to a much
greater degree than conventional projects.7 Individually, each of these characteristics presents
particular challenges to the successful delivery of megaprojects. Considered together, they begin
to suggest a framework through which one might measure a project’s success outside of the cost,
schedule, and scope paradigm.
It is virtually inevitable that significant changes to a project’s scope impacts the project’s
cost and schedule. Thus, viewed strictly through the lens of cost, schedule, and scope, such
changes typically register as negative in terms of measuring project success. Cost increases and
schedule impacts have consequences that should not be ignored. Yet the key insight of the
Omega study is the recognition that overall success or failure, particularly in the case of a
megaproject, needs to be evaluated in a broader context. While it is important to do a thorough
risk assessment at the front end, the open systems nature of most megaprojects makes it difficult,
if not impossible, to capture fully the potential impacts of such projects on the front end.
Moreover, because of their organic nature, megaprojects inevitably evolve as society’s needs
change. In view of the typically outsized impact that megaprojects can have on society, the
failure to allow them to evolve to address changing societal concerns can have significant costs,
resulting in a project that, while meeting cost and schedule constraints, could fail to address
current or future needs.
7
Mega Projects: Lessons for Decision Makers. p. 16-17.
7|Page
8. Toward More Successful Megaprojects: Key Elements
Beyond reconsideration of the lens through which we measure a megaproject’s successful
completion, other factors may contribute to a project’s success or failure. The Legislature should
develop measures to improve these factors in the state’s megaproject development process.
While not an exhaustive list, this discussion will highlight the importance of transparency,
stakeholder engagement, performance-based goal setting, proper governance, risk management,
and leadership.
Transparency – In order for the public to have confidence in a project, it must be clear
that those responsible for its development are acting as good stewards of the public interest and
of public resources. This can only occur when all project plans, documents, studies, and reports
are available and accessible to the public. Further, Flyvbjerg argues that the use of independent
peer review, both by experts working directly within the paradigm of official expertise and by
those with professional competence but working outside that paradigm,8 is critical both to project
success and to public confidence.
Along these lines, many experts also stress the role of effective communication in project
success. Communication and outreach efforts should be taken every bit as seriously, and funded
as adequately, as any of the technical aspects of project development. Washington State
Department of Transportation recognized the value of transparency, and after instituting a
number of measures to bolster its efforts, was able to successfully raise additional statewide
transportation revenues. Practitioners suggest entities that do not effectively communicate their
project goals and plans find themselves constantly on the defensive and end up spending more
money appeasing opponents than they would have on a successful transparency campaign
beforehand.
Stakeholder Engagement – According to many experts, the success of any project,
especially one as inevitably complex as a megaproject, depends heavily on the effective
engagement of stakeholders. Megaprojects tend to have a much broader spectrum of both direct
and indirect impacts. Thus, they have the potential to spark interest and concern from a wide
8
Megaprojects and Risk, p. 112-113.
8|Page
9. range of stakeholders. Therefore, having a robust process for engaging and interacting with
stakeholders, beginning during the conceptual phase and stretching throughout all phases of the
project is essential. According to Virginia Greiman, Deputy Counsel and Risk Manager for the
Central Artery/Tunnel Project (the Big Dig) in Boston, stakeholders are a key resource on
megaprojects. Among other things, she emphasizes the importance of viewing them as partners,
valuing their contributions, and developing and maintaining a relationship of trust. 9
The development process of the Doyle Drive Replacement Project in San Francisco is an
example of effective stakeholder engagement. Amidst a heavily-populated geography and
touching more than a dozen local, state, and federal entities, building consensus and getting to
construction was a decades-long process. To attain buy-in, project consultants developed a suite
of explanatory materials, signage, visualizations, and a web presence. They then brought
together a wide spectrum of stakeholders from neighbors and tenants, to visitors and special
interest groups to collaboratively determine the proper approach.
Performance Specifications – According to Flyvbjerg, a critical weakness of
conventional project development is the failure to employ a performance specification approach.
Too often, project planners either begin with, or at least move quickly to, discussion and analysis
of specific technical solutions and project alternatives. The problem with this is that as soon as
particular technical options are proposed, many stakeholders immediately gravitate toward
support or opposition to those specific alternatives. He observes that in many cases, such
support or opposition is rooted in concerns regarding specific elements of the project but can
obscure focus on broader goals and objectives. Moreover, once drawn, lines of support and
opposition can be difficult to change.
Flyvbjerg suggests that project developers should begin instead with a planning process
focused on defining and building public consensus around the range of performance-based goals
and objectives that any eventual project should be expected to achieve, such as improved
sustainability, safety, or cost-effectiveness. He believes that a robust commitment to
development of consensus among a broad range stakeholders and the public prior to a discussion
9
Mega Project Management. p. 81.
9|Page
10. of technical solutions is critical to project success. Such an approach, he argues, forces people to
focus on the ends rather than the means, the project’s goals rather than specific technical issues
related to a particular proposed solution. This not only ensures that stakeholders have an
opportunity for early engagement in the process, but also provides a clear measuring stick
against which all subsequent technical solutions can be equally measured.10
For example, the next time the state considers building a new large bridge, it should
begin by defining performance specifications for the bridge, such as the level of seismic safety,
the volume and types of traffic it must accommodate, and what cost constraints it needs to meet.
Then, once these various parameters are adequately defined, the state can judge any proposed
project alternatives against these specifications. In the past, the state has launched into
discussions of possible alternatives to major infrastructure projects before adequately
determining the desired performance measures by which to judge the proposals.
Governance Structure – Key to the management of any complex endeavor, such as a
major construction project, is an effective governance structure. Indeed, undertaking a major
project without ensuring an adequate governance regime exposes an organization to “a high
degree of failure.”11 The governance structure defines the system of relationships within an
organization as well as the processes and procedures through which decisions are made and
performance is monitored. In order for a large and complex organization to function effectively,
roles and responsibilities of various individuals and entities should be clearly defined, and lines
of accountability must be transparent.
Greiman observes that because every major project has unique elements and specific
needs and demands, no single type of governance structure will work for every project. In
addition, because megaprojects tend to evolve over time, the governance structure must be
flexible enough to adapt to new demands that may emerge. Flyvbjerg is quite critical of
conventional public sector project governance, suggesting that it requires government to play too
many, and often conflicting, roles. He notes that in many cases, the public agency in charge of a
10
Megaprojects and Risk. p. 115-117.
11
Megaproject Management. p. 111-113.
10 | P a g e
11. project serves as its promoter, and at the same time, is also expected to serve as guardian of the
public interest, responsible for ensuring that concerns over issues such as environmental
protection, public safety, and financial risk, are fully addressed. We must consider and
adequately address this conflict to improve megaproject outcomes.
Risk Management – Megaprojects are risky endeavors, and project success depends in
large measure on the effective management of these risks. To be truly effective, identification of
risks should begin as early as possible during project development, ideally while the project is
still in the conceptual phase. Researchers acknowledge that particularly during early stages,
specific risk events are often difficult to predict. Even early on, however, it is generally possible
to identify likely types and sources of risk (such as political, environmental, fiscal, or design
risks), and to estimate risk exposure based on experience with other projects. Following initial
identification, risk management entails development of a robust risk assessment identifying: 1)
what can go wrong, 2) how likely it is to occur, and 3) the likely impacts if it occurs. Following
this analysis, risks are prioritized (based on probability and severity of impact) and response
strategies developed. Such strategies can involve efforts to avoid some risks, tolerate others, and
transfer still others (in whole or in part) to other parties.12
Legislation in 2005 required the state to develop such a risk management tool for the East
Span project. While the project had suffered significant delay and cost increases to that point,
since instituting its complex risk management program, among other things, the new span
opened relatively on time and within its contingency budget. The Legislature should consider
applying risk management requirements to all large infrastructure projects similar to those
required for the East Span project.
Leadership – Beyond the aforementioned, largely technical and process-based elements,
that contribute to the success or failure of a megaproject, many experts point to one other factor –
effective leadership – as fundamental to the project’s outcome. While the need for effective
project management was addressed above, most clearly in the discussion of governance,
Greiman and others stress that leadership is a separate, albeit complementary function. She
12
Megaproject Management. p. 267-271.
11 | P a g e
12. frames the distinction this way: management is about coping with complexity whereas leadership
is about coping with change. Managers, she says, achieve their goals by planning, setting
targets, and monitoring results against the plan, whereas leaders create a vision, develop
strategies and implement them. While managers use processes and procedures, leaders must
impact human emotion, change minds, motivate, and inspire individuals to do things they have
never done before. In as much as projects and especially megaprojects are about change,
effective leadership is essential. Specific traits she highlights include honesty, competence,
inspiration, and forward-looking vision.13
The Omega researchers also noted, among their conclusions, the need for strong and
sustained leadership in promoting visions that megaprojects should seek to fulfill. They argue
specifically that politicians need to assume a major leadership role in steering major
transportation projects through the process, and in sustaining the momentum of a project’s
development. Ultimately, research suggests, the success of a megaprojects depends on the
presence of leaders who are willing and able to champion a project vision and sustain it over a
period of time.14
Conclusion
Given the complexity involved in megaproject development, it is understandable that the
state may have suffered some less fortunate outcomes to date. Research has shown what pitfalls
exist, and if we create structures for evaluation of these projects as well as properly selecting
alternatives and effectively overseeing future endeavors, the state should be able to mitigate risks
and improve our overall ability to deliver megaprojects.
Questions for Consideration:
1. Based on your experience with large projects, how would you define “success” and how
do you measure it?
13
Megaproject Management. p. 391-393
14
Mega Projects: Lessons for Decision Makers. p. 38-39.
12 | P a g e
13. 2. Can you share with us some examples of any megaprojects with which you have been
involved where project goals shifted (or new potential benefits have emerged) during
project development? How were these developments handled? Do you have practical
recommendations for us as far as planning for and managing this kind of dynamic?
3. If, as some suggest, project success needs to be measured with broader criteria than cost,
scope, and schedule alone, how should various costs and benefits be balanced? As a
practical matter, what governance and evaluation structures need to be put in place to
facilitate this kind of analysis during the project development process?
4. Professor Flyvbjerg has suggested changes to the traditional governance structure of
public infrastructure projects, including, in part, that the public agency refrain from
serving as project promoter in order to maintain an arms-length relationship to the
project. Do you agree with this approach, and, if so, how would you envision it working
in practice?
5. Professor Flyvbjerg has also proposed that the initial stage of megaproject development
involve identification of performance-based criteria, independent of specific solutions.
Can you share with us any real-world projects of this kind of process? What practical
strategies are needed to accomplish this?
6. Oversight is critical to the success of any project. What elements need to be in place to
ensure success? In particular, what do you see as the most appropriate and effective role
for elected officials (i.e., the Legislature) in this process?
7. Environmental issues are a critical element of megaproject development and can be a
substantial source of risk, frequently leading to delay and cost growth. What strategies
(statutory, administrative) would you propose to mitigate this risk?
8. What role does the delivery method play in determining megaproject success? Are there
tools needed that California does not have at its disposal today that would enhance the
prospects of success on future megaprojects?
9. What role, if any, do you see that project financing plays in managing risk on projects?
10. What other suggestions do you have that would facilitate California’s future success in
megaproject development?
13 | P a g e