Αφρο-Ευρασιατική Γεωπολιτική, οι Νέοι Δρόμοι του Μεταξιού, το Ινδο-Ειρηνικό Σύμπλεγμα, η Διάλυση της Δύσης

Αφρο-Ευρασιατική
Γεωπολιτική, οι Νέοι
Δρόμοι του Μεταξιού,
το Ινδο-Ειρηνικό
Σύμπλεγμα, η
Διάλυση της Δύσης
και το Τέλος της
Ψευτο-Ιστορίας του
‘Ελληνο-Ρωμαϊκού
Πολιτισμού’
https://greeksoftheorient.wordpress.com/2019/0
8/30/αφρο-ευρασιατική-γεωπολιτική-οι-νέοι/
===================

Οι Ρωμιοί της Ανατολής –
Greeks of the Orient
Ρωμιοσύνη,Ρωμανία, Ανατολική Ρωμαϊκή
Αυτοκρατορία
Τίποτα δεν υπογραμμίζει καλύτερα την
αποδυνάμωση και αποσύνθεση του δυτικού
κόσμου καλύτερα από την οικτρή εικόνα
της τελευταίας συνάντησης των αρχηγών
κρατών μελών της οργάνωσης G-7 στο
Μπιαρίτς της Γαλλίας. Το 45ο G7 summit
αναφέρθηκε στο ενδεχόμενο επιστροφής της
Ρωσσίας στην οργάνωση και συνεπώς
μετατροπής της και πάλι σε G -8, αλλά την
καλύτερη απάντηση σ’ αυτή την ιδέα έδωσε
το ρωσσικό think tank Valdai Club που
πρόσκειται στον Ρώσσο πρόεδρο.
Σημειώνοντας ότι το G-7 δεν έχει πλέον
την σημασία που είχε προ 20 ετών, το εν
λόγω ίδρυμα σε σχετική δημοσίευσή του
(δείτε παρακάτω) αναρωτήθηκε τι έχει
πλέον σημασία, το G-7 ή το G-20!

Λεπτομέρειες υπάρχουν πολλές
(https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/45th_G7_s
ummit), αλλά η πραγματικότητα φαίνεται
σε λίγους μόνον αριθμούς:
Οι χώρες του G-7 (ΗΠΑ, Ιαπωνία,
Γερμανία, Αγγλία, Γαλλία, Ιταλία και
Καναδάς) με 766 εκ. πληθυσμό διαθέτουν
μαζί το 30.1% του παγκοσμίου ΑΕΠ (σε
αντιστοιχία αγοραστικής δύναμης /
purchasing power parity).
Αλλά οι πέντε χώρες των BRICS (Κίνα,
Ινδία, Ρωσσία, Βραζιλία, Νοτιοαφρικανική
Ένωση) με 3165 εκ. εκπροσωπούν το
32.7% του παγκοσμίου ΑΕΠ, όντας έτσι πιο
σημαντικές από το G-7, το οποίο είναι
πολιτικά διαιρεμένο και οικονομικά
κλυδωνιζόμενο.
Από την άλλη πλευρά, οι υπόλοιπες 7
χώρες του G-20 (το οποίο αποτελείται από
την Ευρωπαϊκή Ένωση και 19 χώρες, οι
οποίες απαρτίζονται από τους BRICS, το G-
7 και άλλες 7 χώρες), ήτοι Ινδονησία,
Μεξικό, Τουρκία, Νότια Κορέα, Αργεντινή,

Σαουδική Αραβία, και Αυστραλία, με 633
εκ. πληθυσμό έχουν το 10.8% του
παγκοσμίου ΑΕΠ.
Με άλλα λόγια το G- 20 εκπροσωπεί το
75% της παγκόσμιας οικονομίας, μη
αφήνοντας εκτός καμμιά παγκοσμίως
σημαντική χώρα.
Αλλά το πολύ εντυπωσιακό δεδομένο
(συγκριτικά με τον κόσμο προ 20 ή 30
ετών) είναι ότι μαζί οι Ινδονησία, Μεξικό,

Τουρκία, Νότια Κορέα, Αργεντινή, Σαουδική
Αραβία, και Αυστραλία διαθέτουν ήδη
περισσότερο από το 1/3 του ΑΕΠ των
χωρών μελών του G-7. Αυτό από μόνο του
δείχνει πόση ισχύς έχει χαθεί από τις παλιές
μεγάλες οικονομίες της Δυτικής Ευρώπης,
Βόρειας Αμερικής, και Ιαπωνίας (που
κάποτε απεκαλούντο ‘ο πρώτος κόσμος’). Για
το G- 20 θα βρείτε λεπτομέρειες εδώ:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/G20
Αν στα παραπάνω συνυπολογιστούν η
δυναμική της οικονομίας των εκτός του G-
7 χωρών, το δημογραφικό πρόβλημα (το
οποίο είτε είναι πολύ σοβαρό είτε προξενεί
πολιτικές αναταραχές στην αντιμετώπισή
του) και ο εκπαιδευτικός – επιστημονικός
– μορφωτικός παράγοντας, τότε
συμπεραίνουμε ότι η καταβαράθρωση της
Δύσης θα είναι γρήγορη και απόλυτη. Αυτή
η διάλυση θα είναι μάλιστα γενική και όχι
μόνον οικονομική-πολιτική. Μαζί με την
Δύση, θα βουλιάξει όλο το ιδεολόγημα που

προέκυψε από την Αναγεννησιακή Ευρώπη
και έφθασε στις μέρες μας.
Άλλωστε, η Γερμανία είναι η Γερμανία του
αφηγήματος του ‘ελληνορωμαϊκού ή
ιουδαιοχριστιανικού πολιτισμού’, όσο
παραμένει πληθυσμιακά όπως την ξέρουμε
μέχρι σήμερα. Το ίδιο κι η Γαλλία, η Ιταλία
ή η Αγγλία. Αλλά μια Γερμανία
κατακλυσμένη από Τούρκους, Ιρανούς,
Αφγανούς, Τουρκμένους κι Ιρακινούς
αναγκαστικά χρειάζεται άλλο αφήγημα –
κάτι που να την φέρνει κοντά στον
Ταμερλάνο, στην Χρυσή Ορδή και στον
Χουλάγκου Χαν.
Όλα αυτά φαίνονται ήδη πολύ καθαρά από
τους κινητήριους μοχλούς σκέψης, τις
γενικώτερες θεωρήσεις της Παγκόσμιας
Ιστορίας, τις μεγάλες αναζητήσεις, και τις
βασικές κατευθυντήριες γραμμές των
κυριωτέρων σχεδίων που υλοποιούν οι
εκτός του G-7 μεγάλες δυνάμεις. Η
ανάδειξη της Κίνας σε πρώτη υπερδύναμη
βγάζει αυτόματα τον Περικλή, τον

Θουκυδίδη και τον Ιούλιο Καίσαρα από το
επίκεντρο της Ιστορίας και εκεί τοποθετεί
τον Κινέζο αυτοκράτορα Σουζόν (Suzong), ο
οποίος έγραψε στον χαλίφη της Βαγδάτης
ζητώντας του βοήθεια και στρατό για να
καταστείλει την επανάσταση Αν Λουσάν ή
τον ιδρυτή της δυναστείας Μιν αυτοκράτορα
Χουνβού (Hongwu), ο οποίος το 1368
έγραψε ένα ποίημα 100 λέξεων για να
εξυμνήσει τον Μωάμεθ Προφήτη του Ισλάμ.
Δεν είναι θέμα καν επιλογής ανάμεσα σε
μια αλήθεια κι ένα ψέμμα. Είναι κάτι πολύ
πιο μακριά από αυτό. Είναι θέμα ότι ‘αυτό’
ήταν η δική ‘σου’ αλήθεια και ‘εκείνο’ ήταν
η δική ‘του’ αλήθεια, και τελικά
αποδεικνύεται ότι η δική ‘σου’ αλήθεια
(ακόμη κι αν είναι αληθινή) δεν είναι η πιο
σημαντική, ή η πιο καθοριστική.
Πάρτε για παράδειγμα την βασική
γεωπολιτική της Κίνας! Η Ευρώπη,
ιδωμένη από το Πεκίνο, γίνεται νοητή ως
μία χερσόνησος της Ασίας, δηλαδή κάτι σαν
μια άλλη Ινδία, ενώ η Ασία κι η Αφρική

νοούνται ως μία ενότητα γης της οποίας τα
πολλά τμήματα είναι αλληλεξαρτώμενα,
αλληλοσυνδεόμενα και
αλληλοσυνεργαζόμενα, καθώς αποτελούν μια
ενότητα. Και ακριβώς αυτή την θεώρηση
αλλά και μέθοδο έρευνας κι ερμηνείας της
Ιστορίας υλοποιεί το μεγαλόπνοο σχέδιο της
Κίνας που εν συντομία αποκαλείται Νέος
Δρόμος του Μεταξιού {Belt and Road
Initiative (BRI) ή One Belt One Road
(OBOR); Один пояс и один путь; 一带一路
}. Σχετικά:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Belt_and_R
oad_Initiative
https://zh.wikipedia.org/wiki/一带一路
https://ru.wikipedia.org/wiki/Один_пояс_
и_один_путь
https://de.wikipedia.org/wiki/One_Belt,_O
ne_Road
https://de.wikipedia.org/wiki/TRACECA

Η ιστορική επιστροφή στους – κατά ξηράν,
έρημον και θάλασσαν – Δρόμους του
Μεταξιού ντε φάκτο συνενώνει την αφρο-
ευρασιατική γήινη έκταση, σβύννοντας
ψεύτικες κι αναθεωρητικές γραμμές που
είχαν επιβάλει οι διάφοροι αποικιοκράτες
και οριενταλιστές. Ψευτο-γεωπολιτικές
παρουσιάσεις που χωρίζουν την Αφρο-
Ευρασία πετιούνται εκ των πραγμάτων στα
σκουπίδια ως ιστορικά ανυπόστατες και ως
οικονομικά – πολιτικά άχρηστες και
βλαβερές. Η Ενδιάμεση Περιοχή του
Δημήτρη Κιτσίκη δεν υπάρχει: ήταν μια
στρεβλή κι άχρηστη επινόησή του.

Το ίδιο έχει να κάνει και με το ρατσιστικό
αφήγημα των αποικιοκρατών του 18ου και
του 19ου αιώνα. Άγγλοι και Γάλλοι
αποικιοκράτες, ακριβώς για να επιβάλλουν
την αποικιοκρατία τους, επιχείρησαν να
αναθεωρήσουν την Ιστορία και να αρνηθούν
το τι μέχρι τότε είχε συμβεί.
Η αναθεώρηση της Ιστορίας που οι
Αγγλογάλλοι ελληνιστές, λατινιστές κι
οριενταλιστές επέβαλαν είχε να κάνει με
α. μια παρά φύσιν και ψεύτικη διαίρεση του
κόσμου σε Ανατολή και Δύση,
β. μια ανιστόρητη κι αυθαίρετη ταύτιση της
Δύσης με πολιτισμό και πρόοδο και της
Ανατολής με βαρβαρότητα κι ‘απολυταρχία’
(λες κι η ‘απολυταρχία’ είναι κάτι το
οπωσδήποτε κακό!),
γ. μια παρανοϊκή κι εξωπραγματική
αναγωγή του λεγόμενου ‘ελληνορωμαϊκού
πολιτισμού’ σε επίκεντρο της Παγκόσμιας
Ιστορίας, κάτι που αντιστρατευόταν τις ίδιες
τις ιστορικές πηγές, και

δ. μια ολότελα αφελή ταύτιση των
νεώτερων Ευρωπαίων με τους αρχαίους
Ρωμαίους, Έλληνες και ακόμη τους
Μυκηναίους και τους Μινωΐτες της 2ης
προχριστιανικής χιλιετίας σε μια οικτρά
ρατσιστική απόπειρα να παρουσιασθεί το
παρελθόν των Ευρωπαίων αποικιοκρατών
ως ‘ανώτερο’ και ‘αρχαιότερο’ εκείνου των
εθνών των αγγλικών και γαλλικών
αποικιών.
Όλα αυτά τα ψευδή, αυθαίρετα κι
ανιστόρητα ‘αξιώματα’ επιβλήθηκαν με
τυραννικές μεθόδους στην Ασία, την Αφρική
κι ακόμη την Ευρώπη, αλλά εις μάτην.
Με την αναφορά στην αλήθεια των
Ιστορικών Δρόμων του Μεταξιού, η Ιστορία
επιστρέφει, οι αναθεωρητικές και
ρατσιστικές απόψεις των νεώτερων
Ευρωπαίων για ‘ελληνορωμαϊκό’ ή
‘ιουδαιοχριστιανικό’ πολιτισμό σβύννονται,
και η ισότιμη συμμετοχή όλων των εθνών
στο μελλοντικό γίγνεσθαι στηρίζεται στην
πραγματική Ιστορία, την έρευνά της, την

εκμάθησή της, την διάδοσή της, χωρίς τους
εθνοκεντρικούς και ιδεολογικούς,
παραποιητικούς φακούς.
Ποια ήταν λοιπόν η Ιστορική Αλήθεια των
Δρόμων του Μεταξιού που επιστρέφει για
να γίνει κτήμα όλων όσων θα συμμετέχουν
στην εξέλιξη της Ανθρωπότητας;
Ένα πλήθος εθνών συμμετείχαν στις
εμπορικές, μορφωτικές, θρησκευτικές και
γενικώτερα πολιτισμικές ανταλλαγές
μεταξύ Ρώμης, Συρίας Αλεξάνδρειας,
Ανατολικής Αφρικής, Ινδίας, Ινδοκίνας-
Ινδονησίας, Μεσοποταμίας, Ιράν, Κεντρικής
Ασίας, Σιβηρίας και Κίνας.
Έλληνες, Ρωμαίοι και γενικώτερα οι
ευρωπαϊκοί λαοί επηρεάστηκαν
κατακλυσμικά από ανατολικές λατρείες,
μυστικισμούς, θρησκείες, θεουργίες, τέχνες,
τρόπους ζωής και πολιτισμούς, και μάλιστα
είχαν συνείδηση αυτού του συμβάντος.
Η αυτοκρατορική Ρώμη ήταν μια ασιατική
πρωτεύουσα, ένα αντίγραφο της

Περσέπολης, της Βαβυλώνας, ή ακόμη της
Νινευή. Κάθε αρχαιοελληνική ‘επίδραση’
στην Ρώμη είχε πλέον ολότελα σβυσθεί.
Αν και μεγάλο κράτος, η Ρώμη πολύ
περισσότερο επηρεάστηκε παρά επηρέασε
άλλα έθνη πάνω στους Δρόμους του
Μεταξιού, των Μπαχαρικών και των
Αρωμάτων (Λιβανωτών). Έθνη που
έπαιξαν καθοριστικό ρόλο στην ανάπτυξη
αυτού του ιστορικού φαινομένου ήταν οι
Ιρανοί, οι Αραμαίοι, οι Τουρανοί, οι
Σογδιανοί, κι οι Υεμενίτες.
Οι Έλληνες αποδέχθηκαν τον Μιθραϊσμό, τις
Ισιακές Λατρείες, Μυστήρια και Θεολογία,

τον Μανιχεϊσμό, την Χριστιανωσύνη, και
άλλα ανατολικά θρησκευτικά συστήματα.
Κανένας Αιγύπτιος, Βαβυλώνιος, Αραμαίος,
Ιρανός ή Τουρανός δεν ενδιαφέρθηκε να
μεταφράσει τα έπη του Ομήρου ή τους
πλατωνικούς διαλόγους στα προχριστιανικά
χρόνια.
Και κανένας Αιγύπτιος Βαβυλώνιος,
Αραμαίος, Ιρανός ή Τουρανός δεν ελάτρευσε
τον Ποσειδώνα ή την Αθηνά.
Αλλά η αποικιοκρατική και ρατσιστική,
ευρωπαϊκή ακαδημαϊκή τάξη του 19ου και
του 20ου αιώνα, αντί να αποκαλέσει την
περίοδο από τον Αλέξανδρο έως τον
Οκταβιανό ‘ανατολιστικά χρόνια’ (επειδή
τότε σημειώθηκαν ανατολικές επιδράσεις
πάνω σε Έλληνες, Ρωμαίους κι άλλους
Ευρωπαίους), την ονόμασε ‘ελληνιστικά
χρόνια’ (επειδή ορισμένοι ασιατικοί λαοί,
όπως οι Φρύγες, οι Λυδοί, οι Κάρες, οι
Λύκιοι κι οι Καππαδόκες εξελληνίστηκαν
γλωσσικά).

Οι Ευρωπαίοι αποικιοκράτες έβλεπαν
εαυτούς στην Ασία ως συνεχιστές εκείνων
από τους Έλληνες στρατιώτες του Μεγάλου
Αλεξάνδρου που έμειναν σε διάφορα σημεία
της Ασίας, ανήγειραν πόλεις, διατήρησαν
την τέχνη τους.
Αλλά αυτό ήταν μια αυθαίρετη ασυναρτησία
που δεν δημιουργεί Ιστορία.
Αντίθετα από την ρατσιστική, εθνοκεντρική
διαστροφή της Ιστορίας που ήταν το
επακόλουθο του αποικιοκρατικού
αφηγήματος, η νέα αφρο-ευρασιατική
γεωπολιτική πραγματικότητα και οι Νέοι
Δρόμοι του Μεταξιού δεν αφήνουν κανένα
περιθώριο – ειμή μόνον τον εξευτελισμό –
σε όσους επιμένουν να μιλάνε εθνοκεντρικά
και να βλέπουν μια ‘ιστορική ανωτερότητα’
για τους προγόνους τους.
Όσοι άθλιοι κι αμόρφωτοι στην Ελλάδα
μιλάνε υποτιμητικά για Μογγόλους μόνο
γελοιοποιούν την Ελλάδα και δείχνουν ότι η
χώρα είναι ένα άχρηστο σκουπίδι μιας
περασμένης εποχής.

Άλλωστε οι πρόγονοι αυτών των σημερινών
αμορρφώτων Ελλήνων πήγαιναν πριν από
600 χρόνια στην Κεντρική Ασία για να
σπουδάσουν σε αστεροσκοπεία με Μογγόλους
καθηγητές.
Όταν υλοποιείται ένα τόσο σημαντικό,
κοσμοϊστορικό σχέδιο, όπως οι Νέοι Δρόμοι
του Μεταξιού, ισχυρές χώρες προσπαθούν να
βρουν καλύτερους τρόπους να ενταχθούν σ’
αυτό και προς τούτο η ιστορία κι η
γεωγραφία μελετούνται υπό διαφορετικά
πρίσματα, αναπτύσσονται νέες συνθέσεις,
και επινοούνται συμπληρωματικές
ερμηνείες και προσεγγίσεις.
Το Ινδο-Ειρηνικό Σύμπλεγμα είναι μια
καθαρά ινδική θέση που επινοήθηκε για να
ενισχύσει την θέση της Ινδίας μέσα στους
Νέους Δρόμους του Μεταξιού.
Ιστορικά στηρίζεται στους τεκμηριωμένους
θαλάσσιους εμπορικούς δρόμους, οι οποίοι
κυρίως χρησίμευαν για την μετακίνηση
μπαχαρικών, λιβανωτών και άλλων
προϊόντων και είχαν φέρει κοντά την

Ανατολική Αφρική, την Ινδία, την Ινδοκίνα
και την Ινδονησία.

Στα σύγχρονα πλαίσια, μια τέτοια
προσέγγιση συμφέρει την Ινδία, επειδή το
Δελχί, βάζοντας έτσι στο αφρο-ευρασιατικό
παιχνίδι σημαντικές οικονομίες όπως η
Ινδονησία κι η Αυστραλία αλλά κι η
Ανατολική Αφρική, λειτουργεί
εξισορροπητικά απέναντι στην εμφανή
κυριαρχία της Κίνας στο καθαρά ηπειρωτικό
ευρασιατικό επίπεδο.
Αυτό είναι μια πολύ γνωστή τακτική στις
διεθνείς σχέσεις: διευρύνεις το πεδίο
ανταγωνισμού, όταν σε πιο ‘στενά’ όρια
γίνεσαι ουραγός. Αλλά δείχνει ότι η Ινδία
καταλαβαίνει ότι οι Νέοι Δρόμοι του
Μεταξιού είναι μονόδρομος των
παγκοσμίων εξελίξεων. Και όπως είναι
εύκολο να καταλάβει ο οποιοσδήποτε, είτε
μουσουλμάνοι είτε ινδουϊστές, οι Ινδοί
περιμένουν ανυπόμονα την ημέρα που οι
παλιές αποικιοκρατικές δυνάμεις Γαλλία κι
Αγγλία θα έχουν απομείνει με τόση ισχύ
διεθνώς όση και η Σρι Λάνκα ή η Μαλαισία.

Αντίθετα, το σύνολο του αμόρφωτου,
άρρωστου και ουσιαστικά σάπιου ελληνικού
πολιτικού, πανεπιστημιακού και
δημοσιογραφικού κατεστημένου εξακολουθεί
να νομίζει ότι η Ελλάδα μπορεί να
επιβιώσει μέσα στον σημερινό κόσμο είτε με
προσήλωση στις παλιές συμμαχίες (Γαλλία,
Αγγλία, ΕΕ, ΗΠΑ, ΝΑΤΟ), είτε με ελπίδες
στηριγμένες στην ξεκάρφωτη, έωλη κι
ανυπόστατη συμμαχία με το Ισραήλ και την
Αίγυπτο.

Η αλήθεια είναι ότι η Ιστορία θα κτυπήσει
τραγικά το νεώτερο αναθεωρητικό
ψευτοκράτος Ελλάδα, όταν οι δημιουργοί του
(Γαλλία, Αγγλία) παύσουν να υφίστανται.
Τόσο θα καταλάβουν όλοι οι Ρωμιοί ότι η
Ελλάδα, αποσχισμένη από την Οθωμανική
Αυτοκρατορία, στερημένη από τη ρωμέικη
ορθόδοξη ταυτότητά της, κι εκμαυλισμένη
λόγω εκδυτικισμού, πίστευε για δική της
μια ‘ελληνοκεντρική’ ψευτοϊστορία τόσο
ψεύτικη όσο και το κρατίδιο του Όθωνα.
Με τον επερχόμενο θάνατο και διάλυση των
δημιουργών του ψευτοκράτους, θα σβύσουν
και τα ρατσιστικά αποικιοκρατικά
αφηγήματα για την τάχα σημασία του
αρχαίου ελληνικού πολιτισμού, την δήθεν
κοσμοϊστορική απήχησή του, και την
υποτιθέμενη επίδρασή του σε άλλα έθνη.
Δηλαδή, κοντά είναι η μέρα που, αν
κάποιοι κομπλεξικοί, υστερικοί και
διεστραμμένοι σκατόψυχοι ισχυριστούν ότι
υπήρχαν Έλληνες στην Αρχαία Κίνα, ότι η
επαρχία Γιουν-νάν της Κίνας είναι ελληνική

(επειδή οι Έλληνες λέγονται ‘Γιουνάν’ στα
αραβικά!!!!!), κι ότι τα αγάλματα (από
τερακότα) του κινεζικού στρατού στο Σιάν
(https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Terracotta_
Army) είναι φτειαγμένα από Έλληνες, θα
τρώνε κι ένα σκεπάρνι στο κεφάλι για να
ξεμπερδέψουμε μια και καλή από τους
ψευτομασώνους της κακιάς ώρας.
Στην προώθηση κι εμπέδωση των
μακρόπνοων σχεδίων της αφρο-
ευρασιατικής επανασύνδεσης συμμετέχει με
ιδιαίτερη έμφαση και η Ρωσσία, επειδή έχει

καταλάβει ότι αυτή η εξέλιξη συμφέρει και
στην Μόσχα.
Το Eastern Economic Forum-2019, το
οποίο λαμβάνει χώρα σε λίγες μέρες στο
Βλαδιβοστόκ, είναι μια κορυφαία εκδήλωση
απ’ αυτή την άποψη.
Ως μείζον γεγονός φέρνει μαζί αρχηγούς
κρατών, υπουργούς, βουλευτές, διευθυντές
κρατικών οργανισμών, εκπροσώπους της
ιδιωτικής πρωτοβουλίας και του
επιχειρηματικού κόσμου,
πανεπιστημιακούς, ειδικευμένους
επιστήμονες, και δημοσιογράφους οι οποίοι
εξετάζουν δυνατότητες και παρουσιάζουν
προτάσεις για την υλοποίηση του φιλόδοξου
προγράμματος των Νέων Δρόμων του
Μεταξιού.
Είναι μια κοσμογονία που στην Ελλάδα
δυστυχώς θα μείνει ολότελα άγνωστη και
δεν θα καλυφθεί από τα διαπλεκόμενα ΜΜΕ
και τα social media των κρετίνων
αρχαιολατρών κι ελληνο-αυνανιστών.

Παράλληλα και εντός των πλαισίων της
οργάνωσης του Eastern Economic Forum-
2019, κορυφαία think tanks οργανώνουν
ιδιαίτερα σεμινάρια και συζητήσεις που
φωτίζουν όψεις της αφρο-ευρασιατικής
αναγέννησης.
Στην συνέχεια θα βρείτε μια σειρά από
παρουσιάσεις εκ μέρους του ρωσσικού think
tank Valdai Club το οποίο συμμετέχει
επίσης στο γεγονός.
Στο τέλος, σύνδεσμοι σας παραπέμπουν στο
σάιτ του Eastern Economic Forum. Επίσης
επισυνάπτω μια έκδοση του Valdai Club
για το Μέλλον του Πολέμου (The Future of

War) για να δείτε πόσο διαφορετική μορφή
θα έχουν οι αυριανοί πόλεμοι: κανένας
στρατός δεν θα μπορεί να τους
αντιμετωπίσει και μόνον οι επί τούτω
οργανωμένες ιδιωτικές στρατιωτικές
εταιρείες θα είναι ικανές να τους
διεξαγάγουν επιτυχώς.
———————————————————

Valdai Club at the Eastern Eco
nomic Forum-2019
This year, the Valdai Club will take part
in the Eastern Economic Forum for a
fourth time. On September 4, at 10:00 the
Club will hold a session titled “The Asian
Mirror: The Pivot to the East Through the
Eyes of our Asian Partners” and on the
same day, at 14:30, it is due to present a
book titled “Toward the Great Ocean: A
Chronicle of Russia’s Turn to the East”.
http://valdaiclub.com/events/own/valdai
-club-at-the-eastern-economic-forum-
2019/?utm_source=newsletter&utm_campa
ign=137&utm_medium=email
——————————————

Valdai Club at the EEF-2019:
The Asian Mirror: The Pivot to
the East Through the Eyes of
Our Asian Partners. Special
Session
This year, the Valdai Discussion Club
will take part in the Eastern Economic
Forum for the fourth time. On September
4, at 10:00 the Club will hold a session
titled “The Asian Mirror: The Pivot East
Through the Eyes of Our Asian Partners”.

Logically and thematically, the session is
a continuation of a series of events
dedicated to the key focus of the Club’s
work in 2019 – Russian politics in the
East.
Our interest in the topic is due to the
strengthening of Russia’s position in the
East, the ambition of the country’s leaders
to enhance the Eastern aspect of foreign
policy, and the geopolitical events in the
region, which have had an effect on the
entire world.
The Valdai session’s main goal won’t be to
discuss plans for the development of the
Far East and its integration in the Asia-
Pacific Region, but rather the things that
have already been achieved. Russia’s turn
to the East is gaining momentum.
The time has come to summarise its
interim results and to hear the position of
our Asian partners on how successful
Russian policy has been, from their point
of view.

The session will feature prominent experts
and public opinion leaders from Russia
and several Asian countries.
Together, they will answer: how do they
regard the results of Russia’s turn to the
East? What has it managed to do? What
role does Asia want Russia to play?
Speakers:
To Anh Dung, Deputy Minister of Foreign
Affairs of Vietnam
Fan Weiguo, Chief of Eurasian Bureau of
Xinhua News Agency
Lee Jae-Young, President, the Korea
Institute for International Economic
Policy (KIEP)
Michael Tay, Founder and Director of the
Foundation for the Arts and Social
Enterprise, Ambassador of Singapore to
Russia (2002-2008); Founder of the
Russia-Singapore Business Forum

Andrey Bystritskiy, Chairman of the
Board of the Foundation for the
Development and Support of the
International Valdai Discussion Club
Apurva Sanghi, Lead Economist, World
Bank in Russia
Moderator:
Timofei Bordachev, Programme Director
of the Valdai Discussion Club; Academic
supervisor of the Centre for
Comprehensive European and
International Studies, HSE
Working languages: Russian, English.
Venue: Vladivostok, Far Eastern Federal
University, Building B, Conference Hall 6.
http://valdaiclub.com/events/announcem
ents/valdai-club-at-the-eef-2019-the-
asian-mirror-the-pivot-to-the-
east/?utm_source=newsletter&utm_campaig
n=137&utm_medium=email

———————————————
Valdai Club at the EEF-2019:
Presentation of a Book ‘Toward
the Great Ocean: A Chronicle of
Russia’s Turn to the East’
On September 4, at 14:30, in the
framework of Eastern Economic Forum-
2019, the Valdai Discussion Club is going
to present a book titled “Toward the Great
Ocean: A Chronicle of Russia’s Turn to
the East”.
For years, the Valdai Discussion Club has
been Russia’s leading analytical centre
for discussing and developing the agenda
for Russia’s turn to the East. Since 2013,
when Russia’s leaders proclaimed that the

development of the Far East is “a national
task for the 21st century”, this project has
become the most important engine of the
country’s foreign and domestic policy.
Since 2012, the Club has published six
analytic papers under the general title
“Toward the Great Ocean”, which refers
to the credo used by Russian pioneers
from the 16th century until the early
20th century. The papers aim to both
summarise the achievements and
challenges of Russia’s turn to the East,
and make suggestions for its development.
“Toward the Great Ocean: A Chronicle of
Russia’s Turn to the East” is a collection
of all the six analytic papers (2012–
2018), as well as detailed comments by
project manager Sergei Karaganov on each
of its parts, as well as essays on the topic,
delivered by prominent Asian scholars.
During the presentation of the book,
attendees will also learn about the
research work carried out by the Valdai

Club and its plans for future
publications.
Speakers:
Timofei Bordachev, Programme Director
of the Valdai Discussion Club; Academic
supervisor of the Centre for
Comprehensive European and
International Studies, HSE
Andrey Bystritskiy, Chairman of the
Board of the Foundation for the
Development and Support of the
International Valdai Discussion Club
Sergei Karaganov, Dean of the Faculty of
World Economy and International Affairs
at the National Research University
Higher School of Economics; Honorary
Chairman of the Presidium of the
Council on Foreign and Defence Policy
Thomas Graham, Senior Director,
Kissinger Associates
Moderator:

Victoria Panova, Vice-President for
International Affairs, Far Eastern Federal
University
Working languages: Russian, English.
Venue: Vladivostok, Far Eastern Federal
University, Roscongress & Governors ’Club,
Building A, Level 4.
http://valdaiclub.com/events/announcem
ents/valdai-club-at-eef-2019-
presentation-of-a-book-toward-the-
great-
ocean/?utm_source=newsletter&utm_campa
ign=137&utm_medium=email
——————————————

The Indo-Pacific Concept First
Hand: Indian Foreign Minister
Speaks at Valdai Club
On Tuesday, August 27, Indian Minister
of External Affairs Subrahmanyam
Jaishankar met with the Valdai
Discussion Club’s experts. During the open
part of the meeting, he spoke about the
concept of the Indo-Pacific, as New Delhi
sees it, about the key trends in modern
international relations and the prospects
for bilateral cooperation.

The day before, Mr. Jaishankar had
arrived in Russia on his first visit as
Minister of External Affairs in
preparation for the Eastern Economic
Forum, whose main foreign guest will be
Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi. It
is worth noting that the professional
career of Subrahmanyam Jaishankar took
him to Moscow almost forty years ago: for
two years he worked at the Embassy of
India as the third, and then the second
secretary. At the beginning of the meeting
at the Valdai Club, the Minister
optimistically said that much has

changed in the world over the years, but
the Russian-Indian relations remain one
of the stable factors in international life.
According to the minister, the most
important trend in international
relations is a movement towards multi-
polarity. This is due to the weakening of
US dominance, established after the end
of the Cold War, and the emergence of
new centres of power. “We believe that
economic, political and technological
power is more distributed around the
world than ever before in history after
1945,” he said.

“Now there are more sources of influence
in the world order, and the idea that one
country can play a decisive role is out-
dated.” This process is accompanied by
the weakening of established rules and
the growth of uncertainty. According to
Mr. Jaishankar, the world goes from a
system of alliances to a system of
convergences, when countries join forces to
solve common problems without entering
into formal alliances.

As one example of such convergence, he
named the concept of the Indo-Pacific
region, which has become the hallmark
of Indian foreign policy in recent years.
According to the minister, the connection
between the regions of the Indian and
Pacific Oceans have existed for centuries:
five hundred years ago, India’s cultural,
political and economic presence was felt
in Southeast Asia and on the coast of
China, and the policy of the British, who
made India the centre of their colonial
empire in Asia, can be described as Indo-
Pacific project.
Everything changed after the Second
World War, when the United States,
which became the hegemon in the region,
shifted its focus to the Pacific Ocean and
made Northeast Asia the centre of gravity.
Mr. Jaishankar believes that the concept
of the Indo-Pacific region has allowed for
the restoration of the artificially-broken

connection between the regions of the
Indian and Pacific Oceans.
The minister welcomed the fact, that the
problems of the Indo-Pacific are
beginning to be discussed more and more
widely in Russia. According to him, it
would be good if Russia formulates its

own vision toward the Indo-Pacific
region. “India is a strong power in the
Indian Ocean with a serious interest in
the Pacific Ocean, Russia is a strong
Pacific power with an interest in the
Indian Ocean,” he said.
‘How can we harmonize these interests –
that’s the matter. We have such experience
in the Eurasian space. It is important
today to see where our interests in
maritime cooperation can be translated
into real interaction.”

Mr. Jaishankar emphasized that the
concept of the Indo-Pacific is not directed
against any countries, particularly China.
According to him, the opinion that this
concept is being promoted by Washington
to contain Beijing’s influence is out-dated
and reflects the Cold War paradigm.
“India views the Indo-Pacific region in a
more comprehensive manner,” he said.
http://valdaiclub.com/events/posts/article
s/indo-pacific-concept-firsthand-
indian-foreign-minister-speaks-at-
valdai-

club/?utm_source=newsletter&utm_campai
gn=137&utm_medium=email
——————————————————
Presentation of the Valdai
Discussion Club’s Analytical
Report “The Future of War”
On August 27, at 11.00, the Valdai
Discussion Club hosted a presentation of
Club’s new analytical report titled “The
Future of War”.
http://valdaiclub.com/events/own/present
ation-of-report-the-future-of-
war/?utm_source=newsletter&utm_campaig
n=137&utm_medium=email
————————————-

The Big Seven: The West Can
No Longer Solve All Problems
Alone
What is the “West”? Does the West still
exist as such – in light of Britain’s exit
from the EU and the US drift towards
unilateral approaches? This question
concerns many people now – mainly in
Old Europe, writes Arnaud Dubien, head
of the Observo Franco-Russian Analytical
Centre.

Today, the G7 is going through difficult
times – and even, perhaps, suffering a
real existential crisis. This is due to at
least two factors.
First, there is the presence in this club of
an element that contrasts itself with the
rest of the member countries – this, of
course, is the United States. Since the US
is the largest Western power, it has made
the work of the organisation problematic:
many experts say that on many issues it’s
incorrect to think of the group as the G7,
but rather “six plus one”.
Second, the weight and legitimacy of the
Seven has been called into question, not
only in connection with the absence or
possible return of Russia to the group, but
also because it is impossible to seriously
discuss the fate of the world without
China, India and other major world
powers.
It would be more appropriate here to
return to the idea of another French

president – Giscard d’Estaing, who
launched this project in the 1970s and
saw what would become the “seven” as an
informal conversation among Western
democracies.
Now it better resembles something between
the old “seven” and the current G20 with
a joint agenda, which does not contribute
to a better understanding of the group’s
current tasks.
Even though, in order to avoid
disagreements, the leaders of the G7 didn’t
attempt to publish a joint communique,
the benefits of the Biarritz summit were
more than expected. Emmanuel Macron
showed considerable energy and a lot of
questions were brought up for discussion
– these not only concerned the fate of the
West, but also trade wars and Brazil’s
fires.
As for Macron’s discussions about the
future of the West and the role the G7,
one can see here that the development of

those thoughts surrounded his meeting
with Vladimir Putin: the French
president understands that the West can
no longer solve all problems alone and
that its influence is diminishing,
although this does not need to be
overestimated.
On the other hand, what is the “West”? Is
there still the West as such – in light of
Britain’s exit from the EU and the US
drift towards unilateral approaches? This
question is of concern to many now –
mainly in Old Europe. If initially the
European Union was created out of fear of
the USSR, now it has to dissociate itself
from the United States. If Europe, as
Macron says, wants to be sovereign, it will
have to assert itself and go against the
ideas that have dominated for sixty years.
Therefore, this process is becoming harder.
Whether negotiations with Iranian
Foreign Minister Javad Zarif following
his somewhat unexpected appearance at

the summit have succeeded in
influencing the fate of the JCPOA is not
known, and one can only hope for that.
However, in general, this once again
shows that even within the G7, the
United States has adopted an isolated
stance on this issue.
Although this initiative originally
belonged to Macron, it seems to have been
supported by all other countries in
Europe and even Japan. In other words,
this is an attempt to show that Europe, at
least on this issue, can assert its identity,
take a unified position and force the
United States to talk, and maybe even
make concessions.
As for the question of Russia’s return,
Moscow has little interest in re-creating
the G8, because it never felt comfortable
there; on the contrary, it often found
itself alone against everyone else.
However, the very fact that this issue is
being discussed, that new watersheds have

appeared and frictions have arisen, is
positive for Russia: this means that the
topic is big and important for discussion
in a club where Moscow does not
represent itself.
This confirms Macron’s thesis that
without Russia, serious global problems
cannot be solved. For Moscow, at this stage,
this is the most positive development.
http://valdaiclub.com/a/highlights/the-
west-can-no-longer-solve-all-
problems/?utm_source=newsletter&utm_ca
mpaign=137&utm_medium=email
————————————————

G7 Summit in Biarritz: The
End of Westernization
Biarritz was, if we must believe the
French media, the centre of the world, on
the occasion of the G7 summit this
weekend (24th – 26th August). It was a
summit that was dedicated, officially, to
fighting inequality, but one where
contentious topics were discussed: the
GAFA tax, which had the unusual effect
of uniting the French and the British
against the Americans, the environment,
the trade dispute between the United
States and China, and the question of
Iran, regarding which the US decision to
withdraw from the JCPOA agreement has
been widely criticised among European
countries.
But this G7 summit, despite
communications operations – like the
arrival, presented as a “surprise,” by the
Iranian Foreign Minister – could well

turn out to be a failure. The member
countries have taken action so that
national policies and bilateral relations
now outweigh multilateralism. In
addition, it should be added that we are
no longer where we found ourselves
during the 1980s or 1990s. The G7,
which claims to be the “club” of the
richest and most powerful countries, has
today been overtaken by the BRICS. In
fact, it is the G20 that is increasingly
emerging as the legitimate institution for
dealing with the interweaving of
economic, financial and strategic affairs.
The G7, official and unofficial agenda
Officially, therefore, the expected
decisions concerned the reduction of
inequality, an important topic in a world
torn apart by inequalities. However, it is
a subject on which we can expect a lot of
beautiful words and very little concrete
action. The issue of the environment has
taken some urgency because of the

devastating forest fires ravaging the
Amazon.
This is obviously an important question,
but also an issue where there is a lot of
hypocrisy. This is because the Amazon
isn’t just burning in Brazil (fires have
also ravaged Bolivia, Paraguay and other
countries), and also because the Amazon
is not the only major forest to burn: forest
fires that today rage in Africa are equally
important, but no one speaks of it.
Similarly, this summer’s fires, which are
certainly disastrous, are only slightly
more numerous than those of 2016:
75,336 fires versus 69,310. It is true that
the problem of deforestation, induced by
the pressure of livestock and the
cultivation of soybeans, is a major issue
today in the Amazon. But it was, perhaps,
an even more pressing problem twenty
years ago.

Source:
https://rainforests.mongabay.com/amazon
/deforestation_calculations.html#content
The issue of trade negotiations and the
role of multilateralism were also
discussed. The United States and other
countries differ on this point in
important ways. We can also note that
some issues which were not explicitly on
the agenda were addressed: the
instrumentalisation of trade in dollars for

political purposes by the United States is
a major problem, as well as the growing
risks of recession and global crisis.
The United States has clearly expressed
dissatisfaction with multilateral
negotiations. The countries of the
European Union are, rightly or wrongly,
more attached to it. The membership of
the United States in the WTO has
therefore been called into question; it is
indeed a central issue. If the US
government were to decide to walk out of
the WTO, it would probably sound the
death toll for the organisation.
The question of Iran was also raised at the
summit. The European countries have
denounced the US decision to walk away
from the agreement with Iran on nuclear
weapons and technology. They have also
denounced the US sanctions policy, which
is hurting the European countries much
more than Iran. The arrival of the
Iranian Foreign Minister testifies to

Emmanuel Macron’s willingness to restart
negotiations at this point.
The challenges of this summit
Emmanuel Macron, who happens to be
the President of the G7 this year, was
playing a high-stakes game with this
meeting. A clear failure, as in 2018 in
Canada, would have lastingly
compromised his claims to present himself
as a great negotiator. He is also aware that
the influence of the G7 has greatly
diminished over the last ten years. The
G7 is the distant heir of the G5, which
was formed to try to coordinate the
monetary policies of the major Western
powers following the dissolution in 1973
of the Bretton Woods agreements.
Originally, the G7 was the brainchild of
French President Giscard d’Estaing
(1974-1981). The G7 has been tasked
with coordinating currency movements as
exchange rates have become flexible.
Called first informally the G5, then

provisionally the G6 when it was
formally established in 1975, and later
the G7 with Canada’s integration in
1976, its influence soon spread to other
aspects of the economy, beyond mere
monetary policy problems.
The G7 nations still had, at the end of
the twentieth century, a dominant role in
the world economy. This is no longer the
case today. The process of the emergence of
new economies has clearly changed the
whole ball game. The expulsion of Russia
from the G8 in 2014, an expulsion that
is now regretted by both the Japanese and
Italian leaders as well as Donald Trump,
has certainly hastened its decline.
Moreover, if we calculate in purchasing
power parity terms, the G7’s share of
global GDP is today lower than that of
the BRICS, a forum which brings together
five emerging market countries.

It is obvious that Emmanuel Macron’s
proposal to invite other countries, such as
Australia, India, South Africa and Chile,
is a recognition of this state of affairs.
However, it must be noted here that
China and Russia were not invited,
despite the major role they play. The
invitations that were made were therefore
intended to mask the G7’s loss of
influence and prestige in comparison
with the G20.

G7 or G20?
It is clear today that any closed club of
rich countries no longer has any
legitimacy making decisions on behalf of
the emerging market countries or even just
proposing them. The United States, for its
part, has understood that it would like to
re-invite Russia to participate in the G7,
according to a statement mirroring one
made by the Japanese prime minister. But
it is unlikely that Russia would really be
moved by such a proposal. It knows full
well that the G7 is an institution that is

nearing the end of its life. The G7 is thus
being overtaken by the BRICS not only in
terms of its percentage of world PPP-
adjusted GDP, but also in terms of the
proportion of investment being made
worldwide.
This reflects not only the rise of
investments being made in China, India
and Russia, both internally and
worldwide, but also the significant
slowdown in investments made in the G7
countries, whether they be German or US
investments. Again, it can be seen that
until 2000, the G7 countries accounted
for about 60% of global investment. The
turning point therefore dates from the
21st century. Emerging market countries
have significantly increased their share of
investment. They caught up with the G7
countries in 2009, and they overtook
them.
In fact, a comparison of the G20 with the
G7 shows that the first group has taken

precedence over the second. It is the G20
that has become the global forum that
really counts. And this is true when you
compare the weight of the G7 with that of
the G20.
The G20 currently accounts for 73.6% of
global GDP. The group is comprised of the
G7 nations, the European Union, the
BRICS and six other countries. It is this set
of countries (along with the EU) that is
most economically relevant.
What are final results of this summit?
The record that we can draw today from
this summit is very mixed. Clearly, we
have not gone beyond rhetoric in
addressing the question of inequality or
the environmental emergency. It could not
have been otherwise, given the significant
differences among the G7 countries.
The trade dispute between China and the
United States, meanwhile, is more
beautiful. On Friday, August 23rd, China

re-launched the escalation of the trade
war, with further tariff increases on
products imported from the United States.
The US administration immediately
responded by increasing duties on
products imported from China.
All this has been observed, by the
European G7 countries, which have not
reacted. Germany, in particular, fears
being dragged into this trade war, as its
economy is on the verge of a recession.
Regarding the GAFA tax, which both the
French and British governments are
pushing for, an agreement could possibly
be reached, but at the probable price of
making a mockery of the very idea of
taxing Internet giants.
With respect to the Iranian issue, it is
clear that the discussions will continue.
Both the United States and Iran want to
find a way out of the current crisis. It is
perhaps on this issue that progress is
possible.

However, this summit has rammed home
an important lesson. So we are witnessing
the end of the Westernisation of the
world, a process that took place between
the late eighteenth century and the end of
the twentieth century. We must make note
of this. It is why Russia does not
particularly want to return to the G7,
even though it has been pleased to hear
Donald Trump’s statements about its
possible return.
The centre of gravity of the global
economy is indeed no longer the Atlantic
Ocean. It has moved to Asia with the rise
of China, the world’s second largest
economy (and even first if we calculate in
Purchasing Power Parity terms) and a
direct interlocutor of the United States.
And this is not to mention India, which
is also gaining strength and is now in 5th
place, ahead of France. This is why the
meeting of the G7 in Biarritz was no
longer able to decide for the world,

whatever the major French media and its
journalists think.
The G7 countries, since the summit held
in Canada in 2018, have measured what
it would be like to show off their
differences. At the same time, never have
the latter been so important, and above
all, seemed irremediable and
irreconcilable. So, we cannot exclude the
notion that the group is witnessing open
failure. However, it is more likely that
diplomats will find some beautiful
hollow formulas that proclaim that the
“club” still works even though it is
patently acknowledged that the group is
paralyzed and, above all, that it no
longer has the importance it had 20 years
ago.
http://valdaiclub.com/a/highlights/g7-
summit/?utm_source=newsletter&utm_cam
paign=137&utm_medium=email
————————————————-

Goodbye Pacific Rim, Hello
Indo-Pacific?
THE EASTERN PERSPECTIVE
01.07.2019
By Anton Bespalov
In recent years, the term “Indo-Pacific”
has been used more and more frequently.
According to some analysts, it is replacing
the well-established concept of the Asia-
Pacific region, reflecting a new balance of
power in Asia. Beijing is suspicious of the
fact that the Indo-Pacific concept is being

actively promoted by Washington,
believing that its ultimate goal is to
contain China.
We are investigating whether or not this is
so – and whether Russia should be wary
of the emergence of a new regional
construct.
“Indo-Pacific” appeared for the first time
as a geostrategic concept in a January
2007 article by analyst Gurprit Khurana
for the magazine Strategic Analysis. The
author, an Indian naval captain,
postulates that for India, the safety of sea
routes has become more and more
important, since almost all of its foreign
trade, including the import of energy
resources, is by sea. Japan is in a similar
situation – and therefore, in his opinion,
the interests of the two countries will
increasingly converge, which will lead to
the creation of a special political and
economic community uniting the two
oceans.

The Indo-Pacific notion immediately
gained recognition in India – if only
because the concept of “Asia-Pacific”
categorically did not suit Indians. In a
publication dedicated to the tenth
anniversary of the article “Safety of sea
routes: prospects for Indian-Japanese
cooperation,” Khurana quoted the former
chief of staff of the Indian Navy, Aruna
Prakash, who, speaking in 2009 at the
Shangri-La Dialogue forum, said:
Every time I hear about the Asia-Pacific
region, it seems to me, as an Indian, that
my country is left out of the box. This
region seems to include northeast Asia,
Southeast Asia and the Pacific Islands,
and ends at the Strait of Malacca. But the
whole world begins west of the Strait of
Malacca.
The new term appeared at an opportune
time: India was becoming increasingly
aware of itself as an independent actor in
the global arena, which was reflected in

the national consciousness. As for Japan,
at the beginning of the 21st century, it
was already headed for rapprochement
with India. Also in 2007, Japanese Prime
Minister Shinzo Abe spoke about the
special role of the two countries in Asia
in an address to the Indian parliament.
He called for the creation of an “arc of
freedom and well-being” along the outer
rim of the Eurasian continent. The Indo-
Japanese partnership, according to Abe,
should be built on “common values, such
as freedom, democracy and respect for
fundamental human rights, as well as
strategic interests”.
The Japanese prime minister painted a
grand picture – through their joint
efforts, the two countries would create a
new “open and transparent” community
of freedom and democracy that will unite
the entire Pacific region, including the
United States and Australia, and ensure

the free movement of people, goods,
capital and knowledge.
“CONFLUENCE OF THE TWO SEAS”
SPEECH BY H.E.MR. SHINZO ABE, PRIME
MINISTER OF JAPAN AT THE
PARLIAMENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF
INDIA
By Japan and India coming together in
this way, this “broader Asia” will evolve
into an immense network spanning the
entirety of the Pacific Ocean,
incorporating the United States of
America and Australia. Open and
transparent, this network will allow
people, goods, capital, and knowledge to
flow freely.
The word “China” was not heard in Abe’s
speech even once, but both parties
understood each other perfectly. The “arc
of freedom” neatly bypasses the PRC, and
the Asian giant remains outside the
brackets of the “wide open Asia” that the
Japanese prime minister spoke of.

During his second term in office, Abe
perfected this concept, making Indo-
Pacific a central theme of Japan’s
security policy, economic aid and
investment, writes Robert Manning,
author of the Valdai Paper “United States
Indo-Pacific Strategy: Myths and Reality.”
In a 2016 speech, Abe defined this
concept, explaining that “the goal of this
strategy is to turn the Indo-Pacific region
into a zone free from violence and
coercion, where the rule of law reigns and
where the market economy rules, ensuring
regional prosperity”. The three main
pillars, according to Tokyo, are: values
and principles – democracy, the rule of
law, free markets and the improvement of
physical and institutional connectedness;
safety and stability; and ensuring freedom
of navigation.
Another country where the new concept
was adopted with enthusiasm was
Australia, which is logical, given that the

country is actually washed by the waters
of the Indian and Pacific Oceans, despite
being on the periphery of the newly-
imagined region.
For more than a decade, the economic
development of the country has relied on
trade with China, and in recent years
Australian policymakers have been
increasingly talking about the influence
of Beijing on the nation’s domestic policy.
Becoming overly dependent on
“undemocratic” and “unfree” China is
the main nightmare of the elites of one of
the most “Western” countries in the
southern hemisphere..
In 2013, the country’s White Paper on
Defence noted: “The continuing rise of
China as a global power, the growing
economic and strategic weight of East
Asia, and India’s imminent
transformation into a global power are all
key trends affecting the development of
the Indian Ocean region as being of

heightened strategic importance. Taken
together, these trends contribute to the
formation of the Indo-Pacific region as a
single strategic arc.”
As for the United States, the first mention
of the Indo-Pacific by their officials was
in 2010. “We understand how important
the Indo-Pacific basin is for global
trade,” Secretary of State Hillary Clinton
said, emphasising the importance of the
interaction between the US Navy and
India in the Pacific. At long last, “Indo-
Pacific” entered the American foreign
policy lexicon with Donald Trump.
It was during his presidency that the
format of the quadrilateral security
dialogue (QUAD), proposed by Shinzo Abe
back in 2007, was revived. In November
2017, Trump took part in two important
East Asian forums over the course of
several days: the APEC summit in Da
Nang, Vietnam and the ASEAN summit in
Manila, Philippines.

As Valdai Club expert Viktor Sumsky
wrote, in public statements, Trump made
no mention of the Pacific Rim, a key
feature of APEC rhetoric, speaking instead
about the Indo-Pacific region. A working
meeting among the diplomats of four
countries on the sidelines of the East
Asian Summit caused a wave of
publications about the formation of a
new security configuration in the region
– directed against China.
It must be said that Beijing perceived the
very first consultations in the
quadrilateral format as being directed
against China, and reacted with
lightning speed. On the eve of the meeting,
the representatives of Australia, India, the
US and Japan in Manila on the sidelines
of the ASEAN Regional Forum in May
2007, China sent a note to each of the
four countries. Beijing’s attitude toward
the Indo-Pacific concept was and remains
negative, and is characterised by Valdai

club expert Zhao Huasheng as one of
“coldness and suspicion.”
But can it really be considered anti-
Chinese? To what extent are the QUAD
members attempting to contain China or
confront it? Looking ahead, let’s say: no
one wants confrontation, but there are
nuances.
The idea of the Indo-Pacific has an anti-
Chinese sound only as interpreted by
Washington, says Valdai Club expert
Alexei Kupriyanov, a researcher at
IMEMO RAN. “In the US interpretation,
the Indo-Pacific is structured around the
QUAD as a prototype of a defensive
alliance that operates in the most
acceptable form to other participating
states – without commitments and
exclusively through informal
consultations,” he says. “The United States
wants to demonstrate its interest in this
project without extra spending and
commitment, by trying to establish an

anti-China alliance with the
participation of India and Australia.”
In turn, India seeks to maximize the use
of Americans as a counterweight to
China, the expert said. Delhi does not
want to get too close to Washington and
commit itself – and at the same time
wants to increase its economic and
political ties with Japan. “India is trying
to maintain a balance between the US
and China,” says Kupriyanov. “Although
India’s political and military leaders are
emphatically anti-China, its economic
interests require cooperation with China.
Although India bluntly rejects the idea of
becoming China’s junior partner, it does
not intend to take part in any anti-
Chinese actions outside the Indian Ocean.
”
Japan is in a similar situation. According
to Kupriyanov, it has to simultaneously
cooperate and compete with China. “In
addition, Japan is interested in access to

the promising markets of the African
countries and preserving its positions in
Southeast and South Asia.
In August 2018, Indonesia announced its
own vision of Indo-Pacific, and this was
an interesting turn in the development of
the concept. “ The importance of this step
is hard to overestimate,” writes
Kupriyanov. “For a decade, the ASEAN
states denied the Indo-Pacific region the
right to exist, fearing that the new
geopolitical construct would destroy the
familiar, well-known Asia-Pacific
region, in which ASEAN had already
staked out a key role.
The decision of Indonesia, which claims
to be the unofficial leader of the
Association, to abandon this practice and
henceforth build its policy within an
Indo-Pacific framework means that one of
the most serious opponents of the Indo-
Pacific construct has moved to the camp
of its supporters, and others will follow. ”

This step was quite logical, since it is
Indonesia that serves as a link between
the Indian and Pacific oceans. It is
noteworthy that its vision of the Indo-
Pacific region has no anti-Chinese
overtones. As can be seen, the US desire to
create an alliance against Beijing
contradicts the objective interests of other
countries of the region being created. They
not only do not want confrontation with
China, but also realize that trade and
economic ties with the Asian giant are the
key to their successful development.
However, Washington is aware of the
reluctance of Asian countries to enter
direct confrontation with China.
Therefore, the system of restraining
China’s regional ambitions will be
“elegant and subtle”, rather than taking
the form of a defensive alliance, wrote
Valdai club expert Anton Tsvetov in
March 2018. Despite the continuing
statements about shared values, the

nature of the union, the backbone of
which will remain the QUAD, will be
pragmatic.
This is quite natural, given that a
number of states that are concerned about
the strengthening of China do not fall
into the category of “free” and
“democratic” at all. We are talking
primarily about Vietnam, which is
actively developing relations with the
United States and with India, despite the
differences in political systems. This
transition to pragmatism is reflected in
the fact that the Indo-Pacific region is
less and less often categorized in terms of
“maritime democracies”, notes Tsvetov:
“instead of this phrase, the expression
‘like-minded states’ is used.”
It is interesting to look at how countries
from this still largely imaginary region
look at Chinese infrastructure projects as
part of the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI).
In Asia, this initiative is perceived

ambiguously: both as a chance for
development, and as a means of
promoting Beijing’s influence.
In February 2018, the QUAD member
countries first addressed the creation of
alternatives to the Chinese initiative, and
the development of “quality
infrastructure” was among the themes
during the Japanese presidency of the
G20.
The term “quality”, as you might guess,
means infrastructure created not under
the leadership of China or with Chinese
money. So far, the results have been
rather modest, but this does not mean
that in the future the two projects will not
be able to compete, for the benefit of the
countries which receive infrastructure
assistance.
“Currently, the BRI and the ‘free and
open’ Indo-Pacific region are competing
initiatives,” says Samir Saran, President
of the Indian Observer Analytical Centre

Research Foundation. However, the real
choice will be made by developing states,
who are currently leveraging both
initiatives to obtain better deals.
It’s not inconceivable that in the long
term, some multilateral arrangement will
accommodate both initiatives. The
‘viability’ of these competing propositions
will depend on which resonates more
with the development and security needs
of developing states in Eurasia and the
Indo-Pacific. In the short term, both will
co-exist and compete.”
Japan, despite being one of the key
countries interested in creating an
alternative to the Belt and Road, is
“inclined to cooperate with China on the
BRI to advance its own commercial
interests,” adds Saran. As for India, it does
not plan to participate in the BRI,
believing that this project undermines its
sovereignty and makes it difficult to
defend interests in other areas. “On the

other hand, China can become the largest
investor in the economy of India. Delhi
will have to pursue a steadfast course in
foreign policy and develop economic
cooperation with China,” the expert
emphasises.
The Indo-Pacific project is only
considered by Washington as a zero-sum
game, says Alexei Kupriyanov: “For the
US, freezing or liquidating all Chinese
infrastructure and trade initiatives is
beneficial, as it undermines China’s
economic and political opportunities,
destroys its safe rear, and forces resources
and funds to be removed from the main,
from the American point of view, theatre
– the Pacific Ocean.”
For the rest of Asia, Indo-Pacific offers an
alternative to the land projects of the Belt
and Road. “It is quicker and easier to
transport some goods by land and others
by sea. If there is a problem with one, the
other could compensate. The Indo-

Japanese-Indonesian version of the Indo-
Pacific and the Belt and Road project
could be integrated if both sides are
interested and have the political will:
both initiatives increase Eurasia’s
transport potential.”
That is why Russia should closely
monitor the implementation of the Indo-
Pacific concept, seeing in it not as a
threat, but a chance for itself. “Russia
should support the Indo-Japanese-
Indonesian view of the Indo-Pacific as a
maritime Eurasia to counterweigh the US
concept of it as a space for an anti-China
alliance. It is necessary to uphold the
inclusive character of the Indo-Pacific
(probably including renaming the concept
the Indo-Asia-Pacific) and to facilitate
China’s involvement in it,” Kupriyanov
says.
“The Indo-Pacific project gives Moscow
leverage with China in Eurasia,” believes
Samir Saran, reflecting India’s traditional

concern about the close ties between
Moscow and Beijing. “Currently, Russia is
subservient to China’s economy and, by
consequence, its political vision. Moscow
should recognize that while China may
seek a multipolar world, its vision for
Eurasia is unipolar. Russia will only
benefit if both the Indo-Pacific and
Eurasia are truly multipolar in their
power structures.”
In this regard, questions arise regarding
the quality of Russia’s relations with
India and the ASEAN countries, as key
participants in the region being created.
This topic was discussed during two
important events held by the Valdai Club
in 2019: the Russia-India and Russia-
Vietnam conferences. The participants
have stated that there is a “demand for
Russia” both in India and in Southeast
Asia, but Russia’s ability to increase its
economic and political presence in the
region is limited. Moreover, the existing

bias towards military technology
cooperation (especially in relations with
India) may result in the loss of strategic
positions in the long run.
Therefore, it is time for Russia to form its
own vision of Indo-Pacific and,
importantly, bring it to the countries of
the region. “A provision to the effect that
Russia’s regions in the Far East (Primorye
Territory and Kamchatka) are an
inalienable part of the Indo-Pacific
should play a key role in this respect,”
Kupriyanov says.
“These regions should be viewed as gates
to the north that can provide access to the
wealth of northern Eurasia and the
joining of great Eurasian overland routes
with the sea routes along its southern
coast. They should also be seen as gates to
the Arctic, a storehouse of resources. The
Far East should be positioned as one of
the centers of attraction in the Indo-

Pacific, its resource, scientific and, in
perspective, also its production base.”
Thus, connecting to the Indo-Pacific
project could provide for Russia an
addition to its large-scale turn to the East.
By providing an alternative to the main
sea trade route of Eurasia, Indo-Pacific
also fit into the logic of building a
Greater Eurasia, as Moscow advocates.
Washington’s attempts to “encircle” China
run up against the resistance of regional
powers that do not want confrontation
with Beijing, as well as excessive US
influence in Asia. The geostrategic
landscape is changing rapidly, and the
main thing for Russia is to keep up with
these changes, taking advantage of
opportunities as they arise.
http://valdaiclub.com/a/highlights/goodb
ye-pacific-rim-hello-indo-pacific/

Σχετικά με το Eastern Economic Forum-
2019, 4-6 Σεπτεμβρίου 2019:
https://forumvostok.ru/en/about-the-
forum/
https://forumvostok.ru/en/programme/
https://forumvostok.ru/en/programme/cul
tural/
https://forumvostok.ru/en/programme/org
anizing-committee-reception/

https://forumvostok.ru/en/programme/co
mbat-night/
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rt-programme/
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tner-events/
————————————————————
—

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