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UUnnddeerrssttaannddiinngg tthhee SSoouutthh CChhiinnaa SSeeaa DDiissppuuttee
Introduction
Territorial Disputes have always been opening Pandora’s Boxes since the very beginning
of human societies. These disputes are sometimes settled by negotiation and some turn
into violence. But in today’s world, while internationally recognized entities are
dedicated for inter-state dispute settlements, it is difficult to observe a situation to be
malignant. South China Sea is a complicated case with a combination of territorial and
maritime disputes among six claimants China, Vietnam, Malaysia, Brunei, Taiwan and
Philippines. This dispute has become a flashpoint in global politics for uprising tensions
among these claimants and the concerned states, risking a military escalation.
The islands of South China Sea can be grouped into two island chains. The Paracels
Islands (Clustered in the northwest corner of the sea) and The Spratly Islands (Located in
the southeast corner). Territorial conflicts are growing in these Islands due to claims by
different countries of the region. In the Spratly Islands, different geographic locations are
occupied by claimants such as Taiwan, Vietnam, the Philippines, China, and Malaysia.
The Paracels Islands are claimed by China, Taiwan and Vietnam.
The South China Sea functions as the connecting point of the Western Pacific and Indian
oceans as the host of global sea routes. Annually, global trade passing through these
routes are estimated to be worth 5.3 Trillion USD, which counts in a third of all maritime
traffic worldwide. In addition to geographic significance, the South China Sea has an
estimated reserve of 11 billion barrels of untapped oil and 190 trillion cubic feet of
Natural Gas. Besides these marine resources, South China Sea contains 10% of annual
global fisheries catch.
In the first half of the 20th century, the South China Sea was almost quiet with no
claimant occupying a single Island. In 1947, China claimed her dominance over South
China Sea for the first time. When China introduced the Nine-dash Line, it covered
almost 90% of the Sea. After 1960s, when surveys reported the huge reserve of Oil and
Natural Gas, the territorial claims started emerging. In 1994, when the United Nations
Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) came into force, all the claimant coastal
countries started measuring their maritime territory and legitimizing their claims based on
their own interpretation on UNCLOS. Regional initiatives like the Declaration of Code of
Conduct of Parties (initiated by ASEAN and China in 2002) and bilateral initiatives like
the Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf (CLCS) in 2009 (a joint
commission of Malaysia and Vietnam) took place, but there was no headway in the
dispute resolution.
On July 26, 2016, the Permanent Court of Arbitration issued its ruling in favor of
Philippines which claimed China’s occupancy and dominance in South China Sea is
illegitimate and the controversial Nine-dash Line is invalid. But in spite of being a
signatory of UNCLOS, China refused the authority of the court and expressed her interest
in bilateral negotiation in this issue. This event turned the South China Sea into armed
camps of the claimant countries and upraised tension in the region.
Geographic and Economic Significance of the South China Sea
The South China Sea, an area of open water, part of the Pacific Ocean, which extends
from Singapore and the Malacca Strait in the South to the Strait of Taiwan in the North.
This vast sea, which stretches over an area of about 3.5 million sq. km, contains over 250
small islands, reefs, atolls, corals and sandbars, most uninhabited, and some remaining
permanently submerged. The sea, however, is very important both regionally as well as
globally. Besides handling a third of the world’s annual maritime traffic, the sea is also
widely believed to hold vast reserves of oil and natural gas under its seabed. It is also
home to unique maritime wildlife and is a valuable fishing ground.
1 The South China Sea and surrounding landmasses, Source: ClearIAS
Islands and Seamounts: The South China Sea contains over 250 small islands, atolls,
cays, shoals, reefs, and sandbars, most of which have no indigenous people, many of
which are naturally under water at high tide, and some of which are permanently
submerged. The features are grouped into three archipelagos, Macclesfield Bank and
Scarborough Shoal:
o The Spratly Islands
o The Paracel Islands
o The Pratas Islands
o The Macclesfield Bank
o The Scarborough Shoal
1 The South China Sea and surroundinglandmasses,Source:ClearIAS
The Spratly Islands spread over an 810 by 900 km area covering some 175 identified
insular features, the largest being Taiping Island at just over 1.3 km long and with its
highest elevation at 3.8 meters. The largest singular feature in the area of the Spratly
Islands is a 100 km wide seamount called Reed Tablemount, also known as Reed Bank,
in the northeast of the group, separated from Palawan Island of the Philippines by the
Palawan Trench. Now completely submerged, with a depth of 20 m, it was an island until
it sank about 7,000 years ago due to the increasing sea level after the last ice age. With an
area of 8,866 km, it is one of the largest submerged atoll structures in the world.
Oil and Natural Gas: The South China Sea harbors an alleged 11 billion barrels of
untapped oil and 190 trillion cubic feet of natural gas. These vast resources have been
deemed by some as the root cause of the territorial dispute. Some have even gone to the
extent of calling this issue a ‘Resource Conflict’. Thus, proper distribution and
development of these resources will be a key to solving the South China Sea dispute.
Since most oilfields fall in disputed areas, the best option for claimants has been to jointly
develop these resources. The Joint Marine Seismic Undertaking between China, the
Philippines and Vietnam is an example of nations successfully developing natural
resources together. Under the tripartite agreement, CNOOC geological surveillance
vessels collected data that was processed in Vietnam and subsequently brought to the
Philippines for interpretation. All three parties were present at each step. Even though
nations have entered into successful joint development agreements in the past, they now
face some significant obstacles.
Marine Fisheries: Southeast Asia is home to more marine biodiversity than anywhere
else in the world, supporting thousands of catalogued plant and animal species. The
oceans provide the people of Southeast Asia and the world a critical source of protein,
with fish protein accounting for more than 22 per cent of the average Asian diet,
according to a 2013 study. South China Sea contains 10% of annual global fisheries
catch. Forty percent of the world’s tuna are born in the South China Sea and fisheries in
the South China Sea have become a multibillion dollar industry. However, Illegal,
Unreported and Unregulated (IUU) fishing in the area is widespread. Common practices
such as Dynamite fishing, Cyanide Poisoning, and Bottom Trawling have wreaked havoc
in regional ecosystems, threatening the future of the regional fishing market. Forty per
cent of the South China Sea’s fish stocks have already disappeared and 70 per cent of the
South China Sea’s coral reefs are rated to be in fair or poor condition. On top of various
instances of IUU in the sea, even China and other claimants’ island building activities are
having an adverse effect on the sea’s marine ecosystem. China and to a lesser extent the
other countries contesting the Spratly Islands appear to have been dredging sand from
within atolls in order to build their artificial islands. Dredgers sweep back and forth, in
the process destroying whatever lives there, including reef-building organisms, turtles
and giant clams, while sending up plumes of corrosive sand and sediment that settle on
surrounding reefs, killing them. For the many scientists who are predicting that coral
reefs globally are in danger of disappearing by as early as the middle of the century due
to bleaching, ocean acidification and rising seas, the reclamation is comparable to
switching of fan ailing patient’s life support.
Trade and Economy: The South China Sea functions as the throat of the Western
Pacific and Indian oceans — the mass of connective economic tissue where global sea
routes coalesce. Here is the heart of Eurasia’s navigable rimland, punctuated by the
Malacca, Sunda, Lombok, and Makassar straits. More than half of the world’s annual
merchant fleet tonnage passes through these choke points and a third of all maritime
traffic worldwide. The oil transported through the Malacca Strait from the Indian Ocean,
en route to East Asia through the South China Sea, is triple the amount that passes
through the Suez Canal and fifteen times the amount that transits the Panama Canal.
Roughly two thirds of South Korea’s energy supplies, nearly 60 per cent of Japan’s and
Taiwan’s energy supplies, and 80 per cent of China’s crude oil imports come through the
South China Sea. Whereas in the Persian Gulf only energy is transported, in the South
China Sea you have energy, finished goods, and unfinished goods.
It is not only location and energy reserves that promise to give the South China Sea
critical geostrategic importance; it is the territorial disputes surrounding these waters,
home to more than two hundred small islands, rocks, and coral reefs, only about three
dozen of which are permanently above water.
Reasons of the Dispute
The South China Sea dispute primarily involves 6 countries, namely China (including
Taiwan, which maintains similar claims as China), Brunei, Indonesia, Malaysia, the
Philippines and Vietnam. The main issues of the dispute involve territorial claim and
demarcation of territorial sea and Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) generated by the
territory.
The territorial dispute involves China, Brunei, Malaysia, the Philippines, and Vietnam.
Since most of the disputed area is submerged during high tides, the exact number of
islands and rocks is difficult to calculate. Among the known islands, only a few dozen are
inhabitable. Of the disputed islands and rocks, Vietnam possesses 30, the Philippines 9,
Malaysia 6, Brunei 1 and China 7.
The dispute over demarcation of sea territory and EEZ in the area surrounding the Spratly
Islands involves China, Brunei, Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines and Vietnam. Before
the 1960s, the respective claims focused on the right to fishery in this area. After the
1960s, the focus has shifted to the right to fishery as well as ownership of the oil and
natural gas that sea has to offer. The dispute on the ownership of oil and natural gas
reserves has become the major concern in recent years. Of the two types of disputes,
solving the territorial dispute will be a key because according to the United Nations
Convention of the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), once the ownership of territory is decided,
the territorial sea, maritime zone and EEZ can be set in accordance with UNCLOS
clauses.
The conflict has legal and economic origins. In regard of legal origins, there are two laws
and practices that all nations have based their claims upon. First is the law of “continuous
and effective acts of occupation”. The second one is the United Nations Convention of
the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). Before the ratification of the UNCLOS by all the
claimants, the “effective occupation” law was the prevailing rule, which resulted in
military conflict between China, Vietnam and the Philippines, who tried to effectively
occupy the disputed islands for international reorganization. With the ratification of the
UNCLOS, some claimants such as China have misused it to extend their sovereign
jurisdiction unilaterally and justify their claims in the South China Sea. If a certain
nations violate the treaty despite ratifying it, while others, expecting compliance, comply
with the treaty themselves, then those violating the treaty obviously have an undue
advantage. The economic cause of the dispute is the large reserves of oil and natural gas
as well as the fishery right.
Conflict between China and the Philippines over natural gas deposits is highly likely,
especially if the Philippines decide to start drilling in any disputed area, as they have
planned to do in the past. Filipino drilling could quickly escalate to violence if China
intervened to put a stop to the drilling. A further concern is that the mutual defense treaty
between the Philippines and the US could be invoked if, for example, a Philippines naval
or coast guard vessel is attacked, a Philippines military aircraft is shot down, or members
of the Philippines armed forces are in any way injured.
A military clash between China and Vietnam is also a grave concern. In May 2014, China
deployed a deep sea oil rig into Vietnam's two hundred–nautical mile exclusive economic
zone (EEZ), leading to a seventy three day standoff. As a result of this standoff, Chinese
and Vietnamese ships rammed each other repeatedly and in the end, the rig was
withdrawn. Although Vietnam's military capabilities are dwarfed by China's, the
Vietnamese are nevertheless determined to defend their maritime rights and will probably
be bolstered by their recent engagements with the United States.
In addition, the risk of a dangerous incident involving the United States and Chinese
forces within China's EEZ remain, given the possibility of military escalation. Following
several dangerous near misses: notably in December 2013, that involved a Chinese
amphibious dock ship and a US guided missile cruiser and another from August 2014 that
involved a Chinese fighter aircraft and a US surveillance plane. The US and Chinese
militaries, though, have struck a ground breaking deal on rules of behavior for safe
military encounters between surface naval ships at sea. Such confidence-building
measures may help reduce the potential for accidents in the future but individual
commanders may still display aggressive behavior that could have dire consequences.
Uplift of the dispute
Before the 1960s, other claimants of the South China Sea admitted to or did not respond
to China’s claim of South China Sea islands. However, after the 1960s, when large
reserves of oil and natural gas were found in the region, claimant countries began to
counter China’s claim, and the dispute arose. The disputes after the 1960s can be divided
into 3 phases.
1st Step: The first phase was between the 1970s and early 1990s when claimants adopted
various measures to conquer or control the islands and rocks in question. The most severe
military conflict took place between China and Vietnam in the 1970s. After the
formulation of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea in 1982, claimant
countries started to legitimize their claims based on their own interpretation UNCLOS.
The period between the 1970s and early 1990s was characterized by constant military
conflict arising from lack of communication and trust among claimants. On the other
hand, the Cold War prevented the escalation of these conflicts to larger scale wars.
2nd Step: The second phase began when China’s former Premier Li Peng, on a visit to
Singapore in August 1990, proposed shelving the sovereignty issue and jointly exploring
the South China Sea. The proposal was acknowledged by other claimants, but these
claimants did not give up their claims. Military conflict between claimants decreased
dramatically. However, a noticeable change of policies was seen with regards to Vietnam
and the Philippines. With the fall of Soviet Union and its loss of support from the Soviet
Union, the Vietnamese government started to improve and normalize its relations with
China. In the late 1990s, several agreements were signed between Vietnam and China in
order to settle the land and sea territorial disputes in the Beibu Gulf. Major conflict
between the two countries was ceased. On the other hand, the tension between China and
the Philippines increased. The tension finally resulted in the signing of the Visiting
Forces Agreement between the Philippines and the US in 1998, which involved the
military strength US as a balance to that of China.
3rd step: The third phase started with the signing of the ASEAN Code of Conduct on the
South China Sea in 2002 and China’s joining of the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in
South-East Asia in 2003. As the first multilateral agreement reached between all
claimants, the Code of Conduct on the South China Sea stipulated that the dispute should
be dealt with in accordance with international law. Most importantly, the Code of
Conduct on the South China Sea expresses the will of all claimants to restrain from
escalating the dispute. It proclaims that nations will resort to cooperation in all possible
fields for the purpose of building confidence among them. The two agreements laid the
foundation for the peaceful resolution of the South China Sea dispute.
Role and Interests of Major Countries in the Dispute
China:
China has made the largest claim in the South China Sea, within a ‘dash-line’ map
published by the Kuomintang Government in 1947. The ambiguous nine ‘dash line’,
which China asserts is supposedly based on evidence of historical usage, is disputed by
other South China Sea territorial claimant sand lacks a legal foundation under UNCLOS.
Chinese officials say that this claim has been made on historical grounds of discovery and
occupation. There is evidence that suggests Chinese marines discovered the Spratly
islands about 2100 years ago, during the Han Dynasty. The Spratlys island chain has also
been mentioned in ancient Chinese records from the Sung Dynasty. In fact, China claims
that it began to exercise jurisdiction over the Spratly islands as early as the Ming Dynasty
(14th-17th century AD)2. Chinese presence in these islands is even more documented
from the 19th century onwards. Although China has made all these claims, the nation has
failed to provide substantial evidence to support them. This has raised questions of
authenticity and accuracy of these claims, which are further weakened by the fact that
Chinese occupation of these islands has been interrupted on several occasions by Britain
and France during the colonial era.
Under contemporary international law, the rule of discovery states that a nation is
required to have carried out ‘continuous and effective acts of occupation’ if the nation is
to have a legitimate claim to the territory in question. The fact that China has never
clarified the nature or the legal basis of its claim or supplied any compelling evidence
supporting it makes it unlikely that its claim can be accepted as having any legal
foundation. However, despite having little legal or historical basis for its claim, China
will not be easily shaken. When asked about the case against China in the UN Arbitration
Court in The Hague, A senior Chinese diplomat said that the arbitral tribunal had no
jurisdiction and its ruling would be invalid under international law. “The tribunal
misinterpreted the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), catered
to the Philippines' claims and violated the basic principle that rulings must be based on
facts and laws. Its stance is neither fair nor objective, and its decision on jurisdiction
would be unconvincing”, said Xu Hong, the Foreign Ministry's Director General of
Treaties and Law.93
Another important factor to consider when analysing China’s stance on the issue is its
military might. In the past, China has used its superior military capabilities to throw its
2 Hung, Joe. "Sovereignty over the Spratly Islands"The China Web-Post. N.p., 22 June 2009.
3 Lee, Jason. "China Says Has WideSupport for Stance on South China Sea Case." Reuters. Thomson Reuters, 12
May 2016.Web. 21 July 2016.
weight around in the South China Sea, deterring the other, smaller claimants from taking
any action against it. Although China has adopted such a tough stance on the issue, it has
always maintained that it is willing to solve the dispute through peaceful means and
bilateral negotiations. Thus, bilateral negotiations seem to be the only way that the
international community will be able to discuss and try and resolve the issue at least as
far as China is concerned.
Philippines
Among the ASEAN states, the Philippines claim the largest area of the Spratly Islands -
Kalayaan. First officially proclaimed in 1971, the 1978 presidential decree of the
Philippines declared Kalayaan as part of its national territory. The Philippines then
proceeded to establish a 200 nautical mile EEZ as well.
On 7th July, 2016, the UN Arbitral Tribunal began the hearing of the case submitted to it
by Philippines, against China, regarding the South China Sea dispute. The case submitted
was regarding China’s nine-dash line claim, the status of the individual features occupied
by China, and perhaps most importantly, China’s interference in the Philippines activities
in the Sea. As mentioned before, China has stated that it does not consider this case
legitimate and has not agreed to take part in the proceedings.
On the 12th 0f July, 2016, the Permanent Court of Arbitration ruled in favor of the
Philippines. In a case that was seen as a test of China's rising power and its economic and
strategic rivalry with the United States, the Permanent Court of Arbitration in The Hague
ruled China had breached the Philippines' sovereign rights by endangering its ships and
fishing and oil projects in the energy-rich region. China has maintained its previous
stance, with the Chinese Defense Minister Chang Waquan saying that, “China's
sovereignty over the South China Sea will not be affected by the decision made by an
arbitration court over the South China Sea.”
The Court itself does not have the power to enforce its ruling, and thus this case has been
a somewhat pyrrhic victory for the Philippines. The Philippines has thus turned in other
directions looking for help. One of these directions has been West, with the Philippines
inking The Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement (EDCA) with the United States in
2014 in order to bolster US – Philippines relations. As a result of the EDCA, the United
States has access to 8 Philippines military bases, and a ninth is being re-commissioned.4
This ninth base is important to the dispute as it lies close to the South China Sea, in Subic
Bay, and would be a great boost to the military capabilities of both nations once it is
ready. The Philippines has also been carrying out joint military exercises with the United
States, and is receiving military aid from Japan, another nation that is not on good terms
with China (as a result of the East China Sea Dispute).
Malaysia
Malaysia, just like the US, has no official policy when it comes to the dispute, despite
being a claimant. Malaysia’s methods have often been referred to as examples of ‘Quiet
Diplomacy’. Malaysia proceeded to extend its continental shelf in 1979 to include
features of the Spratly Islands in its territory. Malaysia seems to be playing it safe in the
South China Sea, by taking a combination of diplomatic, economic, legal and security
initiatives in order to secure its interests while at the same time maintaining its relations
with China. Unlike the Philippines and Vietnam, Malaysia hasn’t openly supported any
side in the UN Arbitral Tribunal case. It prefers bilateral talks with China and privately
voices its concerns to the PRC.
Of late, Malaysian policy has seemed to be reaching a turning point. With Malaysian oil
fields and platforms used to extract hydrocarbons present within China’s nine-dash line,
and China allegedly militarizing the Spratly islands, Malaysia has been gradually
hardening its stance on the issue. Instead of striking a careful balance between ASEAN
and China, Malaysia is now looking to advance relationships with the US and
simultaneously advance its own capabilities to combat China’s threat.
4 12 Thayer, Carl."Analyzingthe US-Philippines Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement." The Diplomat.N.p., 2
May 2014.Web. 21 July 2016.
Vietnam
Until the reunification, Vietnam had recognized Chinese sovereignty over the Paracel and
Spratly Islands. Since 1975, Vietnam too has claimed both Islands based on historical
claims of discovery and occupation. In 1977, Vietnam also established a 200 nautical
mile Exclusive Economic Zone as per the UNCLOS.5
In May 2014, China moved its oil-drilling rig, the HD-981, into waters around the
Paracel Islands.6 China's exploratory drilling provoked a confrontation with Vietnam,
which also claims the area. Both countries deployed coast guard vessels and fishing fleets
to the drilling site. Ships collided and turned water cannons on each other, sinking a
fishing boat. In Vietnam, the incident sparked popular protests; over 20 people were
killed. Even in the past, Vietnam has been the worst affected by conflict in the South
China Sea.
Despite this, Vietnam’s stand on the issue is fairly simple. The Vietnamese government is
aiming to resolve the dispute through peaceful means, within the set boundaries of the
UNCLOS and ASEAN the Code of Conduct. In a bid to strengthen its position, Vietnam
has been developing closer ties to Japan, another nation not well disposed towards China.
Besides Japan, Vietnam is backed by the US and Russia as well, although it seems that
the nation will have to choose an ally when it comes to the two Cold War rivals.
Republic of China (Taiwan)
The claims of the Republic of China mirror those of the People’s Republic of China but
the problem is in the lack of seriousness of these claims. Even though the government is
not as powerful as it used to be, and most nations regard Taiwan itself as a Chinese
province, Taiwan still holds a garrison on Itu Aba, the largest islands of the Spratlys. And
herefore it is still considered as one of the claimants. (Nominally, but nonetheless
acknowledged).
5 "South China Sea Disputes And Resolution International LawEssay Law International Essay."UKessays.com.11
2013.All Answers Ltd. 072016
6 Meierding, Emily. "The Real Reason Tensions Are Risingin the South China Sea." Vox. N.p., 24 May 2015.Web. 21
July 2016.
Indonesia
Up until now, Jakarta has maintained a neutral stance on the issue in spite of being a
claimant. However, there have been renewed calls for Jakarta to take a tougher stance
against Beijing following an incident where a Chinese coast guard vessel rammed one of
its own fishing boats to pry it free from Indonesian authorities who had seized it for
illegal fishing. As Jakarta tries to work towards changing its stance, internally it is a
nation divided.
The foreign ministry and the defense administration have conflicting views on how this
issue must be handled.7 The foreign ministry believes that Jakarta should maintain a
'Non-claimant' status that allows Jakarta to become an 'Honest Broker' in the ASEAN
negotiations to form a binding Code of Conduct with China. This allows Indonesia to
continue exploiting hydrocarbon resources within the Natuna Islands while upholding full
sovereignty over its territorial sea and EEZs. The defense administration, on the other
hand, is concerned with the growing number of Illegal, Unreported and Unregulated
(IUU) fishing incidents within Indonesia's EEZs around the Natunas involving not just
Chinese fishermen but also Beijing's maritime law enforcement agencies. They thus want
Jakarta to adopt a tougher stance on the issue; an act that the foreign ministry believes
will only serve to increase tension. Indonesia, who is not a party to the Spratly Islands
dispute, was neutral in the South China Sea issue until 1993, when it became one of the
claimants because of the suspected extension of Chinese claims to the waters close to the
Natuna gas fields (currently harvested and operated by Indonesia).
United States of America
The United States of America, although not directly involved in this dispute, can play a
major role in resolving it. The gradual shift of US interests to the Asia-Pacific region is
known as the Pacific Shift. The US Undersecretary of Defense for policy, Christine
Wormuth said, “As nations there rise and become more prosperous, it's created a lot of
opportunity [and] at the same time that dynamism in the region [that] has created a much
7 "The Domestic Politics of Jakarta's South China Sea Policy."The Interpreter. Lowy Institute, 1 Apr. 2016. Web.
more complex security environment in which we are now operating.” One of the US’s
chief concerns in the region is China. “China's expanding interests are a natural part of its
rise”, Wormuth said, “but its behaviour in the maritime domain, for example, has created
friction for its neighbors.” Its goal, therefore, has been to maintain friendly relations with
China while at the same time trying to protect smaller nations from the powerful
‘Aggressor’.
As a result of this, the US has, in the last few years been providing military aid to the
Philippines and Vietnam, as well as boosting its own military capabilities in the South
China Sea with the help of these nations. Despite this, the US has not taken any formal
stand on the issue as of yet, in the sense that it is not in support of any of the claimants. It
is however, fully committed to maintaining freedom of navigation in areas in and around
the South China Sea. In order to maintain freedom of navigation, the US has been
conducting many FONOPs (freedom of navigation operations) both in the air and at sea.
Meant to promote freedom, these operations have, on the contrary, led to a rise of
tensions in the region. In October 2015, the American missile destroyer Lassen sailed
within 12 miles of a Chinese-built artificial island called Subi Reef to conduct a FONOP8
in what were supposed to be international waters. China told the American ship to leave
the area immediately. America ignored them, and has been conducting FONOPs ever
since.
India
India has friendly relations with ASEAN countries and hostile relation with China, citing
this, the ASEAN nations have encouraged India to get involved in the South China Sea as
they see India as a strong and influential nation that can counter China and can help in
peaceful negotiations (especially Singapore and Vietnam). India sees this as an
opportunity to develop strong relations with 10 ASEAN nations and Japan (Japan is also
very much concerned with the growing Chinese presence in the region as it may threaten
8 LaGrone, Sam. "U.S. Destroyer Comes Within 12 Nautical Miles of ChineseSouth China Sea Artificial Island,
BeijingThreatens Response - USNI News." USNI News. N.p.
their trade). This will also help India to gain support from other countries in times when
China creates a problem for India.
South China Sea sees a heavy percentage of world trade. Around 50% of India's trade
passes through Malacca Strait (part of South China Sea). The presence of China's military
threatens trade and energy exploration for other countries. This provides economic
opportunities to India as countries like Vietnam have asked India to help them out in oil
exploration. China has already warned India when ONGC and Petro Vietnam signed a
MoU (Memorandum Of Understanding). Moreover, the increasing Chinese presence in
the region has created a threat for Indian and Japanese trade. Therefore, India has to be
involved in South China Sea to safeguard its economic opportunities and trade.
From Strategic point of view, India might be interested in developing military and air
base in South China Sea (as suggested by Defense Minister George Fernandes) to counter
China from different directions because of the increasing Chinese presence in Indian
Ocean which has become a huge matter of concern for the Indian Government. However,
nothing can be said much in this regard as India hasn't said or done anything officially in
developing a military presence in South China Sea.9
Previous Endeavors to solve the Dispute
Code of ASEAN Conduct
While tensions in the South China Sea are continuing to evolve, there are several
processes and dialogues underway in an effort to build confidence within the region and
establish a common code of conduct. On November 4 2002, ASEAN countries and China
issued a joint ‘Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea’, which
affirmed the signatories' commitment to international law and the freedom of navigation
in the South China Sea. The Declaration also called for the adoption of a code of conduct
9 Karpukhin,Sergei. "China's Sovereignty Not Affected by South China Sea Case: Defence Minister."Reuters.
Thomson Reuters, 13 July 2016.Web. 26 July 2016.
for the South China Sea, to be negotiated by the parties subsequently. It is unclear how
the possible negotiation of a code of conduct will be affected by international legal action
that has been taken by the Philippines against China, or how ASEAN will respond to
China’s recent policies in the South China Sea. However, as a basis for a code to be
negotiated, confidence between the maritime powers in the South China Sea will first
need to be established.
International Tribunal Court: China vs Philippines
The Philippines has aimed to use international law to assert its claims over the portion of
the South China Sea that it calls the West Philippine Sea. A team of high-ranking
government officials will be present in The Hague, the Netherlands, to set forth their
arguments before the Permanent Court of Arbitration. One of them is Supreme Court
Senior Associate Justice Antonio Carpio, who has spoken extensively on the Philippines’
position in the maritime dispute with China.
To summarize the event, he says the Philippines is asking the tribunal to declare China’s
nine-dashed line void. The nine-dashed line is China’s purportedly historical boundary
that takes up 85% of the South China Sea, including 80% of the Philippines’ exclusive
economic zone (EEZ) in the West Philippine Sea. While China stakes its claim based on
its own version of history, Philippine claim stands on international maritime law.The
United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) entitles a coastal state to
an EEZ of 200 nautical miles of sea from its coastline. In some cases, this may include
rights to an extended continental shelf. That means the state involved has exclusive rights
to use and develop natural resources in and from the region. China itself is a signatory to
UNCLOS, yet its nine-dashed line contradicts the clauses of the treaty.In its arbitration
case, the Philippines’ government is asking the Permanent Court of Arbitration to
identify the maritime entitlements generated by islands and rocks in the West Philippine
Sea, as they call it, in order to deny China its claim. In December 2014, China released a
statement saying that the dispute is ultimately about sovereignty over islands and
therefore the standoff is territorial, not maritime. If so, the tribunal does not have the
authority to hear the case. However, the tribunal court itself discusses such questions
about whether the issue is within its jurisdiction.
On the 12th of July, 2016, in a landmark ruling, the Permanent Court of Arbitration ruled
in favor of the Philippines, thus declaring that China had breached the Philippines'
sovereign rights by endangering its ships and fishing and oil projects in the energy-rich
region. Although the court has ruled in favor of the Philippines, it does not have the
power to enforce its ruling. What may look like a victory for the Philippines may actually
backfire as Beijing's ambassador to the United States said that the international tribunal's
ruling denying China's claims in the South China Sea will only "intensify conflict and
even confrontation."18 Despite this, the ambassador, Cui Tiankai, also told an
international forum in Washington that Beijing remains committed to negotiations with
other parties in disputes over the vital trade route. With no conclusive action being taken
from either side post the ruling, the world will just have to wait and see what exactly the
repercussions of this supposedly groundbreaking ruling will be.
UNCLOS
The United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea defines the rights and
responsibilities of nations in their use of the world's oceans, establishing guidelines for
businesses, the environment, and the management of marine natural resources. Since its
establishment, claimants in the South China Sea have scrambled to justify their claims in
accordance with the provisions of the treaty. China, however, has done no such thing, and
continues to maintain ‘strategic ambiguity’, with its claim only roughly defined by the
Nine- Dash Line. Although the UNCLOS has its advantages, many experts conclude that
the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Seas has complicated rather than
simplified maritime law and security. The UNCLOS has enshrined customary maritime
law, but it also contradicted it by extending national claims far to sea, well beyond
traditional claims, in the form of Exclusive Economic Zones. This creation of EEZs
established new claims and conflicts that never before existed. Traditionally the freedom
of the high seas has included the use of the seas for military manoeuvres or exercises,
including the use of weapons. This freedom – including the freedom to operate in EEZs –
was supposed to be incorporated into UNCLOS. However, the language in the provisions
pertaining to conduct of military activity in EEZs is far too ambiguous, and China has
taken advantage of this. Owing to the ambiguity of the UNCLOS, the Chinese are trying
to redefine it according to their own purposes. In order to solve the South China Sea
Dispute, either the UNCLOS will have to be reformed or an entirely new but
comprehensive treaty will have to be put in place. Without a clearly defined set of rules
in place, attempts to solve the issue are futile.
Possible Solutions
The dispute on South China Sea can be solved with measures, which have been used in
successful settlement of other disputes. For example, a legal solution is one that is quick
and lasting. By adopting a legal solution, all claimants will agree to submit the dispute for
arbitration to the International Court of Justice (ICJ), who will then judge the dispute
according to the international laws applicable. A political solution, also called a one track
approach, will be time consuming but lasting. By adopting a political solution, all parties
will discuss the dispute on formal occasions, either at bilateral or multilateral levels.
Other initiatives such as Confidence Building Measures or CBMs can also be utilized to
avoid further conflict and to promote understanding among the nations. Confidence
Building Measures can include a two track approach, where nations are encouraged to
take up joint projects in the disputed areas as has been done before, especially with
regards to cooperation in energy exploration. A two track approach supplements the one
track approach. By holding informal meetings and carrying out cooperative projects,
claimants can gain confidence and develop understanding.
In the case of the South China Sea dispute, since most nations are reluctant to resolve the
issue of sovereignty through any approach, a permanent peace is unlikely to be achieved
for the time being. However, temporary peace is possible. Peace can be obtained only
when claimants’ interests are attended to. Compared to the interest of sovereignty, the
other two interests are comparatively easier to look after, namely the security of sea lanes
and the exploration of natural resources. Stability and security of the South China Sea
will be necessary for the economic development of all claimants. Previous efforts of
claimants have laid the foundation to carry on further negotiations, fostering cooperation
on all issues except territorial claims. In this regard, China’s proposal of setting aside the
dispute will be a wise choice for all claimants.
Owing to the complexity of the dispute, no single approach would be likely to achieve a
permanent peace. A combination of the available approaches is necessary for obtaining
peace. In this regard, the approaches which have been adopted by the claimants are taking
the peace process in the right direction. First, the Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in
the South China Sea, signed in 2002 shows signs of all claimants’ will to demilitarize the
dispute. This effort ensures that the dispute develops into a political issue, which can be
solved by a political approach in the future. Second, the two track approach, which
includes the ASEAN Regional Forum and other informal meetings will play an important
role in providing ideas and suggestions to solve the dispute and exchange information.
This will help avoid further conflict due to misunderstandings and lack of
communications. Other two track approaches, like the economic integration and energy
co-exploration can further close ties between claimants. Third, the one track approaches,
including the 10+1 Summit between ASEAN and Chinese leaders and other regular
ministerial-level meeting mechanisms can review and co-ordinate each country’s
behavior, serving to enhance understanding and cooperation.
The ideal philosophy behind the combined approaches is that even though they may not
ensure permanent peace, when the loss of economic interests and political risk outweigh
the military gain, according to realist theory, states will act rationally to avoid conflict.
Peace will be thus sustained.
Key Terms
The Nine-Dash Line10
The nine-dash line, also referred to as the "10-dash line" or the "11-dash line", refers to
the demarcation line used initially by the government of the Republic of China (ROC /
Taiwan) with the help of the United States legal office, and subsequently also by the
government of the People's Republic of China (PRC), for their claims of the major part of
the South China Sea. Despite having made the vague claim has not (as of 2016) filed a
formal and specifically defined claim to the area within the dashes. (1947, China)
The United Nations Convention of the Law of the Sea11
The United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), also called the Law
of the Sea Convention or the Law of the Sea treaty, is the international agreement that
resulted from the third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS III),
which took place between 1973 and 1982. The Law of the Sea Convention defines the
rights and responsibilities of nations with respect to their use of the world's oceans,
establishing guidelines for businesses, the environment, and the management of marine
natural resources. The Convention, concluded in 1982, replaced four 1958 treaties. As of
June 2016, 167 countries and the European Union have joined in the Convention.
Base-line12
Normally, the baseline from which the territorial sea is measured is the low-water line
along the coast as marked on large-scale charts officially recognized by the coastal state.
This is either the low-water mark closest to the shore, or alternatively it may be an
unlimited distance from permanently exposed land, provided that some portion of
elevations exposed at low tide but covered at high tide (like mud flats) is within 12
nautical miles (22 km; 14 mi) of permanently exposed land. Straight baselines can
alternatively be defined connecting fringing islands along a coast, across the mouths of
10 Martin Riegl, Jakub Landovský, Irina Valko,eds.(26 November 2014). Strategic Regi ons in 21stCentury Power
Politics.CambridgeScholars Publishing.pp.66–68.
11 "United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea". United Nations Treaty Series. Retrieved 2013-12-01
12 "United Nations Convention Law Of The Sea International LawEssay."UKes says.com. 11 2013. All Answ 7 2016
rivers, or with certain restrictions across the mouths of bays. In this case, a bay is defined
as "a well-marked indentation whose penetration is in such proportion to the width of its
mouth as to contain land-locked waters and constitute more than a mere curvature of the
coast. An indentation shall not, however, be regarded as a bay unless its area is as large
as, or larger than, that of the semi-circle whose diameter is a line drawn across the mouth
of that indentation". The baseline across the bay must also be no more than 24 nautical
miles (44 km; 28 mi) in length.
13 unclos-united-nations-convention-on-the-law-of-the-sea-of-10-december-1982
Continental Shelf
The continental shelf is defined as the natural prolongation of the land territory to the
continental margin’s outer edge, or 200 nautical miles from the coastal state’s baseline,
whichever is greater. State’s continental shelf may exceed 200 nautical miles until the
natural prolongation ends. However, it may never exceed 350 nautical miles from the
baseline; or it may never exceed 100 nautical miles beyond the 2,500 meter isobath (the
line connecting the depth of 2,500 meters). Coastal states have the right to harvest
mineral and non- living material in the subsoil of its continental shelf, to the exclusion of
others. Coastal states also have exclusive control over living resources "attached" to the
continental shelf, but not to creatures living in the water column beyond the exclusive
economic zone.
13 unclos-united-nations-convention-on-the-law-of-the-sea-of-10-december-1982
Territorial Waters
Territorial waters or a territorial sea as defined by the 1982 United Nations Convention
on the Law of the Sea,[1] is a belt of coastal waters extending at most 12 nautical miles
(22.2 km; 13.8 mi) from the baseline (usually the mean low-water mark) of a coastal
state. The territorial sea is regarded as the sovereign territory of the state, although
foreign ships (civilian) are allowed innocent passage through it, or transit passage for
straits; this sovereignty also extends to the airspace over and seabed below.
Contiguous Zone
The contiguous zone is a band of water extending from the outer edge of the territorial
sea to up to 24 nautical miles (44.4 km; 27.6 mi) from the baseline, within which a state
can exert limited control for the purpose of preventing or punishing "infringement of its
customs, fiscal, immigration or sanitary laws and regulations within its territory or
territorial sea". This will typically be 12 nautical miles (22 km; 14 mi) wide, but could be
more (if a state has chosen to claim a territorial sea of less than 12 nautical miles), or less,
if it would otherwise overlap another state's contiguous zone. However, unlike the
territorial sea, there is no standard rule for resolving such conflicts and the states in
question must negotiate their own compromise.
Exclusive Economic Zone
Extends from the edge of the territorial sea out to 200 nautical miles from the baseline.
Within this area, the coastal nation has sole exploitation rights over all natural resources.
In casual use, the term may include the territorial sea and even the continental shelf. The
EEZs were introduced to halt the increasingly heated clashes over fishing rights, although
oil was also becoming important. Foreign nations have the freedom of navigation and
over flight, subject to the regulation of the coastal states. Foreign states may also lay
submarine pipes and cables. The United States invoked a contiguous zone out to 24 nmi
on 24 September 1999.
References
1. Dingli, Shen, Elizabeth Economy, Richard Haass, Joshua Kurlantzick, Sheila A.
Smith, and Simon Tay. "China's Maritime Dispute. "China's Maritime Dispute.
Council on Foreign Affairs, 2013.Web.8 Oct.2015.
2. CNAS. Timeline: 1955-Present. Timeline: 1955-Present | Center for a New
American Security. Center for a New American Security (CNAS), n.d. Web. 8
Oct. 2015.
3. DW. "South China Sea Timeline. "South China Sea Timeline | Asia | DW.COM
|10.04.2013. DW, n.d. Web. 8 Oct. 2015.
4. Stirring up the South China Sea (IV): Oil in Troubled Waters –Crisis Group
Asia Report N°275, 26 January2016
5. Langenheim, Johnny. Preventing Ecocide in South China Sea –The Guardian.
July 15, 2015.
6. "South China Sea Timeline 1955-Present. "Center for a New American Security
| .N.p., n.d. Web. 21 July 2016. http://www.cnas.org/flashpoints/timeline
7. Weissmann, Mikael. "THE SOUTH CHINA SEA CONFLICT AND SINO-
ASEAN RELATIONS: A STUDY IN CONFLICT PREVENTION AND
PEACE BUILDING." Asian Perspective 34.3 (2010): 35-69. Web.
http://www.ui.se/upl/files/49747.pdf
8. Coughlin, Con. "Why the South China Sea Could Be the next Global
Flashpoint." The Telegraph. Telegraph Media Group, 8 Apr. 2016. Web. 21 July
2016. http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2016/04/08/why-the-south-china-sea-could-
be-the-next- global-flashpoint/
9. O'Rourke, Ronald. Maritime Territorial and Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ)
Disputes Involving China: Issues for Congress (2016):n.pag.
Web.https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/R42784.pdf
10. Robert D. Kaplan, "Asia's Cauldron"

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Group f-the-south-china-sea

  • 1. UUnnddeerrssttaannddiinngg tthhee SSoouutthh CChhiinnaa SSeeaa DDiissppuuttee
  • 2. Introduction Territorial Disputes have always been opening Pandora’s Boxes since the very beginning of human societies. These disputes are sometimes settled by negotiation and some turn into violence. But in today’s world, while internationally recognized entities are dedicated for inter-state dispute settlements, it is difficult to observe a situation to be malignant. South China Sea is a complicated case with a combination of territorial and maritime disputes among six claimants China, Vietnam, Malaysia, Brunei, Taiwan and Philippines. This dispute has become a flashpoint in global politics for uprising tensions among these claimants and the concerned states, risking a military escalation. The islands of South China Sea can be grouped into two island chains. The Paracels Islands (Clustered in the northwest corner of the sea) and The Spratly Islands (Located in the southeast corner). Territorial conflicts are growing in these Islands due to claims by different countries of the region. In the Spratly Islands, different geographic locations are occupied by claimants such as Taiwan, Vietnam, the Philippines, China, and Malaysia. The Paracels Islands are claimed by China, Taiwan and Vietnam. The South China Sea functions as the connecting point of the Western Pacific and Indian oceans as the host of global sea routes. Annually, global trade passing through these routes are estimated to be worth 5.3 Trillion USD, which counts in a third of all maritime traffic worldwide. In addition to geographic significance, the South China Sea has an estimated reserve of 11 billion barrels of untapped oil and 190 trillion cubic feet of Natural Gas. Besides these marine resources, South China Sea contains 10% of annual global fisheries catch. In the first half of the 20th century, the South China Sea was almost quiet with no claimant occupying a single Island. In 1947, China claimed her dominance over South China Sea for the first time. When China introduced the Nine-dash Line, it covered almost 90% of the Sea. After 1960s, when surveys reported the huge reserve of Oil and
  • 3. Natural Gas, the territorial claims started emerging. In 1994, when the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) came into force, all the claimant coastal countries started measuring their maritime territory and legitimizing their claims based on their own interpretation on UNCLOS. Regional initiatives like the Declaration of Code of Conduct of Parties (initiated by ASEAN and China in 2002) and bilateral initiatives like the Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf (CLCS) in 2009 (a joint commission of Malaysia and Vietnam) took place, but there was no headway in the dispute resolution. On July 26, 2016, the Permanent Court of Arbitration issued its ruling in favor of Philippines which claimed China’s occupancy and dominance in South China Sea is illegitimate and the controversial Nine-dash Line is invalid. But in spite of being a signatory of UNCLOS, China refused the authority of the court and expressed her interest in bilateral negotiation in this issue. This event turned the South China Sea into armed camps of the claimant countries and upraised tension in the region. Geographic and Economic Significance of the South China Sea The South China Sea, an area of open water, part of the Pacific Ocean, which extends from Singapore and the Malacca Strait in the South to the Strait of Taiwan in the North. This vast sea, which stretches over an area of about 3.5 million sq. km, contains over 250 small islands, reefs, atolls, corals and sandbars, most uninhabited, and some remaining permanently submerged. The sea, however, is very important both regionally as well as globally. Besides handling a third of the world’s annual maritime traffic, the sea is also widely believed to hold vast reserves of oil and natural gas under its seabed. It is also home to unique maritime wildlife and is a valuable fishing ground.
  • 4. 1 The South China Sea and surrounding landmasses, Source: ClearIAS Islands and Seamounts: The South China Sea contains over 250 small islands, atolls, cays, shoals, reefs, and sandbars, most of which have no indigenous people, many of which are naturally under water at high tide, and some of which are permanently submerged. The features are grouped into three archipelagos, Macclesfield Bank and Scarborough Shoal: o The Spratly Islands o The Paracel Islands o The Pratas Islands o The Macclesfield Bank o The Scarborough Shoal 1 The South China Sea and surroundinglandmasses,Source:ClearIAS
  • 5. The Spratly Islands spread over an 810 by 900 km area covering some 175 identified insular features, the largest being Taiping Island at just over 1.3 km long and with its highest elevation at 3.8 meters. The largest singular feature in the area of the Spratly Islands is a 100 km wide seamount called Reed Tablemount, also known as Reed Bank, in the northeast of the group, separated from Palawan Island of the Philippines by the Palawan Trench. Now completely submerged, with a depth of 20 m, it was an island until it sank about 7,000 years ago due to the increasing sea level after the last ice age. With an area of 8,866 km, it is one of the largest submerged atoll structures in the world. Oil and Natural Gas: The South China Sea harbors an alleged 11 billion barrels of untapped oil and 190 trillion cubic feet of natural gas. These vast resources have been deemed by some as the root cause of the territorial dispute. Some have even gone to the extent of calling this issue a ‘Resource Conflict’. Thus, proper distribution and development of these resources will be a key to solving the South China Sea dispute. Since most oilfields fall in disputed areas, the best option for claimants has been to jointly develop these resources. The Joint Marine Seismic Undertaking between China, the Philippines and Vietnam is an example of nations successfully developing natural resources together. Under the tripartite agreement, CNOOC geological surveillance vessels collected data that was processed in Vietnam and subsequently brought to the Philippines for interpretation. All three parties were present at each step. Even though nations have entered into successful joint development agreements in the past, they now face some significant obstacles. Marine Fisheries: Southeast Asia is home to more marine biodiversity than anywhere else in the world, supporting thousands of catalogued plant and animal species. The oceans provide the people of Southeast Asia and the world a critical source of protein, with fish protein accounting for more than 22 per cent of the average Asian diet, according to a 2013 study. South China Sea contains 10% of annual global fisheries catch. Forty percent of the world’s tuna are born in the South China Sea and fisheries in the South China Sea have become a multibillion dollar industry. However, Illegal,
  • 6. Unreported and Unregulated (IUU) fishing in the area is widespread. Common practices such as Dynamite fishing, Cyanide Poisoning, and Bottom Trawling have wreaked havoc in regional ecosystems, threatening the future of the regional fishing market. Forty per cent of the South China Sea’s fish stocks have already disappeared and 70 per cent of the South China Sea’s coral reefs are rated to be in fair or poor condition. On top of various instances of IUU in the sea, even China and other claimants’ island building activities are having an adverse effect on the sea’s marine ecosystem. China and to a lesser extent the other countries contesting the Spratly Islands appear to have been dredging sand from within atolls in order to build their artificial islands. Dredgers sweep back and forth, in the process destroying whatever lives there, including reef-building organisms, turtles and giant clams, while sending up plumes of corrosive sand and sediment that settle on surrounding reefs, killing them. For the many scientists who are predicting that coral reefs globally are in danger of disappearing by as early as the middle of the century due to bleaching, ocean acidification and rising seas, the reclamation is comparable to switching of fan ailing patient’s life support. Trade and Economy: The South China Sea functions as the throat of the Western Pacific and Indian oceans — the mass of connective economic tissue where global sea routes coalesce. Here is the heart of Eurasia’s navigable rimland, punctuated by the Malacca, Sunda, Lombok, and Makassar straits. More than half of the world’s annual merchant fleet tonnage passes through these choke points and a third of all maritime traffic worldwide. The oil transported through the Malacca Strait from the Indian Ocean, en route to East Asia through the South China Sea, is triple the amount that passes through the Suez Canal and fifteen times the amount that transits the Panama Canal. Roughly two thirds of South Korea’s energy supplies, nearly 60 per cent of Japan’s and Taiwan’s energy supplies, and 80 per cent of China’s crude oil imports come through the South China Sea. Whereas in the Persian Gulf only energy is transported, in the South China Sea you have energy, finished goods, and unfinished goods.
  • 7. It is not only location and energy reserves that promise to give the South China Sea critical geostrategic importance; it is the territorial disputes surrounding these waters, home to more than two hundred small islands, rocks, and coral reefs, only about three dozen of which are permanently above water. Reasons of the Dispute The South China Sea dispute primarily involves 6 countries, namely China (including Taiwan, which maintains similar claims as China), Brunei, Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines and Vietnam. The main issues of the dispute involve territorial claim and demarcation of territorial sea and Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) generated by the territory. The territorial dispute involves China, Brunei, Malaysia, the Philippines, and Vietnam. Since most of the disputed area is submerged during high tides, the exact number of islands and rocks is difficult to calculate. Among the known islands, only a few dozen are inhabitable. Of the disputed islands and rocks, Vietnam possesses 30, the Philippines 9, Malaysia 6, Brunei 1 and China 7. The dispute over demarcation of sea territory and EEZ in the area surrounding the Spratly Islands involves China, Brunei, Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines and Vietnam. Before the 1960s, the respective claims focused on the right to fishery in this area. After the 1960s, the focus has shifted to the right to fishery as well as ownership of the oil and natural gas that sea has to offer. The dispute on the ownership of oil and natural gas reserves has become the major concern in recent years. Of the two types of disputes, solving the territorial dispute will be a key because according to the United Nations Convention of the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), once the ownership of territory is decided, the territorial sea, maritime zone and EEZ can be set in accordance with UNCLOS clauses.
  • 8.
  • 9. The conflict has legal and economic origins. In regard of legal origins, there are two laws and practices that all nations have based their claims upon. First is the law of “continuous and effective acts of occupation”. The second one is the United Nations Convention of the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). Before the ratification of the UNCLOS by all the claimants, the “effective occupation” law was the prevailing rule, which resulted in military conflict between China, Vietnam and the Philippines, who tried to effectively occupy the disputed islands for international reorganization. With the ratification of the UNCLOS, some claimants such as China have misused it to extend their sovereign jurisdiction unilaterally and justify their claims in the South China Sea. If a certain nations violate the treaty despite ratifying it, while others, expecting compliance, comply with the treaty themselves, then those violating the treaty obviously have an undue advantage. The economic cause of the dispute is the large reserves of oil and natural gas as well as the fishery right. Conflict between China and the Philippines over natural gas deposits is highly likely, especially if the Philippines decide to start drilling in any disputed area, as they have planned to do in the past. Filipino drilling could quickly escalate to violence if China intervened to put a stop to the drilling. A further concern is that the mutual defense treaty between the Philippines and the US could be invoked if, for example, a Philippines naval or coast guard vessel is attacked, a Philippines military aircraft is shot down, or members of the Philippines armed forces are in any way injured. A military clash between China and Vietnam is also a grave concern. In May 2014, China deployed a deep sea oil rig into Vietnam's two hundred–nautical mile exclusive economic zone (EEZ), leading to a seventy three day standoff. As a result of this standoff, Chinese and Vietnamese ships rammed each other repeatedly and in the end, the rig was withdrawn. Although Vietnam's military capabilities are dwarfed by China's, the Vietnamese are nevertheless determined to defend their maritime rights and will probably be bolstered by their recent engagements with the United States.
  • 10. In addition, the risk of a dangerous incident involving the United States and Chinese forces within China's EEZ remain, given the possibility of military escalation. Following several dangerous near misses: notably in December 2013, that involved a Chinese amphibious dock ship and a US guided missile cruiser and another from August 2014 that involved a Chinese fighter aircraft and a US surveillance plane. The US and Chinese militaries, though, have struck a ground breaking deal on rules of behavior for safe military encounters between surface naval ships at sea. Such confidence-building measures may help reduce the potential for accidents in the future but individual commanders may still display aggressive behavior that could have dire consequences. Uplift of the dispute Before the 1960s, other claimants of the South China Sea admitted to or did not respond to China’s claim of South China Sea islands. However, after the 1960s, when large reserves of oil and natural gas were found in the region, claimant countries began to counter China’s claim, and the dispute arose. The disputes after the 1960s can be divided into 3 phases. 1st Step: The first phase was between the 1970s and early 1990s when claimants adopted various measures to conquer or control the islands and rocks in question. The most severe military conflict took place between China and Vietnam in the 1970s. After the formulation of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea in 1982, claimant countries started to legitimize their claims based on their own interpretation UNCLOS. The period between the 1970s and early 1990s was characterized by constant military conflict arising from lack of communication and trust among claimants. On the other hand, the Cold War prevented the escalation of these conflicts to larger scale wars. 2nd Step: The second phase began when China’s former Premier Li Peng, on a visit to Singapore in August 1990, proposed shelving the sovereignty issue and jointly exploring the South China Sea. The proposal was acknowledged by other claimants, but these
  • 11. claimants did not give up their claims. Military conflict between claimants decreased dramatically. However, a noticeable change of policies was seen with regards to Vietnam and the Philippines. With the fall of Soviet Union and its loss of support from the Soviet Union, the Vietnamese government started to improve and normalize its relations with China. In the late 1990s, several agreements were signed between Vietnam and China in order to settle the land and sea territorial disputes in the Beibu Gulf. Major conflict between the two countries was ceased. On the other hand, the tension between China and the Philippines increased. The tension finally resulted in the signing of the Visiting Forces Agreement between the Philippines and the US in 1998, which involved the military strength US as a balance to that of China. 3rd step: The third phase started with the signing of the ASEAN Code of Conduct on the South China Sea in 2002 and China’s joining of the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in South-East Asia in 2003. As the first multilateral agreement reached between all claimants, the Code of Conduct on the South China Sea stipulated that the dispute should be dealt with in accordance with international law. Most importantly, the Code of Conduct on the South China Sea expresses the will of all claimants to restrain from escalating the dispute. It proclaims that nations will resort to cooperation in all possible fields for the purpose of building confidence among them. The two agreements laid the foundation for the peaceful resolution of the South China Sea dispute. Role and Interests of Major Countries in the Dispute China: China has made the largest claim in the South China Sea, within a ‘dash-line’ map published by the Kuomintang Government in 1947. The ambiguous nine ‘dash line’, which China asserts is supposedly based on evidence of historical usage, is disputed by other South China Sea territorial claimant sand lacks a legal foundation under UNCLOS. Chinese officials say that this claim has been made on historical grounds of discovery and
  • 12. occupation. There is evidence that suggests Chinese marines discovered the Spratly islands about 2100 years ago, during the Han Dynasty. The Spratlys island chain has also been mentioned in ancient Chinese records from the Sung Dynasty. In fact, China claims that it began to exercise jurisdiction over the Spratly islands as early as the Ming Dynasty (14th-17th century AD)2. Chinese presence in these islands is even more documented from the 19th century onwards. Although China has made all these claims, the nation has failed to provide substantial evidence to support them. This has raised questions of authenticity and accuracy of these claims, which are further weakened by the fact that Chinese occupation of these islands has been interrupted on several occasions by Britain and France during the colonial era. Under contemporary international law, the rule of discovery states that a nation is required to have carried out ‘continuous and effective acts of occupation’ if the nation is to have a legitimate claim to the territory in question. The fact that China has never clarified the nature or the legal basis of its claim or supplied any compelling evidence supporting it makes it unlikely that its claim can be accepted as having any legal foundation. However, despite having little legal or historical basis for its claim, China will not be easily shaken. When asked about the case against China in the UN Arbitration Court in The Hague, A senior Chinese diplomat said that the arbitral tribunal had no jurisdiction and its ruling would be invalid under international law. “The tribunal misinterpreted the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), catered to the Philippines' claims and violated the basic principle that rulings must be based on facts and laws. Its stance is neither fair nor objective, and its decision on jurisdiction would be unconvincing”, said Xu Hong, the Foreign Ministry's Director General of Treaties and Law.93 Another important factor to consider when analysing China’s stance on the issue is its military might. In the past, China has used its superior military capabilities to throw its 2 Hung, Joe. "Sovereignty over the Spratly Islands"The China Web-Post. N.p., 22 June 2009. 3 Lee, Jason. "China Says Has WideSupport for Stance on South China Sea Case." Reuters. Thomson Reuters, 12 May 2016.Web. 21 July 2016.
  • 13. weight around in the South China Sea, deterring the other, smaller claimants from taking any action against it. Although China has adopted such a tough stance on the issue, it has always maintained that it is willing to solve the dispute through peaceful means and bilateral negotiations. Thus, bilateral negotiations seem to be the only way that the international community will be able to discuss and try and resolve the issue at least as far as China is concerned. Philippines Among the ASEAN states, the Philippines claim the largest area of the Spratly Islands - Kalayaan. First officially proclaimed in 1971, the 1978 presidential decree of the Philippines declared Kalayaan as part of its national territory. The Philippines then proceeded to establish a 200 nautical mile EEZ as well. On 7th July, 2016, the UN Arbitral Tribunal began the hearing of the case submitted to it by Philippines, against China, regarding the South China Sea dispute. The case submitted was regarding China’s nine-dash line claim, the status of the individual features occupied by China, and perhaps most importantly, China’s interference in the Philippines activities in the Sea. As mentioned before, China has stated that it does not consider this case legitimate and has not agreed to take part in the proceedings. On the 12th 0f July, 2016, the Permanent Court of Arbitration ruled in favor of the Philippines. In a case that was seen as a test of China's rising power and its economic and strategic rivalry with the United States, the Permanent Court of Arbitration in The Hague ruled China had breached the Philippines' sovereign rights by endangering its ships and fishing and oil projects in the energy-rich region. China has maintained its previous stance, with the Chinese Defense Minister Chang Waquan saying that, “China's sovereignty over the South China Sea will not be affected by the decision made by an arbitration court over the South China Sea.” The Court itself does not have the power to enforce its ruling, and thus this case has been a somewhat pyrrhic victory for the Philippines. The Philippines has thus turned in other
  • 14. directions looking for help. One of these directions has been West, with the Philippines inking The Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement (EDCA) with the United States in 2014 in order to bolster US – Philippines relations. As a result of the EDCA, the United States has access to 8 Philippines military bases, and a ninth is being re-commissioned.4 This ninth base is important to the dispute as it lies close to the South China Sea, in Subic Bay, and would be a great boost to the military capabilities of both nations once it is ready. The Philippines has also been carrying out joint military exercises with the United States, and is receiving military aid from Japan, another nation that is not on good terms with China (as a result of the East China Sea Dispute). Malaysia Malaysia, just like the US, has no official policy when it comes to the dispute, despite being a claimant. Malaysia’s methods have often been referred to as examples of ‘Quiet Diplomacy’. Malaysia proceeded to extend its continental shelf in 1979 to include features of the Spratly Islands in its territory. Malaysia seems to be playing it safe in the South China Sea, by taking a combination of diplomatic, economic, legal and security initiatives in order to secure its interests while at the same time maintaining its relations with China. Unlike the Philippines and Vietnam, Malaysia hasn’t openly supported any side in the UN Arbitral Tribunal case. It prefers bilateral talks with China and privately voices its concerns to the PRC. Of late, Malaysian policy has seemed to be reaching a turning point. With Malaysian oil fields and platforms used to extract hydrocarbons present within China’s nine-dash line, and China allegedly militarizing the Spratly islands, Malaysia has been gradually hardening its stance on the issue. Instead of striking a careful balance between ASEAN and China, Malaysia is now looking to advance relationships with the US and simultaneously advance its own capabilities to combat China’s threat. 4 12 Thayer, Carl."Analyzingthe US-Philippines Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement." The Diplomat.N.p., 2 May 2014.Web. 21 July 2016.
  • 15. Vietnam Until the reunification, Vietnam had recognized Chinese sovereignty over the Paracel and Spratly Islands. Since 1975, Vietnam too has claimed both Islands based on historical claims of discovery and occupation. In 1977, Vietnam also established a 200 nautical mile Exclusive Economic Zone as per the UNCLOS.5 In May 2014, China moved its oil-drilling rig, the HD-981, into waters around the Paracel Islands.6 China's exploratory drilling provoked a confrontation with Vietnam, which also claims the area. Both countries deployed coast guard vessels and fishing fleets to the drilling site. Ships collided and turned water cannons on each other, sinking a fishing boat. In Vietnam, the incident sparked popular protests; over 20 people were killed. Even in the past, Vietnam has been the worst affected by conflict in the South China Sea. Despite this, Vietnam’s stand on the issue is fairly simple. The Vietnamese government is aiming to resolve the dispute through peaceful means, within the set boundaries of the UNCLOS and ASEAN the Code of Conduct. In a bid to strengthen its position, Vietnam has been developing closer ties to Japan, another nation not well disposed towards China. Besides Japan, Vietnam is backed by the US and Russia as well, although it seems that the nation will have to choose an ally when it comes to the two Cold War rivals. Republic of China (Taiwan) The claims of the Republic of China mirror those of the People’s Republic of China but the problem is in the lack of seriousness of these claims. Even though the government is not as powerful as it used to be, and most nations regard Taiwan itself as a Chinese province, Taiwan still holds a garrison on Itu Aba, the largest islands of the Spratlys. And herefore it is still considered as one of the claimants. (Nominally, but nonetheless acknowledged). 5 "South China Sea Disputes And Resolution International LawEssay Law International Essay."UKessays.com.11 2013.All Answers Ltd. 072016 6 Meierding, Emily. "The Real Reason Tensions Are Risingin the South China Sea." Vox. N.p., 24 May 2015.Web. 21 July 2016.
  • 16. Indonesia Up until now, Jakarta has maintained a neutral stance on the issue in spite of being a claimant. However, there have been renewed calls for Jakarta to take a tougher stance against Beijing following an incident where a Chinese coast guard vessel rammed one of its own fishing boats to pry it free from Indonesian authorities who had seized it for illegal fishing. As Jakarta tries to work towards changing its stance, internally it is a nation divided. The foreign ministry and the defense administration have conflicting views on how this issue must be handled.7 The foreign ministry believes that Jakarta should maintain a 'Non-claimant' status that allows Jakarta to become an 'Honest Broker' in the ASEAN negotiations to form a binding Code of Conduct with China. This allows Indonesia to continue exploiting hydrocarbon resources within the Natuna Islands while upholding full sovereignty over its territorial sea and EEZs. The defense administration, on the other hand, is concerned with the growing number of Illegal, Unreported and Unregulated (IUU) fishing incidents within Indonesia's EEZs around the Natunas involving not just Chinese fishermen but also Beijing's maritime law enforcement agencies. They thus want Jakarta to adopt a tougher stance on the issue; an act that the foreign ministry believes will only serve to increase tension. Indonesia, who is not a party to the Spratly Islands dispute, was neutral in the South China Sea issue until 1993, when it became one of the claimants because of the suspected extension of Chinese claims to the waters close to the Natuna gas fields (currently harvested and operated by Indonesia). United States of America The United States of America, although not directly involved in this dispute, can play a major role in resolving it. The gradual shift of US interests to the Asia-Pacific region is known as the Pacific Shift. The US Undersecretary of Defense for policy, Christine Wormuth said, “As nations there rise and become more prosperous, it's created a lot of opportunity [and] at the same time that dynamism in the region [that] has created a much 7 "The Domestic Politics of Jakarta's South China Sea Policy."The Interpreter. Lowy Institute, 1 Apr. 2016. Web.
  • 17. more complex security environment in which we are now operating.” One of the US’s chief concerns in the region is China. “China's expanding interests are a natural part of its rise”, Wormuth said, “but its behaviour in the maritime domain, for example, has created friction for its neighbors.” Its goal, therefore, has been to maintain friendly relations with China while at the same time trying to protect smaller nations from the powerful ‘Aggressor’. As a result of this, the US has, in the last few years been providing military aid to the Philippines and Vietnam, as well as boosting its own military capabilities in the South China Sea with the help of these nations. Despite this, the US has not taken any formal stand on the issue as of yet, in the sense that it is not in support of any of the claimants. It is however, fully committed to maintaining freedom of navigation in areas in and around the South China Sea. In order to maintain freedom of navigation, the US has been conducting many FONOPs (freedom of navigation operations) both in the air and at sea. Meant to promote freedom, these operations have, on the contrary, led to a rise of tensions in the region. In October 2015, the American missile destroyer Lassen sailed within 12 miles of a Chinese-built artificial island called Subi Reef to conduct a FONOP8 in what were supposed to be international waters. China told the American ship to leave the area immediately. America ignored them, and has been conducting FONOPs ever since. India India has friendly relations with ASEAN countries and hostile relation with China, citing this, the ASEAN nations have encouraged India to get involved in the South China Sea as they see India as a strong and influential nation that can counter China and can help in peaceful negotiations (especially Singapore and Vietnam). India sees this as an opportunity to develop strong relations with 10 ASEAN nations and Japan (Japan is also very much concerned with the growing Chinese presence in the region as it may threaten 8 LaGrone, Sam. "U.S. Destroyer Comes Within 12 Nautical Miles of ChineseSouth China Sea Artificial Island, BeijingThreatens Response - USNI News." USNI News. N.p.
  • 18. their trade). This will also help India to gain support from other countries in times when China creates a problem for India. South China Sea sees a heavy percentage of world trade. Around 50% of India's trade passes through Malacca Strait (part of South China Sea). The presence of China's military threatens trade and energy exploration for other countries. This provides economic opportunities to India as countries like Vietnam have asked India to help them out in oil exploration. China has already warned India when ONGC and Petro Vietnam signed a MoU (Memorandum Of Understanding). Moreover, the increasing Chinese presence in the region has created a threat for Indian and Japanese trade. Therefore, India has to be involved in South China Sea to safeguard its economic opportunities and trade. From Strategic point of view, India might be interested in developing military and air base in South China Sea (as suggested by Defense Minister George Fernandes) to counter China from different directions because of the increasing Chinese presence in Indian Ocean which has become a huge matter of concern for the Indian Government. However, nothing can be said much in this regard as India hasn't said or done anything officially in developing a military presence in South China Sea.9 Previous Endeavors to solve the Dispute Code of ASEAN Conduct While tensions in the South China Sea are continuing to evolve, there are several processes and dialogues underway in an effort to build confidence within the region and establish a common code of conduct. On November 4 2002, ASEAN countries and China issued a joint ‘Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea’, which affirmed the signatories' commitment to international law and the freedom of navigation in the South China Sea. The Declaration also called for the adoption of a code of conduct 9 Karpukhin,Sergei. "China's Sovereignty Not Affected by South China Sea Case: Defence Minister."Reuters. Thomson Reuters, 13 July 2016.Web. 26 July 2016.
  • 19. for the South China Sea, to be negotiated by the parties subsequently. It is unclear how the possible negotiation of a code of conduct will be affected by international legal action that has been taken by the Philippines against China, or how ASEAN will respond to China’s recent policies in the South China Sea. However, as a basis for a code to be negotiated, confidence between the maritime powers in the South China Sea will first need to be established. International Tribunal Court: China vs Philippines The Philippines has aimed to use international law to assert its claims over the portion of the South China Sea that it calls the West Philippine Sea. A team of high-ranking government officials will be present in The Hague, the Netherlands, to set forth their arguments before the Permanent Court of Arbitration. One of them is Supreme Court Senior Associate Justice Antonio Carpio, who has spoken extensively on the Philippines’ position in the maritime dispute with China. To summarize the event, he says the Philippines is asking the tribunal to declare China’s nine-dashed line void. The nine-dashed line is China’s purportedly historical boundary that takes up 85% of the South China Sea, including 80% of the Philippines’ exclusive economic zone (EEZ) in the West Philippine Sea. While China stakes its claim based on its own version of history, Philippine claim stands on international maritime law.The United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) entitles a coastal state to an EEZ of 200 nautical miles of sea from its coastline. In some cases, this may include rights to an extended continental shelf. That means the state involved has exclusive rights to use and develop natural resources in and from the region. China itself is a signatory to UNCLOS, yet its nine-dashed line contradicts the clauses of the treaty.In its arbitration case, the Philippines’ government is asking the Permanent Court of Arbitration to identify the maritime entitlements generated by islands and rocks in the West Philippine Sea, as they call it, in order to deny China its claim. In December 2014, China released a statement saying that the dispute is ultimately about sovereignty over islands and
  • 20. therefore the standoff is territorial, not maritime. If so, the tribunal does not have the authority to hear the case. However, the tribunal court itself discusses such questions about whether the issue is within its jurisdiction. On the 12th of July, 2016, in a landmark ruling, the Permanent Court of Arbitration ruled in favor of the Philippines, thus declaring that China had breached the Philippines' sovereign rights by endangering its ships and fishing and oil projects in the energy-rich region. Although the court has ruled in favor of the Philippines, it does not have the power to enforce its ruling. What may look like a victory for the Philippines may actually backfire as Beijing's ambassador to the United States said that the international tribunal's ruling denying China's claims in the South China Sea will only "intensify conflict and even confrontation."18 Despite this, the ambassador, Cui Tiankai, also told an international forum in Washington that Beijing remains committed to negotiations with other parties in disputes over the vital trade route. With no conclusive action being taken from either side post the ruling, the world will just have to wait and see what exactly the repercussions of this supposedly groundbreaking ruling will be. UNCLOS The United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea defines the rights and responsibilities of nations in their use of the world's oceans, establishing guidelines for businesses, the environment, and the management of marine natural resources. Since its establishment, claimants in the South China Sea have scrambled to justify their claims in accordance with the provisions of the treaty. China, however, has done no such thing, and continues to maintain ‘strategic ambiguity’, with its claim only roughly defined by the Nine- Dash Line. Although the UNCLOS has its advantages, many experts conclude that the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Seas has complicated rather than simplified maritime law and security. The UNCLOS has enshrined customary maritime law, but it also contradicted it by extending national claims far to sea, well beyond traditional claims, in the form of Exclusive Economic Zones. This creation of EEZs
  • 21. established new claims and conflicts that never before existed. Traditionally the freedom of the high seas has included the use of the seas for military manoeuvres or exercises, including the use of weapons. This freedom – including the freedom to operate in EEZs – was supposed to be incorporated into UNCLOS. However, the language in the provisions pertaining to conduct of military activity in EEZs is far too ambiguous, and China has taken advantage of this. Owing to the ambiguity of the UNCLOS, the Chinese are trying to redefine it according to their own purposes. In order to solve the South China Sea Dispute, either the UNCLOS will have to be reformed or an entirely new but comprehensive treaty will have to be put in place. Without a clearly defined set of rules in place, attempts to solve the issue are futile. Possible Solutions The dispute on South China Sea can be solved with measures, which have been used in successful settlement of other disputes. For example, a legal solution is one that is quick and lasting. By adopting a legal solution, all claimants will agree to submit the dispute for arbitration to the International Court of Justice (ICJ), who will then judge the dispute according to the international laws applicable. A political solution, also called a one track approach, will be time consuming but lasting. By adopting a political solution, all parties will discuss the dispute on formal occasions, either at bilateral or multilateral levels. Other initiatives such as Confidence Building Measures or CBMs can also be utilized to avoid further conflict and to promote understanding among the nations. Confidence Building Measures can include a two track approach, where nations are encouraged to take up joint projects in the disputed areas as has been done before, especially with regards to cooperation in energy exploration. A two track approach supplements the one track approach. By holding informal meetings and carrying out cooperative projects, claimants can gain confidence and develop understanding. In the case of the South China Sea dispute, since most nations are reluctant to resolve the issue of sovereignty through any approach, a permanent peace is unlikely to be achieved
  • 22. for the time being. However, temporary peace is possible. Peace can be obtained only when claimants’ interests are attended to. Compared to the interest of sovereignty, the other two interests are comparatively easier to look after, namely the security of sea lanes and the exploration of natural resources. Stability and security of the South China Sea will be necessary for the economic development of all claimants. Previous efforts of claimants have laid the foundation to carry on further negotiations, fostering cooperation on all issues except territorial claims. In this regard, China’s proposal of setting aside the dispute will be a wise choice for all claimants. Owing to the complexity of the dispute, no single approach would be likely to achieve a permanent peace. A combination of the available approaches is necessary for obtaining peace. In this regard, the approaches which have been adopted by the claimants are taking the peace process in the right direction. First, the Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea, signed in 2002 shows signs of all claimants’ will to demilitarize the dispute. This effort ensures that the dispute develops into a political issue, which can be solved by a political approach in the future. Second, the two track approach, which includes the ASEAN Regional Forum and other informal meetings will play an important role in providing ideas and suggestions to solve the dispute and exchange information. This will help avoid further conflict due to misunderstandings and lack of communications. Other two track approaches, like the economic integration and energy co-exploration can further close ties between claimants. Third, the one track approaches, including the 10+1 Summit between ASEAN and Chinese leaders and other regular ministerial-level meeting mechanisms can review and co-ordinate each country’s behavior, serving to enhance understanding and cooperation. The ideal philosophy behind the combined approaches is that even though they may not ensure permanent peace, when the loss of economic interests and political risk outweigh the military gain, according to realist theory, states will act rationally to avoid conflict. Peace will be thus sustained.
  • 23. Key Terms The Nine-Dash Line10 The nine-dash line, also referred to as the "10-dash line" or the "11-dash line", refers to the demarcation line used initially by the government of the Republic of China (ROC / Taiwan) with the help of the United States legal office, and subsequently also by the government of the People's Republic of China (PRC), for their claims of the major part of the South China Sea. Despite having made the vague claim has not (as of 2016) filed a formal and specifically defined claim to the area within the dashes. (1947, China) The United Nations Convention of the Law of the Sea11 The United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), also called the Law of the Sea Convention or the Law of the Sea treaty, is the international agreement that resulted from the third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS III), which took place between 1973 and 1982. The Law of the Sea Convention defines the rights and responsibilities of nations with respect to their use of the world's oceans, establishing guidelines for businesses, the environment, and the management of marine natural resources. The Convention, concluded in 1982, replaced four 1958 treaties. As of June 2016, 167 countries and the European Union have joined in the Convention. Base-line12 Normally, the baseline from which the territorial sea is measured is the low-water line along the coast as marked on large-scale charts officially recognized by the coastal state. This is either the low-water mark closest to the shore, or alternatively it may be an unlimited distance from permanently exposed land, provided that some portion of elevations exposed at low tide but covered at high tide (like mud flats) is within 12 nautical miles (22 km; 14 mi) of permanently exposed land. Straight baselines can alternatively be defined connecting fringing islands along a coast, across the mouths of 10 Martin Riegl, Jakub Landovský, Irina Valko,eds.(26 November 2014). Strategic Regi ons in 21stCentury Power Politics.CambridgeScholars Publishing.pp.66–68. 11 "United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea". United Nations Treaty Series. Retrieved 2013-12-01 12 "United Nations Convention Law Of The Sea International LawEssay."UKes says.com. 11 2013. All Answ 7 2016
  • 24. rivers, or with certain restrictions across the mouths of bays. In this case, a bay is defined as "a well-marked indentation whose penetration is in such proportion to the width of its mouth as to contain land-locked waters and constitute more than a mere curvature of the coast. An indentation shall not, however, be regarded as a bay unless its area is as large as, or larger than, that of the semi-circle whose diameter is a line drawn across the mouth of that indentation". The baseline across the bay must also be no more than 24 nautical miles (44 km; 28 mi) in length. 13 unclos-united-nations-convention-on-the-law-of-the-sea-of-10-december-1982 Continental Shelf The continental shelf is defined as the natural prolongation of the land territory to the continental margin’s outer edge, or 200 nautical miles from the coastal state’s baseline, whichever is greater. State’s continental shelf may exceed 200 nautical miles until the natural prolongation ends. However, it may never exceed 350 nautical miles from the baseline; or it may never exceed 100 nautical miles beyond the 2,500 meter isobath (the line connecting the depth of 2,500 meters). Coastal states have the right to harvest mineral and non- living material in the subsoil of its continental shelf, to the exclusion of others. Coastal states also have exclusive control over living resources "attached" to the continental shelf, but not to creatures living in the water column beyond the exclusive economic zone. 13 unclos-united-nations-convention-on-the-law-of-the-sea-of-10-december-1982
  • 25. Territorial Waters Territorial waters or a territorial sea as defined by the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea,[1] is a belt of coastal waters extending at most 12 nautical miles (22.2 km; 13.8 mi) from the baseline (usually the mean low-water mark) of a coastal state. The territorial sea is regarded as the sovereign territory of the state, although foreign ships (civilian) are allowed innocent passage through it, or transit passage for straits; this sovereignty also extends to the airspace over and seabed below. Contiguous Zone The contiguous zone is a band of water extending from the outer edge of the territorial sea to up to 24 nautical miles (44.4 km; 27.6 mi) from the baseline, within which a state can exert limited control for the purpose of preventing or punishing "infringement of its customs, fiscal, immigration or sanitary laws and regulations within its territory or territorial sea". This will typically be 12 nautical miles (22 km; 14 mi) wide, but could be more (if a state has chosen to claim a territorial sea of less than 12 nautical miles), or less, if it would otherwise overlap another state's contiguous zone. However, unlike the territorial sea, there is no standard rule for resolving such conflicts and the states in question must negotiate their own compromise. Exclusive Economic Zone Extends from the edge of the territorial sea out to 200 nautical miles from the baseline. Within this area, the coastal nation has sole exploitation rights over all natural resources. In casual use, the term may include the territorial sea and even the continental shelf. The EEZs were introduced to halt the increasingly heated clashes over fishing rights, although oil was also becoming important. Foreign nations have the freedom of navigation and over flight, subject to the regulation of the coastal states. Foreign states may also lay submarine pipes and cables. The United States invoked a contiguous zone out to 24 nmi on 24 September 1999.
  • 26. References 1. Dingli, Shen, Elizabeth Economy, Richard Haass, Joshua Kurlantzick, Sheila A. Smith, and Simon Tay. "China's Maritime Dispute. "China's Maritime Dispute. Council on Foreign Affairs, 2013.Web.8 Oct.2015. 2. CNAS. Timeline: 1955-Present. Timeline: 1955-Present | Center for a New American Security. Center for a New American Security (CNAS), n.d. Web. 8 Oct. 2015. 3. DW. "South China Sea Timeline. "South China Sea Timeline | Asia | DW.COM |10.04.2013. DW, n.d. Web. 8 Oct. 2015. 4. Stirring up the South China Sea (IV): Oil in Troubled Waters –Crisis Group Asia Report N°275, 26 January2016 5. Langenheim, Johnny. Preventing Ecocide in South China Sea –The Guardian. July 15, 2015. 6. "South China Sea Timeline 1955-Present. "Center for a New American Security | .N.p., n.d. Web. 21 July 2016. http://www.cnas.org/flashpoints/timeline 7. Weissmann, Mikael. "THE SOUTH CHINA SEA CONFLICT AND SINO- ASEAN RELATIONS: A STUDY IN CONFLICT PREVENTION AND PEACE BUILDING." Asian Perspective 34.3 (2010): 35-69. Web. http://www.ui.se/upl/files/49747.pdf 8. Coughlin, Con. "Why the South China Sea Could Be the next Global Flashpoint." The Telegraph. Telegraph Media Group, 8 Apr. 2016. Web. 21 July 2016. http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2016/04/08/why-the-south-china-sea-could- be-the-next- global-flashpoint/ 9. O'Rourke, Ronald. Maritime Territorial and Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) Disputes Involving China: Issues for Congress (2016):n.pag. Web.https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/R42784.pdf 10. Robert D. Kaplan, "Asia's Cauldron"