This document summarizes China's disputes over maritime territories in the South China Sea. It discusses China's historical claim to much of the South China Sea based on the "Nine Dash Line" and its efforts to police foreign military activity in the region. However, an international tribunal recently invalidated China's Nine Dash Line claim as having no legal basis. Nonetheless, China continues actions to assert control, including recent military drills, and does not recognize the tribunal's authority. While China argues it has rights under the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea to regulate foreign activity in its EEZ, the tribunal found this does not permit restricting innocent passage of foreign militaries in international waters.

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China’s Maritime Disputes
Madison Sasnett
Senior Capstone Research- Draft
Professor McCarl
30 Novemeber 2016
China’s Maritime Disputes:
Sovereignty, International Waters, and Foreign Militaries
The South China Sea, SCS, is a region of immense wealth, commerce, and navigation.
Globalization and market growth has set the region on fire with contention between states, both
economically and militarily. The vast space has thus been seen by China as an opportunity to
exert its influence and apply historical roots into modern society. As they attempt to project their
sovereignty and control, conflicts have floated to the surface with neighboring countries as well
as with the United States military. There have been actions perpetrated by Chinese naval fronts
in direct attempts to buffer and police foreign militaries operating in the high seas as defined by
the United Nations Convention of the Law of the Sea. These actions stem from China’s goal of
enforcing territorial claims. In analyzing this situation, the question that begs to be answered is
what legal frameworks is China using to justify their policing of foreign militaries in
international regions that overlap with their exclusive economic zone and territorial claims? Are
these claims sound in regards to current conventions? It is in my conclusion that though Chinese
maritime actions may be rooted in historical values and a varied interpretation of UN
conventions, to which they are party, these claims do not hold true.

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EEZs and Conflicting Superpowers
Freedom of navigation has caused an uptick in tensions as well as actual direct conflicts
between China, its neighbors and, even the United States in the South China Sea, SCS. Increased
uneasiness has extended from Chinese actions to “embark on a substantial modernization of its
maritime paramilitary forces as well as naval capabilities” in order “to enforce its sovereignty
and jurisdiction claims by force if necessary” (Glaser). By patrolling these regions, the area is
being essentially being taken by a show of force. China is stretching its might against its
neighbors as a show of power and hegemony.
Economically $5.3 trillion worth of trade passes through the SCS (Dingli et. al.) and with
China’s EEZ encapsulating most of the region’s waterways, their push for full control of the sea
could reverberate through the global economy and raise tensions with neighboring countries. The
Council on Foreign Relations, CFR, states that there is roughly 190 trillion cubic feet of natural
gas within the subsoil of the SCS (Dingli et. al.). Focusing specifically on the Philippines, the
Reed Bank is a hard line for them but also an area that China claims as its own. For this research
I am not going to dive into which countries the islands/islets/shoal lines justly belong to within
the South China Sea, as it constitutes a separate analysis. Reverting back to the Reed Bank, there
are natural gas reserves present to which the Philippines are seeking to access and yet “oil survey
ships operating in Reed Bank under contract have increasingly been harassed by Chinese
vessels” (Glaser). This is a specific example of how China is attempting the police the economies
of its neighbors and due to the contention of ownership each state is in opposition.
Economic policing has the possibility to turn into militarized confrontation if tensions
continue to increase and an act of aggression is made. In regards to the Philippines, the US has a
bilateral peace and security agreement in which “an armed attack in the Pacific Area on either of

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the Parties would be dangerous to its own peace and safety and declares that it would act to meet
the common dangers” (Mutual Defense Treaty Article IV). Therefore, U.S. interest in the SCS is
increased; not only is the US striving for freedom of navigation, it has security agreements with a
nation directly involved and in opposition to China’s forceful goals which would require
involvement and protection if the policing by China becomes strong-armed.
Chinese and US relations have taken an uneasy turn the last several years in regards to
freedom of navigation of militaries. China seeks to enforce their sovereign rights and solidify
their influence and control. If successful, a buffer would be established in which foreign
militaries, especially the US, would have difficulty accessing the region in times of war or even
to assist in humanitarian efforts (Bader). There were “incidents in March 2001, September 2002,
March 2009, and May 2009, in which Chinese ships and aircraft confronted and harassed the
U.S. naval ships Bowditch, Impeccable, and Victorious as they were conducting survey and
ocean
surveillance operations in China’s EEZ” (O’Rourke 12). These harassments were meant to be a
display not of aggression as of now but an attempt to bully a great power. If successful, the US
image in the area would be vulnerable to other such attempts. In an aerial show of force “On
April 1, 2001, in a Chinese fighter collided with a U.S. Navy EP-3 electronic surveillance
aircraft flying in international airspace about 65 miles southeast of China’s Hainan Island in the
South China Sea, forcing the EP-3 to make an emergency landing on Hainan Island” (O’Rourke
12). Again, China is attempting to show its strength and legality by policing airspace; now
according to UNCLOS and established conventions, the locations these acts are taking place is
occurring in international waters and would not be deemed a threat to an EEZ, making their
present just. Conversely, China sees these acts as an invasion of their sovereignty so engagement

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would be just. In a direct military push to redirect US militarized ships “an incident [occurred]
on December 5, 2013, in which a Chinese navy ship put itself in the path of the U.S. Navy
cruiser Cowpens as it was operating 30 or more miles from China’s aircraft carrier Liaoning,
forcing the Cowpens to change course to avoid a collision” (O’Rourke 12). Two recent acts
which were perpetrated by Chinese fighters display the extent to which China strongly believes
the SCS is in their sovereign territory and willing to push right to the edge of physical action. It
would be apparent to presume China’s actions are attempts to weaken the US power and
influence in the Asia-Pacific region as well to further implement their own resolve of power;
“On August 19, 2014, in which a Chinese fighter conducted an aggressive and risky intercept of
a U.S. Navy P-8 maritime patrol aircraft that was flying in international airspace about 135 miles
east of Hainan and an incident on May 17, 2016, in which Chinese fighters flew within 50 feet of
a Navy EP-3 electronic surveillance aircraft in international airspace in the South China Sea—a
maneuver that DOD characterized as ‘unsafe’” (O’Rourke 12).
The concept of territorial disputes and that of policing militaries within China’s EEZ are
fundamental but also separate issues (O’Rourke 14). UNCLOS does not designate land rights
and to whom which territory belongs; China’s mainland is indisputable so the use of UCLOS and
their EEZ as their methodology for attempts to buffer foreign militaries would still be possible.
The territorial disputes, if won would only extend their reach but if lost it would not ultimately
alter their actions.
A rise in China’s naval efficiency and strength acts as a counter to US force and allies in
the region. The US main strategic goal would be to maintain freedom of navigation in the face of
Chinese attempts to police the region. To fully understand the reasoning’s for such actions and

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arguments as to why these actions are just on the part of the Chinese, one must understand the
legal frameworks at play in the region.
Legal Frameworks
China’s attempts at expanding their sovereign claims involve islets almost 90% of the
South China Sea arises from their historical Nine Dash line. The line was first brought into a
physical representation in 1947 under Nationalist China with the reasoning of “the experience of
historic surveying expeditions, fishing, and naval activities dating back to the 15th century”
(Chapman). As well in China’s modern academia, Wang Ying, a marine geographer, asserts
“that plenty of historical evidence supports Beijing’s claims of ancient sovereignty over the
South China Sea — from pottery shards to navigational handbooks used by Chinese fishermen”
(Beech). China is asserting that these interactions as well their critical involvement in WWII
against the Japanese support their ‘true’ boundary. In 1949 when the communist party came to
power in China the Nine Dash Line was accepted as the extent the country’s border. With this
agreeance, the population was indoctrinated, especially school children, with the outline of their
country’s power (Beech).
Modernization and the economic growth of China are factors in China’s goal of enforcing
their claimed sovereign borders. It can be deduced that the increase in interaction amongst States
as well as nationalistic goals of becoming a greater power that these conflicts that have arisen,
especially in the South China Sea. “In May 2009, Beijing's submitted a claim to the United
Nations Commission on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS)… using the nine-dashed map claiming
indisputable sovereignty” (Chapman); this assertion would neutralize the surrounding nations,

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Vietnam, Philippines, Malaysia, and Brunei’s claims and access to these waters and subsoil
assets. Deepening the mindset of this sovereign claim can be seen on modern Chinese maps and
on their passports which depict the Nine Dash Line but slightly altered from that of the original
1947 map, mainly “the new dashes hug the coasts of other Southeast Asian nations more closely,
giving China an even more expansive claim to the waterway” (Beech). Their assertion to expand
their sole rights to the area is being implemented socially, to engrain their people with this
knowledge, so that their support will have a solid foundation if these conflicts continue to rise.
In direct contrast to China’s historical claims, modernized conventions like that of
UNCLOS do not recognize historical boundaries. With the emergence of the globalized market
and an increase in access to far reaching markets, modern treaties and establishments created a
structure so that states and their citizens have a “a legal order for the seas and oceans which will
facilitate international communication, and will promote the peaceful uses of the seas and
oceans” (UNCLOS 25). UNCLOS operates as an organization to establish and dictate
interactions in the sea and territorial air space. It operates off of current physical land boundaries,
from which a States are provided territorial and sovereign rights of up to 12 nautical miles
(UNCLOS 27); outside of this would be considered international water and shared use by all
States. Now UNCLOS does provide rights for states whom establish an Exclusive Economic
Zone, or EEZ, of which can only extend up to 200 nautical miles (44). As well, the State is given
some controls within their EEZ in regards to foreign economic activity but as for military
purposes it does not specifically state. In response, China asserts that peaceful navigation
discussed in UNCLOS does not apply to militaries because of the fact militaries are not based in
a foundation of peace but rather either as a defense or offense (Pham). This supposed

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contradiction has been the tool in which Chinese scholars and officials have used to justify their
policing behavior of the South China Sea. In reading Article 58 of UNCLOS, one can find it
explicitly states that the right to freedom of navigation, as well as the freedom to engage
in internationally lawful uses of the sea … are also effective in a coastal state’s EEZ.
Thus, while the article’s language does not include reference to military activities, it can
be inferred that military survey activities are one such freedom related to the
aforementioned authorized activities (Pham).
UNCLOS Arbitral Tribunal and its Repercussions
The Philippines requested in 2013 that the case be heard in The Hague to decide whether
the actions of China on specific geographical claims, under the Nine Dash line, are valid. The
Philippines are making this request under UNCLOS, as both states are party to the convention.
As stated earlier, UNCLOS does not dictate as to which states have sovereignty and The Hague
makes clear of this in the Introduction, Article 5 “this Tribunal has not been asked to, and does
not purport to, make any ruling as to which State enjoys sovereignty over any land territory in
the South China Sea, in particular with respect to the disputes concerning sovereignty over the
Spratly Islands or Scarborough Shoal” (Arbitral Tribunal 1-2). Of the four main requests by the
Philippines for The Hague to evaluate and make a ruling on, the forerunning matter would be
that of the validity of the Nine Dash Line, and from which other actions are stemming (Arbitral
Tribunal 2). China though rejected the tribunal from the start and refused to send or appoint any
representatives. Informally though, China made its views clear on the existence of the tribunal.
As they asserted, “the essence of the subject-matter of the arbitration is the territorial sovereignty

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over the relevant maritime features in the South China Sea” (Arbitral Tribunal 4). Continuing to
make the claim that the dispute in the SCS is a territorial one, would make the UNCLOS method
of disagreement inappropriate.
Though the Tribunal recognized their contention, it could not be overlooked that the use
of the Nine Dash line was in fact to extend sovereignty over maritime boundaries that are not
based off of inhabitable islands but rather historical contexts. Though The Hague found the Nine
Dash line as contradictory and invalid amongst today’s agreed upon conventions and therefore
holds no place in dictating maritime boundaries, China still refuses to let their claims go. The
Chinese government’s mouthpiece, the People’s Daily, released an article following the decision
of the tribunal stating that “China will take all necessary measures to protect the territorial
sovereignty and maritime rights and interests, all against China's territorial sovereignty and
maritime rights and interests of the attempt can only be wishful thinking.” Essentially, they still
hold in regard their nationalist territorial views, and will not let modern conventions erase their
historical territory. “For this thoroughly political provocation, China will certainly not accept that
this is both a necessary move to defend China's territorial sovereignty and maritime rights and
interests, but also to maintain the dignity and status of international law, international law
practice just move” (People’s Daily).
The repercussions of China’s statements are yet to be fully known but with the language
of Chinese empowerment and protection of rights being exalted through the media tensions will
continue to rise. After the ruling was made, China declined to start bilateral talks with the
Philippines and later announced that “another set of military drills in the South China Sea,
following live-fire action earlier in the month” would take place. China is cordoning off part of
the South China Sea for war games from July 19 to 21, [2016]. Entrance to these waters by

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foreign ships, China’s Maritime Safety Administration said, will be “prohibited” (Beech).
These actions can be seen as an act of deterrence and strength. Operating militarily and taking
over sections of the SCS for a time period displays acts of hegemonic strength over its Asian
neighbors.
As this ruling negated the Nine Dash line, it does strike a blow to China’s justifications
for attempts at policing foreign militaries. As stated earlier, these acts are separate and The
Hague made no reference to military use in international waters but in the international arena,
China’s standing suffered. China has made it clear it does not want to back down and will defend
its territory but wishes to do so peacefully, at least as much as possible (People’s Daily). This
would seem in direct contradiction to the actions taking place prior to the ruling as outlined
earlier. China needs to maintain their dominance but whether they continue to attempt to fully
police militaries is in question.
The key to US ability to operate in international waters that overlap with an EEZ is
Article 58 of the UNCLOS. Seemingly the Chinese government actions seem to overlook this
act. The US military vessels that have incurred conflicts with the Chinese over the last decade
have not been there to attack, but merely as an oceanic survey and operating under their freedom
of navigation. If these vessels began to involve economic sources or entered into their territorial
airspace or waters, then it would be permissible to police such an action. However, this is not the
case. China uses the peaceful navigation ideal under UNCLOS but the Nine Dash line was the
presupposition to begin their policing efforts, because to them the SCS is generally a part of their
sovereign nation. In the international community, China’s loss in the Tribunal thus makes their
actions against foreign militaries formally unjust (Vuving).

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Analyzing the conflicts of the South China Sea reveals a deep rooted history in territorial
boundaries that date back to World War Two and pre-communist China. The basis of their
nationalism in expanded territory has been flourishing due to recent provocations by the
government. Even though China claims that the Nine Dash line is justifiable and its validity is
unquestionable amongst the nation, it does not hold true against current conventions and the path
of modernity that China has taken. To be a member of a convention that is organized to sustain
peace and order so that maritime claims would be equal and then superimpose ‘claimed historical
boundaries’ is perplexing and based in hypocrisy. Using UNCLOS to police militaries and
project an EEZ but yet also provide maritime territorial claims contrary to this organization only
discredits China’s standing.

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Bibliography
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the Republic of the Philippines and the People’s Republic of China.” 12 July 2016. Web.
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