SlideShare a Scribd company logo
Signaling Security
essentials.
Ready, steady, 5G!
Paolo Emiliani
Leading Technical Manager
Agenda
1/4 of presentation
V
Introduction about me and Positive Technologies
V
V
Security guidelines
V
Inherited and new security issues in 5G & IoT
The never ending battle
Who I am
 Started as Telecommunication and Airlines system Engineer in 1996
 System & Network Engineer in 2000
 Broadband/Distributed Network Designer
(deployment of one of biggest private network based on DWDM technology)
 Switched to security in 2010
 Working, having fun in a team of eager security friends
@ Positive Technologies, since 2012
 IoT Security Analyst
Signaling System 7
(SS7) security report
Vulnerabilities of
mobile Internet (GPRS)
2014 2016
Primary security threats
to SS7 cellular networks
2017
Threats to packet core
security of 4G network
Next-generation networks, next-level
cybersecurity problems (Diameter vulnerabilities)
2018
Diameter vulnerabilities
exposure report
2019
5G security
analytics
Positive Technologies at glance
V V
V
V
VV
17 years
of experience
in security development
and research
200+
zero-day vulnerabilities
discovered yearly
900 employees:
security engineers,
developers, analysts,
and others
200+
corporate security audits
performed for clients annually
250 experts
at our security
research center
50%
of all industrial and telecom
vulnerabilities are discovered
by our experts
We protect enterprise information
systems from cyberthreats by:
 Creating products and solutions
 Performing security audits
 Investigating incidents
 Researching threats
What we do
Competences:
Identification of threats and possible
attack scenarios in companies of any
business sphere
Global cybersecurity research
Wide range of products and services
portfolio: corporate, ICS, telecom,
financial, media, retail, government
National scale sports and government
cybersecurity service provider
Worldwide leadership
Web
Banking
ERP
Telecom
IoT
ICS
More IT technologies
penetrate
into other segments
Analytics
and research
OVER 20+
PUBLICATIONS YEARLY:
Quarterly reports on the latest cyber threats and
trends, forecasts and investigations of hacker
activity, industry-specific information
positive-tech.com/articles/
ptsecurity.com/ww-en/analytics
Agenda
2/4 of presentation
V
Introduction about me and Positive Technologies
V
V
Security guidelines
V
Inherited and new security issues in 5G & IoT
The never ending battle
Analogue
1980 1991 1999 2001 2005 2010 2017
1G 2G 2.5G+ 3G 3.5G 4G 5G
SS7
GTP
SIP
4.5G
APIs
Diameter
Mobile signaling history
2019
Constant & continual introduction of additional network access
1G 2G 2.5G+ 3G 3.5G 4G 5G4.5G
How everything started for us
Tell a story about how we
started. The first SA, the first
findings, how we helped
customers
...and then how we continued
to help customers on 3G 4 & 4.5G, customers
everywhere are experiencing
the new trending cross
protocol attacks
...and then how we continued
to help customers on 3G
Stories about people
Protocol threat comparisons
Successful attacks by threat types
Threat
Percentage of vulnerable
networks (2017)
SS7
networks
Diameter
networks
Subscriber information disclosure 100% 100%
Network information disclosure 63% 75%
Subscriber traffic interception 89% —*
Fraud 78% 33%
Subscriber denial of service 100% 100%
* In the tested networks, SMS transmission using the Diameter network was not carried out.
To establish voice calls in 4G networks, the SIP protocol is used.
Possible different reasons for previous generations
out performing Diameter in certain areas.
 SS7 threat awareness is higher
 Diameter specific challenges
Positive Technologies have further research being
published very soon looking at Diameter.
Comparing 4G networks using Diameter against
earlier network generations
Positive Technologies
SS7 Research Facts and Figures
Threat
Average number
of attacks per day
Subscriber information disclosure 4,827
IMSI disclosure 3,087
Subscriber location disclosure 3,718
Subscriber profile disclosure 47
Network information disclosure 4,294
Fraud 62
Call redirection 2
USSD request manipulation 59
Real-time billing evasion 2
SMS interception 1
Disruption of service availability for subscribers 4
Positive Technologies
SS7 Research Facts and Figures
Threat
Average number
of attacks per day
Subscriber information disclosure 4,827
IMSI disclosure 3,087
Subscriber location disclosure 3,718
Subscriber profile disclosure 47
Network information disclosure 4,294
Fraud 62
Call redirection 2
USSD request manipulation 59
Real-time billing evasion 2
SMS interception 1
Disruption of service availability for subscribers 4
Hackers exploit SS7
flaws to drain bank accounts
February 2017, Germany
Perform phishing attack and
steal usernames/passwords
for bank accounts
Perform SMS interception
attacks via SS7 and obtain
one-time passwords
Use OTPs to confirm
money transfer
theregister.co.uk/2017/05/03/hackers_fire_up_ss7_flaw
Causes of Diameter
Vulnerabilities
Encryption is formally mandatory, however not often used in home
and only occasionally at boundaries. In addition, encryption is peer-to-peer,
and not end-to-end so relies on trust
Substitution of the source is a specific behaviour of the Diameter protocol
where all responses must follow the same route the request came from.
Category 1
Category 2
Category 3
Successful Diameter attacks by GSMA FS.19 Category
* GSMA FS.19 document also describes the zero category but not considered here
CAT0
describes basic traffic filtering
at the network level
CAT1
includes configuring the
allowed interfaces and
messages on the DEA / DRA
CAT2
defines message filtering
and blocking by legitimacy
IMSI/source combination
CAT2
Operator mist cross reference
messages correspond to the
subscriber's motion matrix
(i.e. last fixed location and the
time since last location update).
Complex
Agenda
3/4 of presentation
V
Introduction about me and Positive Technologies
V
V
Security guidelines
V
Inherited and new security issues in 5G & IoT
The never ending battle
Convergence of
telecom and IT world
 The 5G network core
is TCP/IP-based
 These protocols are
open and well-known
 Tools for finding and
exploiting vulnerabilities
are available to
any adversary
Where do I start … slicing
 Splitting a network
into isolated slices
 Allocating separate
(virtual) resources
 Unique security
policies to each slice
Where do I start … slicing
more slices =
more virtual devices =
more configurations
BUT
1/3 successful attacks
during 4G network testing
due to misconfiguration
75% of corp harbored critical
or high-severity vulnerabilities
because of configuration flaws
Misconfiguration Misconfiguration Vulnerability in Rest API
Vulnerability in network equipment
New core, all virtual
 Lots of VMs
and containers
 Communication
over software bus
BUT NEF NRF PCF UDM AF
Network Exposure
Function
NF Repository
Function
Policy Control
Function
Unified Data
Management
Application
Function
AUSF
Authentication
Server Function
AMF
Core Access and Mobility
Management Function
SMF
Session Management
Function
Nnef Nnrf Npcf Nudm Naf
Nusf Namf Nsmf
UE (R)AN UPF DN
User Plane
Function
N2 N4
N5N3
N1
New core, all virtual, web-based
Example
of communication
between functions
Service Registration
Service Discovery
Session Establishment
Session
Establishment Request
HTTP PUT (NF register)
201 Created
HTTP PUT (NFDiscovery)
200 OK (List of SMSFs)
HTTP POST (Create PDU Session)
201 Created
More security by design but many
heterogeneous engress points
Plane Generation Protocol Authentication Confidentiality Integrity
2G/3G
SS7 — — —
GTPv1 — — —
4G
Diameter partial partial partial
GTPv2 — — —
5G HTTP/2 + + +
2G/3G/4G GTP — — —
5G
GTP-over-
IPSec
+ + +
Diameter usage can be
extended. Implementation is
under discussion with GSMA.
Encryption using IPsec can
provide more security in 5G.
But all the same was planned
for Diameter – never
implemented in real life.
Signaling /
Control
Data / User
The migration process
from 4G to 5G
The network evolution will happen in 2 steps
The existing network uses legacy
protocols. This stack of technologies
has security deficiencies that can lead
to data interception, fraud and DoS
attacks
During transition phase new 5G
radio network will be using EPC
since 5G core is not in place yet.
This means that all security issues
from the past are still relevant.
As soon as 5G standalone is
implemented it will probably solve
legacy security issues. But we need
to keep eye on new ones that will
definitely appear.
EPC
eNB
EPC
eNB gNB
EPC
eNB gNB
5GC
Today: 4G 2-5 years horizon:
Non-Standalone 5G
(Option #3, for instance)
In future:
Standalone 5G
Old/new threats applied
to the 5G architecture
An example 5G deployment
and the relevant attacks:
 Data interception
 Impersonation
 Denial of Service
 Asset compromise
 etc.
Inherited issue
AvailabilityConfidentiality
IntegrityIntegrity
ConfidentialityAvailability
USUALSECURITY
PRIORITIES
IOTSECURITY
PRIORITIES
5G non-standalone is vulnerable to denial of service
Problem is still there and not solved
Hacking 5G will be possible as hacking the web or enterprise
Difficulty of bypassing the perimeter (percentage of systems) Security level (percentage of web applications)
Now what can a hacker do?
Easily
From
anywhere
Any mobile
operator
No special
skills needed
Steal your money
Get access to your
email and social media
Track your location
Intercept your data, calls,
and SMS messages
Take control of
your digital identity
from
GSM to 5G
Different protocols
SAME THREATS
Perform massive
denial-of-service attacks
Briefly about IoT
GARTNER: "By 2020, over 25% of identified attacks in enterprises will involve IoT"
32%
37%
24%
8%
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
35
40
1 2 3 4
Smart metering
 Gas metering
 Water metering
Smart cities
 Streetlights
 Parking
 Waste management
Consumer
 White goods
 People tracking
Smart buildings
 Alarm systems
 HVAC
 Access control
Agriculture / Environment
 Land / Environment monitoring
 Pillution monitoring
 Animal trackingAlready
use IoT
Preparing to
implement IoT
Will wait
and see
Will wait as long
possible
Guess how easy is it?
Millions of connected IoT devices mean
millions of potential botnet soldiers
Mirai,
500K devices
in botnet
2016
1M potentially
vulnerable
2019 TOTAL RESULTS 1,086,395
TOP COUNTRIES
Application
Network
Device
IoT/Cellular IoT Device
Reserve Analyze and Security
Assessment on IoT Device
M2M SIM
SS7 SA, GTP SA
Diameter SA,
Secure Network
GTP SA,
Penetration Testing
IoT Web &
Mobile App
Web and Mobile
Application
Testing
MNO IoT
Manegement
System
Penetration
Testing
SIM
Management
Platform
Penetration
Testing
Big Data
Platform
Penetration
Testing
Management Level:
Service Providers IoT
with Private offices
for B2B Clients
Penetration Testing
To Secure IoT you have
to know its DNA
Agenda
4/4 of presentation
V
Security guidelines
 Adherence to standards
 4/5G Security cycle
 IoT Security recomendations
Security
recommendations
GSMA
 FS.07 SS7 and SIGTRAN Network Security
 FS.11 SS7 Interconnect Security Monitoring Guidelines
 IR.82 Security SS7 implementation on SS7 network
guidelines
 FS.21 Overview document on SS7 Diameter and GTP.
 FS.19 Diameter Protocol Security
 IR.88 Provides detail on Diameter & GTP protocols
and interworking with SS7
FCC
FCC Public Notice and CSRIC's Legacy
Systems Risk Reductions Report
ENISA
Signaling Security in Telecom
SS7/Diameter/5G. EU level assessment
of the current situation
GSMA Recommendations
Explained
GSMA
FS.07
GSMA
FS.11
GSMA
FS.82
Monitoring
Filtering
SS7 Interconnect security monitoring and firewall guidelines
SS7 and SIGTRAN network security
SS7 security network implementation guidlines
1.1 Overview
Signalling System 7 (SS7) was designed and initially deployed for a closed telecommunications community because
relatively few telephone companies with well-defined network boundaries existed. Therefore, SS7 possesses limited
security capabilities, but that environment no longer exists because of market liberalization/deregulation.
1.1 Overview
This document is designed to outline at a high level how mobile operators can monitor and sample interconnect Signalling
System 7 (SS7) traffic to investigate if they have experienced, or are likely to experience, unwanted or malicious SS7 traffic
that may affect their network, and to improve the protection of their networks against such traffic. It outlines signs of
abnormalities, how operators can handle these abnormalities to protect their networks, and how an operator can report
these abnormalities to the GSMA.
1.1 Overview
This document describes the different recommended and practical technical details of SS7 security aspects implemented
by PLMNs or carriers in order to counter potential SS7 attacks.
Earlier versions of this document (before 2014) were focussed only on SMS and the scope is now extended to all SS7
messages, including MAP and CAP signalling.
GSMA Recommendations
Explained
GSMA
FS.19
GSMA
FS.21
GSMA
FS.88
Diameter interconnect security
Interconnect signaling security recommendations
LTE and EPC Roaming guidlines
1.1 Overview
Mobile network operators (MNOs) have historically treated all signaling messages received from outside the network as trusted and
necessary/ As access to and use of the signaling networks has evolved, interconnect signaling protocols such as Signaling System number
7 (SS7), Diameter, and the GPRS Tunneling Protocol (GTP) have been discovered to be vulnerable to exploitation, potentially enabling
attackers to perform eavesdropping, service denial, location tracking and fraud. The GSMA has produced recommendations for mobile
operators to mitigate these risks and prevent attacks by monitoring and filtering signaling traffic, leading to greater protection for their
customers and businesses/ This document provides a risk-based introduction to the topic in a non-technical manner.
1.1 Overview
This document outlines potential Diameter based attacks against mobile networks and their customers, and
countermeasures for those attacks. It aims to provide an understanding of potential risks, threats and countermeasures
related to LTE and 5G interconnection security to GSMA members. This document describes attacks and countermeasures
known to the authors at the time of publication, but future research may highlight possible new attacks at any time. The
full details of technical countermeasures can be found in GSMA permanent reference document (PRD) IR.88 [9].
1.1 Overview
This document aims to provide a standardised view on how Long Term Evolution (LTE) and Evolved Packet Core (EPC)
networks can interwork in order to provide "Next Generation Mobile Network" capabilities when users roam onto a
network different from their HPMN. Expectations of the "Next Generation Mobile Network” capabilities are described in
the GSMA Project Document: Next Generation Roaming and Interoperability (NGRAI) Project Scope White Paper [16].
Complete Telecom
Operator Security
V
GSMA Recommendations
Start monitoring
Impossible to prevent signaling network
access: detection is the key
GSMA, Interconnect Security
The usage of automated ways of testing
and monitoring may become mandatory Assess
Monitor
Protect
Auditing provides the essential
visibility to fully understand your
ever changing network risks.
Continual real time monitoring is essential
to measure network security efficiency
and provide rapid detection and mitigation.
Completely secure
your network by
addressing both
generic
vulnerabilities
(GSMA) and the
threats that actually
effect you as an
ongoing process.
Complete Telecom
Operator Security
V
GSMA Recommendations
Start security testing
Network Architecture and
ImplementationAudit / Testing
 Auditing … is the only way to ensure
that security is working the way it should
 A variety of attacks have already been successfully
performed on production network equipment of MNOs
 Only a comprehensive approach to security will
result in effectively countering the attacks described
Assess
Monitor
Protect
Auditing provides the essential
visibility to fully understand your
ever changing network risks.
Continual real time monitoring is essential
to measure network security efficiency
and provide rapid detection and mitigation.
Completely secure
your network by
addressing both
generic
vulnerabilities
(GSMA) and the
threats that actually
effect you as an
ongoing process.
Step 1. Introduce monitoring
of signaling security
Step 1 Step 2 Step 3 Step 4 Step 5
Why you need it
Your network is being attacked right now:
focus your attention on the vulnerabilities
being exploited in real-time
Always be aware of new breaches
and threats
Follow GSMA recommendations
on security monitoring (FS.11)
Results
Ability to take proactive measures
during early stages of an attack
Empirical evidence for the
operator showing the likely sources
of illegitimate traffic
How to do it
Install SS7 security monitoring system
Route copy of external signaling traffic
to the system
Identify malicious traffic
and its sources in real time
PT—TAD (Treat inteligence – IDS)
Passive traffic taps feed
monitor with raw traffic
or traffic copy
Detect dangerous traffic
and list active attack
sources
Analyze and prioritize
real threats for your
network and subscribers
Step 2.
Implement protection measures
Step 1 Step 2 Step 3 Step 4 Step 5
Why you need it
You already know your attack
exposure and which vulnerabilities are
being exploited, so now protect your
network immediately
Results
Improved security level
of the network
Reduction in the number
of attack attempts
How to do it
Create a filtering policy
Fine-tune network configuration
Contact the MNOs that originate
suspicious traffic
Protect
Targeted protection
against hacker attacks
Protection against
configuration errors
More security with less
efforts
Powerful threat
intelligence
Step 3.
Signaling security assessment
Step 1 Step 2 Step 3 Step 4 Step 5
Why you need it
Gain visibility into signaling network
vulnerabilities
See your network the way a hacker sees it
Follow GSMA recommendations (IR.82)
Results
Understanding of all existing
vulnerabilities
Step-by-step plan for mitigating
weaknesses before intruders start
abusing them
How to do it
Scan the network from international
signaling vantage point
Use advanced methods to check whether
current security tools are effective
Vulnerability
Management
Deliverables
 Information about existing
and potential vulnerabilities
 Recommendations for
improving network security
 Highly valuable info to
assess risks — you see
what hackers see!
Step 4.
Threats Validation / evaluation
Step 1 Step 2 Step 3 Step 4 Step 5
Why you need it
Identify threats and risks
Evaluate which risks are most
urgent for your company
Results
Informed decision
Tailored strategy
Effective action plan
How to do it
You already know:
 Your network flaws
 Vulnerabilities that are being exploited
 Vulnerabilities that could be exploited in the future
 Malicious countries, operators, and sources
 Attacked subscribers
With all information at hand,
now decide which risks to tackle first
Step 5.
Deploy security process
Step 1 Step 2 Step 3 Step 4 Step 5
Why you need it
Once you have an action plan and
know exactly what to do, it’s time
to implement your security strategy
Then check that the implemented
measures are effective
Results
Persistent awareness of the state
of security on your network
Benchmarking of the security level
Immediate reaction to security
incidents
How to do it
Continue security monitoring
Respond to threats as they occur
Scan the network regularly
Conclusion
Assess
Monitor
Protect
Auditing provides essential
visibility to fully understand your
ever-changing network risks.
Non-stop real-time monitoring is essential for
verifying the effectiveness of network security
and supporting rapid detection and mitigation.
Completely secure
your network by
addressing both
generic
vulnerabilities
(GSMA) and the
threats that actually
affect you as part of
an ongoing process.
 Visibility is the key to securing any protocol
as it allows informed security decisions
 Protection is possible using a number
of strategies
 Expert support speeds mitigations
and reduces resource demands
 Security is an ongoing process
and developing so long term easily
actionable strategy is key
Comprehensive
Multifaceted IoT Security Roadmap
Security
Assessment
Protection
Enforcement
Continuous
compliance
And new MQTT—
Enterprise landscapes
And new MQTT—
Enterprise landscapes
Technical aspect and Benefits
 Ability to filter out/in topics allowed
 Real-time dashboard & centralized console to:
 manage all IoT Firewalls in the domain
 view and manage attacks/exclusions/configurations
 Ability to drill-down into single firewall’s event
 Compact, yet powerful, dedicated hardware or Vm
 TLS offloading
 Monitor of anomalies of publisher/
subscriber by DPI
 Parse and identify anomalies automatically
(HMM) or manually (with regex)
 Ability to manage certificates for authentic-
cation with self-signed CA or their own CA
IoT How to secure?
IoT/NB-IoT Device
Reserve Analyze and Security
Assessment on IoT Device
M2M SIM
SS7 SA, GTP SA
Diameter SA,
Secure Network
GTP SA,
Penetration Testing
IoT Web &
Mobile App
Web and Mobile
Application
Testing
MNO IoT
Manegement
System
Penetration
Testing
SIM
Management
Platform
Penetration
Testing
Big Data
Platform
Penetration
Testing
Management Level:
Service Providers IoT
with Private offices
for B2B Clients
Penetration Testing
 Multi-Discipline Security
Supply chain security certification / SA
 Potentially Requires Large
Operator Security Team — Or Partnership
with a Large or Multiple Security Suppliers
 Continually Developing Services
Ongoing and Growing
Security Testing + MQTT FW
5G deployment
verification
Ensure protection
where interoperability
required from day one
Secure new
interfaces and
communications
channels
Safeguard
SDN/NFV and
virtual environment
Implement policies
separately for
network slices
Take IoT in your
network under control
where possible
Get support
from our experts
Take a comprehensive
security approach:
 positive-tech.com/products/signalling-firewall/
 positive-tech.com/products/signalling-ids/
 positive-tech.com/services/express-monitoring/
 positive-tech.com/services/gsma-compliance-check/
 positive-tech.com/services/telecom-security/
 positive-tech.com/services/iot-security/
Learn more about
telecom security:
 positive-tech.com/articles/5g-security-issues/
 positive-tech.com/articles/ss7-vulnerability-2018/
 positive-tech.com/articles/next-generation-networks-next-level-
cybersecurity-problems/
with more at
positive-tech.com
contact@positive-tech.com
Thank
you

More Related Content

What's hot

4G to 5G Evolution
4G to 5G Evolution4G to 5G Evolution
4G to 5G Evolution
Manoj Singh
 
5G Services Story
5G Services Story5G Services Story
5G Services Story
Ericsson
 
High-level architecture of Mobile Cellular Networks from 2G to 5G
High-level architecture of Mobile Cellular Networks from 2G to 5GHigh-level architecture of Mobile Cellular Networks from 2G to 5G
High-level architecture of Mobile Cellular Networks from 2G to 5G
3G4G
 
Part 6: Standalone and Non-Standalone 5G - 5G for Absolute Beginners
Part 6: Standalone and Non-Standalone 5G - 5G for Absolute BeginnersPart 6: Standalone and Non-Standalone 5G - 5G for Absolute Beginners
Part 6: Standalone and Non-Standalone 5G - 5G for Absolute Beginners
3G4G
 
5G Standards: 3GPP Release 15, 16, and beyond
5G Standards: 3GPP Release 15, 16, and beyond5G Standards: 3GPP Release 15, 16, and beyond
5G Standards: 3GPP Release 15, 16, and beyond
3G4G
 
5G Shared Spectrum
5G Shared Spectrum5G Shared Spectrum
5G Shared Spectrum
Qualcomm Research
 
Mavenir: Why and How Private LTE & 5G Networks Are Rapidly Evolving for Enter...
Mavenir: Why and How Private LTE & 5G Networks Are Rapidly Evolving for Enter...Mavenir: Why and How Private LTE & 5G Networks Are Rapidly Evolving for Enter...
Mavenir: Why and How Private LTE & 5G Networks Are Rapidly Evolving for Enter...
Mavenir
 
Intermediate: 5G Network Architecture Options (Updated)
Intermediate: 5G Network Architecture Options (Updated)Intermediate: 5G Network Architecture Options (Updated)
Intermediate: 5G Network Architecture Options (Updated)
3G4G
 
5G Concept
5G Concept5G Concept
5G ConceptEricsson
 
Advanced: Private Networks & 5G Non-Public Networks
Advanced: Private Networks & 5G Non-Public NetworksAdvanced: Private Networks & 5G Non-Public Networks
Advanced: Private Networks & 5G Non-Public Networks
3G4G
 
5G Network Overview
 5G Network Overview 5G Network Overview
5G Network Overview
Hamidreza Bolhasani
 
2G / 3G / 4G / IMS / 5G Overview with Focus on Core Network
2G / 3G / 4G / IMS / 5G Overview with Focus on Core Network2G / 3G / 4G / IMS / 5G Overview with Focus on Core Network
2G / 3G / 4G / IMS / 5G Overview with Focus on Core Network
Hamidreza Bolhasani
 
6G Training Course Part 9: Course Summary & Conclusion
6G Training Course Part 9: Course Summary & Conclusion6G Training Course Part 9: Course Summary & Conclusion
6G Training Course Part 9: Course Summary & Conclusion
3G4G
 
What is a Private 5G Network.pdf
What is a Private 5G Network.pdfWhat is a Private 5G Network.pdf
What is a Private 5G Network.pdf
Antenna Manufacturer Coco
 
5G_NR_Overview_Architecture_and_Operating_Modes
5G_NR_Overview_Architecture_and_Operating_Modes5G_NR_Overview_Architecture_and_Operating_Modes
5G_NR_Overview_Architecture_and_Operating_Modes
Aalekh Jain
 
3GPP Packet Core Towards 5G Communication Systems
3GPP Packet Core Towards 5G Communication Systems3GPP Packet Core Towards 5G Communication Systems
3GPP Packet Core Towards 5G Communication Systems
Ofinno
 
Packet core network basics
Packet core network basicsPacket core network basics
Packet core network basics
Mustafa Golam
 
Mobile spectrum and network evolution to 2025 slides coleago - 24 mar 21
Mobile spectrum and network evolution to 2025 slides   coleago - 24 mar 21Mobile spectrum and network evolution to 2025 slides   coleago - 24 mar 21
Mobile spectrum and network evolution to 2025 slides coleago - 24 mar 21
Coleago Consulting
 
Setting off the 5G Advanced evolution with 3GPP Release 18
Setting off the 5G Advanced evolution with 3GPP Release 18Setting off the 5G Advanced evolution with 3GPP Release 18
Setting off the 5G Advanced evolution with 3GPP Release 18
Qualcomm Research
 
Telecom incidents investigation: daily work behind the scenes
Telecom incidents investigation: daily work behind the scenesTelecom incidents investigation: daily work behind the scenes
Telecom incidents investigation: daily work behind the scenes
PositiveTechnologies
 

What's hot (20)

4G to 5G Evolution
4G to 5G Evolution4G to 5G Evolution
4G to 5G Evolution
 
5G Services Story
5G Services Story5G Services Story
5G Services Story
 
High-level architecture of Mobile Cellular Networks from 2G to 5G
High-level architecture of Mobile Cellular Networks from 2G to 5GHigh-level architecture of Mobile Cellular Networks from 2G to 5G
High-level architecture of Mobile Cellular Networks from 2G to 5G
 
Part 6: Standalone and Non-Standalone 5G - 5G for Absolute Beginners
Part 6: Standalone and Non-Standalone 5G - 5G for Absolute BeginnersPart 6: Standalone and Non-Standalone 5G - 5G for Absolute Beginners
Part 6: Standalone and Non-Standalone 5G - 5G for Absolute Beginners
 
5G Standards: 3GPP Release 15, 16, and beyond
5G Standards: 3GPP Release 15, 16, and beyond5G Standards: 3GPP Release 15, 16, and beyond
5G Standards: 3GPP Release 15, 16, and beyond
 
5G Shared Spectrum
5G Shared Spectrum5G Shared Spectrum
5G Shared Spectrum
 
Mavenir: Why and How Private LTE & 5G Networks Are Rapidly Evolving for Enter...
Mavenir: Why and How Private LTE & 5G Networks Are Rapidly Evolving for Enter...Mavenir: Why and How Private LTE & 5G Networks Are Rapidly Evolving for Enter...
Mavenir: Why and How Private LTE & 5G Networks Are Rapidly Evolving for Enter...
 
Intermediate: 5G Network Architecture Options (Updated)
Intermediate: 5G Network Architecture Options (Updated)Intermediate: 5G Network Architecture Options (Updated)
Intermediate: 5G Network Architecture Options (Updated)
 
5G Concept
5G Concept5G Concept
5G Concept
 
Advanced: Private Networks & 5G Non-Public Networks
Advanced: Private Networks & 5G Non-Public NetworksAdvanced: Private Networks & 5G Non-Public Networks
Advanced: Private Networks & 5G Non-Public Networks
 
5G Network Overview
 5G Network Overview 5G Network Overview
5G Network Overview
 
2G / 3G / 4G / IMS / 5G Overview with Focus on Core Network
2G / 3G / 4G / IMS / 5G Overview with Focus on Core Network2G / 3G / 4G / IMS / 5G Overview with Focus on Core Network
2G / 3G / 4G / IMS / 5G Overview with Focus on Core Network
 
6G Training Course Part 9: Course Summary & Conclusion
6G Training Course Part 9: Course Summary & Conclusion6G Training Course Part 9: Course Summary & Conclusion
6G Training Course Part 9: Course Summary & Conclusion
 
What is a Private 5G Network.pdf
What is a Private 5G Network.pdfWhat is a Private 5G Network.pdf
What is a Private 5G Network.pdf
 
5G_NR_Overview_Architecture_and_Operating_Modes
5G_NR_Overview_Architecture_and_Operating_Modes5G_NR_Overview_Architecture_and_Operating_Modes
5G_NR_Overview_Architecture_and_Operating_Modes
 
3GPP Packet Core Towards 5G Communication Systems
3GPP Packet Core Towards 5G Communication Systems3GPP Packet Core Towards 5G Communication Systems
3GPP Packet Core Towards 5G Communication Systems
 
Packet core network basics
Packet core network basicsPacket core network basics
Packet core network basics
 
Mobile spectrum and network evolution to 2025 slides coleago - 24 mar 21
Mobile spectrum and network evolution to 2025 slides   coleago - 24 mar 21Mobile spectrum and network evolution to 2025 slides   coleago - 24 mar 21
Mobile spectrum and network evolution to 2025 slides coleago - 24 mar 21
 
Setting off the 5G Advanced evolution with 3GPP Release 18
Setting off the 5G Advanced evolution with 3GPP Release 18Setting off the 5G Advanced evolution with 3GPP Release 18
Setting off the 5G Advanced evolution with 3GPP Release 18
 
Telecom incidents investigation: daily work behind the scenes
Telecom incidents investigation: daily work behind the scenesTelecom incidents investigation: daily work behind the scenes
Telecom incidents investigation: daily work behind the scenes
 

Similar to Signaling security essentials. Ready, steady, 5G!

Positive approach to security of Core networks
Positive approach to security of Core networksPositive approach to security of Core networks
Positive approach to security of Core networks
PositiveTechnologies
 
5G mission diary: Houston, we have a problem
5G mission diary: Houston, we have a problem5G mission diary: Houston, we have a problem
5G mission diary: Houston, we have a problem
PositiveTechnologies
 
SS7: 2G/3G's weakest link
SS7: 2G/3G's weakest linkSS7: 2G/3G's weakest link
SS7: 2G/3G's weakest link
PositiveTechnologies
 
Security course: exclusive 5G SA pitfalls and new changes to legislation
Security course: exclusive 5G SA pitfalls and new changes to legislationSecurity course: exclusive 5G SA pitfalls and new changes to legislation
Security course: exclusive 5G SA pitfalls and new changes to legislation
PositiveTechnologies
 
Abdullah Al Mamun 062507056
Abdullah Al Mamun 062507056Abdullah Al Mamun 062507056
Abdullah Al Mamun 062507056mashiur
 
Security Gen Ensures Robust Telecom Security with Comprehensive Assessments
Security Gen Ensures Robust Telecom Security with Comprehensive AssessmentsSecurity Gen Ensures Robust Telecom Security with Comprehensive Assessments
Security Gen Ensures Robust Telecom Security with Comprehensive Assessments
SecurityGen1
 
Unlock the Future: SecurityGen's 5G Standalone Solutions
Unlock the Future: SecurityGen's 5G Standalone SolutionsUnlock the Future: SecurityGen's 5G Standalone Solutions
Unlock the Future: SecurityGen's 5G Standalone Solutions
Security Gen
 
Enhance Your Network Security with NGFW Firewall Solutions by SecurityGen
Enhance Your Network Security with NGFW Firewall Solutions by SecurityGenEnhance Your Network Security with NGFW Firewall Solutions by SecurityGen
Enhance Your Network Security with NGFW Firewall Solutions by SecurityGen
SecurityGen1
 
Elevate Safety with Security Gen: Unraveling the Power of Signaling Security
Elevate Safety with Security Gen: Unraveling the Power of Signaling SecurityElevate Safety with Security Gen: Unraveling the Power of Signaling Security
Elevate Safety with Security Gen: Unraveling the Power of Signaling Security
SecurityGen1
 
SecurityGen's Pioneering Approach to 5G Security Services
SecurityGen's Pioneering Approach to 5G Security ServicesSecurityGen's Pioneering Approach to 5G Security Services
SecurityGen's Pioneering Approach to 5G Security Services
SecurityGen1
 
Protecting Your Text Messages: SecurityGen's SMS Fraud Detection Solutions
Protecting Your Text Messages: SecurityGen's SMS Fraud Detection SolutionsProtecting Your Text Messages: SecurityGen's SMS Fraud Detection Solutions
Protecting Your Text Messages: SecurityGen's SMS Fraud Detection Solutions
SecurityGen1
 
Securing the Future Safeguarding 5G Networks with Advanced Security Solutions...
Securing the Future Safeguarding 5G Networks with Advanced Security Solutions...Securing the Future Safeguarding 5G Networks with Advanced Security Solutions...
Securing the Future Safeguarding 5G Networks with Advanced Security Solutions...
SecurityGen1
 
Elevating Network Security through NGFW Firewalls.pdf
Elevating Network Security through NGFW Firewalls.pdfElevating Network Security through NGFW Firewalls.pdf
Elevating Network Security through NGFW Firewalls.pdf
SecurityGen1
 
Chrono Defend: Time-Traveling Safeguards through NGFW Firewall Innovation
Chrono Defend: Time-Traveling Safeguards through NGFW Firewall InnovationChrono Defend: Time-Traveling Safeguards through NGFW Firewall Innovation
Chrono Defend: Time-Traveling Safeguards through NGFW Firewall Innovation
SecurityGen1
 
NGFW - An Updated Overview
NGFW - An Updated Overview NGFW - An Updated Overview
NGFW - An Updated Overview
Security Gen
 
Navigating the Unseen Risks: Exploring 5G Vulnerabilities
Navigating the Unseen Risks: Exploring 5G VulnerabilitiesNavigating the Unseen Risks: Exploring 5G Vulnerabilities
Navigating the Unseen Risks: Exploring 5G Vulnerabilities
SecurityGen1
 
Unveiling SecurityGen's Advanced 5G Security Services
Unveiling SecurityGen's Advanced 5G Security ServicesUnveiling SecurityGen's Advanced 5G Security Services
Unveiling SecurityGen's Advanced 5G Security Services
SecurityGen1
 
Address 5G Vulnerabilities with SecurityGen's Expert Solution
Address 5G Vulnerabilities with SecurityGen's Expert SolutionAddress 5G Vulnerabilities with SecurityGen's Expert Solution
Address 5G Vulnerabilities with SecurityGen's Expert Solution
Security Gen
 
Security Technique and Congestion Avoidance in Mesh Network
Security Technique and Congestion Avoidance in Mesh NetworkSecurity Technique and Congestion Avoidance in Mesh Network
Security Technique and Congestion Avoidance in Mesh Network
ijtsrd
 
COMPREHENSIVE SURVEY OF POSSIBLE SECURITY ISSUES ON 4G NETWORKS
COMPREHENSIVE SURVEY OF POSSIBLE SECURITY ISSUES ON 4G NETWORKSCOMPREHENSIVE SURVEY OF POSSIBLE SECURITY ISSUES ON 4G NETWORKS
COMPREHENSIVE SURVEY OF POSSIBLE SECURITY ISSUES ON 4G NETWORKS
IJNSA Journal
 

Similar to Signaling security essentials. Ready, steady, 5G! (20)

Positive approach to security of Core networks
Positive approach to security of Core networksPositive approach to security of Core networks
Positive approach to security of Core networks
 
5G mission diary: Houston, we have a problem
5G mission diary: Houston, we have a problem5G mission diary: Houston, we have a problem
5G mission diary: Houston, we have a problem
 
SS7: 2G/3G's weakest link
SS7: 2G/3G's weakest linkSS7: 2G/3G's weakest link
SS7: 2G/3G's weakest link
 
Security course: exclusive 5G SA pitfalls and new changes to legislation
Security course: exclusive 5G SA pitfalls and new changes to legislationSecurity course: exclusive 5G SA pitfalls and new changes to legislation
Security course: exclusive 5G SA pitfalls and new changes to legislation
 
Abdullah Al Mamun 062507056
Abdullah Al Mamun 062507056Abdullah Al Mamun 062507056
Abdullah Al Mamun 062507056
 
Security Gen Ensures Robust Telecom Security with Comprehensive Assessments
Security Gen Ensures Robust Telecom Security with Comprehensive AssessmentsSecurity Gen Ensures Robust Telecom Security with Comprehensive Assessments
Security Gen Ensures Robust Telecom Security with Comprehensive Assessments
 
Unlock the Future: SecurityGen's 5G Standalone Solutions
Unlock the Future: SecurityGen's 5G Standalone SolutionsUnlock the Future: SecurityGen's 5G Standalone Solutions
Unlock the Future: SecurityGen's 5G Standalone Solutions
 
Enhance Your Network Security with NGFW Firewall Solutions by SecurityGen
Enhance Your Network Security with NGFW Firewall Solutions by SecurityGenEnhance Your Network Security with NGFW Firewall Solutions by SecurityGen
Enhance Your Network Security with NGFW Firewall Solutions by SecurityGen
 
Elevate Safety with Security Gen: Unraveling the Power of Signaling Security
Elevate Safety with Security Gen: Unraveling the Power of Signaling SecurityElevate Safety with Security Gen: Unraveling the Power of Signaling Security
Elevate Safety with Security Gen: Unraveling the Power of Signaling Security
 
SecurityGen's Pioneering Approach to 5G Security Services
SecurityGen's Pioneering Approach to 5G Security ServicesSecurityGen's Pioneering Approach to 5G Security Services
SecurityGen's Pioneering Approach to 5G Security Services
 
Protecting Your Text Messages: SecurityGen's SMS Fraud Detection Solutions
Protecting Your Text Messages: SecurityGen's SMS Fraud Detection SolutionsProtecting Your Text Messages: SecurityGen's SMS Fraud Detection Solutions
Protecting Your Text Messages: SecurityGen's SMS Fraud Detection Solutions
 
Securing the Future Safeguarding 5G Networks with Advanced Security Solutions...
Securing the Future Safeguarding 5G Networks with Advanced Security Solutions...Securing the Future Safeguarding 5G Networks with Advanced Security Solutions...
Securing the Future Safeguarding 5G Networks with Advanced Security Solutions...
 
Elevating Network Security through NGFW Firewalls.pdf
Elevating Network Security through NGFW Firewalls.pdfElevating Network Security through NGFW Firewalls.pdf
Elevating Network Security through NGFW Firewalls.pdf
 
Chrono Defend: Time-Traveling Safeguards through NGFW Firewall Innovation
Chrono Defend: Time-Traveling Safeguards through NGFW Firewall InnovationChrono Defend: Time-Traveling Safeguards through NGFW Firewall Innovation
Chrono Defend: Time-Traveling Safeguards through NGFW Firewall Innovation
 
NGFW - An Updated Overview
NGFW - An Updated Overview NGFW - An Updated Overview
NGFW - An Updated Overview
 
Navigating the Unseen Risks: Exploring 5G Vulnerabilities
Navigating the Unseen Risks: Exploring 5G VulnerabilitiesNavigating the Unseen Risks: Exploring 5G Vulnerabilities
Navigating the Unseen Risks: Exploring 5G Vulnerabilities
 
Unveiling SecurityGen's Advanced 5G Security Services
Unveiling SecurityGen's Advanced 5G Security ServicesUnveiling SecurityGen's Advanced 5G Security Services
Unveiling SecurityGen's Advanced 5G Security Services
 
Address 5G Vulnerabilities with SecurityGen's Expert Solution
Address 5G Vulnerabilities with SecurityGen's Expert SolutionAddress 5G Vulnerabilities with SecurityGen's Expert Solution
Address 5G Vulnerabilities with SecurityGen's Expert Solution
 
Security Technique and Congestion Avoidance in Mesh Network
Security Technique and Congestion Avoidance in Mesh NetworkSecurity Technique and Congestion Avoidance in Mesh Network
Security Technique and Congestion Avoidance in Mesh Network
 
COMPREHENSIVE SURVEY OF POSSIBLE SECURITY ISSUES ON 4G NETWORKS
COMPREHENSIVE SURVEY OF POSSIBLE SECURITY ISSUES ON 4G NETWORKSCOMPREHENSIVE SURVEY OF POSSIBLE SECURITY ISSUES ON 4G NETWORKS
COMPREHENSIVE SURVEY OF POSSIBLE SECURITY ISSUES ON 4G NETWORKS
 

More from PositiveTechnologies

Telecom under attack: demo of fraud scenarios and countermeasures
Telecom under attack: demo of fraud scenarios and countermeasuresTelecom under attack: demo of fraud scenarios and countermeasures
Telecom under attack: demo of fraud scenarios and countermeasures
PositiveTechnologies
 
Migrating mobile networks to 5 g a smooth and secure approach 01.10.20
Migrating mobile networks to 5 g a smooth and secure approach 01.10.20Migrating mobile networks to 5 g a smooth and secure approach 01.10.20
Migrating mobile networks to 5 g a smooth and secure approach 01.10.20
PositiveTechnologies
 
Cybersecurity & Fraud Mitigation in Telcos
Cybersecurity & Fraud Mitigation in TelcosCybersecurity & Fraud Mitigation in Telcos
Cybersecurity & Fraud Mitigation in Telcos
PositiveTechnologies
 
On the verge of fraud
On the verge of fraudOn the verge of fraud
On the verge of fraud
PositiveTechnologies
 
Attacks you can't combat: vulnerabilities of most robust MNOs
Attacks you can't combat: vulnerabilities of most robust MNOsAttacks you can't combat: vulnerabilities of most robust MNOs
Attacks you can't combat: vulnerabilities of most robust MNOs
PositiveTechnologies
 
Simjacker: how to protect your network from the latest hot vulnerability
Simjacker: how to protect your network from the latest hot vulnerabilitySimjacker: how to protect your network from the latest hot vulnerability
Simjacker: how to protect your network from the latest hot vulnerability
PositiveTechnologies
 
Creating a fuzzer for telecom protocol 4G LTE case study
Creating a fuzzer for telecom protocol 4G LTE case studyCreating a fuzzer for telecom protocol 4G LTE case study
Creating a fuzzer for telecom protocol 4G LTE case study
PositiveTechnologies
 
SS7 Vulnerabilities
SS7 VulnerabilitiesSS7 Vulnerabilities
SS7 Vulnerabilities
PositiveTechnologies
 

More from PositiveTechnologies (8)

Telecom under attack: demo of fraud scenarios and countermeasures
Telecom under attack: demo of fraud scenarios and countermeasuresTelecom under attack: demo of fraud scenarios and countermeasures
Telecom under attack: demo of fraud scenarios and countermeasures
 
Migrating mobile networks to 5 g a smooth and secure approach 01.10.20
Migrating mobile networks to 5 g a smooth and secure approach 01.10.20Migrating mobile networks to 5 g a smooth and secure approach 01.10.20
Migrating mobile networks to 5 g a smooth and secure approach 01.10.20
 
Cybersecurity & Fraud Mitigation in Telcos
Cybersecurity & Fraud Mitigation in TelcosCybersecurity & Fraud Mitigation in Telcos
Cybersecurity & Fraud Mitigation in Telcos
 
On the verge of fraud
On the verge of fraudOn the verge of fraud
On the verge of fraud
 
Attacks you can't combat: vulnerabilities of most robust MNOs
Attacks you can't combat: vulnerabilities of most robust MNOsAttacks you can't combat: vulnerabilities of most robust MNOs
Attacks you can't combat: vulnerabilities of most robust MNOs
 
Simjacker: how to protect your network from the latest hot vulnerability
Simjacker: how to protect your network from the latest hot vulnerabilitySimjacker: how to protect your network from the latest hot vulnerability
Simjacker: how to protect your network from the latest hot vulnerability
 
Creating a fuzzer for telecom protocol 4G LTE case study
Creating a fuzzer for telecom protocol 4G LTE case studyCreating a fuzzer for telecom protocol 4G LTE case study
Creating a fuzzer for telecom protocol 4G LTE case study
 
SS7 Vulnerabilities
SS7 VulnerabilitiesSS7 Vulnerabilities
SS7 Vulnerabilities
 

Recently uploaded

Mission to Decommission: Importance of Decommissioning Products to Increase E...
Mission to Decommission: Importance of Decommissioning Products to Increase E...Mission to Decommission: Importance of Decommissioning Products to Increase E...
Mission to Decommission: Importance of Decommissioning Products to Increase E...
Product School
 
Accelerate your Kubernetes clusters with Varnish Caching
Accelerate your Kubernetes clusters with Varnish CachingAccelerate your Kubernetes clusters with Varnish Caching
Accelerate your Kubernetes clusters with Varnish Caching
Thijs Feryn
 
Unsubscribed: Combat Subscription Fatigue With a Membership Mentality by Head...
Unsubscribed: Combat Subscription Fatigue With a Membership Mentality by Head...Unsubscribed: Combat Subscription Fatigue With a Membership Mentality by Head...
Unsubscribed: Combat Subscription Fatigue With a Membership Mentality by Head...
Product School
 
GDG Cloud Southlake #33: Boule & Rebala: Effective AppSec in SDLC using Deplo...
GDG Cloud Southlake #33: Boule & Rebala: Effective AppSec in SDLC using Deplo...GDG Cloud Southlake #33: Boule & Rebala: Effective AppSec in SDLC using Deplo...
GDG Cloud Southlake #33: Boule & Rebala: Effective AppSec in SDLC using Deplo...
James Anderson
 
Knowledge engineering: from people to machines and back
Knowledge engineering: from people to machines and backKnowledge engineering: from people to machines and back
Knowledge engineering: from people to machines and back
Elena Simperl
 
To Graph or Not to Graph Knowledge Graph Architectures and LLMs
To Graph or Not to Graph Knowledge Graph Architectures and LLMsTo Graph or Not to Graph Knowledge Graph Architectures and LLMs
To Graph or Not to Graph Knowledge Graph Architectures and LLMs
Paul Groth
 
Builder.ai Founder Sachin Dev Duggal's Strategic Approach to Create an Innova...
Builder.ai Founder Sachin Dev Duggal's Strategic Approach to Create an Innova...Builder.ai Founder Sachin Dev Duggal's Strategic Approach to Create an Innova...
Builder.ai Founder Sachin Dev Duggal's Strategic Approach to Create an Innova...
Ramesh Iyer
 
PCI PIN Basics Webinar from the Controlcase Team
PCI PIN Basics Webinar from the Controlcase TeamPCI PIN Basics Webinar from the Controlcase Team
PCI PIN Basics Webinar from the Controlcase Team
ControlCase
 
Smart TV Buyer Insights Survey 2024 by 91mobiles.pdf
Smart TV Buyer Insights Survey 2024 by 91mobiles.pdfSmart TV Buyer Insights Survey 2024 by 91mobiles.pdf
Smart TV Buyer Insights Survey 2024 by 91mobiles.pdf
91mobiles
 
Monitoring Java Application Security with JDK Tools and JFR Events
Monitoring Java Application Security with JDK Tools and JFR EventsMonitoring Java Application Security with JDK Tools and JFR Events
Monitoring Java Application Security with JDK Tools and JFR Events
Ana-Maria Mihalceanu
 
The Future of Platform Engineering
The Future of Platform EngineeringThe Future of Platform Engineering
The Future of Platform Engineering
Jemma Hussein Allen
 
Epistemic Interaction - tuning interfaces to provide information for AI support
Epistemic Interaction - tuning interfaces to provide information for AI supportEpistemic Interaction - tuning interfaces to provide information for AI support
Epistemic Interaction - tuning interfaces to provide information for AI support
Alan Dix
 
UiPath Test Automation using UiPath Test Suite series, part 4
UiPath Test Automation using UiPath Test Suite series, part 4UiPath Test Automation using UiPath Test Suite series, part 4
UiPath Test Automation using UiPath Test Suite series, part 4
DianaGray10
 
Software Delivery At the Speed of AI: Inflectra Invests In AI-Powered Quality
Software Delivery At the Speed of AI: Inflectra Invests In AI-Powered QualitySoftware Delivery At the Speed of AI: Inflectra Invests In AI-Powered Quality
Software Delivery At the Speed of AI: Inflectra Invests In AI-Powered Quality
Inflectra
 
FIDO Alliance Osaka Seminar: Overview.pdf
FIDO Alliance Osaka Seminar: Overview.pdfFIDO Alliance Osaka Seminar: Overview.pdf
FIDO Alliance Osaka Seminar: Overview.pdf
FIDO Alliance
 
Kubernetes & AI - Beauty and the Beast !?! @KCD Istanbul 2024
Kubernetes & AI - Beauty and the Beast !?! @KCD Istanbul 2024Kubernetes & AI - Beauty and the Beast !?! @KCD Istanbul 2024
Kubernetes & AI - Beauty and the Beast !?! @KCD Istanbul 2024
Tobias Schneck
 
Slack (or Teams) Automation for Bonterra Impact Management (fka Social Soluti...
Slack (or Teams) Automation for Bonterra Impact Management (fka Social Soluti...Slack (or Teams) Automation for Bonterra Impact Management (fka Social Soluti...
Slack (or Teams) Automation for Bonterra Impact Management (fka Social Soluti...
Jeffrey Haguewood
 
FIDO Alliance Osaka Seminar: The WebAuthn API and Discoverable Credentials.pdf
FIDO Alliance Osaka Seminar: The WebAuthn API and Discoverable Credentials.pdfFIDO Alliance Osaka Seminar: The WebAuthn API and Discoverable Credentials.pdf
FIDO Alliance Osaka Seminar: The WebAuthn API and Discoverable Credentials.pdf
FIDO Alliance
 
Generating a custom Ruby SDK for your web service or Rails API using Smithy
Generating a custom Ruby SDK for your web service or Rails API using SmithyGenerating a custom Ruby SDK for your web service or Rails API using Smithy
Generating a custom Ruby SDK for your web service or Rails API using Smithy
g2nightmarescribd
 
De-mystifying Zero to One: Design Informed Techniques for Greenfield Innovati...
De-mystifying Zero to One: Design Informed Techniques for Greenfield Innovati...De-mystifying Zero to One: Design Informed Techniques for Greenfield Innovati...
De-mystifying Zero to One: Design Informed Techniques for Greenfield Innovati...
Product School
 

Recently uploaded (20)

Mission to Decommission: Importance of Decommissioning Products to Increase E...
Mission to Decommission: Importance of Decommissioning Products to Increase E...Mission to Decommission: Importance of Decommissioning Products to Increase E...
Mission to Decommission: Importance of Decommissioning Products to Increase E...
 
Accelerate your Kubernetes clusters with Varnish Caching
Accelerate your Kubernetes clusters with Varnish CachingAccelerate your Kubernetes clusters with Varnish Caching
Accelerate your Kubernetes clusters with Varnish Caching
 
Unsubscribed: Combat Subscription Fatigue With a Membership Mentality by Head...
Unsubscribed: Combat Subscription Fatigue With a Membership Mentality by Head...Unsubscribed: Combat Subscription Fatigue With a Membership Mentality by Head...
Unsubscribed: Combat Subscription Fatigue With a Membership Mentality by Head...
 
GDG Cloud Southlake #33: Boule & Rebala: Effective AppSec in SDLC using Deplo...
GDG Cloud Southlake #33: Boule & Rebala: Effective AppSec in SDLC using Deplo...GDG Cloud Southlake #33: Boule & Rebala: Effective AppSec in SDLC using Deplo...
GDG Cloud Southlake #33: Boule & Rebala: Effective AppSec in SDLC using Deplo...
 
Knowledge engineering: from people to machines and back
Knowledge engineering: from people to machines and backKnowledge engineering: from people to machines and back
Knowledge engineering: from people to machines and back
 
To Graph or Not to Graph Knowledge Graph Architectures and LLMs
To Graph or Not to Graph Knowledge Graph Architectures and LLMsTo Graph or Not to Graph Knowledge Graph Architectures and LLMs
To Graph or Not to Graph Knowledge Graph Architectures and LLMs
 
Builder.ai Founder Sachin Dev Duggal's Strategic Approach to Create an Innova...
Builder.ai Founder Sachin Dev Duggal's Strategic Approach to Create an Innova...Builder.ai Founder Sachin Dev Duggal's Strategic Approach to Create an Innova...
Builder.ai Founder Sachin Dev Duggal's Strategic Approach to Create an Innova...
 
PCI PIN Basics Webinar from the Controlcase Team
PCI PIN Basics Webinar from the Controlcase TeamPCI PIN Basics Webinar from the Controlcase Team
PCI PIN Basics Webinar from the Controlcase Team
 
Smart TV Buyer Insights Survey 2024 by 91mobiles.pdf
Smart TV Buyer Insights Survey 2024 by 91mobiles.pdfSmart TV Buyer Insights Survey 2024 by 91mobiles.pdf
Smart TV Buyer Insights Survey 2024 by 91mobiles.pdf
 
Monitoring Java Application Security with JDK Tools and JFR Events
Monitoring Java Application Security with JDK Tools and JFR EventsMonitoring Java Application Security with JDK Tools and JFR Events
Monitoring Java Application Security with JDK Tools and JFR Events
 
The Future of Platform Engineering
The Future of Platform EngineeringThe Future of Platform Engineering
The Future of Platform Engineering
 
Epistemic Interaction - tuning interfaces to provide information for AI support
Epistemic Interaction - tuning interfaces to provide information for AI supportEpistemic Interaction - tuning interfaces to provide information for AI support
Epistemic Interaction - tuning interfaces to provide information for AI support
 
UiPath Test Automation using UiPath Test Suite series, part 4
UiPath Test Automation using UiPath Test Suite series, part 4UiPath Test Automation using UiPath Test Suite series, part 4
UiPath Test Automation using UiPath Test Suite series, part 4
 
Software Delivery At the Speed of AI: Inflectra Invests In AI-Powered Quality
Software Delivery At the Speed of AI: Inflectra Invests In AI-Powered QualitySoftware Delivery At the Speed of AI: Inflectra Invests In AI-Powered Quality
Software Delivery At the Speed of AI: Inflectra Invests In AI-Powered Quality
 
FIDO Alliance Osaka Seminar: Overview.pdf
FIDO Alliance Osaka Seminar: Overview.pdfFIDO Alliance Osaka Seminar: Overview.pdf
FIDO Alliance Osaka Seminar: Overview.pdf
 
Kubernetes & AI - Beauty and the Beast !?! @KCD Istanbul 2024
Kubernetes & AI - Beauty and the Beast !?! @KCD Istanbul 2024Kubernetes & AI - Beauty and the Beast !?! @KCD Istanbul 2024
Kubernetes & AI - Beauty and the Beast !?! @KCD Istanbul 2024
 
Slack (or Teams) Automation for Bonterra Impact Management (fka Social Soluti...
Slack (or Teams) Automation for Bonterra Impact Management (fka Social Soluti...Slack (or Teams) Automation for Bonterra Impact Management (fka Social Soluti...
Slack (or Teams) Automation for Bonterra Impact Management (fka Social Soluti...
 
FIDO Alliance Osaka Seminar: The WebAuthn API and Discoverable Credentials.pdf
FIDO Alliance Osaka Seminar: The WebAuthn API and Discoverable Credentials.pdfFIDO Alliance Osaka Seminar: The WebAuthn API and Discoverable Credentials.pdf
FIDO Alliance Osaka Seminar: The WebAuthn API and Discoverable Credentials.pdf
 
Generating a custom Ruby SDK for your web service or Rails API using Smithy
Generating a custom Ruby SDK for your web service or Rails API using SmithyGenerating a custom Ruby SDK for your web service or Rails API using Smithy
Generating a custom Ruby SDK for your web service or Rails API using Smithy
 
De-mystifying Zero to One: Design Informed Techniques for Greenfield Innovati...
De-mystifying Zero to One: Design Informed Techniques for Greenfield Innovati...De-mystifying Zero to One: Design Informed Techniques for Greenfield Innovati...
De-mystifying Zero to One: Design Informed Techniques for Greenfield Innovati...
 

Signaling security essentials. Ready, steady, 5G!

  • 1. Signaling Security essentials. Ready, steady, 5G! Paolo Emiliani Leading Technical Manager
  • 2. Agenda 1/4 of presentation V Introduction about me and Positive Technologies V V Security guidelines V Inherited and new security issues in 5G & IoT The never ending battle
  • 3. Who I am  Started as Telecommunication and Airlines system Engineer in 1996  System & Network Engineer in 2000  Broadband/Distributed Network Designer (deployment of one of biggest private network based on DWDM technology)  Switched to security in 2010  Working, having fun in a team of eager security friends @ Positive Technologies, since 2012  IoT Security Analyst Signaling System 7 (SS7) security report Vulnerabilities of mobile Internet (GPRS) 2014 2016 Primary security threats to SS7 cellular networks 2017 Threats to packet core security of 4G network Next-generation networks, next-level cybersecurity problems (Diameter vulnerabilities) 2018 Diameter vulnerabilities exposure report 2019 5G security analytics
  • 4. Positive Technologies at glance V V V V VV 17 years of experience in security development and research 200+ zero-day vulnerabilities discovered yearly 900 employees: security engineers, developers, analysts, and others 200+ corporate security audits performed for clients annually 250 experts at our security research center 50% of all industrial and telecom vulnerabilities are discovered by our experts We protect enterprise information systems from cyberthreats by:  Creating products and solutions  Performing security audits  Investigating incidents  Researching threats
  • 5. What we do Competences: Identification of threats and possible attack scenarios in companies of any business sphere Global cybersecurity research Wide range of products and services portfolio: corporate, ICS, telecom, financial, media, retail, government National scale sports and government cybersecurity service provider Worldwide leadership Web Banking ERP Telecom IoT ICS More IT technologies penetrate into other segments
  • 6. Analytics and research OVER 20+ PUBLICATIONS YEARLY: Quarterly reports on the latest cyber threats and trends, forecasts and investigations of hacker activity, industry-specific information positive-tech.com/articles/ ptsecurity.com/ww-en/analytics
  • 7. Agenda 2/4 of presentation V Introduction about me and Positive Technologies V V Security guidelines V Inherited and new security issues in 5G & IoT The never ending battle
  • 8. Analogue 1980 1991 1999 2001 2005 2010 2017 1G 2G 2.5G+ 3G 3.5G 4G 5G SS7 GTP SIP 4.5G APIs Diameter Mobile signaling history 2019 Constant & continual introduction of additional network access
  • 9. 1G 2G 2.5G+ 3G 3.5G 4G 5G4.5G How everything started for us Tell a story about how we started. The first SA, the first findings, how we helped customers ...and then how we continued to help customers on 3G 4 & 4.5G, customers everywhere are experiencing the new trending cross protocol attacks ...and then how we continued to help customers on 3G Stories about people
  • 10. Protocol threat comparisons Successful attacks by threat types Threat Percentage of vulnerable networks (2017) SS7 networks Diameter networks Subscriber information disclosure 100% 100% Network information disclosure 63% 75% Subscriber traffic interception 89% —* Fraud 78% 33% Subscriber denial of service 100% 100% * In the tested networks, SMS transmission using the Diameter network was not carried out. To establish voice calls in 4G networks, the SIP protocol is used. Possible different reasons for previous generations out performing Diameter in certain areas.  SS7 threat awareness is higher  Diameter specific challenges Positive Technologies have further research being published very soon looking at Diameter. Comparing 4G networks using Diameter against earlier network generations
  • 11. Positive Technologies SS7 Research Facts and Figures Threat Average number of attacks per day Subscriber information disclosure 4,827 IMSI disclosure 3,087 Subscriber location disclosure 3,718 Subscriber profile disclosure 47 Network information disclosure 4,294 Fraud 62 Call redirection 2 USSD request manipulation 59 Real-time billing evasion 2 SMS interception 1 Disruption of service availability for subscribers 4
  • 12. Positive Technologies SS7 Research Facts and Figures Threat Average number of attacks per day Subscriber information disclosure 4,827 IMSI disclosure 3,087 Subscriber location disclosure 3,718 Subscriber profile disclosure 47 Network information disclosure 4,294 Fraud 62 Call redirection 2 USSD request manipulation 59 Real-time billing evasion 2 SMS interception 1 Disruption of service availability for subscribers 4 Hackers exploit SS7 flaws to drain bank accounts February 2017, Germany Perform phishing attack and steal usernames/passwords for bank accounts Perform SMS interception attacks via SS7 and obtain one-time passwords Use OTPs to confirm money transfer theregister.co.uk/2017/05/03/hackers_fire_up_ss7_flaw
  • 13. Causes of Diameter Vulnerabilities Encryption is formally mandatory, however not often used in home and only occasionally at boundaries. In addition, encryption is peer-to-peer, and not end-to-end so relies on trust Substitution of the source is a specific behaviour of the Diameter protocol where all responses must follow the same route the request came from. Category 1 Category 2 Category 3 Successful Diameter attacks by GSMA FS.19 Category * GSMA FS.19 document also describes the zero category but not considered here CAT0 describes basic traffic filtering at the network level CAT1 includes configuring the allowed interfaces and messages on the DEA / DRA CAT2 defines message filtering and blocking by legitimacy IMSI/source combination CAT2 Operator mist cross reference messages correspond to the subscriber's motion matrix (i.e. last fixed location and the time since last location update). Complex
  • 14. Agenda 3/4 of presentation V Introduction about me and Positive Technologies V V Security guidelines V Inherited and new security issues in 5G & IoT The never ending battle
  • 15. Convergence of telecom and IT world  The 5G network core is TCP/IP-based  These protocols are open and well-known  Tools for finding and exploiting vulnerabilities are available to any adversary
  • 16. Where do I start … slicing  Splitting a network into isolated slices  Allocating separate (virtual) resources  Unique security policies to each slice
  • 17. Where do I start … slicing more slices = more virtual devices = more configurations BUT 1/3 successful attacks during 4G network testing due to misconfiguration 75% of corp harbored critical or high-severity vulnerabilities because of configuration flaws Misconfiguration Misconfiguration Vulnerability in Rest API Vulnerability in network equipment
  • 18. New core, all virtual  Lots of VMs and containers  Communication over software bus BUT NEF NRF PCF UDM AF Network Exposure Function NF Repository Function Policy Control Function Unified Data Management Application Function AUSF Authentication Server Function AMF Core Access and Mobility Management Function SMF Session Management Function Nnef Nnrf Npcf Nudm Naf Nusf Namf Nsmf UE (R)AN UPF DN User Plane Function N2 N4 N5N3 N1
  • 19. New core, all virtual, web-based Example of communication between functions Service Registration Service Discovery Session Establishment Session Establishment Request HTTP PUT (NF register) 201 Created HTTP PUT (NFDiscovery) 200 OK (List of SMSFs) HTTP POST (Create PDU Session) 201 Created
  • 20. More security by design but many heterogeneous engress points Plane Generation Protocol Authentication Confidentiality Integrity 2G/3G SS7 — — — GTPv1 — — — 4G Diameter partial partial partial GTPv2 — — — 5G HTTP/2 + + + 2G/3G/4G GTP — — — 5G GTP-over- IPSec + + + Diameter usage can be extended. Implementation is under discussion with GSMA. Encryption using IPsec can provide more security in 5G. But all the same was planned for Diameter – never implemented in real life. Signaling / Control Data / User
  • 21. The migration process from 4G to 5G The network evolution will happen in 2 steps The existing network uses legacy protocols. This stack of technologies has security deficiencies that can lead to data interception, fraud and DoS attacks During transition phase new 5G radio network will be using EPC since 5G core is not in place yet. This means that all security issues from the past are still relevant. As soon as 5G standalone is implemented it will probably solve legacy security issues. But we need to keep eye on new ones that will definitely appear. EPC eNB EPC eNB gNB EPC eNB gNB 5GC Today: 4G 2-5 years horizon: Non-Standalone 5G (Option #3, for instance) In future: Standalone 5G
  • 22. Old/new threats applied to the 5G architecture An example 5G deployment and the relevant attacks:  Data interception  Impersonation  Denial of Service  Asset compromise  etc.
  • 24. Problem is still there and not solved Hacking 5G will be possible as hacking the web or enterprise Difficulty of bypassing the perimeter (percentage of systems) Security level (percentage of web applications)
  • 25. Now what can a hacker do? Easily From anywhere Any mobile operator No special skills needed Steal your money Get access to your email and social media Track your location Intercept your data, calls, and SMS messages Take control of your digital identity from GSM to 5G Different protocols SAME THREATS Perform massive denial-of-service attacks
  • 26. Briefly about IoT GARTNER: "By 2020, over 25% of identified attacks in enterprises will involve IoT" 32% 37% 24% 8% 0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40 1 2 3 4 Smart metering  Gas metering  Water metering Smart cities  Streetlights  Parking  Waste management Consumer  White goods  People tracking Smart buildings  Alarm systems  HVAC  Access control Agriculture / Environment  Land / Environment monitoring  Pillution monitoring  Animal trackingAlready use IoT Preparing to implement IoT Will wait and see Will wait as long possible
  • 27. Guess how easy is it? Millions of connected IoT devices mean millions of potential botnet soldiers Mirai, 500K devices in botnet 2016 1M potentially vulnerable 2019 TOTAL RESULTS 1,086,395 TOP COUNTRIES
  • 28. Application Network Device IoT/Cellular IoT Device Reserve Analyze and Security Assessment on IoT Device M2M SIM SS7 SA, GTP SA Diameter SA, Secure Network GTP SA, Penetration Testing IoT Web & Mobile App Web and Mobile Application Testing MNO IoT Manegement System Penetration Testing SIM Management Platform Penetration Testing Big Data Platform Penetration Testing Management Level: Service Providers IoT with Private offices for B2B Clients Penetration Testing To Secure IoT you have to know its DNA
  • 29. Agenda 4/4 of presentation V Security guidelines  Adherence to standards  4/5G Security cycle  IoT Security recomendations
  • 30. Security recommendations GSMA  FS.07 SS7 and SIGTRAN Network Security  FS.11 SS7 Interconnect Security Monitoring Guidelines  IR.82 Security SS7 implementation on SS7 network guidelines  FS.21 Overview document on SS7 Diameter and GTP.  FS.19 Diameter Protocol Security  IR.88 Provides detail on Diameter & GTP protocols and interworking with SS7 FCC FCC Public Notice and CSRIC's Legacy Systems Risk Reductions Report ENISA Signaling Security in Telecom SS7/Diameter/5G. EU level assessment of the current situation
  • 31. GSMA Recommendations Explained GSMA FS.07 GSMA FS.11 GSMA FS.82 Monitoring Filtering SS7 Interconnect security monitoring and firewall guidelines SS7 and SIGTRAN network security SS7 security network implementation guidlines 1.1 Overview Signalling System 7 (SS7) was designed and initially deployed for a closed telecommunications community because relatively few telephone companies with well-defined network boundaries existed. Therefore, SS7 possesses limited security capabilities, but that environment no longer exists because of market liberalization/deregulation. 1.1 Overview This document is designed to outline at a high level how mobile operators can monitor and sample interconnect Signalling System 7 (SS7) traffic to investigate if they have experienced, or are likely to experience, unwanted or malicious SS7 traffic that may affect their network, and to improve the protection of their networks against such traffic. It outlines signs of abnormalities, how operators can handle these abnormalities to protect their networks, and how an operator can report these abnormalities to the GSMA. 1.1 Overview This document describes the different recommended and practical technical details of SS7 security aspects implemented by PLMNs or carriers in order to counter potential SS7 attacks. Earlier versions of this document (before 2014) were focussed only on SMS and the scope is now extended to all SS7 messages, including MAP and CAP signalling.
  • 32. GSMA Recommendations Explained GSMA FS.19 GSMA FS.21 GSMA FS.88 Diameter interconnect security Interconnect signaling security recommendations LTE and EPC Roaming guidlines 1.1 Overview Mobile network operators (MNOs) have historically treated all signaling messages received from outside the network as trusted and necessary/ As access to and use of the signaling networks has evolved, interconnect signaling protocols such as Signaling System number 7 (SS7), Diameter, and the GPRS Tunneling Protocol (GTP) have been discovered to be vulnerable to exploitation, potentially enabling attackers to perform eavesdropping, service denial, location tracking and fraud. The GSMA has produced recommendations for mobile operators to mitigate these risks and prevent attacks by monitoring and filtering signaling traffic, leading to greater protection for their customers and businesses/ This document provides a risk-based introduction to the topic in a non-technical manner. 1.1 Overview This document outlines potential Diameter based attacks against mobile networks and their customers, and countermeasures for those attacks. It aims to provide an understanding of potential risks, threats and countermeasures related to LTE and 5G interconnection security to GSMA members. This document describes attacks and countermeasures known to the authors at the time of publication, but future research may highlight possible new attacks at any time. The full details of technical countermeasures can be found in GSMA permanent reference document (PRD) IR.88 [9]. 1.1 Overview This document aims to provide a standardised view on how Long Term Evolution (LTE) and Evolved Packet Core (EPC) networks can interwork in order to provide "Next Generation Mobile Network" capabilities when users roam onto a network different from their HPMN. Expectations of the "Next Generation Mobile Network” capabilities are described in the GSMA Project Document: Next Generation Roaming and Interoperability (NGRAI) Project Scope White Paper [16].
  • 33. Complete Telecom Operator Security V GSMA Recommendations Start monitoring Impossible to prevent signaling network access: detection is the key GSMA, Interconnect Security The usage of automated ways of testing and monitoring may become mandatory Assess Monitor Protect Auditing provides the essential visibility to fully understand your ever changing network risks. Continual real time monitoring is essential to measure network security efficiency and provide rapid detection and mitigation. Completely secure your network by addressing both generic vulnerabilities (GSMA) and the threats that actually effect you as an ongoing process.
  • 34. Complete Telecom Operator Security V GSMA Recommendations Start security testing Network Architecture and ImplementationAudit / Testing  Auditing … is the only way to ensure that security is working the way it should  A variety of attacks have already been successfully performed on production network equipment of MNOs  Only a comprehensive approach to security will result in effectively countering the attacks described Assess Monitor Protect Auditing provides the essential visibility to fully understand your ever changing network risks. Continual real time monitoring is essential to measure network security efficiency and provide rapid detection and mitigation. Completely secure your network by addressing both generic vulnerabilities (GSMA) and the threats that actually effect you as an ongoing process.
  • 35. Step 1. Introduce monitoring of signaling security Step 1 Step 2 Step 3 Step 4 Step 5 Why you need it Your network is being attacked right now: focus your attention on the vulnerabilities being exploited in real-time Always be aware of new breaches and threats Follow GSMA recommendations on security monitoring (FS.11) Results Ability to take proactive measures during early stages of an attack Empirical evidence for the operator showing the likely sources of illegitimate traffic How to do it Install SS7 security monitoring system Route copy of external signaling traffic to the system Identify malicious traffic and its sources in real time
  • 36. PT—TAD (Treat inteligence – IDS) Passive traffic taps feed monitor with raw traffic or traffic copy Detect dangerous traffic and list active attack sources Analyze and prioritize real threats for your network and subscribers
  • 37. Step 2. Implement protection measures Step 1 Step 2 Step 3 Step 4 Step 5 Why you need it You already know your attack exposure and which vulnerabilities are being exploited, so now protect your network immediately Results Improved security level of the network Reduction in the number of attack attempts How to do it Create a filtering policy Fine-tune network configuration Contact the MNOs that originate suspicious traffic
  • 38. Protect Targeted protection against hacker attacks Protection against configuration errors More security with less efforts Powerful threat intelligence
  • 39. Step 3. Signaling security assessment Step 1 Step 2 Step 3 Step 4 Step 5 Why you need it Gain visibility into signaling network vulnerabilities See your network the way a hacker sees it Follow GSMA recommendations (IR.82) Results Understanding of all existing vulnerabilities Step-by-step plan for mitigating weaknesses before intruders start abusing them How to do it Scan the network from international signaling vantage point Use advanced methods to check whether current security tools are effective
  • 40. Vulnerability Management Deliverables  Information about existing and potential vulnerabilities  Recommendations for improving network security  Highly valuable info to assess risks — you see what hackers see!
  • 41. Step 4. Threats Validation / evaluation Step 1 Step 2 Step 3 Step 4 Step 5 Why you need it Identify threats and risks Evaluate which risks are most urgent for your company Results Informed decision Tailored strategy Effective action plan How to do it You already know:  Your network flaws  Vulnerabilities that are being exploited  Vulnerabilities that could be exploited in the future  Malicious countries, operators, and sources  Attacked subscribers With all information at hand, now decide which risks to tackle first
  • 42. Step 5. Deploy security process Step 1 Step 2 Step 3 Step 4 Step 5 Why you need it Once you have an action plan and know exactly what to do, it’s time to implement your security strategy Then check that the implemented measures are effective Results Persistent awareness of the state of security on your network Benchmarking of the security level Immediate reaction to security incidents How to do it Continue security monitoring Respond to threats as they occur Scan the network regularly
  • 43. Conclusion Assess Monitor Protect Auditing provides essential visibility to fully understand your ever-changing network risks. Non-stop real-time monitoring is essential for verifying the effectiveness of network security and supporting rapid detection and mitigation. Completely secure your network by addressing both generic vulnerabilities (GSMA) and the threats that actually affect you as part of an ongoing process.  Visibility is the key to securing any protocol as it allows informed security decisions  Protection is possible using a number of strategies  Expert support speeds mitigations and reduces resource demands  Security is an ongoing process and developing so long term easily actionable strategy is key
  • 44. Comprehensive Multifaceted IoT Security Roadmap Security Assessment Protection Enforcement Continuous compliance
  • 46. And new MQTT— Enterprise landscapes Technical aspect and Benefits  Ability to filter out/in topics allowed  Real-time dashboard & centralized console to:  manage all IoT Firewalls in the domain  view and manage attacks/exclusions/configurations  Ability to drill-down into single firewall’s event  Compact, yet powerful, dedicated hardware or Vm  TLS offloading  Monitor of anomalies of publisher/ subscriber by DPI  Parse and identify anomalies automatically (HMM) or manually (with regex)  Ability to manage certificates for authentic- cation with self-signed CA or their own CA
  • 47. IoT How to secure? IoT/NB-IoT Device Reserve Analyze and Security Assessment on IoT Device M2M SIM SS7 SA, GTP SA Diameter SA, Secure Network GTP SA, Penetration Testing IoT Web & Mobile App Web and Mobile Application Testing MNO IoT Manegement System Penetration Testing SIM Management Platform Penetration Testing Big Data Platform Penetration Testing Management Level: Service Providers IoT with Private offices for B2B Clients Penetration Testing  Multi-Discipline Security Supply chain security certification / SA  Potentially Requires Large Operator Security Team — Or Partnership with a Large or Multiple Security Suppliers  Continually Developing Services Ongoing and Growing Security Testing + MQTT FW
  • 48. 5G deployment verification Ensure protection where interoperability required from day one Secure new interfaces and communications channels Safeguard SDN/NFV and virtual environment Implement policies separately for network slices Take IoT in your network under control where possible
  • 49. Get support from our experts Take a comprehensive security approach:  positive-tech.com/products/signalling-firewall/  positive-tech.com/products/signalling-ids/  positive-tech.com/services/express-monitoring/  positive-tech.com/services/gsma-compliance-check/  positive-tech.com/services/telecom-security/  positive-tech.com/services/iot-security/ Learn more about telecom security:  positive-tech.com/articles/5g-security-issues/  positive-tech.com/articles/ss7-vulnerability-2018/  positive-tech.com/articles/next-generation-networks-next-level- cybersecurity-problems/ with more at positive-tech.com contact@positive-tech.com