This document discusses security issues in federated database systems. It begins with an introduction to federated databases and their key characteristics of distribution, heterogeneity, and autonomy. It then discusses how the autonomy of component database systems can pose security challenges for confidentiality, integrity, and availability. The document proposes some approaches for deriving global authorization policies from the local policies of the individual component systems through techniques like subject clustering and abstraction rules for operations and objects.

2. Prepard by:
1. Mohamed Siddig
2. Mohamed zeinelabdeen
3. Omer Salih

3. Agenda :
Introduction.
Security in distributed Database.
Security in federated and integrated database.

4. Security in federated Database.
 The effect of heterogeneity and autonomy on
federated database security Russell Daviea and
Reinhardt Bothab
a Port Elizabeth
Technikon, s20026335@student.petech.ac.za
b Port Elizabeth Technikon, reinhard@petech.ac.za

5.  Background.
 Federated Database Systems:
- The term has been used for several different but related
database system architectures. Federated Database System
(FDBS) is a collection of co-perating but autonomous
component database systems.
- The component databases systems (CDBSs) are integrated
to various degrees and are controlled and co-ordinated by
a Federated Database Management System (FDBMS).

6. The road towards Federated Database Systems:
Characteristics of Federated Database Systems :
Distribution.
Heterogeneity.
Autonomy.

7. A CDBS participating in a FDBS may possess several
types of autonomy:
Design autonomy .
Communication autonomy .
Execution autonomy .
Association autonomy .
Authorization autonomy .

8. A Five-level Schema Architecture for Federated Databases

9.  Information security in Database systems:
Confidentiality / Integrity / Availability (CIA).
 Security problems in databases :
identifying the threats + policies + mechanisms.
Security in Federated Database Systems :
A FDBS provides interoperability between existing
heterogeneous databases providing two advantages :
a user the capability to retrieve data located at
different heterogeneous databases.
Interoperability is a significant advantage
-- need for protecting the security of the CDBSs and
their local users.

10. Security in Federated Database Systems :
 CDBSs join a FDBS.
 establishment of administrative policies.
 Identification and authentication.
 Authorization autonomy .
 Full authorization autonomy .
 Medium authorization autonomy
 Low authorization autonomy.

11.  Conclusion.
 Opinion.

12. Deriving Global Authorizations for Federated
Databases
Eugene F. Fodor
Department of Computer Science
University of California, Davis, USA 95616
Email: fodor@cs.ucdavis.edu
URL: http://avalon.cs.ucdavis.edu/

13.  Introduction.
 Federated Databases.
 Federated Database Security Issues:
 FDBs pose is the formulation of a global security policy from the
local security policies of CDBs.
 FDBs are that the integration of data from multiple sources leads
to new aggregation and inference problems not seen in the CDBs.
 Accountability and authentication also become more complicated
for FDBs.

14. Deriving Authorizations for Integrated Objects
 Federated DB Protection Objects:
Constituent schemas provide a common data model:
1. Integrated objects.
2. Local objects.
3. Federated objects.
4. Composite objects.
Exported Local Authorizations and the Dictionary :
 Subject Section
 Operation Section
 Object Section

15. Global authorization derivation :
Analysis of local authorizations :
auth = <s,op,o> and auth΄= <s΄,op΄,o΄> are Compatible
Auth≈auth΄ ↔(o≈o΄)^(op≈op΄)
Subject Clustering :
A hierarchical clustering technique called single link
clustering is used to derive a similarity tree of subjects.

16. Global authorization derivation :
 Abstraction of Global Authorizations :
There are two rules for authorization abstraction with
regard to operations and objects :
 Rule 1 :
 Rule 2 :
for objects states that global authorization o¯ for
coincides
with the integrated object o¯ and its local objects.

17.  Deriving Authorizations for Composite Objects.
 Conclusion.
 Opinion