1. ROMANIAN REVIEW
OF POLITICAL SCIENCES
AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS
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DAN DUNGACIU, The 150th
Anniversary of the Romanian
Academy – The Academy of all the Romanians
INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS
VIKTORIYAFEDORCHAK, Ukrainian-Russian Conflict: The
Revival of Classic IR Realism?
HERMAN BUTIME, Assessing the Roots of the Boston
Marathon Bombings
EVA-NICOLETABURDUSEL, Cultural Intelligence – A New
Paradigm of International Relations
POLITICAL IMAGE, THEORY AND PHILOSOPHY
NICOLAE DRÃGUªIN, Man’s Power in Boundless Space. A
Theological Reading of Hannah Arendt’s Conception of Praxis
MARIANNA PAPASTEPHANOU, Space, Time, and Rosi
Braidotti’s Europe
HENRIETAANIªOARAªERBAN, There is no Post-Ideological
World: Ideology in a Zizekian Key
POLITICAL SCIENCE REVISITED
GABRIELATÃNÃSESCU, Romania and the European Semi-
Presidentialisms
LORENA-VALERIA STUPARU, The Legitimacy of Power
and the Political Imaginary Theoretical Considerations
JEAN-NOËL GRANDHOMME, French Support of the
Transylvanian Cause until the Alba Iulia Union
(August 1916 – December 1918)
EEDDIITTUURRAA IINNSSTTIITTUUTTUULLUUII DDEE ªªTTIIIINNÞÞEE PPOOLLIITTIICCEE
ªªII RREELLAAÞÞIIII IINNTTEERRNNAAÞÞIIOONNAALLEE ““IIOONN II.. CC.. BBRRÃÃTTIIAANNUU””
ACADEMIA ROMÂNĂ
INSTITUTUL DE ŞTIINŢE POLITICE
ŞI RELAŢII INTERNAŢIONALE
“ION I. C. BRĂTIANU”
3. VOL. XIII No. 2 2016
C ONTENTS
DAN DUNGACIU, The 150th Anniversary of the Romanian Academy – The
Academy of all the Romanians..........................................................................
INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS
VIKTORIYA FEDORCHAK, Ukrainian-Russian Conflict: The Revival of Classic
IR Realism?........................................................................................................
HERMAN BUTIME, Assessing the Roots of the Boston Marathon Bombings ....
MÃDÃLINA VIRGINIAANTONESCU, India, Global Emergent Actor in the 21st
Century International System, Under the Modi Administration ......................
EVA-NICOLETA BURDUSEL, Cultural Intelligence – A New Paradigm
of International Relations .................................................................................
LUCIAN JORA, European Union’s Development Policy and the Issue
of Effectiveness .................................................................................................
POLITICAL IMAGE, THEORY AND PHILOSOPHY
KERSTIN SHANDS, Resting in Oneness: Conceptions of Reality in the Teachings
of Balanced View ..............................................................................................
NICOLAE DRÃGUªIN, Man’s Power in Boundless Space. A Theological
Reading of Hannah Arendt’s Conception of Praxis ..........................................
MARIANNA PAPASTEPHANOU, Space, Time, and Rosi Braidotti’s Europe ....
HENRIETA ANIªOARA ªERBAN, There is no Post-Ideological World:
Ideology in a Zizekian Key ...............................................................................
POINTS OF VIEW
VIORELLA MANOLACHE – IAN BROWNE, A Double Reading of the Political
Philosophy Terms: Meaning and Difference. A Dialogue ................................
IN FOCUS
Encyclopedia of International Relations. Theories, Doctrines, Institutions
(ANA-MARIA IANCU) ...................................................................................
Encyclopedia of Fundamental Writings of Political Philosophy. The Contemporaries:
1971-1989 (LUCIAN-ªTEFAN DUMITRESCU) ...........................................
ROMANIAN REVIEW OF POLITICAL
SCIENCES AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS
Pol. Sc. Int. Rel., XIII, 2, pp. 1–230, Bucharest, 2016.
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141
4. POLITICAL SCIENCE REVISITED
GABRIELA TÃNÃSESCU, Romania and the European Semi-Presidentialisms .....
LORENA-VALERIA STUPARU, The Legitimacy of Power and the Political
Imaginary Theoretical Considerations .............................................................
JEAN-NOËL GRANDHOMME, French Support of the Transylvanian Cause
until the Alba Iulia Union (August 1916 – December 1918)............................
ENACHE TUªA, An Analysis of the Turkish-Tatar Political Elite of Dobrogea
Between 1880-1930 ...........................................................................................
SCIENTIFIC LIFE ...........................................................................................
BOOK REVIEWS.............................................................................................
REVIEW OF REVIEWS ..................................................................................
THE AUTHORS ...............................................................................................
143
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203
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224
227
5. THE 150TH ANNIVERSARY OF
THE ROMANIAN ACADEMY – THE ACADEMY
OF ALL THE ROMANIANS
All the scientific and academic productions of the Institute of Political Sciences
and International Relations “Ion I. C. Brãtianu” of the Romanian Academy shall
be dedicated this year to the 150th anniversary since the founding of Romanian
Academy. Be they articles, journals edited at our institute, books published at our
publishing house, summer schools organized by the Institute of Political Sciences
and International Relations “Ion I. C. Brãtianu” – all these activities shall by
conducted under the aegis of this unique event.
And this is not just a formality. We are entertaining the clear consciousness
of the importance of this moment and of the profound designation that the Academy
of All the Romanians – for this is what the Romanian Academy should be – has
or should have within the subtle, immutable equation of the becoming and continuity
of a people. The observation of the great Italian philologist Angelo de Gubernatis,
honorary member (nominated at the 21st of February 1897) of the highest Romanian
academic forum, that “in the Romanian Academy pervaded the very soul of the
Romanian nation” has unparalleled hermeneutical value. For beyond the cultural
and scientific performance, beyond the institutes and the accredited publications,
beyond its branches or the international conferences – an Academy is the bearer
of an ethos. It is the depositary of a past that should remain alive, that is, fruitful
for the present. From this perspective, the Academy illustrates in the most ample
manner what the Anglo-Saxon research calls “moral innovators”. The phrase
indicate those instances that, having the profound legitimacy to accomplish a
renewalrenewing moral task, set the mirror of the past before our times and show
to the responsible factors how dramatic is the compass of the present rendered
askew. The appeal to the past and its heritage is not past-ridden but dynamic,
irrepressible and admonitory. This is a curative function for a society, and this
function is not reserved only to the paramount personalities – Eminescu, Iorga or
Ion I. C. Brãtianu –, but the institutions, too. And the Romanian Academy is
entitled the most to this function. A report, be it summary, of the evolution of
Romanian Academy reveals a single fact: the performances of this national
institution were, each time, directly proportional to the level of its public
involvement.
Pol. Sc. Int. Rel., XIII, 2, pp. 3–4, Bucharest, 2016.
6. This is the reason why, when we are celebrating 150 years since the founding
of the RomanianAcademy, is not an exercise in complaisance. For we pay homage
to 150 years since this institution was founded with a purpose and a mission that
no other Romanian institution could assume. This is an excellent opportunity, as
any anniversary is, for the quantitative, eloquent and imposing reports. But this
is an admirable occasion to understand, contemplating 150 years of activity, that
no scientific, academic or cultural production of the Romanian Academy could
be a kind of purpose in itself, as paradoxical as this may sound. The academic
accomplishments are purposes for themselves, respectively for the fulfillment of
the primordial mission of this scientific, cultural and moral forum, a mission
illustrated maybe in a best succinct manner by King Ferdinand I “The Loyal”
and “head of victorious army” (Nicolae Iorga): “the victory of the country is also
its ascendancy”.
27 March 2016
DAN DUNGACIU,
Professor PhD,
Director of the Institute of Political Sciences
and International Relations “Ion I. C. Brãtianu”
of the Romanian Academy
4 DAN DUNGACIU 2
7. UKRAINIAN–RUSSIAN CONFLICT:
THE REVIVAL OF CLASSIC IR REALISM?
VIKTORIYA FEDORCHAK*
Abstract. After the end of the Cold War, the international community was
enthusiastic about building a global, integrated community driven by the
economic interests of prosperity and growth. Hopes were oriented towards
the dominance of international organizations in problem-resolution and
the rule of law. More than two decades after the end of the Cold War, IR
specialists observe the revival of the Cold War discourse and the return of
classic IR realism into academic and political discourses. The aim of the
offered article is to demonstrate that in the contemporary world of inequality,
just as during the Cold War, reaction to and resolution of conflicts depends
primarily on the position and interests of the main actors of IR. The offered
paper explores the interests of the most influential states regarding the
recent conflict in Ukraine in the context of IR realism and the implications
of these interests in the resolution of conflict or rather the establishment
of a frozen status. Consequently, the paper addresses the topics of political
and military inequality in asymmetric conflicts between global power and
a developing state.
Keywords: Ukrainian–Russian conflict, international relations, liberalism,
realism.
Introduction
Attending a conference devoted to the 10th anniversary of the concept of
Responsibility to Protect1 in one of the British universities, the author expected
to hear about the complexity of its implementation in the contemporary reality
of international relations and challenges – and its evolution. Thus, one could have
expected to hear an optimistic neo-liberal discourse of humanitarian interventions
and how successful the implementation of the principle was on various occasions
during the last decade. One of the prominent speakers outlined exactly this
INTERNATI O NAL RELATIONS
Pol. Sc. Int. Rel., XIII, 2, pp. 5–17, Bucharest, 2016.
————————
* PhD., Assistant Professor at School of Politics and International Relations, the University of Nottingham,
UK; Viktoriya.Fedorchak@nottingham.ac.uk.
1 The Responsibility to Protect (R to P or R2P) – “is a new international security and human rights norm
to address the international community’s failure to prevent and stop genocides, war crimes, ethnic cleansing
and crimes against humanity” Retrieved from http://www.responsibilitytoprotect.org/.
8. optimistic perspective on the subject matter. Often, when you deliver a lecture
or presentation, you meet another person’s eyes and see a reflection on your
speech. It must have been that case, because when the speaker looked at me, he
paused and all of a sudden, started explaining that “R2P was demonstrated to
function well except in those occasions when geopolitical interests were involved”.
After this statement, the speaker began discussing the cases of Ukraine, Georgia and
Syria, and how the interests of the global powers clashed in those countries, resulting
in a stalemate. The change of emphasis in his narration made me smile at the irony
that a celebration of the anniversary of that very practice which demonstrated the
functionality of IR Liberalism coincided with events that demonstrated the strong
positions of traditional IR Realism. Coming from the country that was denied its
sovereignty in the medieval tradition of aggression, the author considered this
irony to be particularly bitter.
Classic IR Realism
The classic realist theory of international relations argues that international
relations are driven by a nation’s self-interest, or competition for dominance.
Consequently, the primary actors of international relations are considered to be
states that are driven by personal gain and considerations of security. In such
framework altruism, ethics and morality are of little concern, since power and
strategic objectives prevail over any humanist or moral goals.According to Niccolo
Machiavelli, the prominent classic IR theorist, the end justifies the means, suggesting
that a state can use many means at its disposal for the achievement of the desired
goal within the framework of national interest: “I believe that this follows from
severity being badly of properly used. Those may be called properly used, if of
evil it is lawful to speak well, that are applied at one blow and are necessary to
one’s security, and that are not persisted in afterward unless they can be turned to
the advantage of the subjects”2.
While Thomas Hobbes argued in favor of the social contract and the existence
of a state for the security purposes of its citizens, a few centuries later Hans
Morgenthau crystallized the principles of IR realism3. In his work Politics among
Nations, first of all, Morgenthau emphasized that: “Political realism believes that
politics, like society in general, is governed by objective laws that have their roots
in human nature which remained unchanged through the entire human history.
Secondly, the main signpost that helps political realism to find its way through the
landscape of international politics is the concept of interest defined in terms of
power”4.
In other words, the driving forces behind state actions are not humanistic and
moral considerations but the purposes of gaining power and supremacy over other
competitors in the international arena.
6 VIKTORIYA FEDORCHAK 2
————————
2 Machiavelli, N., The Prince (W. K. Marriott, Trans.), New York: Sterling Publishing, 2008, 97.
3 Donelly, J., Realism and international relations, Cambridge, CB: Cambridge University Press, 2000, 7.
4 Morgenthau, H., Politics among nations: The struggle for power and peace, London: McGraw-Hill
Higher Education, 1992, 4-5.
9. Moreover, he argued that although political realism proclaims that the concept
of self-interest considers power as “an objective category which is universally
valid, but it does not endow that concept with a meaning that is fixed once and for
all”5. Thus, the essence of power and national interest might change, but it does
not mean that the significance of the concept of self-interest based on power is
undermined. Furthermore, “political realism is aware of the moral significance
of political action… political realism refuses to identify the moral aspirations of
a particular nation with the moral laws that govern the universe”6. Thus, it can
be argued that the nature of IR or political realism is in conflicting nature with
the relationship between states and the dominance of self-interest over the benefits
of common actions. Inevitably, the final means of achieving a state’s self-interest
remains military force. In the context of IR realism, a Clausewitzian approach to
war remains as sound as ever: “Each tries through physical force to compel the
other to do his will; his immediate aim is to throw his opponent in order to make
him incapable of further resistance. War is thus an act of force to compel our
enemy to do our will”7.
In terms of the above outlined discourse of classic IR realism, any further
discussion of the Ukrainian case aims to prove that Russian actions correspond
to the following principles of political realism: power-driven self-interest; prevalence
of strategic and military objectives of a single state over the interests of any other
members of the existing international relations system; the use of war and distortion
of the international law for aggressive territorial gain; dominance of military
interest over humanitarian or moral considerations.
It has to be outlined that this author does not intend to suggest the world did
not change since the times of Morgenthau. In fact, after the end of the Cold War,
international relations were perceived as being driven by economic and mutual
gain inside the global society. In other words, states were more likely to cooperate
through international organizations, according to the principles of international
law. However, the primary argument of this article is that in the case of recent events
in the Ukraine, Russian actions demonstrate that the era of relative post-Cold
War cooperation and liberal IR discourse is over; strategic and geopolitical interests
remain predominant in Russian foreign policy. Thus, is the world the same as in
1948? No. However, is IR realism more present in international relations in 2015
rather than in 2000? Yes.
Pacta Sunt Servanda
One of the manifestations of IR Liberalism (Neo-Liberalism and even Post-
Liberalism8) is the dominance of international cooperation through international
organizations and inter-state agreements for the establishment of global stability
3 UKRAINIAN–RUSSIAN CONFLICT: THE REVIVAL OF CLASSIC IR REALISM? 7
————————
5 Morgenthau, Politics among nations, 10.
6 Ibid., 12-13.
7 Clauzewitz, C. V., On war (M.E. Howard & P. Paret Trans.), Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press,
1989, 75.
8 For the sake of consistency of this article Liberal and Realist approaches are contrasted in their general
principles rather than emphasizing the diversity of theoretical concepts within each approach.
10. and security9. In this regard, the main rationale is based upon the supremacy of
international relations laws, protecting states’ sovereignty and territorial integrity,
which was a logical decision in the context of human history of wars fought for
strategically valuable territories and resources. Thus, these principles were meant
to protect the existing system of international relations, irrespective of its bipolar
or multipolar nature, after the end of the Cold War.
In the case of Ukraine, its sovereignty and territorial integrity were meant to be
secured by those principles of international law embodied in various treaties.
First of all, when Ukraine gave up its nuclear potential, the Budapest Memorandum
on Security Assurances was signed between Ukraine, Russia, the UK and the US,
on December 5, 1994, according to which three great powers agreed to become
the guarantors of Ukrainian sovereignty and territorial integrity10. In 2014, the
celebration of the 20th anniversary of this memorandum was darkened by the
annexation of Crimea by the Russian Federation and the beginning of Russian
aggression in the East. Apparently, the translation of the Latin “pacta sunt servanda”
(agreements must be kept) into Russian has an entirely different meaning.
Another aspect of the Liberal perspective on security and institutional
collaboration is the post-Cold War cooperation between Ukraine and the NATO,
which resulted in signing the NATO-Ukrainian Charter on a Distinctive Partnership
on July 9th, 1997. Accordingly, two points of the agreement are particularly
relevant in the contemporary discourse. Both NATO and Ukraine were committed
to: “The recognition that security of all states in the OSCE area is indivisible,
that no state should pursue its security at the expense of that of another state,
and that no state can regard any part of the OSCE region as its sphere of influence
respect for the sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence of all other
states, for the inviolability of frontiers, and the development of good-neighborly
relations”11.
Since Ukraine is not a member of NATO, military actions would not follow
one state’s aggression against Ukraine; however, it would be expected “to react
politically when Ukraine is attacked”12. The recent announcements about the
creation of six new command posts on the Eastern border of the Alliance and the
creation of the 5,000 rapid reaction force are considered insufficient in order to stop
Russian aggression, even by former NATO Assistant General for Defense Planning
and Operations, Edgar Buckley13. Thus, in terms of the Liberal theory of IR, there
are international organizations like the UN and NATO, there are agreements signed
to secure Ukrainian sovereignty according to the principle of international law, and
8 VIKTORIYA FEDORCHAK 4
————————
9 Menon, R. & Rumer, E. Conflict in Ukraine: The unwinding of the post-Cold War order, Cambridge, MA:
Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 2015.
10 Ibid., 25.
11 NATO-Ukrainian Charter on a Distinctive Partnership, July 9, 1997, http:// www.nato .int/cps/en/
natohq/official_texts_25457.htm.
12 Buckley, E. & Pascu, I. NATO’s Article 5 and Russian hybrid warfare. 2015, March 17, 2015, Atlantic
Council. http://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/natosource/nato-s-article-5-and-russian-hybrid-warfare.
13 Ibid.
11. there is a globalized interdependent world aiming at building global security; yet,
Ukraine’s sovereignty and territorial integrity were practically non-existent for a
participant in the same system of international relations; the participant who
violated all above-mentioned treaties and principles, and acted according to his
strategic interests and expansionist plans. In this regard, the Russian approach to
contemporary warfare and the achievement of its strategic objectives is conducted
through the manipulation of legitimate excuses of Liberal IR context (protection
of the rights of Russian-speaking population and humanitarian support), and the
straightforward IR realistic strategic interest of the state. Thus, it can be argued
that Russia used the gray zones of international law and distorted its principles for
the sake of good old-fashioned state interests of territorial gain and geostrategic
superiority. However, it brings a new definition of contemporary war – hybrid
warfare.
Concerns about the fragility and imperfection of international law are not new.
They are mentioned from time to time, and nothing changes. Or rather, it does
change. The violation of the laws of international relations is getting worse. Using
a spurious referendum for the annexation of territory is one thing; adding to that
state-sponsored terrorism is a matter of an entirely different complexity. Bringing
armed green men without insignia into the territory of a sovereign state and using
them in order to overthrow a legitimate government in the region can be viewed
as a traditional-style military coup d’état or a new form of state-sponsored terrorism.
In any case, the problem of the green men is not the aggressive nature of their
use, but their gray and invisible status in international law. This was exactly the
point of using them and not the Russian army. In order to apply international law
and the UN’s legal procedural apparatus, their identification is essential, if one
aims to take certain actions against them. Their status was even more blurred by
the fact that they were brought in white trucks with so-called “humanitarian
support” for Crimean and Eastern Ukrainian separatists14.
The Reality of IR realism
The reality of the contemporary IR is that post-Cold War altruism is over, and
the true nature of interstate relations is back upon the table of discussions. The
Russian war in Ukraine is already called hybrid warfare, since it uses both
traditional and unconventional means of fighting wars. While the Kremlin’s initial
discourse and comments regarding the situation in Ukraine were oriented towards
condemning illegal actions against the legitimate government, soon the emphasis
was placed on the necessity of protecting the rights of Ukrainian minorities,
meaning by this the Russian-speaking population15. For the record, the Russian-
speaking population was never a minority in a practically bilingual country. The
5 UKRAINIAN–RUSSIAN CONFLICT: THE REVIVAL OF CLASSIC IR REALISM? 9
————————
14 Stepanova, A., “Ukrainian crisis and international law as the most cynical thing ever existed”, 2014,
August 27. Beyond The EU, http://beyondthe.eu/ukrainian-crisis-international-law-cynical-thing-ever-existed/.
15 Burke-White, W., “Crimea and the International Legal Order”, Survival: Global Politics and Strategy,
56, 2014, 70.
12. media discourse about protecting the rights of minorities was immediately supported
by military actions, in the form of deploying green men troops into Crimea, and
taking the Supreme Council of Crimea under their control16. Although this action
was an actual intervention into the territory of a sovereign country, it was once
again semi-legitimate, because technically the green men had no insignia and did
not belong to the Russian army. They were just well-armed individuals, who were
simply dropped off Russian ships in the Black Sea, or from helicopters. Whereas
these actions were not exactly an intervention and not a terrorist act, but something
in-between, yet they proved to be very effective for Kremlin’s plans. The main
purpose of the green men was to clear the territory of representatives of the
Ukrainian administration and Ukrainian military dislocated in the region.
Having done the dirty work with military means, Kremlin was very prompt in
using legal means to gain Crimea before the international community realized
what had happened and what needed to be done next. The next step was to clear the
territory of Ukrainian population and pro-Ukrainian sympathizers. People were
given a choice to stay or to leave, although the question was more, did they want to
stay in occupied territory or in Ukraine. With the number of ethnic Ukrainians
decreasing even further, a supposedly legitimate referendum was announced by
Kremlin’s puppet government of Sergei Aksenov. However, this referendum was
illegitimate because it contradicted the Ukrainian Constitution of 1996 (Article 73)
and the Law of Ukraine on “All-Ukrainian Referendum” (Article 3) of 2012,
which state that any territorial changes in Ukraine require all citizens of Ukraine to
participate in the decision, irrespective of their place of residence17. The international
community, including NATO and the UN, did not recognize this referendum and
supported Ukraine’s sovereign integrity.
Moreover, for the Kremlin strategy, this reaction of the international community
had little impact if any. Putin could easily proceed with the second stage of his
expansion strategy. Not waiting for all of the Western states to express their concern,
he continued with further attempts to legitimize his annexation of Crimea. On
18th March 2014, two days after the Crimean referendum, the treaty of incorporation
of Crimea into the Russian Federation was signed. Moreover, “in ticking-off the
international legal boxes of self-determination, Putin simultaneously sought to
expand those boxes”18. Immediately, the process of changing citizenship started.
Those who wished to keep Ukrainian citizenship were asked to leave. They could
be allowed to stay or return to their previous place of residence only by getting
visas. New passports were issued to the proud citizens of the Russian Federation,
yet with a slight modification. None of the Crimean people who had lived all
their lives in this territory were given correct address registration for their actual
residence. In the field of registration, the regions of Vladivostok and Yakutia were
stated.
10 VIKTORIYA FEDORCHAK 6
————————
16 Ibid.
17 Stepanova, A., “International Law on Legality of the Crimea Secession”, Beyond The EU, 2014, April, 15,
Retrieved from http://beyondthe.eu/international-law-crimea-secession/.
18 Burke-White, W. “Crimea and the International Legal Order”, 70.
13. To systematize Russian actions in Ukraine, the Potomac Group has developed
a four-stage model of Russian hybrid warfare in Ukraine19. The first stage, of
political subversion, is characterized by hidden insurgent or terrorist activities aimed
at seizing governmental buildings, political assassinations, agitation, propaganda
campaigns and infiltration of agents20. This was demonstrated during the events
of the uprising in Independence Square, February 2014, when a youth was shot
down by Russian snipers; FSB agents were kidnapping leaders of the uprising, an
action paralleled with propaganda in the Russian and Russia-controlled Ukrainian
media.
The second stage is called proxy sanctum, characterized by; consolidation of
controlled areas, recruiting local supporters of the aggression (as was the case
for Eastern Ukraine where separatists were recruited from released prisoners),
destruction of governmental infrastructure (military bases in Crimea, border posts
in Eastern Ukraine).
The third stage is the intervention, which includes threats and preparation of
invasion, destruction of governmental forces, logistics and fire support, combined
with cyber disruptions21. This stage was demonstrated in the East of Ukraine,
where so-called “humanitarian green men” occupied the territory and provided
military support for the separatists. The next strategic step was bringing Russian
troops to Ukrainian borders, with the fire support of Soviet multiple rocket – the
BM-21 (Grad) – in early July 201422.
The fourth stage outlined by the Potomac Group is a coercive deterrence which
is characterized by public discussions of nuclear power, fly-by force demonstrations
(as in the case of air zones of Baltic countries and the UK), hints of escalation23.
Although these stages demonstrate a model which can explain the development
of Russian hybrid warfare in Ukraine, it misses out on a few aspects of its hybrid
nature. First of all, except for the above-outlined hidden stage of political
subversion, there was a preparatory stage beginning from the time of Kuchma’s
presidency in Ukraine, in 1994. It was, not accidentally, the year when Ukraine
gave up its nuclear potential. Starting from his presidency, Ukraine began to
come closer to the Russian realm of influence24. From this time, a kaleidoscope
of puppet governments aimed at weakening Ukraine economically, politically
and militarily were brought to power. Although the Orange Revolution suggested
a certain democratic change,Yushchenko’s government did as little for strengthening
Ukraine’s capacity to survive just as any other Russian-controlled government,
as was demonstrated in Yushchenko’s gas wars and thefts from the National Budget.
7 UKRAINIAN–RUSSIAN CONFLICT: THE REVIVAL OF CLASSIC IR REALISM? 11
————————
19 Johnson, F. J., “Update: Russia’s hybrid war in Ukraine ‘is working’”, February 26, 2015, HIS Jane’s
Defence Weekly. Retrieved from http://www.janes.com/article/49469/update-russia-s-hybrid-war-in-ukraine-
is-working.
20 Ibid.
21 Ibid.
22 Weiss, M., & Miller, J., “Russia is firing missiles at Ukraine”, Foreign Policy, 2014, July 17. http://www.
foreignpolicy.com/articles/2014/07/16/russia_is_firing_missiles_at_ukraine_grad_rockets_us_sanctions.
23 Johnson, “Update: Russia’s hybrid war in Ukraine.”
24 Kuzio, T., “Neither East Nor West: Ukraine’s Security Policy Under Kuchma”, Problems of Post-
Communism, 52, 2005, 60.
14. The rule of the last pro-Russian government of Yanukovich demonstrated that
the main purpose of all puppet governments was to prepare Ukraine for the
Russian invasion, resulting in an unconditional capitulation of the country.
This conclusion is conditioned by a few considerations: Over more than 20
years of independence, Ukrainian economic infrastructure across the country was
virtually destroyed; governments sponsored only economic sectors that were
related to Russian capital and oligarchy, which meant that the Eastern region was
developing, while donations from the entire country’s local budgets had to pay
for it. Moreover, the country was not only deprived of its nuclear deterrence, but its
conventional forces were utterly shattered, without any financing or technological
improvement of their defense capabilities. In other words, the country was aimed
to be offered in a lovely package with a red ribbon for Russia to take. At the time
of the invasion and the annexation of Crimea, Ukrainian soldiers did not even
have socks in supply, not to mention that, during the first six months of Grad
attacks, they had neither bullets nor guns to match the bullets they had. The country
was not prepared at all. It was made unprepared.
This preparatory phase for the occupation is essential for understanding the
Russian way of establishing its global and strategic interests – it uses mixed
methods for achieving the traditional objective of regional strategic and military
supremacy. In this case, instead of direct intervention when the country was
militarily ready to fight back, the Kremlin applied a politico-economic approach
to weaken the country from the inside in order to maximize the effect of attrition
warfare during the annexation of desired territories. This long-termed planning and
weakening of the enemy before the attack is not news for strategic thought; however,
neither is the legitimization of one’s aggressive actions with a seemingly just cause.
In this regard, another feature of Russian warfare and one of the elements which
can be traced through each stage of war outlined by the Potomac Group is the use
of propaganda and distortion of information in order to undermine the clearly
illegitimate nature of the annexation and invasion of a sovereign state. For this
reasons, one of the key elements in Russian military strategy is the manipulation
of legitimacy and its consequent distortion in the public opinion perception of
Western countries.
The Ukrainian Case and International Law
So, what does the Crimean case demonstrate regarding international law and
state-sponsored terrorism? First of all, just like 100 years ago, the international
community could not stop a straightforward territorial aggression of one state
against another. The proclaimed democratic values and restraining leverage of
globalization as well as economic incentives prove to be irrelevant when military
and strategic concerns are at stake. In other words, the recent events in Ukraine
bring back a realistic paradigm in the theory of international relations.
Secondly, the Crimean case demonstrated not only that classic aggression works
nowadays as well as ever before, but also that the international community’s
intervention is limited by the means of international law and the UN.
12 VIKTORIYA FEDORCHAK 8
15. However, international condemnation and sanctions against Russia did not
change the fact of the intervention and annexation of Ukrainian territories.
Thirdly, the very notion of legitimacy was compromised. The Kremlin’s
actions demonstrate that there are no legitimate actions according to international
law principles or national legislature; what counted was the ability of a state to
sell a semi-legitimate action to a certain segment of public opinion that knows
little about the matter, or about why Ukrainians should be independent and how
different they are from Russians, or that having the green men on the territory of
a sovereign state is a move against any state’s sovereignty and independence.
The best example of this argument is a comment on an article about the potential
consequences of the Crimean referendum for Ukraine and Western countries, in
The Independent newspaper. One of the readers stated: “I never thought I would
ever say this in my life time but I’m with Russia on this one. The principle of self-
determination is not some spurious attempt at legitimizing a dispute, it is a basic
human right. The fact that the US, UK and NATO oppose it for the Crimea is
deeply disturbing”25.
What is actually disturbing is how the lack of knowledge on the subject makes
public opinion easily manipulated by Russia’s fake legitimization. Although it
can be argued that every person is entitled to his/her opinion, and public opinion
is far from the actual decision and policy-making, the point here is that pretended
legitimization and abuse of the principles of international law and human rights
devalue their original meaning and what they stand for. This is far more dangerous
than straightforward military aggression, because it leaves people in Western
countries in doubt about what is actually going on in the Ukraine. Thus, Putin’s
government conducts a PR campaign mixing old-style military means with a
semi-legitimate campaign covering his expansionist intentions.
Position of Other Parties
It is justified to say that Ukrainian-Russian conflict is far from being just a
two-state conflict without any geopolitical context. The Ukraine’s geographical
position, between the West and Russia, made it the primary ground for the
establishment of borders between NATO and Russia. There were various triggers
that Russia could perceive as threatening its geopolitical and strategic interests
in Ukraine. In this regard, both European and NATO enlargements, which could be
perceived as means of moving Ukraine out of Russian influence, were stimulating
Russian pressure on the Ukrainian puppet governments – which resulted in the
further escalation of the conflict.
These triggers included NATO summit in Bucharest in April 2008, when
Georgian and Ukrainian memberships were considered, yet, vetoed by France and
Germany. As a reply, Russian invasion into Georgia took place in August 2008.
9 UKRAINIAN–RUSSIAN CONFLICT: THE REVIVAL OF CLASSIC IR REALISM? 13
————————
25 Geordie’ Comment to Morris, N. & Dejevsky, M., “Ukraine crisis: Decision time for Crimea in
referendum which could change the complexion of Europe”, 2014, March 14, The Independent, http://www.
independent.co.uk.
16. Moreover, at the same time, the EU was launching its Eastern Partnership Initiative
aimed at strengthening the development of potential members26. The potential of
moving EU and NATO borders closer to Russia was viewed as a tremendous
strategic threat, fear of which was further fueled by overthrowing Yanukovich’s
presidency27. John Mearsheimer argued that it was the last straw for Putin: “He
responded by taking Crimea, a peninsula he feared would host a NATO base,
and working to destabilize Ukraine until it abandoned its efforts to join the
West”28.
Therefore, the conflict is, in fact, contextualized in terms of the traditional
Cold War antagonism between the West and Russia. Although the discourse might
have changed slightly, the nature of that antagonism prevails. In this context, it
is worth outlining the position of various stakeholders. Regarding the EU, although
various member-countries expressed mixed feelings about the conflict, the common
position was aimed towards the necessity of resolving the conflict and achieving
ceasefire agreements. This was the first occasion when Germany took leading
position in negotiating conflict-resolution on an international scale29. For the EU,
the primary objective was to avoid a full-blooded warfare close to its borders,
especially with constant pressure from Poland, a country that remembered Soviet
rule way too well.
From the official perspective, NATO condemned Russian actions as
illegitimate and against the norms of international law. The organization called
upon Russia to abide by agreements achieved in Minsk. According to the joint
statement of the NATO-Ukraine Commission on 13th May 2015, NATO
recognized the independence, peace and integrity of Ukraine and “condemn
Russia’s aggressive actions and continued violation of international law and its
international obligations; we call on Russia to fully abide by international
law”30. Regarding America’s position on Ukraine, irrespective of the division of
views in American domestic politics, the official position advocated using the
soft power of a certain isolation of Russia in the international arena, which was
once again reaffirmed in President Obama’s Press Conference after the G7
Summit 8th June 2015: “With respect to security, the G7 remains strongly united
in support for Ukraine. We’ll continue to provide economic and technical
assistance that Ukraine needs as it moves ahead of critical reforms to transform
its economy and strengthen its democracy. As we’ve seen in recent days, Russian
14 VIKTORIYA FEDORCHAK 10
————————
26 Mearsheimer, J. I., “Why the Ukraine crisis is the west’s fault: The liberal delusions that provoked
Putin”, Foreign Affairs, 2014, September/October, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/russia-fsu/2014-08
-18/why-ukraine-crisis-west-s-fault.
27 Freedman, L.,“Ukraine and the art of crisis management”, Survival: Global Politics and Strategy, 56,
2014, 7-42.
28 Mearsheimer, “Why the Ukraine crisis is the west’s fault”.
29 Speck, U., “German power and the Ukraine conflict”, 2015, March 26, Carnegie Europe.
http://carnegieeurope.eu/2015/03/26/german-power-and-ukraine-conflict.
30 “Joint statement of the NATO-Ukraine commission” NATO, last modified May 13, 2015, http://www.
nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_texts_119425.htm.
17. forces continue to operate in eastern Ukraine, violating Ukraine’s sovereignty
and territorial integrity”31.
Thus, the position of the EU, NATO and USA remained within the framework
of using economic and political sanctions against Russia. The EU and USAcontinue
to provide economic and advisory support to Ukraine, condemning Russian
actions, which might seem to bring the conflict to at least a cease-fire stage in
the occupied territories; yet actual warfare takes place in the East of Ukraine and
there is no ceasefire there. Analyzing Ukrainian–Russian conflict, Lawrence
Freedman made a conclusion that, “the Western response reflected the fact that
Ukraine was not a core interest. What did matter, however, was a pattern of
Russian behavior that threatened to unsettle not only Ukraine but the whole
region, including members of NATO. This required reaffirming the benefits of
alliance to those members and drawing Moscow’s attention to the potential costs
of continuing with a campaign of detraction, deception and destabilization
against Ukraine”32.
Discussion
So, why can it be argued that classic IR realism is revived in the case of the
Ukrainian-Russian conflict? First of all, Russian actions demonstrated the
dominance of a very straightforward self-interest – that of keeping Ukrainian
territory under Russian control in the classic military-strategic way of territorial
intervention and annexation of the Crimean peninsula. Secondly, the moral or
ethical aspect of the action is absent; just as the beginning of the WWII started
with a pretext of legitimacy, so did the Ukrainian-Russian conflict start from a
pretext of protecting the rights of Russian-speaking population. However, the core
of Russian interest in Ukraine was strategic and military, in terms of opposing
potential NATO and European expansion. Moreover, that self-interest was fulfilled
through military actions, irrespective of how they were advertised and justified
by the Russian media, and undermined both the sovereignty of Ukraine and the
principle according to which the contemporary system of international relations
functions – the rule of international law.
Although it can be argued that violation of international law does not mean
the revival of realist IR paradigms, the dominance of self-interest, particularly a
geostrategic one, and its execution through military means places both Machiavelli’s
ideas and Morgenthau’s discourse back on the table of discussion. Moreover,
Lawrence Freedman’s evaluation demonstrates that Western response was
conditioned by the fact that core Western interests were not yet at stake at this stage
of conflict development. Once again, the situation in Ukraine, and not just in
Ukraine, but also in Libya and Syria, proves that ethics, morality and protection of
human rights are in fact differently perceived by governments and individuals.
11 UKRAINIAN–RUSSIAN CONFLICT: THE REVIVAL OF CLASSIC IR REALISM? 15
————————
31 The White House. Remarks by President Obama in Press Conference after G7 Summit, Elmau Briefing
Center, 2015, June 8th, https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-Office/2015/06/08/remarks-president-obama-
press-conference-after-g7-summit.
32 Freedman, “Ukraine and the art of crisis management”, 9.
18. This aspect once again demonstrates that classic IR realism is far from being
forgotten or irrelevant in explaining contemporary international relations.
Moreover, with the contemporary trends in international relations, it might
soon become the predominant paradigm. After all, it is hard not to agree that “the
crisis represented a sharp geopolitical jolt, a reminder that hard power never
quite goes away and that, however much we may which it were not so, the role
of force remains formidable when it comes to setting borders and changing
regimes”33.
Conclusion
Taking into consideration all the above-mentioned arguments, it can be concluded
that the case of Russian war in Ukraine, the annexation of Crimea, the long-term
preparation for invasion through puppet governments, the hybrid nature of Russian
warfare and manipulation of the legitimacy of international law all argue in favor of
a revival of the Realist paradigm in IR or even its constancy, irrespective of the
epoch of human development. As it was mentioned at the beginning of this paper
and on various occasions in conferences the author has attended, humanitarianism
and Liberalism in IR have their place in the contemporary world.
However, when global interests clash and military-strategic objectives are at
stake, Liberal means of IR regulation are of little influence. Taking into account
the contemporary and historical discourses of Russian foreign policy and its
strategic ambitions, it is not surprising that post-Soviet academia remained loyal
to a dominance of the Realist paradigm over the Liberal one. After all, military
doctrine states that war is another means of achieving political objectives, as it
has been throughout the history of human civilization.
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hybrid-war-in-ukraine-is-working;
16 VIKTORIYA FEDORCHAK 12
————————
33 Freedman, “Ukraine and the art of crisis management”, 8.
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13 UKRAINIAN–RUSSIAN CONFLICT: THE REVIVAL OF CLASSIC IR REALISM? 17
20. ASSESSING THE ROOTS OF
THE BOSTON MARATHON BOMBINGS
HERMAN BUTIME*
Abstract. This article examines the Boston Marathon bombings within the
context of the political and social evolution of Chechnya and its impact on
the wider Chechen national character. It is argued that the long conflict
history of Chechnya has progressively fostered the evolution of a hardened
collective Chechen national character that has not only fortified the
Chechen people’s capacity to cope with life in exile but also to participate
in violent activities geared towards reinforcing their national ethos.
Whereas this factor by itself may not have been sufficient to push the
Tsarnaev brothers to conduct the bombings, as Americans of Chechen
descent, it provided them with a potential framework of susceptibility to
commit the attacks.
Keywords: Terrorism, Boston Marathon Bombings, America, Chechnya.
Introduction
The Boston Marathon bombings were a watershed in United States (U.S)
terrorism history. They were not only the first terror attacks on American soil
since 9/11 but also the suspected perpetrators were U.S citizens. On 15th April,
2013, two home-made bombs were detonated at the finish line of the Boston
Marathon in the U.S state of Massachusetts, killing 3 and injuring 264 people.
The suspects in this double terror attack were Tamerlan Tsarnaev and Dzhokhar
Tsarnaev, two brothers of ethnic Chechen descent whose family had immigrated
to America from the Caucasus region of Russia1. On interrogation, Dzhokhar, the
younger of the two brothers, stated that the U.S’military involvement inAfghanistan
and Iraq and the global ‘conspiracy’ against Muslims were the motivation
behind the bombings2.
Pol. Sc. Int. Rel., XIII, 2, pp. 18–32, Bucharest, 2016.
————————
* PhD, Independent Conflict and Security Researcher; hrb955@uowmail.edu.au.
1 CNN, ‘Boston Marathon Terror Attack Fast Facts,’ CNN Library, 17th January 2015. Available at:
http://edition.cnn.com/2013/06/03/us/boston-marathon-terror-attack-fast-facts/. Accessed on 17/02/2015.
2 Parker Diantha and Bidgood Jess 2015, ‘Boston Marathon Bombing: What We Know,’ The New York
Times, 1st January 2015. Available at: http://www.nytimes.com/2015/01/02/us/boston-marathon-bombings-
trial-what-you-need-to-know.html?_r=0. Accessed on 17/02/2015.
21. The Boston Marathon bombings triggered a couple of complex issues: If the
allegations linking the Tsarnaev brothers to Chechen militant groups were correct,
then it is challenging to explain why they chose to attack the U.S (a country that
had provided them a home in exile) and not Russia (that had been at war in
Chechnya); the fact that the Tsarnaevs never grew up in restive Chechnya makes
it even more challenging to explain where and how they picked up the radical
Chechen nationalism that partly fed into their wider web of discontentment; equally
perplexing are the contradictions of their social integration into American
society. On one hand, Tamerlan and Dzhokhar appeared to have settled in well in
their host country. On the other, they seemed to reject the American way of life.
Against this backdrop, the article examines the Boston Marathon bombings
within the context of the political and social evolution of Chechnya and its impact
on the wider Chechen national character. It is argued that the long conflict history
of Chechnya has progressively fostered the evolution of a hardened collective
Chechen national character which has not only fortified the Chechen people’s
capacity to cope with life in exile but also to participate in violent activities geared
towards reinforcing the Chechen national ethos. Whereas this factor by itself may
not have been sufficient to push the Tsarnaev brothers to conduct the bombings,
as Americans of Chechen descent, it potentially provided them with a framework
of susceptibility to commit the attacks.
National Predisposition to Political Violence
Although the Tsarnaevs were neither raised in Chechnya nor cited the Chechen
people’s struggle for self-determination as motivation for the Boston Marathon
bombings, the fact that they were linked to Chechen militant groups necessitates
a closer examination of the history of Chechnya and how it could have impacted on
their behavioural development. In this respect, it is argued that the long suffering
of the Chechen people as a result of conflict has not only fortified their capacity
to cope with life in exile but also earned them marketability in domestic and
international armed conflict industry.
At the national level, this collective character presented as a framework of
resilience and a predisposition for Chechens to pursue martial careers. Whereas this
attribute may not be inherent in the behaviour of all Chechens, its hovering existence
within the wider Chechen national character potentially provides disillusioned
Chechens with a framework for the violent resolution of contradictions in their lives.
In looking at the predisposition of Chechens to engage in violent activity, this
section examines the national, geographical, social and political distinctness of these
people that is relevant to this debate.
The national and geographical distinctness of the Chechen nation makes it
susceptible to separatism. Chechens have historically occupied the northern slopes
of the Caucasus mountain ranges3. They inhabit this area alongside Dagestanis and
2 ASSESSING THE ROOTS OF THE BOSTON MARATHON BOMBINGS 19
————————
3 Goltz Thomas, ‘Is there a Chechen Connection to the Boston Bombings,’ The Nation, 13th May 2013.
Available at: http://www.thenation.com/article/174026/there-chechen-connection-boston-bombings#. Accessed
on 25/02/2015.
22. Circassians. To the south and west, they are neighboured by Azeris and Georgians
respectively4. Although the rest of the world calls them Chechens, they are a
distinct national group accurately known as the Nakhs or Vainakhs. They do,
however, prefer calling themselves Noxchi which translates as ‘the people’5. With
this ethno-nationalist consciousness manifest in a distinct geographical area,
attempts at eroding it through occupation potentially trigger resistance supported
by a favourable rugged terrain.
Chechens also have a measure of social distinctness that supports their collective
propensity for violent separatism. According to Julia Loffe, “Tolstoy, who was
once stationed in the region, wrote about their eternal struggle against the Russians
in Hadji Murat as did Pushkin, who went there in exile, in Prisoner of the Caucasus.
They describe a society that fetishizes masculine honour and violence, skill with
one’s horse and one’s sword”6.
While these observations could be dismissed as subjective anthropology authored
by Russians with an ‘imperialist complex,’ the enduring violent resistance to
Russian rule; the disproportionate representation of Chechens in the Soviet military
services coupled with their marked participation in the current global Jihadist
campaign gives some credence to the stereotypical perspective of them as a martial
nationality7.
The ‘inherent’ martial credentials of the Chechens are particularly evident in
their enduring resistance to Russian imperialism. The Chechens were involved
in the Murid Wars of the 19th century. These were the earliest Sufi Muslim wars of
resistance against czarist Russia’s occupation of the Caucasus8. The significance
of this epoch is that it consolidated Islam not only as an aspect of Chechen national
identity (as different from the wider Orthodox-Christian Russian identity) but also
as an ideology for violently defending it.
Russia’s ruthless suppression of the resistance in the Caucasus prevented the
Chechen national character from solely being shaped by historical dynamics
inside Chechnya. When the Russians captured Imam Shamil who had been leading
Chechen guerrillas, a segment of the Chechen resistance transferred its fighting
resources to the Ottoman Empire where, generically known as Circassians, this
group was instrumental in pacifying the Balkans and the Arab lands of the Levant.
20 HERMAN BUTIME 3
————————
4 Kordunsky Anna, ‘Boston Bombing Suspects Put Chechnya in Spotlight,’ National Geographic, 19th
April 2013. Available at: http://news.nationalgeographic.com/news/2013/13/130419-chechnya-russia-
caucuses-boston-marathon-bombing-suspects-world-militants/. Accessed on 25/02/2015.
5 Goltz Thomas, op. cit.
6 Loffe Julia, ‘The Boston Bombing Suspects were Reared by Both Chechnya and America,’ New
Republic, 19th April 2013. Available at: http://www.newrepublic.com/article/112971/boston-marathon-
bombers-brothers-chechnya-forged-america. Accessed on 25/02/2015.
7 Ibidem; Dzhokhar Dudayev rose to the rank of Air Force Major General in the Soviet Armed Forces
despite belonging to the minority Chechen ethnic group. See: Goltz Thomas, op. cit; Omar al-Shishani, the
overall military chief of the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) is a Chechen. See: Associated Press and
Daily Mail Reporter 2014, ‘The face of evil: Young, red-bearded Chechen who has become the most
recognisable commander of ISIS terror group,’ Mail online, 2nd July 2014. Available at: http://www.dailymail.
co.uk/news/article-2677683/The-face-evil-Young-red-bearded-Chechen-recognisable-commander-Isis-terror-
group.html. Accessed on 09/04/2015.
8 Goltz Thomas, op. cit.
23. In Jordan, it went on to constitute the ceremonial guards of the king9. In a sense,
Russia’s occupation of the Caucasus triggered the first trans-national marketability
of the Chechen martial streak helping to transform it into an enduringly integral
element of the broader Chechen national character.
The crushing of the Caucasus resistance also paved way for the hardening of
the Chechen national character. By the end of the 1817-1863 Russian campaign
(aimed at securing a route to Transcaucasia), the Chechen population, which had
been 1 million in the 1840s, had been significantly reduced to 140,000 in 186110.
Russian strategy at the time involved, among others, the forceful displacement of
segments of the restive population. For example, north Caucasians of Ingush,
Abkhaz and Adyghe extraction were exiled11.This development presented the
first wealth of collective Chechen embitterment.
The second unfolded during World War II. Although by the 1920s and 30s, the
Stalinist regime had tried to ‘reach out’to this nationality by declaring Chechnya
an ‘autonomous republic’ complete with territory and an official culture, Chechen
resistance to collectivisation and wider Soviet rule persisted12. Whether this may
have led to actual Chechen collaboration with Nazi Germany or it was simply a
link manufactured by the Stalinist regime, in February 1944, the Chechen republic
was dissolved and half of the 478,479 people who were forced out of Chechnya
died enroute to Siberia and Central Asia13.
Assessing how the mass deportations of 1944 affected the Chechen national
psyche, Thomas Goltz observes that: “The Vysl or deportation became the defining
event in the Chechen collective memory, as resonant as the Trail of Tears for the
Cherokees, the Retreat of the Nez Perce or the Holocaust of Europe’s Jews. In the
gulags and collective farms of Central Asian exile (mostly Kazakhstan and
Kyrgyzstan), the Chechens honed their reputation for toughness… Those who did
return to Chechnya did so with a collective bad attitude as well as a reputation for
ruthlessness and organized crime”14.
During the Cold War, the Chechen national character was not greatly influenced
by dynamics inside Chechnya because of what appeared like a final Soviet
settlement of the Chechen question. Chechen military resistance inside Chechnya
had been suppressed while on the political front, the repatriation of Chechens to
their ancestral homeland eased tensions between them and the Soviet government.
But with resistance against foreign occupation enduringly embedded in the Chechen
national psyche, this collective character had to find a domain for development
outside Chechnya. This development would not only transform the character of
Chechen resistance to Soviet occupation but also, in future, widen the pool of
‘enemies’ of the Chechen nation.
4 ASSESSING THE ROOTS OF THE BOSTON MARATHON BOMBINGS 21
————————
9 Ibidem.
10 Kordunsky Anna, op. cit.
11 Goltz Thomas, op. cit.
12 Ibid; Loffe Julia, op. cit.
13 Goltz Thomas, op. cit; Parker Diantha and Bidgood Jess, op. cit.
14 Goltz Thomas, op. cit.
24. Cross-cutting similarities in the conflict dynamics of Cold War Eurasia coupled
with the international marketability of the Chechen martial streak allowed the
Chechen national character to be shaped by dynamics outside Chechnya. With
the U.S and her ally, Pakistan, backing the Mujahideen guerrillas in an Afghan
Islamist campaign against what was seen as Soviet occupation, the Chechen
resistance found a favourable foreign resistance it could relate to. Both resistances
were not only against Soviet occupation but they were also spurred by an
Islamist ideology. This rationale accounts for the onset of the radical Islamist streak
inside Chechen resistance.
The beginnings of Chechen resistance anchored in radical Islamist ideology
are closely tied with the career of Shamil Basayev, a Chechen rebel commander.
With the assistance of Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI), Pakistan’s intelligence agency,
Basayev and his lieutenants underwent military training at the Amir Muawia
camp in the Khost province of Afghanistan. This training facility had been set up
by Gulbudin Hekmatyar, a prominent Mujahideen commander. Later, they were
transferred to the Markaz-i-Dawar camp in Pakistan where they received advanced
training in guerrilla tactics15.
The significance of the Basayev chapter in Chechen history is in the way it
transformed the character of the Chechen resistance. The subsequent participation
of Chechen Jihadists in insurgent campaigns in the predominantly Muslim Georgian
region of Abkhazia and the Nagorno-Karabakh (a territory disputed between
Armenia and Azerbaijan) consolidated the international marketability of Chechens
as a martial nationality16. It was, however, the subsequent injection of a radical
Islamist ideology into domestic resistance that significantly altered the character
of the Chechen resistance.
Like in other former republics of the Soviet Union, the end of the Cold War
triggered secessionist movements in Russia. Chechnya was to be gripped by two
wars which in many ways showcased the transformation of the Chechen character
of resistance17. Whereas the First Chechen War (1994-1996) was mounted by
secular-nationalists, by the start of the Second Chechen War (1999-2000), the
Chechen resistance was dominated by radical Islamists and criminal clans18.
The secular-nationalist strand had very much been in tandem with the Sufi
campaigns of the 19th century. Although the two strands of resistance are separable
in ideological terms, both were identical in the pursuit of limited strategic goals
– attaining Chechen independence. It is also worth noting that aspects of the
Chechen national character evolving from these strands were shaped by dynamics
22 HERMAN BUTIME 5
————————
15 Chossudovsky Michel, BOSTON TRUTH: The ‘Chechen Connection,’ Al Qaeda and the Boston
Marathon Bombings, Global Research, 22nd April 2013. Available at: http://www.globalresearch.ca/boston-truth-
the-chechen-connection-al-qaeda-and-the-boston-marathon-bombings/5332337. Accessed on 23/02/2015.
16 Ibidem.
17 Vancauwenberghe Nadja, ‘First Take: Don’t blame Chechnya for Boston Bombings,’ USA Today, 21st
April 2013. Available at: http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/world/2013/04/20/chechnya-boston-bombings-
first-take/2099255/. Accessed on 25/02/2015; BBC, ‘Boston Bombings: Suspects’Chechen Connections,’BBC
News US & Canada, 22nd April 2013. Available at: http://www.bbc.com/news/world-us-canada-22229442.
Accessed on 17/02/2015.
18 Ibidem.
25. internal to Chechnya. On the other hand, the radical Islamist and criminal strands
were an intrusion into the Chechen psyche of resistance emanating from without.
Whereas Salafism had been imported from the Mujahideen camps in Afghanistan
and Pakistan, the propensity for criminality evolved from the gulags and collective
farms of Siberia and Central Asia19.
Significantly, though, the dawn of the Salafist era expanded the strategic
goals of the Chechen resistance. Emphasizing this point, Doku Umarov, a Chechen
rebel leader, observes: “Our enemy is not Russia only, but everyone who wages war
against Islam and Muslims”20. Thus, unlike the Sufist and secular-nationalist
campaigns that had only aimed to achieve Chechen independence, the Salafists
were out to attain the maximal strategic goal of establishing a caliphate of which
an independent Chechen nation would be a part21. In order to understand how the
shape of the Chechen resistance had reached this point, it is imperative to examine
the activities of Basayev in the post-Cold War era.
When he returned to his homeland, Basayev invited Ibn-ul-Khattab, the
Saudi-born Mujahideen, to set up a military training camp in Chechnya. This
development was significant in that it went beyond the mere setting up of
infrastructure to resist Russian rule. It also carried with it an underlying plan to
undermine the secularist and Sufist foundation of the Chechen state. Militant
religious organizations in Saudi Arabia (which is predominantly Sunni) pumped
funds into the Khattab project. This financial assistance which also came from
other Gulf States was contingent on the installation of Sharia courts in Chechnya.
The installation of Sheikh Abu Umar as Principal Judge of Sharia courts in
Chechnya and the organization of these judicial institutions under the leadership
of Khattab marked a significant move towards the radical Islamization of Chechen
society22.
It is important to note that the Salafist and criminal elements in the Chechen
resistance were not only imported into the Chechen theatre but also exported
abroad. With regard to Salafism, Russia launched the Second Chechen War because
Chechen insurgents had started exporting their activities into Dagestan. The
collective reputation for criminality was also manifest both domestically and
internationally. For example, one of the excuses that President Boris Yeltsin cited
for sending Russian forces into Chechnya was Grozny’s (the Chechen capital)
evolution into a centre for organized crime23. Internationally, Chechen criminal
syndicates had a foothold in Albania, Moscow (the Russian capital) and links with
the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA), a Balkan rebel group24.
The Salafist phase not only transformed the socio-political fabric of Chechen
resistance but also the military tactics underpinning it. Unlike in the past where
Chechen rebels had employed orthodox guerrilla warfare against Russian forces,
6 ASSESSING THE ROOTS OF THE BOSTON MARATHON BOMBINGS 23
————————
19 Chossudovsky Michel, op. cit; Goltz Thomas, op. cit.
20 Vancauwenberghe Nadja, op. cit.
21 Ibidem.
22 Chossudovsky Michel, op. cit.
23 Goltz Thomas, op. cit.
24 Chossudovsky Michel, op. cit.
26. with the dawn of the new millennium, they increasingly started conducting terrorist
attacks. Notable incidents included the 2002 attack on a Moscow theatre that
resulted in the death of 130 people; the 2004 attack on a school in the Caucasian
peninsula that cost more than 330 lives; the 2010 suicide bombing of the Moscow
Metro that resulted in 40 casualties; and the 2011 attack on the Domodedovo
airport that claimed 37 lives25. The increasing use of terrorism was an indication
of negative shifts in the Chechen insurgent campaign. With the Russian security
apparatus mounting pressure on the separatists, brazen attacks on civilian
infrastructure were a mechanism for demonstrating that the Chechen resistance
was still alive.
Thus far, the history of Chechnya appears to point to Russia as the historically
enduring ‘enemy’ of Chechen nationalists. Given that the Tsarnaevs went on to
attackAmerica, which had provided them a home in exile, it is imperative to explain
how the U.S could have evolved into an ‘enemy’ of a segment of the Chechen
resistance. Although during the Cold War, America allied with radical Islamist
groups in resisting communism, it was always debatable that this cooperation would
continue in the post-Cold War era26. With the collapse of the communist bloc
and the disappearance of a common enemy that had unified the west and radical
Islamist groups, ideological contradictions and competition for global power and
influence were bound to brew tensions between these erstwhile allies.
For starters, the west and radical Islamist groups were ideologically cut from
different pieces of cloth. Whereas the west espoused the principles of democracy
and a free market economy, the Salafists aimed to establish Islamist theocracies.
These inherent ideological differences would not have generated friction between
the two sides as long as they did not cross each other’s path on the global stage.
The snag, however, was that the Salafist non-state actors intended to implement
their programmes in predominantly Islamic countries which were strategic allies of
the west. The west’s hands were tied in the sense that if the Salafist agenda
succeeded, western influence would decline in those countries. On the other hand,
if the west robustly defended its largely undemocratic allies, it would not only
earn the wrath of its erstwhile Salafist allies but also contradict its stated commitment
to democracy. These contradictions partly underpin the rise of Al Qaeda and its
commitment to attack the west27.
In the case of Chechnya, contradictory shifts in America’s position on the
Chechen conflict allowed her to gravitate between being perceived as an ally and
24 HERMAN BUTIME 7
————————
25 Vancauwenberghe Nadja, op. cit.
26 Global Research, ’Sleeping with the Devil: How US and Saudi Backing of Al Qaeda Led to 9/11’,
Global Research, Center for Research on Globalization. Available at: http://www.globalresearch.ca/sleeping-
with-the-devil-how-u-s-and-saudi-backing-of-al-qaeda-led-to-911/5303313. Accessed on 03/04/2014; Mashal
Mujib 2012, ‘Hekmatyar’s never-ending Afghan war,’ Aljazeera, 28th January 2012. Available at:
http://www.aljazeera. com/indepth/features/2012/01/201212614551208744.html. Accessed on 03/04/2014.
27 For an example of political repression by Arab Middle Eastern countries, see: Fitzgerald Andy, ‘Why
won’t the west call out Saudi Arabia for persecution of democratic activists?’, The Guardian, 29th December
2013. Available at: http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2013/dec/29/saudi-arabia-us-human-rights-
persecution-activists. Accessed on 03/04/2014; Muskus Jeff, ’Osama bin Laden Dead: The Rise, Fall and
Legacy of America’s Most Wanted Terrorist’, The World Post, 2nd May 2011. Available at: http://www.
huffingtonpost.com/2011/05/02/osama-bin-laden-killed-legacy_n_856138.html. Accessed on 03/04/2014.
27. an enemy of the Chechen cause. During the Cold War, Chechen perceptions of
the U.S were largely positive given America’s opposition to the Soviet hegemony
and Pakistan’s (America’s ally) logistical and military assistance for the Chechen
resistance28. Even in the aftermath of the Cold War, these perceptions endured,
as evidenced by Moscow’s suspicions that America looked favourably to the
Chechen resistance as an instrument for destabilizing Russia. This argument found
basis, for example, in the U.S offering Ilyas Akhmadov (Foreign Minister in the
Chechen rebel government) political asylum despite Russia’s protestations about
his alleged terrorist links29.
Three factors could have changed Chechen perception of America: first,
Dzhokhar Dudayev (the Chechen nationalist leader) was killed by a laser-guided
missile while he waited to speak with a U.S peace mediator. This incident led to
Chechen suspicions of America’s involvement in their leader’s death30. Second,
the U.S has been keen on a rapprochement with Russia, in order to maintain her
military supply lines to Afghanistan that run through southern Russia and central
Asia. From the Chechen perspective, the Chechen cause could be sacrificed upon
the alter of improved Russo-American relations. Third, despite its historical
‘sympathy’for the Chechen cause, the U.S has been overly restrictive on admitting
Chechen immigrants31.
From the foregoing discussion, it could be asserted that the Chechen national
character has historically been shaped by dynamics inside and outside the cradle
of Chechen civilization and it has consequently picked up the following critical
elements: first, the perennial attempts at eroding Chechen nationhood potentially
make Chechens susceptible to adopting a collective siege mentality. Second,
Islam has emerged as an important doctrine for rallying resistance against threats
to the Chechen national ethos. Third, the inherent Chechen martial character has
not only emerged as useful in the resistance against Russian occupation, but has
also become marketable abroad. Fourth, attempts at adapting to a condition of
nationlessness have added ‘ruggedness’ to the collective Chechen character.
It would, however, be difficult to adopt these propositions without qualification,
given that only a fraction of the wider Chechen population goes on to participate
in political violence. The challenge at this juncture then is to investigate how the
above ‘inherent’national attributes shape individual Chechen communities. Since,
for the better part of their lives, the Tsarnaev brothers were a part of the Chechen
American diaspora, it is imperative that the characteristics of this community are
examined, in order to determine how these could have shaped the careers of
Tamerlan and Dzhokhar.
8 ASSESSING THE ROOTS OF THE BOSTON MARATHON BOMBINGS 25
————————
28 Chossudovsky Michel, op. cit.
29 Schreck Carl, ‘In Small Boston Diaspora, Echoes of Chechnya,’ RIA Novosti, Sputnik International,
23rd April 2013. Available at: http://sputniknews.com/analysis/20130423/180799181.html. Accessed on
27/02/2015.
30 Goltz Thomas, op. cit.
31 Upton Jodi and Overberg Paul, ‘Few Chechen immigrants make it to US,’ USA Today, 20th April 2013.
Available at: http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/nation/2013/04/19/chechens-immigrants-us-population/20
97065/. Accessed on 27/02/2015.
28. Communal Predisposition to Political Violence
Although the evolution of the ChechenAmerican community (and other Chechen
diaspora) should have ‘softened’the ‘hardened’collective Chechen character (borne
out of generations of nationlessness and suffering), there are contradictions in
the social integration of this segment of American society that potentially allow
gaps for individual alienation and gravitation towards political violence to exist.
The notion that the U.S has been a welcoming home for Chechen immigrants
is contestable in some respects. Despite immigration waves that date as far back
as the 1920s, Chechens in the American diaspora are comparatively few. The
Chechen population in the U.S is estimated at between 200 and 1,000 dispersed
in the states of Massachusetts, Michigan, Oregon and California. The cities that
predominantly host this immigrant community are Boston, Chicago, Seattle,
New York and the D.C Metropolitan area32. By comparison, there are 30,000
Chechen immigrants in Austria33. Almut Rochowanski, Founder of the Chechnya
Advocacy Network, attributes this situation to logistical challenges. It is easier
for Chechens to relocate to Europe than to America34. While this may be the case,
however, U.S security concerns could also partly account for the small Chechen
American population.
Due to stringent U.S anti-terrorism laws and Russian protestations, few
Chechens, and fewer men for that matter, are admitted into America. 70% of
Chechen immigrants to the U.S are women. It is worth noting that the U.S Treasury
Department has three Chechen insurgent groups (implicated in the 2002 terror
attack on a Moscow theatre) on its terrorism watch list: Islamic International
Brigade; Special Purpose Islamic Regiment; and Riyadus-Salikhin Battalion35.
This could explain the restrictive admission of Chechens into America. Glenn
Howard, President of the Jamestown Foundation, asserts that some American cities
do not accept Chechen immigrants, a position that is, however, contested by
Nicholas Daniloff, Professor at North Eastern University, who notes: “As far as
I knew, they have also settled in Chicago, Seattle [and] New York”36.
It is plausible to argue, therefore, that whereas Cold War alignments may have
established a modicum for positive Chechen perceptions of America, the restrictive
immigration policy targeting North Caucasians at the same time undermined this
foundation. This reality fostered the evolution of mistrust in Chechen-American
relations that could potentially be exploited by disillusioned Americans of Chechen
descent seeking to attach ideological meaning to their individual predicaments.
26 HERMAN BUTIME 9
————————
32 Bishop Tricia, ‘Chechens in U.S. feel shame, fear over Boston bombing,’The Baltimore Sun, 28th April
2013. Available at: http://articles.baltimoresun.com/2013-04-28/news/bs-md-local-chechens-20130428_1_
chechens-boston-marathon-caucasus. Accessed on 27/02/2015; Gray Rosie, ‘Chechen Community in the US:
Tiny, IsolatedAnd Disorganized,’Buzz Feed News, 21stApril 2013.Available at: http://www.buzzfeed.com/rosiegray
/chechen-community-in-the-us-tiny-isolated-and-disorganized#.mdwN0Jo671. Accessed on 27/02/2015;
Schrek Carl, op. cit.
33 Upton Jodi and Overberg Paul, op. cit.
34 Bishop Tricia, op. cit.
35 Upton Jodi and Overberg Paul, op. cit.
36 Schreck Carl, op. cit; Upton Jodi and Overberg Paul, op. cit.
29. Social Environment
Since Boston was not only home to Tamerlan and Dzhokhar but is also reputed
to host the largest number of Chechens in the U.S, it is important to examine the
kind of social infrastructure that makes it an attractive destination for this segment
of American society and also establish whether there are certain social integration
gaps in its social settings that might have fed into the Tsarnaevs’ wider web of
discontentment.
There are conflicting population figures for the Chechen American community
in Boston. Whereas Daniloff estimates the population to be between 20 and 30,
Howard puts the figure at 4037. Other commentators on the Chechen-American
diaspora estimate the population in terms of families: Both Fatima Tlisova, a
Voice ofAmerica (VOA) journalist and Magomed Imakaev, a Chechen immigrant,
put the figure at 5-6 families, with Imakaev asserting that “It is less than 50
people”38. From the above statistics, it is possible to deduce that there are at least
between 20 and 50 Chechen-Americans in the Boston area. Whether one adopts the
‘floor’or ‘ceiling’figure of these population estimates, Chechens are a comparatively
very tiny community in Boston.
In terms of settlement history, Boston should not have created a foundation for
alienation for the Tsarnaevs. Historically, it has been a favourite settlement destination
for Chechens. For example, when Akhmadov was granted political asylum in the
U.S, he resided in the home of Khassan Baiev (a best-selling Chechen-American
author and medical doctor) in Boston39. Thus, aside from settling in an area with
the highest number of co-ethnics, the Tsarnaevs were in social proximity to both
prospective Chechen and Chechen-American role models, which, to a certain extent,
should have dampened any emerging feelings of hopelessness and alienation.
The cosmopolitan urban settings of their precincts of residence should equally
have eased their social integration. The Tsarnaev family lived along Norfolk Street
which is proximate to Prospect Street, Cambridge Street and Brighton Avenue.
This residential precinct is not only multi-cultural but it also has the social
infrastructure that should have assisted Tamerlan and Dzhokhar to fit into
American society. Cambridge Street, for example, is populated by Americans
originally from Portugal and the Azores40. The conglomeration and mixing of
people from different cultural backgrounds in this precinct should have offered
the Tsarnaevs an opportunity to break out of an in-ward looking Chechen diasporan
cocoon, in the event they had been caught up in one.
It is common, in many cases of immigration, that successful social integration
is not necessarily synonymous with total social assimilation. An immigrant group
could embrace its new host society without abandoning all its cultural traditions
and practices. In this connection, the Boston area where the Tsarnaevs resided
10 ASSESSING THE ROOTS OF THE BOSTON MARATHON BOMBINGS 27
————————
37 Schreck Carl, op. cit.
38 Gray Rosie, op. cit; Schreck Carl, op. cit.
39 Schreck Carl, op. cit.
40 McKelvey Tara, ‘Disbelief in home district of bomb suspect Dzhokhar Tsarnaev,’ BBC News US &
Canada, 20th April 2013. Available at: http://www.bbc.com/news/world-us-canada-22229176. Accessed on
24/02/2015.
30. had the needed social infrastructure to accommodate such a scenario. Amongst
others, the Boston area has Islamic institutions like the Cambridge and Masjid al
Qur’aan mosques where Tamerlan and Dzhokhar could have kept in touch with
their faith; and the area also has the Ali Bara market which, as a sign on its front
window indicates, “sells chicken hand-slaughtered by Muslims according to
Islamic law”41. These social facilities, per se, should have nipped in the bud any
start-up perceptions ofAmerican society as ‘inherently’hostile to Muslims, a reason
alluded to by Dzhokhar as motivation for the attacks.
Boston also provided the Tsarnaevs with the social infrastructure to accommodate
their financial means (in the event they were living on the margins) and also
engage in career pursuits that would keep them in touch with the Chechen
martial ethos, if they so wished to adopt it. Apart from having Troy Anthony’s
Barber Shop, restaurants, shops and a fish market, Cambridge Street, for example
has a store for second-hand items where those presumably living on the financial
margins can make purchases. If the stereotypical perspective of Chechens as a
martial nationality is true, then Boston also offered Tamerlan and Dzhokhar a facility
where they could have peacefully exerted their ‘in-born’attribute. Their residential
precinct is home to the Wai Kru gymnasium where Tamerlan worked out42.
The dodgy dimension of this residential precinct, though, manifests in its
propensity to attract Russian related criminal activity. Only prior to the attacks, it
had been discovered that Russian spies, Donald Heathfield and Tracey LeeAnn Foley,
had lived there43. While these individuals could have conducted their espionage
in other parts of the U.S, the fact that they selected this area points to the possibility
that it had the requisite social infrastructure to conceal their illegal activities. As
to whether this factor partly accounts for Tamerlan’s alleged criminal stint is
something worthy researching in future44.
On balance, though, it could be asserted that the Boston social environment
is largely suited for the integration of Chechens into American society. While this
area has the ‘ideal’ pillars for this purpose, however, the smoothness of social
integration itself depends on the actual behaviour of the Chechen community
relative to this social infrastructure. This is the subject of the ensuing section.
Social Integration
The ChechenAmerican community exhibits remarkable contradictions of social
integration. Whereas Chechen Americans neither live in compact communities
28 HERMAN BUTIME 11
————————
41 Ibidem; McPhee Michele, ‘Family Matters: Dzhokhar Tsarnaev and the Women in His Life,’ Newsweek,
16th October 2014. Available at: http://www.newsweek.com/2014/10/24/women-behind-boston-marathon-
bombing-suspects-277760.html. Accessed on 24/02/2015 .
42 McKelvey Tara, op. cit.
43 Ibidem.
44 Boston Herald.com, ‘Marathon bombing defense likely to focus on dead brother,’ Boston Herald.
Available at: http://www.bostonherald.com/news_opinion/local_coverage/2015/02/marathon_bombing_defense
_likely_to_focus_on_dead_brother_0. Accessed on 17/02/2015; Memmott Mark, ‘Court Papers Link One
Tsarnaev Brother To Previous Murders,’The Two-Way, NPR, 23rd October 2013. Available at: http://www.npr.
org/blogs/thetwo-way/2013/10/23/240239111/court-papers-link-one-tsarnaev-brother-to-previous-murders.
Accessed on 17/02/2015.
31. nor maintain ethnic solidarity in the U.S (which should have been a sign of
successful social integration), they are at the same time very nostalgic about their
ancestral roots. This discrepancy constrains U.S authorities in gauging the actual
depth of social integration of this segment of American society. And where
individuals from this community choose to go down the path of political violence
or criminality, the authorities are unlikely to nip their activities in the bud.
Unlike some minorities, Chechens do not maintain ethnic solidarity in Boston.
According to Tlisova: “The Boston Chechen community wasn’t very much
connected with each other. They know about each other, but I don’t think they are
close. They care for themselves mostly, and are isolated from the society, not only
from the other Chechens”45.
This observation throws a spanner in the wheel of existing perspectives on
the collective character of Chechens: If historically, they come across as people who
are fiercely conscious about their ethno-nationalist roots, then they should be
networking socially. Existing evidence shows that this is not something they do.
Aside from being dispersed across the U.S, Chechen Americans are not linked
by any representative body which should have addressed the above organizational
need. The only known attempt at social networking was initiated byAlbert Digaev,
a Chechen American and founder of Amina.com, a social media website which
allowed Chechens in different parts of the world to interact online. This initiative itself
hit a dead end in 2004/2005 after the posting of photos of some girls in compromising
situations led to them committing suicide and the Chechen government instituting
a tight social media monitoring regimen46.
Logically, the individualistic approach to social interaction would have been
an indication of ‘successful’ integration of Chechens into American society. The
assumption here would have been that the relocation of Chechens from their
ancestral homeland (where Chechen ethno-nationalist sentiments were rife) to a
foreign land (where those sentiments were not sustained) had broken Chechen
ethno-nationalism to a point where Chechens neither cared about their immediate
co-ethnics nor about developments in Chechnya.
While the above assumption may hold true with regard to Chechen-to-Chechen
interaction in the U.S, it is unsustainable when it comes to the connection
between Chechen Americans and their ancestral homeland. This segment of
American society is very nostalgic about its ancestral roots. In this respect, Alsan
Doukaev, a Radio Free Europe journalist, observes that while Chechen Americans
do not stick together, “…they don’t lose touch with their homeland”47.
This observation is supported by the interior and exterior design of Imakaev’s
home in Boston. According to Carl Schrek: “Traditional ram’s wool hats hang
on the walls; a computer monitor glows with the green of the Chechen flag; and
the sapling of a medlar, an ancient fruit-bearing tree rare in America but common
in the north Caucasus, awaits summer in a backyard garden”48.
12 ASSESSING THE ROOTS OF THE BOSTON MARATHON BOMBINGS 29
————————
45 Gray Rosie, op. cit.
46 Ibidem.
47 Ibidem.
48 Schreck Carl, op. cit.
32. The above description points to a deliberate attempt at maintaining a strong
cultural connection with Chechnya. Imakaev, who immigrated to Boston as a war
refugee in 2004, confirms this deduction: “It (the fruit tree) makes me feel at
home, because that’s the tree originally that I grew up around, the tree that I used
to see everywhere in Chechnya when I went around the woods as a kid”49.
From the above exposition, it could be deduced that the relocation of Chechens
to the U.S precipitated a double-edged social integration scenario where on one
hand, the absence of strong communal ties would facilitate the ‘successful’
integration of some Chechens into American society; while on the other hand,
‘inherent’ nostalgia about their ancestral roots would potentially predispose
others to strongly identify with Chechnya. The ‘inherent’ resilience of Chechens
(embedded in their national character) would play a critical role in whichever of
the two directions Chechen Americans headed. For those who would choose to
participate in the ‘liberation’ of their homeland, their ‘inherent’ attributes as good
fighters would not be in question given the historical marketability of Chechens
as a martial nationality.
Chechens who would choose to embrace the U.S would also have the benefit
of tapping into the rich reservoir of resilience inherent in their collective character
in order to fit into American society. Citing Imakaev, Schrek underscores this
point: “Many of the Chechens who have settled in Boston and other U.S cities
seek out manual jobs that allow them to capitalize on the resourcefulness and tenacity
acquired while growing up amid destruction and harsh climes in Chechnya”50.
However, in terms of social class, given that the majority of this community
would be located in the lower stratum of the American social structure, the
propensity for some Chechen Americans being alienated and gravitating towards
Chechen ethno-nationalism (as a way of attaching meaning to their individual
predicaments) would not be ruled out.
Conclusion
It is important to note, therefore, that given the lack of ethnic solidarity among
Chechen Americans, it is challenging to accurately gauge the extent to which
some of the broader aspects of the Chechen national character have shaped them
as a collective unit. In order to effectively assess susceptibility to adopting a
siege mentality; the emergence of Islam as a doctrine binding the Chechen
American diaspora; and the significance of the Chechen martial streak as a tool
for pursuing collective objectives, it is imperative that the Chechen community
in the U.S be a relatively tight-knit unit – which is not the case.
In the foregoing analysis, however, it has been possible to determine the impact
of the Chechen national character upon the work rate of Chechens in the U.S
because, unlike the rest, assessment of this variable is not overly contingent on
30 HERMAN BUTIME 13
————————
49 Ibidem.
50 Ibidem.
33. group solidarity. Even while operating at an individual level, it is relatively possible
to assess whether Chechen Americans at work reflect the wider Chechen national
character. The fact that Tamerlan and Dzhokhar went on to pursue martial sporting
careers (boxing and wrestling respectively) and puritanically embraced Islam as
a means to redefining their identity cannot be underestimated. These individual
career attributes resonate with the evolution of the wider Chechen national
character that is synonymous with toughness, resilience and reliance on Islam for
ideological direction.
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14 ASSESSING THE ROOTS OF THE BOSTON MARATHON BOMBINGS 31
