The global economy experienced a slight slowdown in 2013 with a growth rate of 2.9%, but is projected to improve to 3.6% in 2014, driven by both developed and emerging economies. The U.S. economy grew by only 1.6% in 2013 but is expected to rebound, while Japan's economy, bolstered by expansionary monetary policy, is anticipated to grow by 1.5% in 2014. Latin America's growth is projected at 3.5%, with Mexico and Colombia showing resilience despite various economic challenges.

1. ECONOMIC
OVERVIEW
January 2014
Department
of Economics

2. ESADE ECONOMIC OVERVIEW
Economic Overview
Global Economy
Some improvement at the global level
GDP GROWTH RATE (%)
The global economy slowed down slightly in 2013 with an annual growth rate of 2.9%, somewhat lower than the rates of
3.9% and 3.2% seen in 2011 and 2012, respectively. This
slowdown was seen both in developed and emerging economies, which grew by 1.2% and 4.5%, respectively (again, a few
tenths of a percentage point lower than in previous years).
Worldwide economic growth is expected to be up slightly in
2014, to a forecasted level of 3.6%. This improvement will be
seen both in developed and emerging economies, which are
expected to grow by around 2% and 5%, respectively.
8
7
6
5
4
3
2
1
0
-1
-2
-3
-4
2008
2009
2010
2011
2012
2013
2014*
Worldwide economic growth is
expected to be up slightly in 2014,
to a forecasted level of 3.6%
Source: IMF
In mid-2013, financing conditions briefly became more restric-
The episode showed that the global economy – and emerging
tive for emerging economies. The announcement that the Fed-
economies in particular – are extremely sensitive to monetary
eral Reserve intended to shift its monetary policy by tapering
conditions in developed economies. Therefore, monetary pol-
off its liquidity injections had an immediate impact on finan-
icy must therefore be progressively normalised in the not-too-
cial markets across the globe. The interest-rate differential be-
distant future.
World
Emerging
Developed
*Forecast
*Forecast
tween public debt and private bonds grew, capital withdrawals
increased, and stock-market indices fell. Calm returned to the
The U.S. economy grew by just 1.6% in 2013, largely due to
markets after the Fed clarified its position in September.
fiscal adjustments implemented during the year. In 2014, U.S.
JANUARY 2014
2

3. ESADE ECONOMIC OVERVIEW
whole. The Fed has announced its intention to maintain the
liquidity injections first introduced in 2007 and is expected to
keep interest rates at their current 0% level for at least two
more years.
After several years of deflation and stagnation, the Japanese economy grew by 2% in 2013, confirming the turnaround first seen in 2012. This growth was brought about
by prime minister Abe’s new approach to economic policy
and the Bank of Japan’s shift towards a clearly expansionary monetary policy. Fiscal stimulus on the order of 1.5% of
GDP fostered growth in 2013 by boosting household spending and business investment.
Facade of the U.S. Federal Reserve Building in Washington
The Japanese economy will grow
by 1.5% in 2014, confirming
the turnaround first seen in 2012
In 2014, Japan’s fiscal policy will be somewhat more restric-
economic growth is expected to increase to 2.6%. American
tive – the sales tax will be increased to 8% and government
fiscal policy will become less restrictive after Congress manag-
spending on reconstruction will be slashed – with the explicit
es to reach a budget agreement. U.S. monetary policy, mean-
aim of shrinking the public deficit to 2.5% of GDP. As a result,
while, will remain clearly expansionary, as the Fed announced
recently. Other factors that will contribute to higher growth include the recovery of the real estate market (which will lift net
household wealth) and the improved flow of credit with more
favourable financial conditions.
U.S. fiscal policy will also contribute to an increase in economic
activity. Fiscal adjustments were on the order of 2.5% of U.S.
GDP in 2013, but this figure is expected to drop to 0.75% in
2014. Adjustments will be needed in the medium term to keep
U.S. public debt sustainable; this process must be carried out
in a well-planned, staggered manner. Budget sequestration
has been an exaggerated, inefficient resource – a result of
partisan jockeying rather than economic logic. Failure to raise
the debt ceiling in the near future would have extremely negative effects on the U.S. economy and the global economy as a
Shinzo Abe, Prime Minister of Japan
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3

4. ESADE ECONOMIC OVERVIEW
1.5%. The depreciation of the yen, caused by the Bank of Ja-
Latin American Economy
Prospects
pan’s expansionary monetary policy, has allowed the foreign
The Latin American economy is expected to grow by around
sector to attain positive growth figures.
3.5% in 2014, slightly more than the previous year, when this
the country’s annual growth rate will fall to between 1% and
figure fell just short of 3% (one of lowest growth rates posted
In the medium term, Japan’s challenge will be to maintain
by the region in the past decade). Given Latin America’s sharp
stable growth that generates expectations of inflation rather
upturn following the global crisis of 2008-2009, the recent
than deflation (a recurring phenomenon over the past two de-
moderation was, to some degree, expected.
cades). Japan may eventually require more fiscal stimulus, so
have a medium-term fiscal adjustment plan.
The Latin American economy is expected
to grow by around 3.5% in 2014, slightly
more than the previous year
China’s economy grew by 7.7% in 2013 and is expected to grow
The falling cost of raw materials and the rather restrictive fiscal
at a slightly slower pace (just over 7%) in 2014. This forms
conditions in many Latin American countries kept the region’s
part of the Chinese authorities’ new strategy of transitioning
economic growth below its potential last year. The region’s
towards a more sustainable and balanced pace of growth. Chi-
growth was also hampered by increased volatility in the global
na’s economic policy will focus on various necessary structural
financial markets after the Federal Reserve announced that
reforms rather than short-term stimulus measures. These re-
it would soon abandon the policy of liquidity injections intro-
the country must give itself room to make such policies possible. It is therefore vitally important that the Japanese economy
forms aim to address risks that have accumulated in recent
years, such as an excess of credit and highly indebted local
governments. The expansion of credit over the past decade
GDP GROWTH RATE (%)
has brought investment up to 50% of GDP. In order to achieve
more balanced growth, China needs to shift more of its production towards consumption.
China’s new strategy will transition
towards a more sustainable and
balanced pace of growth, shifting more
of its production towards consumption
10
8
6
4
2
0
-2
-4
The Chinese authorities have made reforming the country’s
-6
financial system a high priority. These reforms are intended
-8
to increase the system’s security and make credit allocation
2008
more efficient. Another priority, the liberalisation of China’s
2009
Mexico
service industry, is meant to improve the provision of health-
2010
2011
Brazil
2012
2013
Colombia
2014*
Peru
*Forecast
care and education services.
Source: IMF
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4

5. ESADE ECONOMIC OVERVIEW
duced in 2007. The announcement caused a spike in the risk
premiums on Latin American public debt during a period of
widespread capital outflow from both the fixed- and variableincome markets. The region’s main stock-market indices suffered as a result. Most Latin American currencies suffered a
year-on-year depreciation of between 5% and 15%, prompting
some central banks to intervene in the foreign-exchange market in order to cushion the fall. In September, when the Fed
announced that it would be postponing its policy change, the
Mexican twenty-pesos bill
situation went back to normal.
than-expected economic growth in the United States. Growth
This episode showed that Latin America’s economies are
is expected to return to nearly 3% in 2014 on the strength of
stronger now than they were in the 1990s, when some
higher government spending and rising U.S. demand. Mexico
countries in the region experienced severe crises. Better
is expected to consolidate an annual growth rate of between
fiscal and financial fundamentals, plus more credible eco-
3% and 4% in the medium term.
nomic policies, have made the region less vulnerable to external events. Latin American economies also benefit from
flexible interest rates that allow adjustments to be made by
means of currency depreciation.
Latin America’s economies are
stronger now than they were in
the 1990s, when some countries
in the region experienced severe crises
Mexico’s growth is expected to return
to nearly 3% in 2014 on the strength of
higher government spending and rising
U.S. demand
This higher growth rate will be bolstered by increased public investments and government spending on social protection; this
will be possible because Mexico’s legislature voted to increase
the deficit limit to 1.5% of GDP.
The entire region faces downside risks. If the emerging economies of Asia grow less than expected, the price of raw materi-
The reform process initiated by the current administration
als would fall unexpectedly, hampering growth in Latin Ameri-
will also contribute to economic growth. Fiscal reforms to
ca’s largest economies. Likewise, lower-than-expected growth
eliminate tax deductions and raise the income tax on top
in the global economy could hurt Latin American exports. It
earners will lead to higher revenues. In order to maintain its
is also possible that new shifts in U.S. monetary policy could
anti-cyclical fiscal policy, Mexico must adopt flexible goals,
lead to tougher financing conditions. If any of these risks were
allowing an unbalanced budget during slow years (like
to materialise, monetary policy would be the first recourse to
2013) and capping spending in times of expansion. Mexi-
stimulate economic growth in Latin America.
co’s energy reforms should allow an increase in oil production, which is currently at 1998 levels. Such reforms will be
Mexico
based on the principle of public ownership of oil reserves,
Mexico’s economy grew by just 1.3% in 2013. The country’s
with the possibility of privatising certain activities in order
economic activity was hurt by falling oil prices and by lower-
to increase efficiency.
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5

6. ESADE ECONOMIC OVERVIEW
Brazil
Thanks to the strength of the Peruvian economy, the country’s
After stagnation in 2012, the Brazilian economy grew by 2.5%
unemployment rate has reached a historic low of 6% and real
in 2013. Similar growth is expected for 2014, confirming the
wages have increased by 3%. These two factors have led to
gradual economic recovery seen last year.
higher household consumption. Private investment also grew
by 8% in 2013, thanks in part to foreign investment inflows,
With a year-on-year rate of 6.7% in mid-June, inflation was
which are expected to remain at similar levels at least through
slightly above the target set by Brazil’s currency authorities.
2015.
The country’s central bank was therefore forced to increase
the interest rate from 7.25% to 9.5% between April and October. During the second half of the year, the central bank
kept depreciation under control by regularly selling off U.S.
Peru is one of Latin America’s fastestgrowing economies, with a growth rate
of 5.4% in 2013
dollars.
Peru’s foreign sector experienced negative growth as the counIn general terms, Brazil’s economic growth was hampered by
try’s exports experienced a greater slowdown than its imports.
changes in inflation, interest rates and credit. Rising inflation
As a result, Peru nearly posted its first current-account deficit
led to lower household disposable income, which will continue
in ten years.
to drag down consumption in the future. Rising interest rates
on public debt presented additional difficulties, giving the pub-
In 2014, the Peruvian economy is expected to grow by 6%
lic sector less room to manoeuvre in terms of growth-stimu-
– approaching figures from recent years – thanks to robust
lating fiscal policies. However, the depreciation of Brazil’s cur-
consumption and investment, but also because foreign de-
rency during 2013 should boost the country’s exports.
mand will reduce the foreign sector’s negative contribution.
The main risks that could hamper Peru’s growth are a larger-
Brazil’s current-account deficit increased to 3.6% of GDP as
than-expected drop in the price of copper and other metals on
the country’s positive balance of goods and negative balance
the international markets and a global decrease in demand;
of services both fell. This foreign deficit is financed largely –
either of these scenarios would worsen the contribution of
though not fully – by the inflow of direct investment. In the
Peru’s foreign sector.
short term, this is not a problem; however, Brazil must bring
down its current-account deficit in order to preserve its exter-
Colombia
nal position.
The Colombian economy grew by 4% in 2013. Growth picked
up during the second half of the year after flagging slightly in
Peru
2012 and the first half of 2013. This change was largely due
Peru is one of Latin America’s fastest-growing economies, with
to improvements in Colombia’s foreign sector.
a growth rate of 5.4% in 2013. This figure, while high, is one
percentage point lower than in the previous two years. A downturn in the country’s foreign sector was responsible for this
slowed growth. Investment and government spending, Peru’s
main drivers of growth, increased by 12% and 8.5%, respectively, in 2013.
Colombia is expected to maintain
its strong economic trajectory
throughout 2014, with GDP growth
reaching 4% due to improvements
in the foreign sector
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6

7. ESADE ECONOMIC OVERVIEW
Eurozone Economy
Prospects for 2014
After a year and a half of negative growth, the eurozone
posted positive growth in the second quarter of 2013 and is
expected to grow by around 1% in 2014. This figure is below
the region’s potential; unemployment is therefore expected
to remain high. Furthermore, the disparity between the core
and peripheral countries will remain significant: Germany,
France, Austria, Finland, Belgium, Luxembourg and Ireland
will grow by 1% to 1.5%, but Italy, Spain, Portugal, Greece
and the Netherlands will grow by around 0.5%. Growth will
remain negative in Cyprus and Slovenia. Only the emerging
economies of the eurozone – Estonia, Slovakia and Malta –
will grow by more than 2%.
Headquarters of the Central Bank of Colombia in Bogota
The eurozone is expected to grow by
around 1% in 2014
Although it appears that activity will cease to drop in the eurozone periphery, growth will remain low in these economies.
Colombia is expected to maintain its strong economic trajec-
Therefore, 2014 will be the seventh consecutive year of reces-
tory throughout 2014, with GDP growth reaching 4% or even
sion or stagnation in the periphery. Economic growth, albeit
slightly higher. Domestic consumption and investment will
weak and wavering, will once again be seen in the core coun-
grow at a rate similar to that of the economy as a whole. How-
tries. Various factors will keep growth below its potential. In
ever, investment will not reach the peak rates seen in 2011
the peripheral countries, the simultaneous deleveraging of the
and 2012 due to uncertainties surrounding investment in the
private and public sectors will weaken demand considerably.
oil industry.
Although the pace of budget adjustment has slowed, fiscal
policy continues to be contractionary.
Colombia’s central bank was able to keep the official interest
rate at 3.25% throughout 2013. This was possible because
The eurozone’s economic growth is too weak to merit speculation
the 6% depreciation of the Colombian peso in 2013 did not
as to whether it could continue on its own, without corrections to
push up inflation, which remained steady at 2.4%. With growth
the dysfunctions of the eurozone and its constituent economies.
close to its potential, Colombia’s economic activity is solid and
inflation will surely rise. Therefore, the country’s official inter-
The public deficit of the eurozone was reduced by 1% of the re-
est rate will probably need to increase by late 2014, even if
gion’s GDP in 2013, but this figure is expected to drop to 0.5%
the central bank brings it down earlier in the year in response
in 2014. The problem is that deficit reduction is not uniform:
some sort of difficulty. The central bank will also maintain its
it is primarily occurring in the periphery, where growth is lower
current policy of purchasing U.S. dollars.
and stimulus measures are more necessary.
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7

8. ESADE ECONOMIC OVERVIEW
GDP GROWTH RATE (%)
Eurozone total & selection of countries
4
2
0
-2
-4
-6
-8
-10
Eurozone
Germany
2008
France
2009
Italy
2010
Greece
2011
Spain
2012
Portugal
2013
Ireland
2014*
*Forecast
*Forecast
Source: European Commission and compiled by the author
Inflation remains at around 1.5%, below the European Central
countries. Interest rates on household and business loans re-
Bank’s medium-term target of 2%, showing that deflationary
main higher in the periphery than in the core, with a difference
effects remain. It will be necessary to monitor the economy
of about 300-400 basis points. This shows that the mecha-
closely to keep it from backsliding into deflation and deepen-
nism by which monetary policy is transmitted does not work
ing the crisis.
properly for the periphery: the ECB’s low-interest-rate policy
has not reached the periphery, where companies and families
Fragmentation of financial and credit markets
are forced to pay high rates. This poses a serious obstacle to
Since the ECB launched its Outright Monetary Transactions
economic recovery.
(OMT) programme in September 2012, interest rates on public debt have returned to levels last seen in mid-2010, before
risk premiums started to rise as a consequence of the Greek
public-debt crisis. The volume of bank deposits has been stabilised and the capital outflow from financial institutions in the
The fragmentation of the financial
markets is the reason for the higher
interest rates paid by companies and
families in the peripheral countries
periphery to those of the core has been stemmed. Larger private companies have seen their financing conditions improve
There are various reasons for higher interest rates in the
as the risk premiums have dropped.
peripheral countries, but the most important reason is the
fragmentation of the financial markets. The flows of financ-
Despite these improvements, there are still large differences
ing between banks in different countries – in particular, be-
between the financing conditions in the various eurozone
tween the core and the periphery – have slowed consider-
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8

9. ESADE ECONOMIC OVERVIEW
RISK PREMIUM
Sovereign spreads compared with 10-year German bond
700
600
500
400
300
200
100
Spain
Italy
13
-1
3
no
v-
se
p
-1
3
ju
n
13
m
ar
-
2
-1
de
-1
p
se
France
c
2
2
-1
n
ju
m
ar
-1
2
-1
1
c
de
-1
1
se
p
-1
1
n
ju
-1
1
ar
m
de
c
-1
0
0
Belgium
Source: European Central Bank & Bank of Spain
ably due to the perception of greater risk, the expectation
delinquency rates, larger provisions and lower volumes of
of possible losses for various types of creditors (“bail-ins”),
business.
and regulations enacted by certain countries to isolate their
banks from the rest of the system. In addition, many insti-
The difficulty of securing financing and remaining profitable
tutions have had trouble staying profitable due to higher
have prompted institutions to increase interest rates on house-
GERMAN BANK EXPOSURE TO SPAIN AND ITALY
€ Billions
250
200
150
100
50
0
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
Spain
2010
2011
2012
Italy
Source: Bank of International Settlements
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9

10. ESADE ECONOMIC OVERVIEW
FRENCH BANK EXPOSURE TO SPAIN AND ITALY
€ Billions
350
300
250
200
150
100
50
0
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
Spain
Italy
2010
2011
2012
Source: Bank of International Settlements
hold and business loans while considerably reducing the flow
been lower between 2008 and 2013. The economies in which
of credit. This has important implications for economic activity,
non-financial businesses were highly indebted in 2007 – Spain,
given that bank loans account for 90% of non-financial debt
Ireland, Portugal and Estonia – have since seen higher increas-
while the remaining 10% corresponds to large companies.
es in unemployment. In countries that had a highly leveraged
financial sector before the crisis – Ireland, Portugal, Greece and
In order for economic recovery to reach the entire eurozone,
Spain – interest rates on loans have since risen more sharply,
monetary policy must start working again and the flow of credit
making it more difficult to end the recession.
to small and medium-sized enterprises must be restored.
The volume of debt in the eurozone varies considerably be-
The weight of debt
tween countries and sectors. In Ireland, Portugal and Spain,
Debt accumulation played a clear role in triggering and shaping
debt levels are high in households, non-financial companies
the eurozone crisis. This phenomenon encompasses the accu-
and the public sector. In Greece, debt is concentrated in
mulation of public debt and foreign debt as well as the volume
households and the public sector, whereas in Cyprus house-
of private debt incurred during the boom years following the
holds and non-financial companies have the highest debt lev-
creation of the euro. Indeed, the countries where debt levels
els. As a result of these imbalances, all of the aforementioned
grew most sharply between 2000 and 2007 have seen lowers
countries have accumulated significant levels of foreign debt.
levels of economic growth between 2008 and 2013. In countries where household debt grew quickly between 2000 and
Increases in nominal GDP and nominal wages have historically
2007 – Portugal, Ireland, Greece and Spain – consumption has
been the means by which debt ratios are reduced. It is gener-
JANUARY 2014
10

11. ESADE ECONOMIC OVERVIEW
Selection of
Eurozone countries
INDEBTEDNESS (% of GDP)
Household sector
slow and complex throughout the eurozone, particularly in the
peripheral countries.
120
Debt reduction and economic viability
100
The fragmentation of the eurozone’s financial system has
80
given rise to a negative feedback loop between bank risk,
business health and sovereign risk. The combination of over-
60
indebted companies with low profits, banks with balance-
40
sheet problems, and highly indebted states has led to this
vicious cycle. Perceiving the weakness of their own balance
20
sheets, the banks have expanded their “safety cushions”,
Spain
Greece Portugal Ireland Germany France
2000
2010
2013
increased their interest rates and decreased the number of
loans they grant. Companies have therefore found it harder
to refinance their debt and their profits have suffered as a
result. Consequently, more companies have begun to default
Source: IMF
on their loans, thereby hurting the banks’ balance sheets.
INDEBTEDNESS (% of GDP)
Non-financial corporate sector
Selection of
Eurozone countries
The situation in the public sector poses an added difficulty.
The high level of indebtedness and the public sector’s status
as the ultimate guarantor of bank deposits has put upward
pressure on public-debt interest rates and risk premiums.
250
This has hurt companies because it has pushed up the cost
200
of obtaining financing in the bond market, and it has hurt
banks because it decreases the value of public debt, which
150
the banks hold in large quantities. The overall result is a
weakened credit flow, lower growth and greater difficulties
100
for the economy.
50
0
has brought gross income down by 3.4% in Spain and by 1.8%
in Portugal. As a result, the debt-reduction process has been
140
0
tion is very low and, since 2010, negative economic growth
Spain
Greece Portugal Ireland Germany France
2000
2010
2013
At the same time, companies’ problems have exacerbated the
troubles of the strongest banks. As a consequence of pre-crisis
debt accumulation, more than 75% of the debt held by nonfinancial companies in Spain and Portugal is in the hands of
Source: IMF
highly leveraged companies with debt/asset ratios of 40% or
higher. In Italy, 50% of company debt is held by highly lever-
ally considered that 75% of the reduction is due to inflation
aged companies. Because of these high levels of debt, com-
and 25% is due to real income growth. Today, however, infla-
bined with lower profits as a result of the crisis, companies
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11

12. ESADE ECONOMIC OVERVIEW
SHARE OF DEBT AT FIRMS WITH VARIOUS
DEBT-TO-ASSETS RATIOS
SHARE OF DEBT AT FIRMS WITH VARIOUS
INTEREST COVERAGE RATIOS
100%
100%
90%
90%
80%
80%
70%
70%
60%
60%
50%
50%
40%
40%
30%
30%
20%
20%
10%
10%
0%
Germany
France
Italy
Spain
Portugal
0%
Germany
France
Italy
Spain
Below 30%
30%–35%
Above 3
2–3
35%–40%
Above 40%
1–2
Portugal
Below 1
Source: IMF
Source: IMF
have had difficulty making their interest payments and the de-
the percentage of all business debt held by companies with an
linquency rate on bank loans has increased.
interest coverage ratio lower than 1. In Portugal, 45% of business debt is held by companies with an interest coverage ratio
This difficulty meeting obligations as a result of high indebted-
of less than 1. In Spain and Italy, the percentages are 40% and
ness has cast doubt on the viability of many companies and
30%, respectively. By way of contrast, this figure is below 15%
put high-debt economies at risk.
in Germany and France.
The viability of highly leveraged companies can be measured
The percentage of business debt held
by at-risk companies is 40% in Spain,
45% in Portugal and 30% in Italy
in terms of interest coverage ratio, which is defined as a company’s earnings before interest and taxes divided by its interest expenses. An interest coverage ratio below 1 indicates that
the company is not generating enough income to meet its in-
Policies to facilitate debt reduction
terest expenses. Companies in this situation can only make
Countries that, like the United States, took steps early to shore
their interest payments by reducing their debt or capital costs
up financial institutions’ balance sheets have made greater
– and, consequently, their interest expenses – or by increas-
progress at reducing debt levels. If mechanisms for restruc-
ing their earnings. The “at-risk” debt of a particular economy is
turing debt – of both banks and the private sector – are used
JANUARY 2014
12

13. ESADE ECONOMIC OVERVIEW
generously, uncollectible debts can be removed from banks’
of the market for bonds backed by loans to SMEs would
balance sheets more easily; as a result, uncertainty can be
increase the flow of bank credit to these companies. The
reduced more quickly and credit flows can resume sooner.
market for eurozone-based bonds has a volume of €1 trillion, and just 14% of these bonds are backed by loans to
For the debt-reduction process to be quick and effective, the
SMEs. Meanwhile, the volume of bank loans to SMEs is
financial sector must be reorganised. The first step is to re-
much greater: €1.5 trillion. It would also be very useful to
capitalise weak institutions and remove uncollectible debt
create programmes by which governments back loans to
from balance sheets; only then can the banks restructure the
SMEs. Tax incentives for the issue of “mini-bonds” related
debt of delinquent creditors. The eurozone has nearly finished
to loans to SMEs have already been successfully introduced
the process of reorganising troubled financial institutions, so
in Italy. It would also be possible to introduce tax benefits on
it should be possible to carry out the debt-reduction process
bank income derived from loans to SMEs, accompanied by
over the course of 2014.
measures to ensure that such loans did not hurt the banks’
balance sheets.
Another possible way to accelerate this process is to restructure business debt. This can take several forms: renegotiation
Finally, another option is to create funds whose objective
of deadlines, renegotiation of interest rates, acceptance of
is to grant loans directly to SMEs, whether through public
partial payment, or writing off debts. However, this approach
institutions, venture-capital firms, investment funds or busi-
can entail high costs: it sets a bad precedent and creates a
ness-development companies.
moral hazard; it threatens debtor-creditor relations, leading to
uncertain future repercussions; and it can harm third parties,
European Central Bank policies
including investors, who would shun the region in the future. It
In order to unblock the flow of credit, it will be necessary to
is therefore preferable to take steps to guarantee the availabili-
restore the health of banks’ balance sheets, break the feed-
ty of credit to companies that, with access to reasonably afford-
back loop between sovereign risk and bank risk, solve the
able credit, would be in a position to begin reducing their debt.
problem of the fragmented financial system, and create a
banking union. These objectives will not be achieved for some
Credit stimulation measures
time. In the meantime, to make economic recovery possible,
During recessions, government intervention to mitigate credit-
steps will need to be taken to foster credit availability.
restricting factors is not usually necessary. However, in especially severe recessions – like the present one – intervention
The ECB must provide weak financial institutions with li-
can be very useful at preventing these factors from exacerbat-
quidity. It can do this by means of long-term refinancing op-
ing the recession.
erations (LTROs): loans at low interest rates (1%) maturing
after three to five years. Alternatively, it can accept more
In Ireland and Spain, 25% of small and medium-sized enter-
types of assets as backing for loans, or discount a smaller
prises consider restricted access to credit to be their largest
percentage of the value of collateral securities. Because
obstacle; in Germany and Austria, this figure is just 8%.
market-based financing was hard to come by, banks in
the peripheral countries made extensive use of the LTROs
There are several possible ways to improve access to credit
granted in early 2012. Extending this source of liquidity
for small and medium-sized enterprises. Greater development
would be a good strategy.
JANUARY 2014
13

14. ESADE ECONOMIC OVERVIEW
Spanish Economy
Prospects for 2014
The Spanish economy is expected to grow by 0.5% to 1% in
2014. Despite this return to positive figures, growth will be
very modest – just enough for a small amount of job creation.
The unemployment rate will remain nearly stable at around
27%. This will be the seventh consecutive year of recession
or stagnation.
The ECB could also take direct measures to ensure that liquidity reaches small and medium-sized enterprises. It could consider a system by which financial institutions would gain access to credit in exchange for providing loans to SMEs (as the
The Spanish economy is expected to
have moderate growth of 0.5% to 1%
in 2014
Bank of England has done). Alternatively, it could link access
to LTROs to the provision of SME loans.
In 2013, the inflation rate fell to 1.7%. This drop began in the
third quarter, by which time the direct effect of the September
It is essential that the ECB take direct
measures to ensure that liquidity
reaches small and medium-sized
enterprises
2012 increase in VAT and medicine costs on the CPI inflation
Banking union
In 2014, household consumption will continue to be held
The European Union is now working on the first stages of the
down by the high unemployment rate and falling wages.
rate had become diluted. As a result of this decrease in inflation, Spain’s inflation differential relative to the eurozone average became negative in late 2013.
banking union approved by the European Council in 2012. The
single supervisory mechanism will be launched in November
2014. The EU is considering how the European Stability Mechanism (ESM) should proceed in its efforts to directly recapitalise
troubled banks and is also drafting a bank recovery and resolution directive. At some point it will also need to create some sort
of deposit insurance shared by all banks in the region.
It should be noted that the first steps towards the banking
union have not solved the financial sector’s fragmentation
problem; indeed, they have exacerbated it by making the differences between the core and the periphery more obvious.
Measures to counteract this fragmentation – basically, the
introduction of common deposit insurance – are slated for
GDP GROWTH RATE (%)
4
3
2
1
0
-1
-2
-3
-4
2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014*
*Forecast
implementation at a later date. It is therefore crucial that this
process move forward quickly and decisively.
Source: Bank of Spain and compiled by the author
JANUARY 2014
14

15. ESADE ECONOMIC OVERVIEW
Spanish exports will continue the four-year growth streak
late 2013 to become consolidated, the flow of credit will
that increased their market share to 33% of GDP at the end
need to be restored, the interest rates paid by families and
of 2013. The volume of Spain’s imports will continue to be
companies will need to decrease, and expectations will
conditioned by the behaviour of domestic demand. As a re-
need to improve overall.
sult, Spain’s net exports will remain the country’s largest
Internal devaluation
source of economic growth.
Thanks to the process of internal devaluation, the Spanish
It will not be possible, however, for Spain to make a full
economy is regaining some of the competitiveness it lost in
economic recovery based solely on the foreign sector. For
the run-up to the crisis. In other words, it is becoming com-
the country’s economy to return to sustained growth, do-
petitive again as prices and wages drop below the eurozone
mestic demand must also increase. It is vitally important
average. This is a slow, costly process that requires a long
that Spain regain the conditions that will allow household
period of recession or stagnation.
6
consumption and business investment to increase. For
household consumption to rise, families will need to have
Structural reforms introduced in 2010 reduced unit labour
better access to credit, unemployment will need to drop,
costs and made the labour market more flexible, which in
and expectations will need to improve. For business invest2
turn boosted Spanish exports and attracted foreign tourism.
0
ment to increase overall, investment in capital goods will
The decrease in wages has shown that Spain’s labour costs
need to rise and investment in construction will need to
are sensitive to the economic cycle – an essential condi-
stop falling. In order for the slight improvement in house-
tion for a speedier recovery. This sensitivity is a result of the
hold consumption and capital-goods investment seen in
2012 labour reform.
4
-2
-4
-6
2007
2008
2009
2010
2011
2012
2013*
2008
2009
2010
2011
2012
2013*
labour costs
Annual percentage change
6
4
2
0
-2
-4
-6
2007
*1st and 2nd quarter forecast
Source: Bank of Spain
JANUARY 2014
15

16. ESADE ECONOMIC OVERVIEW
EXPORTS OF GOODS AND SERVICES
Annual percentage change
20
15
10
5
0
-5
-10
-15
-20
2009
2010
2011
2012
2013*
*4th-quarter forecast
Source: Bank of Spain
IMPORTS OF GOODS AND SERVICES
Annual percentage change
15
10
5
0
-5
-10
-15
-20
-25
2009
2010
2011
2012
2013*
*4th-quarter forecast
Source: Bank of Spain
JANUARY 2014
16

17. ESADE ECONOMIC OVERVIEW
Measured in terms of real exchange rates, the competitive-
households was equivalent to 85% of the country’s GDP. By
ness of the Spanish economy dropped by 14% from the intro-
2013, this figure had dropped to 79%.
duction of the euro to the onset of the economic crisis in 2008;
The lack of growth and the low
inflation rate make the debt-reduction
process slower and more difficult
since then, however, it has bounced back by 4%.
Spain’s labour costs have become
sensitive to the economic cycle
Debt ratios have historically been reduced by passive means,
Deleveraging underway
particularly the growth of nominal GDP or nominal wages. It is
History suggests that deleveraging and debt-reduction pro-
generally considered that 75% of the reduction is due to infla-
cesses are slower and have a greater impact on growth when
tion and the remaining 25% is due to real wage growth. How-
all sectors of the economy – households, businesses and the
ever, because inflation is currently very low and gross income
public sector – are highly indebted. Unfortunately, this is pre-
has fallen by 3.4% in Spain since 2010, amortization is the
cisely the case of the Spanish economy at present.
only way to reduce debt. This makes for a slower, more difficult
process that has negative effects on the economy.
Because of the magnitude of the debt held by the private
sector, the deleveraging of this sector is vitally important to
In addition, although the volume of debt is gradually decreas-
Spain’s economic recovery. In 2010 – a critical moment in the
ing, lower wages mean that debt payments account for a
debt-accumulation process – the total debt held by Spanish
larger share of household income, and this drags down con-
EXTERNAL DEBT
€ Billions
2.000
1.800
1.600
1.400
1.200
1.000
800
600
400
200
0
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
2011
2012
2013*
*Until June
Source: Bank of Spain
JANUARY 2014
17

18. ESADE ECONOMIC OVERVIEW
sumption. Spain has the eurozone’s highest ratio between
continue to see considerable restrictions on public spending
debt-servicing expenses and total household income (19%),
in the future.
ahead of Portugal (16%), France (13%) and the Netherlands
(13%); the eurozone average is less than 12%.
Fiscal policy
Even after the severe fiscal adjustments of the last four years,
Spain’s non-financial companies reduced their debt from
Spain has not yet completed the process of reducing its public
148% of GDP in 2010 to 143% in late 2012. In 2000, when
deficit. In accordance with Spain’s commitments to European
the availability of credit began to grow sharply, the debt of
authorities, the country’s public deficit, which was more than
Spain’s non-financial companies was the equivalent of just
6.5% of GDP in 2013, must be reduced to 5.8% in 2014, 4.2%
60% of GDP. According to empirical studies of other historical
in 2015 and 3% in 2016.
periods marked by high debt levels, a sharp increase in business debt should be followed, on average, by a reduction to
Because a higher GDP will translate into somewhat higher
two-thirds of the previous amount. For this to happen, Spanish
revenues, Spain would not need to make many more budget
companies would need to reduce their debt to 50% of GDP.
cuts in order to achieve its target for 2014. However, stricter
targets are required for 2015 and 2016. Given the high lev-
Steps should be taken to facilitate the reduction of business
el of public debt and the resulting interest-servicing costs,
debt. Resources now being used to refinance nonviable
Spain would need to have a primary surplus of 2% to 3%
companies should be reallocated to help viable companies
– not counting interest payments – in order to bring the
that are capable of creating jobs and investing. For this to
deficit down to 3% of GDP. As a result, even if the economy
be possible, insolvency and bankruptcy legislation should
starts growing again, considerable fiscal adjustments will
be reformed to allow help to reach viable companies quickly
be necessary. The targets set by the European authorities
and to accelerate the liquidation of nonviable ones. Debt-re-
need to be flexible enough to adapt to growth fluctuations
structuring agreements – especially for small and medium-
because additional budget cuts could hamper short-term
sized enterprises – should also be facilitated, but first the
growth and must be avoided. This short-term flexibility would
financial sector must be brought back to full health.
be offset by Spain’s inescapable medium-term commitment
to reduce the deficit.
In the public sector, the debt-reduction process has not yet
begun. The volume of public debt as a percentage of GDP
Financial system
will continue to rise until the public deficit falls below 3%
The financial support provided by the European Financial
and higher growth rates are consolidated. Spain’s ratio be-
Stability Facility (EFSF) and the European Stability Mecha-
tween public debt and GDP is not expected to stabilise until
nism (ESM) has enabled Spain to speed up the reorgani-
it reaches 110%-120% around the year 2017. With a risk
sation of its financial sector. Following independent stress
premium of around 200 basis points and interest rates in
tests and a meticulous asset-quality review, Spain’s troubled
Germany of 1% to 2%, debt-interest servicing for the pub-
yet viable banks have been recapitalised and the remaining
lic sector accounts for approximately 3% of GDP. Therefore,
entities have adopted restructuring or resolution plans. The
keeping debt levels stable requires generating a primary
viable banks were recapitalised by raising private capital
surplus of 2% to 3% of GDP. Because the government has
and by transferring assets and liabilities related to the real
not even managed to eliminate the primary deficit, Spain will
estate sector to SAREB, Spain’s so-called “bad bank”. In the
JANUARY 2014
18

19. ESADE ECONOMIC OVERVIEW
ertheless, there remain some risks, essentially those derived
from the difficult macroeconomic situation. Additionally, the
flow of household and business loans has yet to improve.
The solvency of the Spanish financial
system has improved but the flow of
household and business loans has not
resumed
Good news in the foreign sector
Spain’s current-account balance rose from a deficit of 10% of
GDP in 2008 to positive figures in mid-2013. Of this notable
improvement, 75% is due to an improved balance of exports
of goods and services and more than 50% is due exclusively to
the increase in exports.
In previous instances of current-account imbalance, the deficit
had reached just 3% to 4% of GDP and adjustment was parmeantime, the regulatory and supervisory capacities of the
tially carried out by depreciating the peseta.
Bank of Spain have been enhanced.
Exports increased steadily from 2010 to 2013. The number of
Since the first measures were taken in 2009, the public sec-
exporting companies increased by 10% each year, indicating a
tor has injected €63 billion into the Spanish financial sector
growing level of internationalisation in Spanish industry.
(approximately 6% of GDP), €43 billion of which came from
the EFSF and ESM. In addition, the public sector has guaran-
The growth figures posted by Spain’s trade partners, in com-
teed bonds issued by banks, including SAREB, for a value of
bination with the current behaviour of imports and exports,
€105 billion.
suggest that the current-account balance adjustment is permanent (i.e. not due to cyclical factors).
The overall volume of capital in the financial system has been
increased. In mid-2013, Spain reached the minimum core
capital ratio required by European regulations (9%). Provisions
for doubtful debts have also been increased. The number of
Exports increased steadily from 2010
to 2013 and the number of exporting
companies increased by 10% each year
banks in Spain decreased from 50 in 2009 to 16 in 2013, and
the number of branch offices and employees has dropped by
In recent years, Spain’s current-account balance has been
approximately 14% in the same period.
adjusted primarily through the reduction of costs, especially
wages. Spain should continue this adjustment by dedicating
In short, the Spanish financial system has been stabilised: it
more resources to exports, thereby increasing the size of the
is now much more secure and has no solvency problems. Nev-
export sector as a share of the Spanish economy.
JANUARY 2014
19

20. ESADE ECONOMIC OVERVIEW
Final considerations
cially among young people). These problems will not solve
Having put its growth figures back into the black, Spain needs
themselves: they require action on the part of the Spanish
to avoid falling into multiple-year stagnation – a scenario
and European authorities.
that could easily arise from the present situation. The accumulated effect of stagnation and unemployment on various
There is no reason why Spain should go through a pro-
social groups could lead the public to increasingly question
longed economic recession as a sort of Biblical punishment
the eurozone in political and economic terms. The leaders
for past mistakes. Indeed, a prolonged recession is an inef-
of the core European countries need to understand this.
ficient response to those mistakes; the loss of production is
unrecoverable and, in addition to the obvious social costs,
The events of recent years have shown that the Spanish
it hurts Spain’s ability to repay its debts. A return to growth
economy has significant collateral effects on the eurozone
in Spain – and throughout the periphery of the eurozone –
economy as a whole, principally through the financial mar-
should be a priority on the European political agenda.
kets. Spain has shown that its economy, like Italy’s, plays a
systemic role within the EU. Therefore, trouble encountered
by Spain on its path towards stable growth poses a danger
to all eurozone economies and must therefore be avoided.
Efforts to reform the Spanish economy should continue. If
the country’s first positive growth figures do not lead to job
creation, additional labour reforms must be undertaken.
Such reforms should probably take the form of a single permanent contract with severance indemnity conditions that
increase over time.
2015 could mark the beginning of a
more solid economic recovery, though
uncertainty is still high
In last year’s Economic Report, we outlined a scenario in
which it would be possible for the Spanish economy to return to positive growth in 2014. In the end, as explained in
the present report, this growth will be very weak. However, if
certain conditions are met, 2015 could mark the beginning
of a more solid economic recovery. For this to be possible,
the general scenario in Europe needs to improve and specific problems must be solved. Spain urgently needs solutions to the fragmentation of its financial system, the poor
availability of credit, and its unemployment figures (espe-
Mariano Rajoy, Prime Minister of Spain, during the last
press conference held in 2013
JANUARY 2014
20

21. ESADE ECONOMIC OVERVIEW
ABOUT THIS PUBLICATION
This Overview is based on ESADE’s Economic Report, January 2014, produced by the Department of Economics (http://itemsweb.esade.edu/biblioteca/archivo/informeeconomicoenero2014.pdf). This article was
written by Prof. Josep M. Comajuncosa. The original document was produced with the support of Banc de
Sabadell. If you would like any further information on ESADE, our Department of Economics or our professors,
please contact our International Communication Department (esadenews@esade.edu +34 93 495 20 99).
ABOUT ESADE
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Street Journal and BusinessWeek). ESADE currently has a network of more than 44,000 alumni occupying
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the fields of business and law.
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