The Reform Philippines Coalition (RPC) issued a media statement demanding that the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) restore four security features of the automated election system as required by law: 1) ballot verification using UV detectors, 2) source code review, 3) a voter-verified paper audit trail, and 4) digital signatures on transmitted election results. The RPC argues credible evidence shows these features were removed or diluted in 2010 and 2013, undermining the legitimacy of those elections. Failure to restore these safeguards threatens the integrity of the upcoming 2016 elections as well. The RPC Chairman calls on COMELEC to faithfully institute these security features to protect public trust in the electoral process.

1. REFORM PHILIPPINES COALITION
HEADQUARTERS: 4
th
Floor, VICTORIA ONE BLDG., QUEZON AVENUE CORNER SGT. ESGUERA AVENUE,
METROMANILA, PLDT LANDLINE: (02) 546-8450 / email: reformph@yahoo.com
MEDIA/PRESS STATEMENT
DECEMBER 15, 2015
MANILA YACHT CLUB
MANILA
OFFICIAL RPC STATEMENT BY: RPC CHAIRMAN GRECO BELGICA
MEDIA COMMITTEE & OFFICIAL SPOKESMAN
CONTACT NOS: 09175920631 // 09255699777
AUTHORIZED SIGNATURE: ________________________________________
URGENT DEMAND FOR THE COMELEC TO IMMEDIATELY
RESTORE THE FOUR (4) PCOS SECURITY FEATURES!!
CREDIBLE EVIDENCE HAS RECENTLY COME TO LIGHT WHICH SERIOUSLY
UNDERMINED THE LEGITIMACY, INTEGRITY AND CREDIBILITY OF THE 2010 AND 2013
AUTOMATED ELECTIONS, ESPECIALLY THOSE INVOLVING THE FLAGRANT
VIOLATIONS OF REPUBLIC ACT NO. 9369 (AUTOMATED ELECTIONS LAW) ON THE
OUTRIGHT REMOVAL AND/OR EFFECTIVE DILUTION OF THE MAJOR SECURITY
FEATURES OF THE SMARTMATIC AUTOMATED ELECTIONS SYSTEM, PRIMARILY THE
FOLLOWING:
1. BALLOT VERIFICATION (UV DETECTOR) – WHICH IS INTENDED TO
PREVENT THE USE OF FAKE BALLOTS AND PREVENT THE PRE-
LOADING OF SPURIOUS VOTES INTO THE CF CARDS –
IN THE 2010 ELECTIONS, THE UV DETECTORS OF THE PCOS MACHINES
WERE NEVER USED PURPORTEDLY FOR A VARIETY OF REASONS, I.E.
SMARTMATIC SUPPLIED THE WRONG UV INK; THE UV MARK WAS
MISALIGNED; THE UV INK WAS NOT PRINTED ACCORDING TO THE
REQUIRED DENSITY SPECIFICATIONS, THUS, CAUSING THIS
COMMISSION TO PURCHASE 30 MILLION PESOS WORTH OF HANDHELD
UV SCANNERS WHICH, ACCORDING TO THE FINAL REPORT OF THE
CARTER CENTER’S LIMITED MISSION TO THE MAY 2010 ELECTIONS IN
THE PHILIPPINES, WAS OBSERVED IN ONLY A HANDFUL OF POLLING
STATIONS (PAGE 32).
IN THE 2010 ELECTIONS, AUDIT LOG REPORTS FROM 145 PCOS
MACHINES IN BILIRAN SHOWED A TOTAL OF 4,114 BALLOTS WERE
ALREADY SCANNED BY THE PCOS MACHINES BEFORE ELECTION DAY,
RAISING VERY SERIOUS CONCERNS OF PRE-LOADING OF CF CARDS.
2. SOURCE CODE REVIEW – WHICH IS INTENDED TO INSURE THE
INTEGRITY AND CREDIBILITY OF THE AUTOMATED ELECTION SYSTEM
BY SUBJECTING THE SOURCE CODES OF THE ENTIRE ELECTION
SYSTEM TO INDEPENDENT REVIEW, TESTING AND FORENSIC
EXAMINATION –
IN THE 2010 ELECTIONS, NO LESS THAN THEN CHAIRMAN SIXTO
BRILLANTES, JR., ADMITTED BEFORE THE JOINT CONGRESSIONAL
OVERSIGHT COMMITTEE ON THE AES THAT NO SOURCE CODE REVIEW
WAS EVER CONDUCTED.
PAGE TWO

2. IN THE 2013 ELECTIONS, ONLY A PARTIAL SOURCE CODE REVIEW, I.E.
THE PCOS SOURCE CODE, WAS CONDUCTED AFTER THE ELECTIONS.
IN THE ON-GOING SOURCE CODE REVIEW FOR THE 2016 ELECTIONS,
WE NOTE THE OBJECTIONS OF A NUMBER OF I.T. PRACTITIONERS
THAT A REVIEW INVOLVING “READ-ONLY COPY” AND WITHOUT THE
ABILITY TO ACTUALLY TEST THE SOURCE CODES MAKES THE REVIEW
INEFFECTIVE AND UNRELIABLE.
3. VOTER VERIFIED PAPER AUDIT TRAIL – WHICH IS INTENDED TO
ASSURE THE VOTER THAT HIS VOTES HAD BEEN CORRECTLY READ
AND COUNTED BY THE VOTING MACHINE –
SECTION 7(E) OF REPUBLIC ACT NO. 9369 IS QUITE CLEAR IN THAT THE
REQUIRED PAPER AUDIT TRAIL MUST BE VOTER VERIFIED AND NOT
MERELY A CONGRATULATORY SCREEN MESSAGE CONTAINING
NOTHING FOR THE VOTER TO VERIFY HIS VOTES AS HOW THIS
COMMISSION INTERPRETED THE LAW IN BOTH 2010 AND 2013
ELECTIONS.
THE ELECTION RETURNS AND THE AUDIT LOG REPORTS DO NOT EVEN
COME CLOSE AS TO BE CONSIDERED ITS FUNCTIONAL EQUIVALENT
WHEN THE SAME CONTAIN NO DETAILS OF THE VOTER’S VOTES.
VOTER VERIFIED PAPER AUDIT TRAIL SIMPLY MEANS THE VOTER’S
RECEIPT WHICH ALLOWS HIM TO VERIFY WHETHER OR NOT HIS VOTES
WERE CORRECTLY READ AND COUNTED.
EFFECTIVE MEASURES CAN BE PUT IN PLACE TO PREVENT THE
SELLING OF THE VOTER RECEIPT OUTSIDE THE POLLING PLACES AS
FEARED BY THIS COMMISSION BY REQUIRING THE VOTERS TO DROP
THEIR RECEIPTS AFTER THEIR PERSONAL VERIFICATION INTO THE
OLD YELLOW BALLOT BOXES, WHICH, AFTER THE POLLS CLOSED, CAN
BE MANUALLY COUNTED FOR PURPOSES OF VERIFICATION WITH THE
AUTOMATED COUNT PRIOR TO TRANSMISSION, THUS PROVIDING
TOTAL TRANSPARENCY IN THE COUNTING OF THE VOTES.
4. DIGITAL SIGNATURES – WHICH IS INTENDED TO AUTHENTICATE ALL
TRANSMITTED ELECTION RESULTS AND PREVENT THE TRANSMISSION
OF FAKE ELECTION RESULTS VIA UNAUTHORIZED NETWORK
INTRUSION OR HACKING –
THIS COMMISSION HEAVILY RELIES ON THE CAPALLA DECISION OF
THE SUPREME COURT AS JUSTIFYING THE USE OF MACHINE DIGITAL
SIGNATURES. HOWEVER, THE CASE IS ABOUT THE EXERCISE OF THE
OPTION TO PURCHASE THE PCOS MACHINES AND ITS TECHNICAL
CAPABILITIES. THE CASE OPINION THAT THE PCOS MACHINES ARE
CAPABLE OF PRODUCING DIGITALLY SIGNED TRANSMISSIONS
REFERRED TO THE ISSUE OF TECHNICAL CAPABILITY. CAPALLA DID
NOT AFFIRM THE ACTUAL USE OF MACHINE DIGITAL SIGNATURES.
ADDITIONALLY, COMELEC RESOLUTION 8739 PROMULGATED ON 29
DECEMBER 2009, MENTIONED OF TWO (2) IBUTTONS IN SECTION 33(A).
ONE IBUTTON WAS INTENDED AS AN ACCESS DEVICE TO OPEN AND
CLOSE THE POLLS WHILE THE OTHER IBUTTON, USED IN
CONJUNCTION WITH THE PIN OF EACH OF THE BEIS, WAS INTENDED
TO BE USED TO DIGITALLY SIGN THE ELECTIONS RETURNS.
HOWEVER, IN THE REVISED VERSION, I.E. COMELEC RESOLUTION 8786
PROMULGATED ON 4 MARCH 2010, IN SECTION 34(A), THIS PROVISION
ON IBUTTONS WAS OMITTED. THE SECOND IBUTTON TO BE USED IN
CONJUNCTION WITH THE PINS OF THE BEIS FOR PURPOSES OF THE
DIGITAL SIGNATURE REQUIREMENT WAS NO LONGER PROVIDED.
THEREFORE, RESOLUTION 8739 CLEARLY INTENDED TO COMPLY WITH
THE LAW WHILE RESOLUTION 8786 CLEARLY SKIRTED WITH THE LAW.

3. PAGE THREE
THE CONSEQUENT EFFECT OF THE ABSENCE OF DIGITAL SIGNATURES IS
BEST REPRESENTED BY THE DOCUMENTED CASES IN BILIRAN IN THE 2010
ELECTIONS WHERE HIGHLY SUSPICIOUS DOUBLE TRANSMISSION OF RESULTS
WERE CLEARLY OBSERVED.
NOTABLY, THE COMELEC AND SMARTMATIC HAVE REPEATEDLY REFUSED TO
TIMELY AND SERIOUSLY ADDRESS THESE GRAVE PUBLIC CONCERNS DESPITE
CLEAR AND UNCONTROVERTED EVIDENCE AND THE FILING OF NUMEROUS
COMPLAINTS BEFORE THE SUPREME COURT, THE JOINT CONGRESSIONAL
OVERSIGHT COMMITTEE ON THE AES, THE DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, THE
OMBUDSMAN, AND THE PNP/CIDG (CYBER CRIME UNIT) BY DIFFERENT CIVIL
SOCIETY GROUPS AND PERSONALITIES OVER THE COURSE OF FIVE YEARS.
THE LEGITIMACY, INTEGRITY AND CREDIBILITY OF THE 2016 ELECTIONS ARE
AGAIN SERIOUSLY THREATENED BY THE VERY SAME CONTROVERSIAL REMOVAL
AND/OR DILUTION OF THE AES SECURITY FEATURES AND THE VERY SAME
FLAGRANT VIOLATIONS OF OUR ELECTION LAWS BY THOSE ENTRUSTED WITH ITS
CONDUCT AND MANAGEMENT.
HENCE, WE DEMAND, AS INTEGRAL TO THE PEOPLE’S RIGHT OF SUFFRAGE,
THE FAITHFUL, FULL AND EFFECTIVE INSTITUTION AND/OR RESTORATION OF ALL
THESE FOUR (4) MAJOR SECURITY FEATURES OF THE AUTOMATED ELECTION
SYSTEM AS REQUIRED BY LAW.
THE HONESTY, TRANSPARENCY AND CREDIBILITY OF OUR ELECTIONS ARE
NOT WHAT THIS COMMISSION AND CONTRACTED SUPPLIER SAY IT IS. BUT RATHER,
HOW IT IS TRULY PERCEIVED BY THE PEOPLE WHOSE VOTES ARE WHAT THIS
COMMISSION IS CONSTITUTIONALLY AND LEGALLY BOUND TO GIVE FULL MEANING
AND EFFECT.
GRECO BELGICA
CHAIRMAN, RPC
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RPC SECRETARIAT/HEADQUARTERS:
4
th
Floor, VICTORIA ONE BLDG., QUEZON AVENUE CORNER SGT. ESGUERA AVENUE, METROMANILA,
PLDT LANDLINE: (02) 546-8450 / email: reformph@yahoo.com