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Rebooting the smartcard
1. The document discusses rebooting the smartcard concept to make it more plug and play, developer friendly, and malware resistant. 2. It proposes isolating secure and non-secure code using a microkernel architecture to improve auditability. 3. Details are provided on Ledger's latest consumer devices, the Ledger Nano S and Ledger Blue, and resources for developers including sample apps and documentation.
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Rebooting the smartcard
- 1. Rebooting the Smartcard RebootingWeb Of Trust Paris Meetup November 2016 Nicolas Bacca @btchip
- 2. A trust layerbetween the blockchain and the physical world For industrials, enterprises and consumers Securing the first and last mile LEDGER TECHNOLOGY
- 3. Without trust, datahas no actionable value node node node node nodeCloud servers User on a PC or a smartphone Industrial sensor / IoT node node node Connected object Blockchain/IT trusted zone Physical world absence of trust Is this really you? Am I allowed to executethis transaction? Critical temperature data Did the driver got switched?
- 4. The ubiquitous Safe Besttechnical solution for at scale (CHEAP) secure deployment Best technical solution against physical attacks (theft, evil maid)
- 5. A configurable Safe Lotof resources invested in secure remote management Great portability of Java Card, at least on paper
- 6. But not YOURmanageable identity The secrets are not YOUR secrets Or are yours but you can’t manage them (fingerprint match on card) > >
- 7. Definitely not madefor YOU Not Plug & Play Cannot be reliable in a regular (malware infected) computing environment
- 8. Rebooting the Smartcard Plugand Play Developer friendly Malware resistant Auditable
- 9. Plug and Play Nativebrowser / mobile access No driver, no middleware Reusing the FIDO standards
- 10. Malware resistant Physical userconsent can be required for all sensitive operations Display the operation to be validated, in human readable format
- 11. Developer friendly Native isolationwhenever possible Accelerated, low level cryptographic primitives to build on
- 12. Improving on isolation,using ARM capabilities Native application 1 Native application 2 Native application 3 Microkernel User seed MMU lock User modeSupervisor mode System call UI application
- 13. Auditable Isolate secure andnon secure code Build on top of a microkernel that can be gradually opened
- 14. Ledger platform architecture Trusted/ Secure component (Secure Element or enclave) with limited I/O options Non trusted component with more I/O options Screen Direct control from the Trusted component, proxied Pairing at boot time User app 1 User app 2 Button Sensor USB
- 15. Our latest consumerdevices Ledger Nano S : available now Ledger Blue : pre order, Christmas delivery (larger screen, BLE)
- 16. Hardware Oracle -for machines Cryptographically attestable anti-tampering sensors ￭ Secure chip ST31G480 (CC EAL6+) ￭ Sensor ￭ 3 axis anti-tampering MEMS ￭ USB interface for blockchain computer
- 17. Getting started withdevelopment Nano-S resources : compiler and SDK - https://github.com/ledgerhq/ledger-nano-s Sample applications : https://github.com/LedgerHQ/blue-sample-apps Documentation in progress : http://ledger.readthedocs.io/ Developer Slack : http://slack.ledger.co Documentation is getting put together, so don’t hesitate to ask on Slack
- 18.