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RBV and its value
1. Strat. Change 11: 307–316 (2002)
Published online 25 June 2002 in Wiley InterScience
(www.interscience.wiley.com). DOI: 10.1002/jsc.593
The resource-based view of strategy
and its value to practising managers
Tom Connor∗
Luton Business School, The University of Luton, Luton, UK
• A dominant theoretical paradigm in academic strategic management circles is the
Resource-Based View (RBV). This paper reviews the literature of this position and the
extent to which the RBV may be seen as a source of practical guidance for managers
seeking competitive advantage and strategic success.
• The theories of management academics should be of practical value to managers,
otherwise such theories are of limited value. The test of the validity of theorizing about
management is whether the theories produced help to improve the art of management.
That is the criterion adopted in this paper.
• The RBV is an ‘inside-out’ perspective, according to which, competitive success lies
within the hands of managers themselves and it is from the point of view of practising
managers that this paper examines competitiveness. Consequently, the assessment of
the RBV will be a purely instrumental one. Does it help managers to manage better?
Copyright 2002 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.
Introduction The literature of the resource-based
The RBV is essentially an ‘inside-out’
view – a summary
approach to developing successful strategy. The literature within the RBV is quite eclectic
The firm is not the reactor of the positioning with contributions from a variety of per-
school but can find strategic success through spectives including organizational structures
the acquisition, development and deploy- and cultures, managerial competence, tech-
ment over time of scarce resources and skills nological capabilities and core competences.
which are either unique in themselves or in In consequence, that body of literature that
the way they are combined with other assets. describes the RBV is syncretic in nature and
The RBV claims its inspiration from classical a central theme is quite difficult to identify.
microeconomics. It is the acumen and expe- However, this view broadly sees the resource
rience of managers and their ability to create endowment of a firm as the principal source
unique advantages in the marketplace which of strategy options rather than constant repo-
are difficult, if not impossible, for other firms sitioning in the face of shifts in the external
to emulate or compete away, which lay the environment. The resources of the firm will
foundations for value creation and sustained provide the basis for its survival and success
competitive advantage. through time as external conditions in the
environment change.
* Correspondence to: Tom Connor, Luton Business A central thrust of the RBV is the con-
School, The University of Luton, Putteridge Bury,
Hitchin Road, Luton, Bedfordshire, LU2 8LE, UK. tribution of core competences as strategic
E-mail: tom.connor@luton.ac.uk assets which will be the continuing source of
Copyright 2002 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. Strategic Change, Sept–Oct 2002
2. 308 Tom Connor
view of strategy based upon industry per-
A central thrust is the spectives. Vasconcellos and Hambrick (1989)
contribution of core enrich this insight by pointing out that an
industry-based approach to strategy, driven
competences as by concepts of key success factors, would
strategic assets not explain the heterogeneous range of
firm strategies and performance asymmetries
which we actually see. Thus profit perfor-
new products and services through whatever mance is determined by the deployment of
future developments may take place in the firm resources and capabilities within the
market, which by their nature, are unknow- industry setting. The differing responses of
able. Thus the emphasis of the RBV approach managers will reflect a multitude of causes
to strategic management decision-making is (largely the consequence of differing view-
on the strategic capability of the firm rather points), uncertainty, confusion, bias, experi-
than attempting to constantly ensure a per- ence, and other factors. (Kahneman, Slovic,
fect environmental fit. According to McKier- and Tversky: 1982). This point is supported
nan (1997): by Oliver (1997) who argues that decisions
about strategy, even if based upon a ratio-
The resource-based view has a long nal analysis of strategic assets, will actually
history. The rich vein can be traced from be made in a distinctive institutional envi-
Marshall (1890), through Coase (1937) ronment with its own norms and values.
and Andrews (1949) to Penrose (1959). Hence, bounded rationality will to a large
degree determine decision-making processes
Although stemming from microeconomic and outcomes.
theory, the tradition has departed from Collis (1994) believes that any advantage
the steady-state, diminishing returns to in the marketplace that might be enjoyed by
scale model of the classical theory of the a firm will in fact, be competed away by a
firm towards the difficult-to-model world competitor’s ‘higher-order capability’. Thus,
of heterogeneous assets as the source market failure in strategic assets will be over-
of growth and performance asymmetries come by other firms creating better strategic
between firms. From a firm-level view the assets of their own. A key feature of Collis’s
RBV approach sees the source of sustain- view is the great importance placed upon
able competitive advantage proceeding from management itself as a strategic asset driving
the possession and deployment of strategic the adaptability of firms and their ability to
assets that demonstrate particular properties recognize market opportunities. This links
and characteristics that through market fail- with the importance of the idea of intangi-
ure generate economic rents for successful ble assets as central to the RBV approach to
companies. understanding competitive advantage. Tan-
Powell (1996), in the tradition of Schmal- gible assets may be relatively easy to imitate
ansee (1985), Wernerfelt and Montgomery or acquire, but the real difficulty (market fail-
(1988) and Rumelt (1991), demonstrated the ure) is encountered in the case of intangible
relative importance of firm-level factors, as assets. Hall (1992) identified the importance
opposed to industry factors, in determining of such intangible assets as know-how, prod-
the financial performance of the compa- uct reputation, culture and networks, in
nies he researched. This is fundamentally contributing to the overall success of a firm.
opposed to the positioning paradigm asso- Hall (1992) saw these intangible assets as
ciated with Porter (1980). This stance is fundamental to the types of capability dif-
reinforced by Amit and Schoemaker (1993) ferential identified by Coyne (1986) as the
who argue that success comes to managers basis for firm superiority. Thus, the asymme-
with a company perspective rather than a tries of performance between heterogeneous
Copyright 2002 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. Strategic Change, Sept–Oct 2002
3. The resource-based view of strategy 309
firms are very much driven by the intangible Peteraf (1993), considering competitive
strategic assets. The intangible assets iden- strategy, sees the strategic assets as of both
tified by Stopford and Baden-Fuller (1994) tangible (technology) and intangible (capa-
may essentially be defined as corporate bility) types. The heterogeneity of firms is
entrepreneurship. These assets are exempli- the source of economic rents and this het-
fied by proactiveness, striving aspirations, a erogeneity is largely path dependent. In
teamwork approach, dilemma resolution and this context, Makadok (2001) discusses the
a learning capability. This view may be con- alternative approaches to rent creation of
sidered in much the same light as Collis’s ‘resource picking’ (acquisition) and ‘capabil-
(1994) proposition of management itself as a ity building’ (organic development). Inter-
strategic asset determining the firm’s ability estingly, the importance of path dependency
to recognise market opportunities. Lovas and as a causal explanation would mesh with the
Ghoshal (2000) hypothesize that evidence for equifinality emerging from the
Jennings and Seaman conclusions. Implicit
Firms that are able to choose strategic in the RBV is the idea of market failure
initiatives which effectively exploit their and this leads Peteraf (1993) and Werner-
existing human and social capital while, felt (1989) to the view that diversification is
at the same time, facilitating the develop- the logical process at the corporate strat-
ment of new, variable human and social egy level in the attempt to seek to earn
capital, will perform better in the long run economic rents on potentially multiple-use
than those that are not able to achieve resources which are in excess of the needs of
this synergy between exploitation and core activities. This is consistent with Hamel
creation. (1994) who speaks of the longevity and tran-
This view is in a direct link with the ideas of scendence of core competences (intangible
Dierickx and Cool (1989) who wrote of the strategic assets) and sees this as a basis, not
accumulation of strategic asset stocks over for product/market-specific strengths of the
time through consistent investment. The organization in a particular setting, but for
development of strategic asset stocks is fur- the source of competitive products and ser-
ther examined by Prencipe (2001). Jennings vices over time. This reflects the distinction
and Seaman (1994), using Hage’s (1965) between adaptation and adaptability, which
organizational attribute typology, contend are quite different in any consideration of an
that the organization structure itself is pro- organization’s chances for evolutionary sur-
posed as a key strategic asset, determining vival. This theme of adaptability is expanded
the extent to which the firm is capable of by Bogaert, Martens and Van Cauwenbergh
delivering a selected strategy. Rather than (1994) who note the central role of managers
supporting the idea of establishing strategy deploying experience and game skill in fitting
as a response to industry factors, they see the strategic assets to elusive and mutating
the success or failure of strategy dependent environmental settings. The perceptiveness
upon the selection of the correct organiza- of the actors (managers) in interpreting envi-
tion structure, which is of greater significance ronmental signals is, therefore, an aspect of
than the actual strategy selected, using in the tacit strategic asset of effective manage-
their case, the Miles and Snow (1978) typol- ment itself and is redolent of Collis’s (1994)
ogy. Their findings of no single best strategy ‘metaphysical strategic insights’. In this vein,
but, on the contrary, support for the idea Krugman (1994) reminds us that frequently
of equifinality, is a strong argument for the irrational phenomena, well understood by
RBV, since this is a more intuitively attractive managers, can form the basis of strategic
explanation for the firm heterogeneity and value, reinforcing the insight into the role
performance asymmetries actually observed. of managers in conditions of market fail-
In other words decision makers are the archi- ure. An interesting variation on this theme
tects of their environments. is the idea of causal ambiguity. King and
Copyright 2002 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. Strategic Change, Sept–Oct 2002
4. 310 Tom Connor
Zeithaml (2001) argue the importance of to consider their findings with some degree
causal ambiguity from the viewpoint of not of caution, since a principal concern is the
only competitor firms but also of the focal basis of competitive advantage in contestable
firm. The reasoning is that causal ambiguity markets. In considering the current literature
is necessary not only to prevent managers of competences, Tampoe (1994) reminds us
in other firms from understanding the link that although Parsons (1960) had pointed
between resources and performance in the out over thirty years earlier that the dis-
focal firm, but it is also necessary among tinctiveness of a firm was a function of its
managers within the focal firm itself so technical core, there was little detailed guid-
that knowledge of causal links cannot be ance in the literature how an organization
exported intact from the focal firm. If this is might identify and deploy core competences.
true then it would appear to be important Interestingly, Inkpen and Choudhury
that successful managers are not sure what (1995) consider that the absence of a for-
they are doing right. This is augmented by mal or explicit business strategy can be
Whittington’s (1994) view of the processual interpreted as a virtue if it reflects a state
approach to understanding strategic manage- of constructive ambiguity underpinning an
ment processes, whereby managers create adaptive flexibility within the firm. For Ghe-
value and advantage by deploying compe- mawat and Ricart i Costa (1993), the key to
tences and focusing on the imperfections of strategic advantage lies in the ability of the
organizational and market processes. Alvarez firm to use information to learn about the
and Barney (2000) suggest that the inclusion possibilities for developing new products,
of entrepreneurship as a class of inimitable processes, or capabilities as the substance of
strategic asset will enhance the RBV. They dynamic efficiency. Again, this echoes Collis’s
have in mind such management attributes as (1994) ‘metaphysical strategic insights’ and
agility, creativity and fast decision making. also Baden-Fuller and Pitt’s (1996) view that
According to Powell and Dent-Micallef the adaptive test of management lies in its
(1997), assets should be composed into a ability ‘to recognize where markets will be
complementary bundle embedded in the tomorrow’. For Pettigrew and Whipp (1991),
structure of the firm and its culture, which success will depend upon the ‘uncertain,
accords with Powell (1995) and Hansen emergent and iterative process’ of the effec-
and Wernerfelt (1989) who stress the tive management of change. For them this is
greater importance of embedded cultural the central intangible asset.
and behavioural features rather than eco- Mahoney and Rajendran Pandian (1992),
nomic or technical process factors, for the building on Penrose (1959), Hofer and
explanation of firm performance and inter- Schendel (1978) and Grant (1991a), hold
firm performance asymmetry. The comple- that the only long-term limitation on
mentarity is the path-dependent form which
the unique competence of the firm takes and
this reminds us of Robinson’s (1958) obser-
vation of the ‘organic’ nature of the firm and The only long-term
Grant’s (1991b) description of the charac- limitation on a firm’s
teristics of strategic assets, namely, durabil- growth potential is its
ity, transparency, transferability, and repli- management
cability. Ramaswamy, Thomas and Litschert
(1994) and Major and Van Wittleoostuijn
resources
(1996) researched highly regulated market
environments and found the importance of
management and qualified labour as the key a firm’s growth potential is its manage-
to business success. These were the princi- ment resources. The ‘Penrose effect’ (Marris,
pal strategic assets. It is necessary though, 1963), in which firms are seen to experience
Copyright 2002 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. Strategic Change, Sept–Oct 2002
5. The resource-based view of strategy 311
successive periods of growth and slowdown, of resources is central to the realization of
is explained in terms of the capacity of man- the value potential of strategic assets. It is
agement to devote enough of itself to the this complementarity that Teece and Pisano
pursuit of growth rather than maintaining the (1994) and Teece, Pisano and Shuen (1997)
status quo. Thus, not only is management the have called ‘dynamic capabilities’, defined
source of growth, it can also be the source by Eisenhardt and Martin (2000) as:
of stagnation. The strategic value of manage-
ment is in its ability to adopt different styles at The antecedent organizational and strate-
different stages of firm growth. This perspec- gic routines by which managers alter
tive is similar to that of Greiner (1972) who their resource base — acquire and shed
concluded that organizations should change resources, integrate them, and recombine
management style appropriately for succes- them — to generate new value-creating
sive phases of organizational growth. strategies (Grant, 1996; Pisano, 1994).
The theme of managerial competence as
the key strategic asset is further propounded In effect this view sees the routines referred
by Mehra (1996) for whom the deployment to as ‘best practice’ which itself may attract
of assets (a management function) is more the criticism of being a post facto evaluation.
important than the tangible resource endow- Barney and Griffin (1992) assert the dynamic
ments themselves. Greenley and Oktemgil nature of resources in organizations and
(1996) consider the concept of ‘isolating provide their VRIO framework of asset
mechanisms’ that they describe, in effect, rating: Value, Rareness, Inimitability and
as the idiosyncratic competences of firms. Organizational orientation.
These lead to a number of strategic bene-
fits, principally entrepreneurial heterogene- Critique of the literature
ity. Once again the role of management
competence and experience (Bogaert et al., The RBV is the attempt in recent years to
1994) are uppermost in this view and with develop the original classical microeconomic
their idiosyncrasies, are seen centrally as theory of the firm in order to examine
inimitable and non-tradeable assets. Oliver the vital behavioural features of the vari-
(1997) cautions against the RBV as the sole ables embedded within it. The theory of the
source of our understanding of performance firm was seen as a non-dynamic, steady-state
asymmetry and argues that asset deployment model which, in itself, was not capable of
needs to be seen in the context of insti- explaining the diverse nature of industries
tutional features that may limit adaptability with heterogeneous firms and performance
and flexibility. However, it may be argued asymmetries that was evident in the world.
that Oliver, in asserting the importance of It is important that the RBV is seen as the
key intangibles such as culture and manage- development of the theory of the firm, rather
ment style, puts her own position well within than a replacement for it. Many of the writers
the RBV camp. in the classical tradition realized its imper-
The importance of intangible assets is also fections as a model of reality, but they also
discussed by Black and Boal (1994). Their understood it as a powerful tool for analysing
key and important point is the need for the dynamics of competitive behaviour as a
strategic assets to be combined in synergistic concept within the economist’s traditional,
relationships. The assets may be present analytical framework.
but unless the appropriate organizational In summary we can collect the various
disposition and managerial awareness is characteristics of strategic assets as follows
present the synergy will not be acquired. This in Figure 1. The central message of the
amplifies effectively, Oliver’s (1997) point RBV is that strategic assets are essentially
above and is in turn supported by Helfat intangible and therein lies the paradox. How
(1997) who argues that the complementarity do managers recognise, define and shape
Copyright 2002 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. Strategic Change, Sept–Oct 2002
6. 312 Tom Connor
success, would appear to be essentially
Strategic assets — characteristics
tautological, proffering the idea, in essence,
Tangible More easily competed away that successful firms deploy assets superior
Intangible Less easily competed away to those of less successful firms. The theory
does little to advance us from the position
Features of seeing strategic assets as accidents of
• Inimitable history, which can be subsequently shown
• Non-tradeable to have been the result of certain resource
• Tacit
• Durable strengths in combination with certain benign
• Competence environmental conditions. Thus success is a
• Capability
• Institutional path-dependent phenomenon, the product
• Complementarity of human imagination, creativity, luck and
• Metaphysical insights adventitious environmental events. Thus,
• Competitive advantage an internal
rather than external paradigm we are driven to the conclusion that the
usefulness of the RBV is of a descriptive rather
Figure 1. The principal characteristics of strategic than explanatory nature and as such does not
assets within the RBV literature. equip strategists with practical competitive
advantage-building propositions.
the intangible? The features in Figure 1 Furthermore, the theory describes success-
are either abstract nouns or adjectives ful organizations with market power that, by
and provide little of a concrete nature definition, are likely to be a small proportion
that managers could use as a touchstone. of the corporate population. Managers in
These words are of a highly generalized smaller businesses that are not ‘big names’
and qualitative nature and contain a vastly or industry leaders normally operate in a
diverse range of potential meanings. It is fashion that is typically:
this imprecision in terms that render real
meaning unascertainable. It is this largely • Operations and cost focused
rhetorical nature that may render the RBV • Customer driven
unusable in practical terms. • Reactive
• Concerned with short-term results
• Planned within a steady-state industry
The RBV and managers
model
The theory appears in many respects to be
a means only of providing ex post facto (See, for example, Beaver and Jennings
analysis and assessment of successful firms. 2000).
The literature seems to offer little in the way In these circumstances the stimulus for
of guidance to managers seeking to create management decision making is usually
strategic assets. The theory says little about provided by external pressure which, in
how strategic assets are created or where combination with a probably price-elastic
they come from within an organization. It is demand function, would suggest that for
not possible from the argument of the RBV small businesses the idea of strategic assets
to look at a particular asset of a firm and to with their concomitant of market power
know a priori whether that asset will prove is inappropriate. In the absence of market
in the future to be a strategic asset. power and facing a demand curve of
The insights of the RBV would appear dominant buyers there appears little, if any,
to require the endorsement of history for scope for such managers to pursue the
their validation. The discussion of strategic creation of strategic assets as envisaged by
assets within the literature takes them the RBV — even if the RBV were capable of
as a starting point and to this extent providing specific guidance in this respect.
the RBV, as an explanation of strategic Our knowledge of the business world tells
Copyright 2002 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. Strategic Change, Sept–Oct 2002
7. The resource-based view of strategy 313
us that there is a large class of firms that science. It must be said that further research
are successful in a modest way but with no is needed if we are to be able to define the
sustainable long-term advantage in the form contexts within which the RBV as a partial
of strategic assets. theory, is applicable. Without this it will not
In a general sense the thrust of the RBV is to be possible to use the RBV systematically as a
stress the importance of diversity for poten- means of synthesis or a source of competitive
tial strategic success. In effect it strongly prescriptions.
suggests the reality of equifinality. Thus if Generally the RBV literature seems to
managers can learn from the theory that raise more questions about the nature of
there is no one best way to success then competitiveness and strategic success than it
this might prove to be a benefit. However, it
must be said that good managers have proba-
bly always known this anyway. It is this point
that probably encapsulates the essential para- The RBV literature
dox that appears to lie at the heart of the seems to raise more
RBV. The theory describes successful orga- questions than it
nizations. Unsuccessful organizations are, by answers
definition, unequipped with strategic assets
and managers in them would probably not
know how to use the descriptive insights of
the RBV in a creative manner. answers. In particular, we are faced with the
problem of an absence of any firm definition
of the concept of competitiveness. To be of
Conclusions use, a definition must be expressed in terms
In considering the RBV as a means of improv- of identifiable and measurable properties. If
ing corporate performance and understand- this is not the case, the definition, such as
ing the sources of corporate success it would it is, will merely be an imprecise assertion
probably be appropriate to conclude that it susceptible of a range of interpretations. Its
is ill-advised to bifurcate into environment- imprecision will render it of little, if any value,
positioning-based and resource-based theo- in purposeful management discourse.
ries. Each of these approaches combines with In conclusion, the RBV appears to leave
the other to provide an integrated under- unaddressed a number of key questions that
standing of the process of seeking the highest may render it ineffective as a rubric for
probability of strategic success. In fact to use a practising managers. Such questions are:
concept from the RBV, ‘metaphysical insight’
as a strategic asset is the ability to understand • What determines strategic assets?
in a special way the nature of the environ- • How do we recognize a strategic asset?
ment and the future it potentially holds. • How do we plan to develop intangible
Spanos and Lioukas (2001) sensibly sug- strategic assets?
gest that successful company performance • How do we assess the life span of a strategic
is better explained by linking industry and asset?
resource perspectives in combination rather
than promoting one or the other approach For managers these are key questions relat-
as the superior and complete explanation. ing to the fundamental issues of business
McGuinness and Morgan (2000) have also performance and exemplify Tampoe’s (1994)
cast doubt on the capacity of the RBV (or observation of the lack of detailed guidance
dynamic capabilities approach as they pre- in the literature about the creation of strate-
fer) to provide prescriptive help to managers. gic assets. It is facile to expect academic theo-
They suggest a more fruitful theory of strategy reticians to provide managers with clear pre-
formulation may emerge from complexity scriptions for successful business initiatives.
Copyright 2002 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. Strategic Change, Sept–Oct 2002
8. 314 Tom Connor
The contribution of the academic should be Black JA, Boal KB. 1994. Strategic resources:
to help managers: Traits, configurations, and paths to sustainable
competitive advantage. Strategic Management
• Clarify issues Journal 15: Summer Special Issue, 131–148.
• Provide analytical constructs and Bogaert I, Martens R, Van Cauwenbergh A.
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Competition, Hamel G, Heenev A (eds). John
If achieved, these are concrete outcomes Wiley: Chichester; 57–74.
and are the measures of the value of the Coase RH. 1937. The nature of the firm.
Economica 4: November, 386–405.
academic contribution. These are the criteria
Collis DJ. 1994. Research note: How valuable
against which the RBV needs to be evaluated.
are organisational capabilities? Strategic
In the view of this observer the RBV fails to
Management Journal 15: 143–152.
meet them. Coyne KP. 1986. Sustainable competitive
advantage — What it is and what it isn’t.
Biographical note Business Horizons Jan./Feb: 54–61.
Dierickx I, Cool K. 1989. Asset stock accumula-
Tom Connor has been at the Luton Business tion and sustainability of competitive advan-
School in the University of Luton since 1991. tage. Management Science 35(12): 1504–1510.
His interests are in the field of strategic Eisenhardt KM, Martin JA. 2000. Dynamic
and financial management. His earlier career capabilities: What are they? Strategic
was at senior management levels in industry Management Journal Special Issue, 21:
followed by a period of consulting in 1105–1121.
private practice. He has published articles in Ghemawat P, Ricart i Costa JE. 1993. The
leading journals including Strategic Change, organisational tension between static and
Strategic Management Journal, Corporate dynamic efficiency. Strategic Management
Governance, and European Business Review. Journal 14(S2): 59–73.
Grant RM. 1991a. Contemporary Strategy
Analysis: Concepts, Techniques, Applications.
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