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- 1. KEY QUESTION: What motived the US in 2003 to invade Iraq and was it in their national interest? Argument: In light of perceived national security threats - i.e. 9/11, Iraqi WMD, threatened US oil interests in the Middle East - the neoconservative clique in Washington leading up to 2003 convinced Congress and a vast percentage of the US public that invading Iraq was in the national interest, and subsequently implemented neo-conservative foreign policy in order to justify war in Iraq.
- 2. Contributing to the conversation/discussion… Please participate in discussion throughout the presentation either verbally or online in this discussion forum – participation is welcomed! Here you can make use of this BACK-CHANNEL tool to share your ideas, opinions, and perspectives on material presented here – no account needed! You may also want to ask questions to be answered by either members of the audience or myself throughout or at a later date You may also want to continue the conversation after the presentation and give me feedback for improvement or other… I’d love to hear your thoughts! Cheers! URL for the forum: https://todaysmeet.com/HTAAiraqwar There is also a Twitter handle if you prefer: #htaairaq
- 3. Contributing to collaborative note-taking… Please also participate in note-taking in a collaborative fashion using the ShamblesPad I have set up specifically for this session– participation is welcomed! Here you can make use of the many and differing thoughts, perspectives, ideas and interpretations on the evidence presented. You then have a dynamic and varied set of notes to take-away, plus a new idea to perhaps integrate into your teaching Another alternative that allows for more functionality in collaborative note-taking is to use a shared Google Doc. URL for the Shambles Pad: http://shamblespad.com/p/htaairaq
- 4. Where will we be going? • Learning Intent: By the end of this presentation you will, Know three theories of international relations foreign policy: Liberalism, Realism and Neo-conservatism, And apply them to an historical event in order to better understand its causal factors • Success Criteria Decide to what extent you think neoconservative US foreign policy influenced political decision making leading up to the 2003 Iraq War, and ultimately caused the War.
- 5. Where will we be going? 1. Definitions: What are the key political theories and terms necessary to understanding US foreign policy at the time of the Iraq War? >> Sources (addressing throughout): Who are the key politicians and academics associated with the event and what are their perspectives? 2. Background Context (causes, changes and continuity): What earlier events influenced the Bush administration’s decision making in the decades leading up to the 2003 Iraq War? 3. Interests and Arguments: Whose interests were best served by the Iraq War, and what are the arguments around this? 4. Reflections: Where does this leave us now?
- 6. DEFINITIONS: What are the key political theories necessary to understanding US foreign policy at the time of the Iraq War? • Liberalism – Focus on ideals such as human rights, liberty, and democracy – Incorporates modern conceptions of ethical behaviour between states – Confidence in International institutions – Realists view Liberalism as over-ambitious, unrealistic and over-optimistic "The Law of World Citizenship Shall Be Limited to Conditions of Universal Hospitality“ (Immanuel Kant, Third Definitive Article for a Perpetual Peace, 1795) “The State, according to my ideas, is a society of men established for the sole purpose of the establishment, preservation and promotion of their civil interests. I call on civil interests, life, freedom The health of the body, the possession of external goods, such as are money, land, houses, furniture, and things of that nature ” (John Locke, A Letter concerning Toleration, 1689)
- 7. DEFINITIONS: What are the key political theories necessary to understanding US foreign policy at the time of the Iraq War? • Realism – Inevitable conflict – Balance of power – Anarchical international system – 3 core assumptions: Groupism; Egoism; Power-centrism – Liberalists view realists as pessimistic “it is much safer to be feared than loved because ...love is preserved by the link of obligation which, owing to the baseness of men, is broken at every opportunity for their advantage; but fear preserves you by a dread of punishment which never fails. My view is that it is desirable to be both loved and feared; but it is difficult to achieve both and, if one of them has to be lacking, it is much safer to be feared than loved.” (Niccolò Machiavelli, The Prince 1537) “... the life of man solitary, poor, nasty, brutish, and short. ... The condition of man ... is a condition of war of everyone against” everyone. (Hobbes, Leviathan 1651) “ the web of social and political life is spun out of inclinations and incentives, deterrents threats and punishments. Eliminate the latter two, and the ordering of society depends entirely on the former – a utopian thought impractical this side of Eden.”(Kenneth Waltz, Theory of International Politics, 1979)
- 8. DEFINITIONS: What are the key political theories necessary to understanding US foreign policy at the time of the Iraq War? • Neo-Conservatism: – A US political theory that it should pursue a tough foreign policy on behalf of morality. – Four tenets: • Distinguish between ‘good’ states and ‘bad’ states • Belief that US should remain global hegemon (pre-eminent military and high defence budgets) • Willingness to use military force to attain US goals • Suspicion of international institutions (U.N. etc.) “The alternative is to leave monsters on the loose, ravaging and pillaging to their hearts’ content … Because America has the capacity to contain or destroy many of the world’s monsters, most of which can be found without much searching, and because the responsibility for the peace and security of the international order rests so heavily on America’s shoulders …” (Kristol and Kagan, Foreign Affairs (75), 1996:31)
- 9. DEFINITIONS: What are the key terms necessary to understanding US foreign policy at the time of the Iraq War? • National Interest: – In simple terms, the national interest, often referred to by the French expression raison d'État ("reason of State"), is a country's goals and ambitions whether economic, military, or cultural, and used as a tool to mobalise society in support of government policy. In The Idea of National Interest (1934), Charles Beard traced the history of the concept of 'national interest' to the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, when modern nation-states began to crystallise. Unsurprisingly, the rise of the nation-state and the use of the term occurred at the same time. Beard found that after the development of the nation-state and the appearance of nationalist sentiments, older terms – the 'will of the prince' and 'raison d'état' – lost their ability to mobilise the public will. They were therefore replaced by references to 'national interests' and 'vital interests'. Other terms used for their mobilising capacity include 'national honour', 'public interest' and 'general will'. (School of Humanities and Social Sciences, University of NSW) – Some scholars, such as Rouseau, link the national interest intrinsically of the existence of society >>> a symbiotic relationship The bond of society is what there is in common between these different interests, and if there were not some point in which all interests were identical, no society could exist. The bond of society is that identity of interests which all feel who compose it. In the absence of such an identity no society would be possible. Now, it is solely on the basis of this common interest that society must be governed. (Rousseau 1960:190) – Interestingly, it is difficult to support DFAT’s statement below when viewed in light of the thesis presented today: The national interest does not change with a change in government. (DFAT, Submission to the DFAT Senate Committee on East Timor, 1999.
- 10. Background Context: Change and continuity leading up to the 2003 Iraq War. Rise of neo-conservatism in the late stages of the Cold War. Neoconservative view of Vietnam War • A noble and winnable war • US public/media fickle • Need stronger military budget Clinton Years: NCs on the ideological and political margins • End of Cold War: NCs without external other >>> justified existence of political thought? • Fukiyama 1989: ‘End of History’ Kristol & Kagan’s 1996 Foreign Affairs article: • A consistently strong defence budget that reinforces the power disparity between the US and would-be challengers; • Educating the American public of the importance of supporting the US armed forces as they carry out the ‘responsibilities of global hegemony’; • Clear moral purpose to promote democracy, free markets, and individual liberty abroad. PNAC 1998 signatories SOURCES: Khong, Y. in Smith, S. et al. 2012; and Hubris 2013
- 11. Causes: neo-conservatism Tenets of neo-conservative foreign policy thought 1. Moral clarity about forces of good and evil in the international arena: liberal democracies are GOOD; tyrannies are BAD 2. A benevolent US hegemony will be good for all 3. USA should show greater willingness to use military force to pursue its goals 4. International law and institutions are unreliable in achieving peace/justice Application of tenets to Saddam Hussein’s Iraq Saddam is the No.1 member of the ‘Axis of Evil’; regime change leading to a democratic Iraq >>> democratising the Middle East Regime change in Iraq will remove a major adversary and reinforce US power in Middle East Saddam possesses WMD, containment not working, military force only way to achieve US goals UN resolution is unnecessary; ‘coalition of the willing’ is sufficient (Kristol & Kagan 1998; Khong, Y. in Smith, S. et al. 2012:316)
- 12. Causes: neo-conservatism In 2000, former Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice defined the US national interest in the post-Cold War era as five-fold, “(1) to ensure that America’s military can deter war, project power, and fight in defense of its interests if deterrence fails; (2) to promote economic growth and political openness by extending free trade and a stable international monetary system to all committed to these principles, including in the western hemisphere, which has too often been neglected as a vital area of U.S. national interest; (3) to renew strong and intimate relationships with allies who share American values and can thus share the burden of promoting peace, prosperity, and freedom; (4) to focus U.S. energies on comprehensive relationships with the big powers, particularly Russia and China, that can and will mold the character of the international political system; (5) and to deal decisively with the threat of rogue regimes and hostile powers, which is increasingly taking the forms of the potential for terrorism and the development of weapons of mass destruction (WMD)”. Rice, Condoleezza. 2000. “Promoting the national interest.” Foreign Affairs. 79(Jan./Feb): 45-62.
- 13. Causes: neo-conservatism Former Secretary of State Rice 2000. “Promoting the national interest.” Foreign Affairs. 79(Jan./Feb): 45-62. “(1) to ensure that America’s military can deter war, project power, and fight in defense of its interests if deterrence fails; (2) to promote economic growth and political openness by extending free trade and a stable international monetary system to all committed to these principles, including in the western hemisphere, which has too often been neglected as a vital area of U.S. national interest; (3) to renew strong and intimate relationships with allies who share American values and can thus share the burden of promoting peace, prosperity, and freedom; (4) to focus U.S. energies on comprehensive relationships with the big powers, particularly Russia and China, that can and will mold the character of the international political system; (5) and to deal decisively with the threat of rogue regimes and hostile powers, which is increasingly taking the forms of the potential for terrorism and the development of weapons of mass destruction (WMD)”. President Bush, 19 March 2003 “On my orders, coalition forces have begun striking selected targets of military importance to undermine Saddam Hussein's ability to wage war ...We come to Iraq with respect for its citizens, for their great civilization and for the religious faiths they practice. We have no ambition in Iraq, except to remove a threat and restore control of that country to its own people ... Our nation enters this conflict reluctantly -- yet, our purpose is sure. The people of the United States and our friends and allies will not live at the mercy of an outlaw regime that threatens the peace with weapons of mass murder.”
- 14. Causes: 9/11 as a trigger “The lesson of September 11: take care of threats early” (National security advisor Condoleeza Rice, October 2002) “Is this the time to attack Iraq?” (Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld on 15 September 2001 at meeting held at Camp David, cited in Woodward 2002:43,84) Bill Day, 12 Sep. 2001, The Cagle Post David Horsey, 2002. www.seatlepi.com
- 15. Causes: 9/11 as a trigger Bush’s address to the nation 2001 after 9/11: Today, our fellow citizens, our way of life, our very freedom came under attack in a series of deliberate and deadly terrorist acts ... These acts of mass murder were intended to frighten our nation into chaos and retreat. But they have failed; our country is strong ...These acts shattered steel, but they cannot dent the steel of American resolve. America was targeted for attack because we are the brightest beacon for freedom and opportunity in the world. and no one will keep that light from shining. Today, our nation saw evil, the very worst of human nature. And we responded with the very best of America - with the daring of our rescue workers, with the caring for strangers and neighbors who came to give blood and help in any way they could ...I've directed the full resources of our intelligence and law enforcement communities to find those responsible and to bring them to justice. We will make no distinction between the terrorists who committed these acts and those who harbor them. America and our friends and allies join with all those who want peace and security in the world, and we stand together to win the war against terrorism ...None of us will ever forget this day. Yet, we go forward to defend freedom and all that is good and just in our world ... (www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2001) Neoconservative Tenet 1: Moral clarity/good vs evil Neoconservative Tenet 3: US willingness to use force Neoconservative Tenets 2 & 4: US hegemony restabilise global security & US led coalition (no global institution).
- 16. Causes: Bush’s 1% Doctrine “We [the United States] must build and maintain our defenses beyond challenge … Our forces will be strong enough to dissuade potential adversaries from pursuing a military build-up in hopes of surpassing, or equaling, the power of the United States. We must be prepared to stop rogue states and their terrorist clients before they are able to threaten or use weapons of mass destruction against the United States and our allies and friends. . . .We must deter and defend against the threat before it is unleashed”. U.S. National Security Strategy: Prevent Our Enemies From Threatening Us, Our Allies, and Our Friends with Weapons of Mass Destruction , 2002 Author Ron Suskind discusses his research and subsequent book
- 17. Interests & Arguments: Debate around WMD • US’s power unrivaled after Cold War • No tangible evidence to link 9/11 to Iraq & WMD = bogus threat! Hubris: Selling the Iraq War, 2014 First 6 minutes here deal with debunking the links being established by the Bush administration ‘…a classic modern strategy of endangered right wing oligarchy which is to divert mass [domestic] discontent to nationalism inspired by fear of enemies that are about to destroy us.’ (Chomsky, 2002)
- 18. Interests & Arguments: Opposition to the war “Both logic and historical evidence suggest a policy of vigilant containment would work, both now and in the event Iraq acquires a nuclear arsenal. Why? Because the United States and its regional allies are far stronger than Iraq. And because it does not take a genius to figure out what would happen if Iraq tried to use WMD to blackmail its neighbors, expand its territory, or attack another state directly. It only takes a leader who wants to stay alive and who wants to remain in power. Throughout his lengthy and brutal career, Saddam Hussein has repeatedly shown that these two goals are absolutely paramount. That is why deterrence and containment would work.” Harvard University Professor of International Relations Stephen Walt together with Professor of Political Science at University of Chicago John Miersheimer ‘Unnecessary War’, in ‘Foreign Policy’, January 1, 2003 • Academics united to voice their opposition to the war: – Many were realist scholars who support military action when its in the national interest – Their argument: Iraq War = Not in US national interests “War with Iraq is Not in America’s National Interest,” New York Times, paid advertisement, 26 September 2002.
- 19. Motives, Interests & Arguments: Drill baby, drill! BP statistical review of world energy 2013 Consumption per 1000 barrels daily World consumption increase: • 2005 gap between US/OECD and world = 3 times that of gap in 1965. Cartoons by Australian cartoonist, May 2003
- 20. Interests & Arguments: Drill baby, drill!
- 21. Interests & Arguments: Drill baby, drill! BP statistical review of world energy 2013 Oil proved reserves 1000 million barrels NEOCONSERVATIVE VIEW: CAUSE/EFFECT Without US invasion, >>> US sanctions not enough; >>> Iraqi oil remains ‘off the market’ for US; >>> Iraq continues selling oil to US competitors: China, Russia and France >>> Saddam gains in power avoiding US sanctions designed to prohibit a market for Iraqi oil >>> and, Saddam uses Iraqi oil for political advantage, i.e. link US access to oil contingent on US policy in the Arab-Israeli conflict. >>> Saddam had to go and Iraqi oil had to be secured! Greenberg 2003 in Ventura Country Star
- 22. Reflections: Where does this leave us now? “Faulty assumptions about the nature of Iraqi society, inadequate post-war planning, and above all incompetence in post-war reconstruction allowed the USA to snatch defeat from the jaws of victory” (Galbraith 2006; Woodward 2006) 59% of Americans see the war as a mistake and 72% feel that the costs have exceeded the gains (New York Times 2010)
- 23. Teaching this to a C21 Senior Modern History class http://modernhistoryiraqwar.blogspot.com.au/
Editor's Notes
- Looking at Rice’s definition of the US’s national interest, it is apparent that neo-conservatism was already influencing US foreign policy by the time George Bush took office in 2001. POINT (1) as NC Tenet 3: This characterisation of the national interest – explicit emphasis on a strong military capability and tacit de-emphasis on the realist policy of deterrence to achieve US goals is inferred in point 1. POINT (2) as NC Tenet 1: Rice’s words “to all committed to these principles” provides a psychology of ‘us’ and ‘them’, or ‘good’ and ‘bad’… you are either with us or against us! Furthermore, tacit throughout the whole source is the second tenet of neo-conservatism - a benevolent US hegemony will be good for all. POINT (3) as NC Tenet 1: Again, moral clarity about forces of ‘GOOD’ are clearly displayed in point 3, where Rice explains those that share American democratic values are implied to be good, while those that don’t are not. POINT (4) as NC Tenets 4 and 1: Implicit in Point (4) is the US’s disregard for multilateralism within global and regional institutions (i.e. UN, APEC, IMF etc.) to, as Rice states, ‘mold the character of the international political system’. Also, inline with Tenet 1, this ‘molding’ is along liberal-democratic lines, make no mistake about that with language like ‘comprehensive relationships’. POINT (5) as NC Tenet 1, 2, 3 & 4: (Point (5) carries all tenets, however displays Tenet 4 most accurately. The ‘Bush Doctrine’, adopted the year after Rice’s definition here, utilized the extraordinary circumstances following the attacks on 9/11 and characterised Saddam Hussein as that which Rice refers to in Point (5) – ‘rogue regime; hostile power; potential for terrorism; and WMD ‘. The US exercised its primacy/hegemony to democratise Iraq – Tenet 1 - and launch a pre-emptive war on Iraq – Tenets 3 & 4.
- President Bush in his announcement of the attacks on Iraq on 19 March 2003 stated this, and we can see a clear continuity of neo-conservativism from the former Secretary of State Condaleeza Rice defining the US national interest in 2000 and President Bush’s address to the nation declaring war in 2003. DISCUSSION >>> can you spot the continuity and alignment with the 4 Tenets of NC?
- 9/11 in 2001 provided the opportunity which ‘tipped the balance in favour of neoconservative doctrine…’ The subsequent military action in Afghanistan was a case of taking care of things too late – after one has been attacked. Former National security advisor Condoleeza Rice stated in October 2002, “the lesson of September 11: take care of threats early” (cited in Woodward 2002:350) … and NCs, in a ‘told you so’ sentiment, went on to publicise 9/11 as the ‘Pearl Harbour’ they were wanting to prevent as shown here in the cartoon by Bill Day published only one day after the events of 9/11. Leaving Saddam Hussein in power after 1991 Operation Desert Storm the Bush Sr. administration brought problems for neoconservatives: Merciless suppression of Shiite rebellions in Southern Iraq 1991; His military played cat and mouse with US war planes patrolling the ‘no fly’ zones; Expelled UN weapon inspectors in 1998 >>> heightening suspicions that Iraq was intent on developing WMDs. >>> 9/11 provided the impetus to act on these suspicions and clear a path to war – providing a link could be established! CLICK SLIDE In two National Security Council meetings in the days after 9/11, Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld’s position was to ask: “Do we focus on Bin Laden and al Qaeda, or terrorism more broadly?” According to Professor of International Relations and Foreign Policy Yuen Foong Khong (2012) and investigative journalist Bob Woodford (2002), ‘More broadly’ was code for Iraq. And in the 15 September meeting held at Camp David, Rumsfeld was more explicit: “Is this the time to attack Iraq?” The answer was not yet for President Bush… not until the link between Saddam Hussein, al Qaeda and WMD had been established ‘definitively’ and sold to the US public. Professors Brian Schmidt and Michael Williams, in their 2008 publication appearing in the journal ‘Security Studies’ titled ‘The Bush Doctrine: Neoconservatives Versus Realists’ (p.197) stated that, “In light of the 9/11 terrorist attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon, the Bush administration depicted a threat environment radically different from that which existed during the Cold War. The most worrisome threats were deemed to be rogue states and terrorists armed with weapons of mass destruction (WMD)” – as supported by Rice’s definition of the US national interest in the journal ‘Foreign Affairs’ in 2000. “9/11 had dramatically shown the willingness of terrorists to inflict large-scale destruction and death on American soil. In the climate of fear that existed after 9/11, and intentionally inflamed by neoconservative pundits appearing on MSNBC and Fox News, scenarios of rogue states or terrorists armed with WMD were deemed unacceptable by Bush administration officials.”
- In 2001 President Bush addressed the nation on the subject of 9/11 and the subsequent War on Terror. The address can be linguistically analysed in light of the three foreign policy theories… On analysis of this document through the realist paradigm: Realist assumption that ‘state interest is primarily survival’ can be found (our way of life … came under attack); and realist support for the utility of force is evident in Bush’s speech here >>> ‘… law enforcement to bring them to justice’; However, the realist assumption that only states are main actors in international security >>> not evident = al Qaeda a non-state actor Analysis through the lense of Liberalism with a focus on core values such as Liberty, democracy, human rights and reliance on political institutions, is not explicitly evident but there is implicit mention >>> ‘our freedom came under attack’. Most accurate in analysis of the Bush administration’s foreign policy sentiment is to view this address in terms of the neoconservative foreign policy tenets, embedded within the address … CLICK SLIDE AND DISCUSS FROM PP
- The Bush Doctrine of 2002 showed a neoconservative commitment to preserving the preeminent position of the US, aggressive democracy promotion, unilateralism, and a willingness to use force preventatively – preventative war. It was a proactive doctrine of pre-emption which, as Melvyn Leffler - Professor of History at the University of Virginia – points out in his 2002 book ‘Bush’s Foreign Policy’, de-emphasized the reactive strategies of the past: deterrent and containment; a break from or change in focus for US foreign policy of the past 50 years >>> critics of the NC FP at the time claimed that deterrent and containment would have kept the status quo and prevented 2003 invasion >>> subsequent sectarian violence following US withdrawal from Iraq in 2011 >>> possible prevention of current ISIS conflict as sub-effect of sectarian violence (CAUSE & EFFECT). Bush’s foreign policy after 9/11 included the very neoconservative ‘1% Doctrine’, a doctrine that argued that even ‘with a one percent chance of a grave threat materialising, the USA should treat that threat as a certainty and act to eliminate it.’ The doctrine provided an ‘operational answer to a key element of the Bush Doctrine of preventative war’ (Khong 2012:318). CLICK SLIDE FOR ANIMATION This comes through clearly in Bush’s words in the U.S. National Security Strategy: Prevent Our Enemies From Threatening Us, Our Allies, and Our Friends with Weapons of Mass Destruction in 2002 where he states, “We must be prepared to stop rogue states and their terrorist clients before they are able to threaten or use weapons of mass destruction against the United States and our allies and friends. . . .We must deter and defend against the threat before it is unleashed”. Author Ron Suskind discusses this at length his book ‘The One Percent Doctrine’, and is here giving a synopsis. DISCUSSION: But as you watch this, I want you to consider the larger debate raised here, whether it is justifiable to sacrifice the liberties of many to guarantee the security of all. What do you think? This is pivotal to the libertarian argument over domestic security policy after 9/11 for the War on Terror, and now as the current Abbott Government looks to revise Australia’s anti-terror laws increasing the power of ASIO >>> meta-data storage; torture????
- However, not all bought into the fear campaign and neoconservative rhetoric sold to the US public in the months following 9/11. Liberal academic and avid opposer of the Iraq invasion in 2003, Professor Noam Chomsky of MIT, echoing the view of Anatol Yevin of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace (in his 2002 book “The Push for War”), and Zbigniew Brzezinski writing in the Washington Post on the 9 November 2003 (“Another American Casualty: Credibility”), maintained the view that 9/11 had no tangible link to Iraq and went on to add that, CLICK SLIDE the link was manufactured through unfounded claims of weapons of mass destruction, to suit neo-conservative political ends by stating that the Bush administration used a “classic modern strategy of endangered right wing oligarchy which is to divert mass discontent to nationalism inspired by fear of enemies that are about to destroy us.” This is echoed by Sheldon Rampton and John Stauber in their book Weapons of Mass Destruction: The Uses of Propaganda in Bush’s War on Iraq, where they claim that the war was clearly a project of a small clique and had to be strenuously propagated with ‘weapons of mass deception’, by exploiting the ‘politics of fear’… Something to consider as we move closer to another military operation in Iraq where critics such as John Pilger claiming in the Guardian (19 Sept. 2014) that Australia is ‘backing the latest US installed sectarian regime in Baghdad and re-branded ex-Kurdish “terrorists”, now guarding Chevron, Exxon Mobil, Marathon Oil, Hunt Oil et al.’ CLICK SLIDE The immense and unchallenged accumulation of power by the US in the years following the end of the Cold War meant that it was unchallenged in power by any other state in the world. According to Professor of political science at the University of Oklahoma Jonathan Monten, in the years leading up to 9/11 the US found itself “at the top of a unipolar distribution of power, commanding a greater share of the world capabilities than any state in modern international history”. To Quote Professor Monten: “U.S. economic dominance is surpassed only by its own position immediately following World War II. U.S. military dominance is even more asymmetrical: U.S. defense spending in 2003 was more than the combined defense spending of the next twenty-five military powers, many of which are U.S. allies, and it conducts approximately 80 percent of the world’s military research and development. The United States dominates across most of the quantitative dimensions of power traditionally used by political scientists to measure polarity, as well as in many qualitative, information-age measures. The extent of current U.S. preponderance is difficult to overstate: it is the only state with global power projection capabilities.” (Monten, J. 2005, “The Roots of the Bush Doctrine”, in International Security, Vol. 29, No. 4. 112-156.) CLICK SLIDE If we look at the nations that President Bush termed the ‘axis of evil’ in the years leading up to the invasion of Iraq (of Iraq, Iran and North Korea) and view the Bush administration’s post-9/11 actions in realist terms, that is as Realist scholar Stephen Walt claims, states will adopt a balance of threat approach to an imbalance of power in an anarchic international system, the assertion that the US’s survival was threatened becomes problematic, to say the least. In fact, in 2001 no other single state posed a threat to US national security or its national interest by extension. Even if the weapons of mass destruction (WMD) threat was founded to be real in Iraq, Saddam Hussein posed no direct threat to the US national security, nor any real threat to that of its liberal allies, as the complete and utter disproportion of conventional military capability (nuclear excluded) assured the total destruction of Iraq if it was to employ WMD, providing they existed. And, Saddam Hussein was reported to understand this point clearly and, despite aggravating many at the United Nations, complied with the UN’s deadline and produced a 12,000 page report to UN weapons inspectors proving the non-existence of WMD. Consequently, the Bush administration claimed they had “taken too long”, disregarded UN resolutions and decided to invade Iraq anyway – clearly exhibiting tenets 3 & 4 of neoconservative foreign policy thought. Evidently, the unilateral decision had long been made by the neo-conservative clique in the White House, despite domestic opposition and international condemnation. As Secretary of State Colin Powell noted in the 2013 BBC documentary ‘Iraq War’, “all meetings that were scheduled in respect of Iraq involved war plans”. Raymond Hinnebusch of St Andrews University noted in 2007 that ironically Secretary of State Colin Powell expressed that the US should not get involved in a war in Iraq unless there is a ‘clear and present threat to national security.’ Therefore, the threat needed to be manufactured and as we know WMD were the focus. However, as pointed out in this section of the 2014 documentary ‘Hubris: Selling the Iraq War’, the threat was bogus and the neoconservative clique in Washington were manufacturing a threat around WMD to sell to the public in justification for war.
- Scholars of international security affairs, including high profile realist scholars such as Kenneth Waltz, Stephen Walt and John Mearsheimer, in a paid advertisement in the New York Times in September 2002 were among some of the most vocal critics of the Bush administration’s move towards war in Iraq. They broadly asserted that Saddam Hussein could be contained; and that there was no direct link between 9/11 and Iraq (which there wasn’t); They argued that war with Iraq would “impose significant costs” on the US (which it did); “it would direct resources and attention away from the campaign” against Al Qaeda (the more immediate threat); and would “increase anti-Americanism around the globe (which it has)”. Harvard University Professor of International Relations Stephen Walt together with Professor of Political Science at University of Chicago John Miersheimer (both realists) stated in January 1, 2003 in their article titled ‘Unnecessary War’, published in the journal ‘Foreign Policy’, that, “Both logic and historical evidence suggest a policy of vigilant containment would work, both now and in the event Iraq acquires a nuclear arsenal. Why? Because the United States and its regional allies are far stronger than Iraq. And because it does not take a genius to figure out what would happen if Iraq tried to use WMD to blackmail its neighbors, expand its territory, or attack another state directly. It only takes a leader who wants to stay alive and who wants to remain in power. Throughout his lengthy and brutal career, Saddam Hussein has repeatedly shown that these two goals are absolutely paramount. That is why deterrence and containment would work.”
- Another prevailing argument supporting unilateral power accumulation by the neo-conservative Bush administration in its invasion of Iraq is the securing of access to and control of the world’s second largest oil reserves: A clear message expressed in these cartoons from April and May 2003 >>> 1 month after the commencement of the invasion Professor Noam Chomsky of MIT, an advocate of the argument around oil as motive, maintains that the US’s goal in the invasion of Iraq was to control the second largest oil reserves in the world, which was recognised by the State Department in 1945 as a major component of what they called “a stupendous source of strategic power and one of the greatest material prizes in world history.” Chomsky continues with the argument that this was a major facet of US foreign policy since the Second World War, to sideline the French with enemy state status through WWII and exclude the British as a diminishing power in the Middle East in order to “gain control of” – not access to - Middle East oil reserves. Whoever controls “this stupendous source of strategic power”, according to Chomsky, “has an effect on setting the price and production levels and determines the vast amount of the wealth flows right back into the hands of the controller… [This] translates to a lever of world control”, which is NC Tenet 2. This argument is supported by statistics from British Petroleum’s Statistical Review of 2013 where is shows that over time the world is increasing in its consumption of oil: the gap between US, OECD nations collectively and the total world consumption in 2005 is three times that of the gap in 1965. And the proven reserves of Iraq are almost four times that of the US, second only to Saudi Arabia, and account for almost one quarter of the world’s proven reserves (British Petroleum 2013 Statistical Review of World Energy, http://www.bp.com/content/dam/bp/pdf/statistical-review/statistical_review_of_world_energy_2013.pdf , posted June 2013)
- Michael Klare in his 2004 book ‘Blood and Oil’ furthers the argument about oil as motivation where he claims that resources are at the root of contemporary conflict in the post-Cold War era. Klare wrote that,“Once an American regime was installed in Baghdad, it would have access to 112 billion barrels of oil. With unproven reserves, the US stood to control almost a quarter of the world’s total reserves. Reported in the Independent in 2005, the US Department of Energy announced that by 2025, US oil imports will account for perhaps 70 percent of total US domestic demands (it was 55 percent two years prior to this statement)… The bulk of the future US supplies will have to come from the Middle East, which have some 70% of the world’s proven oil reserves.”
- Alan Greenspan, Chairman of the Federal Reserve, confessed in a biography out of office that, “Everyone knows: the Iraq War was largely about oil.” and elaborated further in an interview with the Washington Post’s Bob Woodland stating, "If Saddam Hussein had been head of Iraq and there was no oil under those sands, our response to him would not have been as strong as it was in the first Gulf War... ... The removal of Saddam Hussein had been "essential" to secure world oil supplies.“ With access to exploit secure oil reserves, the US along with other OECD nations (other liberal democracies) together would have future trading in petroleum based products assured and secured. This fulfills 3 of the 4 tenets of neoconservatism mentioned earlier: Moral clarity about forces of good and evil in the international arena: liberal democracies are GOOD; tyrannies are BAD >>> take oil from the bad to give to the good (Robin Hood-like) A benevolent US hegemony will be good for all >>> all liberal democracies would benefit from US securing these oil reserves and controlling global oil prices and production levels USA should show greater willingness to use military force to pursue its goals >>> Military invasion of Iraq the tool to assure its national interests/goal. Without the US invasion, US sanctions were seen as not enough >>> Iraqi oil would have remained ‘off the market’ for the US >>> Iraq continues selling oil to US competitors: China, Russia and France >>> Saddam would gain in power avoiding US sanctions designed to prohibit a market for Iraqi oil and perhaps use Iraqi oil for political advantage, i.e. link US access to oil contingent on US policy in the Arab-Israeli conflict. Therefore, Saddam had to go and Iraqi oil had to be secured!
- Douglas Feith, Undersecretary of Defense, whom General Tommy Franks called the ‘[expletive deleted] stupidest guy on the face of the earth’ (cited in Woodward 2006) was the official in overall charge of post war reconstruction. Widely seen as a neoconservative, Feith’s faith about the ease with which post-war Iraq could be stabalised is consistent with neoconservative beliefs about the moral superiority of democracy and the military prowess of the USA. With Saddam Hussein deposed, the neoconservative clique believed that Iraqis would be out in the streets to welcome the coalition forces as liberators – we all saw how that turned out! A liberated Iraq would serve as a beacon for other states in the Middle East (Khong 2012:320). But $800 billion later (Belasco 2011) and 4450 American lives, with 32,000 wounded, and 10,000 Iraqi military-security and 100,000 civilian fatalities (Brookings Institution 2011), these neoconservative hopes reveal a blind spot that is evident when we look at the state of Iraq in 2014; neoconservatives failed to see past their ‘benevolent power in their hegemony’, and as we look to enter another conflict in Iraq, albeit under apparently different motivations – humanitarianism, we should consider where the complete confidence in a foreign policy based on righteous morality that represents the US and its allies as the champions of ‘good’ in global politics might take us with a smoking gun in hand. Thank you!