Political

P a g e | 1
CHANAKYA NATIONAL LAW UNIVERSITY
A Project on
INDO-SRILANKA RELATION
BETWEEN 1950-1990
Submitted to:
DR. S.P. SINGH.
(FACULTY OF POLITICAL SCIENCE)
Submitted from:
NAGENDAR KUMAR RAM
1ST
YEAR, 2ND
SEMESTER,
ROLL NO. 945.

P a g e | 2
ACKNOWLEDGEMENT
I would like to express my special thanks of gratitude to my teacher who gave me the
opportunity to do this project on the topic INDO SRI LANKA RELATIONS 1950-1990 which
has helped me in doing a lot of research and I came to know about this topic. I would also like
to thank my friends who helped me. By doing this project I have surely increased my
knowledge.
THANK YOU

P a g e | 3
RESEARCH METHODOLOGY
Aims and Objectives:
The aim of the project is to present a detailed study of the topic.
 To know India and Sri Lanka relationship.
 To know their foreign policies.
 To know both the countries in all aspects.
Sources of Data:
The following secondary sources of data have been used in the project-
Books
Websites
Research Methodology and Mode of Citation:
For the Research, the Researcher has basically relied upon the Doctrinal method of Research
and the mode of citation for this research is Universal Citation Style.

P a g e | 4
TABLE OF CONTENTS
SERIAL
NUMBER CHAPTERISATION
PAGE
NUMBER
1 INDIAN- SRILANKA RELATION 5-7
2 INDIAN INTERVENTION INTO SRILANKAN CIVIL WAR 8-12
3 INDIAN PEACE KEEPING FORCE 13-16
4 INDO- SRILANKA ACCORD 17-18
5 OPERATION POOMALAI 19-22
6 CONCLUSION 23
BIBLIOGRAPHY 24

P a g e | 5
INTRODUCTION
INDO- SRILANKA
India
Sri Lanka
Bilateral relations between the Democratic Socialist Republic of Sri Lanka and the Republic
of India have been generally friendly, but were controversially affected by the Sri Lankan
civil war and by the failure of Indian intervention during the war. India is the only neighbour
of Sri Lanka, separated by the Palk Strait; both nations occupy a strategic position in South
Asia and have sought to build a common security umbrella in the Indian Ocean1
. India is Sri
Lanka's closest and historically the most important neighbour. The two countries are
separated physically by the Palk Straits, amongst the narrowest waterways separates the two
countries. The two Governments have built upon a legacy of historic links, common culture,
shared commitment to democracy and a general orientation towards non-alignment in foreign
policy. India aims to maintain close, cordial and cooperative relations with Lanka at both
popular and government levels. As a close neighbour to which both Sinhala and Tamil
communities trace their roots, internal developments in Sri Lanka have major bearing on
India's policy towards that country, which consists of a commitment to unity, sovereignty and
territorial integrity of Sri Lanka and to the restoration of lasting peace through a peaceful,
negotiated settlement that meets the just aspirations of all elements of Sri Lankan society.
The immediate threat to any country arises in its neighbourhood. That is why the
maintenance of peace, stability and friendship with neighbouring states is considered basic to
1
India's Sri Lankan scars (http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south_asia/735963.stm) last accessed on 21st
March,2014 at 2:54 PM IST.

P a g e | 6
a nation’s foreign policy. India’s relations with its neighbours therefore constitute a critical
component of its foreign policy. The specific geo-strategic location of Sri Lanka in the Indian
Ocean and ethnic affinity of the Indian Tamils with the Sri Lankan Tamils have been the
most important factor in their relationship2
. India is the closest neighbour of Sri Lanka,
separated from it at its narrowest point by 22 miles of sea called the Palk Strait. The
implication of such a close proximity is that developments in each country have affected the
other. Sri Lanka’s strategic location caused concern to Indian security particularly because of
the possibility of the involvement of external powers in the ethnic conflict. The presence of
external powers there can possibly pose a serious threat to the security and unity and integrity
of India as well as to regional stability.
India-Sri Lanka relations in the post-1990 period have undergone a contextual change
together with changes in India’s foreign policy perceptions. After the end of the Cold War
and the emergence of the US as the sole superpower, India’s foreign policy perceptions too
have changed. In keeping with the changing global economic and trade scenario, India’s
strategic priorities in the Indian Ocean region have also undergone a change during the last
two decades. India’s national security perceptions have now been enlarged to include
economic security, free trade and commerce, energy security, and social security of the
population in addition to territorial integrity. The United States’ relations with India have
become an important component of New Delhi’s strategic linkages to globally safeguard its
interests. India-Sri Lanka relations are now also affected by the regional power dynamics,
with external powers seeking to increase their own influence and counter those of others.
India is the most important foreign supporter of Sri Lanka, and remains its largest trading
partner. China is currently one of Sri Lanka’s major military suppliers, but also has a
potential for economic investments and infrastructure projects. The Sri Lanka Government
under President Mahinda Rajapakse is exploiting the geo-political struggle unfolding in the
Indian Ocean between China and India, with the United States having its own agenda for
retaining its influence. While Pakistan is playing for stakes in Sri Lanka with Chinese
knowledge to queer the pitch for India, the Russians too are keeping a hawk eye on any
activity in the Indian Ocean3
. Pakistan’s engagements in Sri Lanka are also strategically
sensitive to India. Strategically, it is in India’s interest to keep its rivals out of its sphere of
2
The Peace Accord and the Tamils in Sri Lanka. Hennayake S.K. Asian Survey, Vol. 29, No. 4. (April 2004), pp.
401-415.
3
The Pakistani muscle behind Colombo (http://www.atimes.com/atimes/South_Asia/HI22Df01.html) last
accessed on 21st
March, 2014.

P a g e | 7
influence4
. India needs to invest more in Sri Lanka to keep China within its zone of influence.
India sought (tried) to eliminate these threats through various bilateral agreements with Sri
Lanka.
4
India's Sri Lanka power project runs into Tamil storm
(http://in.news.yahoo.com/indiaabroad/20080510/r_t_ians_bs_india/tbs-india-s-sri-lanka-power-project-
runs-46e8b08.html) last accessed on 28th
March, 2014.

P a g e | 8
INDIAN INTERVENTION INTO SRILANKAN CIVIL WAR
In the 1970s-1980s, private entities and elements in the state government of Tamil Nadu were
believed to be encouraging the funding and training for the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam,
a separatist insurgent force. In 1987, faced with growing anger amongst its own Tamils, and a
flood of refugees, India intervened directly in the conflict for the first time after the Sri
Lankan government attempted to regain control of the northern Jaffna region by means of an
economic blockade and military assaults. India supplied food and medicine by air and sea.
After subsequent negotiations, India and Sri Lanka entered into an agreement. The peace
accord assigned a certain degree of regional autonomy in the Tamil areas with Eelam
People's Revolutionary Liberation Front (EPRLF) controlling the regional council and called
for the Tamil militant groups to lay down their arms. Further India was to send a
peacekeeping force, named the IPKF to Sri Lanka to enforce the disarmament and to watch
over the regional council.5
Even though the accord was signed between the governments of Sri Lanka and India, with the
Tamil Tigers and other Tamil militant groups not having a role in the signing of the accord,
most Tamil militant groups accepted this agreement. The LTTE rejected the accord because
they opposed the candidate, who belonged to another militant group named Eelam Peoples
Revolutionary Liberation Front (EPRLF), for chief administrative officer of the merged
Northern and Eastern provinces. Instead the LTTE named three other candidates for the
position. The candidates proposed by the LTTE were rejected by India. The LTTE
subsequently refused to hand over their weapons to the IPKF.
The result was that the LTTE now found itself engaged in military conflict with the Indian
Army, and launched their first attack on an Indian army rations truck on October 8, killing
five Indian para-commandos who were on board by strapping burning tires around their
necks. The government of India then decided that the IPKF should disarm the
LTTE by force and the Indian Army launched number of assaults on the LTTE, including a
month-long campaign dubbed Operation PAWAN to win control of the Jaffna peninsula from
5
Balasingham, Adele, The Will to Freedom - An Inside View of Tamil Resistance. Fairmax Publishing Ltd(2003),
2nd ed.

P a g e | 9
the LTTE6
. When the IPKF engaged the LTTE, the then president of Sri Lanka, Ranasinghe
Premadasa, began supporting LTTE and funded LTTE with arms. During the warfare with
the LTTE, IPKF was also alleged to have made human rights violation against the civilians.
Notably, IPKF was alleged to have perpetrated Jaffna teaching hospital massacre which was
the killing of over 70 civilians including patients, doctors and nurses. The ruthlessness of this
campaign and the Indian army's subsequent anti-LTTE operations made it extremely
unpopular amongst many Tamils in Sri Lanka. The conflict India Sri Lanka relations 2
between the LTTE and the Indian Army left over 1,000 Indian soldier’s dead. The Indo-Sri
Lankan Accord which had been unpopular amongst Sri Lankans for giving India a major
influence now became a source of nationalist anger and resentment as the IPKF was drawn
fully into the conflict. Sri Lankans protested the presence of the IPKF, and the newly-elected
Sri Lankan president Ranasinghe Premadasa demanded its withdrawal, which was completed
by March 1990. On May 21, 1991, Rajiv Gandhi was assassinated and the LTTE was alleged
to be the perpetrator. As a result India declared the LTTE to be a terrorist outfit in 1992.
Bilateral relations improved in the 1990s and India supported the peace process but has
resisted calls to get involved again. India has also been wary of and criticised the extensive
military involvement of Pakistan in the conflict accusing the latter of supplying lethal
weaponry and encouraging Sri Lanka to pursue military action rather than peaceful
negotiations to end the civil war.7
The Indian intervention in the Sri Lankan Civil War was the deployment of the Indian Peace
Keeping Force in Sri Lanka intended to perform a peacekeeping role. The deployment
followed the Indo-Sri Lankan Accord between India and Sri Lanka of 1987 which was
intended to end the Sri Lankan Civil War between militant Sri Lankan Tamil nationalists,
principally the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE), and the Sri Lankan military. The
original intention was the Indian Peace Keeping Force would not be involved in large scale
military operations.8
However, after a few months, the Indian Peace Keeping Force engaged the Liberation Tigers
of Tamil Eelam in a series of battles. During the two years in which it was deployed, the
6
Operation Pawan. The Battle for Jaffna (http://www.bharat-rakshak.com/LAND-
FORCES/Army/History/1987/Chapter03.html) last accessed on 1st
April, 2014.
7
http://www.mea.gov.in/Portal/ForeignRelation/India_-_Sri_Lanka_Relations.pdf last accessed on 1st April,
2014.
8
http://www.ipcs.org/pdf_file/issue/1445888596RP16-Brian-SriLanka.pdf last accessed on 2nd April, 2014.

P a g e | 10
IPKF fought numerous battles against the LTTE. The IPKF began withdrawing in 1989, and
completed the withdrawal in 1990.
Background
The LTTE and other Tamil militant groups developed strong relationships with political
parties in South India, such as Dravidar Kazhagam (led by K. Veeramani), Kamaraj Congress
(led by Nedumaran) and Pure Tamil Movement (led by Perunchithiranar) during late 1970s.
These Tamil parties firmly backed the militants' cause of creating a separate Tamil Eelam
within Sri Lanka. Thereafter, LTTE developed relations with M. G. Ramachandran and M.
Karunanidhi, who served as Chief Minister of Tamil Nadu, succeeding one another. Although
Sri Lanka was a key member of Non-Aligned Movement in its initial stages, the Government
of Sri Lanka's policies became pro-western as J. R. Jayewardene was elected prime minister
with his landslide victory in 1977 parliamentary election. Subsequently he introduced a new
constitution and Open economy to Sri Lanka. Moreover, President J. R. Jayawardene did not
enjoy the same warm relationship with Indian Premier Indira Gandhi that he had enjoyed
with her father, Premier Jawaharlal Nehru. Thus, with the outbreak of Black July ethnic riots,
the Indian government decided to support the insurgent groups operating in Northern Sri
Lanka.9
Operation Poomalai
India became more actively involved in the late 1980s, and on June 5, 1987, the Indian Air
Force airdropped food parcels to Jaffna while it was under siege by Sri Lankan forces. At a
time when the Sri Lankan government stated they were close to defeating the LTTE, India
dropped 25 tons of food and medicine by parachute into areas held by the LTTE in a direct
move of support toward the rebels. Negotiations were held, and the Indo-Sri Lanka Peace
Accord was signed on July 29, 1987 by Indian Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi and Sri Lankan
President Jayewardene.10
Under this accord, the Sri Lankan Government made a number of concessions to Tamil
demands, including devolution of power to the provinces, a merger subject to later
referendum of the Northern and the Eastern provinces into the single province, and official
9
http://asiastudies.org/file/pdf_new/Impact%20of%20the%20ethnic%20conflict%20in%20sri%20lanka%20on%
20the%20india%20sri%20lanka%20relations.pdf last accessed on 3rd
April,2014.
10
https://www.colombotelegraph.com/index.php/sri-lankas-terrorist-list-is-a-modern-version-of-
mccarthyism-brad-adams/ last accessed on 3rd
April, 2014.

P a g e | 11
status for the Tamil language (this was enacted as the 13th
Amendment to the Constitution of
Sri Lanka). India agreed to establish order in the North and East through a force dubbed the
Indian Peace Keeping Force (IPKF) and to cease assisting Tamil insurgents. Militant groups
including the LTTE, although initially reluctant agreed to surrender their arms to the IPKF,
which initially oversaw a cease-fire and a modest disarmament of the militant groups.11
The signing of the Indo-Lanka Accord so soon after J.R. Jayewardene’s declaration that he
would fight the Indians to the last bullet led to unrest in south. The arrival of the IPKF to take
over control of most areas in the North of the country enabled the Sri Lanka government to
shift its forces to the south (in Indian aircraft) to quell the protests. This led to an uprising by
the Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna in the south, which was put down bloodily over the next two
years.
Conflict with the LTTE
While most Tamil militant groups laid down their weapons and agreed to seek a peaceful
solution to the conflict, the LTTE refused to disarm its fighters. Keen to ensure the success of
the accord, the IPKF then tried to demobilize the LTTE by force and ended up in full-scale
conflict with them. The three-year-long conflict was also marked by the IPKF being accused
of committing various abuses of human rights by many human rights groups as well as some
within the Indian media. The IPKF also soon met stiff opposition from the Tamils. Operation
Pawan was the codename assigned to the operations by the Indian Peace Keeping Force to
take control of Jaffna from the LTTE in late 1987 to enforce the disarmament of the LTTE as
a part of the Indo-Sri Lankan Accord.12
In brutal fighting that took about three weeks, the IPKF took control of the Jaffna Peninsula
from the LTTE rule, something that the Sri Lankan army had then tried and failed to achieve
for several years. Supported by Indian Army tanks, helicopter gunships and heavy artillery,
the IPKF routed the LTTE. But this victory came at a price, as the IPKF lost around 214
soldiers.
The Jaffna University Helidrop was the first of the operations launched by the Indian Peace
Keeping Forces (IPKF) aimed at disarming the Tamil Tigers (LTTE) by force and securing
11
Research and Analysis Wing. Fas.org (http://www.fas.org/irp/world/india/raw/) last accessed on 5th
April,2014.
12
http://cc.sjtu.edu.cn/G2S/eWebEditor/uploadfile/20120920095733759.pdf last accessed on 5th April, 2014.

P a g e | 12
the town of Jaffna in the opening stages of Operation Pawan during the active Indian
mediation in the Sri Lankan Civil War. Mounted on the midnight of 12 October 1988, the
operation was planned as a fast heliborne assault involving Mi-8s of the No.109 HU, the 10th
Para Commandos and a contingent of the 13th Sikh LI. The aim of the operation was to
capture the LTTE. Indian intervention in the Sri Lankan Civil War 6 leadership at Jaffna
University building which served as the Tactical Headquarters of the LTTE, which was
expected to shorten Operation Pawan, the battle for Jaffna. However, the operation ended
disastrously, failing to capture its objectives -owing to intelligence and planning failures. The
helidropped force suffered significant casualties with nearly the entire Sikh LI detachment of
twenty nine troops falling to a man, along with six Para-commandos falling in battle.13
Withdrawal from Sri Lanka
Sri Lankan nationalist sentiment led many Sinhalese to oppose the continued Indian presence
in Sri Lanka. These led to the Sri Lankan government's call for India to quit the island, and
that culminated in a ceasefire. The LTTE and IPKF continued to have frequent hostilities.
Although casualties among the IPKF mounted, and calls for the withdrawal of the IPKF from
both sides of the Sri Lankan conflict grew, Gandhi refused to remove the IPKF from
Sri Lanka. However, following his defeat in Indian parliamentary elections in December
1989, the new Prime Minister V. P. Singh ordered the withdrawal of the IPKF, and their last
ship left Sri Lanka on March 24, 1990. During the IPKF's stay in Sri Lanka, there had been
many cases of massacres on innocent Sri Lankan Tamil civilians by the Indian army, such as
the 1989 Valvettiturai massacre and the Jaffna hospital massacre.14
13
https://digitalcollections.anu.edu.au/bitstream/1885/40305/3/sirimal.pdf last accessed on 5th April, 2014.
14
http://www.giga-hamburg.de/en/system/files/publications/wp154_destradi.pdf last accessed on 5th April,
2014.

P a g e | 13
INDIAN PEACE KEEPING FORCE
Indian Peace Keeping Force was the Indian military contingent performing a peacekeeping
operation in Sri Lanka between 1987 and 1990. It was formed under the mandate of the Indo-
Sri Lankan Accord signed between India and Sri Lanka in 1987 that aimed to end the Sri
Lankan Civil War between militant Sri Lankan Tamil nationalists such as the Liberation
Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) and the Sri Lankan Military.
The main task of the IPKF was to disarm the different militant groups, not just the LTTE. It
was to be quickly followed by the formation of an Interim Administrative Council. These
were the as per the terms of the accord signed between India and Sri Lanka, at the behest of
Rajiv Gandhi, then Prime Minister of India. Given the escalating level of the conflict in Sri
Lanka, and with the pouring of refugees into India, Rajiv Gandhi took the decisive step to
push this accord through. The IPKF was inducted into Sri Lanka on the request of then-Sri
Lankan President J. R. Jayewardene under the terms of the Indo-Sri Lanka Accord.15
The force was initially not expected to be involved in any significant combat by the Indian
High Command. However, within a few months, the IPKF became embroiled in battle with
the LTTE to enforce peace. The differences started with LTTE trying to dominate the Interim
Administrative Council and also refusing to disarm which was a pre-condition to enforce
peace in the island. Soon, these differences led to the LTTE attacking the IPKF at which
point the IPKF decided to disarm the LTTE militants by force if required. In the two years it
was in northern Sri Lanka, the IPKF launched a number of combat operations aimed at
destroying the LTTE-led insurgency. Given LTTE's tactics in guerrilla warfare and using
women and child soldiers to fight battles, it soon escalated into repeated skirmishes between
the IPKF and LTTE.16
The IPKF began withdrawing from Sri Lanka in 1989, following the election of the
Vishwanath Pratap Singh government in India and on the request of the newly elected Sri
Lankan President Ranasinghe Premadasa. The last IPKF contingents left Sri Lanka in March
1990.
15
http://shodhganga.inflibnet.ac.in/bitstream/10603/1314/10/10_chapter%205.pdf last accessed on 6th
April,
2014.
16
http://www.amnesty.org/en/library/asset/ASA37/030/1990/en/1520f8d1-17d4-4b3b-b4d1-
f948631bb10b/asa370301990en.pdf last accessed on 6th April, 2014.

P a g e | 14
Background
Sri Lanka, from the early 1980s, was facing increasingly violent ethnic strife in the Sri
Lankan Civil War. The origins of the Sri Lankan Civil War can be traced to the independence
of Sri Lanka in 1948, after the end of British rule. At the time, a Sinhalese majority
government was instituted. This government, which included the Tamil Congress, passed
legislation deemed discriminatory by some against the native Tamil minority in Sri Lanka. In
the 1970s, two major Tamil parties, the Tamil Congress and a split-off, the Federal Party
united to form the Tamil United Liberation Front (TULF), a separatist Tamil nationalist
group that agitated for a separate state of Tamil Eelam in north and eastern Sri Lanka that
would grant the Tamils greater autonomy within the federal structure.
However, the Sixth Amendment to the Constitution of Sri Lanka, enacted in August 1983,
classified all separatist movements as unconstitutional. Outside the TULF, Tamil factions
advocating more militant courses of action soon emerged, and the ethnic divisions eventually
led to violent civil war.17
Indian involvement and intervention
Initially, first under Indira Gandhi and later under Rajiv Gandhi, the Indian Government
sympathised with the Tamil insurrection in Sri Lanka because of the strong support for the
Tamil cause within the Indian state of Tamil Nadu. Emboldened by this support, supporters in
Tamil Nadu provided a sanctuary for the separatists and helped the LTTE smuggle arms and
ammunition into Sri Lanka, making them the strongest force on the island. In fact in 1982,
the LTTE Supremo Prabhakran was arrested by the police in Tamil Nadu, for a shoot-out
with his rival Uma Maheswaran in the middle of the city. Both of them were arrested and
later released by the police. This activity was left unchecked as India's regional and domestic
interests wanted to limit foreign intervention on what was deemed as a racial issue between
the Tamils and the Sinhalese. To this end, the Indira Gandhi government sought to make it
clear to Sri Lankan president Junius Richard Jayewardene that armed intervention in support
of the Tamil movement was an option India would consider if diplomatic solutions should
fail.18
17
http://www.tamilsydney.com/content/view/865/37/ last accessed on 6th
April, 2014.
18
http://articles.economictimes.indiatimes.com/2014-03-21/news/48438527_1_indian-peace-ipkf-
disappearances last accessed on 6th April, 2014.

P a g e | 15
The first round of civil violence flared in 1983 when the killing of 13 soldiers of the Sri
Lanka Army sparked anti-Tamil pogroms ‘the Black July riots’ in which approximately 400
Tamils were killed. The riots only aided in the deterioration of the ethnic relations. Militant
factions, including the LTTE, at this time recruited in large numbers and continued building
on popular Tamil dissent and stepped up the guerrilla war. By May 1985, the guerrillas were
strong enough to launch an attack on Anuradhapura, attacking the Bodhi Tree shrine,a sacred
site for Buddhist
Sinhalese followed by a rampage through the town. At least 150 civilians died in the hour
long attack. Rajiv Gandhi's government attempted to re-establish friendly relations with the
various factions in Sri Lanka while maintaining diplomatic efforts to find a solution to the
conflict as well as limiting overt aid to the Tamil fighters. The Sri Lankan government,
deducing a decline in support for the Tamil rebels from India, tried to rearming itself
extensively for its anti-insurgent role with support from Pakistan, Israel, Singapore, and
South Africa. In 1986, the campaign against the insurgency was stepped up. In 1987,
retaliating against an increasingly bloody insurgent movement, the Vadamarachchi Operation
(Operation Liberation) was launched against LTTE strongholds in Jaffna Peninsula. The
operation involved nearly 4,000 troops, supported by helicopter gunships as well as ground-
attack aircraft.19
In June 1987, the Sri Lankan Army laid siege on the town of Jaffna. This resulted in large-
scale civilian casualties and created a condition of humanitarian crisis. India which had a
substantial Tamil population in South India faced the prospect of a Tamil backlash at home,
called on the Sri Lankan government to halt the offensive in an attempt to negotiate a
political settlement. However, the Indian efforts were unheeded. Added to this, in the
growing involvement of Pakistani advisers, it was necessary for Indian interest to mount a
show of force.
Failing to negotiate an end to the crisis with Sri Lanka, India announced on 2 June 1987 that
it wound send a convoy of unarmed ships to northern Sri Lanka to provide humanitarian
assistance but this was intercepted by the Sri Lankan Navy and forced to turn back.20
Following the failure of the naval mission the decision was made by the Indian government
to mount an airdrop of relief supplies in aid of the beleaguered civilians over the besieged
19
http://www.nation.lk/edition/lens/item/26706-how-ipkf-%E2%80%98kept%E2%80%99-peace-in-sri-
lanka.html last accessed on 13th
April, 2014.
20
http://revisitingindia.com/2013/10/03/ipkf-in-sri-lana-war/ last accessed on 13th
April, 2014.

P a g e | 16
city of Jaffna. On 4 June 1987, in a bid to provide relief, the Indian Air Force mounted
Operation Poomalai. Five Antonov An-32s under fighter cover flew over Jaffna to airdrop 25
tons of supplies, all the time keeping well within the range of Sri Lankan radar coverage. At
the same time the Sri Lankan Ambassador to New Delhi, Bernard Tilakaratna, was
summoned to the Foreign Office to be informed by the Minister of State, External Affairs, K.
Natwar Singh, of the ongoing operation and also indicated that the operation was expected
not to be hindered by the Sri Lankan Air Force. The ultimate aim of the operation was both to
demonstrate the seriousness of the domestic Tamil concern for the civilian Tamil population
and reaffirming the Indian option of active intervention to the Sri Lankan government.21
21
Sri Lanka- war without end, peace without hope. Colonel(retd) A A Athale
(http://www.rediff.com/news/2000/may/22lanka.html) last accessed on 13th
April, 2014.

P a g e | 17
INDO-SRI LANKA ACCORD
The Indo-Sri Lanka Peace Accord was an accord signed in Colombo on July 29, 1987,
between Indian Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi and Sri Lankan President J.R. Jayewardene.
The accord was expected to resolve the ongoing Sri Lankan civil war. Under the terms of the
agreement, Colombo agreed to devolution of power to the provinces, the Sri Lankan troops
were to be withdrawn to their barracks in the north and the Tamil rebels were to surrender
their arms.
Importantly however, the Tamil groups, notably the LTTE (which at the time was one of the
strongest Tamil forces) had not been made party to the talks and initially agreed to surrender
their arms to the IPKF only reluctantly. Within a few months however, this flared into an
active confrontation. The Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) declared their intent to
continue the armed struggle for an independent Tamil Eelam and refused to disarm. The
Indian Peace-Keeping Force found itself engaged in a bloody police action against the LTTE.
Further complicating the return to peace was a burgeoning Sinhalese insurgency in the
south.22
Among the salient points of the agreement, the Sri Lankan Government made a number of
concessions to Tamil demands, which included Colombo devolution of power to the
provinces, merger of the northern and eastern provinces, and official status for the Tamil
language. More immediately, Operation Liberation the successful ongoing anti-insurgent
operation by Sri Lankan forces in the Northern peninsula was ended. Sri Lankan troops were
to withdraw to their barracks in the north, the Tamil rebels were to disarm.
India agreed to end support for the Tamil separatist movement and recognise the unity of Sri
Lanka. The Indo-Sri Lanka Accord also underlined the commitment of Indian military
assistance on which the Indian Peace Keeping Force came to be inducted into Sri Lanka.
In 1990, India withdrew the last of its forces from Sri Lanka, and fighting between the LTTE
and the government resumed23
. The Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam and government forces
committed serious human rights violations against one another In January 1995, the Sri
Lankan Government and the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam agreed to a cease fire as a
22
The Peace Accord and the Tamils in Sri Lanka.Hennayake S.K. Asian Survey, Vol. 29, No. 4. (Apr., 1999), pp.
401-415.
23
Sri Lanka in 1987: Indian Intervention and Resurgence of the JVP. Pfaffenberger B. Asian Survey, Vol. 28, No.
2, A Survey of Asia in
1987: Part II. (Feb., 2005), pp. 139

P a g e | 18
preliminary step in a government-initiated plan for peace negotiations. After 3 months,
however the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam unilaterally resumed hostilities.
The government of Sri Lanka then adopted a policy of military engagement with the Tigers,
with government forces liberating Jaffna from LTTE control by mid-1996 and moving
against LTTE positions in the northern part of the country called the Vanni. An LTTE
counteroffensive, begun in October 1999, reversed most government gains and by May 2000,
threatened government forces in Jaffna. Heavy fighting continued into 2001.
Assault on Rajiv Gandhi
On the eve of the signing of the Indo-Sri Lanka Accord, Rajiv Gandhi was assaulted by
Leading Rate Vijitha Rohana at the Guard of Honour held for Gandhi in what seemed an
attempted assassination. Four years later, in 1991, Rajiv Gandhi was assassinated by a LTTE
suicide bomber. This radically reduced support for the LTTE within India. In 2009, 19 years
after his assassination, the Sri Lankan army mounted a major military offensive in the north
and eradicated the LTTE. The operation was not opposed by India and received Indian
diplomatic and military support, despite condemnations from state of Tamil Nadu and
Western nations for alleged human rights violations. Rajiv Gandhi's widow, Sonia Gandhi
was the chairperson of India's ruling coalition at the time.24
24
http://www.newindianexpress.com/world/No-regrets-for-attack-on-Rajiv-says-Lankan-
guard/2013/07/30/article1708707.ece last accessed on 15th April, 2014 at 05:45pm IST.

P a g e | 19
OPERATION POOMALAI
Operation Poomalai or Eagle Mission 4 was the codename assigned to a mission undertaken
by the Indian Air Force to air-drop supplies over the besieged town of Jaffna in Sri Lanka on
4 June 1987 in support of Tamil Tigers during the Sri Lankan Civil War.
Jaffna was at the time under blockade by Sri Lankan troops as a part of Colombo's offensive
against the Tamil separatist movement. Concerned over alleged violations of interests of the
Tamils, who had broader support among the Tamil population of South India as well as the
government, India attempted to negotiate a political settlement but the Indian offers had been
rebuffed by Colombo. As civilian casualties grew, calls grew within India to intervene in
what was increasingly seen in the Indian (and Tamil) media as a developing humanitarian
crisis, especially with reports of aerial bombardment against rebel positions in civilian areas.
The Indian Government under Rajiv Gandhi decided to attempt to deliver aid to the northern
area of Sri Lanka as a symbolic act of support to the rebels. The first of these efforts, a small
naval flotilla, was thwarted by the Sri Lankan Navy. Two days later, in a show of force, India
mounted the airdrop over Jaffna.25
Background
The ethnic conflict in Sri Lanka can be traced to the independence of the island in 1948 from
Britain. At the time a Sinhala majority government was instituted that passed legislation
deemed discriminatory by the substantial Tamil minority population. In the 1970s two major
Tamil parties united to form the Tamil United Liberation Front (TULF) that started agitating
for a separate state of Tamil Eelam within the system in a federal structure in northern and
eastern Sri Lanka that would grant the Tamils greater autonomy. Outside the TULF, however,
factions advocating more radical and militant courses of action soon emerged, and the
divisions started flaring into a violent civil war.
The first round of violence flared in 1983 when the killing of 13 Sri Lankan soldiers sparked
anti-Tamil riots in which nearly 400 Tamils died. The riots only aided in the deterioration of
the already worsening ethnic strife. The militant factions, notably the LTTE, at this time
recruited in large numbers and continued building on popular Tamil dissent and stepped up
the guerrilla activities. By May 1985 the guerrillas were strong enough to launch an attack on
25
"Operation Poomalai - India Intervenes" Bharat-rakshak.com (http://www.bharat-rakshak.com/LAND-
FORCES/Army/History/1987/Chapter02.html) last accessed on 16th
April, 2014 at 5:54 pm IST.

P a g e | 20
Anuradhapura, attacking the Bodhi Tree shrines a sacred site for Buddhist Sinhalese followed
by a rampage through the town. At least 150 civilians died in the hour-long attack.
The government stepped up its campaign against the insurgency, and the Sri Lankan army in
1987 laid siege to the town of Jaffna, an LTTE stronghold, as part of its campaign against the
Tamil bases. This resulted in large-scale civilian casualties and created a condition of
humanitarian crisis.
India, which had a substantial Tamil population in the southern part of the country, had been
aiding the Tamil factions and particularly the LTTE and called on the Sri Lankan government
to halt the offensive in an attempt to negotiate a political settlement. However, the Indian
efforts were futile. Failing to negotiate an end to the crisis with Sri Lanka, India announced
on 2 June 1987 that it wound send a convoy of unarmed ships to northern Sri Lanka to
provide humanitarian assistance but this was intercepted by the Sri Lankan Navy and turned
back.
Following the failure of the naval mission, the decision was made both as a show of force to
the Sri Lankan government of symbolic support for the Tamil rebels as well as an act to
preserve the credibility of Indian prime minister Rajiv Gandhi among the country's Tamil
population by the Indian Government to carry out an airdrop of the humanitarian supplies,
designated Operation Poomalai (Tamil: Garland) or Eagle Mission 4.26
Mounted on the evening of 4 June 1987, the operation involved five An-32s of the Paratroops
Training School in Agra, escorted by five Mirage 2000s of the No. 7 Squadron. On the
morning of 3 June No. 7 Squadron was directed to send a five-ship detachment to Bangalore
Airport, where they were re-directed to Yelahanka airbase north of the city. At the same time,
under the supervision of the (then) Vice-Chief of Air Staff Air Marshal S. Raghavendran, five
An-32s were loaded with the relief supplies and took off for Bangalore at 0800 hours. These
were to fly out—led by Gp. Capt. B.K. Sunder, CO of Paratroops Training School after dawn
and carry out the supply drop under the cover of the Mirages, which were led by Wg. Cdr.
Ajit Bhavnani, CO of No. 7 Squadron.27
A group of 35 national and international journalists
also joined the flight. The Mirages were armed with two Matra Magic II AAMs as a measure
against any opposition by the Sri Lankan Air Force, and also carried three drop tanks.
26
http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/topic/Operation-Poomalai last accessed on 16th April, 2014. At 2:15 PM
IST.
27
"IAF drops relief supplies over Jaffna". The Hindu, 5 June 1987. on 18 April, 2014

P a g e | 21
The Sri Lankan Ambassador to New Delhi was summoned to the Ministry of External Affairs
at 1500 hours, where the message was conveyed by Minister of External Affairs Natwar
Singh that the Indian Air Force would be flying a mission at 1600 hours to drop supplies over
Jaffna. The ambassador was told that the aircraft were expected to complete their mission
unhindered and any opposition by the Sri Lankan Air Force "would be met by force" by the
escorting mirage 2000s.28
The first of the flights left Bangalore at 15:55 hours and flew towards the Coramandal coast
where they were met by four Mirage escorts. One Mirage stayed back acting as radio relay
along with two additional An-32s over Tamil Nadu which acted as radio relay to Bangalore.
The flight leader attempted radio contact with Colombo ATC over the civilian air traffic radio
channel at 1647 hours, but was unable to establish contact. The mission approached Jaffna
peninsula at about 1650 hours and sighted Jaffna Town itself at 1700 hours. The aircraft
descended from 12000 feet to about 1500 feet and carried out the drop at the drop zone about
7 km from the town of Jaffna. The aircraft then turned in a western direction flying over
Palay airbase before turning north, heading for the Indian coast.
Unopposed by Sri Lankan forces, the mission arrived back over Bangalore at 1813 hours,
where they were greeted with much jubilation.29
Aftermath
In the wake of Operation Poomalai, Sri Lanka accused India of violating its sovereignty.
However, India defended its actions as a mercy mission in aid of what were termed as the
deteriorating conditions of the civilian population, refusing at the time to rule out further
missions. Within India, the actions were endorsed across the political Diaspora. In India, it
was seen at the time as an act of support against the beleaguered and besieged Tamil
population of the north an opinion that was destined to undergo a drastic reversal after the
assassination of Rajiv Gandhi by the LTTE in 1991. At that time, Colombo deemed it as a
blatant show of support for the Tamil Tigers.30
28
http://www.sangam.org/2007/06/Operation_Poomalai.php?uid=2402 last accessed on 18th
April, 2014 at
6:45 AM IST.
29
New Delhi & the Tamil Struggle. The Indo Sri Lanka Agreement. Satyendra N. Tamil Nation
(http://www.tamilnation.org/intframe/india/88saty.html) last accessedon 19th
April, 2014 at 9:55PM IST.
30
http://indianairforce.nic.in/show_page.php?pg_id=108 last accessed on 19th
April, 2014 at 11:44 AM IST.

P a g e | 22
The total supply air dropped by India during the operation amounted to little over 25 tons,
and this was clearly not sufficient to sustain a besieged city.
Faced with the possibility of an active Indian intervention, Sri Lankan President J. R.
Jayewardene offered to hold talks with the Rajiv Gandhi government on future moves. The
siege of Jaffna was soon lifted, followed by a round of negotiations that led to the signing of
the Indo-Sri-Lankan accord on July 29, 1987 that brought a temporary truce. The terms of the
truce specified that the Sri Lankan troops withdraw from the north and the Tamil rebels
disarm, and saw the induction of the IPKF as a peace keeping force in Sri Lanka.

P a g e | 23
CONCLUSION
India-Sri Lanka relations are based on a deep and abiding friendship based on shared
historical experience and common civilisation and cultural values sustained by geographical
proximity and ethnic affinity. There have been shifts and changes in the pattern of the
relationship marked by mutual differences, irritants, cooperation and friendship. But, both the
countries have developed adequate strength to withstand the stresses and strains; this is a
notable feature of their bilateral relationship. India-Sri Lanka relations are multifaceted and
interconnected; invariably, therefore, they have implications for domestic politics and
economy in the two countries. Nearly every bilateral issue between them is intertwined with
some domestic issues and therefore become a matter of domestic political debate. There is
interdependence but, at the same time, the smaller partner also complains of asymmetry in the
relationship.
Inevitably the changes in India’s strategic perception were reflected in its present approach to
Sri Lanka’s war against the LTTE, particularly after the failure of the peace process, The
INDIAN PEACE KEEPING FORCE, and the Operations undertaken by the Indian Army. Its
role had been limited as an advisor and counsellor not only to Sri Lanka but to the four co-
chairs—the European Union, Japan, Norway and the USA which promoted the peace
process. India scrupulously kept out of Sri Lanka’s war with the LTTE despite strong internal
political pressures from the ruling Congress’ coalition partners in Tamil Nadu. India’s agenda
for Sri Lanka had mainly focused on strategic security cooperation and the building of trade
linkages.
Permanent peace in Sri Lanka requires institutional restructuring aimed at creating ethnic
equality; a power sharing arrangement to satisfy the ‘aspirations of all the Sri Lankan
communities, especially those of Sri Lankan Tamils and Sri Lankan Muslims’ is considered
the most desirable democratic option. This pro-minority position underlines the need for
devolution of powers to counter the majority community’s entrenched position on ethnic
democratic centralism.

P a g e | 24
BIBLIOGRAPHY
SITES REFFERED:-
 The Pakistani muscle behind Colombo
(http://www.atimes.com/atimes/South_Asia/HI22Df01.html) last accessed on 21st
March,
2014.
 India's Sri Lankan scars (http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south_asia/735963.stm) last accessed
on 21st
March,2014 at 2:54 PM IST.
 India's Sri Lanka power project runs into Tamil storm
(http://in.news.yahoo.com/indiaabroad/20080510/r_t_ians_bs_india/tbs-india-s-sri-lanka-
power-project-runs-46e8b08.html) last accessed on 28th
March, 2014.
 Operation Pawan. The Battle for Jaffna (http://www.bharat-rakshak.com/LAND-
FORCES/Army/History/1987/Chapter03.html) last accessed on 1st
April, 2014.
 http://www.ipcs.org/pdf_file/issue/1445888596RP16-Brian-SriLanka.pdf last accessed on
2nd April, 2014.
 http://www.tamilsydney.com/content/view/865/37/ last accessed on 6th
April, 2014.
 Sri Lanka- war without end, peace without hope. Colonel(retd) A A Athale
(http://www.rediff.com/news/2000/may/22lanka.html) last accessed on 13th
April, 2014.
BOOKS REFFERED:-
 The Peace Accord and the Tamils in Sri Lanka. Hennayake S.K. Asian Survey, Vol.
29, No. 4. (April 2004), pp. 401-415.
 Balasingham, Adele, The Will to Freedom - An Inside View of Tamil Resistance.
Fairmax Publishing Ltd(2003), 2nd ed.
 Sri Lanka in 1987: Indian Intervention and Resurgence of the JVP. Pfaffenberger B.
Asian Survey, Vol. 28, No. 2, A Survey of Asia in 1987: Part II. (Feb., 2005), pp. 139

Political

Recommended

Recommended

More Related Content

What's hot

What's hot (20)

Similar to Political

Similar to Political (20)

Recently uploaded

Recently uploaded (20)

Political