There are a daunting number of maritime security threats and challenges in the north-western Indian Ocean region, both extant and potential. Indeed, the mere fact that the Indian Ocean constitutes the world’s largest swath of maritime space that is prone to the major menace of piracy (in the Gulf of Oman, the Arabian Sea, the Gulf of Aden and in the waters off the north-east African coastline), as well as the sporadic threat of terrorism (by Islamic militias of Al-Shabaab in Somalia and Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula in Yemen), signifies that the region will arguably remain the maritime area with the greatest array of security challenges. However, while anti-piracy measures ought to have shaped regional policymaking, and the resources that a large and diverse group of states has devoted to addressing these maritime challenges have never been adequate to the task, largely successful coalition-building exercises and joint naval task-force operations have been encouraging. The transformation of Somali piracy from a haphazard activity into a highly organised, professionalised criminal enterprise is briefly elucidated by greed-grievance theory and supplemented by the theory of crime, also known as routine-activity theory

1. Piracy and Maritime
Security in the North-
Western Indian Ocean:
From the Gulf of Oman
to the Waters off the
Somali Coast
Rulah Odeh Alsawalqa1
and DenisVenter2
Abstract
There are a daunting number of maritime security threats and challenges in the
north-western Indian Ocean region, both extant and potential. Indeed, the mere
fact that the Indian Ocean constitutes the world’s largest swath of maritime
space that is prone to the major menace of piracy (in the Gulf of Oman, the
Arabian Sea, the Gulf of Aden and in the waters off the north-east African
coastline), as well as the sporadic threat of terrorism (by Islamic militias of
Al-Shabaab in Somalia and Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula in Yemen), signifies
that the region will arguably remain the maritime area with the greatest array of
security challenges. However, while anti-piracy measures ought to have shaped
regional policymaking, and the resources that a large and diverse group of states
has devoted to addressing these maritime challenges have never been adequate to
the task, largely successful coalition-building exercises and joint naval task-force
operations have been encouraging. The transformation of Somali piracy from a
haphazard activity into a highly organised, professionalised criminal enterprise is
briefly elucidated by greed-grievance theory and supplemented by the theory of
crime, also known as routine-activity theory.
Keywords
Maritime security, north-western Indian Ocean, Somali piracy, Horn of Africa,
greed-grievance theory, routine-activity theory
Insight on Africa
1–16
© 2021 African Studies
Association of India
Reprints and permissions:
in.sagepub.com/journals-permissions-india
DOI: 10.1177/09750878211049224
journals.sagepub.com/home/ioa
1
Department of Sociology, University of Jordan, Amman, Jordan
2
Former Nelson Mandela Chair Professor, Centre for African Studies, School of International
Studies, Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi, India
Corresponding author:
Rulah Odeh Alsawalqa, Department of Sociology, University of Jordan, Queen Rania Street, Amman
11942, Jordan.
E-mail: R.sawalka@ju.edu.jo
Article

2. 2 Insight on Africa
This article endeavours to answer several research questions. How can piracy be
broadly defined and what are some of the major causes driving it? What deleterious
effect has Somali piracy activity had on maritime security in the north-western
Indian Ocean? What containment measures have out-of-theatre powers taken to
secure international sea lanes of communication (SLOCs)? Are there any clear
linkages between Somali piracy activity and the role of Islamist militants in the
region around the Horn of Africa? Are there any chance of onshore solutions to
Somali piracy?
Due to a lack of institutional support and financial resources, the research
methodology utilised in writing this article has been based exclusively on
secondary materials, such as journal articles, books, research reports, conference
papers, policy perspectives and briefings, as well as resolutions adopted by
international organisations. It is also not intended for this contribution to be a
theoretical tour de force, but rather the broad brushstrokes of an empirical research
endeavour.
The focus in this study is on the scourge of piracy, concentrated in, but not
confined to, the Gulf of Oman and much of the Arabian Sea, the southern reaches
of the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden, and the waters around the Horn of Africa, as
well as maritime security in the north-western Indian Ocean.
Introduction
Having emerged from relative obscurity during the Cold War, the Arabian Sea and
the north-western Indian Ocean is a dynamic, fast evolving strategic arena,
destined to be of increasing importance in the geopolitics of the region during the
twenty-first century (Brewster 2018b). Luke and O’Loughlin (2010, 12‒16)
suggest that some of the key issues that present themselves, looking beyond 2021,
are potential geopolitical rivalries, competition for influence and resources, the
problem of failed or failing states, piracy, terrorism and religious extremism. And
as Brewster (2018b) asserts, competition and rivalry by more powerful countries
for influence among states along the north-western Indian Ocean littoral can spill
over into considerable political instability right across the region. Although the
United States remains the biggest military power in the region, it will increasingly
need to deal with a much more multifarious environment, one in which it will not
always have a leading role.
On both land and at sea, the situation in Somalia appears unlikely to be resolved
in the immediate future. Somali pirates will continue to threaten maritime security
in the Gulf of Aden and the north-western Indian Ocean, whilst Islamist militants,
such as Al-Shabaab, will continue to pose a threat to security on land.1
Clearly,
Al-Shabaab’s admiration for Al-Qaeda bodes nothing but ill for stability in the
wider region. Allied to this, argue Luke and O’Loughlin (2010, 15‒16), is
the proliferation of militant Islamist movements that will continue to pose
challenges to governments across the Middle East and the north-east African sub-
regions, exploiting the issues of poor governance and lack of economic
opportunities. First, regional governments are seen by Islamists, who are obsessed

3. Alsawalqa andVenter 3
with the restoration of a pan-regional Islamic Caliphate, as too closely allied to the
West—a future existential threat to many states, despite the seeming demise of
ISIS/ISIL/IS. And second, Islamism may prove attractive to unemployed and
under-employed youth in states such as Yemen or Djibouti, where the growth in
religious schools or madrassas, fanatically devoted to extremist ideologies, is
targeting the marginalised and easily impressionable younger generation.
Maritime Security in the North-Western Indian Ocean:
Setting the Scene
As Brewster (2018a; 2014, 5‒11) argues, the north-western Indian Ocean has,
once again, become an arena for geostrategic rivalry of some sort. In fact, the
region is emerging as one of the twenty-first century’s leading strategic theatres,
a stage for the pursuit of global strategic and regional military and security
interests.
As one of the world’s most important routes for international maritime long-haul
cargo, the north-western Indian Ocean remains vulnerable to piracy and highly
unpredictable potential acts of maritime terrorism. Hughes (2011) and Vreÿ (2013,
16) point out that maritime security can no longer be conceptualised only in terms
of a composite of naval arms build-ups and sea power, maritime and island boundary
disputes, navigational regimes, activities in exclusive economic zones (EEZs),
competition over resources, and the maintenance of law and order at sea, including
the protection of sea lanes of communication (SLOCs). The concept of human
security also needs to be revisited, focusing on some of the most pressing offshore
environmental concerns: the illegal disposal of nuclear waste, illegal and unsafe
resource exploitation, illegal oil bunkering, narcotics, arms and human trafficking,
the exploitation of fishing stocks, weak control (jurisdiction) over territorial waters,
climate change and environmental refugees putting unbearable pressure on land-
based resources (Samaranayake 2017, 189‒191).
Of the three temperate oceans of the world, observed Cozens (1998) more than
two decades ago, the Indian Ocean is probably the most problematic for security
management. Despite this reality, however, the ocean seems bereft of any
collective maritime security arrangements, although a greater maritime domain
awareness of core challenges and opportunities has come about over time (Singh
2021; Sakhuja 2017; Singh 2016; Sharma 2016). Nonetheless, the lack of maritime
security around the Horn ofAfrica causes a great deal of concern. From whichever
direction, entry into the north-western Indian Ocean is constrained by geographical
imperatives. The routes through the Gulf of Aden and the Strait of Hormuz have
been used since antiquity for purposes of trade and communication. It raises the
important question of what the strategic responses are of regional navies, ensuring
the safe and efficient passage of cargoes along this route. Rather than leave
security management to chance, it is self-evident that it is in the interests of all to
build a maritime security mechanism to promote an ocean-wide sphere of peace
and tranquillity (Kumar 2016).

4. 4 Insight on Africa
In determining strategies, regional navies have a vital role to play, but it should
be appreciated that ‘maritime strategy has a [clear] peace-time dimension’, argues
McCaffrie(1996,7).Maritimestrategyisidiosyncratic—infact,itisfundamentally
and significantly different from any other purpose. It is unique, points out
McCaffrie (1996, 4),
[Because navies] have always been noted for their versatility and their utility in situa-
tions short of conflict. This versatility comes from the characteristics of reach (includ-
ing sustainability), adaptability (including the capacity to threaten and apply force in a
finely graduated way), and acceptability (in that warships are diplomatic instruments
unlike any other kind of armed force).
Maritime security, on the other hand, can be a rather broad, unfocussed and
somewhat amorphous concept, admits Potgieter (2012, 1), as it is both multi-
faceted and multi-dimensional and is concerned with both military and non-
military issues. Today, Roy (2009, 1–2) points out, one can hardly indulge in
making clear-cut distinctions between ‘traditional military’ security issues (naval
threats and challenges), ‘hard non-military’ security issues—such as piracy,
terrorism at sea, human trafficking, the protection of shipping and SLOCs (also
securing choke-points such as the Strait of Hormuz, the Bab-el Mandeb and the
Suez Canal) and regulating the exploitation of offshore oil/natural gas resources
andsea-bedminerals—and‘softnon-military’securityissues,suchassafeguarding
port and ship-building facilities, delimiting extended maritime spaces (EEZs),
enforcing legal and regulatory mechanisms in maritime zones (maritime
management), protecting the marine environment and providing energy security.
Ultimately, Potgieter (2012, 1) emphasises, maritime security must prevent illicit
activity in the maritime domain, trying to enforce security through national,
regional and international containment efforts.
A particularly dangerous and worrying development is the role of non-state
actors in the maritime environment (Sakhuja 2017, 263; Gippner 2016, 107; Vats
and Rangi 2016). Resultant non-traditional security issues challenge the traditional
understanding of the term ‘security’. These issues are propelled by non-state
actors who rely on asymmetric strategies to challenge the state, their roles and
actions demanding international responses. Navies will continue to react to
traditional naval threats and challenges, like safeguarding national sovereignty,
but they will simultaneously have to be prepared to address multiple forms of
non-traditional security threats and challenges, besides protecting the marine
environment (Sakhuja 2017, 263, 275). These challenges have direct and
fundamental consequences for the rich, broader western Indian Ocean maritime
trade. And in this context, it would be prudent to remember that almost half of
global container traffic and much of the world’s energy shipments pass through
these waters, vitally important for the world economy (Herbert-Burns 2012b).
The anticipated economic turbulence worldwide, in the wake of the COVID-
19 pandemic, suggests that a prudent and cautious approach to the matter of
maritime security is required.As Lingle (1997, 55) warned more than two decades
ago, when economic growth is charging along and prosperity seems assured for
all, voices of protest and disquiet tend to fade away. However, the present political

5. Alsawalqa andVenter 5
discord in some countries and the rise of authoritarian regimes in many others is
symptomatic of the converse of that contention. It is difficult, of course, to predict
what the next stage in the world economy post-2021 will have in store. But it is
obvious, argues Cozens (1998, 1‒2), that economic growth, of necessity, must
rely largely on the use of SLOCs—during any era, whether past or present.
What, then, are the latent and potential areas of friction that could threaten
freedom of navigation or otherwise impede the free flow of trade in the SLOCs of
the north-western Indian Ocean? Some areas of insecurity, Valencia (1998) and
Pandya, Herbert-Burns and Kobayashi (2011, 2, 4) point out, are transnational
disputes about undersea mining exploration, the right of ‘innocent passage’ and
maritime territorial disputes around EEZs. There are also some arrangements not
readily appreciated or understood, suggests Grove (1996), grouped under the
collective title of ‘maritime confidence-building measures’, such as transparency
and co-operation measures and incidents at sea agreements (ISAs), the latter
addressing specific regional concerns around the threats posed by piracy, human
trafficking, arms and narcotics smuggling, and the depletion of fishing stocks.
The fact that these measures are suggested as necessary, illustrates a degree of
‘uncertainty-based planning’ in the north-western Indian Ocean. As Cozens
(1998, 3) suggested many years ago, this is not to suggest the beginnings of an
arms race but rather the convergence of at least two important motivators. First,
since the ratification of UNCLOS (UN Convention on the Law of the Sea)
governments are acutely aware of the importance of rights and sovereignty over
their respective ocean territories and EEZs. Second, countries need ‘sea-securing
resources’ to carry out these responsibilities—in other words, ships capable of
exercising sea power. Navies of north-western Indian Ocean countries (and
others) will have to insert sea-control platforms into the maritime arena as a
contribution to reducing insecurity at sea, thus demonstrating their determination
to maintain and preserve good order at sea, leading to a stable and secure maritime
environment (Mohabeer and Sullivan de Estrada 2019).
The Festering Sore of Somali Piracy
The question immediately arises: what constitutes piracy and what led to its
emergence?
Defining the Phenomenon of Piracy
Piracy is characterised by international law as a universal jurisdictional crime
(Kontorovich 2004). Article 15 of the Geneva UN Convention on the High Seas
(UN-CHS 1958) defines piracy as ‘… illegal acts of violence, detention or any act
of depredation, committed for private ends by the crew or the passengers of a
private ship …, and directed on the high seas against another ship … or against
persons or property on board such [a] ship’. In terms of this definition, piracy
could only take place against persons or property on the high seas outside the

6. 6 Insight on Africa
jurisdiction of any state. Article 101 of UNCLOS (1982) reiterates the UN-CHS
(1958) definition of piracy as sub-paragraph (a)(i) but, quite significantly, adds
other sub-paragraphs (International Maritime Organisation [IMO] 2013, 3),
broadening the definition to:
[Any act] (a)(ii) against a ship, … in a place outside the jurisdiction of any state, (b)
any act of voluntary participation in the operation of a ship … with knowledge of facts
making it a pirate ship …, [and] (c) any act of inciting, or of intentionally facilitating,
an act described in sub-paragraphs (a) or (b).
In addition to UNCLOS, the international community employs the Convention for
the Suppression of UnlawfulActs against the Safety of Maritime Navigation (SUA),
although the latter treaty does not specifically refer to ‘piracy’ as such (IMO-SUA
1988). However, Article 3 of SUA defines an offender as any person who ‘seizes or
exercises control over a ship by force or threat [of force]’ and ‘performs an act of
violence against a person on board a ship’. Furthermore,Article 4 of the Convention
refers to ‘acts taking place within and through the territorial waters of states’, thus
not limiting its applicability to the high seas. Although UN Security Council
resolutions encouraged countries to employ the provisions of SUA to repress piracy
(UNSC 2011), certain political and legal implications forced the international
community to follow a ‘catch-and-release’strategy during the early stages of putting
these conventions into effect, Elmi et al. (2015, 149–150) point out. This led to an
escalation in pirate attacks because the inducements for capturing and ransoming
ships were high, whereas the consequences for committing acts of piracy were quite
low or even non-existent.
The UNCLOS definition of piracy was adopted by the IMO. As a result, its
security portfolio includes the prevention and suppression of acts of piracy
through, inter alia, the promotion of regional counter-piracy responses. Aiming to
combat piracy and armed robbery at sea, specifically in the waters of the north-
western Indian Ocean and the Gulf of Aden, the IMO has been one of the
instrumental parties in the adoption of the 2009 Djibouti Code of Conduct. This
agreement provides a co-operative platform for the fostering of situational
awareness through capacity-building, information-sharing and joint training but,
crucially, put pressure on the 20 signatory governments to strengthen national
legislative frameworks by enacting anti-piracy legislation (Munyua 2019, 10‒11;
Elmi andAffi 2014). The agreement was later amended to include the development
of the ‘blue economy’as a source for sustainable development, as well as a counter
to other emerging challenges such as maritime terrorism (Singh 2021). Somalia
has been condemned to a position of impotence to implement any stand-alone
anti-piracy policy, however, because of endemic violence and instability onshore.
The International Maritime Bureau (IMB) is also mandated to battle maritime
crime and malpractice. As Geiss and Petrig (2011) note, it defines piracy broadly
by including the intent to commit crime, like theft, against any ship in any area
and by any means. Any attempt to hijack or attack a ship is regarded as piracy,
emphasises Zou (2009), regardless of whether that ship is in the territorial waters
of a given state or on the high seas. International law does not recognise this rather
broad IMB characterisation of piracy but, even so, the shipping industry applies

7. Alsawalqa andVenter 7
this specific definition. And, although different legal instruments provide
contending definitions of unique or distinct maritime crimes (terrorism, armed
robbery and piracy), the UNCLOS and IMO-SUA definitions are often conflated
(Elmi et al. 2015, 159). Then again, Rohwerder (2016, 1) asserts that piracy refers
‘to both piracy and armed robberies at sea. The distinction between the two terms
is in jurisdiction ‒ piracy occurs outside of a state’s territorial waters and armed
robberies at sea occur in[side] territorial waters’.
Determining Some of the Root Causes of Piracy,
Naval Counter-Piracy Measures
Although grievances such as abject poverty (Somalis struggling for survival amid
the disruptions of civil war), as well as illegal fishing by foreign vessels, were
important motivators for pirate activities in the waters around the Horn of Africa,
and may explain earlier instances of piracy, they do not throw sufficient light on
the evolution of this phenomenon, Elmi et al. (2015, 156) contend. Thus, state
failure (statelessness), crime of opportunity, poverty, illegal fishing and toxic-
waste dumping were all useful, contributary but somewhat incomplete,
justifications why piracy developed into a ‘professional occupation’ during the
mid-1990s. While all five issues embody elements of the complex phenomenon of
piracy around the Horn of Africa, the main driver is crime of opportunity.
A combination of the other four features explains the indifference and, at times,
even endorsement by Somali coastal communities of pirate activities (Rohwerder
2016, 3‒4). These issues amplified the pervasive feeling of neglect and
vulnerability in the face of the callous exploitation of their natural resources,
suggest Sumaila and Bawumia (2014). And pirates were able to justify their
actions by making the most of these grievance narratives, Schofield (2010) argues,
when pirate activities moved to the high seas.
However, the transformation of piracy from a haphazard activity into a highly
organised criminal enterprise supports the observation by Collier, Hoeffler and
Rohner (2009, 6) that ‘greed considerably outperforms grievance’. Greed theory
best explains the motivations of pirates, their predatory behaviour being driven by
the incentive of large financial rewards. These opportunistic criminals were fully
aware that they could get away with hijacking ships and demand large ransoms
from shipping companies for releasing crews and cargo (Collier and Hoeffler
2002). As a result, pirates rendered the waters close to Somalia inhospitable to all
ships, including foreign fishing vessels. As the incidents of piracy increased
exponentially, Somali pirates employed a business model that would result in
huge, quick pay-outs, attracting large numbers of unemployed youth and morphing
into a professionalised enterprise run by a complex criminal network, argue
Shortland and Varese (2012). Soon the business of piracy expanded beyond
Somali territorial waters as pirates widened their range of operations, straining
naval patrols. It became a global threat, emphasises Saltmarsh (2009), when pirate
syndicates that have previously terrorised ships in the Gulf of Aden and the
Arabian Sea, started to attack ships in the Strait of Hormuz and prey on ships

8. 8 Insight on Africa
carrying World Food Programme (WFP) supplies to needy countries on the north-
west Indian Ocean littoral, as well as targeting commercial shipping transiting as
far as 1,800 nautical miles off the Somali coast.
In addition to the greed-grievance theory, Cohen and Felson’s (1979) routine-
activity theory, also known as the theory of crime, provides a complementary
perspective. For predatory crimes to occur, three factors must converge: the
presence of an easy target, a motivated offender and the absence of a capable
guardian. As Sakhuja and Kothari (2017) point out, initially ships passing by the
Somali coast were unarmed and therefore easy prey for well-armed pirates
(monetary motivated offenders). As there was no capable guardian, because both
local and national authorities were unable to guard the coast, pirates simply
docked captured vessels at harbour-towns along the Somalia coast, awaiting huge
ransom payments, creating a ‘veritable feeding frenzy’ and thus ‘perpetuating the
cycle’ (Luke 2010, 32; Middleton 2011).
Discussions on the causes of piracy can be separated into two schools. Those
who consider criminal acts of toxic-waste dumping and illegal fishing
(Weldemichael 2012) as the major causes, believing that piracy is primarily a
reaction to legitimate concerns. Some institutions refer to it as the ‘other piracy’
(IMB 2015), while researchers describe it, more pointedly, as ‘resources
piracy’(Samatar, Lindberg and Mahayni 2011). On the other hand, there are those
who consider statelessness (Somalia being a failed or failing state) as one of the
root causes. The end of the Cold War, and the beginnings of what was then still a
unipolar international order dominated by the US, led to the implosion of the
Somali state as the Siad Barre regime lost the decades-long backing of the Soviet
Union and was ousted. Somali society soon disintegrated into a chaotic and
lawless rabble of warlords, drawing their influence and power from traditional
clan-based loyalties as no credible alternative to the outgoing regime emerged.
A direct consequence of these developments was the rise of the Somali ‘piracy
industry’(Luke 2010, 31). Other analysts point to poverty and crime of opportunity
as the root causes, arguing that pirates hijack and ransom ships, their criminal
activities being both low-risk and profitable ‘getting-rich-quick-schemes’, with
virtual impunity from prosecution (Hassabou 2016; Beri 2011). Thus, the easy
profits to be derived from piracy contributed to a shift in focus away from the
professed protection of natural resources and the environment to ‘piracy as a
business practice’ (Hughes 2011, 42–43).
Somalia has a coastline of some 3,300km, Africa’s longest, making it
extremely porous and difficult to patrol. But it took the international community
several years to acknowledge the extent of pirate activity as it began to escalate
and broaden its reach, becoming a significant security risk for international
shipping. Seeing that well-armed Somali pirates created a situation in which the
international community had to react swiftly to try and contain this growing
threat to world trade (Baniela and Ríos 2012), the UN Security Council invoked
Chapter 7 of the UN Charter, arguing that Somali piracy posed ‘a threat to
international peace and security’, and urging member states to tackle maritime
crime by sending warships to the high-risk areas around the Horn of Africa
(UNSC 2012).

9. Alsawalqa andVenter 9
Earlier, acknowledging that piracy in the waters around the Horn of Africa
represents a major transnational threat, demanding an international response, the
Contact Group on Piracy off the Coast of Somalia was created, and three naval
task forces were established: US-led Combined Task Force 151 (CTF-151),
focusing specifically on counter-piracy, EU-NAVFOR’s Operation Atalanta, and
NATO’s Operation Ocean Shield. It should be mentioned that the Pakistani and
Turkish navies have been forces for stability, having commanded CTF-151 several
times, the former also part of a counter-terrorism task force under the US-led
Combined Maritime Force (CMF) based in Bahrain. In addition, many countries
such as India, China and Japan did not wish to participate in these coalitions and
deployed naval forces independently (Samaranayake 2017, 187). Recently,
several new ‘non-traditional players’have also become active in the Indian Ocean,
which may make the regional security environment much more multipolar and
complex than in the past. These include regional middle powers which have
played a limited, little or no security role in the Indian Ocean in the past. This may
even indicate the beginnings of a new Indian Ocean strategic order, where some
of these middle powers vie for influence and position, acquiring bases in the Horn
of Africa and immediate vicinity: Saudi Arabia (in Djibouti), the UAE (at Assab
in nearby Eritrea), Turkey (an extra-regional power at Suakin in Sudan), the latter
possibly sparking off rivalry with Egypt (and Saudi Arabia) for naval dominance
in the Red Sea (Brewster 2018b).
So, policy responses to the piracy problem (sometimes underscored by
competition and rivalry) have largely tended to concentrate on offshore solutions.
But as Affi, Elmi and Mohamed (2015) contend, the heavy reliance on the use of
naval flotillas can only be a short-term tactic. Keeping naval forces deployed in
the region for the longer-term is not only questionable but unsustainable. The
counter-piracy strategy of deterrence and suppression employed by naval task
forces has, unfortunately, not yet translated into any long-term solution. The vast
expanses of the western Indian Ocean, some 2,5mn km² in which piracy attacks
take place, are simply too huge to be monitored comprehensively. Nevertheless,
international efforts centred on a 25-nation coalition of maritime forces remain
the sharp point of the spear to disrupt and deter Somali piracy activity (Herbert-
Burns 2012a, 3)—and the international efforts to contain and eradicate piracy can
only last if the political will exists to contribute resources to them.
Indeed, after becoming the most dangerous waters in the world for pirate
attacks around 2008, the seas off the north-western Indian Ocean littoral saw
incidences of piracy drastically falling from a peak of over 224 attacks in 2011 to
only 3 in 2018, and by 2019 there was not a single successful hijacking.
A combination of improved surveillance, concerted counter-piracy patrols by the
three international naval task forces, and industry-wide measures (the introduction
of best management practices (BMP) and armed guards on vessels) for better
on-board defences, reduced the threat, as did the strengthening of government
capacity and infrastructure on land through the aid efforts of international
organisations like the World Bank. However, this does not mean that piracy has
been eradicated. After steadily decreasing over the last decade, maritime piracy
incidents rose again in 2020, while other illicit maritime activities, such as arms,

10. 10 Insight on Africa
drugs and human trafficking, also increased. This points to a new developing and
worrying trend in the western Indian Ocean maritime space (HDI Marine
Underwriting 2021).2
A Land-Based Solution to Piracy? Reviving Somalia’s
Fisheries Industry to Secure Onshore Livelihoods
Acts of piracy do not occur in a vacuum—they are impacted by what is happening
onshore (Rohwerder 2016, 2). Without addressing the political context in Somalia
all possible tactical gains in the fight against piracy will not be effective or
sustainable. Clearly, support for stabilising the country requires a commitment to
invest heavily in onshore activities (Holzer and Jürgenliemk 2012, 10–11). There
is, indeed, no cure for Somali piracy short of a stable government in control of the
country. It is the safe haven on land that allows piracy to flourish—if pirates are
dealt with on land, as well as at sea, it would be a less lucrative undertaking, Affi,
Elmi and Mohamed (2015, 312) argue. However, as Luke (2010, 32–33)
emphasises, three enabling conditions will have to be realised: first, an end to the
chronic instability and long-running state of anarchy afflicting Somali society;
second, putting in place a functioning national government with the capacity and
the will to enforce the rule of law both on land and in the country’s territorial
waters; and third, largely dependent on the foregoing two, the revival of a formal
economy, despite the poverty and deprivation which Somalis had to endure since
long before the fall of the Siad Barre regime.
Somalia is not without some economic potential, despite the huge devastation
visited upon it over several decades. If stable government were to return, the
country could present lucrative opportunities for astute foreign investors. Potential
prospects could include fishing and fish-processing, as well as agriculture and
livestock. Given that piracy originated among fishermen whose livelihoods were
threatened, a revival of the Somali fishing industry, once a source of valuable
export earnings, could offer a good starting point. But not much of a fishing
industry was ever developed, even though Somali waters are teeming with fish
and other marine life, as traditional Somali culture is based almost exclusively on
pastoralism (Hughes 2011, 43).
Even if Somalia’s commercial fishing and canning industries could be revived,
argues Luke (2010, 33), the remuneration earned by workers would be only a
fraction of the cash takings extracted through piracy, besides the exhilarating
experience of an exotic life on the high seas versus the rather tedious and
routinised, subsistence way of life as a fisherman or factory-hand. Thus, Somali
pirates will be disinclined to abandon their current lifestyle. So, ultimately,
without a revived and productive economy, as well as an effective national
government able to assert its authority, piracy will continue to expand further out
into the western Indian Ocean and will, most probably, be Somalia’s only ‘growth
industry’ for quite some time. Former UN Secretary-General, Ban Ki-moon,
sagely noted that ‘the issue of piracy and armed robbery at sea … will be resolved

11. Alsawalqa andVenter 11
only through an integrated approach that addresses the conflict, lack of governance,
and absence of sustainable livelihoods on land in Somalia’(UNSC 2009, para 59).
Elmi and Mohamed (2016, 12) emphasise that ‘there are no alternative to
investing in onshore, long-term solutions to end piracy once and for all’. It would,
therefore, be more desirable, efficient and sustainable for any approach to the
Somali conundrum to start focusing on onshore solutions, rather than to continue,
almost exclusively, to pursue the current offshore approach of deterring and
containing pirate activities. The development of a local marine industry for Somali
coastal communities affected by piracy should be the prime focus of any onshore
strategy.
In the 1980s, the Somali government resettled thousands of nomads from the
drought-stricken interior to work in coastal fishing co-operatives, vastly expanding
both artisanal fish production and the number of people dependent on small-scale
fisheries (Desai and Shambaugh 2021). For decades, though, Somalia had to face
recurring famines and food crises resulting from droughts, poor governance, or
inaction amid civil war. Could the country’s fisheries become a beacon of hope for
food security and poverty alleviation, despite piracy and illegal fishing?
Undoubtedly, with its long coastlines on the Horn of Africa, its waters being home
to some of the richest fishing grounds in the world, Somalia has great potential to
generate income from fishing, prompting the interest of investors and foreign
donor agencies. Therefore, sustainable management plans need to be put in place
to administer and enforce foreign fishing-licensing agreements, despite rampant
corruption (Bahadur 2021, 1, 42), widespread poverty and land-based security
issues. These challenges require a broad approach when looking for solutions that
take both social and ecological factors into account, ensuring that the country
benefits from its marine resources and removing the social justification for piracy
(Persson and Karlsson 2019).
The nascent fishing sector in Somalia now employs over 70 000 people in a
country of more than 11mn people and is thought to contribute US$135mn per
annum to the economy, or around 2% of the country’s gross domestic product
(GDP). Current offshore fishing, both domestic and foreign, amount to over
125 000 tonnes of fish and shellfish a year. However, foreign fishing far outweighs
domestic fishing, contributing about two-thirds of the reconstructed catch since
the beginning of the 1990s. Furthermore, the latest severe drought in 2017 led to
large-scale food insecurity that affected an estimated 5,4mn Somalis who need
humanitarian assistance, malnutrition being a serious concern. Today, there are
over 870 000 Somalis registered as refugees and around 2,1mn are internally
displaced (Persson and Karlsson 2019). And following the steady decline in
attacks by Somali pirates since 2012, foreign fishing fleets have gradually returned
to the area. Many of these vessels routinely engage in IUU (illegal, unreported
and unregulated) fishing practices, employing habitat-destroying fishing
techniques, abetted by a cabal of local Somali enablers, both inside and outside
the state apparatus (Bahadur 2021, 1–2).
As a more sustainable onshore solution, the UN Food and Agriculture
Organisation (FAO) and the EU seek to build strong coastal communities through
fishing, educating and training Somalis in new fishing techniques to avoid

12. 12 Insight on Africa
overfishing, thus enhancing food and economic security, improving livelihoods
(through income-generation), help building resilience against conflict and disaster
and establishing longer-term regional peace and security (Persson and Karlsson
2019). In fact, the FAO has been one of Somalia’s most steadfast international
supporters in the fisheries sector, monitoring fishing vessels in the country’s EEZ
with automatic identification system (AIS) tracking devices, as well as assisting
the Federal Government of Somalia (FGS) engaging with foreign governments
and potential commercial partners (Bahadur 2021, 2, 42–43). Moreover, the FAO
has been instrumental in efforts to combat IUU fishing and overfishing. Likewise,
the concept of the ‘blue economy’ has gained acceptance in many Indian Ocean
countries infusing national development goals with the ideals of conservation and
the sustainability of ocean resources (fisheries and aquaculture), as well as
increasing maritime domain awareness (Samaranayake 2017, 191–192).
In regions where threats to small-scale fisheries and their dependents persist,
piracy thrives in an ecosystem of organised criminal activity. Perhaps, therefore,
there should be a different interpretation of the fishing/piracy nexus. It may not be
poverty or unemployment driving piracy, as much as the belief that industrial
fishing by foreign fleets will deplete fish stocks and harm livelihoods that depend
on small-scale fisheries. IUU fishing has an especially pronounced impact on the
growth in piracy, especially in waters that are subject to heavy depredation. Also,
anti-piracy actions by naval patrols matter, but are insufficient in curbing piracy.
If fish stocks do not recover in the absence of protection against illegal and
destructive fishing practices, piracy will return (Desai and Shambaugh 2021, 12).
Clearly, the rebuilding and strengthening of effective national governmental
institutions, the enactment and enforcement of comprehensive counter-piracy
legislation, and the creation of national coast-guard capabilities will allow Somalia
to protect its own territorial waters and marine resources, as well as deter and,
hopefully, end piracy once and for all.
Conclusion
Stabilising Somalia is an uphill struggle—nevertheless, it is the major, perhaps
the only, part of a long-term solution to the piracy problem. Without solving the
decades-long Somali conflict, pirates will continue to use the favourable maritime
environment and weak national government to further their objectives. A viable,
functioning and stable Somali government and genuine economic alternatives are,
therefore, necessary prerequisites to fight piracy—also, a government which
succeeds in overcoming and disarming the country’s Islamist militias.
So, in the short to medium term there seems to be no permanent solution to the
scourge of Somali piracy—rather, only a permanent form of containment. If
countries on the north-western Indian Ocean littoral cease their anti-piracy patrols,
and international naval forces leave the area, the incidences of piracy will start to
rise again. There is also no easy form of containment. The countries neighbouring
Somalia is not powerful enough to do so on their own.

13. Alsawalqa andVenter 13
Piracy has sensitised the international community to maritime threats, but it
also skewed the debate towards a problem-solving approach in a piracy/anti-
piracy mould. Responses to piracy mask the general regression of good order at
sea. The growing range of maritime threats tends to favour naval responses, but
closer scrutiny presents a profile of inter-state and inter-agency co-operation for
the securitisation of threats beyond piracy, revealing landward and offshore
initiatives that promote overall regional security, rather than merely fighting
piracy. Envision a response inventory that reaches further than merely anti-piracy
towards a maritime security environment more clearly aligned to the imperatives
of good order both on land and at sea.
It is, therefore, vital that countries on the north-western Indian Ocean littoral
ratify and implement their own national maritime security strategies. This would
require sustained political will, the strengthening of relevant institutions and
enforcement mechanisms, upholding of the rule of law and allocating adequate
financial and human resources. Such measures would, however, be difficult for
Somalia with its extremely low governance indicators.
Declaration of Conflicting Interests
The authors declared no potential conflicts of interest with respect to the research,
authorship and/or publication of this article.
Funding
The authors received no financial support for the research, authorship and/or publication
of this article.
ORCID iDs
Rulah Odeh Alsawalqa https://orcid.org/0000-0002-5605-5444
Denis Venter https://orcid.org/0000-0002-3364-3307
Notes
1. Al-Shabaab exerts a destabilising influence on Somalia and has remained a persistent
threat to other countries confronting Islamist extremism, demonstrated by its launch-
ing of spectacular attacks in the capitals of several neighbouring north-east and East
African countries between August 1998 and January 2019. However, any detailed
expose on this threat must be dealt with in a separate study.
2. The tenuousness of maritime security of countries along the East African littoral (from
Kenya and Tanzania to Mozambique, as well as the offshore island states) falls outside
the scope of the present article.
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