Mission with Hindrance African Union (AU) and Peacekeeping Operations

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Missions with Hindrance: African Union (AU) and
Peacekeeping Operations
Adegboyega A. Ola
Afe Babalola University Ado-Ekiti, Nigeria
gboyega_ola@yahoo.com
&
Stanley O. Ehiane
University of KwaZulu-Natal, Durban, South Africa
stanleyehiane@yahoo.com
Abstract
Peacekeeping has been a dominant theme of the African Union (AU) for
decades and major operations have been undertaken by the regional
organisation. This article takes into perspective an assessment of the AU
peacekeeping operations, amidst its challenges and politics within the context of
continental peace and security. The paper discovers that AU missions on the
continent have been stalled by a lot of factors in the last few decades. These
dynamics have made the AU role appears to be facilitating role to the United
Nations (UN) peacekeeping rather than a dominant character. The paper
concludes that when the overarching issues were addressed, the AU capacities
and the proclivities for successful peacekeeping operation are at its ultimate.
Keywords: African Union, Conflict, Peace, Peacekeeping, United Nations
1. Introduction
While it has been the responsibility of the United Nations
(UN) to conduct peacekeeping operations on the continent,
the trend is gradually changing. African Union (AU) is
increasingly assuming responsibility of securing peace and
ensuring stability on the African continent (Charles, 2010).
Journal of African Union Studies (JoAUS)
Volume 5, Issue 1, 2016
Pp 113-135

Missions with Hindrance …
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Since the end of the Cold War, increased attention has been
drawn to the various violence and conflict around the world,
especially in African states. There have been disturbing
increases in armed conflict, which pose a great security
challenge to African states (Stohl & Doug, 2009). The
frequency and brutish nature of violent conflict had made it
possible for peace support operations to become a common
mode of international third party intervention to address
protracted social conflict. In the last fifteen years, fifty new
peacekeeping operations have been initiated in Africa, most
often led by the UN or the AU Williams, 2015). There are now
over one hundred thousand uniformed peacekeepers deployed
across the continent serving on a range of missions (Williams,
2015).
The avalanche of violent crises on the African continent
has made the region very volatile and depicts an environment
where violent conflict has been institutionalized (Egena, 2011).
The AU came into existence, when the African space had
already become notorious for conflicts (Mathiasen, 2006).
Therefore, conflict resolution is expected to be a major
challenge to the Union. Peace and stability proved elusive in
pre-colonial and colonial Africa. The scourges of the slave
trade, inter-tribal warfare and the imposition of colonialism
did not allow it (Sylvia & Okeke, 2013). One would expect
emancipation and independence to have created an era of
stability and relative peace. Instead, post-colonial Africa has
experienced conflicts of a scale and magnitude heretofore un-
witnessed (Sylvia & Okeke, 2013). Pre-colonial Africa may
have been volatile but the rudimentary nature of the weapons
and the unsophisticated organizational structure of the
societies made conflicts disruptive and adventurous rather
than catastrophic (Muluwa, 1999). Peace operations have
increasingly become dynamic due to the intractable conflicts in
some part of the world. The input of the combination of key

Ola & Ehiane (JoAUS) Volume 5, Issue 1, 2016, Pp 113-135
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implementing actors and agencies during the mission planning
phase would enhance both overall concept of the operation
and this could only be achieved through efficient gathering
and processing of information and the dissemination of
military information (Okeke, 2013). The inability of national
defence forces to nip violent attack and reprisals in the bud
like the current Burundi political violence has led to the
increase in AU peacekeeping operation (Williams, 2005).
The AU has given some indications that it can do better
than the defunct OAU. Where peaceful resolution had failed,
the AU had resorted to military intervention (Muluwa, 1999).
The AU’s first military intervention in a member state was the
May 2003 deployment of peacekeeping forces from South
Africa, Ethiopia, and Mozambique to Burundi, to oversee the
implementation of the various agreements (Williams, 2015).
Furthermore, one of the objectives of the AU is to promote
peace, security, and stability on the continent. Among its
principles is the principle of “peaceful resolution of conflicts
among member states of the Union, through such appropriate
means as may be decided upon by the Assembly” (Sylvia &
(Okeke, 2013: 286). The study therefore examines the AU and
peacekeeping in Africa.
2. The birth of African Union and the Evolution of
Peacekeeping in Africa
The birth of the AU at the dawn of the 21st
century enhanced
engagement in peacekeeping initiatives as a tool to address
conflicts and instabilities on the continent (Charles, 2010).
When African leaders adopted the AU Constitutive Act in
2000, they were crucially conscious of the fact that the scourge
of conflicts in Africa constitutes a major impediment to the
socio-economic development of the continent and the need to
promote peace, security, and stability as a prerequisite for the

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implementation of a development and integration agenda
(Brian-Vincent & Dauda, 2011).
The transition from the Organization of African Unity
(OAU) to the AU fundamentally changed the norms
underpinning the peacekeeping concept as it was previously
known and implemented under the OAU (Maluwa, 2003). The
normative differences between the AU and the OAU are
significant. The differences reflect the desire and
understanding of African leaders to create a strong institution
capable of addressing challenges facing Africa and its people
comprehensively (Kioko, 2003). The objectives of AU in the
views of Sylvia and Okeke (2013) are supported by principles
including the establishment of a common defence policy for
the African continent; the peaceful resolution of conflicts
among member states through such appropriate means as may
be decided upon by the Assembly. The prohibition of the use
of force or threat to use force among member states; peaceful
co-existence of member states and their right to live in peace
and security; the right of member states to request
intervention from the Union in order to restore peace and
security (Charles, 2010). The AU is therefore expected to
chart a new and more dynamic course for the continent
and its numerous peoples (Fielman, 2008).
The idea of African solutions for African problems is a
relatively new concept which lay behind the birth of the AU
(Cilliers, 1999). Unlike when most of the calamities bedeviling
the continent were blamed on the colonialists and their
successors, the new concept signals a new and more
constructive attitude. It realizes that it is not enough to blame
the West for Africa’s problems. It rather acknowledges that
Africa must be responsible for its own challenges (David,
2005). Peacekeeping was therefore designed to deal with
interstate conflict rather than intra-state conflict. It is based on

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the assumption that conflicting states have agreed to
international assistance to regain stability (Cilliers, 1999).
Peacekeeping operations are known by their emphasis on
restraint and a self-defensive posture and usually presuppose
the existence of a cease-fire, while the political objective is of
the utmost importance (Francis, 2006). The changes in the role
and scope of peace operations over the last decade exposed a
new range of potential unintended consequences for the host
society as well as for the peace operations themselves (Aoi et
al, 2007). Peacekeeping missions enjoy growing popularity as
the international community’s tool of choice for conflict
containment in different parts of the world (Berman & Sams,
2000). Essentially, the goal of peacekeeping is not the creation
of peace but the containment of war so that others can search
for peace in stable conditions (Francis, 2006).
The concept of peacekeeping according to Charles (2010)
is based on two major tenets. First, the need to halt armed
conflict in order to create a semblance of a stable environment
in which negotiations can occur. The second purpose is to
function as a deterrent against the outbreak of armed
hostilities, following arrangement of ceasefire. Peacekeeping
theorists believed that when violence occurs in a particular
country, zone or region, there will be chaos and crisis which
could endanger human lives and destroy properties (Cilliers,
1999). According to the peacekeeping theory, the presence of
a peacekeeping operation in a conflict zone alters the situation
on the ground and forces the belligerents to recalculate the
dangers and opportunities as a result of the introduction of a
new factor (Laura, 1997). Peacekeeping occurs when conflict
has broken out and a third party, like the UN or regional
organisation (AU) tries to intervene in order to assist in
peacekeeping. Such initiatives aim at creating space for
conflicting parties to negotiate a settlement (De Coning, 2006).

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Ngoma (2005) observed that there are three stages of
peacekeeping. Firstly, when unarmed or lightly armed troops
intercede between warring parties and it is called first-
generation peacekeeping (Ngoma, 2005). Second-generation
peacekeeping improves upon the first model by undertaking
more complex functions, such as policing responsibilities
(Ngoma, 2005). All belligerents will give comprehensive
consent to the mission. Support structures will consolidate
peace by disarming the warring parties, destroying weapons,
repatriating refugees, monitoring elections and promoting
formal and informal processes of political participation
(Bakradze, 2001). These pertinent requirements for a peaceful
environment show the magnitude of the task at hand (Ngoma
2005). Third-generation peacekeeping is designed to resolve
major difficulties, such as guaranteeing the safe passage of
humanitarian assistance, helping displaced persons and
stopping the killing of ordinary citizens by more forceful
measures (Bakradza.2001). These are followed by peace-
enforcement missions to ensure that all agreements reached in
prior negotiations are respected.
Peacekeeping has become the prominent intervention
strategy for managing and resolving war and conflict in the
world, and this was the primary purpose in which the United
Nations was founded in 1945, in order to save succeeding
generations from the scourge of war and terrorism (Sylvia &
Okeke, 2013) . A peacekeeping operation focuses exclusively
on the consequence of conflict, which compels third party
intervention in the situation (De-Waal, 2007). This is what the
AU has been actively involved in Africa since its establishment
in 2002.
Peacekeeping operation in Africa has grown dramatically;
the present of operations and peacekeepers in the continent is
more than any other region or continent in the world. Out of
16 peace operations led by the UN in early 2005, seven were in

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Africa: Burundi, Côte d’Ivoire, Liberia, Ethiopia/Eritrea, the
Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), Sierra Leone, and the
Western Sahara (Holt & Shanahan, 2015). These African
missions accounted for about 75 percent of all UN
peacekeepers deployed worldwide (Williams, 2013).
3. The Causes and nature of armed conflicts in Africa
Violent crises remain one of the most crucial challenges facing
the African continent in the 2st century. Armed conflict has
killed a lot of civilians and displaced many more, leaving them
to run for safety and well-being, disease, and malnutrition.
Such violence has also upset a generation of children and
recruiting them as child soldiers, broken bonds of trust and
authority structures among and across local communities,
shattered education and healthcare systems, disrupted
transportation routes and infrastructure, and done untold
damage to the Africa region (Fieldman, 2008). According to
Williams (2013) various violence in Africa has cost the
continent to lose about 900 billion dollars since the beginning
of the new millennium in year 2000.
Violent conflict and the power of armed non-state actors
remain defining priorities in 21st century Africa. Organized
violence has killed millions and displaced many more, leaving
them to run the gauntlet of violence, disease, and malnutrition.
Such violence has also traumatized a generation of children
and young adults, broken bonds of trust and authority
structures among and across local communities, shattered
education and healthcare systems, disrupted transportation
routes and infrastructure, and done untold damage to the
continent’s ecology from its land and waterways to its flora
and fauna (Williams, 2010).
Contemporary armed conflict in Africa is characterized by
various national and international actors, to include state and

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non-state actors, insurgents, and terrorists- such as the Boko
Haram group in Nigeria. Saroja (2012) believes most of the
conflicts nowadays are intra- state conflicts, unlike in the past
when most conflicts arose from inter-state conflicts.
Accordingly, most of these intra-state conflicts are based on
political, religious, ethnic or separatist causes resulting in
armed conflict and violence, which are majorly caused due to
the proliferation of small arms and light weapons in the region
(Muggah, 2010).The nature of violent armed conflict in Africa,
as defined by the actors and the changing security
environment, has certain implications for the role and
readiness of the AU in African Peace Support Operation.
According to Kobbie (2008), the causes of armed conflict
include ethnicity, discrimination and national rivalries, the
illegal exploitation and competition for natural resources,
foreign intervention, the proliferation of small arms and light
weapons, poverty, fundamentalism, religious cleavages, crises
of identity within a society and exclusionary ideological beliefs,
territorial disputes and the struggle for access to political
power.
4. The African Union and Peacekeeping Operation: An
Assessment
Owing to the changing nature of international conflict, the
1990s witnessed a growing need for humanitarian
peacekeeping operations, especially in Africa (Ferreira, 2012).
The conflict between Chad and Libya in 1981 furnished the
AU with its first major peacekeeping experience and a first test
of its capability to resolve conflicts on its own continent
(Lemarchand, 1985). Under this initiative, a force consisting
of troops from Benin and Zaire was to be deployed in Chad
(Ferreira, 2012). The mandate of the force included
supervision of the ceasefire, ensuring the freedom of

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movement, disarming the combatants, the restoration of
order, and the establishment of the new Chadian army (Mays,
2002).
In Somalia, the African Union Mission for Somalia
(AMISOM) and Somalia government forces have made
considerable gains against Al-Shabaab, the militant group,
particularly over the last 18 months (Maphosa, 2014). A
military campaign that bought sudden and unexpected pro-
gress in August 2011 has provided space for the conclusion of
the political transition and the establishment of the new
Federal Government (Freear & Coning, 2013). However, these
security gains will only be sustained if effective and acceptable
governance for those areas recovered from Al-Shabaab can be
arranged (Williams, 2012). It is very important to note that the
African military operations in Mali and Somalia are at very
different stages of maturity. The force, and its supporting
partners, in Somalia have accumulated a wealth of context-
specific knowledge and expertise over six years of operations
and under its own command (Maphosa, 2014).
The AU had been engaged in Burundi since the overthrow
and assassination of the first democratically elected President
of Burundi in 1993. But the full-fledged mission did not
materialize until 2003 when the African Union authorized the
creation of the African Union Mission in Burundi (AMIB)
(Boshoff & Francis, 2003). The full deployment of the AU
Mission stemmed from the ceasefire Agreement between the
Burundi government and the rebels in December 2002. The
AU deployed more than 3,000 troops from South Africa,
Ethiopia, and Mozambique to monitor the peace process and
provide security (Majinge, 2010). The mandate of the
peacekeeping mission in Burundi was to facilitate the
implementation of the ceasefire agreements, to ensure that the
defense and security situation in Burundi was stable and
further to protect politicians who had return from exile and

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would assume roles in the transitional government (Boshoff &
Francis, 2003).
The AU mission also sought to create conditions that
would allow internally displaced persons and refugees, who
lived in the eight Burundian provinces and three refugee
camps in Tanzania, to return to their homes (Muggah, 2010).
The African Union Mission in Burundi (AMIB) mission also
had the task of establishing conditions that would enable a UN
peace operation to enter the country, since the UN was
reluctant to enter a situation that had the potential to relapse
into conflict (Rodt, 2012). A comprehensive ceasefire
agreement was reached on the 16th
of November, 2003. The
mandate of the AU in Burundi was concluded on the 31st
May
2004. Africa Union was able to contribute to the resolution of
the dispute by addressing its underlying causes and contributed
to peace and stability in Burundi even in the face of serious
policy, institutional and conceptual limitations.
The Darfur situation has become the AU’s most significant
test to date and defies simplistic analysis (Murithi, 2010). The
conflict in Darfur is synonymous with the AU peacekeeping
efforts on the continent (Agoagye, 2004). Arguably, the
conflict of Darfur in Sudan is and has been a litmus test for
the newly created AU. From the beginning the organization
was actively involved in the resolution of the conflict (Swigert,
2005). After the conflict arose in Sudan’s Darfur region in
2003, the African Union took the lead in the peace process
and in deploying personnel to monitor the situation. The AU
has gone to the Darfur region of Sudan with troops to protect
AU ceasefire monitors and is in the process of vastly
expanding this critical mission (Swigert, 2005).
The African Union Mission in Sudan (AMIS) was
established in July 2004 with a mandate to monitor the
ceasefire and provide security to civilians in the region (Mans,
2004). The instability in Darfur has assumed regional and

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international dimensions, evolving into a large-scale
humanitarian crisis in Sudan and bordering countries, claiming
between 200,000 and 220,000 lives, displacing over 2 million
people into more than 100 camps in Darfur and in
neighboring Chad (Beswick, 2010). All these crises led the
African Union to intervene in the Sudan crisis by deploying a
peacekeeping troop and initiated a peace talk seeking an
agreement, to disarm the Janjaweed, rebuild Darfur, and the
integration of various armed groups into the national army.
The AU established a Ceasefire Commission (CFC) on May
28, 2004 and sent a small group of troops to monitor the
scene (Boutellis & Williams, 2013).
The involvement of the AU in ensuring peace in Comoros
started in 1995 when AU was still known as the OAU when
President Djohar’s Government fell after a coup (Murithi,
2010). This crisis led to the condemnation of the coup by the
OAU, and the international community’s refusal to recognise
the government. However, it was the outbreak of the
secessionist crisis in the island of Anjouan in August 1997 that
led to factual involvement of the OAU, as the demand for
secession was a major challenge to the OAU principle of
respect for the territorial integrity of member states (Swigert,
2005). The OAU was also involved in the making of the
Antananarivo Peace Agreement in 2001 (Muggah, 2010). Since
the establishment of AU, the organization has been actively
involved militarily on several occasions. In 2004, elections
were held for assemblies both at the national and local levels
and in order to secure peace during and after the election in
Comoros, AU sent 39 troops as an Observers Mission in the
Comoros (MIOC) for a few months. Based on the AU effort
in ensuring peace, the elections were held in a calm
atmosphere (Lamamra, 2010). In 2006, when the presidential
election of the Union of Comros was held, the African Union
also monitor the election just like the previous one in 2004 by

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sending troops from South-Africa, Nigeria, Mozambique,
Egypt, the DRC, Mauritius, Madagascar and Rwanda to
Comoros consisting of both military and civilian police in
ensuring a peaceful election (Mkwezalamba & Chinyama,
2007).
The crisis in Mali could be traced to many years of poor
governance after a 1968 coup d’état followed by a fragile
democratic transition 22 years later (1990). In March 2012,
another coup occurred in Mali that overthrew Mali’s
democratically elected government and led the military chain
of command to collapse (Williams, 2013). The insurgents
include Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb, a United States
(U.S.)-designated foreign terrorist organisation, along with two
loosely allied groups (AQIM), a U.S. designated foreign
terrorist organisation, terrorised the country. According to
Arieff & Johnson (2013), insecurity in northern Mali displaced
over 350,000 people and exacerbated regional food insecurity
and poor humanitarian conditions.
The joint peacekeeping operation goal was to provide
support to the Malian authorities in the restoration of state
authority; support the preservation of Mali’s national unity and
territorial integrity; provide protection to civilians; reduce the
threat posed by terrorist groups; support the Malian authorities
in the implementation of the roadmap for transition; and assist
the Malian authorities to reform Mali’s defence and security
sectors. In a difficult context, African-led International
Support Mission in Mali AFISMA, jointly led by the African
Union and the Economic Community of West African States
(ECOWAS), brought an important contribution to preserve
the unity of Mali and restore the security throughout the
nation (Rodt, 2012).

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5. African Union and the Challenges of Peace Keeping
Operations
Africa faces several challenges in its endeavours to implement
her integration and development agenda (Mkwezalamba &
Chinyama, 2007). After years of transiting from the OAU to
the AU and, soon, to the proposed Union Government, it is
impossible to ignore the relevance of problems encountered
towards a meaningful continental integration (Saroja, 2012).
Half a decade after the creation of the AU, citizens of Africa
are yet to realize a full integration into governance structures
of the continent. When the newly mandated AU replaced its
predecessor, the OAU, many were hopeful of, and subscribed
to the new vision of the AU- a peoples-driven AU (Saroja,
2012).
The creation of new organs such us the Economic, Social
and Cultural Council (ECOSOCC), the Pan African
Parliament (PAP), the Peace and Security Council (PSC) as
well as the adoption of the New Partnership for Africa’s
Development (NEPAD) and its African Peer Review
Mechanism (APRM) heightened hopes for a continental body
more responsive to the voices of its citizens (Afedo, 2009).
Despite achieving decolonization and conflict resolution on
the continent, the OAU fell far short of achieving its original,
idealistic and purpose envisioned by the likes of Dr. Kwame
Nkrumah, Sekou Toure and Julius Nyerere: a continent able to
and playing an assertive role in the international community;
whose people will be free from misery and deprivation (Stohl,
& Tuttle, 2009).
Africa is not a monolith. Not in religions, not in economic
systems, and especially not in languages (Fieldman, 2008). As a
result, there are inherent difficulties in attempting to create a
cohesive force from widely disparate populations. Should a
nation’s military choose only soldiers who speak the same

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language; numerous others will be disenfranchised, which can
lead to internal dissent (Ngwane, 2000). On the other hand, it
can be costly in both money and time to train and fully
integrate a military force of different linguistic backgrounds.
One of the immediate problems faced by African leaders
following the launch of the AU was the question of
Madagascar. There was no doubt the fact that the world was
watching to see if the Union would maintain its unity and
cohesion. All the member states, except three adhered to the
AU’s position on non-acceptance of un-constitutional regimes
in the continent. At least this offered a hope for unity under
the AU, and is in fact a good beginning for the Union
(Egiebade, 2004). Another challenge confronting AU is how to
make African governments incorporate regional agreements
into national policies. The policies of liberalisation,
privatisation and deregulation as well as unsound package of
macro-economic policies imposed by the International
Monetary Fund (IMF) and World Bank, are biased against
African countries on one hand and peace keeping operations
effort on the other hand (Ngwane, 2000). Another challenge
that the AU has to contend with in its effort to promote peace
keeping operations in Africa is the inadequate and inefficient
infrastructure, especially transport and communications. In
addition, the challenge the AU has to contend with in its effort
to integrate African economies is the prevalent of civil strife
and conflicts. The lack of sustained political commitment to
put in place agreed policies and plans has been one of Africa’s
major shortcoming and in the context of the AU, this is an
issue that needs to be addressed (Ngwane, 2000).
It is pertinent to point out that in spite of the
transformation of the OAU to AU, Africa is still the poorest
continent in the world with almost half of its population still
living in absolute poverty. This is despite the fact that Africa
ranks as the most richly endowed continent in terms of natural

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resources. The AU is faced with some challenges that can
jeopardize its objectives if not properly handled. The first and
perhaps the most important challenge is how to promote inter
and intra-African trade (Rodt, 2012). Africa countries produce
only raw materials for which there is virtually no demand
elsewhere in in the continent. However, for many African
countries, few commodities often make up the bulk of exports
to the rest of the continent. Three, African countries are still
“grapping to undo a legacy dominated by trade with their
former colonial rulers rather than with each other” (Mutume,
2002: 4).
The diversity in African countries’ sizes, national resources,
level of development and connections to global markets has
been a major stumbling block to successful peace keeping
operations. Obviously, many African states achieved only
political independence and not economic independence
as their economies are still tied to the apron string of the
Western powers. They depend on foreign aid and loans
to supplement their annual budget (Charles, 2010). Many
African countries also face internal economic problems.
Agriculture, which is the backbone of African
economies, is on the decline, while African exports face
constant fluctuations and occasional decline in
international market. For instance, Benin Republic does not
have the same economic interests as its giant oil-rich
neighbour, Nigeria. Similarly, South Africa and Malawi do not
experience the costs and benefits of regional trade
arrangements in the same way (Harsch, 2002).
Unlike the other regional institutions such as the European
Union (EU), the AU receives poor funding and non-payment
of dues by the Africa states. Between1993-2005, the AU Peace
Fund was greatly financed by non-African actors by
contributing 45 million US dollars out of the 60-70 million
that AU was able to raise (David, 2005). In 2009, AU Peace

128
fund had a negative balance because of the lack of fund by
other African nations. Another challenge is the membership of
Morocco, an important African country since 1984. It should
be noted that Morocco has been outside the OAU because of
the recognition and admission of the Saharawi Arab
Democratic Republic (SADR) by the organisation (De-Waal,
2007). Furthermore in spite of their exit, the crisis generated
over the matter has persisted, rearing its head intermittently
within the ranks of the organisation. Morocco has not
subscribed to the Constitutive Act of the AU. She has recently
joined the CEN-SAD and also continued to retain
membership of the LEMA to institutions recognised as RECs
and building blocs of the AU (Egiebade, 2004).
Another major obstacle is the known division among
African as Franco and Anglo- Phone countries which
has disunited African peoples. Many issues have been
decided not on their merits but on this line of divide. For
example, appointing a Secretary-General for the
continental organization has been politicized on this line
of divide (Brian-Vincent, & Dauda, 2011). The greatest
challenge before the AU in the views of Olubomehin and
Kawonishe (2004) is how to incorporate the generality of
Africans into integration schemes in the continent. There is
enough evidence to support the fact that, apart from all else,
regional efforts have failed in Africa because such efforts side-
tracked the people. In this wise, the AU itself seems to have
fallen into the same pit, as did the OAU, which it replaced. Its
Act seems more an instrument for “building a coalition of
states” rather than “uniting of people” as obvious in the
provisions for the Union’s structure and decision-making
process (Okeke, 2013: 288).

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6. Concluding Remarks
The ability of AU to face Africa’s peace keeping operation and
development challenges will give it the necessary credibility
and effectiveness to pursue its stated objectives (Ogaba, 1999).
The effectiveness of the peacekeeping operations under the
aegis of the AU greatly hinges on the ability of the force to
keep peace. Again, the experience in Darfur has shown that
African military personnel have marginal experience in keeping
the peace in conflict zones like Darfur or Somalia.
The future of peacekeeping in Africa fundamentally hinges
on the political will of African states first to realize that it is
Africa, which should be responsible for Africa (De-Waal,
2007). Indeed, the AU has recognized the important role of
regional organizations in peacekeeping by stating that regional
brigades shall constitute the African Standby Force (ASF)
which is slated to be unveiled in 2010. ASF is envisaged to
cooperate where possible with the UN and sub-regional
African organizations in securing peace and stability in Africa.
The foregoing study examined the potential problems the
AU in its efforts to integrate African economies. A
successfully implemented cooperation and peace keeping
operation strategy holds enormous benefits for the continent
and will place it as a respectable partner in the global economy
(Kobbie, 2008). The establishment of the African Union
has brought a new ray of hope to Africa. Although the
Union had taken off, a lot still has to be done for the
Union to achieve its desired objectives. Africans must
finance the Organization. Member states must pay their
dues and contributions as at when due to enable the
Union to meet all its financial obligations. There is a need
for a strong intellectual debate to find feasible pathways and
signposts to make this peace keeping operation possible.
Through this debate and other citizen-based and community

130
activities, we need to work out the values and visions that
Africans must share to accelerate the formation of integrated
Africa.
Enhancement of regional cooperation and peace keeping
operation is essential for Africa to deal effectively with other
development challenges that are internal in origin. Effective
regional cooperation and peace keeping operation are also
required to mitigate the over-reliance on official development
assistance. Also, Africa needs greater regional cooperation and
peace keeping operation for a common front and stronger
voice to engage the rest of the world for the reshaping of the
global economic, financial and political systems. In
conclusion, the challenges facing the AU is no doubt,
huge but with good political will, good governance self-
reliant economy and patriotism on the part of African
peoples, the new organization in the view of Charles
(2010) will propel the continent to the "Promised Land".
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