Pick two of the types of criminal acts discussed in the readings and conduct an internet search for cases in which a security professional was charged with those particular offenses. Explain in detail the facts of the case, why you selected it and the outcome of the case. Technical Requirements • Your paper must be at a minimum of 2-3 pages (the Title and Reference pages do not count towards the minimum limit). • Scholarly and credible references should be used. A good rule of thumb is at least 2 scholarly sources per page of content. • Type in Times New Roman, 12 point and double space. Reference  Nemeth, C. (2011). Private Security and The Law-4th Edition (4th ed.). Waltham, MA: Elsevier Butterworth-Heinemann. Lola Rabon, Appellee, v. Guardsmark, Inc., Appellant No. 76-2398 UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT 571 F.2d 1277; 1978 U.S. App. LEXIS 12576 November 9, 1977, Argued February 16, 1978, Decided PRIOR HISTORY: Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of South Carolina, at Columbia. Sol Blatt, Jr., District Judge. DISPOSITION: Reversed. CASE SUMMARY: PROCEDURAL POSTURE: Appellant security company sought review of a judgment from the United States District Court for the District of South Carolina which granted summary judgment to appellee injured person in her action which sought damages from the security company after the injured person was sexually assaulted at her place of employment by a security guard employed by the security company. OVERVIEW: The security company provided security services where the injured person was employed. The injured person was sexually assaulted by a security guard employed by the security company and sought to find the security company liable for the attack. The district court found that, under state law, the security company would have a higher standard of care because the assault occurred at the place where the security company's business was carried out and because it was committed with a gun supplied by the security company. The court noted that only common carriers owed its patrons the highest degree of care. The court, however, disagreed with the district court's extension of that standard of care to the security company. The court found that the cases which extended the highest degree of care to the employer all involved common carriers and that it was unclear from the law the reasons for the state's adoption of the higher standard of liability. The court refused to extend liability to the security company for the unauthorized acts of its employee without some reasonable basis in the law and noted that S.C. Code § 56-646.1 et seq. was a licensing statute and did not impute liability. (Lola Rabon, Appellee, v. Guardsmark, Inc.) There are three reasons usually given for the extraordinary liability of common carriers. First, the contract of passage between the carrier and the passenger is said to contain an implied assurance that the passenger will be transpor.

1. Pick two of the types of criminal acts discussed in the readings
and conduct an internet search for cases in which a security
professional was charged with those particular offenses. Explain
in detail the facts of the case, why you selected it and the
outcome of the case.
Technical Requirements
•
Your paper must be at a minimum of 2-3 pages (the Title and
Reference pages do not count towards the minimum limit).
•
Scholarly and credible references should be used. A good rule
of thumb is at least 2 scholarly sources per page of content.
•
Type in Times New Roman, 12 point and double space.
Reference
Nemeth, C. (2011). Private Security and The Law-4th Edition
(4th ed.). Waltham, MA: Elsevier
Butterworth-Heinemann.
Lola Rabon, Appellee, v. Guardsmark, Inc., Appellant No. 76-
2398 UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE
FOURTH CIRCUIT
571 F.2d 1277; 1978 U.S. App. LEXIS 12576 November 9,
1977, Argued February 16, 1978, Decided
PRIOR HISTORY: Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of South Carolina, at Columbia. Sol Blatt, Jr.,
District Judge.
DISPOSITION: Reversed.
CASE SUMMARY: PROCEDURAL POSTURE: Appellant
security company sought review of a judgment from the United
States District Court for the District of South Carolina which
granted summary judgment to appellee injured person in her
action which sought damages from the security company after

2. the injured person was sexually assaulted at her place of
employment by a security guard employed by the security
company.
OVERVIEW: The security company provided security services
where the injured person was employed. The injured person was
sexually assaulted by a security guard employed by the security
company and sought to find the security company liable for the
attack. The district court found that, under state law, the
security company would have a higher standard of care because
the assault occurred at the place where the security company's
business was carried out and because it was committed with a
gun supplied by the security company. The court noted that only
common carriers owed its patrons the highest degree of care.
The court, however, disagreed with the district court's extension
of that standard of care to the security company. The court
found that the cases which extended the highest degree of care
to the employer all involved common carriers and that it was
unclear from the law the reasons for the state's adoption of the
higher standard of liability. The court refused to extend liability
to the security company for the unauthorized acts of its
employee without some reasonable basis in the law and noted
that S.C. Code § 56-646.1 et seq. was a licensing statute and did
not impute liability. (Lola Rabon, Appellee, v. Guardsmark,
Inc.)
There are three reasons usually given for the extraordinary
liability of common carriers. First, the contract of passage
between the carrier and the passenger is said to contain an
implied assurance that the passenger will be transported safely,
second, common carriers are thought to be charged with public
responsibilities; the stringent standard of care is therefore
imposed as a matter of public policy. Third, the special duties
of the common carrier arise from the fact that the passenger has
entrusted his safety, as a bailor entrusts his goods, to the
custody and safekeeping of the carrier. (Lola Rabon, Appellee,
v. Guardsmark, Inc.)
PEOPLE v. HOLLOWAY Docket No. 77-934 Court of Appeals

3. of Michigan 82 Mich. App. 629; 267 N.W.2d 454; 1978 Mich.
App. LEXIS 2255
January 3, 1978, Submitted April 17, 1978, Decided
DISPOSITION: Reversed and remanded for trial.
CASE SUMMARY
PROCEDURAL POSTURE: Defendant was charged with
concealed weapons offenses and filed a motion to suppress
certain evidence. The trial court (Michigan) granted the motion
to suppress, and the state appealed.
OVERVIEW: A private security guard employed by a drugstore
became suspicious that defendant intended to steal something
and performed a pat down of defendant's person. The security
guard discovered a pistol and a knife concealed in defendant's
clothing and turned over defendant and the weapons to the
police. Defendant claimed that the warrantless search of his
person by the security guard violated his rights under the Fourth
Amendment. The court held that the suppression of the pistol
and the knife was improper. The court ruled that (1) the security
guard was not a governmental official and was not acting under
color of law, and (2) the Fourth Amendment's protection against
unreasonable searches, therefore, did not apply.
Bruce Holloway was charged with carrying a concealed pistol
and another [***2] concealed weapon. Defendant's motion to
suppress the concealed weapons as evidence was denied at the
preliminary examination and defendant was bound over for trial.
At trial, the defendant again made a motion to suppress and the
trial judge granted the motion on the basis that private security
guards are bound by the strictures of the Fourth Amendment and
the defendant was ordered discharged, Recorder's Court of
Detroit, Susan D. Borman, J. The people appeal. Held: Private
security guards who are not acting under "the color of the law"
are not bound by the strictures of the Fourth Amendment.
Security guards act under the color of law and are subject to the
strictures of the Fourth Amendment. However, the evidence
should not have been suppressed because the search conducted
by the security guards was reasonable. (PEOPLE v.

4. HOLLOWAY, 1978)
OUTCOME: The court reversed the grant of the motion to
suppress and remanded the case for trial.
Opinion of the Court
1. Searches and Seizures -- Governmental Officers -- Private
Security Guards -- Restraints -- Constitutional Law. The Fourth
Amendment restraints on the activities of governmental officers
does not extend to searches by private security guards (US
Const, Am IV).(PEOPLE v. HOLLOWAY, 1978)
2. Searches and Seizures -- Private Security Guards -- Color of
State Law -- Reasonableness Standards -- Police Officers.
Private security guards, in reality, do act under color of state
law and, therefore, their actions in searching a person are
subject to the same reasonableness standards as are applicable
to police officers.(PEOPLE v. HOLLOWAY, 1978)
3. Searches and Seizures -- Security Guards -- Reasonableness
of Search -- Suppression of Evidence -- Pat-Down Search.
Evidence seized by security guards in a pat-down search of a
defendant was admissible into evidence and the trial court
should not have ordered the evidence suppressed where, under
the circumstances surrounding the encounter between the
security guards and the defendant, the search was reasonable.
(PEOPLE v. HOLLOWAY, 1978)
In Griffin v Maryland, 378 U.S. 130; 84 S Ct 1770; 12 L Ed 2d
754 (1964), the security guard involved had been deputized by
the county sheriff for the express purpose of policing an
amusement park where the incident complained of occurred.
Williams v United States, 341 U.S. 97; 71 S Ct 576; 95 L Ed
774 (1951), involved a private detective who held a special
police officer's card and badge. The detective was accompanied
by a city police officer sent by his superior to lend authority to
the proceedings. It was under those circumstances that the
United States Supreme Court determined that evidence obtained
could be suppressed because it was acquired under "the color of
the law". Surely the facts in the foregoing cases are

5. distinguishable from those at bar.(PEOPLE v. HOLLOWAY,
1978)