CRJ 550Legal Issues in Criminal Justice AdministrationCase B.docx

CRJ 550
Legal Issues in Criminal Justice Administration
Case Brief ExampleThis is an example of a well-written case
brief. Note the compliance with the required format and how the
student gets right to the important points in plain language. If
legal terms are encounter which are not understood, chances are
that other students will not understand them, so it is best not to
use them unless defined within the brief.
Assignment sub-heading: Sixth Amendment Right to Counsel
TITLE AND CITATION: Nix v. Williams, 467 U.S. 431, 104
S.Ct. 2501 (1984)
TYPE OF ACTION: Review by the U.S. Supreme Court of a
lower court ruling that evidence should be suppressed as a
result of a violation of the Sixth Amendment right to counsel.
The state (Nix) sought to overturn the motion to suppress that
was upheld by the U.S. District Court of Appeals.
FACTS OF THE CASE:
On December 24, 1968, ten year old Pamela Powers was
kidnapped from an Iowa YMCA and her body was later found in
a ditch, which was within an extensive area that was being
searched by volunteers and law enforcement. The defendant was
observed “carrying a large bundle wrapped in a blanket…two
legs in it and they were skinny and white.” Williams’ car, which
contained clothing items belonging to the victim, was found the
next day approximately 160 miles from the incident. Based on
this information, an extensive search was started that extended
from Des Moines to Davenport, Iowa.
Law enforcement obtained a warrant for Williams’ arrest, and
he subsequently turned himself into the authorities in

Davenport. Williams was arraigned and had obtained and
spoken with an attorney. Des Moines police detectives agreed to
transport Williams and not interview him during the drive
between Davenport and Des Moines. During the drive, one of
the detectives on the case began to speak to Williams regarding
the need to find the child’s body before it snowed so that her
parents could give her a proper, “Christian” burial. The
detective did not ask Williams any specific questions during
this conversation. At that point, Williams provided statements
to the detectives that led them to the child’s body.
Williams was then tried in state court and was found guilty of
first degree murder. Williams filed a motion to suppress the
evidence of the body and all related evidence concerning the
body’s location based on illegally obtained testimony. When the
conviction was affirmed by the Iowa state Supreme Court,
Williams sought relief in the U.S. District Court for the
Southern District of Iowa. The U.S. District Court, U.S. Court
of Appeals, and the U.S. Supreme Court agreed with Williams
and determined that he was denied the right to counsel and his
statements, which led to the child’s body, could not be
introduced into evidence.
Williams was tried in state court a second time, without the use
by the prosecution of the statements he had given to detectives.
Prosecutors introduced evidence of the child’s body under the
premise of “inevitable discovery”, as the child’s body was in an
area that was within the designated search area. Williams was
convicted a second time and the conviction was upheld by the
Iowa Supreme Court again. Appeals by the parties brought the
case back to the U.S. Supreme Court a second time.
CONTENTIONS OF THE PARTIES:
Nix: The state (Nix) contends that the evidence of the child’s
body and all related evidence concerning the body as to its
location should be admissible in spite of the denial of right to

counsel because the body would have been discovered in any
event due to the wide-ranging search in the area which was not
the result of anything that Williams said to the detectives. In the
second trial, the defendant’s statements were not introduced,
but the body evidence should still be admissible because it
would have been discovered and in the same condition anyway
even if there was no violation of the Sixth Amendment. The
child’s body was found well within the extensive search area
and would have been located by one or more of the over two
hundred searchers nearly the same time that the defendant took
the detectives to the child’s body. This argument is called the
“inevitable discovery rule.”
Williams: Williams contends that were it not for the illegally
obtained statements from Williams by law enforcement, the
evidence would not have been discovered or used against the
defendant. The evidence obtained is considered the “fruit of the
poisonous tree,” and therefore should not be admitted at trial.
ISSUE: Once a violation of the Sixth Amendment right to
counsel has occurred, can evidence obtained from the illegally-
obtained statements be admitted at trial based on the fact that
the evidence would have been discovered anyway?
DECISION: Yes, because the prosecution was able to prove that
the same physical evidence would have been discovered even if
the constitutional rights violation did not occur.
REASONING: The court applied the reasoning of the
independent source doctrine to that of inevitable discovery.
“The independent source doctrine teaches us that the interest of
society in deterring unlawful police conduct and the public
interest in having juries receive all probative evidence of a
crime are properly balanced by putting the police in the same,
not a worse, position that they would have been in if no police
error or misconduct had occurred” (quoting from Nix v.

Williams, 104 S.Ct. 2501, 2509 (1984)).
RULE OF LAW: Evidence that may have been obtained in
violation of a constitutional protection may still be admissible
if it can be proven by a preponderance of the evidence that it
was inevitable that the evidence would have been discovered
even if the violation had not occurred. This is known as the
“inevitable discovery” rule.
SOC-400
Content Analysis Worksheet
As a student of sociology, it is essential to be able to conduct a
content analysis and explain its purpose in social research. This
assignment will help you learn this concept.
Cite two scholarly sources, including the textbook, to answer
the following prompts.
Topic 5: Content Analysis
Use the following situation to answer the prompts that follow:
A sociology student has decided to analyze how PTSD (post-
traumatic stress disorder) has been described and explained in
popular media (magazines, newspapers, online news blogs) and
literature (novels, poetry, short stories).
Citing two sources that used quantitative analysis, explain how
quantitative analysis could be involved in the student’s study of
media and literature. If this approach were used, would it likely
reflect an interpretivist or positivist methodology? (50-75
words)
Citing two sources that used qualitative analysis, explain how
the student would approach this topic as qualitative analysis to

the study of media and literature. If this approach were used,
would it likely reflect an interpretivist or positivist
methodology? (50-75 words)
Imagine you are using content analysis as your research method
for your research study. Using your selected social problem,
create a research question that could be studied through content
analysis: MY SUBJECT IS HUMAN TRAFFICING
References:
© 2018. Grand Canyon University. All Rights Reserved.
Oddsen v. Board of Fire and Police Com'rs for City of
Milwaukee, 108 Wis.2d 143 (1982)
321 N.W.2d 161
© 2018 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S.
Government Works. 1
KeyCite Yellow Flag - Negative Treatment
Declined to Extend by Herek v. Police & Fire Com'n Village of
Menomonee Falls, Wis.App., April 28, 1999
108 Wis.2d 143
Supreme Court of Wisconsin.
Timothy J. ODDSEN, Plaintiff-
Respondent-Petitioner,
v.

BOARD OF FIRE AND POLICE
COMMISSIONERS FOR the CITY OF
MILWAUKEE, Defendant-Appellant.
In the Matter of the Appeal of Timothy J. ODDSEN.
Timothy J. ODDSEN, Petitioner-
Respondent-Petitioner,
v.
COMMISSIONERS FOR the CITY OF
MILWAUKEE, Defendant-Appellant.
Gail A. QUADE, Plaintiff-Appellant-Petitioner,
v.
COMMISSIONERS OF the CITY OF
MILWAUKEE, Defendant-Respondent.
STATE ex rel. Gail QUADE,
Petitioner-Appellant-Petitioner,
v.
BOARD OF FIRE AND POLICE COMMISSIONERS
OF the CITY OF MILWAUKEE, Respondent.
Nos. 80–1726, 81–684.
|
Argued June 2, 1982.
|

Decided July 2, 1982.
Synopsis
An order of the board of fire and police commissioners
discharging a female police officer was affirmed by the
Milwaukee Circuit Court, William A. Jennaro, J., and
the Court of Appeals, 105 Wis.2d 764, 318 N.W.2d 23,
affirmed. An order of the board discharging a male officer,
whose case arose out of the same incident, was affirmed by
the Milwaukee Circuit Court, John E. McCormick, J., and
the Court of Appeals, 103 Wis.2d 689, 309 N.W.2d 889,
affirmed. Upon granting consolidated review of the two
decisions, the Supreme Court, Heffernan, J., held that the
confessions extracted from two police officers, a male and
a female officer who admitted having sexual intercourse
with each other on three separate occasions, were, as a
matter of fact and law, coerced, involuntary, the result
of a denial of due process, and contrary to fundamental
principles of decency and fair play; and without said
confessions, there was no evidence whatsoever to support
the discharge decisions of the board.
Reversed and remanded, with directions.
West Headnotes (13)
[1] Municipal Corporations
Evidence in general
Municipal Corporations
Sufficiency of evidence to support finding
or decision
Public Employment

Admissions, declarations, and
confessions
Public Employment
Removal, separation, termination, and
discharge in general
Confessions extracted from two police
officers, a male and a female officer who
admitted having sexual intercourse with each
other on three separate occasions, were, as a
matter of fact and law, coerced, involuntary,
the result of a denial of due process, and
contrary to fundamental principles of decency
and fair play; and without said confessions,
there was no evidence whatsoever to support
the discharge decisions of the board of fire
and police commissioners. W.S.A. 62.50(13),
944.16; U.S.C.A.Const.Amend. 14.
6 Cases that cite this headnote
Evidence in general
Public Employment
confessions
Statements which the police extracted from a
female officer were coerced and involuntary,
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321 N.W.2d 161
Government Works. 2
where they were the result of 14 hours of
interrogation, during which time the officer
complained of severe stomach pains and
the vomiting of blood, where, during the
interrogation, she was permitted to call her
doctor four times to make appointments to
see him, but each time, when the time for
the appointment came, she was told by her
interrogators that she could not see her doctor
until they were finished with her, where she
knew that her failure to respond to questions
could result in her discharge, and where, after
she wrote her initial statement, she was told
she would have to write another report, one
which would conform to what the police
believed to be the truth.
Evidence in general
Public Employment

Admissibility in general
Superiors in a police force may question a
subordinate and ask questions specifically,
directly, and narrowly relating to the
performance of his or her official duties, as
distinguished from beliefs or other matters
that are not within the scope of subordinate's
specific duties.
Cases that cite this headnote
Evidence in general
Public Employment
confessions
Failure to afford counsel to two police
officers, who were being interrogated on the
matter of whether they committed adultery
with each other, was a coercive factor and
contributed to the production of involuntary
and coerced statements from both officers.
[5] Constitutional Law
Protections Provided and Deprivations
Prohibited in General
Right of due process, which is constitutionally
protected, is not limited to criminal matters.

U.S.C.A.Const.Amend. 14.
Rights and Interests Protected in General
Public employment is a property right.
[7] Evidence
Evidence wrongfully obtained
Evidence obtained by the denial of due process
may not be used in the courts of Wisconsin.
Procedural due process in general
Due process is required not merely for
the protection of unfortunate victims of
coercive police tactics, but is also necessary
for the integrity of the judicial process.
Circumstances Under Which Made;
Interrogation

Due process is violated by coerced
confessions, because they are unreliable and
should not be allowed to contribute to a
finding of guilt in a court of law which
attempts to base its judgments on trustworthy
and reliable evidence. U.S.C.A.Const.Amend.
14.
Evidence in general

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321 N.W.2d 161
Government Works. 3

Public Employment
Admissibility in general
Although high fidelity to duty is required
of police officers, this does not mean that
inquisitorial tactics may be employed to
determine their fidelity to duty even though
elementary constitutional rights which are
afforded to other citizens are bypassed.
Grounds for removal or suspension
Public Employment
Disobedience or insubordination
A police officer may be discharged for refusal
in a disciplinary proceeding to testify as to his
conduct as a police officer.
Evidence in general
Public Employment
confessions
As a matter of law, the coerced, involuntary
confessions extracted from two police officers,
who were suspected of having engaged in an
adulterous relationship, could not, under the

circumstances, be used for any purpose.
Evidence in general
Public Employment
confessions
Where both police officers, suspected of
having been involved in an adulterous
relationship with each other, knew that they
could be fired if they refused to answer
questions, and where they were not told that,
if they spoke, the statements they gave could
not be used against them in a prosecution for
adultery, the statements given by them were
barred as a matter of law; absent advice that
they could not be prosecuted on the basis of
statements given, their statements were the
product of a coercive choice.
Attorneys and Law Firms
**163 *144 Bruce B. Jacobson, Milwaukee, argued,
for plaintiff-petitioner in No. 80–1726; Piano, Duffy &
Jacobson, Milwaukee, and Charles J. Rainey, River Hills,
of counsel, on brief.
Laurie A. Eggert, Madison, and Kenneth J. Murray,

Milwaukee, for plaintiff-petitioner in No. 81–684;
Richard D. Moake and Murray & Moake, S. C., attys.,
Milwaukee, on brief.
Rudolph M. Konrad, Asst. City Atty., for defendant-
appellant; James B. Brennan, City Atty., on brief.
Opinion
*145 HEFFERNAN, Justice.
We review two separate decisions of the court of appeals,
103 Wis.2d 689, 309 N.W.2d 889, 105 Wis.2d 764, 318
N.W.2d 23. Because the cases arose out of the same
incident, present substantially the same questions of law
and fact, and by direction of this court were argued on
the same day, we consider it appropriate to consider the
review of the decisions of the court of appeals in a single
opinion.
Both cases involve discharges of police officers of the
city of Milwaukee. In each case, after interrogation in
the police headquarters, the two police officers, Gail
A. Quade, a female officer, and Timothy J. Oddsen, a
male officer, confessed to sexual intercourse, each with
the other, on three separate occasions. Following the
interrogation, Chief Harold Breier of the Milwaukee
Police Department directed the discharge of each of
the officers, and pursuant to sec. 62.50(13), Stats., he
filed a complaint with the Board of Fire and Police
Commissioners setting forth the reasons for the discharge.
In his notice to the board, he specifically stated that Gail
Quade and Timothy J. Oddsen had failed to conform to
the adultery statute, sec. 944.16, Stats.

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321 N.W.2d 161
Government Works. 4
Pursuant to the statutes, Gail A. Quade and Timothy
J. Oddsen took separate appeals. The board conducted
separate hearings and affirmed the chief's action in respect
to each of the officers and directed their discharge. Appeal
was then taken separately by each of the police officers to

the circuit court for Milwaukee county.
In respect to Gail A. Quade, the circuit court for
Milwaukee county, WILLIAM A. JENNARO, Circuit
Judge, affirmed the order of the Board of Fire and Police
Commissioners by an order dated January 8, 1981. The
court of appeals by unpublished opinion dated December
23, 1981, affirmed the order of the circuit court approving
the discharge.
Oddsen also took an appeal from the order of the Board of
Fire and Police Commissioners. Oddsen's case was *146
heard in the **164 circuit court for Milwaukee county,
JOHN E. McCORMICK, Circuit Judge. That court on
September 15, 1980, reversed the order of the Board of
Fire and Police Commissioners. Appeal was taken by the
board to the court of appeals. The court of appeals, by
unpublished opinion dated June 23, 1981, reversed the
circuit court and reinstated the discharge order of the
Milwaukee Board of Fire and Police Commissioners.
In respect to each of these cases we accepted review on
petition of the police officers. We review the decisions
of the court of appeals; and in each case, we reverse the
court of appeals and direct the reinstatement of each of
the police officers without prejudice and without loss of
entitlement to pay for the period since discharge. The
causes are remanded to the respective circuit courts for the
purpose of calculating the pay to which each of the officers
is now entitled, after making a determination of what
earned income each of the officers has accrued during the
period of suspension, which income, if any, shall be an
offset against the liability of the city for the pay the officers
would otherwise have accrued during the period that runs
from the date of their discharge, April 11, 1978, to the date
of reinstatement.

[1] Numerous issues are posed in each of these cases.
We find it unnecessary, however, to resolve all the
issues, because we find controlling in each case the same
dispositive issue—that the confessions extracted from
Quade and Oddsen, as a matter of fact and law, were
coerced, involuntary, the result of denial of due process,
and contrary to fundamental principles of decency and
fair play. Because we set aside each of these confessions in
their entirety, there is no evidence whatsoever to support
the decision of the board; and, accordingly, we need
not decide whether the board, in making its decision on
the basis of the preponderance of the evidence, rather
than upon the basis of clear and convincing evidence,
committed *147 error in determining misconduct when
the underlying conduct was alleged to be criminal. Here,
there was no evidence in respect to the guilt of either
Quade or Oddsen in the posture in which the Board of Fire
and Police Commissioners decided the two cases other
than that contained in the coerced confessions. It should
be noted that no charge was filed in respect to any conduct
at Officer Quade's house on March 22, 1978. All the
charges stemmed from information revealed in the coerced
confessions.
We recount the facts as revealed by the record. Gail
A. Quade was a woman police officer and, at the time
of her discharge, had been an officer for approximately
two and one-half years. She was twenty-three years of
age. Timothy J. Oddsen had been with the force for
approximately nine years. From the record it appears that
each of them worked out of the same district headquarters,
and on occasion Quade was assigned to duty with Oddsen.
Officer Oddsen was single. Officer Quade was married to
Richard Quade. The record indicates that the Quades were

estranged. A divorce was contemplated, but the actual
departure of Richard Quade from the couple's home had
occurred only a day or two before the March 21–22
incident.
On March 21, 1978, after Officer Quade completed the
work of her shift at approximately 12 midnight, she invited
several off-duty police officers to a party at her home.
Oddsen was not invited by Quade, but was called by a
fellow police officer and arrived later. By 5:30 a. m., all
except Oddsen and Gail Quade had left the home. Those
two had breakfast in the early morning hours. According
to the police records, Richard Quade, Gail's estranged
husband, stopped at the house to see whether Gail needed
anything. He said that he found Oddsen and Gail in bed.
Richard Quade, who was not a police officer, went to the
phone and called police headquarters and *148 used the
code meaning “an officer needs assistance.” The response
must have exceeded Richard Quade's wildest expectations,
for within minutes 10 squad cars and at least 20 officers
were at the Quade home. 1 At the time **165 the squad
321 N.W.2d 161
Government Works. 5
cars arrived, both Oddsen and Gail Quade were fully
dressed.

Shortly thereafter, at approximately 8 o'clock, Oddsen
and Gail Quade were taken to the headquarters of the
Fifth District, and each was separately interrogated by
more senior officers. About the time the police arrived
at the Quade home, Gail Quade became ill and vomited
blood. She called her doctor and told him of her condition
and made an appointment for that morning at 10 a. m.
Upon arrival at District Station 5, she was questioned
about her off-duty conduct. Although she told the
sergeants who were interrogating her that she had made
an appointment with her own doctor, and although they
knew that she was complaining about vomiting blood, she
was not allowed to leave in order to keep the appointment
with her own physician. She was instructed to submit to
the investigation or be subject to further *149 charges.
It is undisputed that she knew that her failure to answer
questions could result in her discharge.
At about 10 a. m. she gave a statement in which she
admitted no wrongdoing. Under the scrutiny of her
interrogators, she called her doctor again, telling him
that she could not leave the police station, and a new
appointment was made for 2:15 p. m.
There is evidence in the record adduced at the hearing
before the Board of Fire and Police Commissioners that
indicates that, following her first statement, one of the
interrogating officers tore up some of the sheets of Gail
Quade's statement which he thought were false and kept
those he considered useful. He indicated to her that she
would stay there until she gave the information which the
interrogators thought to be truthful.
At around 10 a. m., Quade again vomited blood, and
she reported this to Sergeant Parys. At about 2 p. m.,

Quade was taken to the First District Central Police
Headquarters; and there, apparently, Lieutenant Starke
took charge of the interrogation. He was told by either Sgt.
Parys or Sgt. Eccher that Quade was spitting up blood.
Quade told Starke that she had an appointment with her
physician at 2:15 p. m., but when she asked Lt. Starke
for permission to see her own physician, he said, “We're
not through with you yet. When we're done, you can go.”
Lt. Starke, however, allowed Quade to call her doctor.
Her conversations with her physician were always made
in the presence of one or more of the interrogating police
officers. She told her physician that she had continued
to vomit blood, had very severe stomach pains, and was
very nervous and upset. Her doctor then said he would
see her later in the afternoon if she at that time would
be able to leave the police headquarters. At or about the
time of this phone call, Lt. Starke told Quade that, if
she wanted to go to a hospital or see a doctor, he would
stop the interrogation. He said at the hearing before the
Board of Fire and Police Commissioners that he was
*150 very conscious of her physical condition. Quade
told Starke that she wished to see her own doctor. It was
very clear from the testimony that, at no time, did Lt.
Starke acquiesce in Quade's request to see her personal
physician, who was familiar with her condition. He merely
said that she could go to a hospital or see a doctor. He
stated that she could see her own doctor when the police
were finished with her.
Quade testified that she vomited during the afternoon, and
she said that she had **166 severe stomach pain during
the entire period of questioning.
At 5:45 p. m., after approximately ten hours of

questioning, Quade gave a statement in which she
admitted to having intercourse with Police Officer Oddsen
while off duty. During the course of the taking of a
verbatim statement at about 5:45 or 6 o'clock, Quade
denied having intercourse with Oddsen that morning.
She did admit, however, to having intercourse on three
earlier dates. Lt. Starke asked such “narrow” job-related
questions during the course of this interview as, “During
any of these affairs, did Oddsen use protection,” “Did you
have any contraceptives or a pill,” and “Could there have
been a possibility of your becoming pregnant.” 2
After being questioned for twelve hours, Quade was
allowed to leave shortly after 7 p. m. While she was on
her way home, being driven by police sergeants, they were
ordered to return her to the central police administration
offices. She was returned for a purpose that is not made
clear in the record nor was it made clear to her. She was
finally permitted to return home after fourteen hours of
custody and confinement.
[2] Accordingly, the statements which the police officers
extracted from Quade were the result of approximately
*151 fourteen hours of interrogation, during which
time Quade complained of severe stomach pains and
321 N.W.2d 161

Government Works. 6
the vomiting of blood. During the interrogation she
was permitted to call her doctor four times to make
appointments to see him; but each time, when the time for
the appointment came, she was told by the interrogators
that she could not see her doctor until they were finished
with her. Officer Quade knew that her failure to respond to
the questions could result in her discharge; and when she
wrote her initial statement, she was told she would have
to write another report—a report which would conform
to what the police officers believed to be the truth—unless
she wished to be subjected to additional discipline.
At the time Oddsen and Quade were brought to
police headquarters, Oddsen asked for a lawyer or a
representative of the policemen's union to be present
during the interrogation. In Quade's hearing before the
Board of Fire and Police Commissioners, Oddsen stated
this request was made not only for himself but also for
Officer Quade. Officer Quade did not ask for a lawyer
or a representative of the policemen's union until late in
the afternoon, and that request was denied. Although it
was made clear to Officer Quade that their interrogation
focused upon adultery, at no time was she told of her
fifth amendment rights against self-incrimination nor
was she told that any statements she might give during
an interrogation under the duress of possible job loss
for failure to answer could not be used in a criminal
proceeding.
Oddsen was brought to the police headquarters at the
same time as Gail Quade. He immediately asked, as
recounted above, for a lawyer or representative of the
union. This request was denied.

Oddsen told the interrogating officers that he was
extremely tired, that he had not slept for two nights, and
it was his assertion near the end of the interrogation that
he had not slept for forty-seven hours. Nevertheless, he
was directed to write a report of the morning incident.
*152 At 9 a. m., Oddsen wrote a report which his
interrogators believed to be untruthful, and he was
told that he would be punished for filing an untruthful
report. In the first statement given, he denied that he
had ever had sexual intercourse with Officer Quade.
After writing this initial report, Oddsen again requested
representation, which was again denied. He was told that,
if he left without satisfying his interrogators, he would
face additional disciplinary action. Early in the afternoon,
Oddsen was taken to the downtown police headquarters,
where he was told by Lt. Starke he would have to give
a **167 statement. Again his request for counsel or
representation was denied. Oddsen stated that he was
physically and mentally exhausted and unable to answer
any more questions. Nevertheless, he was directed to write
additional statements.
At the hearing before the Board of Fire and Police
Commissioners, Lt. Starke was asked about the
conditions surrounding Oddsen's interrogation at central
headquarters. He stated that Oddsen alleged that he had
been without sleep for forty-seven hours, but he said he
examined Oddsen closely and felt that he was coherent in
his answers. He acknowledged that Oddsen, despite the
request, was not allowed counsel, and he asserted that
his purpose for interrogation was merely an employee
investigatory matter and that, had a felony charge for
adultery been contemplated, the interrogation would have
been by the vice squad. He did say, however, that he was

aware that a felony charge for adultery could result. He
acknowledged that Oddsen was told that he would not
be allowed to leave until he satisfactorily responded in a
stenographically reported verbatim statement.
Oddsen contended that, during the period of time he was
at the police headquarters, from approximately 8 in the
morning to 8:45 at night, he was not offered any food,
and the only thing he had to drink was a cup of coffee at
about 10 a. m. During this period, during a respite *153
in his interrogation, he said he saw Gail Quade go into
a washroom and heard her vomit. He stated that, before
each statement was requested of him, he asked for counsel.
He was denied the right to make any phone calls.
Lt. Starke testified before the board that, in fact,
Oddsen was offered food. Oddsen told the commissioners,
however, that he was offered food so late in the day that
at that point he was not interested in food and could not
have eaten.
The verbatim stenographically reported statement of
Oddsen was given in response to Lt. Starke' questions
at about 6 p. m. Officer Oddsen was asked about what
happened that morning at the residence of Police Officer
Gail Quade. Officer Oddsen responded by saying that
he had not had any sleep for forty-eight hours and he
would like someone present from the union to represent
him, either one of the officers of the union or Attorney
Kenneth Murray, the legal representative of the police

321 N.W.2d 161
Government Works. 7
officers union. He was told that the rules did not allow
representation. Officer Oddsen stated that he knew that
he was bound by the rules of his employment to answer
questions put to him.
He denied having intercourse that morning with Officer
Quade, but finally he did admit to having intercourse
with her on three occasions, the first being on Christmas
Eve of 1977. Two other instances of intercourse were
acknowledged. With the same assiduity for probing into
facts that narrowly and directly are within the scope of
official duties of subordinate officers that he displayed in
interrogation of Officer Quade, Lt. Starke asked Oddsen,
“Any sodomy?”
Oddsen was released at about 8:45 p. m., after being
questioned in excess of thirteen hours.
While the two police officers were being interrogated, an
identification squad was sent to the Quade home in *154
an attempt to determine whether Oddsen's fingerprints
could be found in the bedroom or bathroom. No
fingerprint identification was made. However, a T-shirt
was found in the bedroom, which Oddsen acknowledged
was his. During the course of his interrogation, although
denying intercourse with Gail Quade on that day, he
admitted that, because of his fatigue, he had gone to bed
wearing only his undershorts and socks and had slept only
about fifteen minutes prior to the advent of the indignant
Mr. Quade.

During the entire interrogation of Oddsen, it was clear
that the investigation was centered on whether Oddsen
and Quade had committed adultery. Oddsen, like Quade,
knew, and in fact was told, that the failure to answer
questions truthfully could result in being discharged
from the police force. Oddsen, like Quade, knew that
the commission of the sexual acts could result in
criminal **168 prosecution. During the course of these
interrogations, neither of them was told that they had a
right not to incriminate themselves, nor were they told
that, were they to make a statement under the duress
of the possibility of losing their jobs, they were afforded
immunity from prosecution by operation of law.
The record at the hearing before the Board of Fire
and Police Commissioners shows that, on the basis of
the statements given by the accused officers, the police
department attempted to have the district attorney's office
commence prosecution for adultery against both Quade
and Oddsen. This, the district attorney's office refused to
do. During the course of the hearing before the board in
respect to Oddsen, the deputy district attorney testified
that adultery was not being prosecuted by the district
attorney's office.
Following the taking of these statements from Oddsen and
Quade, Chief Breier discharged both of them, and each
took separate appeals to the Board of Fire and Police
Commissioners. The complaint against Oddsen *155 by
Chief Breier alleged that Oddsen violated department
rules which require that:
“Members of the police force ...
shall conform to, abide by and
enforce all the criminal laws of

the State of Wisconsin and the
ordinances of the City of Milwaukee
of which the Department must take
cognizance ....”
Because Officer Oddsen had engaged in intercourse with
Gail Quade, Chief Breier alleged that the dismissal of
Oddsen from the department was required.
The complaint against Quade was similar in that it alleged
that Officer Quade engaged in sexual intercourse with
Oddsen. In addition, it alleged that, on New Year's Eve,
January 1, 1978, she had knowledge of an unauthorized
party at the Police Academy and failed to notify her
commanding officer. This, the chief of police alleged,
subjected Gail Quade to discipline for disobedience of
orders. This latter allegation on the face of Breier's
complaint is insufficient, because there is not even an
assertion that the alleged conduct was in violation of a rule
or in violation of an order. The only allegation is that there
was no authorization for the party. Moreover, the only
proof in respect to Quade's knowledge of the New Year's
Eve party or her conduct in respect thereto is contained in
her statement given under duress.
Numerous issues were addressed in both appeals to
the Board of Fire and Police Commissioners. The only
evidence of misconduct before the board in respect to
either Quade or Oddsen was derived from the statements
taken during their interrogation on March 22. We
conclude that all of the information thus adduced was
involuntary, coerced, in violation of their constitutional

321 N.W.2d 161
Government Works. 8
rights of due process, and, accordingly, was untrustworthy
and required to be excluded from the evidence.
[3] It is, of course, the law that superiors in a police force
may question a subordinate and ask:
“... questions specifically, directly, and narrowly
relating to the performance of his official duties as
distinguished *156 from his beliefs or other matters
that are not within the scope of the specific duties ....”
Spevack v. Klein, 385 U.S. 511, 519, 87 S.Ct. 625, 630,
17 L.Ed.2d 574 (1967), Fortas concurring.
At the very outset, one who peruses the record is struck
by the fact that the accused police officers here involved
were off duty and, in fact, are referred to in the brief of
the Board of Fire and Police Commissioners as “off-duty
police officers.” Moreover, the questioning that ensued
was not confined narrowly, directly, and specifically to
matters within the scope of the specific duties of the
officers. Questions directed to whether the parties used
contraception, whether pregnancy was likely to ensue,
or how the sexual acts were performed are not the
questions that can be asked by a public employer. Rather,
under the circumstances here, they smack of the salacious
inquisitiveness of a “nosey parker.” We, however, do not
base our conclusion that both cases must be thrown out
on the ground that the **169 police superiors invaded
the constitutional rights of privacy of their subordinates.

Rather, we conclude that the entire course of questioning
of both officers was coercive as a matter of fact and as a
matter of law and resulted in involuntary statements.
It is apparent that neither investigation was properly
termed investigatory. They were accusatory. From the
very beginning, it was apparent that the questioning police
officers were directing their attention to Oddsen and
Quade as likely suspects of adulterous conduct. Their
purpose was not merely investigatory but was to sew up
and confirm their preconceptions of guilt for punitive
purposes, whether those purposes be criminal prosecution
or the imposition of penalties under the rules of the police
department. 3
*157 In both cases, Officers Quade and Oddsen were
denied counsel. In respect to Oddsen, the Board of Fire
and Police Commissioners made a specific finding that
there was a “conscientious” denial of counsel. No such
finding was made in respect to Quade, but the evidence
adduced at her hearing showed, at the very outset of the
interrogation, Oddsen requested counsel for himself and
for Quade. Also, it is undisputed that Quade requested
counsel before her verbatim stenographic statement was
elicited. If there were a constitutional right to counsel
clearly spelled out, or a statutory right to counsel, the
denial of counsel would end the controversy and result in
a dismissal of the charges. Here, the city contends, there
is no right to counsel. Conceding, arguendo, that may be
true, that does not mean that the lack of counsel here
did not contribute substantially to the totality of coercive
circumstances.
[4] We conclude that the failure to afford counsel was

a coercive factor and contributed to the production of
involuntary and coerced statements from both officers. 4
Additionally, both of the police officers knew that they
were obliged to answer questions or possibly forfeit the
property rights in their employment. They were conveyed
to the police station in a squad car and were under close
supervision for the rest of the day. Both of them were
in the coercive atmosphere of the police station. The
coerciveness of these surroundings upon one who is not
a police person has been recognized in Miranda v. *158
Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694
(1966). The coercive character of those surroundings is
perhaps even clearer to a police officer who is familiar with
the techniques of police interrogation.
Both of the parties stated they were fatigued. Oddsen
stated that he had not slept for forty-seven hours, although
there is evidence that, during that period, he did have
a short period of rest. Quade stated that she had not
slept for twenty-four hours. Each of them gave one or
more statements which the interrogators concluded were
unsatisfactory, and it was made clear that neither would
be released until they gave a statement which satisfied the
interrogators' conception of what was the truth. Oddsen
alleged he had no food during his approximately thirteen
to fourteen hours of interrogation, and when he was
offered food, it was so late in the day that he could not eat.
Quade was there for a period of fourteen hours and was
given no food, and the first statement that she gave was
in part torn up by the interrogating sergeant; and there
is substantial evidence in the record of the board which
could lead a reasonable finder of facts to conclude that the
portion of the **170 first statement was pieced together

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321 N.W.2d 161
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with a portion of a later statement in order to present a
narrative that was to the satisfaction of the interrogators.
In respect to Officer Oddsen, it is clear that the principal
most coercive factor was his lack of sleep, to which he
referred repeatedly.
During the course of interrogation, Officer Quade made
four appointments to see her doctor. The time of each
appointment was known to her interrogators. Yet, they
refused to allow her to see her own doctor, who was
familiar with her case. They did agree that they would take
her to a hospital and have her seen by a doctor, but it was
very clear that they were denying her medical attention
from her own physician. Much is made by the city of
the fact that, upon Lt. Starke's question, “Do you *159
wish medical attention at this time,” Quade responded,
“No, I'll wait.” However, Quade had just stated that she
was experiencing discomfort. Moreover, this statement
was taken at 5:45 p. m., after approximately ten hours
of questioning, and it was at a time when Officer Quade
had finally given a preliminary statement that satisfied her
inquisitors. She had already stated that she had indulged
in sexual intercourse with Oddsen. The police had told
her that when she finished her statement she would be
released. It is rather obvious why at this point, with
release imminent, she did not demand immediate medical
attention. Cruelly enough, even after this statement was
completed, she was kept in custody for approximately
another three hours.
[5] The right of due process, which is constitutionally
protected, is not limited to criminal matters. Our
constitution provides:

“No State shall ... deprive any person of life, liberty, or
property, without due process of law ....” U.S.Const.,
Art. XIV, sec. 1.
[6] [7] Public employment is a property right. Board of
Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 92 S.Ct. 2701, 33 L.Ed.2d
548 (1972). Evidence obtained by the denial of due process
may not be used in the courts of this state.
In respect to Quade's case, where she was ill and in pain
during the interrogation, the language of the United States
Supreme Court in Malinski v. New York, 324 U.S. 401, 65
S.Ct. 781, 89 L.Ed.2d 1029 (1945), is appropriate. There,
the court, discussing the due process clause, stated that
that amendment to the constitution:
“... inescapably imposes upon this Court an exercise of
judgment upon the whole course of the proceedings in
order to ascertain whether they offend those canons of
decency and fairness which express the notions of justice
of English-speaking peoples even toward those charged
with the most heinous offenses.” At 416–17, 65 S.Ct. at
789–80.
*160 [8] [9] Clearly, the detention and interrogation of
Police Officer Quade was offensive to canons of decency
and fairness. It is shocking to the conscience of this court,
and it is shocking and almost inconceivable that a police
department would assume that it could maltreat its own
employees in a manner which it knows would not be
tolerated or approved by the courts, even were the object
of the interrogation a person accused of a heinous crime.
Due process, of course, is required, not merely for the
protection of the unfortunate victim of coercive police
tactics, but it is necessary to the integrity of the judicial
process. Due process is violated by coerced confessions,

because they are unreliable, and should not be allowed to
contribute to a finding of guilt in a court of law which
attempts to base its judgments on trustworthy and reliable
evidence. Moreover, where the tactics used are offensive
and outrage the public's sense of decency, it is society
and society's standards of fundamental fairness that are
offended. See, Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U.S. 278, 56 S.Ct.
461, 80 L.Ed. 682 (1936); Spano v. New York, 360 U.S. 315,
79 S.Ct. 1202, 3 L.Ed.2d 1265 (1959). As Spano stated:
“The abhorrence of society to the use of involuntary
confessions does not turn alone on their inherent
untrustworthiness. It also turns on the deep-rooted
**171 feeling that the police must obey the law while
enforcing the law; that in the end life and liberty can
be as much endangered from illegal methods used to
convict those thought to be criminals as from the actual
criminals themselves.” At 320, 79 S.Ct. at 1205.
We find the coercive tactics used in respect to Oddsen
only slightly less offensive than those used in respect to
Officer Quade. We find them less offensive, not because
he is a male officer and she is a female officer, but because,
clearly, she was ill at the time and, irrespective of sex, was
entitled to solicitude, which was not afforded her.
*161 We find in respect to each of them that the
circumstances of their interrogation, when considered
in their totality, were coercive and rendered the

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321 N.W.2d 161
Government Works. 10
statements unreliable, untrustworthy, and involuntary,
and, above all, the products of the denial of due
process. While in each case the Board of Fire and
Police Commissioners purported to find the statements

voluntary, an examination of the record makes it clear
that the facts to the contrary are overwhelming. Giving
full credence to the statements of the interrogators,
it is apparent that the expressed attitude of the
interrogating police officers and their conduct in light
of the circumstances demonstrate beyond a reasonable
doubt that the statements were of such a nature that
to permit their use in the denial of a property right
would contravene the constitutional protections of the
fourteenth amendment.
[10] Additionally, we conclude that both of these
discharges must be set aside, because the statements were
coerced and involuntary as a matter of law. It is apparently
the contention of the board that, because high fidelity
to duty is required of police officers, inquisitorial tactics
may be employed to determine their fidelity to duty
even though elementary constitutional rights which are
afforded to other citizens are bypassed. If truth can only
be obtained by the denial of rights, then our entire judicial
system, which is based upon affording due process and a
panoply of constitutional rights, is based upon a premise
doomed to failure.
[11] The argument is a familiar one—that a police officer
may be discharged for refusal in disciplinary proceedings
to testify as to his conduct as a police officer. See,
Spevack v. Klein, 385 U.S. 511, 519, 87 S.Ct. 625, 630,
17 L.Ed.2d 574 (1967); Garrity v. New Jersey, 385 U.S.
493, 87 S.Ct. 616, 17 L.Ed.2d 562 (1967). This is, of
course, a correct statement of the law, but it is misapplied
in the context of these cases. It has been recognized in
Garrity, supra, *162 and numerous other cases that a
public officer, a police officer, may be interrogated and
his refusal to respond can result in a discharge for that
very reason. Garrity pointed out, however, that, where

the interrogation concerns a matter which is criminal,
“The choice imposed on petitioners was one between self
incrimination or job forfeiture.” P. 496, 87 S.Ct. at p. 618.
Garrity pointed out that such coercion renders a statement
taken in such circumstances as being “infected by the
coercion inherent in this scheme of questioning and cannot
be sustained as voluntary ....” PP. 497–98, 87 S.Ct. at pp.
618–19.
It is clear that Garrity, quite aside from the use to which
the statements or confessions are to be put, recognizes the
inherent coercion in a situation where a police officer, on
one hand, can be fired for not answering and, on the other
hand, can be prosecuted if he answers and incriminates
himself. Garrity went on to resolve the particular problem
presented therein, where the coerced statement was sought
to be used in a subsequent prosecution. It held that, where
a police officer faces such a dilemma:
“[T]he protection ... against coerced statements
prohibits use in subsequent criminal proceedings of
statements obtained under threat of removal from
office, and that it extends to all, whether they are
policemen or other members of our body politic.” P.
500, 87 S.Ct. at p. 620.
[12] The representatives of the City of Milwaukee in this
case twist the meaning of Garrity by acknowledging that a
statement **172 taken under these circumstances cannot
be used in a criminal case because it is coercively violative
of the fifth amendment rights against self-incrimination,
but they then jump to the startling conclusion that it
is because it is excluded in a criminal prosecution that
the coerced and involuntary confession can be used for
other purposes. This is clearly incorrect. It is because the
confession *163 is coerced and involuntary that it cannot

be used for a criminal prosecution. The fact that it is not
used and cannot be used in a criminal prosecution does not
make it voluntary and trustworthy. As a matter of law, the
coerced, involuntary confessions here extracted may not,
under the circumstances, be used for any purpose.
Subsequent cases shed some light upon the scope and the
meaning of Garrity. In Confederation of Police v. Conlisk,
489 F.2d 891 (7th Cir. 1973), the United States Court of
Appeals considered a situation in which Chicago police
officers were questioned in respect to certain allegations
of criminal conspiracy and corruption. The police officers
in that case were warned by the United States Attorney
that anything they said could be used against them.
They were also aware of the fact that they could be
discharged if they did not make a statement. In each case
the police officers, upon the advice of counsel, invoked the
privilege and declined to answer. They were discharged as
a result of their failure to respond. The circuit court of the
Seventh Circuit analyzed the Garrity case, supra, Spevack
v. Klein, supra, Gardner v. Broderick, 392 U.S. 273, 88 S.Ct.
1913, 20 L.Ed.2d 1082 (1968), and Uniformed Sanitation
Men Association, Inc., v. Commissioner of Sanitation, 392

321 N.W.2d 161

U.S. 280, 88 S.Ct. 1917, 20 L.Ed.2d 1089 (1968). The
Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals held that the firing of
the Chicago police officers in these circumstances was
unconstitutional. The Conlisk case points out that, merely
to relieve a police officer, after the fact, of the possibility of
prosecution, does not solve the dilemma with which he is
faced while undergoing interrogation. The exclusion of the
statement in a criminal proceeding is nothing more than
the exclusion of a coerced statement. In the first place, the
employee may or may not know of his rights to remain
silent and to avoid self-incrimination; and, even if he is
aware of that right, he almost certainly does not know
that, under Garrity, as a matter of law, his response cannot
be used against him *164 in a criminal case. Thus, the
philosophy of Conlisk is that the coercive power of job
forfeiture should not be employed unless it is made clear
that to speak will not result in criminal prosecution. The
Seventh Circuit Court summarizes its analysis by stating:
“In sum, then, the Gardner and Uniformed Sanitation
Men decisions indicate that a public employer may
discharge an employee for refusal to answer where
the employer both asks specific questions relating to
the employee's official duties and advises the employee
of the consequences of his choice, i.e., that failure to
answer will result in dismissal but that answers he gives
and fruits thereof cannot be used against him in criminal
proceedings.” P. 894.
In the Seventh Circuit case, because the police officers
were not informed that any information which they gave
could not be used against them in criminal proceedings,
their discharges were unconstitutional as a matter of law
under the rationale of Garrity, Gardner, and Uniformed

Sanitation Men.
[13] In the instant case, it is clear that both Oddsen and
Quade knew that they could be fired if they refused to
answer the questions. It is equally clear that they were
not told that, were they to speak, the statements they
gave could not be used against them in a prosecution
for adultery. Accordingly, the statements they gave were
barred as a matter of law. Absent the advice that they
could not be prosecuted on the basis of the statement
given, their statement was the product of a coercive choice.
They were truly between Scylla and Charybdis. If they
did not speak, they knew that they would be fired. If
they spoke, what they said could lead to prosecution, and
most likely, in any event, to conviction and dismissal from
their jobs. Absent the warning spelled out in Conlisk, these
coerced statements cannot be used. There is no necessity
for the police department **173 or anyone else to be
*165 given authority to grant immunity from criminal
prosecution. Immunity is conferred by operation of law
as determined by the United States Supreme Court in
Garrity. If a statement is taken under these conditions, i.e.,
a threat of job forfeiture, a defendant is given immunity
from prosecution, at least to the extent that the statement
could be the basis for the prosecution. Accordingly, in
the instant case, in order to prevent the statement being
excluded as a matter of law, where its purpose is discipline,
it was incumbent upon the interrogating police officers to
advise:
“... the employee of the consequences of his choice,
i.e., that failure to answer will result in dismissal but
that answers he gives and fruits thereof cannot be used
against him in criminal proceedings.” Conlisk, supra at

894.
McQuillin, 4 Municipal Corporations, sec. 12.242, pp. 292–
93, states in accord:
“[A]n employee may be dismissed
for refusal to answer where he
has been asked specific questions
relating to his official duties and has
been advised that the answers he
gives and the fruits thereof, cannot
be used against him in criminal
proceedings.”
Because such admonitions were not given here, the
statement is coercive and involuntary as a matter of law. It
was a statement given under duress and compulsion with
no opportunity to weigh the consequences of answering
or not answering. Accordingly, even were the conduct
of the police interrogators in this case not as gross and
degrading as the record shows it to be, the statements must
be excluded as a matter of law.
In the absence of these statements, there was no
proof whatsoever that either Oddsen or Quade had
indulged in the conduct alleged. Moreover, the additional
charge *166 brought against Quade that she failed to
report an unauthorized party at the Police Academy
is also dependent upon her own statement and must
be disregarded for the same reason. Independent
corroboration was so tenuous as to be devoid of any
probative value whatsoever.

321 N.W.2d 161
Because we have decided each of these cases on what
are basically due process grounds, which exclude the only
proof put forward by the chief of police, we reverse and
order the reinstatement of Officer Quade and Officer
Oddsen pursuant to sec. 62.50 (21), Stats., and remand to
the circuit court for purposes of computing past due wages
for each of these police officers.
Our focusing, however, on the due process deficiencies
of the interrogation procedure does not mean that we
validate or accept other contentions made by the city
Board of Fire and Police Commissioners on this review.
We have directed our attention solely to the question
of proof, and we find there was none. Thus, we do not
address ourselves to the quantum of proof required where
the conduct used as a basis for disciplinary measures
is also a crime. We have not addressed ourselves to
that issue, because such determination would be moot in
circumstances where there is no proof whatsoever.
Decisions reversed and the causes are remanded to the
respective circuit courts, with directions that the officers
be reinstated without prejudice as provided by the statutes

and for the computation of wages due.
All Citations
108 Wis.2d 143, 321 N.W.2d 161
Footnotes
1 During the hearing it appeared that the police witnesses
gauged the enormity of the accused officers' offense by the
response of the police department as a result of Richard Quade's
misuse of a police department code. The fact that
many officers and a large amount of equipment of the
Milwaukee Police Department were diverted from useful duties
can hardly be blamed on either Gail Quade or Oddsen. It may
well be that the police department felt impelled, because
of the publicity that ensued as the result of Richard Quade's
call, to bring charges. The public relations aspect of these
proceedings is apparent in the board hearings. E.g., although it
was acknowledged that Oddsen was an outstanding
officer, the board concluded that his usefulness was impaired
because of “media” attention. Also, Gail Quade was judged,
not solely on her conduct, but because it appeared to the board
that her conduct cast discredit upon their attempts to
have more women on the force. In respect to both officers,
blame was assessed for reasons extraneous to the conduct.
2 The right to interrogate a police officer is limited to
“questions specifically, directly, and narrowly relating to the
performance of his official duties ... within the scope of the
specific duties ....” Spevack v. Klein, 385 U.S. 511, 519, 87
S.Ct. 625, 630, 17 L.Ed.2d 574 (1967), Fortas concurring.
3 As pointed out, supra, the chief of police in his notice of
discharge sent to the Board of Fire and Police Commissioners
referred to the conduct as adultery and cited the criminal law.

Sec. 944.16, Stats.
4 The legislature has provided by sec. 164.02, Stats., effective
in 1980, that, in cities of the first class, where there has
been a request by a law enforcement officer for representation
during interrogation and that request is denied, evidence
obtained cannot be used in a subsequent disciplinary
proceeding. While this statute was not in effect at the time of
the
interrogation of Quade and Oddsen, it reflects the rationale we
use here—that the failure to provide representation during
a coerced interrogation is a factor in the determination of
involuntariness.
End of Document © 2018 Thomson Reuters. No claim to
original U.S. Government Works.
&contextData=(sc.UserEnteredCitation)#co_pp_6a62000089fb7

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