1. HECUA Northern
Ireland
Spring 2016
Submitted 11 May,
2016
“Taking Up the Gun”: Violence, Masculinity, and Paramilitarism in Northern Ireland and
Beyond
Ezra Coopersmith, Colorado College
Mosea Esaias, Swarthmore College
Sachin Mathur, Colorado College
A submission for the Prize on War, Violence, & Human Values, May 2017

2. Submission for the Prize on War, Violence, & Human Values Abstract
We would like to submit our research on why young men in Northern Ireland and
beyond choose to engage with armed groups for the Prize on War, Violence, & Human
Values. This report was written in May 2016 in Derry, Northern Ireland by Sachin
Mathur ’17, Ezra Coopersmith ’17, and Mosea Esais ’17 (from Swarthmore College), and
was advised by Nigel Glenny from the University of Ulster. The reason we would like to
submit this for the prize is because it speaks to how direct violence can drastically alter
the course for all caught within its atmosphere; many of the people whom we met with in
Northern Ireland consistently told us stories about how life in both the Troubles and post-
peace agreement has still had a lasting effect on their lives. This is especially true with
young men in Northern Ireland, especially in low-income urban areas, who are still
highly vulnerable to recruitment in paramilitary groups. We ask the readers of this report
please also refer to our Epilogue at the end of the report for the full explanation of not
only the importance of this research, but why it applies to us as young and male liberal
arts students. Thank you to the readers for considering our submission, and to all those
who read this report with the interest in peace in Northern Ireland and beyond.

3. In the Ulster Cycle of Irish mythology, Cú Chulainn, the Hound of Ulster, a
legendary warrior, young and proud, defended the province against the invading forces of
Connaught. Despite his courage and venerable abilities as a fighter, Cú Chulainn perishes
in the face of overwhelming odds defending his home. According to legend, Cú Chulainn
tied himself to a stone pillar in order to stay on his feet, fighting until the very end.
Whether or not he truly existed, Cú Chulainn continues to live in some innermost
part of the Northern Irish zeitgeist. For better or worse, the lessons and notions of Cú
Chulainn’s story – those of sacrifice, of defending one’s home, and of steadfast manliness
in the face of insurmountable and deadly odds – are honored to this day, on both sides of
the conflict. In loyalist neighborhoods of Belfast, Cú Chulainn’s image– sometimes still
tethered to that stone – is joined by the Red Hand of Ulster, Union Jacks, gunmen, and
paramilitary insignias. His likeness is also found in a republic context, alongside a Celtic
cross and fighters from the 1916 Easter Rising. To republicans, Cú Chulainn may
represent fighting for what is right and noble in the face of death. To loyalists, Cú
Chulainn drew the line in the sand against territorial ambitions from the rest of Ireland
(Whose Cú Chulainn?).
The fact that Cú Chulainn navigated the minds of men – paramilitary men –
during the Troubles speaks to the intersections between notions of sacrifice, violence, and
masculinity that underpin why young men may feel compelled to engage with
paramilitary organizations. What factors in a young man’s life compel him to join a
paramilitary organization? It is perhaps somewhat paradoxical that during times of chaos
and conflict, such as the Troubles, this question could be answered with perhaps greater
clarity – men may have felt their neighborhoods, loved ones, and livelihoods were under
siege and sought to embody the role of protectors. The greater puzzle is why young men
may seek to join paramilitary organizations post-peace agreement. This discussion will

4. attempt to contribute to that question by examining issues related to masculinity, urban
poverty, and paramilitary culture and how they coalesce to have made paramilitaries
attractive in the past and present. This will open up other questions, including what peace
may offer young men, in terms of masculine roles they are expected to perform.
While Northern Ireland is certainly an insightful case study into why young men
choose to engage with paramilitary organizations – legal or illegal -- it is not alone.
Countries around the globe struggle with the multitude of problems that arise when
young men decide to further engage in armed conflict. In the United States, we must
acknowledge our own struggle with young men choosing to engage with violent
organizations, including our own police forces, who have cultivated hypermasculinity to
a point where violent and racist behavior has finally come to forefront of the discussion
regarding our own country’s security forces. This paper will discuss why particularly
young men are prone to join paramilitaries. It will then discuss what motivations for
those young men tend to be. In concluding our discussion, we will attempt to see if there
lay any correlating evidence, anecdotes, or characterizations between paramilitary
recruitment and hegemonic masculinity in Northern Ireland, Palestine, and the United
States, followed by possible peace solutions that have been researched in Colombia,
another nation that has had to face paramilitarism.
Why do young men join paramilitaries?
We must first confront the unexplained reality that, as Harlan summarizes,
“violence and paramilitary influence underpin violent male youth subculture” (2011:
417). This statement brings attention to the complex relationship between young male
masculinity and violence in Northern Ireland. Why do young, often disadvantaged males
in particular, join paramilitaries?

5. First, virtually all existing data indicate that primarily young men engage with
paramilitaries and behave violently. Across all ages, the number of men killed or injured
during the Troubles far outweighs the corresponding figure for women. Within the age
groups of 10-14, 15-19, 20-24, and 25-29, males accounted for 69%, 89%, 94%, and
94%, respectively, of deaths (Reilly, Muldoon, & Byrne, 2004: 469). “From early life,”
Reilly, Muldoon, and Byrne note (2004), “males report higher levels of violent conflict-
related experiences than females” (469). Statistically, the men associated with this
violence tended to be young, too. For example, in addition to the fact that 91% of those
killed by paramilitary groups between 1969 and 2011 were male, a disproportionate 31%
were males between 17 and 24 years of age (Harlan, 2011: 417). There exists scholarly
consensus, too, that young men of poor and working class backgrounds in particular are
and were most likely to engage with paramilitary groups. “Young men from
disadvantaged communities throughout Northern Ireland have always been a prime target
for paramilitary membership,” summarizes Harlan (2011). “Conversely, paramilitary
membership has been a potentially attractive option for marginalized young men living in
areas of deprivation” (428).
Aside from the question of what motivates these young men to “take up the gun,”
the question of what connects this demographic to violence more than others still
remains. While no clear explanation has been constructed, existing literature identifies
elements of Northern Irish society such as masculinity and the role of paramilitary groups
in communities as potential factors, which provide young men with pathways to elevated
status and defined group roles. Political motives aside, these explanations provide insight
into why young males from deprived backgrounds see more opportunity in paramilitary
violence than do other groups.

6. Masculinity and violence
Through qualitative analysis, researchers have found associations between
expectations of masculinity and violent youth culture in Northern Ireland (Harland, 2011;
Harland & Ashe, 2014; Reilly, Muldoon, and Byrne, 2004). Of the sample of 130 young
men between the ages of 13 to 16, from 20 communities across Northern Ireland
interviewed during a 2011 study on youth violence and peacebuilding, Ken Harlan
writes: “These young males believed they were expressing an important aspect of what it
means to be a man—they need to be tough. This often led to them resorting to violence to
sort out issues that separated them from their internal world of feelings and emotions”
(Harlan, 2011: 417).
Other empirical analysis, such as the interviews carried out by Reilly, Muldoon,
and Byrne (2004), report a similar sentiment—that young men in depraved communities
experience inescapable violence, and that this experience shapes a social expectation for
young men to behave violently (476). “The young men in this study actively valued and
strove to develop an identity that incorporates both a personal capacity for and a tacit
acceptance of violence. This both reflects and reproduces a form of masculinity in which
violence is virtually compulsory,” the team concludes (481). Thus in many Northern Irish
communities, violence represents an essential characteristic of what “being a man” means
for youths.
Interviewees cited violent role models in sports, media, and video games, as well
as in their own communities and even families, as major influences on their
understanding of masculinity (Reilly, Muldoon, & Byrne, 2004: 476). Others expressed
the understanding that violence was simply a part of masculinity. “There were frequent
references to biological and reductionist explanations for male violence such as nature,
hormones, ‘survival of the fittest,’ and instincts, as well as to social expectations,” Reilly,

7. Muldoon, and Byrne write (2004: 474). The research team also identify thrill-seeking,
lack of parental supervision, and the excitement of inter-community conflict themselves
as factors that contribute to the expectation of violence among young men (470).
Today, another message young men receive is that of confusion surrounding the
peace process and the role of paramilitaries in their communities. Particularly where
political violence has been the most acute, many men grow up with role models who
previously engaged in violence or were involved in paramilitary groups (Muldoon et al.,
2008: 691), despite the ceasefires of the late 1990’s. These “’mixed messages,’” argues
Harlan, “serve to further confuse young men’s understanding of whether their society is
at peace or preparing for war” (Harlan, 2011: 428). Perhaps for this reason, many young
people in communities with a strong paramilitary presence display a strong desire to offer
value judgments of paramilitarism, by “taking a stand” either for or against them
(Muldoon et al., 692).
Status and Identity
Reilly, Muldoon, and Byrne’s (2004) interviewees also expressed the
understanding that displaying masculinity through violence often provided them with
more tangible societal benefits than simply excitement or emotional satisfaction—many
identified violence as a way to gain status and defined roles within their communities.
Interviewees described how young men in their communities were expected to “grow out
of” their capacity for violent behavior, once they had demonstrated it was there and
society perceived them as fully adult men. (Reilly, Muldoon, & Byrne, 2004: 476).
“”Paramilitary members were...perceived as having status and may, thus, represent potent
role models for some young people anxious for status and respect in their community,”
conclude Muldoon et al. (2008: 691).

8. Reilly, Muldoon, and Byrne also found that fulfilling violent expectations of
masculinity affirmed a sense of identity for many young males. Young men who had the
most experience with violence in their communities were found to be the most committed
to their group identity and ideologies. The researchers point to a desire for peer approval,
which young men in particular seek, as a reason many interviewees sought out violent
behavior (Reilly, Muldoon, & Byrne, 2008: 471). On a group level, Muldoon et al.,
(2008) find that young people perceive individuals’ paramilitary activism to bolster
community identity in relation to other communities (691). This elevates that individual’s
status as a prominent community member.
Finally, young men describe a cost-benefit analysis, during which they engage in
a rational decision-making process:
There was much discussion in all groups around the perceived benefits for a
young man of maintaining a social identity that suggests at least the capacity to
behave violently. Once achieved, it was acknowledged that such an identity was a
double-edged sword in that it could elicit or prevent violent behavior from others,
depending on context (Reilly, Muldoon, 447).
For many disadvantaged young males, violent conceptions of masculinity are ingrained in
their communities. And as a result, more so than any other demographic group, these
young people see opportunities in joining paramilitary groups, such as the acquisition of
status (Muldoon et al., 2008: 693-694). However, beyond the role of masculinity, other
cultural, political and social factors capture important aspects of why young men join
paramilitary organizations.
Why do young men join paramilitaries?
Cultural, Political and Social Factors
Past research on the causes of joining paramilitary groups has focused on
individualistic explanations such a mental disorder and sociopathy. (Ferguson et al 2008:

9. 132) These explanations cast paramilitary members as problematic “others” and other
members of society as “normal”. They fail to capture the cultural, political and social
conditions that allow paramilitarism to exist. And most importantly, by casting
paramilitary members as different and exceptional, they fail to acknowledge the extent to
which paramilitarism and violence can affect even “ordinary” citizens. While
conscription in a paramilitary organization is usually a deliberate decision, a number of
factors can influence this decision. According to Ferguson, these factors include: (a) the
existence of a grievance; (b) age and gender; (c) previous familial involvement and/or
support; (d) Community support or social capital associated with paramilitarism; (e)
Coercion; (f) “Eventual membership as the result of an incremental process of increasing
acts of insurgence”; (g) vengeance; (h) the presence of a paramilitary organization which
seeks the member of the individual (2008: 133). We argue that understanding social and
cultural factors such as these provides more insight into paramilitary membership than
the tired individual explanations explored by past research.
The “critical incident”
Research on paramilitary membership identifies the occurrence of a “critical
incident” as one of the most significant factors that influence individuals to join
paramilitary groups. These “critical incidents” generally involve “a notable example of
unjust victimization at the hands of an outgroup.” Examples include but are not limited
to attacks on an individual, their family, or their community. (Ferguson et al 2008: 133)
The effect critical incidents have on an individual’s psyche is distinct from vengeance,
due to the deliberative nature of the actions they inspire; critical incidents do not cause
individuals to “mindlessly respond to events”. Rather, these incidents spark a period of
reflection, causing individuals to make the decision to join a paramilitary organization. It

10. is critical to note this distinction because failure to do so would be to simplify the
complex relationships between individuals and their paramilitary activity. Paramilitary
activity is not merely the result of a “stimulus-response relationship”. (2008: 134) It is
important to continue to explore and understand how these critical incidents affect
paramilitary membership, because they may occur often and indiscriminately during
violent conflict.
Now that Northern Ireland has reached a relative (negative) peace following the
Belfast Agreement, we can expect fewer people to experience “critical incidents” and
find the motivation to join paramilitary groups. However, peace brings its own challenges
too. (Burgess et al. 2007: 70) For example, even after the Belfast Agreement, sectarian
communities still promote a strong sense of shared identity. These identities are upheld
by socially meaningful symbols such as flags, murals and colors, which in only the recent
past would often validate violent behavior. Murals, too, communicate violent and
sectarian messages, especially to the younger members a community. (2007: 71)
Furthermore, research indicates that personal relationships, such as family relationships,
are and have been important factors in supporting paramilitary membership. (Ferguson et
al. 2008: 132) Many of the social connections that existed during the Troubles still
persist in communities today; especially family relationships, as one might imagine.
Communities played an important role in supporting paramilitary movements financially,
ideologically, and in other ways during the Troubles. (Burgess et al. 2007: 71-72) Yet
those communities did not disappear after the signing of the Belfast Agreement, and
neither did their identities. They continue to play an important role today, particularly in
the lives of young people.
Politics

11. Politics have also played a role in paramilitary group membership--although for
some paramilitary groups this role was minor. Bruce (2001) argues that loyalist Gusty
Spence struggled to maintain influence over the majority of Ulster Volunteer Force
(UVF) members, mainly due to his political approach to leadership. Bruce writes: “Some
people joined the UVF to defend the state. Others joined because they wanted revenge.
Some simply wanted the thrills. Nobody joined for politics lessons.” Further, according
to one member of the UVF, the organization lacked any cohesive political goal at all.
(2001: 28)
Yet others became involved in paramilitary activity out of the belief that it would
bring attention to their political agenda. Says one ex-paramilitary member, “[the Belfast
Agreement] is a direct result of a lot of violent action as well as the more peaceful action.
As far as the London government was concerned, I am damn sure it was the violence,
particularly the violence in London, that made them sit up and say, ‘hey, we better do
something about this.’” (Burgess et al. 2007: 75) Individuals like this paramilitary
member believed that violence represented an acceptable (and objectively effective)
method of achieving political goals.
Furthermore, during the troubles, many loyalists believed that they had the most
to lose if the state was forced to compromise or give concessions. Therefore, loyalist
paramilitaries sought to eliminate threats to the state in ways that the state legally could
not (or would not). (Silke 1999: 2) This ideology represents a motivation that is
inherently political in its nature. From it, we may also reasonably expect that if loyalist
communities feel the state is under threat at some point in the future, membership in
loyalist paramilitaries might be understood as politically legitimate in certain
communities. In the same way that sectarian communities and ideologies did not
disappear after the signing of the Belfast Agreement, neither did political ambitions and

12. goals. Thus, the use of para-militaristic violence as a method of promoting political
priorities remains a possibility, particularly if members of loyalists or republican
communities feel that their interests are under threat.
Comparisons
This section does not seek to fully compare and contrast what motivates young
men in Northern Ireland to join paramilitaries with the motivations of women and men in
Northern Ireland and elsewhere, but instead highlights some crucial similarities and
differences that merits further investigation.
When considering how paramilitaries attract young people, two broader
comparative questions arise: 1) what are the differences and similarities between why
young men and why young women decide to engage with paramilitary groups, and 2) can
we identify broader patterns in why people join paramilitary, terrorist, or other violent
organizations in other countries?
Women & Paramilitary Involvement
With respect to women who joined paramilitary organizations in Northern
Ireland, clearly research on the associations between male aggression and violence are of
little explanatory value. Further, in the milieu of violence and chaos that conflict can
bring, researchers may side-step gender comparisons and analyses in favor of more
pressing matters related to conflict studies, academic or otherwise. Denov and Gervais
(2007) note a “misleading binary” within the characterizations of the experiences and
roles of women and men during conflict; according to this binary, men are the agents of
war, violence, and aggression, while women are often characterized as “victims,
peacemakers, wives, and mothers, or as appendages to males who are regarded as the true

13. participants in war” (885). Whereas men are considered the enforcers of security, women
are at the mercy of that security.
However, as the paramilitary enlistment of women in Northern Ireland and
beyond suggests, female engagement with violence does indeed occur. This reality forces
women to navigate “contradictory” and “multidimensional” roles in relation to the
violence they experience as victims, observers, and perpetrators. Because women
experience security within such a highly gendered context, we are forced to ask: does this
experience prompt separate, gendered motivations for women to engage with
paramilitaries? In a Northern Irish context, Alison (2004) notes:
In Northern Ireland, republican paramilitary women reported a similar variety of
motivating factors, such as political commitment to republicanism/Irish
nationalism (occasionally with a long family history of republican conviction);
community experiences of discrimination and injustice; harassment and violence
from the security forces; experiences of family members having been injured,
killed, harassed or imprisoned; the impact of the civil rights movement; and the
impact of the prison protests and hunger strikes. In respect to loyalist
paramilitary women, who have been much less heavily involved in political
violence than republican women, it seems that a great many (though certainly not
all) of those who did engage in some form of paramilitary activity were
introduced to this through male family members, usually husbands. However
these women still stressed that not all loyalist women would support their
husbands in such activity – they themselves also had to have conviction in the
justness of such actions, and most rationalised this in terms of defence of their
families and wider communities (4).
In this brief overview of female paramilitarism in Northern Ireland, we can
identify many motivating factors that are similar to the motivations men describe: the
“critical incident”, intergenerational involvement, vengeance for the harm done to a loved
one, and the exposure to, or harboring of, the pain felt by one’s community. Thus despite
the “misleading binary” often used to characterize women’s experiences with
paramilitaries, women describe “joining up” for generally the same reasons as men.
However, it is worth noting a key point (maybe intentionally) missing in Alison’s
treatment, which is perhaps crucial to understanding the motivation of women versus

14. men is that for women, the traditionally male desire to be honored for one’s sacrifice and
role as a protector (a la Cú Chulainn) appears absent. (This is not to say that desire for
glory does not exist within the psyche of female paramilitaries – a patriarchal and sexist
paramilitary leadership may be very well responsible for repressing women receiving
credit for paramilitary deeds).
Men, especially in loyalist paramilitaries, often received far more respect and
social capital than their female counterparts, which speaks to the glorified and
traditionally masculine roles men sought as fighters and defenders. These traditionally
masculine roles held greater social value than the more discreet and complex roles
women played (Denov & Gervais, 2007, p. 886). Many women ran guns or filled other
vital support roles that perhaps male paramilitaries, whose roles were often informed by a
sense of masculine aggression and protectiveness, valued less. This “strongly gendered
division of labor” in early republican organizations – and consistently in loyalist ones –
leaves the question of whether there exists a “female equivalent” of the macho Cú
Chulainn-complex that drove many men to join paramilitary organizations and assume
the roles they did (Alison 2004, pg. 5).
Young Men In Other Countries - Palestine, Colombia, and the United States
“[They] killed my niece last summer. Now I want to kill them.” These words -- a
young man speaking candidly about his ‘critical incident’ -- could have been spoken in a
seemingly endless number of conflict societies around the world, including Northern
Ireland, Sri Lanka, Sierra Leone, and so on. In this case, they were belonged to a 14-year
old Palestinian boy named Hatem, whose niece was killed by who he only referred to as
“the Israelis” (Traumatized by war, 2015). Hatem went on to graduate from one of
Hamas’ training camps, where he learned military tactics such as how to use light and

15. heavy weapons, and how to ambush the enemy. That week, Hatem was among 17,000
youths to engage in a Hamas recruiting camp. In Palestine, young men have engaged in a
form of spatial negotiation that requires them to reconcile the everyday violence they are
exposed to with their understandings of masculine roles and religious -- as well as a
political – traditions. In her interaction with a young Qassam soldier named Mohammed,
Malmström (2015) notes:
In the case of Mohammed, he had done what was expected of him by the local
community, as a man, as a freedom fighter, and not least as a national hero. He
was held in great respect in his neighbourhood, not only by Hamas members, but
also by political actors living in other parts of the West Bank (303).
Malmström underscores the substantial social capital Mohammed has received,
which is rooted in the ongoing violence many young Palestinian men experience in their
lifetimes. Mohammed faces a reconciliation between his mind (inundated with opinions
and information about the Palestinian cause, Israeli propaganda, pro-violence
declarations being made in Palestine, as well as religious discourse) and his body (the
desire to act on available information, and the ongoing exposure to violence). Palestinian
men who grow up exposed to violence--quite similarly to young men in Northern
Ireland–are often compelled, if not forced, to conduct their minds and bodies in
masculine ways. This urges them to consider taking violent measures, which may bring
greater social capital in the future, such as joining paramilitaries such as the Irish
Republican Army, the Ulster Volunteer Force, or Hamas. Further, Palestine, a country
that has repeatedly been bombed on-and-off since its occupation, may present young
people with the same “mixed-messages” Harlan (2011: 428) notes, offering a confusing
narrative about whether their society is “at war” or “in peace”. Masculinity in the
Palestinian-Irish connection is then, in many ways, ‘porous’, where the agency of young

16. men is often substantially restricted and controlled due to circumstances of politics,
poverty, and exposure to direct violence (Malström 2015).
It is important to acknowledge that while masculinity certainly plays a substantial
role in the paramilitarism of conflict societies, hegemonic masculinity plays a role in
perhaps any organization that practices direct violence – unlawful or lawful, “at peace” or
“at war”. In the United States, policing has come under scrutiny as a vehicle between
hegemonic masculinity and the use of zealous (and overzealous) force. Rather than
exposure to violence from a young age that socializes men into idolizing and eventually
joining paramilitaries composed of “hard men”, policing, through its education and
subsequent practice, seeks to encourage male police academy recruits to cultivate
hypermasculine attitudes and insecurities within their work. As Prokos and Padavic
(2002) note:
Hegemonic masculinity is a central defining concept in the culture of police work
in the United States. Male police officers have drawn on images of a 'masculine
cop' to enhance their sense of masculinity and to resist women's growing
presence (Martin and Jurik, 1996). Hunt (1984, 1990) contended that the
policeman's symbolic world is one of opposing qualities directly related to
gender. Male officers equate women with feminine moral virtue, the domestic
realm, social service, formal rules, administration, cleanliness, and emotions. In
contrast, they equate men and masculinity with guns, crime fighting, a combative
personality, resistance to management, fights, weapons, and a desire to work in
high crime areas (Hunt, 1990) (442).
While paramilitaries sought to embody hegemonic masculinity to challenge
authority that they believed had marginalized them, American police instead use
hegemonic masculinity to carry out their own vision of authority. This becomes
problematic in many ways; most observed lately, of course, is the highly racist and
violent behavior of the police towards minority communities in the United States,
particularly the African-American community. One could wonder how much more trust
there would be within American racial minority communities, without such police

17. brutality – a direct byproduct of the aggression and disregard for good conduct that stems
from hegemonic masculinity. The case of American police forces go to show that while
many forces in a young man’s life can be compelling to why he would engage with a
violent organization, hegemonic masculinity remains a compelling exacerbating variable
in the use of violence, whether a society is “at war” or “at peace”.
Conclusions
The Hill, an American political newspaper, published an article: “What drives
people to turn to violent extremism”, in regards to the Islamic State terror organization.
Their answer (Greenberg 2016):
…perceptions of marginalization, discrimination and injustice, exposure to
violence, and the absence of formal channels to redress grievances and hold the
perpetrators of injustice and abuse accountable.
Eerily familiar? Indeed so. The problem of young men continuously choosing to
engage with violent organizations, while highly relevant to Northern Ireland, is a
universal problem, whether that society is at war or peace, or both at the same time; in
some post-peace agreement societies, while there has been disarmament on a large scale,
many young men still feel as if their community is still under siege or at war, leaving in
place informed roles of masculinity that encourage violent organization and behavior.
And so, what can be done about masculine links to paramilitarism after a peace
agreement has been put in place?
One approach, as proposed in post-conflict Colombia, is that masculinity must be
also be approached in a “demilitarized” way, in the same way that other aspects of
society are disarmed, disarmed, and demilitarized during wartime (Theidon 2009). As
previously mentioned, during periods of intense conflict, gender studies is often
neglected in lieu of what may be considered more “relevant” pursuits, yet understanding

18. how male identity is constructed could be a key aspect in the de-escalation of violence.
As Theidon says, “what is constructed can be transformed” (34). To undo constructed
hegemonic masculinity -- in Colombia, Northern Ireland, and perhaps anywhere else --
requires multitudes of engagement: (1) men who have either been in paramilitaries or
come from communities where there is a heavy paramilitary presence must be able to
engage on an economic, community, and family level, for such engagements not only
mark a use of time away from paramilitary activity, but also fulfill the male leitmotif of
being a protector and recognized in one’s community. (2) the role of women as
facilitators of hegemonic masculinity must also be treated; Theidon noted that in the
Colombian nucleos familiares she observed that had ex-combatants, many of the men sit
idly by and wait for food to be served, while the women, often simultaneously caring for
the child and performing other domestic tasks, cooks for him. (31). In order to erode such
clearly power-lopsided patriarchal standards of post-peace agreement family life, the role
of women, both as agents of their own lives, as well as how they fit into the puzzle of
hegemonic masculinity must be examined; for too long, it appears, the discourse of
gender and conflict has largely treated women simply as victims and dependents. This
must change during peacetime. (3) Within and across neighborhoods where male
paramilitarism dominates, disputes are often settled through violence, which in turn
perpetuates paramilitary enlistment and dominance. In turn, Theidon proposes “carving
out space to be a civilian and to act like one” (33), where the kangaroo courts and
pseudo-martial law that can persist through paramilitary-ruled neighborhoods that bolster
hegemonic masculinity can be ignored without fear of violent reprisal.
In our examination of paramilitaries, then, in order to address the multitudes of
reasons how and why hegemonic masculinity is constructed and leads to paramilitary

19. recruitment, transitional justice for post-peace agreement societies such as Colombia and
Northern Ireland must address how masculinity has been informed for young men, and
how it could be shaped within a peace-building framework. Further, how could these
masculinities be deconstructed to better service the common good in nations like
Palestine, where violent conflict seems to never end, or a place like the United States,
where under a façade of peacefulness exists a hegemonically masculine and racist male
subculture that has made certain minority communities hold them in greater contempt
than regard.
Cú Chulainn, even when tied that stone pillar, never really died in the hearts and
mind of Northern Ireland; in a way that is as ethereal as it is dangerous, his spirit lives on.
But, in the path towards peace, hopefully one day he -- like the young men of Northern
Ireland -- can instead be remembered for courage and sacrifice as a whole, and less
people will care for the war he -- and many young men today, all over the world -- still
feel compelled to wage.
Epilogue, May 2017
As of the writing of this epilogue, it has been approximately a full year since we
were last in Northern Ireland. In that year, amid a tumultuous election season in the
United States, we have had the opportunity to contemplate our lessons learned from
Northern Ireland and how we may apply them to the examined life, or the life worth
living. One lesson -- more relevant at this time, than any other point in our young lives –
is how we must bear in mind how easily our social fabric may become frayed along the
fault lines of identity and politics, and how if those fractures remain unresolved, violence
may flow past our best intentions, unchecked. We have already seen in flashpoints like

20. Washington, D.C., Berkeley, and Ferguson how feelings of marginalization can only let
the spiral of violence grow in intensity, and like a natural disaster, or an epidemic,
consume the lives and livelihoods of those who may have had the misfortune of standing
in its path. Our experience in Derry instilled in us how the spiral of direct violence has
the capacity to consume the lives of those in its way, bystanders and combatants alike.
Many liberal arts students have the opportunity to study why humans feel compelled to
use force, but the stories we were told, people who we met, and the work we conducted
served to educate us on a first-hand basis on just how explosive and corrosive violence
can be to human life. That understanding – of violence’s sheer capacity to destroy order
and our greatest hopes– was not lost on us in the composing of this report. And so, how
does this greater understanding apply to our pursuit of the examined life? In times of
conflict and violence, it was often demanded of young men – the same age as us – to
invest our lives in a cause, often as combatants. This was especially true in Northern
Ireland, and remains true today: many of our fellow young men – friends and family --
are on the front lines of violent protests and foreign wars. Their enemies and opponents,
too, are young men. It is then crucial to our living the examined life that we apply these
lessons how we may to the resolution of conflict and understanding in terms of identity.
The present is asking much of us as young people, and we must maintain with clarity of
mind that the cause of peace is crucial, not simply for our sake as young people, nor just
for the sake of our friends and loved ones, but also for the sake of those who we do not
know, and many of whom with which we have differences, political or otherwise.
In our minds, a life lived in pursuit of peace and greater understanding is then a
life worth living. We will, of course, never likely be the sole arbitrators of peace under
any circumstance; but a life where we do our best in pursuit of peace will be worth it. We

21. are not remiss of the fact that a life in pursuit of peace may be, at times, extremely
stressful and difficult, and that much will be demanded of our intellect, character, and
spirit, and that we will not always succeed. Yet we hope that we will not ask for a lighter
burden, but for broader shoulders. We hope our time in Northern Ireland and Colorado
College was the onset of an education necessary for a life committed to the cause of
peace, and thus, a life worth living.
Acknowledgments
This report is dedicated to the people of Derry and Northern Ireland, whose
stories they so kindly shared became integral to our greater understanding not just as
scholars, but also as global citizens. We would also like to thank Nigel Glenny, who we
cannot thank enough for his guidance, wisdom, and endless patience, as well as the
University of Ulster for lending us its spaces, resources, and faculty. We would also like
to thank the Higher Education Consortium for Urban Affairs and Colorado College for
helping us get to Europe in the first place, particularly Sally Piernot, Heather Brown, Kari
Pederson Behrends, Tom Cronin, the Colorado College Political Science department, and
the Swarthmore College Peace & Conflict Studies department. Finally, we would like to
thank our family and loved ones, for encouraging us to embark on this adventure, and for
constantly reminding us why we started.
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